{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. May 2012- The Inter-American Dialogue - “The United States,
¶
Latin America and
China:
¶
A “Triangular Relationship”?” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf
At the political level,
US engagement with Latin America n
¶
countries
has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop
¶
military and other ties in the region
. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese
¶
initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless,
Latin
America’s own leadership has
¶
responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with
China could damage its relationship with the United
¶
States
.
Colombia’s close relationship with the
United States
, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant
¶
to procure major military items from the PRC
.28
¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States.
The degree to which a “bad” relationship
¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism.
The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to
¶
diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United
¶
States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese
¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military
¶
hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after
¶
the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable
¶
aircraft from the Czech Republic.30
China’s influence in Latin America is key to their soft power
PhD in International Relations
Mohan, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America,"
6/12, http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/info@uyghuramerican.org)
China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive national power
" to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural resources and markets,
China is forging deep economic
, political and military ties with most of the Latin American
and Caribbean countries.
There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut.
China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American
and
Caribbean countries
. As in many other parts of the developing world,
China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower
. Beijing's courtship of Latin American countries to support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless, Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin America and the Caribbean countries, China is an enviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer,

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] economic partner, a great power friend and counterweight to the United States, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States, that needs to be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa,
China is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Latin America -
- a region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence.
China's interest in
Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the United States.
In Latin America, China is viewed differently in different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's staggering economic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of commodities and an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics fear losing jobs and investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia,
Cuba, and Venezuela). While China's growing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United
States as a primary benefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on the block that everyone wants to be friendly with, and
Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit resentment of
Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For Washington, China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline in its pursuit of global influence
. China's Grand
Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be identified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that is second to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regional and global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies;
Build a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's
"soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via closer economic integration
(free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms sales.
(Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s
Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm)
As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty , international conflict , the clash of civilizations and environmental protection . Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas
. Poverty and development
The
Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries
. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means.
In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would i ndeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty
. War and peace
In the past few years, the
American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security
.
In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious".
It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism
. The clash of civilizations
Conflict between
Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying
. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?".
China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other
.
This

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] philosophy is,
in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument
. Environmental protection
Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases . Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model.
Perfecting the China model
The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger
. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is t he rise of China's political soft power
, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues
. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Patricia Rey, International Buisness Times “Latin America Increases Relations With China:
What Does That Mean For The US?” http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-chinawhat-does-mean-us-1317981 June 28]//Bmitch
As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global superpower, China is
gaining influence in its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of State John Kerry's unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now
positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its
attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. “[The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on America’s
list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void,” Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009,
China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached
$41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin
America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008.
Notably, though, America’s trade participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is
closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil. Concomitant with this burgeoning interest from the Far East, Latin
America is undergoing an economic rebirth. After decades of devastating economic crises, the region is
experiencing unprecedented growth: On average, annual GDP growth for Latin American countries will be 3.7 percent this year, according to United Nations estimates, almost double the average for the rest of the world. That has prompted several countries to form quasi-governmental entities to further promote the progress of the region. One such entity is the recently formed Pacific Alliance. Born with the specific goal of increasing relations with Asia, its members include Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which together represent half of the region’s total exports and 35 percent of its GDP. In a meeting in
Colombian capital Bogotá last month, the Pacific Alliance signed an agreement to open its member countries' economies to Asian markets; the U.S., despite an invitation, did not attend. Though a recent trip to the region by Vice President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, China’s
President Xi Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin American leaders, illustrating
how the two global powers are going after the same prize. Biden traveled to Colombia, Trinidad and
Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip coinciding with the beginning of Xi’s in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met with several Latin American presidents and
discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of their trips were very different, however. Xi’s trip was the first visit from a Chinese official to the region in almost a decade. Trinidad and Tobago’s main
newspaper, Newsday, called the visit a “historic occasion” and a “visit from China to a good friend.”
Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to boosting relations with China and accepted an invitation to Beijing for November of this year. In Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main ally in the region. Costa Rica is the only

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute and does not recognize the island as a nation. Even more significant was Xi’s visit to Mexico. President Enrique Peña
Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. Biden’s visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was
called “brutal and tense” by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrés Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America “Washington’s backyard” in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogotá, no agreements
were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development in China’s investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to allow a Chinese company to build a canal through the
country. Although still in the proposal stages, the project would bring profound change to the
geopolitics of the region -- and even the world. If built, the canal could significantly affect commerce
through the Panama Canal, which, though it is now part of Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and
remains a symbol of the nation's historical dominance in the region. That dominance is in decline.
After decades of uncontested U.S. influence in the region, some Latin American leaders have started
making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the late Venezuelan Comandante Hugo
Chávez, who was very vocal about his disdain for the U.S., but he is far from the only one. Bolivia's
President Evo Morales, for instance, kicked out USAID after Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban Coca-Cola from the country. But now it's Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to Ecuador granting entry to NSA-secrets leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that they would welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free man," no matter what the U.S. said. Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade agreement, which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail." Beyond the lack of understanding with its former main trade partner, why is Latin America so smitten with China? Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international relations at Boston University, says China speaks to the region’s newfound confidence. “China is offering attractive deals to Latin American economies while the United States
continues to lecture and dictate,” Gallagher wrote for The Globalist. “For too long, the United States
has relied on a rather imperial mechanism, just telling Latin America what it needs,” he added.
“Compare that to China’s approach: It offers Latin America what it wants.” Gallagher argued that the
U.S.’ biggest offer to Latin America is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its
conditions. China, on the other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America than the
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since
2003, with no previous conditions and very few strings attached. “Latin America is very sensitive to any
notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank,” Gallagher said. “China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities.” Gallagher said the U.S. should
awake from its past slumber and stop taking Latin America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in the region does not automatically equate with
American loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent in the same period), and America continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area. Perhaps even more crucial are America's cultural and historical ties to the region, Ben-Ami said. “Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the U.S., it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China,” he said. Still, Gallagher and Ben-Ami agree that the U.S. needs to step up, both economically and diplomatically, to compete with new influences in a part of the world that was until recently widely considered America’s

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] domain. “Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure U.S.
influence -- in Latin America or anywhere else,” Ben-Ami said. “It is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America,” Gallagher observed. “Very soon, it might be too late.”
Latino News Today “China and Latin America Begin Courting Mutual Trade” http://latinonewstoday.com/china-and-latin-americabegin-courting-mutual-trade/ June]//BMITCH
Chinese President Xi
Jinping
recently met with President Obama in California. It was ignored in the minds of many that the main focus
of his trip may have been his journey through Latin America
. He made stops in Costa Rica, Trinidad and
Mexico. The Trinidad meeting was especially significant. There, he met with the leaders of nine Caribbean countries and advanced them almost
$4 billion in development loans. The fact that the meeting with President Obama was held in California instead of Washington, D. C. may have hidden significance. Traveling to Costa Rica, he extended them a $900 million dollar line of credit that may be used to modernize an oil refinery.
In Mexico City, Xi offered help to reduce Mexico’s trade deficit with China, which was about $51 billion dollars last year. Xi committed Chinese citizens to eating more Mexican pork and drinking more tequila. Consistent with China’s desire for oil, they extended a $1 billion line of credit to Pemex, the Mexican state-owned oil company. Brazil and Chile are already in the midst of a trade boom with China, which has a ravenous appetite for their copper, iron ore and soybeans. Brazilian trade with China already surpasses trade with the U. S.
China’s economy has an astronomical
growth rate that exceeded 10 percent in six of the last 10 years.
This has given them the resources and confidence to exert worldwide economic influence. They have taken the position as the world’s second-largest economy, displacing Japan.
China’s trade with Latin America is only about one-third the size of the U.S. trade
with Latin America, but trade with China is growing at a faster rate
. In the past 12 years,
Chinese trade with the region has increased
from almost nothing to $260 billion annually.
This bodes ill for American economic supremacy in the region. Latin America is an area of emerging economies,
notably Chile and Brazil.
This means many customers for Chinese products.
The region has abundant natural resources that are needed by both China and the U.S.
Starting with the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has historically considered Latin America within their sphere of influence
. They have intervened militarily in several Latin American countries for various reasons. There is undoubtedly lingering ill will from these interventions. To this day, the U.S. combines policy with trade
. The Monroe Doctrine was designed to thwart the territorial desires of European powers in Central and South America.
It is impotent in relation to the
Chinese economic invasion.
In a ChinaDaily.com article, Boston University Professor Kevin P. Gallagher shows the extent of the
Chinese economic excursion into Latin America. He speaks about the financing offered on Xi’s recent tour of Latin America. “Making available this financing comes on top of the already $86 billion in financing provided by China to Latin American governments since 2003. Granted, that the amount – large as it sounds – seems just like another number in today’s world. To put it into proper perspective, consider this: Since 2003,
China’s policy banks have provided more finance to Latin American countries than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank and the US Export-Import Bank.”
Gallagher states that China attaches few conditions to their economic aid. In contrast, the U.S. demands many conditions and economic reforms. This places the
U.S. at a huge disadvantage
. This Chinese strategy is a great success in Africa. China obtains much raw material from Africa, and over one million Chinese now reside there.
The U.S. has a habit of taking its southern neighbors for granted. This economic competition with China for trade with the region may bring forth a new era of mutual respect and cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America that will benefit the interests of both.
[Xiangming Chen has since 2007 been the founding Dean and Director of the
Center for Urban and Global Studies and Paul Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies and Sociology at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut and Distinguished Guest Professor in the School of Social Development and Public Policy at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. He has published extensively on urbanization in and globalization of China. His most recent book is Introduction to Cities:
How Place and Space Shape Human Experience (with Anthony Orum and Krista Paulsen, Wiley-

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Blackwell, 2012). Kayla Chen is currently an intern at VOX Global, a public affairs and strategic communications consulting firm headquartered in Washington DC. She graduated from Colby College in
2012 with a BA in Global Studies with concentrations in Latin America and Development Policy, and a minor in East Asian Studies. “China And Latin America: Connected And Competing – Analysis” http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-and-latin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/
June]//BMitch
The rise of China has stolen more headlines than any other global issue these days
, stirring up questions about what China’s growing prominence really means, and how – more than why – it affects the world. While the rise of previous global powers took decades, if not centuries,
China’s rise has been
spectacularly fast and furious, considering the tremendous economic prowess
it has gained over a relatively short period of time. Accounting for approximately 2 percent of the world’s total GDP around 1980, China holds almost 15 percent of world GDP in purchasing power parity today. From a longer historical perspective, however,
China has yet to regain its dominant status in the world economy back in 1840 when it accounted for about a third of world GDP – the largest among all countries at the time – before its protracted economic decline in the aftermath of the two Opium Wars.
As China’s share of the world economy has grown larger, its integration with global trade has also accelerated
. According to the Chinese government’s statistics,1 China’s share of global trade rose from 4.7 percent in 2002 to 10.2 percent in 2011, with its export share of the global total growing from 5 percent to 10.4 percent. This rapid ascent has moved China from fourth to first on the list of top trading nations. With an annual growth rate of 21.8 percent since 2002, China moved up from being the sixth largest importer in 2002 to the second in
2009, and stayed there through 2012, only behind the United States.
Because China’s speed and intensity of economic growth and global integration over the last three decades is historically unprecedented, it is expected to encounter both concerns and competition from other emerging economies, mainly in Asia and Latin
America.
From Old Allies to New Partners Looking from the 1960s to the present, there has been both continuity and change in China’s relations and position with other developing countries. As a member of the old Third World camp,
China preached and practiced the ideology of socialist, independent development with very limited international trade. At the same time
, China provided development
assistance to a number of
African and
Latin American countries that shared that ideology, such as Tanzania and Chile, whose socialist government under Allende was the first in Latin America to recognize China in 1970
(although trade between the two countries began as early as 1961). Between 1970 and 1975, China put up $500 million to build the Tanzania-
Zambia Railway, the largest single foreign-aid project undertaken by China at the time. As part of this largely ideologically driven project, China invited hundreds of railroad engineers from both countries to Beijing for training. The irony at the time was that many of these engineers were the sons of government elites whom China treated as its “socialist brethren.”
Fast-forward to the first decade of the 21st century, and China has expanded its small and ideologically imbued presence into considerably larger and market-oriented developing economies in
Asia, Africa and
Latin America. China not only has expanded trade and investment ties with many of these economies, but also intensified efforts to target valuable commodities
like oil, gas, metals and minerals. While continuing to provide development assistance, often involving a larger amount of resources to poor developing countries,
China has become a more powerful trader and investor, with a voracious appetite for natural resources that are in short supply at home.
Relative to its interests in acquiring oil and gas in Central Asia and parts of Africa
, China’s economic relations with, and interests in, Latin America are more varied and complex. The Emerging China-Latin America Nexus Trade between China and Latin
American countries has grown exponentially
over the past decade.
Although Sino-Latin American trade continues to remain a relatively small share of their respective global trade, growth has exceeded many expectations
. From 2000 to 2009, annual trade between China and Latin American countries grew more than 1,200 percent, from
$10 billion to $130 billion, according to United Nations statistics.2
China has emerged as the largest export destination for Brazil, Chile and Peru and the second largest export destination for Argentina, Costa Rica and
Cuba. Overall trade with Latin America is mainly driven by China’s need to fuel its expanding economy and to feed its 1.34 billion people.
Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina – more than half of the Mercosur group – are tremendously resource-rich.
For example, agricultural and mining goods accounted for 83 percent of Latin American exports to
China between 2008 and 2009.3 Based on a recent World Bank assessment of China’s impact on Latin American economies, China’s growing demand for South America’s leading exports – copper, iron ore, oil and soybeans – has had an undeniably positive impact on the region’s export growth. Nonetheless, growth has been quite uneven across different countries in Latin America. The Andean and Southern Cone nations have reported increases ranging from 9 to 14 percent of their total exports, respectively. In the case of Central American products, China’s imports accounted for only 2 percent of Central America’s total exports in 2004.4
The composition of Latin America’s main exports to China – copper, iron ore, oil and soybeans – reflects China’s goal to strengthen its “strategic

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] partnerships” with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, due to the value of trade and their regional influence.
Economic ties between these countries and China have continued to deepen since China became
Chile’s largest export consumer
in 2007 and Brazil’s largest trading partner
in 2009.5
China’s rapid growth in trade and investment in Brazil has helped to fuel the Brazilian economy in a sluggish global market.
Yet, similar to the rest of the region, Brazil exports primarily raw commodities and imports manufactured goods from China. In 2009, 77 percent of Brazil’s exports to China consisted of raw materials, mainly iron ore, soybeans and soy oil, while industrial products made up only 23 percent.6 In 2011, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff remarked, “There is a misbalance on our relations with China. Brazil exports commodities and imports too many knick-knacks. I’m told that 80 percent of this year’s Carnival costumes came from China.”7 Argentina, which maintains a trade surplus with China, exported a total value of $5.15 billion to China in 2009.8 The surplus is mainly driven by its heavy export of soy products. Between 2000 and 2009, 55 percent of Argentina’s exports to China were soybeans, and another 23 percent soy oil.9 Argentina has also been a regional leader in forging investment and technological cooperation with China. The establishment of the Argentine-China debt swap in February 2009, worth $10.2 billion, was the first such deal in the region. China’s investment in private Argentine companies has also grown. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s purchase of a $3.1 billion interest in Argentina’s Bridas, and Sinopec’s $2.4 billion purchase of Occidental’s Argentine holdings put Argentina on par with Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela with respect to China’s investment deals in the region.10 Additional areas of cooperation between China and Argentina are evident in military and space. Argentina is one of only four Latin American countries to have purchased military vehicles from China, and one of the few countries to cooperate with China in space exploration. Argentina’s nuclear agency, CONEA, has also discussed joint projects with major Chinese telecommunications companies such as
Huawei and ZTE, which have a significant presence in Argentina.
China’s growing economic influence in Argentina and the region may become a concern to the receiving parties. However, it will have no real impact on the larger and more significant reality, which is that the Chinese and Latin American economies are already strongly connected, and will become even more so through this decade and beyond.
Competing from Afar China’s stronger economic ties with Latin America are generating concerns in some Latin American countries that the Asian superpower is quickly outcompeting them. In the short term though, China’s demand for raw materials helps to raise direct exports from Latin America
. Since
Latin American countries and China have different export structures, the former is not as threatened by China’s rapid market penetration as assumed, with the clear exception of Mexico. According to Kevin Gallagher, a specialist on international economic development, “Mexico is the only country in Latin America whose comparative advantage has been moving in the same direction as the comparative advantage of [India and
China],” and faces strong commercial competition.11 Interestingly though, the head-to-head economic competition between China and Mexico has shifted around to either’s favor in turns. Once upon a time, Mexico saw China as a seemingly unmatchable competitor in producing the same kinds of cheap manufactured goods at a fraction of the cost. Now, for the first time in a decade, Latin America’s second largest economy has become a credible challenger to China in manufacturing. According to figures from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database, Mexico accounted for 12.3 percent of all US non-oil imports in 2010. In 1999, prior to China’s emergence as the “world’s factory,” its share was just 10.6 percent.12 The result of this shifting landscape can seem counter-intuitive. Today, Chrysler is using Mexico as a base to supply some of its Fiat 500s to the Chinese market. To mark the company’s $500 million investment in Mexico last year, former president,
Felipe Calderon, remarked, “I think it is the first time that a Mexican vehicle, at least in recent times, is to be exported to China…we always thought it was going to be the other way around.”13 Other changes have taken place and paved the way for Mexico’s new important role as a global manufacturer. Its free trade agreements with 44 countries – more than twice as many as China, and four times as many as Brazil – have allowed companies based in Mexico to source external inputs, often duty-free. Another significant shift improving Mexico’s competitive status is China’s rising labor costs. For example, wages in southern China have gone up by 20 percent a year over the last four years, and up 14 percent annually in Shanghai from 2002 to 2009, relative to increases of 8 percent in the Philippines and only 1 percent in Mexico.14 As a result, Mexican wages, which were 2.4 times those of China in 2002, are 14 percent higher now, and will be lower than China’s faster rising wages in five more years.15 Mexico is clearly back in the game of labor-intensive competition with China. Competing from across the Pacific
Ocean for exports to the United States, China certainly does not have Mexico’s unique geographic advantage as a next-door neighbor.
According to Lorenza Martínez, Mexico’s Undersecretary of the Economies Ministry, it takes between 20 days and two months to ship goods from China to the United States, whereas Mexican goods can reach their cross-border destinations between two to seven days. This makes a huge difference in cost savings and inventory reduction as just-in-time manufacturing has become more popular with American companies, especially since the 2008 economic recession.16 Distance matters a great deal to the overall competition between China and Mexico for the
United States, their most important common market. However, it may not be sufficient to offset China’s greater advantages against Mexico in its volume of exports and its spread and depth of global supply chains. A Win-Win Prospect?
With strong economic ties to multiple Latin American countries and direct competition with Mexico, China has growing interests and stakes in the region today.
Does this create the impression of a hegemonic or even colonializing China, like that of the Old
World in Latin America? Challenging this perception, Jiang
Shixue
, an influential Chinese scholar on Latin America
, has portrayed the bilateral relationship as South-South cooperation
. He cites China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which constructed a school in the city of Talala, Peru as an example of China taking up local corporate social responsibility.17 One could also point to the generally favorable terms of trade for both sides and China’s absence of political intervention in Latin America as additional evidence for a mutually beneficial relationship. Against this larger picture, China-Mexico’s export competition seems to be an outlier. Moving forward, there may be some uncertainty in Sino-Latin American relations given the internal and external challenges surrounding China’s transition to more balanced and sustainable economic growth, a more egalitarian society and the development of a more consistent foreign policy. Potential slower economic growth will weaken China’s demand for commodities from Latin America and reduce the latter’s vulnerability to export price volatility, although it will experience a slowdown in export growth. Achieving higher levels of domestic consumption will lighten China’s burden

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] to compete with a country like Mexico for manufactured exports. If China can be convinced to be more flexible regarding territorial disputes
(e.g. the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands) and long-distance fishing off South America’s coast, then
China could be seen by Latin
American countries as the “soft power” on the peaceful rise that it claims.
(Mike, 6/6/13, “President Xi uses trip to increase China's influence,” http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/)//DR. H
When
Chinese President
Xi
Jinping's four-nation tour of the America s comes here Friday for a two-day summit with President Barack
Obama, area economists and economic development officials say China already will have taken fresh steps to bolster its economic influence in
nations such as Costa Rica,
Mexico
, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Xi took office in March and has used the trip to expand China's exports and relations:
• Friday, the Chinese leader met with Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar of the Caribbean Republic of Trinidad and Tobago — a nation rich in liquefied natural gas — where they announced they had discussed ways to cooperate in key areas of energy, minerals, infrastructure development, telecommunications and agriculture.
• Monday, Xi met Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla to discuss commercial and energy projects, including upgrading the Central American country's oil refineries and developing a free-trade zone.
•
Tuesday, in Mexico
, President Enrique Pena
Nieto
and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links. Mexican officials said while $
57 billion of Mexico's imports — 15% — came from China last year
, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion — 1.5% — to China.
"The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary
Anderson Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're putting their efforts there."
Last year,
China eclipsed the United States to become the world's biggest trading nation
, as measured by total exports and imports of goods (excluding services), according to figures both countries released earlier this year.
Chinese exports and imports reached $3.87 trillion last year, the Chinese customs administration reported. The U.S. exports and imports combined for $3.82 trillion in 2012, the Commerce Department said.
China's latest efforts to boost export markets in
places such as
Latin America
and Africa don't surprise Wes
Ahlgren
, chief operating officer for the Coachella Valley Economic Partnership in Palm Springs, Calif. Ahlgren has traveled to China and
Europe on trade missions to promote this area's renewable energy and clean technology opportunities.
During a recent conference call with U.S. state, trade and commerce officials
who were in Africa at the time,
Ahlgren said it was clear China has already made substantial investments in Latin America
and Africa, and
China continues to look for markets, resources and ways to expand its influence.
"Similarly, the U.S. foreign policy includes a large component of economic development, foreign military sales, direct investment, support for
NGOs (non-government organizations), etc.," Ahlgren said.
"Perhaps they are taking a page from our playbook and modeling it to their own vision."
At a time when the USA is under financial pressure and has had to cut aid internationally, China is opening its wallet.
"Because (China) is so rich with foreign currency and surplus, they are willing to make direct investments in these countries to improve their ties,"
Adibi said. "Whereas we have budgetary constraints."
Chinese officials announced last week they would loan Trinidad and Tobago $250 million to build a children's hospital, for instance.
During his visit to Costa Rica, the Chinese president signed an agreement to grant Costa Rica a $400 million line of credit for energy and infrastructure projects, the countries announced. They also formalized a $900 million loan enabling Costa Rica to upgrade its main oil refinery to process 65,000 barrels a day.
Economists said China needs oil not only for the growing number of cars for its middle class but to fuel all facets of its expanding economy.
Unlike the U nited
S tates, where some 70% of the economy centers around consumer spending, countries such as China
and Japan rely far more heavily on exports
, Adibi said.
As Latin American ministers and presidents, business executives and others increasingly recognize
China's rapidly growing impact on the world economy, countries
such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile have expanded bilateral ties
, economists said.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Mexico was among the last of the major Latin American countries to sign free-trade agreements with
Beijing
, which meant it lost out as China became the principal trade partner to regional competitors such as Brazil and Peru.
(Philip, Current Readings—Honors, Rutgers University, Camden, “Soft Power and Foreign
Policy Charm in China’s Rise To Great-Power Status” April 2007, http://academia.edu/241077/Soft_Power_And_Foreign_Policy_Charm_In_Chinas_Rise_To_Great-
Power_Status)//MM
China has even extended its influence to Latin America, a geographic area usually considered only in the United States sphere of influence.
Trade between continues to rise, just like everywhere else. Such trade is necessary to infrastructure poor Latin America, which is dependent on foreign direct investment. One example is Brazil. In 2002,
Brazil’s president
Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva visited China and brought with him businesspeople. Lula proclaimed, “last year, the government made the strategic decision to draw closer to China.
[Brazil and China] share similar interests regarding their social needs, imperatives of growth, and communal thinking in the United
Nations and World Trade Organization.”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Mark P.—Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-large to Combat Trafficking in
Persons at the US Department of State, “The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama” World Affairs
Journal, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/world/valuevalues-soft-power-under-obama/p26212)//MM
One irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power
. The president came into office proposing a dramatic shift from George W. Bush's perceived unilateralism, and most of his predecessor's hard-edged counterterrorism tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has escalated forces in Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian casualties, kept Guantánamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral fashion.
What he hasn't accomplished to any great degree is what most observers assumed would be the hallmark of his approach to foreign affairs—a full assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a critique of President Bush's overreliance on hard power.
Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America
created by these excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation
. Upon taking office, he made freshstart statements
, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue, respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US approach
to the world—and that he would quickly remedy that defect.
Yet President Obama's conception of soft power has curiously lacked the very quality that has made it most efficacious in the past—the values dimension . This may seem odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto “the audacity of hope” and his deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored the values dimension of soft power
, which goes beyond the tradecraft of diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert the ideals of freedom in practical initiatives.
The excision of this values dimension renders soft power a hollow concept.
(Mark, is co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in
Washington, D.C. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan. Robert, Policy
Director at Just Foreign Policy, “US ‘Soft Power’ in Latin America Continues to Plummet as Nicaraguans
Elect Ortega” November 6, 2006, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weisbrotand-robert-naiman/us-soft-power-in-latin-am_b_33439.html)//MM
The apparent electoral victory of Sandinista Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, despite threats and warnings from US
officials, is another example
-- perhaps the most extreme so far -- of plummeting US influence in Latin
America
. The election attracted over 18,000 observers and more than 1000 journalists, because of its historic and symbolic significance.
Ortega first came to power with the Sandinista revolution in 1979 against the US-backed Somoza dictatorship and was elected president in
1984. Although this is never mentioned in the press, there were over 400 observers there at the time from 40 countries, including the main organization of US Latin America scholars, the Latin American Studies Association, and they found the election to be free and fair. The Reagan
Administration refused to recognize the election and continued to sponsor a terrorist war against the Sandinista government, destroying the economy of the country in the process. (Click here for a recent column describing this history).
In Sunday's election Washington pulled out all the stops to try to defeat Ortega's re-election. Four
Republican U.S. Members of Congress threatened to cut off remittances sent home by Nicaraguans living in the United States, which is about the worst thing they could threaten short of an invasion, if the voters elected Ortega. The US
Embassy in Managua also threatened economic sanctions
on Friday. As a result

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] of the 1980s war and a US commitment to reconstruction that was about as good as in Iraq (but without the money), Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the hemisphere and heavily dependent on US aid.
Nonetheless it appears that voters ignored these threats and elected Ortega anyway. With40.45% of the votes counted, Ortega has 40 percent. (He needed 35 percent with a 5 percent margin to avoid a second round). The Movement for Sandinista Renovation (MRS), a dissident
Sandinista group which accused Ortega of anti-democratic practices, including his "pact" with the corrupt right-wing former president Arnoldo
Aleman, seems to have gotten only about 7.5 percent, or about half of what it was polling just before the election. This may indicate that many on the left, once they realized that the MRS was not going to win, chose Ortega to avoid a right-wing victory. (It was widely believed that if
Ortega did not win in the first round, he would lose in the second round because the right, which was split in the first round, would unite for the second round).
What makes the result most remarkable is the context of Washington's threats.
In all of the other recent Latin American elections in which the Bush Administration had a strong preference, it remained silent before the vote: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Cost Rica, and Mexico
. In the October 29 election in Brazil, when for a brief period of time after the first round it appeared that centrist PSDB candidate Geraldo Alckmin had a chance to defeat Lula, the Bush Administration showed no sign of preference. (President Bush did intervene in Mexico after the vote was in, calling to congratulate right-wing candidate Felipe Calderon four days after the election, even though Calderon had not been elected yet).
They had learned their lesson from the 2002 election in Bolivia, where the US ambassador denounced Evo Morales and thereby gave him a huge boost in the polls
.
But Nicaragua is so poor and heavily indebted
, and suffered so much violence from its 1984 vote for Ortega that U.S. officials apparently figured that threats could work
. Of course, these are mostly empty threats: a cut off of remittances is extremely unlikely, as are other economic sanctions. This is not 1985, when President Reagan could state, as required by law for imposing a US economic embargo, that Nicaragua posed "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security" of the United States, and sadly, be taken seriously. And if there are loan cutoffs, Nicaragua could now borrow from Venezuela, as Argentina, Bolivia, and other countries have done recently.
The press has also made much of threats that foreign businesses would pull out of
Nicaragua if Ortega won, but this is equally doubtful: these businesses are making money there and will continue to do so under an Ortega presidency.
(Pavlos, reading for a PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of
Cambridge. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge and a BSc in
Politics with Economics from the University of Bath, “Chinese Soft Power: Sources and Implications for the US” December 21, 2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sourcesandimplications-for-the-us/)//MM
The Broader Context
Important external factors for the rise of Beijing’s soft power include the failure of the Washington
Consensus, the erosion of US soft power and the global economic crisis. In the years following 9/11
America went through its ‘unipolar moment’, which claimed it political capital, weakened alliances and distanced friends. Human rights violations in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib further weakened
America’s attractiveness and traumatized its moral example
. This paper deems that there was a power vacuum in the realm of ideas that China’s concepts in part came to fill.
In parallel, the BJC comes as a bright contrast to the ominously failed Washington Consensus. Even more importantly perhaps,China has managed to maintain robust, double-digit economic growth at the most difficult perhaps time for Western economies since the Great Recession (Halper, 2010:33-37).
V. Chinese Soft Power in Africa, Middle East and Latin America and the Importance for the US
The influence of Chinese soft power in the MENA region and Latin America is profound, complex and needs ample space to be evaluated in depth
. This section epigrammatically and selectively refers to some key points and assesses their importance for the US.
China and MENA
The absence of conditions apart from conforming with the ‘one-China-policy’ to trade with, or receive aid from China is crucial for Sino-African relations. Many African states increasingly rely on Beijing, fascinated by China’s growth and development, hoping they can learn and gain from the ‘Chinese example’ (Brookes and Shin, 2006:1-2). The security dimension of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ – and particularly the ‘selfdetermination’ clause – is very attractive for isolated ruthless regime’s, in pariah / nearly-failed states, like Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and Al-Bashir’s
Sudan (Halper, 2010:83-87). This renders the conduct of strategic diplomacy by the US ineffectual. Isolation fails, sanctions miss, and the option
/ threat of humanitarian intervention seems less threatening given the improbability of mandating action through the UNSC.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
In Africa, China’s image has been thriving, not least because of its tangible contribution to economic development, mainly through the building of infrastructure projects and advancing the technological capabilities of many developing nations (Foster, et. al., 2008). This advantageous image, of the benevolent actor who delivers results, combined with the ‘spirit’ and values enshrined in the BJC explains why now most of Africa looks to China rather than the US for a reliable partner[6]. A key implication of this new reality for the US is that it is losing out in the ‘race’ of securing energy resources, as Chinese energy firms increasingly ‘lock’ resources through long-term semi-barter deals in resource-rich African states (Brookes and Shin, 2006:2).
Similar difficulties have been posed in dealing with proliferation in the Middle East, and the question of Iran. China’s enthusiasm to fill the vacuum left from Western – largely American firms - leaving Iran in conjunction with US (and EU) sanctions, have held back the negotiations and undermined the ability of the US and the international community to effectively pressure the Iranian government. China’s ‘diplomatic cover’ / umbrella has on occasions, proven a major obstacle (Halper, 2010:91-92).
In Latin America, the role of China has been expanding rapidly. Chinese cultural and educational programs have been expanding with positive impact for the reception of China in the region
(Pan, 2006).
Moreover
, Bush era’s American hegemony alienated friends and distanced allies in Latin America, who increasingly find in Beijing a robust and increasingly crucial partner.
Both Halper (2010) and Ramo (2004) discuss in considerable depth the strengthening of Venezuelan – Chinese relations. America is the largest consumer of Venezuelan oil. In pursuit of more independence,
Chavez increasingly opts to maximize oil sales to China
(Halper, 2010:90).
Expanding Chinese soft power in Latin America may be disturbing for the US for geopolitical reasons, as Beijing’s friendships and alliances in America’s near abroad may generate concern. Also, America cedes ground in the
‘great game’ of resource acquisition.
VI. Chinese Soft Power and Multilateral Fora. A New Role? The Significance for the US
China’s attractiveness is particularly evident in multilateral settings. As always, interest in China relates to the economic opportunities that arise from increased cooperation. Nonetheless, multilateral organizations are crucial marketplaces of ideas in conjunction with everything else.
Chinese ideational power is increasingly apparent in a series of fora/IOs. For instance, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) started out with the focused agenda of mediating border disputes, but Chinese ideational leadership quickly broadened SCO’s mandate to include politico-economic cooperation in other spheres as well as broader issues of security. To cite an example, in 2005, after denying US observer status in the SCO (Cohen, 2006:8), a Chinese-led SCO declaration pressed Washington to withdraw its forces from Uzbekistan (Halper,
2010:79).
Chinese soft power has effectively created a multilateral milieu which deliberately excludes the US, and can at times pressure it.
Similarly, the US is excluded from both the ‘ASEAN Plus One’ and the ‘APT’ arrangement. China has a leading role in these arrangements, effectively creating separate economic spheres with considerable geopolitical gains for China and non-negligible implications for America
(Halper, 2010:28). In 2009, the first ‘BRIC
Summit’ took place, serving as a platform for exchange of ideas on trade and aid, with an emphasis on how to exclude the US. When Obama asked to send a delegation with the status of observers, his request was turned down (Halper, 2010:29). Through these multilateral settings,
China advances simultaneously its ‘good neighbourliness’ and the ‘China Opportunity’ concepts, which command considerable gravitas in the above-discussed regional IOs (Ramo, 2004: 51-53).
Overall, the exclusion of the US from increasingly important for a and IOs is a demonstration that
Chinese soft power and effective multilateral strategy can be in direct competition with American soft power. Moreover, it shows that whenever Beijing ‘marks a victory’, it opts to exclude the US from the new setting, to carve out alternative spaces for ideational exchanges, often with the deliberate collective aim of operating outside the US-set / dominated framework.
VII. Conclusion or A clear Assessment of the Nature and Composition of Chinese Soft Power as well as its Impact on America and its Global
Interests
Chinese soft power is uniquely complex
. It is so conflated with economic influence that they seem, at times, almost inseparable.
This paper found that Chinese soft power stems greatly from the example of its development model. It impresses nations around the world that may not necessarily want to emulate the model, but are attracted to China, and draw closer to Beijing. A set of ideas, many endeavouring to frame China’s intentions vis-à-vis its neighbours, partners and friends, are also a key component of China’s ideational influence. The ‘Beijing
Consensus’ has considerable analytical value and is a handy summation of Beijing’s ‘power of example’, cultural and political influence.
China’s soft power has been also empowered by the erosion of US soft power America suffered during the G.W.Bush era.
After identifying the sources of Chinese soft power, this thesis examined its impact on American interests. It started with an analysis of the direct impact of Chinese soft power on the US to show that although on-the-rise
, Chinese soft power has a limited direct impact on the US
. Subsequently, this paper analysed the impact of Chinese soft power in its near abroad, and found that though China presents a threat and opportunity at the same time, its power of public diplomacy and attraction rather advances America’s aim of peace and stability in this sensitive area. This paper’s succinct analysis of China’s ideational influence in MENA and Latin America demonstrated that Chinese ideas often attract dodgy regimes, with which China engages, and hence carries high responsibility
. When China uses its soft power in a responsible way, then, America and the international community

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] benefit greatly; when not
, it undermines efforts aimed at making this world a safer place
(Zoellick, 2006, Shirk, 2008).
Lastly, China’s soft power in multilateral settings is impressive. Apart from the UN, China has empowered the ASEAN Plus One and APT fora, has developed the SCO and has given a new dynamic to the ‘BRIC Summit’. In all these, it has laboured to carve a leading role for itself, while marginalizing America’s role.
(Deb, Associated Press, “Edward Snowden Affair Dampens U.S.-Latin America Ties,”
Huffington Post, Online, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/edward-snowdenus_n_3591560.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE
America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the "backyard," as Secretary of State John Kerry once referred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker
Edward Snowden lays bare already thorny U.S. relations with Latin America.
Taking the opportunity to
snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua have already said they'd be willing to
grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United States for revealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners. Ecuador has said it would consider any request from him.
Relations between the US and these countries were already testy, but the Snowden affair also stunned the Obama administration's effort to improve ties
with friendlier nations in the region like Mexico and Brazil.
Snowden hasn't been the only recent setback. Leaders in the region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil, which was privy to some documents released by Snowden, reported that a U.S. spy program was widely targeting data in emails and telephone calls across Latin America. That revelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane over Europe amid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard.
And all this comes right after President
Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster
U.S. engagement in Latin America.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
“Chinese Soft Power in Latin America,” China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Hu Jintao celebrate at closing of investment and trade seminar.
Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and
Western Institutions. China’s historical status as a “leader of the developing world” positions it as the
natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chávez, Rafael
Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example,
Morales proclaimed himself to be a “great admirer of Mao,” while Chávez has exclaimed that Mao
and South American revolutionary icon Simón Bolívar would have been “great friends.” While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases, the position of the
PRC as a geopolitical “alternative” to the United States shapes the way that they court the Chinese. In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the anti-
U.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with the United States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K–8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.
(Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, “China and
Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
1/2012: 3-19, page 3-4, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE
At the same time, economic relations go substantially beyond trade, and are also perhaps more visibly characterised by the often successful attempts of Chinese state-owned corporations (such as PetroChina and Sinopec) to acquire shares in Latin American oil and mineral commodities exploration companies.
On the political side, Beijing’s involvement in the Western hemisphere has materialised in the
establishment of socalled “strategic partnerships” with several states in the region; China’s training of increasing numbers of Latin American military personnel; and attempts to expand the ties of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political parties across the continent. These examples of the intensifying Sino-Latin American links seemingly support a neorealist perspective according to which
Beijing uses trade, investment, development aid and diplomacy in an attempt to balance the regional and global dominance of the United States and other OECD nations. Li (2008: 195) argues that China is
taking advantage of a power vacuum in the region that was created by the United States’ and Russia’s declining interest in Latin America.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, “Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America,” Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-chinabattles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position
China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region.
Xi arrives in Mexico
Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties.
The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States.
Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the
American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods.
"China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muñoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today.
"It's not the healthiest
(relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America.
China is increasing its
funding to the region just as the US has been coming under pressure to cut aid and investment. "If I’m a
Latin American leader, I’m very happy because I now have more chips to play with," Kevin Gallagher, author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about China’s inroads in Latin America, told
Bloomberg.
"The onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but that’s not so easy because it doesn’t have the deep pockets like it used to." Latin America's growing economy makes for an attractive investment.
The International Monetary Fund forecasts the region’s economies will expand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world.
Xi's tour of
Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are setting the stage for his visit to California later this week, which will be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office.
That Xi's Latin America trip came so early into his presidency is a confident approach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington told Bloomberg.
"In the past Chinese
presidents were very deferential to the US., always making reference to Washington’s backyard," Ellis said. "You don’t hear any of that from Xi’s team, though you don’t find any threatening rhetoric either."

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Susan & Tara, Susan Schmidt is a partner at the law firm Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips and Managing Director at ManattJones Global Strategies. Tara Nicholson is an intern with
ManattJones Global Strategies and a candidate for a dual MA/MBA degree from the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania,
“China’s Relationship with Latin America in Perspective,” Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP April 18, 2010, www.manatt.com/Articles/China%E2%80%99s_Relationship_with_Latin_America_in_Perspective.aspx# sthash.uZO1xhJ1.dpuf)
China’s relations with Latin America are driven by the joint desire for mutually beneficial economic
relations and a multi-polar world. The country’s increasing presence in Latin America is neither a panacea for the region’s economic challenges nor a substitute for its historical economic relationships.
Although China is laying the groundwork to expand its influence in Latin America, that influence will
primarily serve China’s own commercial interests. China’s largely economic focus in Latin America is evident by contrasting the breath and depth of China’s interests and relations in Southeast Asia.
The opportunity for Latin America then lies in making China’s interests a part of long-term economic strategy in the region. Long-term country attempts to turn China’s primarily economic interests into political tools are likely to be unsuccessful. Regional growth and diversification will not be achieved
misunderstanding China’s primarily economic interests. The challenge is to transform the opportunity provided by a more diverse trade and economic relationship into domestic benefits and sustained
growth and development. That will be accomplished only with perspective on an increasingly
multilateral economic structure.
(Sebastian Sarmiento-Saher is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat. “China and Latin America: Big Business and Big competition.” The Diplomat 14 March 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-andbig-competition/ EW
According to Barbara Stallings,
Chinese exports to Latin America grew substantially
from U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 to U.S.
$69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 billion in 2008. However, despite these dramatic increases of 910 percent and 1,226 percent, the
United States and the EU are still ahead of China in terms of trade flows with Latin America
.
China is quickly catching up to many of LAC’s traditional trading partners, however. Already China’s trade numbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the previously dominant Asian trading partner for Latin America
.
What is most significant
about these developments overall is how rapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have expanded
their activity in the region
– a trend that continues to grow.
(Shasta, international correspondent for CNN based in Brazil, “China-Latam economic ties tightening,” “Latam” is not my typo, that’s totes on CNN, November 19, 2012, Online, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/18/business/china-latam-ties, accessed 7/17/13) PE
The rise of China in Latin America, long considered the United States' "backyard," took many by surprise.
Now, its economic influence in the region is only expected to grow. For the past decade China
has fueled high growth in major commodity producing countries like Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] with its appetite for raw materials such as iron ore, soybeans and copper.
In fact, China replaced the
United States as the top trading partner in Brazil and Chile and is on the way to doing so in many others countries in Latin America.
That relationship made China popular with many countries weary of trying
to get their goods onto American and European shelves. But when global demand for Chinese goods dried up in 2008 and 2009, the relationship with Latin America evolved.
"China figured out that Latin
America could be a very good alternative market for its surplus," said Roberto Dumas Damas, a professor at Sao Paulo's INSPER business school.
The flood of cheap exports from China sparked a backlash from many of the hardest-hit industries, but overall, the trade relationship still tips in Latin
America's favor.
Brazil's trade surplus with China, for example, was $11.5 billion in 2011.
China followed
up not only with cheap exports of its goods, but hefty investments in Latin America to make it easier to reach the region's growing middle class consumers.
"There were two waves of foreign direct investment," Dumas said. "First to guarantee access to raw materials, like land for soybeans and iron ore plants." "In the second wave," he added. "Companies want to explore the region's consumer markets." He pointed to plans by Chinese carmakers Chery and JAC carmakers to build automobiles in
South America.
According to China's Ministry of Commerce, Chinese foreign investment in Latin America jumped to $10.5 billion in 2010 from $7.3 billion in 2009.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, “China and
Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
1/2012: 3-19, page 8, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Obama’s Latin America tour of 2011 cannot cover for the fact that the Chinese presence in Latin
America is not a high priority for Washington; China’s relations with the region have remained a minor issue because they lack sufficient strategic and political importance for the United States. Washington’s perception might change soon, though, as there are already a number of factors that it is starting to become concerned about. The US is mostly interested in supporting liberal and economic orders and deepening economic integration between itself and Latin American countries. With regard to these core interests, the US is closely observing Sino-Latin American relations to understand whether China is disrupting the existing patterns of bi- and multilateralism. For the time being, however, China is not a firmly established power in Latin America, and Beijing’s rise on the continent is a relatively recent phenomenon.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
“Chinese Soft Power in Latin America,” China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/17/13) PE
In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to
underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are
the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world’s youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions.
¶
It is also important to clarify that soft power is
based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality.
Although China’s current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future.
¶
Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The “Bolivarian socialist” regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western “imperialism,” while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.
¶
The core of
Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the
PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: ■ hopes for future access to Chinese markets ■ hopes for future Chinese investment ■ influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America
■ hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions ■ China as a development model ■ affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic ■ China as “the wave of the future.” In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, “China’s New Backyard,” Foreign Policy, June 6, 2013,
Onlinehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america, accessed 7/19/13) PE
In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and
Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-
Bissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and
Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to
Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with
China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
6/18/
Sponsored by the Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet is an important central news service-oriented website, an important information organ of the central government, and an important platform for building up China's online international communication capacity. “Chinese President meets
Cuban VP on stronger ties”http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/19/c_124874409.htm-
SJH
BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua)
-- Chinese President
Xi Jinping on Tuesday met with
Miguel Diaz-Canel,
Cuban first vicepresident
of the councils of state and ministers. Xi asked Diaz-Canel to convey his greetings to Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro.
Xi reviewed the growth of China-Cuba relations since the two countries forged diplomatic relations in 1960, particularly the increasingly mature relations and robust cooperation since the beginning of the 21st century. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish its friendship with Cuba. It would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political trust, deepen mutual understanding, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote their own development and common prosperity,
Xi said.
China would like to work more closely with Cuba on
international and regional issues and promote fairness and justice of the international community,
Xi said. Xi said he witnessed vigor and potential of the Latin America and Caribbean region during his visit earlier this month.
China would like a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean countries, featuring political trust, economic cooperation and cultural mutual learning,
Xi said. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between
China and Latin America through a comprehensive cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core.
China appreciates Cuba's efforts to promoting China-Latin America relations and expects growth of relations during Cuba's role as the rotating chair of Community of Latin American and Caribbean states.
Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro to Xi. Diaz-Canel said
Cuba places great importance on building ties with China, pledging to enhance high-level visits and communication, expand mutually-beneficial cooperation and seek growth of ties between the two countries and relations between China and Latin America.
Diaz-Canel will conclude his three-day China visit on Wednesday.
(“Cuba’s reforms pave way for new US policy, too.” Bostonglobe.com 9 February 13. Web.) http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-intocentury/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html
Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests; as Cuba opens
up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba increasingly promotes offshore drilling and other maritime exploration, the United States must improve
communication with Havana. Currently, even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a
narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills.
6/18/
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA or MFA) of the Government of the People's Republic of China is an executive agency responsible for foreign relations between the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world “President

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Xi Jinping Meets with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First
Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Stressing to Push China-Cuba, China-
Latin America Relations for Greater Development” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1051842.shtml)
SJH
On June 18, 2013, President Xi Jinping met with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, at the Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping asked Diaz-Canel to convey his sincere greetings to
President Raul Castro of Cuba and Fidel Castro. Xi Jinping said that
China and Cuba have always understood and supported each other since the establishment of diplomatic relationship. In the new century, the
China-Cuba relationship has been increasingly mature with more content of cooperation and strong vitality. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish the traditional friendship with Cuba and is willing to work with the Cuban side to maintain high-level exchanges, to strengthen party-to-party exchanges and to share the experiences of state governance, to enhance political mutual trust, to build up consensus, to deepen mutual understanding, to expand practical cooperation and to boost development and common prosperity in the two countries.
China is willing to coordinate and cooperate closely with Cuba on international and regional affairs and to make positive contributions to enhancing the influence of developing countries and promoting fairness and justice of the international community. Xi Jinping said, I paid a visit recently to three Latin
American and Caribbean countries. I was deeply impressed by the vigour and potential of development of the Latin American and Caribbean region.
China is ready to be a good partner of Latin American and Caribbean countries, with political mutual respect and trust, complementary and mutual benefit in economy and trade, and exchanges in culture.
China is willing to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to establish an overall China-Latin America cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum as the core to push forward mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation between
China and Latin America at a higher level. China appreciates the positive efforts of Cuba to promote the overall China-Latin America cooperation and is looking forward to greater development of China-Latin America relations while Cuba holding the rotating presidency of
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of President Raul Castro and Fidel Castro to Xi Jinping.
Diaz-Canel said
Cuba places great importance on Cuba-China relations and is willing to work with China to strengthen high-level visits and communication, to expand friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation and to push for greater development of relationship between the two countries and
relations between China and Latin America.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(“Cuba and China strengthening trade relations.” HavanaTimes.com. 27 September 2012. Web.)
The 25th Meeting of the Cuba-China Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Relations took place yesterday in Havana, where both countries expressed their willingness to deepen ties.
According to the Prensa Latina news agency, talks gave priority to issues such as the provision of spare parts for automotive equipment on the island, as well as China’s participation in the island’s program
for the development of renewable energy. On the Chinese side, Commerce Minister Chen Deming said that sugar, nickel and biotechnology are the main items exported to his country from Cuba. Cuban
President Raul Castro visited the Asian giant this past July, at which time important agreements were
signed in the areas of health, information technology, banking, agriculture and customs. At the end of the first half of this year, trade between the two countries exceeded $870 million, making China the
second largest trading partner globally with the Island for the eighth consecutive year.
7/11/
( Cuban News Agency This page offers users news social, economic, political, sports and cultural developments that take place in Cuba and in third world nations) ‘Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese
Bulk Carrier” http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/0711Ninth%20Chinese.htm- SJH
Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier HAVANA, Cuba, July 11 (acn
) Cuba received in the Chinese city of Shanghai the ninth of 10 bulk carriers as part of a contract with the shipyards of that Asian port to develop the
island’s merchant fleet.
Cuban News Agency Gertrudis is the name of the boat, which was received by Cuban authorities during a ceremony at the shipyard located on Conngming Island, in Shanghai. Executives with China’s National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and with the Trade Minister attended the ceremony.
Cuba’s commercial attaché in China, Tania Velazquez, was present at the shipyard along representatives of the ACEMEX Company, engineers and technicians, who supervised the construction of boat.
Shanghai shipyard president Ma Shixiong described as fruitful the current collaboration between China and Cuba and he stressed his company’s commitment to keep strengthening such links, which were established 50 years ago at the diplomatic level. Tania Velazquez recalled the historic friendly and cooperation relations between Beijing and Havana
and she noted that the construction of these boats is the result of those bonds.
Sources with the Cuban embassy in China stressed the strategic importance of these boats for Cuba, and the current bilateral economic and commercial relations.
, Ana, who teaches New Media and Development Communication at Columbia's School of
International and Public Affairs “China influence in Cuba” http://laredcuana.blogspot.com/ SJH
Jennifer Hernandez of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami has posted a note on her research on Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba. She notes that "through bilateral trade agreements, China has been expanding its sphere of influence," and looks at the
activities of two large Chinese telecommunication equipment companies,
Huawei and ZTE. Much of her emphasis is on surveillance and she concludes that "China’s transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit Cubans. Instead
China seems
to be equipping the island’s information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy on Cubans."
Internet surveilance is pretty well taken for granted in Cuba and China, and it is deplorable, but I wonder about the up side.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jennifer, research Assistant at the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies,
University of Miami, “Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba,” Cuba Transition Project, Issue 186,
March 13, 2013, online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Both Chinese companies have commercial presence in Cuba and actively participate in conferences organized by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). Among these conferences are the
XIV Edition of “Converging Technologies: Integration and Independence” held in Havana in 2011, where
Huawei was one of the sponsors, and the V International Symposium of Telecommunications, where both Huawei and ZTE Corporation actively participated. (10) Ramiro Valdes, Cuba’s Vice-President,
Communist party member and former Minister of Information and Communication, position he held until 2011, is an avid supporter of restriction and censorship of information technologies. It is not a coincidence that Ramiro Valdes promotes the commercialization and application of Chinese software
and equipment that can be used to monitor and be remotely accessed.
Cuba and China have been two
amorous friends since the 1960’s when Cuba became the first country in the Caribbean and Latin
America to normalize relations with the Asian nation. Since that time, both countries have promoted communist ideology and have cooperated and coordinated with each other at multilateral organizations and on the issue of human rights. China’s transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit
Cubans. Instead China seems to be equipping the island’s information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy on Cubans. Perhaps, the People’s Republic of China is also equipping an
anti-American leadership with sophisticated communication and network technology capable of cyber espionage 90 miles from our shores.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan“50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US
Influence in Hemisphere is Waning.” Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning
It was not only the containment of communism that drove US attempts to oust Fidel Castro from the
helm of Cuba in the early 1960s, says Mr. Brenner. The US was also concerned about Latin American countries emulating Cuba, particularly its geopolitical stance in the cold war, and thus undermining
American leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Some 50 years later, the US faces the same
situation, just a more modern iteration. “What the US feared the most in 1962 has come to pass,” says
Brenner, who wrote "Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile
Crisis." “We were concerned about our sphere of influence that we had taken for granted.… [Today] we cannot dominate this region anymore. They do not look to us for leadership. Countries look within
the region, and to some extent to Cuba still.”
(Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan“50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US
Influence in Hemisphere is Waning.” Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US turned its attention from Latin America as it focused on
terrorism and threats from the Middle East. At the same time, over the past decade Latin American democracy has flourished and the global economy shifted, with Latin America no longer looking just
north to the US for leadership and investment, but to India, China, and Russia. China surpassed the US as Brazil’s biggest trading partner in 2009.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(director of policy and outreach at One Acre Fund and Senior Production Editor on the Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” January 31, 2013, Online, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113, accessed 7/16/13) PE
What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?
¶
They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in
Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the
official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation.
The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions.
Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in
April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to nonfamily members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes.
¶
Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska,
Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.
¶
Tension between
Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the
Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
¶
Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians
and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and
Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castroaccused the
United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(New Jersey–based consultant and executive director of the nonprofit Cuba Archive,
“FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA: THE LIMITS OF COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT,” page 493-194, ASCE
Cuba, Online, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Because in Cuba power is strongly centralized
and forcefully exercised, and decision-making is
very vertical, market forces, which operate spontaneously and in a decentralized manner, are inherently constrained.
This negates the main theoretical argument for engagement
and renders it essentially flawed at the core. Foreign investment in Cuba is, in essence, hostage to the prevailing dialectic. A recent analysis on China concludes that economic engagement has also failed to bring about political moderation and a modicum of pluralism there because the three elements that would foster reform—the rule of law, political accountability and a free press—challenge the security of the regime and are, thus, banned. A prominent scholar on Asia declares: “If
China is permitted to
merely pick and choose which aspects of integration it finds palatable
, and to resist those that push change in the direction of moderation and plualism, them the time scale required by economic engagement will stretch toward infinity.
”229
The same selective approach
to capitalist mechanisms is
the one applied by the Cuban leadership, and it has been effective.
A systematically repressive apparatus appears to have tremendous impact on the feasibility and timing of political change regardless of economic reform. The Cuban people simply do not possess the means to exercise selfdetermination.
When the leadership is committed to survival at all costs, regime legitimization is not the issue
; the issue is capacity to exercise control. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin
America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The “Bolivarian socialist” regime of Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western “imperialism,” while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.
¶
The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is
the widespread perception that the PRC
, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present
tremendous business opportunities
in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
( “The Encirclement Gathers Pace: China Enters Into a “Strategic Partnership” With
Mexico,” People's Daily Online, http://www.trevorloudon.com/2013/06/the-encirclement-gathers-pacechina-enters-into-a-strategic-partneship-with-mexico/).
From the Communist Party of China website:
MEXICO CITY – Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a
comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries.
Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has
entered a new stage.
The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said.
The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects.
Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust
. The two countries will accommodate
each other’s
concerns
, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other’s core interests
.
China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other’s development strategies.
Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology.
In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors.
Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in
Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well.
Fourthly,
China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues.
The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change.
They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations.
China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level.
After their talks, Xi and Pena Nieto signed a joint statement between the two countries, witnessed the signing of a host of agreements and jointly met the press. Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers,
Mexico and China are each other’s important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development
, the Mexican president said.
China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity
, he said. Xi said his visit to Mexico

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. “I believe with our joint efforts,
China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage
,” he said.
(Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency of the People's Republic of China and the biggest center for collecting information and press conferences in China. “China, Mexico upgrade bilateral relationship”, June 5, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-
06/05/content_29033628.htm)
Chinese President
Xi Jinping
and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena
Nieto
Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership.
The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed
that strengthening
the China-Mexico long-term
friendly cooperation
serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries.
Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena
Nieto
, for his part, said the upgrade of
the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage.
The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects.
First ly, the two sides will
view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust.
The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other's core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other's development strategies.
Second ly, the two sides
will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in
key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and
high technology.
In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. The two countries will also maintain exchanges and learn from each other in such areas as poverty reduction, environmental protection and urbanization.
Third ly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions,
China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges.
Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in
Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well.
Fourth ly,
China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination
based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues.
The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-
Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level.
(Patricia Rey, covers Latin America for the Internation Business Times, former employee
BBC America in New York, La República in Lima, La2 TV in Madrid and the UN in Brussels, “Latin America
Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For the U.S.?,” 2013, International Business
Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981)
Even more significant was Xi’s visit to Mexico
.
President Enrique Peña Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with
China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. Biden’s visit was not as successful
. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was called “brutal and tense” by Persad-Bissessar, and
Colombian journalist
Andrés Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
“Washington’s backyard” in a much-berated slip last April.
While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogotá, no agreements were signed during his trip.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, “Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America,” Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-chinabattles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position
China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region.
Xi arrives in Mexico
Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto are expected to
discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly
when it comes to exports to the United States.
Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the
American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods.
"China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muñoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today.
"It's not the healthiest
(relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to
economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America.
(Economist, The Economist is an English-language weekly news and international affairs publication owned by The Economist Newspaper Ltd. and edited in offices in London, t targets highly educated readers and claims an audience containing many influential executives and policymakers. , “Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?”http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3) SJH
Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by showing that
China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard
. China’s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger.
According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011,
after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank combined.
The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.
(E. Eduardo, Spanish News Editor, “Leaders of Mexico, China promise broadened relations, move toward more balanced trade,” THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, JUNE 4, 2013, http://www.timescolonist.com/cmlink/gmg/canadian-press/business/leaders-of-mexico-china-promisebroadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced-trade-1.312535/)

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
MEXICO CITY -
The presidents of China and Mexico agreed Tuesday to broaden relations between their countries and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork.
After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto said they are transforming the relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade, which now is heavily in favour of China.
The leaders signed a dozen memorandums of understanding and co-operation agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and infrastructure.
"Today, we are giving way to a new relationship, a new phase of the relationship," Pena Nieto said in a joint statement.
Xi said China wanted better relations with
Mexico, which he called "a great friend and a great partner in the Latin American region."
(“China's President Wants To Open The Floodgates Of Trade With Mexico,” FOX
News Network, LLC, June 02, 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/chinapresident-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/#ixzz2ZKRH6wpO)
Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "
China needs to guarantee oil for its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power
," he said. At the same time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people."
State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been minimal.
Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the
United States and about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives.
In April, during Pena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec.
Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well. "
China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete
," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey
Technological Institute. "
Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs
."
(Globalpost, an online US news company that focuses on international news. “Pemex and Sinopec agree to boost Mexican oil exports to China”, April 6, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130406/pemex-and-sinopec-agree-boostmexican-oil-exports-china)
The Mexican oil company
Pemex signed
Saturday on the southern Chinese island of Hainan an accord with the second largest oil company of China, Sinopec, to strengthen trade relations
between the two firms and promote a larger volume of crude exports to the Asian giant
, the second largest petroleum importer in the world.
The accord was signed
by the director general of Pemex, Emilio Lozoya, and the president of the XinXing Cathay International Group, a subsidiary of
Sinopec, Sha Ming, in the presence of Mexican President
Enrique Peña
Nieto
.
The pact marks the de facto opening of trade relations between the two giants
, something of particular interest to the world's second economy because of its need for alternative sources of supply.
The agreement was signed shortly after
Peña
Nieto met with the new president of China, Xi Jinping
, during the Boao Forum on economic issues. The Mexican leader is one of the first Latin
American heads of state to meet with the new Chinese president, along with Peruvian President Ollanta Humala. The Boao Forum, an economic summit that has been called the "Asian Davos," began its 2013 meeting Saturday in China with a marked Latin American character, thanks to the presence as speakers of the presidents of Peru, Ollanta Humala, and of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
6/4/
(Associated Press is a multi-national non-profit news agency, “Leaders of
Mexico, China promise broadened relations, move toward more balanced trade”, Associated Press, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/04/leaders-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relationsmove-toward-more-balanced/)
The presidents of China and Mexico have agreed to broaden relations between their countries and
expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork. After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto say they are transforming their
relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade, which now is heavily in favor of China. The leaders on Tuesday signed a dozen memorandums of understanding and cooperation agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and infrastructure.
(“The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America.” Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW
China has particular interest in Mexico
, the region’s second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But
China is now looking to work with Mexico City — investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment
. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Peña Nieto shared with Xi is that though
Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China.
(“President Xi uses trip to strengthen China’s influence.” USA Today 6 June 2013. Web.) http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/ EW
In Mexico,
President Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links
. Mexican officials said while $57 billion of Mexico's imports — 15% — came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion — 1.5% — to China.
"The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets
," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary Anderson
Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "
They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're putting their efforts there
."
(“Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building trip to Mexico.” New York Times 4 June 2013. Web.) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0 EW
Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward changing their frosty relationship
.
Mexico’s government would like to narrow its large trade gap with
China
. Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexico’s Ministry of Economy.
The two countries announced a series of agreements late Tuesday covering energy, trade and education
. “We agree on the importance of balancing our trade and investment relationship,” Mr. Peña Nieto said, noting promises from China to start by accepting more tequila and pork imports.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. “China’s President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties.” World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html
Upon his arrival
, Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexico’s huge trade deficit
.
This means oil, which China needs to fuel its economy
and the cars of its middle class. “
Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China
,” said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. “Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil
.” “
China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete
,” said Juan Carlos
Rivera, director of Mexico’s Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. “
Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs
.”
(Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. “China’s President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties.” World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html
Not coincidentally,
Xi’s visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican government is bent on opening up the state oil company
Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to private and foreign investment
in order to stem decreasing production by funding deepwater drilling. Peña Nieto will soon present an energy reform bill to the Mexican Congress allowing that.
Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day that Pemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are exported
. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China.
China is looking for much more
. During Peña Nieto’s April visit to China,
Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec
.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Tao, staffwriter Caoxin, 4-26-13, Caoxin Online, “Building Bridges”, http://english.caixin.com/2013-04-26/100521052.html)
Mexico's new president,
Enrique Pena Nieto, wants to redefine bilateral relations with China.
In a trip to the southern province of Hainan in early April, four months after he took office, the 47-year-old
Pena Nieto met with
the head of China's new leadership,
Xi Jinping;
announced the establishment of a government agency to handle trade with China; and repeatedly sent the message that the two economies can complement each other, rather than compete. "I've come to reaffirm, and to also confirm very clearly, the interest Mexico has to expand its relationship with
China," Pena Nieto said
in an exclusive interview with Caixin on April 6. Sino-Mexican economic relations have long been tense. Both are major suppliers of manufactured goods, especially to the United States. Mexico was the last country to sign a bilateral deal with China in
2001 to pave the latter's way into the World Trade Organization, and it has launched several WTO complaints against Chinese exports. Mexico's trade deficit with China is the largest among its trade partners.
(gb Times, 6-6-13, GbTimes, “China, Mexico seek strategic partnership, end to trade issues” http://gbtimes.com/focus/politics/news/china-mexico-seek-strategic-partnership-end-trade-issues#sthash.tVMHq3TW.dpuf)
China and Mexico
signed deals on Tuesday to step up Mexico's exports to China, as the two emerging economies seek to
'relaunch' ties
that have been dogged by trade imbalances and rivalry in international markets. Following a meeting between visiting
Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Peña” Nieto in Mexico City, the two countries agreed to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership
and signed a series of agreements. New contact with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development - Xi
Jinping The deals enable Mexico to export pork and tequila to the Chinese market after years of negotiation, and Mr
Xi announced that
China also plans to sign contracts to purchase Mexican products worth an additional $1 billion.
"New contact with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development," the Chinese leader told Mexico's Senate on the second day of his visit. China's investment in and pursuit of raw materials and oil in Latin America is in contrast to its relationship with Mexico, which has competing with China in the US market in sectors such as manufactured goods.
The two countries also agreed to move to balance Mexico's trade deficit with China.
(Xinhua News, 6-5-2013, Xinhuanet, “China, Mexico upgrade relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132431199_2.htm)
Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers,
Mexico and China are each other's important strategic cooperative partners
, and the
Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese
side to achieve common development, the
Mexican
president said
.
Pena Nieto believed Xi's visit will advance bilateral cooperation into a new stage and promote bilateral
ties to a higher level
. Xi, for his part, said the Chinese and Mexican peoples feel close to each other, as the two countries are both ancient civilizations and have a glorious history of fighting bravely for national independence and liberation. Since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972, China and Mexico have achieved rapid development of friendly cooperation in all fields, shown mutual understanding and support to each other, and maintained close cooperation in international affairs, Xi said, adding that they are good friends and good partners. The Chinese president noted that China and
Mexico are faced with the common task of developing economy and improving people's livelihood. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said.
Xi said his visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. "I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage," he said.
Xi, accompanied by Pena Nieto, then inspected Mexico's guard of honor. Members of the Mexican cabinet and military leaders also attended the welcoming ceremony.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(NewsAsia, 6-5-2013, Channel NewsAsia, “China, Mexico presidents agree on 'strategic' partnership”, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/china-mexico-presidents/698924.html)
MEXICO CITY: Chinese President
Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart vowed to work jointly to access international markets
, like the lucrative US market, as part of a new strategic partnership
. Xi on Wednesday begins his second day of a three-day visit to the Latin American economic powerhouse, which will include a speech before Mexico's congress. Xi arrived in
Mexico after visiting Costa Rica, and after meeting Caribbean leaders in Trinidad and Tobago. On Friday Xi travels to the United States for a much-anticipated weekend summit with US President Barack Obama.
China has in recent years aggressively pushed trade and investment ties with the developing world, particularly Africa and
Latin America
, to secure raw materials to fuel its economic growth and wield greater geopolitical influence in relation to the United States. On Tuesday
Xi and
Mexican President Enrique
Pena Nieto pledged to enhance diplomatic and trade ties between the two countries, and to smooth over their long-standing rivalry on exporting products to the United States. "We expect to broaden investments of Chinese capital in our country," Pena Nieto told reporters
late Tuesday, a move that will create more jobs and make Mexico "an important platform for exports to the countries with which we have free trade agreements." Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with the United States and Canada.
Xi
in turn praised the
"comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries. In a joint statement Mexico and
China agreed to increase talks at various government levels "to deepen mutual trust and conduct bilateral dialogues on strategic issues,"
Chinese state news service Xinhua reported.
Closer ties include more coordination in forums like the United Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping
, Xinhua said.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Xinhua, 6-4-2013, Xinhuanet, “China, Mexico set to further promote trade ties”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/04/c_132428986.htm)
Chinese President
Xi Jinping's
upcoming visit to Mexico is a sign of deepening cooperation
and indicates the two countries are eager to boost their economic and trade ties, officials and experts say. Xi's three-day stay in Mexico starting later Tuesday will include his second meeting with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in less than two months. He will also meet parliament leaders, entrepreneurs and members of the Chinese community. The two sides are expected to sign a series of economic and trade agreements and issue a joint statement on further development of bilateral ties.
China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while the latter is China's second-largest in Latin America
. Two-way trade jumped from about 5 billion U.S. dollars in 2003 to more than 36 billion dollars in 2012. In a written interview with Mexican media before his three-nation Latin American tour, Xi said China was ready to work with Mexico to expand and optimize bilateral trade, raising the possibility of starting negotiations on a bilateral free trade deal.
Officials and experts believe trade relations between China and Mexico are complementary rather than competitive, and the two countries should make more efforts to identify the complementarities in their economies.
In a trip to China in early April
, four months after he took office, Pena Nieto met Xi in China's southern city of
Sanya and the two leaders agreed to work together to enhance trust and achieve win-win cooperation.
(Luis Prados, writer for El Pais, 6-5-2013, El Pais, “China and Mexico sign “tequila pact” to boost bilateral trade”, http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/06/05/inenglish/1370460721_956003.html)
Chinese President Xi Jinping continued his first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean on Wednesday after signing a far-reaching bilateral trade agreement
with Mexican President Enrique Pérez Nieto.
Called the “tequila pact”
— because the distilled beverage is one of the major products Mexico will export to China as part of a $1-billion package — the accord is geared toward offsetting the trade imbalance between Beijing and Mexico City. Xi and Peña Nieto agreed to put aside their country’s past differences over trade issues.
According to Mexican statistics, Mexico exported about $5.7 billion in products to China last year while it imported $57 billion from the Asian giant. At a news conference,
Peña Nieto
said he immediately touched on the need “to search for improved balance in trade
.”
He
also promised
Xi to resolve
“in a friendly way” Mexico’s complaint
lodged against China
at the World Trade Organization (WTO) for unfair business practices
in the textile sector. Mexico charges that China is selling its products under price while at the same time giving government subsidies to the industry. Besides tequila, which is Mexico’s national beverage, Xi said that China has committed itself to purchasing more Mexican pork products.
The two nations agreed to create a joint working group of businessmen and government officials to seek out investment opportunities in both countries.
Peña Nieto said that Mexico could also become a gateway for Chinese products to other Latin American nations, as well as the United States. Xi explained to reporters that
Beijing was interested in investing in Mexico’s energy and mining industries, as well as in infrastructure projects, and announced that in 2015
Mexico has agreed to host the first ever summit between Chinese and Latin American businessmen. The two leaders didn’t give any precise figures on how much money they had pledged in investment or give a timetable as to when some of these accords will be put into place.
Peña Nieto and Xi
, however, both stressed that they were willing to work to forge new relations and cooperate in international forums.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Governmental organization in charge of cataloguing foreign affairs, “President Xi Jinping Congratulates Maduro on
Presidential Election Win,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1032740.shtml)
On April 15, 2013,
Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Nicolas Maduro on his winning the Venezuelan presidency
. In his message,
Xi said with the joint efforts of the leaders
of both sides,
China-Venezuela relations have been developing remarkably since the two countries forged strategic partnership of common development in 2001. "China and Venezuela have become good friends of mutual trust and good partners of close cooperation," he said. Xi stressed the great importance he attached to developing ties with Venezuela, adding China is willing to join hands with Venezuela to carry forward bilateral ties into the future and open up new prospects for the relations
.
(Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, “What Chavez Taught China,” Inter-American Dialogue, 1-18, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/)
Though more aware of country-specific risk, China is unlikely to abandon its deals and strategic agreements with Venezuela
and other ‘risky’ nations in the region.
China’s leaders instead are genuinely committed to expanding relations throughout Latin America in coming years, including investment and lending in a wider variety of sectors. Recent agreements with the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLAC), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) suggest as much
.
The region as a whole is looking east for economic opportunity. A new Venezuelan leadership­—whether ‘chavista’ or not—would be likely to do the same
.
China’s
strategic partnerships with Venezuela and other countries will remain intact. Its foreign policy apparatus is looking to forge stronger and longer-term friendships, and its firms will continue to engage the region based on a combination of Chinese domestic interests and profit-driven motives
. But the trend is toward comprehensive risk assessment and a more cautious, research-based, and well-informed approach to the region.
Latin America should expect ever more methodical engagement from China.
(Diana Villiers, senior fellow with the Latin American Initiative under Foreign Policy at Brookings, former trade lawyer and professor of history, “Maduro As President of Venezuela: What to
Expect,” Brookings Institute, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/04/16venezuela-maduro-negroponte)
With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank (CDB),
Maduro will face a shortage of cash
. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and endure a period of austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election.
He could approach the multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools of the U.S.
“empire.” Maduro’s

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil to the island, preventing him from drawing down that account to sell the oil on the open market.
Maduro has two options: seek a further loan from CDB, similar to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the current Chinese loans
. (Currently 21 percent of Venezuela’s debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is critical. Discussions with officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March revealed that continued Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities.
Since 2007, the
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) have gained large stakes in Venezuela’s oil industry after Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned the country
under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political stability are important to the Chinese
government, its institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms.
However, extended repayment schedules will probably come with the condition that more effective management be put in place at Venezuela’s national oil company (PDVSA) as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That means additional Chinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
7-2-
(Francisco and Jennie Linder. Francisco is the owner of Translegal LLC. Francisco assists clients with every aspect of international commerce, including compliance with regulatory issues, obtaining required licenses and permits, establishing subsidiaries / representative offices. He has a JD from the University of Arizona and a BA in English from UC Berkeley. Jennie Linder Cunningham is a partner at Translegal LLC. “China’s Economic Influence in Latin America.” Translegalllc.com. 2 July 2013. Web.) http://translegalllc.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/chinas-economic-influence-in-latin-america/
Chinese national oil companies
(NOCs) have invested heavily in Venezuela
, often following a “loans-foroil” deal pattern
. Reports indicate that the
Chinese Development Bank (CDB) has now become the country’s primary foreign source of financing
. China currently reports 230,000 barrels imported per day, although official PDVSA
(Venezuela’s state oil company) reports ~ 319,000 exported barrels.
This discrepancy indicates that
China is not only importing oil from Latin America for domestic “energy security”, but that Chinese NOCs are simultaneously reselling their “equity oil” on the global market.
With an almost 100,000 barrel-per-day disparity, it appears that
Chinese NOCs (which are heavily state-supported) have entered the international oil trade, not just the import business
.
(H.T. Writer for The Economist. “Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?” The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3
The short answer is: for simplicity’s sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised
distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither
socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as China’s is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder,
you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuela’s oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion
already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana
Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the island’s latest fad.
(H.T. Writer for The Economist. “Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?” The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3
However, as our story on Mr Xi’s visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did
. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard
.
China’s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigge r. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University,
Latin
America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong
. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says
China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank combined
. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America.
Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods
. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports
(Humberto Marquez, Journalist at IPS specialising in international news. He worked for 15 years with Agence France-Presse
(AFP), 10 as assignment editor in Caracas, covering Venezuela, the Caribbean and the Guyanas. “China Maps out Venezuela’s Valuable Mining
Resources.” Inter Press Service 28 February 2013. Web.) http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/china-maps-out-venezuelas-valuable-miningresources/
The prospecting agreement is part of a growing alliance between the two countries, which has turned
Venezuela into a major source of petroleum for China, while the Asian giant is meeting the South
American country’s growing need for credit to finance its constant outflow of public funds. Venezuela
exports over 600,000 barrels of crude oil a day to China, according to Ramírez, although other sources put the figure at half that much. Beijing, in turn, has granted Caracas more than 38 billions dollars in
credits, and at the same time it participates in energy and construction projects.
, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine, former CNN International Reporter, “China Bankrolling Chavez’s Re-election Bid With Loans,” 9-26,
Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-reelection-bid-with-oil-loans.html)
One vehicle for the lending is a joint fund to finance infrastructure projects
set up in 2007 by CDB and
Venezuela’s Bank for Social & Economic Development. To date,
China has contributed $16 billion, while Venezuela has committed half that amount, according to the Venezuelan government. Separately Chavez also secured a $20 billion loan from CDB
in 2010, half of which is payable in U.S. dollars and half in renminbi. Chavez said this month that he’s seeking a third credit line
. “We’re thinking about 2013,” he told reporters Sept. 11. “I sent Hu Jintao a letter and the teams are already working on it,” he said, referring to the Chinese president.
Venezuela pays off the loans with oil, the amount of which fluctuates depending on the price of crude.
Currently debt- servicing consumes about 200,000 barrels of the 640,000 a day that Venezuela sends China
, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Sept. 25, or about 9 percent of production.
Venezuela relies on oil for 95 percent of its exports and half of public spending. The savings for Venezuela are significant. As a result of
Chavez’s
nationalization drive and inflation that has remained above 18 percent since 2007, the country’s borrowing costs have soared to the highest among major emerging markets
. The extra yield investors demand to own Venezuelan dollar debt rather than U.S. Treasuries widened 5 basis points, or 0.05 percentage point, to 987 at 10 a.m. in Caracas, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI Global index. Cheap
Credit
Venezuela pays no more than 6 percent interest on its loans from China compared with 12 percent it pays for bonds issued in capital markets
, Ramirez told El Nacional in an interview published Sept. 19. Ramirez’s office didn’t immediately respond to a request to confirm his comments as reported by El Nacional.
The lower cost has allowed
Chavez to avoid tapping global investors. While the government and state oil company Petroleos de
Venezuela SA sold a record $17.5 billion of dollar- denominated debt in 2011, so far this year PDVSA has issued just $3 billion.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, “Chinese Press on Chavez’s Death,” China-Latin America Blog, Inter-
American Dialogue, 3-14, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/)
The following news stories
, assembled by former Dialoguer Peng Ruijie, were published in the Chinese press following Hugo Chavez's death
on March 5th.
Although the reports offer a variety of perspectives on
Chavez, most conclude that little will change with respect to the China-Venezuela relationship.
According to most, the results of upcoming elections in Venezuela will have
little effect on China's various agreements and lending arrangements in Venezuela
. Xinhua News - 查韦 斯离世可能 产 生的影响 Predicts stability in Venezuela because of Chavez’s appointment of Maduro
. States that Maduro has a 60 percent chance of winning in the upcoming elections.
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher, Xu Shicheng, notes that
even if Capriles wins the election, there will be some continuity in terms of social policy and that Capriles might even try to lead other leftist countries in the region. Xu goes on to say that a Maduro
or Capriles government will still maintain good relations with China and will honor Chinese agreements in such areas as energy, infrastructure and finance. The report concludes that the political transition will have little effect on China-Venezuela relations
.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Bi-annual forum to discuss western hemispheric political conditions, hosted by Inter-American Dialogue and affiliates Genaro Arriagada, former minister of the presidency of
Chile and ambassador of Chile to the United States, chairman of the Board of Radio Cooperativa and national director of the “NO” Campaign; Sergio Bitar, former Chilean minister of public works under
President Michelle Bachelet from 2008 to 2010, minister of education, minister of mining, a senator, president of the Party for Democracy (PPD) on two occasions, and author of numerous books about
Chilean politics and international relations; Nora Lustig, former visiting Shapiro professor of international affairs at George Washington University, president and professor of the Department of
Economics of the Universidad de las Americas in Mexico, and professor at the Center of Economic
Studies at the Colegio de Mexico; Margaret Myers, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-
American Dialogue, Former China Analyst for US government; Manuel Orozco, chair of US Foreign
Service Institute’s division on Central America and the Caribbean, senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, adjunct professor at the School for
International Service at American University; “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin
America,” Inter-American Dialogue, April, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years
. Just a decade ago, 55 percent of the region’s imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin America’s imports
.
China
and Europe have made huge inroads . China’s share of trade
in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United State s; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia .
Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade much more among themselves .
Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazil’s second largest trading partner, just behind China
. Still, these changes must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the Latin
American market has diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace .
They have more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US exports worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin
America’s growth continues to be strong . But the United States will have to work harder and harder to compete for the region’s markets and resources
. While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the region’s expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability
.
Today the United States exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to
Mexico than it does to China
; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia.
Chinese view Latin American investment as key to their global standing
(Tamara, Silja Voss, Researcher, Steffen Dyck, "China's commodity hunger: Implications for Africa and Latin America" Deutsche Bank Research)
B. Africa and
Latin America have become destinations for Chinese investment
Even if the spotlight has been on the massive inflows of foreign investment money into China in recent years,
China is increasingly investing abroad
as well. We estimate the stock of Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) to have totalled USD 44-50 bn at the end of 2005. While the largest part of these flows remains within Asia (60% of flows in 2005, 73% of the stock as of end-2005, see chart 23), China has been increasingly investing in other regions as well, including
Latin America
and more recently also Africa. However, the high share of Asia is likely biased by the phenomenon of round-tripping through Hong Kong9which would explain its dominant position in the ODI statistics (see table 24)10.Chinese
ODI to Latin America and Africa only makes up 2% and 1% (the latter excluding round-tripping11), respectively, of the total, but
China has stepped up its investment
in the two regions recently (see boxes). In the last few years
Chinese
government officials have

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] made high profile trips to
both
Latin America
and Africa, announcing extensive investment plans
. During his trip to Latin America in late 2004, Hu Jintao announced that China would invest up to USD 100 bn in Latin America
over the next ten years.
We therefore think that
ODI flows could increase substantially over the next few years, as China tries to secure more and more resources in an environment of rising commodity prices
. In fact, in a survey about their
ODI intentions in the next 2-5 years, Chinese firms indicated that the share of ODI flowing into Africa and Latin America could increase to about
15% and 11%, respectively, of the total (see chart 25).12While many of the investment projects in both Africa and Latin America are carried out by Chinese state-owned enterprises, private companies also increasingly invest abroad.13 The Chinese government has created a framework in the form of its “Go-out” or “Going Global” strategy, which centres on active government support and encouragement for domestic firms to pursue investments abroad. Chinese firms have taken up the call: AnUNCTAD report lists five Chinese (state-owned) transnational corporations
(TNC) among the top 50 non-financial TNCs from developing economies14(see table 26). Some 700 Chinese companies are active in Africa alone.15
Three main goals have been
mentioned as driving Chinese outward direct investment
: 1.
Economic rationale
:
Improving energy security and securing access to resources, markets, and strategic assets
.16
Strategic assets in this context refer to management skills, brands or distribution networks. Access to markets includes setting up production sites in countries with favoured access to major markets (e.g. access to the US market from Mexico via NAFTA, or from African countries via the
African Growth and Opportunity Act). 2.
Political intentions
:
Official recognition as a “market economy” from its trading partners and adherence to the “One-China
” principle.173.
Strategic goals
:
Supporting China’s emergence as a major global power
.
Concomitant with its economic success China wants to be accepted as an important international player
.
Closer external trade ties can be leveraged towards reaching this goal.
Moreover, China supports the idea of a multi-polar world to counter American hegemony.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Adrian H., ARC Future Fellow and professor at the University of Sydney in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba”, Journal of Current
Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 156, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE
At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US think tank took the stage with a Chinese official to debate China’s deepening ties with Latin America.
The specialist asked whether China is willing to “come to the table” with the United States to promote democratic development in the region. The Chinese official’s reply was revealing: “We are interested in trade, and not in politics.” Talking past – rather than with – each other, the officials revealed a disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to international affairs, in particular concerning the role of the state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges like these suggest that calls for China to unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, and that Chinese attempts to rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so. They also suggest the need for compromise on both sides of the Pacific as China assumes a more prominent role in world affairs.
Financial instability in
the United States and Europe has intensified China’s engagement with developing countries. Sino-
Latin American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 183 billion USD in 2011, and China’s
priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources of foodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth,
and open new markets for Chinese manufactured products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategic implications of this process, drawing predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by government officials, emphasise the economic benefits of their country’s demand for the region’s primary products, evinced by Latin
America’s impressive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005, 2009; Sun 2011).
Latin American publications reflect the region’s historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on resource exports, 2) declining manufacturing sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010;
Dussel Peters 2005, 2010).
Policy briefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns
about the economic sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionally subsumed by US hegemony (Arnson and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009;
Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. “Countering China's Reach in Latin
America” 2012. http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)
Second, the
U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and
instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily
.
¶ ¶ That means no more allowing trade
deals—and the partners counting on them— to languish
. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.
¶ ¶
Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy
. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in
Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six
Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.
Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending.
The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that
China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last
.
¶ ¶ Reengagement
also means revitalizing security ties
. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard.
To deter China
and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region
. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in
Latin America.
We should remember that many Latin American countries
—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and
Chile— border the Pacific
.
Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region
.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Michael, writer China Research Center, 4-15-2011, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin America”, web)
In March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama met with leaders and officials in Brazil, Chile and El Salvador. Mr. Obama made this visit amid growing Chinese power in the region. The trip marked the first time President Obama had visited Latin America since becoming President. By comparison, at this point in Hu Jintao’s presidency, the Chinese president already had visited four countries, including Brazil, where he signed
39 bilateral agreements and announced $100 billion in investments. While Mr. Obama was well-received during his trip, the most common response in those countries was that the trip was symbolic but not very substantive. Obama’s visit did not reflect any shift in policy. Many of the major statements these countries hoped for (such as a call for Brazil’s permanent place on the U.N. Security Council), in fact, were not made. Mr.
Obama admitted
on his trip: “
There have been times when the United States took this region for granted
,” according to the Latin American Herald Tribune.
Those times are not yet in the distant past
and there are fears this administration is making mistakes similar to ones in the past. After promising during his 2000 election campaign to correct Washington’s indifference to Latin America,
George W. Bush was accused of turning his back on the region in favor of more pressing issues in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The President showed no concern for a growing Chinese influence in the hemisphere, and China put both feet inside before anyone in
Washington seemed to realize the door was open. This was a move China had planned during the administration of George H.W. Bush.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
China views even indirect issues as zero-sum with the U.S
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-chinafrictions.html
In the face of China’s strengths, and worries that the United States will be displaced from its premier
position in the world, Washington is engaged in activities including stepped-up spying by American planes and ships along China’s borders that anger the Chinese, particularly its military, Mr. Wang writes.
Promotion of human rights in China by American-supported nongovernmental organizations is viewed as an effort to “Westernize” the country and undermine the Communist Party, a stance the party will not stand for, he says. That China is increasingly confident that it will prevail in the long run against the
United States is backed, in part, by Mr. Lieberthal’s appraisal of American policy toward China. Mr.
Lieberthal cites findings from American intelligence based on internal discussions among crucial
Chinese officials that these officials assume “very much a zero-sum approach” when discussing issues
directly and indirectly related to United States-China relations. Because these are privileged
communications not intended for public consumption, American officials interpret them to be
“particularly revealing of China’s ‘real’ objectives,” he writes. In turn, American law enforcement
officials see an alarming increase in Chinese counterespionage and cyberattacks against the United
States that they have concluded are directed by the Chinese authorities to gather information of national interest.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Wang, Department of Economics, Tsinghua University, Translated by Laura Lin, “In
America’s Backyard: China in Latin America,” Economic Observer Online, April 27, 2013, Online, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports,
which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin
America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China.
China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China
National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s
investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector.
Oil is a zero-sum game- uniquely true in the context of China and Latin America
(Gal, PhD and Co-Director for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security “Challenge or
Opportunity? China’s Role in Latin America”, United States Government Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm)
China's pursuit of Latin American oil will only make matters worse. With half of its oil imports coming from the Western Hemisphere and with oil imports in the United States projected to surge 60 percent during the next two decades, the United States cannot afford to lose chunks of Western hemispheric crude. Every barrel of oil China buys in the Americas means one less barrel of Western hemispheric oil
available to the United States market. This means that China will have to--the United States will have to look for this oil elsewhere, and that will be particularly in the Middle East, which is contrary to President Bush's pledge to make the
United States less dependent on, ``places that don't particularly like us.'' So when it comes to oil, Mr. Chairman
, this is a zero-sum game.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Perception key- China will base its action towards Latin America based off of its ability to maintain access
(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1 st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)//VP
It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences
),
and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin
America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3
its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin
America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology.
The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru,
Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.
The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions
China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.
Perception is key
(Matt, Specializes China’s Political-Economic Relations with Emerging Economies
“China’s Latin American Interests”, 4/6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latinamerican-interests/a7av)
While overall the United States remains the region’s main trade and investment partner, the perception that China’s star is rising and America’s is falling means the United States must reengage the region both economically and politically in a way that is seen as contributing to rather than inhibiting Latin American economic and political development.
And even if the idea of a China Model or Beijing Consensus remains vague and open to various interpretations, the idea that
China
itself presents a successful model of development, and is a major new trade and investment partner for the region
, exposes the need for the United States to rethink its own approach toward both economic and political development issues in Latin America and elsewhere.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”
NDU Press, 1 st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM
Finally,
Chinese influence is diluted by increasing interactions between Latin America and other extraregional actors, such as India, Russia, Iran, and others.
Although the PRC is arguably the most significant new suitor of the region, it is not the only alternative.
For Nicaragua and populist regimes in the Andean region, Russia provides important alternatives with respect to arms purchases and energy sector investments.
An $18 billion commitment by a Russian consortium to develop the Junin-6 oilfield in Orinoco, for example, may have helped to accelerate China's subsequent commitment to invest $16.3 billion in Junin-4
. In addition to Russia, India is increasingly engaging in commercial opportunities, particularly in high technology, services, and commodity sector investments, while challenging the PRC monopoly over "south-south" developing country partnerships in the region.
When China cut off purchases of Argentine soy oil
, for example,
it was India that picked up the slack.
Analysts looking for signs of imminent Chinese coercion or intervention in Latin America are likely to be disappointed. Nonetheless,
Chinese soft power in Latin America still raises important national security issues, even if the PRC does not explicitly seek to subvert or marginalize the United States as part of its reemergence onto the world stage.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Isabel Hilton is a London-based writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper “China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge?” http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf Feb.]//BMitch
The United States
, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to
date to
China’s increasing presence in
Latin America
. In a striking acknowledgement of China’s importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for mutual transparency through
the
U.S.– China Dialogue on Latin America
. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded China’s standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to
China’s action in troublesome countries
such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign.
The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished fears of Chinese competition for the region’s energy resources
, despite
a strong
Chinese presence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian markets, and China’s success in locking up the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than
50% of its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past.
There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about
China’s still modest military sales
to the region.
Examples
of these sales include Venezuela’s
2010 purchase of 18
K-8 fighters
from China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles to the “China threat”.
Regardless of whether there is any real “threat”
to the U.S., key decision-makers have not reacted. China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future
.
Although this
undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation
.
In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia,
however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States
, there is potential for increasing competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China
Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard
. At that point, the traditional
Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Joshua, Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Harvard, “Latin America to Push Obama on Cuba Embargo at Summit,” April 13, 2009 15:07, Online, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk, accessed
7/17/13) PE
Then Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart of
the U.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a century.
¶
While
Latin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the 47-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexico’s pro-business Felipe
Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving U.S. relations with the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades.
¶
Obama, born six months before President
John F. Kennedy imposed the embargo, isn’t prepared to support ending it. Instead, he’ll seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealing restrictions on family visits and remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush.
¶
That would mesh with his stated goal of changing the perception of “U.S. arrogance” that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy speech on the region last
May.
¶
“All of Latin America and the Caribbean are awaiting a change in policy toward Cuba,” Jose
Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of American States, said in an interview. “They value what Obama has promised, but they want more.”
¶
The policy changes unveiled today also include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allow U.S. telecommunications companies to apply for licenses in Cuba.
¶
Symbolically Important
¶
Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is symbolically important to the
region’s leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to Cuba and its longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries shun the communist policies of Castro and his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the island.
¶
“Cuba represents a 50-year policy
failure in Latin America and that’s why it’s so important for Obama to address it now,” says Wayne
Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who headed the State
Department’s Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. “Unless Obama wants to be booed off the stage, he better come with fresh ideas.”
¶
The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be “unfortunate” if
Cuba is the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead on the economy, poverty and the environment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White House’s top adviser for the meeting.
Obama also understands that he can’t control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders as partners, Davidow told reporters on April
(Andrew, British journalist who has worked for Reuters since 1992 on various assignments in Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Brian, Personal Property lawyer at Alston and Bird LLP, “Latin America rebels against Obama over Cuba,” Reuters, Sun Apr 15,
2012 10:13pm, Online, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summitidUSBRE83D0E220120416, accessed 7/18/13) PE

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Unprecedented Latin American opposition to US sanctions on Cuba left President Barack Obama
isolated at a summit on Sunday and illustrated Washington's declining influence in a region being aggressively courted by China.
Unlike the rock-star status he enjoyed at the 2009 Summit of the
Americas after taking office, Obama has had a bruising time at the two-day meeting in Colombia of some 30 heads of state.
Brazil and others have bashed Obama over US monetary policy and he has been on the defensive over Cuba and calls to legalize drugs.
Due to the hostile US and Canadian line on communist-run Cuba, the heads of state failed to produce a final declaration as the summit fizzled out on Sunday afternoon.
“There was no declaration because there was no consensus,” said Colombian
President Juan Manuel Santos. He bristled at suggestions the summit had been a failure, however, saying the exchange of different views was a sign of democratic health.
For the first time, conservativeled US allies like Mexico and Colombia are throwing their weight behind the traditional demand of leftist governments that Cuba be invited to the next Summit of the Americas.
Cuba was kicked out of the
Organization of American States (OAS) a few years after Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and has been kept out of its summits due mainly to US opposition.
But Latin American leaders are increasingly
militant in opposing both Cuba's exclusion and the 50-year-old US trade embargo on the Caribbean island.
“The isolation, the embargo, the indifference, looking the other way, have been ineffective,”
Santos said. “I hope Cuba is at the next summit in three years.” Santos, a major US ally in the region who has relied on Washington for financial and military help to fight guerrillas and drug traffickers, has become vocal about Cuba's inclusion even though he also advocates for democratic reform by Havana.
In an ironic twist to the debate, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went dancing in the early hours of
Sunday at a Cartagena bar called Cafe Havana, where Cuban music is played.
Argentine President
Cristina Fernandez, who has insisted without success that Washington recognize its claim to the Falkland
Islands controlled by Britain, was one of several presidents who left the summit well before its official closure.
She missed a verbal gaffe by Obama, who referred to the “Maldives” instead of the “Malvinas” when using the name Latin Americans give to the disputed islands.
The leftist ALBA bloc of nations -- including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and some Caribbean nations - said they will not attend future summits without Cuba's presence.
“It's not a favor anyone would be doing to Cuba. It's a right
they've had taken away from them,” Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said from Managua.
(Josh, Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government,
“Obama Can Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open Economy, Groups Say,” Bloomberg Business News, Feb
20, 2013 6:21, Online, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cubaembargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Now, in a second term, and with private business expanding in Cuba, Obama has a freer hand to do more, said Sabatini. An exception to the embargo allowing U.S. businesses and consumers to trade with non-state enterprises in Cuba would be small in scale though help empower a growing, viable constituency for change on the island, he said.
Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in
2006, Castro has relaxed state control of the economy in the biggest economic overhaul since the 1959 revolution. To provide jobs for the 1 million state workers being laid off, the government began allowing the buying and selling of homes and the creation of farming co-operatives and other private businesses.
The latest sign of change are new rules that took effect in January allowing most Cubans to bypass requirements they obtain an exit visa or invitation from abroad to leave the island.
Castro in December said that he hopes that productivity gains will boost economic growth this year to at least 3.7 percent.
Gross domestic product expanded 3.1 percent in 2012.
The Washington-based Cuba Study Group urges
Obama to gain even more leverage by getting Congress to repeal the so-called Helms-Burton act of
1996 and other legislation that conditions the easing of sanctions on regime change.
Any move to ease
the five-decade-old embargo would probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers including Senator
Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
A bill introduced by Representative Jose Serrano, a New York Democrat, in the 112th Congress to dismantle
the web of legislation governing relations with Cuba since as early as the 1960s received no cosponsors.
(Jeff, Lt. Col. in the U.S. military, military fellows program, “Marine colonel: Drop the Cuba embargo,” Friday, October 23, 2009, Foreign Policy, Online, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo, accessed
7/18/13) PE
The Obama administration's decision to extend the U.S. economic trade embargo on Cuba for an additional year is detrimental to our national and regional security and further emboldens our economic, military, and infrastructure rivals. What is most perplexing is the fact that earlier this summer the Obama administration decided to relax some of the regulations regarding personal travel and personal money transfers from Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, as well as telecommunication exchanges between private U.S. and state-run Cuban companies: all are steps in the
right direction for U.S. interests - but are not enough. While these relaxed restrictions are certainly a step forward in normalizing relations, these steps do not outweigh the heavy diplomatic, information, and economic influence of Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, China, Russia, India, and Iran, all of whom support the Cuban government and all of whom seek to be peer competitors with the United States.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Cuba is strategically important for China – political symbol of influence.
(Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January, usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
In terms of economic openness and political ideology Mexico and
Cuba
are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, for China both hold high strategic value
. Examining China’s relations with Mexico and
Cuba opens an analytic window into the way that bilateral commercial, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation programs have adapted
to distinct local conditions. Based on interviews and observations gathered during three years in Cuba, ten months in China, and eight months in
Mexico, this Pacific Rim Report outlines some of the positive and negative local responses that intensifying engagement with China has produced. It also suggests that China has effectively tailored bilateral programs to local environments to advance common economic, political, and cultural objectives.China’s economic impact across Latin America has been uneven. Its demand for energy resources has driven up commodity prices, benefiting exporters such as Argentina and Brazil (soy), Chile (copper), Peru (iron, fishmeal), and Venezuela (crude oil) (Jiang
2005, Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Nevertheless, as the case studies of José Luis León Manríquez (2006) show, the exports of Mexico and the countries of Central America consist primarily of manufactured products and textiles, resulting in seemingly insurmountable competition from a tidal wave of legal and illicit Chinese imports. Romer Cornejo (2005) suggests that this regional variation results in part from the structural adjustments of the public and private sectors pursued by Latin American countries to facilitate cooperation with China. To examine this issue in depth, in 2006 the Red de Estudios de América Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia del Pacífico (Latin American and Caribbean Study Network on Asia and the Pacific, or REDEALAP) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) brought together scholars from IADB member countries to debate the effectiveness and future trajectory of structural adjustments in order to deepen cooperation with China in areas ranging from fiscal integration into regional trade blocks to natural disaster relief (REDEALAP 2006). A recent book from the OECD (Santiso 2007) argues that although China’s emergence represents a valuable opportunity for Latin America to develop alternative economic partnerships that reduce dependence on the United States and Europe, resource exports to China could gradually push the region into a ‘raw materials corner’. Similarly, a book from the Inter-American Development Bank entitled, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the
Caribbean, argues that to avoid future dependence on primary resource exports, Latin American governments should adopt long-term strategies that position their countries as service providers for the expanding Chinese middle class, particularly in the tourism and education sectors (Devlin et al. 2006). The authors signal that to climb the industrial value chain in this way will require a greater coordinating role for
Latin American governments, since development strategies guided by the market alone, adopted in part as a backlash to previous import substitution strategies, will naturally favor short-term growth through commodity export.One summary of China’s relations with six Latin
American countries (Jorge I. Domínguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the ‘triangular’ relationship between
China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007).
China’s multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba
and Mexico.
Although Cuba harbors some
economic value for China through oil exploration
, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote China’s image as a ‘non-aligned’ protagonist of ‘South-South’ cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin America’s ‘New Left’
. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.
Influence in Cuba key to China’s overall Latin American agenda.
(Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January, usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner
after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007
(Cubaencuentro 2008).
This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if
Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand
. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin America’s “New Left”, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance
to U.S. hegemony.
For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is
at least as voracious
as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba
, strongly supported by Raúl Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an external
—potentially imperialistic— threat to economic sovereignty
.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
th
The present era of cooperation began in Nov. 2004, when Chinese President Hu Jintao brought 200 businesspersons and investors to Cuba. He ended up signing a 16-point bi-national agreement covering
bio-technical, higher education, telecommunications, nickel extraction initiatives, and more, with
China providing favorable credit terms. Follow-up took place in Havana in 2009, as national assembly
presidents of the two nations agreed on new financial and commercial arrangements, and prepared for Cuban port, radio and television, and bulk transport modernization. In Dec. 2011, Cuban Council of
State Vice-Minister Ricardo Cabrisas, meeting in China with the inter-governmental Cuba-China
Commission, signed updates and reported on the 6th Cuban Communist Party Congress of that year.
Bilateral trade rose from $590 million in 2004 to $1.8 billion in 2010. China became Cuba's second
largest trading partner, exceeded only by Venezuela. Chinese trade with Latin America overall has increased 42 percent over five years. China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel
China needs for steel production. China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits off Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China. Cuba's Molecular Immunology Center (MIC) recently announced that the anti-lung
cancer vaccine CimaVax-EGF, made by the Cuban-Chinese Biotech Pharmaceutical Ltd (BPL) Company,
would undergo trials in China. MIC head Augustin Lage visited China in February to assess use of
Nimotuzumab monoclonal antibody, a BPL product directed at several human several cancers.
Although China’s investment portfolio in Latin America is highly concentrated in energy and raw materials, advanced technology and biotechnology specifically have stimulated interest and serve as
catalysts for a stronger relationship between China and Cuba. This growing partnership has opened
significant Asian markets to Cuba. For China, the partnership offers access to Cuban biotechnology expertise and a presence in the Western Hemisphere just 90 miles off the coast of the United States
Cuba’s strength in biotechnology stems from a long history of investment in its own nation’s health, scientific, and medical research and delivery. As a result, Cuba boasts some of the best health indicators of any country in the developing world. Its infant mortality rate is lower than that of the United States and several other large industrialized nations, Cuba has made considerable advances in biotechnology, including the development of the world’s first vaccine for meningitis 13 has developed a pesticide for

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] dengue carrying mosquitoes and is an exporter of one of the most effective hepatitis 13 vaccines in the region. Cuba is working to market its expertise and products on the global market and as an example, is advancing its TheraClM hR3 anticancer therapy through a joint venture with Germany. During the past two decades an economic partnership between China and Cuba has developed. According to Cuba’s
National Office of Statistics, trade in goods to China in 2007 was roughly $2.7 billion. Though hard to measure, this number has been boosted by expanded Chinese investments in the Cuban biotechnology industry. Since 2000, several successful Chinese-Cuban biotech pharmaceutical companies have
emerged. Biotech cooperation between China and Cuba began in earnest in 2004 when Chinese and
Cuban officials signed a memorandum of biotechnological cooperation during Chinese president Hu
Jintao’s visit to Havana. The goal of the memorandum was to amplify cooperation and deepen the
economic and commercial ties between the two countries. Following the agreement, in 2005, the first joint Chinese-Cuban biotech entity, Biotech Pharmaceutical, set up a plant in Beijing. Biotech
Pharmaceutical was created with the specific purpose of bringing Cuban research and pharmaceuticals to China and began by making monoclonal antibodies to treat Chinese cancer patients. Since 2006,
China and Cuba have created two new biotechnology firms: ChangHeber Pharmaceuticals, which produces interferon and other compounds; and, most recently. Beijing Neurotechnology Limited,which will develop, produce, and commercialize neurotechnological products. China’s recent economic growth
and increasing global power have cast a new light on this relationship, Beijing’s interest in Cuba has produced more frequent highIevel meetings; rapidly expanding levels of economic cooperation; and numerous exchanges in the areas of science, technology, and defense. Chinese investment in the Cuban
biotechnology industry specifically has opened many doors to the global market for Cuba and is expected to continue to grow.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Jeff
(Staff writer, journalist), 1-19-
, Reuters, “Oil rig arrives for Cuba offshore exploration work,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-cuba-oil-rig-idUSTRE80I1WV20120119
The rig, known as Scarabeo 9, could be seen as it sailed slowly westward, miles off the north coast and
Havana's famed Malecon seaside boulevard. Its arrival went mostly unnoticed by people in the capital,
but it was a long-awaited and landmark day for the island's oil industry, which believes the platform will tap into rich oil fields in Cuba's part of the Gulf of Mexico. Starting next week, Spanish oil giant
Repsol YPF, working in partnership with Norway's Statoil and ONGC Videsh, a unit of India's Oil and
Natural Gas Corp, is expected to drill at least two wells in Cuban waters about 70 miles from the
Florida Keys. Malaysia's Petronas, in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft, will also drill a well using the Scarabeo 9. The rig has been contracted from its owner Saipem, a unit of Italian oil company Eni. All the wells will be in water at least a mile deep, like that of the BP well that blew out and spilled millions of gallons of oil in the U.S. part of the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Cuba has said it may have 20 billion barrels of oil in its parts of the Gulf, but the U.S. Geological Survey has estimated about 5 billion. Repsol drilled the only previous offshore well in Cuba in 2004 and said it found oil, but said it was not "commercial." It has been trying for several years to bring another rig for more drilling, a task that was complicated by the longstanding U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and the limits it places on the amount of U.S. technology that can be used. The Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible rig that floats on four giant pontoon legs and has living quarters for more than 200 crewmembers, was built in China, then sent to Singapore in late 2010 for completion.
Investors.com (Business magazine and advisory), 4-11-12, Investor’s Business Daily, “While We Dither
On Oil, It's Drill, Beijing, Drill,” http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/041112-607461-china-seekscanadian-cuban-oil.htm?p=full
Energy Policy: A Chinese oil company is now the world's top producer. While we sleep and watch pump prices rise, China, India and even Cuba seek supplies the world over, including drilling off the Florida
coast. Global demand for oil is rising, as is its global price, as energy-hungry economies such as China,
India and Brazil scour the earth for oil they know will be the energy of the present for some time to come. Even those lacking their own technology are asking others to help them get more. For them, there is no such thing as "peak oil." The U.S., however, stands alone as the only major country not actively seeking new supplies. Less than two years after the Deepwater Horizon explosion of a single rig virtually shut down our efforts in the Gulf of Mexico, a Chinese rig built for a Spanish company, Repsol,
has begun exploratory drilling for oil off Cuba as close as 50 miles to Key West, Fla. The Scarabeo 9 rig
will drill at a depth of 6,000 feet underwater. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill happened at a shallower depth of 5,500 feet. The U.S. Geological Survey recently estimated the North Cuban Basin contains as much as 9 billion barrels of oil and 22 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Other estimates range from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels. Pools of oil and natural gas tend not to obey lines drawn on a map. It is certain that at least some of Cuba's wells will be tapping oil pools that straddle the boundary separating our zone from theirs, meaning Havana will be getting oil that should be ours. Countries like
China clearly don't see oil as an energy source of the past. China and India provided a combined $24
billion in oil industry subsidies in 2010, according to the International Energy Agency. The figure dwarfs
the $4 billion in industry incentives that President Obama is seeking to end.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Aaron
(Deputy government and politics editor, writer/editor for PolitiFact.com, Times staff writer), 4-4-
, Tampa Bay Times, “PolitiFact: Stearns' claim about Chinese oil drilling in Gulf of
Mexico is half true,” http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/politifact-stearns-claimabout-chinese-oil-drilling-in-gulf-of-mexico-is/1085129
"Cuba wants to let the Chinese drill in some of the very parts of the gulf that American producers are
currently forbidden to touch, as close as 45 miles off the Florida coast," Stearns, R-Ocala, says on his campaign Web site. Stearns' point — that if Cuba is going to drill anyway, why shouldn't we? — is obvious. But are his facts right? First, some background. In 1977, Cuba and the United States negotiated maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the waters south of the Florida Keys, called the Florida
Straits, according to the U.S. Department of State. The boundaries, called Exclusive Economic Zones, give countries special rights of exploration and marine usage. Mexico, Cuba and the United States have
EEZs in the gulf, and Cuba and the United States control the Florida Straits. When it comes to oil, Cuba decides who drills in its EEZ and oil that may come from it — and the United States controls who can drill in its territory. The United States currently bans drilling in much of the eastern Gulf of Mexico
(including waters within 234 miles of Tampa Bay), and all of its portion of the Florida Straits. But last
week, President Barack Obama proposed to open new areas to oil and gas exploration along the eastern seaboard south of New Jersey and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico within 125 miles of Florida's coast. U.S. drilling would still be banned in the Florida Straits. . Now onto Cuba, the heart of Stearns' claim. Cuba's maritime boundary in the Florida Straits extends to within 45 miles of the Keys, as
Stearns suggests. Cuba has no drilling moratorium. Its EEZ is broken down into 59 areas. In 2002, Cuba's state-run oil company, Cubapetroleo, started leasing individual areas to foreign oil companies in both the Florida Straits and the Gulf of Mexico for exploration. So far, Cuba has leased 15 of the 59 areas, said
Jorge Pinon, a former oil executive with Shell and Amoco who is an expert on Cuba's energy sector and a former energy fellow with the University of Miami's Center for Hemispheric Policy. The waters closest
to the United States have not yet been leased. Who holds the rights to the areas? Oil and gas companies based in Spain, Norway, India, Malaysia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Brazil. But not China. China
has an onshore, land-based lease in Cuba but not an offshore lease, Pinon said.
, 05-26-
, Commissioned report for the CubaInfo Series, “Cuba and
China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissionedreports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf
Chinese enterprises have developed a broad range of industrial initiatives in Cuba. Agricultural cooperation has focused on the production of rice, soy, sorghum, and maize, and Cuba exports 400,000 tonnes of raw sugar annually to China. Scientific exchange has developed in earthquake detection, solar energy research, cancer treatment, and vaccine production. In 2004, Hu Jintao pledged to invest $500 million in Cuba’s nickel sector, and although Venezuela emerged as the leading financier of the Las
Camariocas ferro-nickel plant, China has since consumed 20,000 tons of the resource (Cheng 2009:1).
The Chinese oil company Sinopec has teamed up with Cuba’s CUPET to develop onshore operations in
Pinar del Rio (CRS 2008:24), while the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is negotiating
exploration of Cuban deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2007, 10,000 Chinese tourists visited Cuba, and as discussed below, electronics manufacturing and transport infrastructure have emerged as key areas of expansion. China often pays for developing country natural resources with trade credits, construction equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles 2005).

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
, 06-05-
, NewsMax.com, “China to Refurbish Cuban Oil Refinery,” http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/cubanrefinery-china-partnership/2011/06/05/id/398888
China signed a letter of intent to refurbish a Cuban oil refinery and agreed to give new credit and start
drawing up a five-year cooperation plan between the two communist-run countries in accords signed
Sunday during a visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The agreement on the refinery was the first
official word on a project first reported by Reuters in November that is expected to cost $6 billion and would be a significant step forward in budding Cuba-Chinese economic relations. The signing of the accords followed talks between Xi and Cuban President Raul Castro on Xi's second day in Cuba after arriving Saturday from Italy. XI is widely expected to succeed Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2013. Few details about the credit and other agreements were available. China is Cuba's second largest trading
partner, behind Venezuela, with trade last year totaling $1.83 billion, according to official Chinese news agency Xinhua. The refinery letter of intent is an agreement among Cuvenpetrol, which is a joint venture between Cuba and Venezuela, China National Petroleum Corp's Huanqiu Contracting and
Engineering unit and the Italian unit of French oilfield service company Technip to finalize a contract to expand and improve a Soviet era refinery in Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. The plan would expand the refinery's capacity to 150,000 barrels per day, from 65,000, and is a key part of Cuba's plans
to develop its still untapped oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico.
W.T.
(Cuba solidarity activist and member of Veterans for Peace), 03-05-
, People’s
World, “Cuba reaffirms ties with China,” http://www.peoplesworld.org/cuba-reaffirms-ties-with-china/
China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses
(8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs for steel production.
China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits off
Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China.
Alexander
(Author, GasAndOil.com writer, founder, CEO), 3-16-
, GasAndOil.com,
“Sinopec and Cupet to explore oil blocks in Cuba,” http://www.gasandoil.com/news/ms_america/d7c92d068a2d16b0faaa819123514b2d
China Petrochemical Corp., or Sinopec, has signed a memorandum of understanding with Cuba's
national oil company, Cuba Petroleo, or Cupet, to explore four oil blocks in Cuba, a Sinopec official said. The MoU will allow Sinopec to conduct geological studies of the four Cuban blocks over six months beginning mid-March, which could lead to the signing of a production sharing contract
between the two companies, he said. "We will do a survey on these blocks first and then decide if we will enter into a PSC," he said, adding the blocks are likely to contain mostly crude oil, as opposed to natural gas. The MoU marks the first attempt by Sinopec, China's second largest oil and gas company, to enter oil and gas exploration and production in Cuba.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba”, Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 171, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Recent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic odds with the United States,
Chinese initiatives are not inimical to mainstream principles of development and governance. Long-
term market expansion, coordinated industrial sectors, and state oversight of private initiative are goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind Sino-Cuban projects. These goals also resemble the principles advocated by Latin American, European, and US officials in the wake of the GFC.
The Cuban reforms formalised by the 2011 Communist Party Congress will support a further convergence of positions, as they propose a more balanced mix of state and market forces. Although
Sino-Cuban initiatives are managed under the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese support for
Cuba’s liberalisation agenda is prompting the Western hemisphere’s only communist nation toward alignment with international norms.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Hongbo, “A New Stage of Interaction” MERL Research / Technical Staff
Senior Principal Member Research Staff Ph.D., Chongqing University
China Daily, 6/6/2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisit/2013-
06/06/content_16573253.htm)
China and Mexico will work together to safeguard each other's national interests and the interests of developing countries. President Xi
Jinping's visit to Mexico shows the new Chinese leadership's support for Mexico's development and their will to expand and deepen cooperation.
On Tuesday, Xi and his Mexican counterpart, Enrique Pena Nieto, pledged they will enhance political dialogue on bilateral, regional and global issues so as to consolidate the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership. Since diplomatic ties were established 40 years ago, bilateral relations have developed rapidly.
Confucius said, at 40 one should be free of doubts, and China-Mexico ties have matured and are now robust, featuring mutual respect and mutual benefit. And with Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party returning to power, China-
Mexico relations can open a new chapter in their longstanding friendship. Mexico established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. At the
26th session of the UN General Assembly, seven Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba voted that the government of the People's Republic of China was the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. In the
1970s and 1980s, China and Mexico cooperated in the international community supporting South-South cooperation in a bid to promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order.
In 2003, the two countries forged a strategic partnership, expanding their friendly exchanges and cooperation in various fields.
Both China and Mexico are emerging economies with increasingly close bilateral economic and trade relations and the two countries' influence on the global governance reform is irreplaceable. China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while Mexico is China's second-largest trading partner in Latin
America. The two countries should take more political initiative and make pragmatic policy efforts to push relations to a new level. On issues concerning each other's core national interests, the two countries should enhance mutual understanding and properly handle their differences.
And partisan politics in Mexico should not be allowed to have an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship. What concerns Mexico most is how to narrow the huge trade deficit with China. The trade imbalance is an indisputable fact mainly due to the differences in the two countries' economic structures. To solve the problem, the two sides should adopt a constructive attitude, put more political resources into their economic cooperation mechanism and improve the quality, level and sustainability of their economic and trade cooperation. Economic and trade cooperation is high on Mexico's agenda and the Mexican business community is eager to gain more market access to China, which is considering expanding imports of Mexico's competitive products, such as agricultural, livestock and fishery products. The two countries can also expand mutual investment. According to Chinese official statistics, at the end of 2011, China's investment in Mexico was only $264 million, which is less than its investment in some other Latin American countries.
With regard to their economic and trade cooperation mechanism, the two countries can try to set up a China-Mexico cooperation fund to facilitate financing for mutual investment and trade. Mexico has great demand for investment in transportation, agriculture
, communication networks and other areas, and China hopes to expand direct investment in
Mexico
, which will create employment opportunities for local people. The two sides can also consider starting a feasibility study on building a free trade area. Meanwhile, the Mexican government is actively promoting energy reform and the prospects for energy cooperation are bright. The two countries should also strengthen consultation and safeguard each other's national interests and the common interests of developing countries in the fields of finance, trade and climate change under the framework of multilateral mechanisms such as the United
Nations, the G20, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. They should also expand people-to-people exchanges and strengthen cultural and educational exchanges and contacts. Mexico has the most Confucius Institutes in Latin America and the National Autonomous
University of Mexico has set up the Mexican Center in China. Cultural and academic exchanges between China and Mexico are frequent and the two sides may consider expanding the number of exchange students. In addition, the two countries should also strengthen public diplomacy to deliver a real and vivid national image to each other's people. Finally, relations between the two countries must take into account the United
States. Because of the complex and asymmetrical interdependence between Mexico and the US, developing relations with the US is the top priority in Mexico's diplomacy. However, it is definitely not a zero-sum game, and the three countries can explore potential areas for future cooperation.
(Elleka, Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat “Chinese Firms Go Global”
The Diplomat, May 31, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinese-farms-go-global/ )

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Already, as China has developed more of its land, concerns have developed over whether enough arable land will be available to produce enough food to feed its massive population. This problem has serious implications. As Katherine Morton, a specialist on Chinese environmental governance, notes:
“Ten percent of the Chinese population is estimated to be undernourished, the rural labor force is declining, and agricultural productivity is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, natural disasters and water shortages.”
She goes on to explain, “For planning purposes, China must have at least 120 million hectares of arable land to produce enough food to meet future demands. But around two-thirds of available land in China is now classified as either barren or low in agricultural potential…”
Despite its long-standing policy of being agriculturally self-sufficient, the
Chinese government has tried to cope with rising food insecurity by encouraging overseas investment in agricultural farms
around the world, including
in
Mexico,
Cuba, Russia, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Uganda, Tanzania, Laos, the Philippines, and Australia. A 2012 report from the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) examined China’s domestic and global agricultural investment strategies, and found that China is becoming increasingly dependent on agricultural imports. Indeed, the IISD report notes that soybeans have become China’s main imports, accounting for 38 percent of total agricultural imports, while other major agricultural imports include cotton (9 percent), and palm oil (8 percent). The majority of these imports come from
Asia, North and South America, and Africa. Some Chinese farmers, like Zhu Zhangjin, believe this new trend of outsourcing will help strengthen food safety standards and improve quality, while lowering production costs and increasing profit margins. Zhu has followed other individual farmers, agribusiness corporations, and governments by buying huge tracts of land in countries like Brazil and Australia. While outsourcing agriculture has its benefits, as evident from the sheer number of countries pursuing this avenue, there are also many potential problems with transnational land investments. For the investor, these challenges include having to secure large plots of land in order to achieve economies of scales, high transportation costs, political unrest in recipient states, and hostility and resentment from local populations. Chinese investors have been no exception as they have encountered increasing hostility from local populations in purchasing land in areas like South America and Africa, including the charge that this new wave of outsourcing is the equivalent of “neocolonialism.” These allegations are inaccurate though, since neocolonialism involves a relationship whereby a state’s policy is influenced by the political, military, or economic leverage it exercises over an external actor. In the case of agricultural outsourcing, there is no loss of sovereignty in recipient countries – even if trade patterns resemble those in colonial times. As Deborah Brautigam, an expert on China-African relations and Director of the International Development Program at John Hopkin’s SAIS, explained in a recent interview with The Diplomat, observers accusing China of neocolonialism are using an “oversimplified idea of ‘neocolonialism’ – i.e. that China exports manufactured goods and imports raw materials. This structure of trade is accurate – but it’s a very narrow definition. Colonialism is about domination and political control, occupation and military force. This is hardly true of China in Africa.” Furthermore, charging China with neocolonialism absolves the governments in recipient countries of all blame. As Brautigam adds, “I think those who use this term fail to appreciate that African economies are already structured as raw material exporters. It is up to Africans themselves to develop other kinds of attractive export products.” Indeed, countries like Brazil have found ways to resist eager Chinese investment in its arable land by strengthening regulations on foreigners purchasing land. If other countries are opposed to the increasing attention they are receiving from international land investors, they too can pass laws to keep investors in check and focus on developing other export industries. Nonetheless, China has been proactive in devising ways to ensure that local populations benefit from its investment policies. As the IISD report cited above notes, “Acquiring farmland is one of the investment strategies that China is pursuing. But it is part of a much broader strategy that includes joint ventures with local governments or local companies and contracts with local farmers.” Locals are often able to benefit from the investment by continuing to work on the farms rather than being replaced by
Chinese labor that is imported for specific projects. Furthermore, in many countries Chinese investment in land leads to sharp rises in its productivity due to the importation of modern technology and additional investments in key irrigation infrastructure. In some cases, Chinese investment in other types of infrastructure like roads and ports can expand these benefits to other local industries. Nevertheless, local grievances need to be considered and addressed when companies, states, and individuals invest in countries with rich, arable land. For instance, local farmers need to be fairly compensated if they are asked to move off land that is being used for transnational land investments. As mentioned above, local farmers should be given the option of continuing to work the land, and local food security should be guaranteed before any of the harvest is exported to other countries. In adopting these methods, investors can avoid charges of neocolonialism and the accompanying local hostility that puts investments at risk.
(“Niu Dun Co-chairs 5 th China-Mexico Agricultural Working
Group meeting” April 5, 2012 http://english.agri.gov.cn/ic/ao/201304/t20130412_19396.htm
)
China and Mexico held the 5th Agricultural Working Group (AWG) Meeting of China-Mexico Intergovernmental Standing Committee in Beijing on April 5, 2012.
Vice Minister Niu Dun and Dr. Pedro Brajcich Gallegos,
Director General of the Mexican National Institute of Forestry, Agriculture, and Livestock Research (INIFAP) of the Secretariat of Agriculture,
Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGAR) led their respective agricultural delegations to attend the Meeting. Initiated in 2004, the Inter-governmental Standing Committee aims at guiding and coordinating bilateral cooperation and reducing conflicts over trade and investment.
Both sides reviewed and evaluated the progress in agricultural cooperation between China and Mexico.
Both agreed that
, with joint efforts,
China-Mexico agricultural cooperation witnessed increasing
number of mutual visits, smooth agricultural S&T exchange, and agricultural trade growth
. Both sides recognized that in terms of future agricultural development and market demand, there is still greater potential for further cooperation. To this end, both sides expressed their willingness to make concerted efforts to tap cooperation potential based on mutual benefits and win-win outcomes.
Both sides briefed their achievements in recent years, development plans for the years ahead and related agricultural policies.
Both were of the view that the exchange of agricultural development and related policies is beneficial to drawing on advantages from each other and boosting agricultural development. Both agreed to facilitate the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Science and Technology Cooperation between INIFAP and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences (CAAS).
The Memorandum aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in the fields of prevention and control of animal and plant diseases and plant pests, climate change adaptation and agricultural bio-technology, germplasm exchange of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco and other crops, as well as to hold the second Sino-Mexico Forum on Agricultural Science and Technology.
The Meeting also reached consensus on an early signing of Agreement on Fishery Cooperation
, inter alia to intensify cooperation in marine fishing, aquaculture, introduction of new species and fishery stock enhancement. O ther issues discussed at the Meeting included creating
favorable conditions for investment
, granting
appropriate preferential policies
, and providing necessary service and
facilitation measures so as to encourage
and support eligible enterprises from both sides into agricultural trade and investment.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
David
(Former legislative aide to a state senator, staff writer for Examiner), 9-2-
,
Examiner.com, “Chinese companies supporting Mexican drug cartels,” http://www.examiner.com/article/chinese-companies-supporting-mexican-drug-cartels
On Thursday, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency announced the seizure of 520 pounds of
methylamine hydrochloride, the chief chemical component used in producing methamphetamine. The shipment which was found at an air cargo facility at Los Angeles International Airport originated in
China and was headed to Mexico. A Drug Enforcement Agency official told Fox News that the amount
of chemicals seized could have produced 330 pounds of methamphetamine, with a street value worth as much as $16 million. This shipment was only the latest of its kind to have been sent from China in
support of Mexico’s drug trade. -In August 2011, a shipment of gamma-Butyrolactone, the chief component used in manufacturing gamma-Hydroxybutrate, or the date-rape drug. -In February 2011,
Mexican authorities seized over 23 tons of ethyl phenylacetate, which is also used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The drug component was discovered at the Pacific port of Manzanillo. -In April
2010, Mexican officials seized 80 tons of phenylacetic acid and its derivatives shipped from Shanghai,
China. Imports of ethyl phenylacetate require authorization from the country’s health ministry, so the
shipments are intentionally mislabeled before leaving China. Last year, an anonymous U.S. official told
Reuters that between October and November 2010, Mexican authorities seized 818 tons of chemicals used in making crystal meth. Due to rampant corruption among port officials, the cartels are allowed to
receive large shipments of the chemicals from China which are transported to meth labs throughout
Mexico. The chemicals are used in a production process known as phenyl-2-propanone (P2P method), and cost much less than pseudoephedrine, thus increasing the cartels’ profits. In 2009 alone, the
Mexican police and military found 215 meth labs, a 400 percent increase of the labs discovered in 2008.
90 percent of the methamphetamine sold in the U.S. is brought into this country from Mexico and distributed by several street gangs such as the notoriously violent MS-13.
Kari
(Reporter, staff writer for MSNBC, Newsweek writer, foreign/domestic policy journalist), 9-
18-
, NBC News, “Crystal cartels alter face of U.S. meth epidemic,” http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14817871/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/crystal-cartels-alter-face-usmeth-epidemic/#.Ueh3Go2yCn9
Recognizing the new international threat, Washington is taking legislative and diplomatic initiatives to ensure cooperation from the global players in the meth trade — manufacturing centers like Mexico and
the world's biggest producers of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, China, India and Germany. At the
United Nations, the U.S. pushed through a resolution that calls on countries to submit a yearly estimate of their legitimate need for the chemicals and to provide information on all exports -- both bulk shipments and those of pharmaceutical preparations. Previously those ingredients were uncontrolled,
a gaping loophole in regulations that allowed millions of tablets containing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine to be sold on the black market. Under the Combat Methamphetamine act, the State
Department also is required to certify that the biggest exporters and importers of the chemicals cooperate with the United States, with the threat of withdrawal of foreign aid hanging over those that do not. The U.S. initiative is working to a degree. The DEA says the U.S. has seen increasing cooperation from Mexico, China, India and Germany in sharing intelligence and conducting joint enforcement operations. The urgency of the mission is clear because they too are witnessing a rising tide of meth

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] abuse, the DEA says. But political will doesn't always translate into control over agile drug trafficking organizations. “We're seeing ephedrine shipped from India and China to South Africa and then from there to South and Central America,” DEA administrator Karen Tandy said in a recent speech in Canada.
“Chinese ephedrine is being diverted through Cairo on its way to Mexico. And ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are being diverted in other African countries including Angola, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kenya and Mozambique.”
David W.
(Huffington Post staff writer), 12-14-
, Huffington Post World, “Pseudoephedrine
Crackdown Forces Mexican Meth Cartels To Go Back To Basics,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/14/pseudoephedrine-crackdown_n_390894.html#
"We are starting to see a rise in chemicals that are easier to get," said U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration spokeswoman Dawn Dearden. Preisler, who works at an electroplating factory and has been arrested twice in the U.S. for his work with methamphetamine, says he isn't surprised traffickers
have turned to P2P. "P2P is old school," he said. "Hell, I used to cook by that route circa 1980." The fight has come full circle. In the 1980s, the U.S. government severely restricted access to P2P seeking to curtail methamphetamine production. Meth makers shifted to ephedrine, which could be found in common cold remedies. When authorities cracked down on ephedrine, they switched to
pseudoephedrine, the active ingredient in Sudafed and other decongestants. When U.S. authorities regulated bulk sales of the ephedrines ,meth production shifted to Mexico, where, at the time, gangs
could get their hands on mammoth quantities of pseudoephedrine imported from China and India.
Mexico was soon supplying up to 80 percent of the drug sold in the U.S ., and American authorities were calling meth the No. 2 drug threat to society after cocaine. Once Mexico restricted imports and
sales of pseudoephedrine, the cartels took a hit. The volume of methamphetamine seized in the United
States fell 34 percent, from 7.1 tons in 2006 to 4.7 tons in 2007, according to the U.S. National Drug
Intelligence Center. It also said it observed decreased drug purity. Dearden says DEA agents found the price of meth increased. Experts say a crackdown on phenylacetic acid would likely just push traffickers to other chemicals. "People forget that these are synthetically made drugs, and we haven't even seen the end of all the possible recipes," said Ralph A. Weisheit, an Illinois State University professor who wrote "Methamphetamine: Its History, Pharmacology and Treatment."

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Mexico is key to China’s sphere of influence
(Jon Brandt American University School of International Science Derek Hottle
Nicole Adams Nav Aujla Christina Dinh Kirsten Kaufman Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew,
“Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy”,
December http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-
FINAL.pdf)
The PRC’s
military interests in LAC are
closely aligned with its commercial objectives
. Bilateral security ties build political goodwill with regional players, thus reducing the likelihood of actions against Chinese exports and investments.57
China’s economic priorities are seen in its “official system of cataloguing states as cooperative,
friendlycooperative or strategic partners—with the implication that this has for the allocation of economic resources.”58
China’s
four “ strategic partner s” in Latin America - Argentina,
Mexico
,
Brazil and Venezuela – serve as important trading partners and commodity suppliers.
China’s strategic posture in the Western Hemisphere is consistent with its
publically stated national security priorities
. The PRC’s 2010 national defense white paper emphasizes a defensive Chinese military strategy, focusing on strengthening international military relations and countering foreign interference in domestic affairs. The paper highlights Chinese concerns about international military competition in the areas of missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, and the polar regions, while simultaneously insisting the PRC does not seek confrontation or global hegemony. While
China’s ties with LAC reflect a growing desire to protect economic and security interests
, the PRC is promoting cooperation which reflects “ mutual trust and benefit,”
not offensive measures that would directly threaten the United States. A number of high-level defense visits have occurred between
China and Latin American
nations.59 While these interactions
have not resulted in groundbreaking bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve as confidence building measures
and provide openings for arms transactions.606
, (Arizona Daily Star, 9/14/2012, “Fox says US-Mexico ties deter China's influence”, web)
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico
- including recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or get used to the idea of China setting the international agenda on its own terms
. "
The threat is this
so-called power shift from the West to the East
," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox said.
His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews.
"We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge."
That means bolstering the economies of the
United States and Mexico
, he said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the
United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what circumstances.
(Guillermo I, writer South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 5-23-13, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, “America losing influence throughout
Latin America”, web)
Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until
Obama's visit to
Enrique
Peña Nieto
, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels.
Not highlighted was the
Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Peña Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally,
China has helped change the equation.
After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power
. When American presidents spoke, the world listened.
Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world.
Still
, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region.
Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that
Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicolás Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela – the alliance between Cuba's Raúl Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home
. Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence
.
Many
of the leftists' presidents in the region
consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Yang Jingjie is a reporter for Global Times. Global Times a daily Chinese tabloid focusing on international issues. “Increase in Mexican oil exports indicates thawing ties”, Global Times, April 9, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773515.shtml#.Ueht4I1OSSo)
Observers say Mexican state oil company
Pemex's decision to significantly boost oil exports to China
will help optimize the imbalanced bilateral trade structure and indicates thawing ties following their leadership transitions.
On the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia on Saturday, Pemex Chief Executive Emilio Lozoya said the company would begin increasing exports to
China by 30,000 barrels a day starting this month, according to a two-year agreement between Pemex and China's Sinopec, Reuters reported.
The level of exports to China could increase over time as part of the agreement, he added. Mexico, the seventh largest oil producer in the world, exports nearly 80 percent of its oil to the US and only some 50,000 barrels to China each month, according to China Radio International.
Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, told the Global Times that the increase stemmed from China's potential for growth in demand, against the backdrop of shrinking US imports as a result of its shale boom. A report released by OPEC
last week expected China to overtake the US as the world's largest oil importer by 2014.
This would also diversify China's sources of oil imports, "as only about 9 percent of the imports came from Latin America last year," Lin added. Data from the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation showed last year nearly half of China's oil imports came from the Middle East.
Yang Zhimin, a researcher with the Institute of Latin
American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told
the
Global Times
that the supply of oil is not solely decided by market demands, given its strategic nature. "
We can't rule out the possibility of US influence in
Mexico's decision, but the current president Enrique Pena Nieto won't follow the US as closely as his predecessor did.
" Pena Nieto, who is from the center-left Institutional Revolutionary Party, last year replaced rightist Felipe Calderon as president. Yang noted that the visit by Pena Nieto, which was paid just weeks after Xi became president, was a move aimed at mending bilateral ties. His predecessor Calderon met the Dalai Lama in 2011, drawing discontent and objection from Beijing. Yang said the new oil deal would also help narrow the bilateral trade imbalance. Mexico said its trade deficit with China reached $51.2 billion in 2012.
(David Pierson is a reporter for the LATimes. He is based in Beijing and covers the Chinese economy. “China's push for oil in Gulf of Mexico puts U.S. in awkward spot”, LATimes, October 22, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/22/business/fi-china-oil22
A
Chinese
company's gambit to drill for oil in U.S. territory demonstrates China's determination to lock up the raw materials
it needs to sustain
its rapid growth
, wherever those resources lie. The state-owned
China
National Offshore Oil
Corp., or CNOOC, reportedly is negotiating the purchase of leases owned by
the Norwegian
StatoilHydro in U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico, the source of about a quarter of U.S. crude oil production.
China's push to enter U.S. turf comes four years after CNOOC's $18.5-billion bid to buy Unocal Corp. was scuttled by Congress on national security grounds. The
El Segundo oil firm eventually merged with Chevron Corp. of San Ramon. Whether CNOOC's second attempt to lock up U.S. petroleum assets will trigger a similar political backlash remains to be seen.
The
sour U.S. economy and the need
for
Washington and Beijing to cooperate on
potentially larger issues
could mute any outcry.
The U.S. could
also find it difficult to rebuff China when it has long welcomed
other foreign investment in the gulf.
In addition to StatoilHydro, foreign oil companies with stakes in deep-water projects there include Spain's Repsol, France's Total, Brazil's Petrobras, British oil giant BP and the Dutch-British multinational Shell. The U.S. risks undercutting its foreign policy goals as well.
Concern is growing over China's aggressive investment in oil-rich nations with anti-U.S. regimes
, including Iran and Sudan.
Denying China a shot at drilling in U.S. waters would only encourage Beijing to make deals in volatile regions
given that new oil reserves in stable, democratic nations are getting harder to find. "
China doesn't have a lot of alternatives
," said Ben Simpfendorfer, chief
China economist for Royal Bank of Scotland. "
They're very late to the game.
"

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Tim Johnson, the Mexico bureau chief for McClatchy Newspapers. “China’s Xi splashes cash, deals on leisurely trip to woo Mexico”, McClatchy News Service, June 5, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/05/193101/chinas-xi-splashes-cash-deals.html#.Uehqko1OSSo)
China’s leader is a guest who brings lots of gifts and lingers. President
Xi Jinping
, on the second day of an unhurried three-day visit to
Mexico, spoke to the nation’s Senate Wednesday afternoon, then left for City Hall and prepared to visit the nation’s most renowned Mayan pyramid before heading on to California later in the week. Throughout his activities, Xi emphasized that China is upgrading its relations with Latin America, and Mexico in particular.
Xi opened his nation’s wallet
to prove it, splashing out $1 billion
in credit to Pe troleos
Mex icanos, the state oil giant, and pledging $1 billion in trade deals.
He also vowed to strengthen cultural and educational ties, offering 300 scholarships for Mexican students to study in China and announcing the opening of
China’s first cultural center in Latin America. Other accords promised cooperation in renewable energy, disease control and promotion of tourism. Xi’s presence marked the first official state visit of President Enrique Pena
Nieto’s six-month-old government
, which hailed it as giving “new impetus” to ties between the two nations
after passing through a cool phase. Appearing before lawmakers, the 59-year-old
Xi highlighted that he and
Pena
Nieto had upgraded ties to
what he called a
“comprehensive strategic partnership.”
“By doing this, we send a strong message to the international community that China and Mexico will form a common front to face various challenges in the future,” Xi said. “The relationship between China and the region is now at an important stage of accelerated development,” Xi said. Xi did not spell out what commercial deals were in the offing, but the announcement appeared intended to lessen frictions over a wide trade deficit. Local news accounts said Chinese firms are interested in building ports, highways and pipelines. Mexico is China’s second-largest trade partner in Latin America. But even as total trade has risen sixfold, to more than $36 billion in 2012, a trade gap is yawning. For every $9 in goods that China sells to Mexico, Mexico only sells $1 in goods back. China said it had agreed to permit imports of Mexican pork and tequila, and to “a bigger presence of Mexican products in China.” “China is not looking for a trade surplus,” Xi told lawmakers. “On the contrary…it is ready to actively increase the import of Mexican products.”
China also sees crude oil purchases from Mexico as a way to ameliorate the trade gap.
Mexico agreed in April to provide China with 30,000 barrels a day of crude oil. Both Xi and Pena Nieto offered effusive words at a joint appearance, followed by a banquet Tuesday evening. The Mexican leader described Mexico and China as “two countries on the rise” that are “strategic allies,” while Xi noted that both are descended from “millenary civilizations.” Banners of China’s red flag with five gold stars festooned poles along the capital’s main boulevard,
Paseo de la Reforma. The visit marked a warming of relations that were chilled under two previous Mexican presidents, both of whom met with the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetan minority in China, who Beijing brands as an incorrigible separatist. In a 33-point joint statement released Tuesday night, Mexico pledged not to interfere in China’s affairs regarding its “inalienable” region of Tibet and its claims on Taiwan, the independently governed island off its shores. On the sprawling Tibetan Plateau, 118 ethnic Tibetans, many of them monks or nuns, have set themselves on fire since 2009 to protest Chinese rule. Xi’s visit to Mexico drew wide coverage in media on the Chinese mainland, and is likely to boost tourism interest in Mexico, especially after Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, a renowned singer, tour the Mayan pyramids at Chichen Itza on the Yucatan Peninsula on Thursday. Growing numbers of Chinese are traveling outside the mainland, but of the 93 million who did so last year, only 47,810 came to Mexico. The joint statement said the two countries would work to promote reciprocal tourism and develop direct airline connections, both for passengers and freight, by a Chinese airline. Xi pledged to lawmakers that “there will be more Chinese tourists at the temples of the moon and sun” at the pre-Aztec Teotihuacan ruins near the capital, and more “at Chichen Itza and on the beaches of Acapulco.”
Xi’s visit came amid a growing courtship of Latin America by the United States and China
, the world’s No. 1 and 2 economies, respectively, as both nations seek to boost trade with a region
that the United Nations says has lifted 58 million people from poverty in the past decade. President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month, and Vice President Joe
Biden just returned from Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil. In a column printed in the Wall Street Journal Wednesday, Biden wrote “the Obama administration has launched the most sustained period of U.S. engagement with the Americas in a long, long time.”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Knowledge @ Wharton; online resource publication that offers the latest business insights, and information and interviews with business leaders, members of Gumtree, and presidents of various universities; “NAFTA’s ‘Uninvited Guest’: Why China’s Path to U.S. manufacturing Runs Through
Mexico”; Article contains interview from Kevin Gallagher, associate professor of International relations at Boston University, 3-20-2013, http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english)
Gallagher predicts that the next wave of Chinese exports to Mexico may well include finished vehicles
, but he argues that those Chinese-built cars are more likely to be assembled in Mexico
than in the U.S. “There will be
Chinese automotive manufacturing plants in Mexico before there are any such plants in the U.S. because the costs are lower [in Mexico], and it is harder to operate a plant in the U.S., where there are so many regulations.” Nevertheless,
Gallagher worries about whether
Mexico’s transportation infrastructure is up to the task of handling huge, additional volumes of goods made within the country’s own borders. To overcome the significant gaps in Mexico’s industrial and transportation infrastructure, Gallagher suggests that Mexico approach the China Development
Bank for loans that would be used to construct and expand Mexican seaports and high-speed highways.
That way, Mexico could smoothly accommodate additional volumes of imported Chinese raw materials and components that would flow from the decision by Chinese firms to build automotive plants inside Mexico.
(Gary Regenstreif; news editor for Thomson Reuters; “The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America”; Reuters; 6-12-13; http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/thelooming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/)
China has particular interest in Mexico
, the region’s second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods.
But China is now looking to work with Mexico City — investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(JOSÉ DE CÓRDOBA and SARA MUÑOZ, Latin America news reporters for Wall Street Journal,
“Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties”, 1/9/13, web, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)
But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other
since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made
"with the authorization" of Mr. Chávez.
For its part, the U.S.
prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation
,
U.S. officials
say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step.
"It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.
(Bradley, 1/9/2013, writer, Associated Press, “US seeking renewed Venezuela ties after Chavez”, web)
Washington’s goal is a pragmatic relationship with Chavez’s successors
, even as the two countries will likely have much to continue disagreeing over
. The approach is somewhat akin to the one President Barack Obama adopted with Russia after taking office four years ago, hoping to eliminate the distrust
that built up during George W.
Bush’s presidency by re-establishing cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation, while acknowledging that Moscow and Washington won’t necessarily agree on democracy and the rule of law. The “reset” in ties with the Kremlin has stalled amid sharp U.S.-Russian disputes over missile defense plans and Syria’s civil war, but the administration still fiercely defends its merits
. With Venezuela, the U.S. is hoping to start with stronger counter-narcotics coordination,
a challenge given that the Venezuelan government includes officials subject to U.S. drug “kingpin” sanctions. Other American priorities include energy cooperation and stronger enforcement of sanctions against Iran. The U.S. also fears Iranian efforts to use Venezuela as a base for terrorist or other activity in the Western Hemisphere against American interests.
, (Frank, staff writer Reuters, 3-13-2010, Reuters, “China delivers Venezuela jets for anti-drugs fight”, web)
Venezuela
on Saturday tested six training and light attack jets bought from China for
defense and anti-drugs flights in a deal that dodges an embargo banning sales of U.S. weapons
parts to
oil exporter
Venezuela
.
President Hugo
Chavez ordered a total of 18 K-8 jets built by China
after a plan to buy similar jets from Brazil's Embraer fell through, apparently because they include U.S. electrical systems. "
Thank you, China. The empire wanted to leave us unarmed. Socialist China, revolutionary China appeared and here are our K-8 planes," he said during a televised display
of the jets' capabilities. Officials at the ceremony said the versatile jets will be used to train pilots and intercept drug traffickers who use Venezuela as a stop off point to take Colombian cocaine to the United States, Europe and Africa.
(JOSÉ and SARA, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties”, Latin America news reporters for Wall
Street Journal, 1/9/13, web, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)
Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other
. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric.
But
Mr.
Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage
as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels privately
, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think
Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said
Michael
Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank.
Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector.
With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez,
who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Roger, Former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and a former U.S ambassador to the Organization of the United States, Chávez and China: Challenging U.S.
Interests “America Enterprise Institute”, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defensepolicy/regional/asia/chvez-and-china-challenging-us-interests/)
Under the cloak of Washington's indifference, Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez is making steady progress in cementing strategic relations with China, which is eager to eclipse U.S. presence in a key,
mineral-rich South American economy. Russia is a source of weapons and foreign policy clout, Iran is abetting Chávez's shadowy nuclear program, and Cuba is managing a system of internal control and repression in Venezuela. Together with China's capital, in the form of loans and investments, this cadre of hostile powers has selfish motives and ruthless methods for keeping Chávez in power. China has
funneled money and expertise into Venezuela's oil industry and taken an authoritative role in improving the country's manufacturing sector and finances. With so much to gain in trade and oil, China will strive to keep Chávez in power. The United States can no longer afford to practice wishful thinking but must recognize the threat growing in Venezuela. Key points in this Outlook: China's growing
economic role in Venezuela is a direct result of Hugo Chávez's systematic drive to supplant U.S.
influence and impose a socialist system on his country. U.S. oil producers and manufacturers stand to
lose their market share in Venezuela and may soon see new competitors with Chinese backing emerge there. The United States must abandon its policy of inaction and recognize the foreign-backed threat
growing under Chávez in Venezuela. In the last six years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has
increased its presence in Venezuela's oil industry dramatically, filling a void as Chávez muscles out U.S. and even local expertise. More recently, China has also been providing financial support as Chávez grapples with fiscal chaos of his own making and looks to ramp up domestic spending on the eve of
September's National Assembly elections. U.S. diplomats are loath to speak out against Chávez's antidemocratic, anti-U.S. agenda; however, in July a State Department spokesperson broke this eerie silence to say that "we want to continue our mutually beneficial energy relationship" with
Venezuela.[1] Washington's wishful thinking and passive policy are no match for Chávez's tireless campaign to convert Venezuela into a bulwark for U.S. enemies.
(Largest French newspaper, publishes in English, “Venezuela Looks
Beyond US to China As a Customer,” Rappler Beta, 3-15, http://www.rappler.com/world/23924venezuela-united-states-china-oil)
CARACAS, Venezuela -
Woe is Venezuela, sitting atop the world's largest oil reserves. Production is down and its top customer, the United States, is buying less. So here comes China to the rescue
, among others, as
Venezuela seeks to diversify its markets. Under the late Hugo Chavez, Washington and Caracas had a difficult diplomatic relationship,
and they have had no ambassadors in each other's capital since 2010.
But oil makes the world go round and a buck is a buck, so pragmatism prevailed. The US remained the main destination for Venezuelan oil. But those exports have dropped, from 1.38 million barrels in 2007 to 906,000 in
2012,
according to figures from the US Energy Department.
That poses a problem for Venezuela. The United States pays cash, unlike countries of the Caribbean and South America which import Venezuelan crude under

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] preferential terms or even trade oil for services
like doctors and teachers, said analyst Diego Gonzalez. The US is importing less from Venezuela because it wants to diversify its vendor portfolio, said Rafael Quiroz, former director of the state oil company PDVSA. In
2012, Venezuelan exports to the US dropped 11% to $37.4 billion, amid higher prices for Venezuelan crude and derivatives, according to
Venamcham, the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce. The United States is seeking energy efficiency in consumption and has promoted investment and technology in non-conventional oil fields. It will achieve energy independence in around 2020, when it will be the world's top oil producer, says the International Energy Agency (IEA). "
It is not easy to substitute a client like the United
States for any old client,
" said Gonzalez, president of the Center of Energy Orientation. What is harder is to have Venezuelan crude keep going to Venezuelan Citgo refineries in the US, as they do not exist in other countries. "That is hard to transfer," said Gonzalez.
Then there's China, with its booming energy demand. Venezuela has developed serious economic and political cooperation with the Asian giant. Since 2008 exports of oil to China have doubled to 640,000 barrels a day. Of that, 264,000 are to pay off loans totaling $30 billion that Beijing made to Caracas in recent years.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine, former CNN International Reporter, “China Bankrolling Chavez’s Re-election Bid With Loans,” 9-26,
Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-reelection-bid-with-oil-loans.html)
Winning Twice
The loans give the Chinese influence
over Chavez, who regularly speaks of recovering Venezuela’s sovereignty after decades of subjugation to the U.S. “empire.” In addition to securing large deliveries of oil, much of the money lent to
Venezuela returns in the form of contracts to Chinese state-run companies whose global expansion is also being financed by the Beijing-based CDB, the world’s biggest policy lender. Among the beneficiaries are China Petrochemical Corp and the country’s biggest oil and gas producer, China
National Petroleum Corp. Both gained stakes in Venezuela’s oil industry after Exxon Mobil Corp.
(XOM) and ConocoPhillips (COP) abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization
.
“Venezuela’s oil is at the service of China
,” Chavez, 58, said in February 2009 at a meeting in Caracas with a delegation of
Chinese businessmen led by Vice President Xi Jinping.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Daniel Wallis, Senior Correspondent for Reuters. Daniel used to work for The Times newspaper and PA News agency in London before joining Reuters in 2003. Since then he has reported on political, general and economic news from across east Africa, Iraq and Latin America. “Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy to focus on China, Russia” Reuters, Mar 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315)
Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China
and Russia if acting President
Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During his 14 years in power, Hugo Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at the service of his power base,
Venezuela's poor majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharply increased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of foreign funding.
"We are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes of President Chavez's policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said
in a recent interview with a local TV station.
"We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to continue deepening and cultivating.
It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ...
Chavez's policies are more alive than ever, and we will push ahead with them."
Maduro, the late president's preferred successor, faces
Henrique Capriles, governor of Miranda state, in the forthcoming election. The vote was called after Chavez's death last week following a twoyear battle with cancer. If
Maduro
wins, he can be expected to increase oil sales to political allies at the expense of the United States
, while taking on more debt from those partners. Venezuela is sending China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude and products, up from just a few thousand bpd in 2005, in repayment of loans totaling $36 billion. The biggest Chinese energy company,
China National Petroleum Corp
(CNPC), is a key part of Venezuela's efforts to tap its enormous Orinoco extra heavy crude belt, one of the planet's largest hydrocarbon reserves. CNPC has joined with state oil company PDVSA in a joint venture in the
Orinoco
called Petrourica that is expected to begin producing within weeks. A PDVSA project with a Russian consortium, Petromiranda, began pumping there last year.
(R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case
Study”, August 9, 2010, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)
The rise of China is
intimately tied to the global economy
through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth
and development, and
thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests.
In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS
in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB
in 2009 were efforts to
obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests.
In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa
Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the
Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits from the challenges posed to
the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela
, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Chietigj Bajpaee, Master’s degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan
University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint King’s-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. “CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN
AMERICA”, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)
Latin America
is fast emerging as the major stage of competition for oil and gas resources among the global powers. The region, which has traditionally come under the U.S. “sphere of influence,” caught the attention of China following the significant growth potential of its energy resources.
Latin America is estimated to hold 13.5 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves but accounts for only 6 percent of total output.
Although China has tapped energy resources in Venezuela,
Columbia,
Ecuador and Peru, and has begun to tap Argentina and Bolivia, there still exists significant room for expansion
, especially given that China still depends on the Middle East for 60 percent of its oil imports and wishes to further diversify.
China’s domestic energy needs and regional developments
in the Asia Pacific region are likely to fuel Beijing’s desire to access
Latin American energy resources.
China, which has been a net oil importer since 1993, is the world's number two oil consumer after the U.S., importing one third of its crude oil consumption. In the presence of sporadic power shortages, growing car ownership, crosscountry air travel, and the importance of energy to maintain China’s burgeoning growth rates, pressure is mounting on China to access energy resources on the world stage. Furthermore, China’s limited progress in accessing local energy resources due to poor relations with neighboring states (witness the Sino-Japanese dispute over the energy-rich East China Sea, the disputed status of the Spratly and Paracel islands and growing political instabilities in Central Asia) have forced China to search for energy further afield. However,
China's growing presence on the international energy stage could ultimately bring it into confrontation
with the world's largest energy consumer, the U.S. Nowhere is the Sino-U.S. energy competition more evident than in the
United States’ backyard.
The competition for energy resources in Latin America is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere as seen by developments in other regions where China is attempting to access energy resources. For example, China’s military cooperation with
Myanmar, Sudan and the Central Asian republics cannot be separated from its attempts to access energy resources in these states. While not a zero-sum game, growing interlinkages and interdependence between
China and Latin America is likely to come at the cost of the United States’ relations with its neighbors, which will only undermine U.S. ability to access the region’s energy resources.
This will force the U.S. to rely on energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as
West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East.
Entering the U.S. “Sphere of Influence”
As the world’s number five crude exporter with the largest proven oil reserves in the Western hemisphere,
Venezuela is emerging as a major prize in the competition
for energy resources in Latin America.
While Venezuela
sells 60 percent of its crude oil exports to the U.S. and is the United States’ fourth largest oil supplier,
Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez is attempting to reduce his country’s dependence on the U.S. market.
President
Chavez
has stated
that "
We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years
but they have been years of dependence on the United States.
Now
we are free and we make our resources available to the great country of China.
" [1]
Easier said than done, as China’s refineries will have to be refitted to process Venezuela’s heavy crude oil. Furthermore, transporting energy resources from Venezuela and Argentina is particularly difficult given that both states are on South America’s Atlantic coast although there have been discussions to overcome this by constructing a pipeline from the Atlantic to the Pacific through Panama. [2] Nevertheless,
China has made significant inroads in accessing Venezuela’s energy resources.
During Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez's visit to Beijing in December and Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong's visit to Venezuela in January 2005, China committed to develop Venezuela’s energy infrastructure by investing $350 million in 15 oil fields, $60 million in a gas project as well as upgrading the country’s railway and refinery infrastructure. In exchange, China will get 100,000 barrels of oil a day, 3 million tones of fuel oil a year and 1.8 million tones of Orimulsion, an alternative boiler fuel from Venezuela. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has also been given significant oil and gas development opportunities in Venezuela including the fields at Zumano in eastern Venezuela, which has an estimated
400 million barrels of oil.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Chietigj Bajpaee, Master’s degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan
University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint King’s-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. “CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN
AMERICA”, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)
China's growing energy interests in the Americas have been accompanied by
a growing involvement in the region's security.
In October, in its first military deployment to Latin America, China sent a UN peacekeeping contingent to Haiti comprising 140 Chinese policemen with plans to deploy an additional 125 personnel. Ironically, Haiti is one of only 25 states that recognize
Taiwan rather than China. Recently, the issue of extending the mandate of the 6,000-strong UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is due to expire in June, has come under pressure from Sino-Taiwanese frictions. While UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the interim government of Haiti have asked that the mandate be extended by one year in order to oversee the municipal, legislative and Presidential elections to be held later this year, China is pushing for only a six month extension due to a scheduled visit by interim Haitian President
Alexendre Boniface to Taiwan in July. While having to accept the humiliation of aiding a state that engages in relations with Taiwan’s
“secessionist” forces,
China has garnered the goodwill of Latin American states, which will come in handy when negotiating energy and other deals. The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that has traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources.
Venezuela and Canada together provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports.
For every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce their reliance on the U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on contentious issues such as
Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over human rights abuses in Venezuela.
(William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford University's
Hoover Institution, specializing in Latin America, China, and U.S. foreign policy. “Pragmatism Over
Ideology: China’s Relations with Venezuela”, The Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31481&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1#.Uebtgo1OSSo
Chavez seeks a
special relationship so that China can replace the United States as Venezuela’s chief foreign client
, Burgos adds, enabling him to toss the U.S. out of Venezuela in the context of his continentwide “Bolivarian revolution.”
At present, the United States imports about 15% of its foreign oil from Venezuela. Late in 2005,
Chavez noted that so long as the United States does not try to invade Venezuela and overthrow him, oil will continue to flow north (ABC
Nightline, September 16). In the end, however, this self-styled successor to Fidel Castro seems to think Venezuela must break all economic dependence on the United States, and even a Fudan (Shanghai) University specialist sees Chavez using oil as “a diplomatic weapon” (China
Daily, November 22). In early February 2006
Rafael Ramirez, the president of
Venezuela’s state-run oil company Petroleos de
Venezuela (
PDVSA
), reviewed
Venezuela’s oil-related relations with China
in a Caracas interview, saying “we are hoping to
send 300,000 bpd to [China] very soon” (Xinhua, February 9). This would be double the current amount
, most of which goes into asphalt. (Much of what China buys now is orimulsion, a low-grade, dirty fuel oil made by PDVSA from the heavy oil of the Orinoco Tarbelt.)
Venezuela’s ultimate goal is to provide 15-20% of China’s oil import needs. Much of that might have to come from what the United States now receives
, for Chinese and foreign sources fear that production is falling, not rising, in Venezuela.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Peterson 7 (Keith Alan, Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy. “IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S
GROWING DEMAND FOR OIL: A CASE STUDY IN VENEZUELA”, December 2007, 07Dec_Peterson.pdf)
As one energy expert states, “petroleum has proven to be the most versatile fuel source ever
discovered, situated at the core of the modern industrial economy.”66 Beijing certainly understands
this and is striving to secure enough of this precious resource to meet current and future needs. China is now the second largest energy-consumer in the world after the United States.67 China became a net petroleum importer in 1993 and net energy importer in 1996.68 Unlike the United States and other developed nations, China lacks sufficient long-term relationships with energy exporters to guarantee an uninterrupted supply. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position of securing new international oil
sources to meet future demands in a market that is dominated by the United States.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Dr. Gal, Executive Director at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Challenge or
Opportunity: China’s Role in Latin America,” Speech before senate foreign relations committee, 9-20, http://www.setamericafree.org/SenateForeignRelationsSept202005.pdf)
Last but not least is Venezuela, U.S.'fourth largest oil supplier.
Since April 2002, U.S. relations with Venezuela have become increasingly acrimonious
. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez warned the U.S. against any interference with Venezuela’s internal affairs threatening that Venezuela “has enough allies on this continent to start3 a 100-year war," and that "U.S. citizens could forget about ever getting Venezuelan oil." This threat is not being ignored. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked in her confirmation hearing that two of her chief worries with regards to Venezuela are U.S. dependence on Venezuelan oil and whether Chavez will continue to supply it.
The fissure in the relations enables China to step in and reduce Venezuela’s dependence on selling oil to the U.S., which currently buys 60% of Venezuela’s crude. A series of oil agreements signed in early
2005 allow Chinese companies to explore for oil and gas and set up refineries in Venezuela.
Venezuela’s state run oil company PDVSA opened a marketing office in Beijing and has a target of selling to China 300,000 barrels per day by 2012
. But for now Venezuela’s oil exports to China are much more limited. The majority of Venezuela's exports to China as of now consist of Orimulsion, a boiler fuel alternative which is burned by power plants to generate electricity. China’s refineries are not equipped to refine Venezuela’s crude. Geography is also a constraint. Venezuela has no access to the
Pacific shore and the Panama Canal cannot accommodate the biggest tankers. A tanker trip from Venezuela to China takes 45 days. But China and Venezuela are trying to resolve these problems. In July 2004 Venezuela signed a contract with Colombia to build a crude oil pipeline connecting its oil fields with a port on Colombia's Pacific coast sparing Chinese tankers the need to traverse the Panama Canal. This could reduce the travel time by half.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas
Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties.
A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard.
To deter China and prevent an accidental war , the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America . We should remember that many Latin American countries
—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile— border the
Pacific.
Given Beijing’s actions
, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners
on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances
that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived
Monroe Doctrine.
¶
Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas
, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States
welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas.
In addition,
Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.
¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the
21st:
There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.
(R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”
NDU Press, 1 st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions.
The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and
thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests.
In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin
America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
Finally, the PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable
. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-
U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.
(Erich, Der Spiegel writer, “China’s Soft Power is a Threat to the West” July 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/chinas-soft-power-threat-unitedstates/story?id=11277294#.UdGkavlwex4)//MM

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
China may have no intentions of using its growing military might, but that is of little comfort for
Western countries.
From the World Trade Organization to the United Nations,
Beijing is happy to use its soft power to get what it wants -- and it is wrong-footing the West at every turn.
Former Chinese Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen once told me,
half with amusement and half with resignation, that military people around the world are all more or less the same. "They can only be happy when they have the most up-to-date toys," he said.
If this is true, Beijing's generals must be very happy at the moment. China has increased its military budget by 7.5 percent in 2010, making funds available for new fighter jets and more cruise missiles. Beijing's military buildup is a source of concern for Western experts, even though the
US's military budget is about eight times larger. Some feel that China poses a threat to East Asia, while others are even convinced that Beijing is preparing to conquer the world militarily.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Unlike, say, the United States, the People's Republic has not attacked any other country in more than three decades, not since it launched an offensive against Vietnam in 1979. And even though Beijing's leaders periodically rattle their sabers against Taiwan, which they refer to as a "renegade province," they have no intention of entering into any armed conflicts.
Unlike many in the West, they have long since recognized that bombs are little more than deterrents these days. In today's asymmetric conflicts, it is difficult to hold on to territory captured in bloody battles. War is an instrument of the past, and Mao's argument that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" no longer holds true today.
Soft Is the New Hard
It is, however, true that the Chinese are in the process of conquering the world. They are doing this very successfully by pursuing an aggressive trade policy toward the West, granting low-interest loans
to
African and
Latin American countries, applying diplomatic pressure to their partners, pursuing a campaign bordering on cultural imperialism to oppose the human rights
we perceive to be universal, and providing the largest contingent of soldiers for United Nations peacekeeping missions of all Security Council members. In other words
, they are doing it with soft power
instead of hard power.
Beijing is indeed waging a war on all continents, but not in the classical sense.
Whether the methods it uses consistently qualify as "peaceful" is another matter. For example, the Chinese apply international agreements as they see fit, and when the rules get in their way, they "creatively" circumvent them or rewrite them with the help of compliant allies.
But why are politicians in Washington
, Paris and London taking all of this lying down,
kowtowing to the Chinese instead of criticizing them? Does capturing -- admittedly lucrative -- markets in East Asia and trying to impress the Chinese really help their cause?
The Communist Party leaders manipulate their currency to keep the prices of their exports artificially low. The fact that they recently allowed their currency, the renminbi, to appreciate slightly is evidence more of their knack for public relations than of a real change of heart. They are known for using every trick in the book when buying commodities or signing pipeline deals, with participants talking of aggressive and pushy tactics. Meanwhile, these free-market privateers unscrupulously restrict access to their own natural resources.
They denounce protectionism, and yet they are more protectionist than most fellow players in the great game of globalization.
(Robert, Contributing Writer at Global Voices Online and the World Policy Institute, 6/24/13, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america)//DR. H
During the first weekend of June,
U.S. President Barack
Obama and
Chinese President
Xi
Jinping met
in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in
another area could be even more important—
Latin America.
Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but
Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United
States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
The key question now is will Latin American countries lean more toward China or the U nited
S tates, or will it find a way to balance the two against each other? Right now,
Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're demanding to be treated as an equal player.
As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than usual.
In May, President Barack
Obama visited Mexico
and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Shortly after
these trips, President
Xi went to Mexico
and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation.
China’s active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009.
Chinalco, China’s largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Peru’s largest trading partner. China’s imports to Peru, however, rank second with
13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.
China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and technology.
In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as “El Vergatario” (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chávez introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the world’s cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.
(Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H
The Chinese economic threat to the U.S in the region
The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but recently many in the region have felt neglected by Washington, whose focus on terrorism and the middle east and ‘rigid
U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has left regional leaders with no option but to look for other patrons.
Net foreign direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in 2003.” [71]
This economic neglect is exacerbating the political grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez
, but the more moderate social democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China, something the U.S and the E.U have still denied. MES “substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade
Organization rules.
Given the preponderance of non-market factors in the P.R.C.’s economy… there can be little doubt that the three countries made their decision almost exclusively on the basis of China’s growing political and economic influence.”
[72]
This highlights the politico-economic independence of the U.S that Latin America is exerting.
This is also symptomatic of a deep paradox in the American thinking about how to deal with China.
On one hand, tying the nominally communist state to the world economy is expected to bring about economic maturity and gradual political change, but on the other,
China is still a U.S rival whose influence China is competing against. The situation is reciprocal, as China views the U.S as “[using] its economic leverage to exert political pressure on
China, which is one reason that China seeks to diversify its economic relationships.”
[73] In this respect, the
U.S has what it wants –
China is intrinsically tied to the ideals of the open market – as a lower cost, less politicized alternative to the United States.
(Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, “China and
Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
1/2012: 3-19, page 11-12, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Overall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the leftwing – and as it seems, by default, more Washington-critical – Latin American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a welcome means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in the region. While
Latin American governments may rightly complain about both a frequent lack of serious attention on
the part of the United States and the latter’s rather narrowly defined national security interests in its relations with its hemispheric neighbours, why should they be interested in replacing a decades-long dependency on the United States by a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic reason for Latin American countries to play the China card in an attempt to balance against the United
States? China is an increasingly important factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David
Shambaugh (2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries “embrace China as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy”. Multidirectional is the key word here. All Latin American governments have diversified their foreign relations. Their main interest is moderating US hegemony, not substituting it. As part of this strategy and particularly in times of economic hardship such as in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008–09, every trade and investment opportunity is welcome. States in the era of globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maximisers.
This applies to Latin America as much as to East Asia; it is true for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The result of opportunity-maximising in Asia–Latin America relations is a growing and fast-tightening (but not yet deeply institutionalised) transPacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even security links in both bilateral and (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a founding member of the
Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of
American States (OAS) and has expanded its diplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
China US Relations are Zero Sum
(Fernando Menéndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, “The
Counterbalance in America’s Backyard”, web)
From the perspective of Latin America
’s foreign policy makers,
China is undeniably a welcome economic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S
., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon.
Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons –
China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development.
China’s foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, an d especially if
Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional tensions,
U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise China’s cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from America’s national security apparatus.
(Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Gustavo A. Flores-
Macías, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. “No Strings Attached? Evaluating China’s Trade Relations Abroad.” The
Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/ EW

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
To be sure,
China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions.
Even if unintentional
, however,
this “ gravitational effect ” has a sound economic basis.
Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudan’s trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The
asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes
even if not by explicit design.
Whether by design or not, the convergence with China’s foreign policy goals is
important on at least two levels.
First, developing countries in Africa and
Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as
did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of “new colonialism” as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely.A second set of implications deals with the United States.
During the same period in which China’s trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the
United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior
.
This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which China’s growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing
. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere
. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Evan, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an analyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin
America’s relationships with China and other extraregional actors, including India, Russia and Iran, 6-7-
13, Manzella Report, “U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America”, web)
In Latin America, while many governments
and private interests have benefitted from the PRC’s entry into the region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S. policy objectives there
, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the respect for contracts and rule of law. Although the PRC has been careful not to associate itself with the “anti-imperialistic” rhetoric of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), efforts by China
Development Bank and the International Commerce Bank of China to expand lending has been complimented by the interest within
ALBA nations to free themselves from the constraints of borrowing from Western financial institutions.
The resulting
$50 billion loaned to Ecuador and Venezuela since 2007 has proved an important source of liquidity for those regimes, that have enabled them to sustain anti-
Western policies
and promote groups sympathetic to their cause throughout the region. Similarly, the willingness of Chinese companies
such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest
in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired “Western” corporations.
Indeed, so long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRC’s indifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents.
Beyond ALBA,
Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.
(Antonio Castillo is a Senior Lecturer & Program Director At RMIT “China in Latin America” http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/) SJH
China's growing influence on international affairs is nowhere more evident than in Latin America
, a region pejoratively regarded as the 'backyard' of the United States.
Latin America and the Caribbean are the next stop in
China’s global expansion, and the first-ever Chinese white paper for this region, released on 4
November, 2008, doesn’t leave any doubt about China’s intentions. Latin America has ‘abundant natural resources, a good base for economic and social growth and tremendous development potential
,’ the document says. In the November-December 2008 issue of The Diplomat, Peter Hartcher wrote of China emerging from the current financial crisis as ‘a more credible and respected international leader’. This is precisely China’s image in Latin America. China is not only regarded as an alternative to the US hegemony in the region, but it is also seen as a good and credible partner. According to the 2007 Pew
Global Attitudes Project,
China enjoys a positive image among Latin American countries.
China’s aim in Latin America these days differs dramatically from the 1960s, when the Maoist revolution was the main exporting commodity into Latin America.
‘Chinese
policy towards Latin America today is highly pragmatic rather than ideologically driven,’
Professor Gonzalo
Paz, a China-Latin American expert at George Washington University told The Diplomat. Professor Paz said this is a ‘new development paradigm that seems to be attractive to Latin American countries.’ A sign of this new paradigm is the growing and wider range of bilateral agreements
China has signed with Latin American countries, from education to tourism; from aviation to natural resources exploitation.
The trade between
China and Latin America has jumped from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$102.6 billion in 2007, and Beijing has committed to increase its direct investment by around US$50 billion over the next few years. Due to its export boom and favourable terms of trade, Latin America enjoys a healthy surplus.
The Chinese diplomatic model – soft power, multipolar and non-interference – is
considered as a real alternative to the US political and economic influence in the region.
‘South-south cooperation’, ‘strategic partnership of common development’ or ‘common understanding’ is the narrative used by Chinese leaders to frame the

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Sino-Latin American relationship. This has been the narrative used by the considerable number of high-ranking Chinese officials who have become frequent visitors to the region, including President Hu Jintao, who has visited Latin America three times in less than five years. This says a lot.
Dr Adrian Hearn, a China-Latin American Researcher at the University of Sydney and author of the forthcoming book, China and Latin
America: The Social Foundations of a Global Alliance, said China’s soft power, technology transfer and integrated development had been the key to this link. ‘The soft power exercised by Beijing relies heavily on the Chinese communities that began flourishing in the late 19th and early
20th centuries,’ Hearn said.
The first Chinese immigrants in Latin America arrived in Cuba in 1847 and since then have formed well-established Chinatowns in the majority of Latin American countries.
Hearn suggests,
‘Chinatowns are key to the soft power exercised by China in the region.’ This is especially the case in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, countries with the largest number of Chinese immigrants. ‘Chinatown’s leaders play a central role in making connections and building partnerships.
China leverages ethnic locals, technology transfer, development Hearn highlights the northern Mexican city of Mexicali, the heart of the
Mexican Chinese community. ‘Here Chinatown leaders have been luring Chinese investors to get involved in the development of the frontera del silicio [silicon border] – a high-tech park for the production of semiconductors and other electrical products.’ This is very much part of the
Chinese growth model of building a series of industrial hubs.
Technology transfer is the second way the Sino-Latin American relationship is developing and, according to Dr Hearn, ‘this is. different to the United States and Europe.’ Venezuela is one of the largest producers of oil in the world and had previously been reliant on technicians from the US company Chevron for drilling. China, however, is happily teaching
Venezuelans how to do it themselves.
China has implemented a lengthy training programme that has allowed Venezuelans to learn how to make drills – something that they have been doing since 2008,’ says Hearn. And technology transfer is exactly what Latin American countries need desperately to improve their economies.
Integrated development is the third way China has been able to forge relationships with Latin
American countries. For example, Cuban workers trained by Chinese technicians are manufacturing a wide range of electrical goods, from televisions to electrical fans. These are moved to the ports by a transport system designed and developed by Chinese experts. The Cuban docks
– from where the goods will be shipped to China – are no longer inefficient facilities. Chinese investors have transformed them into world-class ports.
Dr Hearn argues that soft power, integrated development and technology transfer have a political edge
:
‘It is a way not to upset the US. You can build cooperation with a country and never express a political ideology or affinity – and this is what
China is doing in the case of Cuba and Venezuela.’
(Isabel, former Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, 2-2013, The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, “China in Latin America:
Hegemonic challenge?”, web)
The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and social landscape
in a number of ways. The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for market reasons unconnected with a political project, since these countries are building societies that are more consonant with U.S. than Chinese values.
In other cases
, however, the availability of Chinese funds signals a loss of political leverage for the United States and permits the survival of anti-U.S. governments
– in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance – that wish to pursue more radical political and social models.
(R. Evan Ellis; Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University; “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case
Study”; Joint Force Quarterly; January 2011; http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latinamerica.html)
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions.
The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting
Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests
. In addition
, the PRC has leveraged hopes
of access to
Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block
(the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the
PRC would have been disadvantaged.
(Patricia Rey, writer Bloomberg, 6-28-13, Bloomberg, “Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean
For The US?”, web)
China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region.
The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which
Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there.
The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe
Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere
, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. “[The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and
Latin America fell lower and lower on America’s list of priorities
.
China has been all too willing to fill any void
,”
Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent
, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports.
China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Georg, advisor to the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala and
Bolivia, “China Eyes Latin American Commodities,” Yale Global Online, Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-eyes-latin-american-commodities, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Latin America is increasingly attractive as a source for large emerging economies with rising commodity import needs. The recent large find of oil and gas in Brazilian waters has only added to that attraction.
¶
Thus, with their large reserves of commodities, especially non-renewable resources in high demand from the global market, Latin American countries should be in the catbird’s seat, calling shots and setting prices. Yet, despite the allure of the region for resource-hungry emerging economies like
China, the cards are not necessarily stacked in Latin America’s favor. Unless the region develops policies of sustainable development and transparent transactions, the advantages it enjoys from its riches could prove to be limited.
¶
Latin America produces 47 percent of the world’s soybean crop, 40 percent of
copper and 9.3 percent of its crude oil – and in five years Brazilian oil will add to that. China needs an increasing amount of such commodities both as inputs in its fast industrialization process and for
private consumption, given the nation’s rapidly rising living standards. Its commodity imports are set to rise at lower double-digit rates until at least 2020. Annual average oil and copper import growth rates
have recently been 10 times higher than average import growth rates for the rest of the world.
(Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE
During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in
California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more
important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming
influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but
Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic
proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Gary, Editor of special projects at Reuters, “The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin
America,” Reuters, JUNE 12, 2013, Online, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/thelooming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/, accessed 7/18-13) PE
Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack
Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washington’s
sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to attain it.
Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals.
Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe
Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru’s leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October.
Meanwhile, just after Biden left
Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation.
Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China — which has money to burn in the region.
“There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the] first time,” Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American
Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. “There’s something happening in the region and the U.S.
wants to be part of it. Whether there’s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.”

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Zhang, Chinese professor of international relations at Fudan University, and a senior research fellow at the Chunqiu Institute. He was a senior fellow at the Centre for Asian Studies,
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and a visiting professor at the Geneva
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, “The rise of China's political soft power,” September
4 th , 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm)
For all of the above questions,
China's soft power has been a guiding light
. "Soft power" does not only include cultural items like martial arts and Chinese food, but also political soft power, political values and China's governance model. As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally
. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas.
Poverty and development
The Westerndominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries.
Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means.
In contrast,
China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty.
War and peace In the past few years, t he American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security.
In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism
. The clash of civilizations
Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying
. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The
Clash of Civilizations?".
China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other.
This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its
"self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection
Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases
. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles.
Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model
. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger.
China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness
. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues.
As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
. [Michael, research associate, "Bush goes to Beijing, China goes to Latin America" Council on Hemispheric Affairs -- November 14
-- www.coha.org/bush-goes-to-beijing-china-goes-to-latin-america/]
Latin America’s Strategic Importance to China
¶
As China’s economy has boomed
, racking up continuous growth rates of 9%, and its population has become increasingly urbanized, the country’s need for raw materials has skyrocketed
.
The need was exacerbated by the decision to become a fully motorized consumer economy, meaning that in short order China would require in the order of twice of its present level of consumption of petroleum. It is relevant to note that today China is the third largest manufacturer of automobiles in the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that according to the Washington Post, Beijing has estimated that by 2020 the country would need 600 million tons of crude oil annually. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in a report in February’s issue of Poder magazine,
“
China has displaced the United States as the world’s largest consumer of most industrial raw materials
, including copper, aluminum, nickel, platinum, and iron ore.” ¶ An Embarrassment of Riches ¶
Latin America offers in abundance many of those key resources now coveted by China
, and its history and experience of serving as a rawgoods-exporting economic enclave
for the industrialized metropolis – be it Spain, the U.K. or the U.S., has been at different stages of its history – further enhances the region’s appeal to Beijin g.
In its eagerness to secure access to the Latin
American resources it so prizes, the PRC has skillfully wielded its economic “soft power” to convince regional governments to amicably open up their countries to Chinese penetrations
. Not that much persuasion was necessary, considering the desire of countries like Brazil to find an outside foreign partner capable of counterbalancing the U.S.
[Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]
In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right.
China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch.
After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the
Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas.
Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state . According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply,
China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan.
Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the
USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming.
It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent.
Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the

{F ILE T ITLE }
Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Max, Associate Editor at the Atlantic, Editor of the International Channel, “5 Most Likely Ways the US and China Could Spark
Accidental Nuclear War”)
(4) China or India occupies disputed territory. In 1962, China seized a disputed district called Tawang along its border with India. Since then,
China hasn't shown much interest in using military force to invade disputed territory.
But Indian politics have become increasingly nationalist and its leaders insecure about the rising Chinese power
.
India's decades-long territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir
-- which came very close to sparking nuclear war in the 1990s -- means that India is extremely sensitive about its borders. It's not hard to foresee an erratic Indian politician or a twitchy general trying to preempt some imagined Chinese invasion of a disputed territory
. If that happens,
China's response could easily escalate the stand-off
, whether intentionally or not. India, like China, not yet clarified precisely when it will and will not consider using nuclear weapons.
The U.S., a close ally of India, would probably be compelled to step in
-- as it has between India and Pakistan. But that might add to the volatility and the ways things could spiral out of control
.Photo: Indian army Brahmos missile launcher passes on a flotilla towards the India Gate memorial during rehearsal for the Republic Day parade in New Delhi.
[Howard M., Visiting Senior Fellow @ NDU, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, “China’s trade opening and implications for regional stability” The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition – National Defense University Press -- http://www.scribd.com/doc/3099389/the-peoples-liberation-army-and-china-in-transition]
A strong services sector
, and the millions of jobs it will create, would
not only support a real middle class
but also slow growth in China’s chronically unemployed underclass, a worrisome source of destabilizing social pres- sure
. China must place over 10 million new workers into the economy every year. It must also find jobs for an estimated 150 million unemployed migrants, a number expected to swell by at least 5 to 6 million a year. Again, domestic stability is the issue
. Domestic stability in China benefits America
. Comfortable, prosperous Chinese citizens are more likely to share concerns similar to those Americans have and be more willing to cooperate on the range of issues relating to such concerns. For example,
China already shows increased interest in working with U.S. officials and private experts on environmental problems ( for example, pollution, hazardous waste, and transportation), drug trafficking, medicine, and public health. These are now issues of real concern for Chinese citizens in more prosperous areas of the country. They are also issues that transcend borders and have the potential to draw China into the international arena as a nation with a stake in making cooperation work. Dialogue on matters of mutual interest promotes communication, increased cooperation, and, ultimately, trust.
A wealthy, stable China can serve U.S. regional security interests
. A
China that risks tangible loss from aggressive and confrontational behavior should be less likely to favor precipitous action and conflic t. It should be more likely to be interested in preserving regional peace and stability, more open to consulting with Pacific Rim neighbors,
and more willing to cooperate on regional security issues, strategies, and disputes. Speaking from a vantage point of growing economic strength and military capability would give Beijing the respect, prestige, and diplomatic stature it craves , making it easier for
China to see itself as a player whose opinion is given serious weight by peers. This could calm Chinese fears of being

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] marginalized or contained, making it easier for China to find common cause with the United States,
Japan, and others in the region in maintaining calm and promoting dialogue on Korean Peninsula security issues, combating international terrorism and piracy, and perhaps even becoming more involved in curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” NDU press. 1st quarter 2011 http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf SCTM)
Access to Latin American Markets.
Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing
in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe
. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft
.
In expanding
access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American
countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance
. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company.
¶ Protection of
Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times,
China has applied more explicit pressures to induce
Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods
. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and
Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
“Three international organizations: China's economy has reached critical period of transition” Xinhua http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-hasreached-critical-period-of-transition.html SCTM
Xinhua Beijing, July 15 (Xinhua) (Reporter Hanjie An Bei) 15, National Bureau of Statistics released the first half of China's economy grew 7.6 percent, the Xinhua News Agency reporters Di Yishi and Jian Lianxian interviewed the IMF [microblogging], the Asian Development Bank, World
Bank [microblogging] three international institutions relevant experts.
¶ Look growth: Economic growth of 7.6% in the world what it means?
¶
'The U.S. economy is expected to grow 1.7 percent this year, the euro zone average negative growth, Japan may reach 2%, Russia is expected to increase 2% ......' In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Department chief economist Olivier Blanchard Seoul seems that
China's current economic growth is undoubtedly a major highlight of the global economy
.
¶
'The economic growth of 7.6% in line with expectations.' Asian Development Bank Resident Representative Zhuang Jian, senior economist, told reporters that although the year in the second quarter,
China's economic growth slowed down continuously reproduced, but the decline is
¶
Around the world, the world economy is still slow growth
, and presented 'three-speed' growth pattern:
China to lead the emerging market countries continue to maintain the 'fastest growing legion' advantage, the U.S. economy is steadily recovering, the vast majority of European countries are still struggling with difficult times.
¶ At the same time,
China,
Brazil, India and other emerging economies, growth is slowing collective confirms an important signal: After years of rapid growth
, the emerging economies are
gradually entering the 'deceleration zone.'
¶ Blanchard also noted that
China's economic growth slowdown
. Few days ago, IMF updated forecasts for the global economy of the agency predicted that
China's economic growth this year of 7.8%, compared with April predictive value of cut 0.3 percentage points . 'China is becoming an economic slowdown affecting the global economy is one of the three new risks.' Blanchard said.
¶ On Risk: China should avoid pursuing short-term economic growth superficial
¶
National Bureau of Statistics data show that the first half of the investment in China's economic growth is still the largest engine, contribution to GDP ratio reached 53.9%.
¶ Blanchard said that a large investment in China's economic growth, but a lot of investment from the shadow banking, which makes the
Chinese macro-control
policy-makers face a dilemma: If you continue to maintain high investment, it will exacerbate overcapacity and credit risk, but if the tightening credit control investment will result in slowdown in economic growth.
¶
'China should pay more attention to the quality of investment, to avoid the pursuit of short-term economic growth superficial
.' Zhuang Jian said.
¶ Zhuang Jian pointed out that the investment plays an important role in developing countries, China's current development is inseparable from the support of investment, but the investment structure and quality is very important.
¶ 'If there is insufficient economic structure adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure, continue to increase investment will only make the problem more severe overcapacity will further exacerbate the local debt and credit risks.' He said.
¶ In this regard, Blanchard believes that although
China's economy is still at risk
, but the macro-control policy makers, there is still enough space for policy control to prevent rapid decline in economic growth.
¶ Seeking good way: China's economy
has slowed down to a critical period of structural adjustment
¶
In a globalized world, China's economy can achieve sustained and healthy development of the global economy is essential.
¶
Blanchard noted that the global economy to achieve sustainable and balanced development, the major economies are facing the task of structural adjustment reforms. For China, a policy to focus on improving growth potential and increase spending on economic growth driven role. 'If say when the opportunity to achieve this transformation, it may be right now. '
¶ 'China's economy continues to years of rapid growth, has been the need to slow down to adjust the structure to the way a critical stage.' Zhuang Jian pointed out the factors supporting China's economic growth is changing,
China urgently looking for a new economic growth point
, and widespread Consensus is to slow down the growth rate, in both the economic growth, more emphasis on improving the quality and efficiency of economic growth.
(Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of
Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China
.
Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions
. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific).
A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession
and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a
political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(“Chinese slowdown casts shadow over world economy” Jul 17, 2013 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.html
SCTM)
LONDON:
China's slowdown cast a shadow over Europe and Asia
on Tuesday, sparking questions over
Beijing's ability to avoid a hard landing that would wreak havoc on the world economy
, analysts said.
¶ The nation's powerhouse economy slowed to 7.5-per-cent growth in the second quarter, down from 7.7 per cent in the previous three months, official data showed Monday.
¶ "
China is a key downside risk to the global economy
. Recent data does suggest that the economy is sluggish," VTB Capital economist Neil MacKinnon told AFP.
¶ "In addition, the authorities are concerned about the rapid rate of credit expansion and the impact it might have on inflation
. This rules out any near-term monetary or fiscal stimulus." ¶
New evidence emerged
Tuesday of the impact of slowing Chinese growth in Europe, which is still struggling to recover from the eurozone's long-running sovereign debt crisis.
¶
Investors in
Germany, Europe's biggest economy, turned gloomy this month on fears over falling exports to China
, in a stark illustration of the new globalised power of the Asian nation's industry and consumers.
¶
Germany's investor confidence index, calculated by ZEW economic institute, fell by 2.2 points to 36.3 points in July. That disappointed analysts' forecasts for an increase to 40 points.
¶ "New dark clouds have started to black out growth prospects of the German economy," said ING DiBa economist Carsten Brzeski.
¶
"These clouds are not coming from the South but from the East. The stuttering and now slowing Chinese economy is a clear cause of concern
(and) could become a new risk factor for the German economic outlook." ¶ China is now the fifth most important single export market for
German companies and accounts for some six per cent of total exports.
¶ The Asian Development Bank meanwhile warned Tuesday that China's slowing growth was weakening momentum and trimmed its outlook for developing Asia this year to 6.3 per cent, from 6.6 per cent.
¶
The sluggishness comes as
"
China is attempting to rebalance its economy away from investment towards a more consumer-driven economy
," said Currencies Direct analyst Alistair Cotton.
¶ But this rebalancing would present growth opportunities for the West, he noted.
¶ "The big winners, should they crack the market, will be consumer companies with strong brand identity," he said.
¶ "The losers are likely to be the countries supplying the raw materials for Chinese investment, conversely the ones that were doing so well in the last decade." ¶ Daiwa Capital Markets economist Chris Scicluna added that markets were eager to see an "orderly" Chinese slowdown that would not disrupt the world economy.
¶ "China's support for global demand has been welcome over the past couple of years as the West has had to work off the excesses of the pre-Lehman era," Scicluna told AFP, in reference to US bank Lehman Brothers whose collapse in 2008 triggered a global slump.
¶ "A slowing of China's growth, over the medium term, to a sub-7.0-per-cent rate was always inevitable as the economy matured.
¶ "The main concern is that the authorities there can engineer an orderly slowdown -- ie. one that does not see growth plummet sub-5.0 per cent and lead to financial and social crisis."
¶
Gekko Markets analyst Anita Paluch added that the West had relied on booming China to help overcome a fierce recession which followed the global financial crisis.
¶ "Slower growth will have impact on those countries who have strong trade links with China -- like Australia, Brazil and (the) South East Asia region -- as demand will fall," Paluch said.
¶
China is vital for the smooth functioning of global economies
because the Asian powerhouse nation is a major consumer of commodities, like crude oil, steel, and copper, and of manufactured products like cars and airplanes.
¶
At the same time, China is also widely regarded as the workshop of the world, and its vast factories benefit from low labour costs and high volume production.
¶ But the
International Monetary Fund cut its global economic growth forecast last week, citing the increased "possibility of a longer growth slowdown" in emerging market economies like China.
¶
Scicluna added Tuesday that all nations around the world needed to return to "appropriate" levels of growth to create a balanced global economy.
¶ "Over the long run we would hope to have all economies running at their potential," he told
AFP.
¶ "It will, however, be a long time before Europe's economies have returned to that position. My big fear is a very abrupt Chinese slowdown with disorderly consequences."
¶
But due to the poor quality of Chinese economic data and lack of information about risks in the Chinese banking sector, "it is difficult to gauge with any confidence the probability of that happening,"
he said.
Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage for TheAtlantic.com. “China’s economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
The Washington Post June 20 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-uphow-freaked-out-should-we-be/ SCTM
Thursday was a very bad day for
China
’s economy, the world’s second-largest and a crucial pillar of the global economy, with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of the U.S. financial collapse.
The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chinese leaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear to be causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it could see
China’s economy finally cool after years of breakneck growth, with serious repercussions for the rest of us
.
¶ Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been fighting rumors all day that it defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S. financial collapse. There’s no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on China’s banks. But the fact that the trouble has even gotten to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be.
¶
Here’s what has happened:
China’s credit market has been in a bubble for years
, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during the financial crisis.
All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts, and it all comes crashing down
, as happened the United States.
China’s economic growth has been slowing, making a similar a crisis more likely
. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster by basically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse meant to avoid The Big One.
¶ In a real, uncontrolled credit crisis like the U.S. financial meltdown, credit suddenly freezes up, particularly between banks, meaning that the daily loans banks were relying on to do business are suddenly no longer affordable. Banks with too many unsafe loans suddenly owe more money than they can get their hands on, sometimes leading them to default or even collapse. And that means that it suddenly becomes much tougher for everyone else – companies that want to build new factories, families that went to buy a home – to borrow money
. That’s an uncontrolled credit crisis, and a number of
China-watchers have been worried that China, in its pursuit of constant breakneck growth, could be headed for one.
¶ China’s central bank, which is likely to tamp down all that unsafe lending and over-borrowing before it leads to a crash, appears to have forced an artificial credit crisis. (It tested a more modest version just two weeks ago.) It looks like the People’s Bank of China has already tightened credit considerably, making it suddenly very difficult for banks to borrow money. Something called the seven-day bond repurchase rate, which indicates “liquidity” or the ease of borrowing money, shot way up to triple what it was two weeks ago.
¶ This pair of charts, from the economics site Zero Hedge, shows the eerie parallels between today’s freeze-up in the Chinese interbank lending market and what happened in the United States when
Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a global crisis that we’re still recovering from: ¶ That second chart shows something called the TED spread, a key indicator of credit risk and how easy it is for U.S. banks to lend to one another.
¶ Money markets in China have also skyrocketed to what the Financial Times’ David Keohane called “silly levels.” This chart, via Keohane and Reuters’ Jamie McGeever, shows the money market rates way, way, way beyond any high of the last five years: ¶ Here’s where things get a little confusing. Bloomberg News reported Thursday evening Beijing time that, as panic moved through the Chinese financial system, the country’s central bank stepped in and offered $8.2 billion in
“relief” to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which just happens to be both state-owned and the largest bank in the world. What does this mean? Maybe that Chinese leaders got cold feet and are trying to walk back the self-imposed crunch, maybe that China’s largest bank managed to negotiate some preferential treatment, maybe that leaders are worried their most important bank might actually be less healthy than they thought and want to protect it from default. Or maybe this is just part of the process of easing down the markets. But then the
Chinese Web portal Sina announced that the reports were false (thanks to Bill Bishop for this link), adding some unnecessary confusion and uncertainty to an already volatile situation.
¶
So what happens next? There are four categories of outcome. The first is that Chinese leaders back off on the credit crunch and nothing happens, in which case they’ll probably just try the strategy again later. The second is that they press on and it works miraculously, cleaning out the financial system without causing too much pain. The third is that this spirals out of control, maybe because Beijing underestimated the risk or acted too late, potentially sending the global economy lurching once more. The fourth, and probably most likely, is that this works but is painful, averting catastrophe but slowing the Chinese economy after 20 years of miraculous growth.
¶ Chinawatchers, who tend to vary widely in their assessments of the country’s economic health, seem to be converging on that fourth scenario, of a painful but necessary slowdown. Nomura, a Japanese investment bank, recently issued a note (via the Financial Times) addressing fears that
China could face a financial collapse. Their less-than-comforting caveat: “This is a tricky issue, as the definition of ‘financial crisis’ can differ among investors.” The bank predict that China will not slip into a full-on crisis, citing Beijing’s control over the financial system and unwillingness to let it go under. But the Japanese bank warned: “Nonetheless, we expect a painful deleveraging process in the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in the manufacturing industry and in non-bank financial institutions.” If that happens, China’s growth would slow even more
. HSBC just cut their prediction for
Chinese GDP growth rate from 8.4 percent in 2014 to 7.4 percent, still high but a major drop that could plunge farther. This would be difficult for China, which has built its economy – and political stability – on keeping high economic growth. Recall that the U.S. financial collapse was disastrous for America’s already unhealthy economic sectors: city budgets, real estate, news media. Something similar could happen in China, which is also facing a massive property bubble.
All of this could also be dire for the rest of the world, which is heavily linked to China’s economy and is still struggling to recover from the U.S. and European crises

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Cynthia J., director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Jeffery, career foreign service officer from the U.S. state of
Virginia. Davidow has served as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, as well as having been the U.S.
Ambassador to Zambia, Venezuela, and Mexico, “China, Latin America, and the United States,”
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, January 2011, page 7, Online, http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf, accessed 7/18/13) PE
In a keynote address, Enrique García, president and CEO of the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), a
Latin American development bank, indicated that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global economic crisis has not obstructed Latin America’s path to sustained economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 7 [to]–8 percent. This success is partially due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued central bank independence, and strict financial regulations. Strong regional growth rates and resilience in the face of the crisis can also be attributed to the favorable terms of trade between Latin America’s resource rich countries and China.
(Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, “Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon,” The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE
First, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it
diversifies the sources of finance – finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and
European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin American
growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth.
Chinese finance is more in tune with what Latin American nations
want, rather than with what western development experts say they "need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and micro-anti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans
tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of
$260bn.
Neither do Chinese loans come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their "conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
. [Li, research director and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center, "China's Team of Rivals"
Foreign Policy -- March 1 -- www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/16/china_s_team_of_rivals]
The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried.
What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall.
Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of
2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.”With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable.
Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt
. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to
handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive the political challenges it will bring.
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic, and the ruling party is no longer led by one strongman, like Mao Zedong
or Deng Xiaoping.
Instead, the Politburo and its Standing Committee,
China’s most powerful body, are run by two informal coalitions
that compete against each other for power, influence, and control over policy. Competition in the Communist Party is, of course, nothing new. But the jockeying today is no longer a zero-sum game in which a winner takes all.
It is worth remembering that when Jiang Zemin handed the reins to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002, it marked the first time in the republic’s history that the transfer of power didn’t involve bloodshed or purges. What’s more, Hu was not a protégé of Jiang’s; they belonged to competing factions. To borrow a phrase popular in Washington these days, post-Deng China has been run by a team of rivals
. This internal competition was enshrined as party practice a little more than a year ago. In October 2007,
President
Hu surprised many China watchers by
abandoning the party’s normally straightforward succession procedure and designating
not one but two heirs
apparent. The Central Committee named
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang—two very different leaders in their early 50s
—to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, where the rulers of China are groomed. The future roles of these two men, who will essentially share power after the next party congress meets in 2012, have since been refined:
Xi will be the
candidate to succeed the president, and Li will succeed Premier
Wen Jiabao. The two rising stars share little in terms of family background, political association, leadership skills, and policy orientation. But they are each heavily involved in shaping economic policy—and they are expected to lead the two competing coalitions that will be relied upon to craft China’s political and economic trajectory in the next decade and beyond.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
. [Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist University and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5]
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of
political and economic collapse in the PRC
, resulting in territorial fragmentation
, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries
. Naturally, any
or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability
. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problem s, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution.
These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectivel y.
Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries
.
Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours
. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario
– nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible
local provincial leaders
or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to
its neighbours and the world.
(San – Epoch Times International – August 3 rd -- http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)
Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life
. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends . The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life.
And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow , the bloody confession affirmed the CCP ’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.
(Stephen, Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution, “Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia: An Unknowable Future”,
May, http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/speeches/cohens20020501.pdf)
A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While there is no expectation today of renewed internal turmoil, it is important to remember that closed authoritarian societies are subject to deep crisis in moments of sudden change
. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged many members of the former communist bloc are examples of what could happen to China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in Tibet and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement and a party torn by factions could be the ingredients of an unstable situation.
A vulnerable Chinese leadership determined to bolster its shaky position by an aggressive policy toward India
or the United States or both migh t become involved in a major crisis with India
, perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage India to adopt a stronger nuclear posture
, possibly with American assistance.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Carol, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, 2009, “China in Latin America: The
Whats and Wherefores,” http://es.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/19/es.kht015.full)//DR. H
At the same time, as China’s commercial and political relationship with the countries in the region continues to grow, so will the influence of Chinese communities, businesses, and organizations now present in
Latin America.
Here, a good deal of diplomatic footwork remains to be done on both sides. Ellis cites the numerous conflicts between
Chinese oil companies and indigenous groups, Ecuador being a prime example; the Argentine truck drivers’ strike against Chinese shop owners in 2006 is cited as further evidence of a troublesome trend underway in the region. The question of China’s ability to continue treading lightly with the United States is another potential problem.
China’s improvement of its military capabilities through the acquisition of new technology is now a reality, as is the PRC’s willingness to form partnerships with various Latin American countries in this realm.
This development is likely to be met with
increased uneasiness in the United States, as is
China’s propensity to increase technology cooperation in areas such as aerospace, biotechnology, and nuclear power.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
China National Center for Biotechnology Development (Qinghua, Qing Li, Yihong Hu,
Hongguang Wang, 2006, “Biotechnology and bioeconomy in China,” pdf)//DR. H
It will be important to establish and perfect the technical system to meet an emergency for the defense against bioterrorism and the prevention and treatment of the major epidemic diseases
, ensuring people’s health and social stability; to develop the vaccines and medications directed against the major bioterrorist factors is the utmost goal. Breakthrough is made in monitoring and detecting biotechniques with rigorous monitoring network and standard protocols and laboratories founded.
The physical protection and equipment reaches the international advanced level.
Breakthrough is made in the surveillance, warning and defense techniques of foreign invading organisms to contain them efficiently.
The evaluation and monitoring techniques of the safety of transgenic plants and their products are standardized and applied to provide technical support for guaranteeing the safety of transgenic plants.
Advanced bio-safety laboratories
(P3, P4) and standardization of the administration procedures and criteria, providing the bases for R&D of the prevention and treatment of the major infectious diseases, and of defense against bioterrorism have to be established.
The code of life ethics for biotherapy stem cell research and cloning techniques, bringing the research, development and application of BT into the legal system has to be established and perfected.
– Chandra: Published over 350 peer-reviewed journals, Director of the Cardiff Centre for Astrobiology, former professor at multiple prestigious universities Award-winning source of credible, unbiased, and easy-to-understand explanations of how the world actually works (How Stuff Works, February 19, 2009, “10 Ways the World Might End: A Monster Plague,” http://videos.howstuffworks.com/science/10ways-the-world-will-end-videos-playlist.htm)//DR. H
[Narrator:]
Conventional science holds the deadly viruses that typically originate in other species, and then jump to humans
. Some scientists believe the biggest threat from plague could come from outer space.
[Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:] Looking at the…the pattern of diseases and the how they extract the earth, I would say that every new strain of virus, new subtype of virus, it has a space connotation to it.
[Narrator:] If Chandra is right, it is possible an asteroid could one day deliver a deadly new strain of plague.
[Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:]
There is the possibility that sometime in the future, there will be a strain of virus or bacteria that we have not encountered throughout evolution history that could cause absolute devastation.
[Narrator:]
A killer plague from outer space isn’t the only concern. Deadly new bioweapons are also being
developed in the barges around the world. Fringe cults, and apocalyptic madmen could right now be developing such bioweapons. As deadly as atomic bombs, and far cheaper to produce, infection with a few particles could mean a slow, agonizing death. It might only take one moment of madness from an absent minded buffet to release such a deadly new strain of plague. Once out of the lab, this grotesque killer would quickly begin to spread.
[Guest]
Anywhere in the world
, infection is on our doorstep, or moving around the world, within nine hours
, that virus could arrive here in London, or anywhere else.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Narrator:]
No one will be safe, as the deadly invisible assassin will swiftly bring entire cities to a standstill.
[Guest] There’s two features, of actually meeting your cad. And what we ask is, how long is the incubation period. That’s the time between the time you get infected, and the time you show symptoms. And the other thing we look for is what’s called its reproductive number, and its reproductive number is basically how many people are going to be infected by one person with that virus.
If the reproductive number is high, and the incubation period is short, then you’ve got a problem on your hands.
[Narrator:]
This monster plague, will bring death on an unprecedented scale, economies will collapse, the medical system will be unable to cope, no one will be spared a terrible, ugly death.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
- Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute., 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran
(Mark, May 20, “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities” US China Economic and Review Commission)//DR.
H
So with that in mind in terms of some of the reasons why they're problematic, why is the PRC relying upon ballistic and land attack cruise missiles?
Well, the
first reason has to do with the relative shortcomings of the aviation industry.
This does not mean that the aviation industry and the PLA Air Force are not modernizing. They are. But in a relative sense, under a program where they've emphasized nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and satellites, aviation industry in the past has not had this much emphasis as a space and missile industry. When you say aerospace industry
, of course, in China, they're neatly divided between aviation and space and missile.
But it also offers an inexpensive means, a relatively inexpensive means, to be able to achieve their operational objectives.
That's the second reason.
- Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute., 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran
(Mark, May 20, “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities” US China Economic and Review Commission)//DR.
H
The centrality of theater ballistic and ground launch cruise missiles in PRC political and military strategy is problematic.
Filling the vacuum created by the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty, the PRC has relied on theater missiles to compensate for shortcomings in its conventional air forces.
In addition to modernizing existing short range (SRBM) variants,
China is expanding its medium range ballistic and ground launch cruise missile infrastructure. The conventional theater missile build-up has the potential to create strategic competitions that increase the risks of conflict in the future. China's successes in fielding advanced ballistic and land attack cruise missiles also dilutes international efforts to stem
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(([Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), “United States-China
Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security”, Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic
Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center
Both the U.S. and China are pursuing activities to develop advanced nuclear power reactor technology. The 2005 Energy Policy Act created a program for the U.S. at the Idaho National Laboratory to demonstrate a next generation light water reactors.
China intends to develop an indigenous advanced nuclear reactor based on the technology being transferred
by the
Consortium. Both the U.S. and China are pursuing R&D on high temperature gas reactors that can be used for both electricity production as well as hydrogen production due to its high temperatures. The latter program offers a significant opportunity for collaboration between the U.S. and China. Looking to the future, advanced fuel cycle technologies will be needed. Given the difficulty of establishing waste repositories, fuel cycle technologies that can minimize the volume and heat load of the waste forms will be at a premium. Increasing proliferation resistance and maximizing the energy from uranium will also drive their development. GIF and GNEP programs specifically address these concerns. Specifically, the Chinese dialogue participants commented that there is a significant need for R&D on advanced fuels that can be remotely fabricated (regardless whether China chooses between an open or closed fuel cycle). It also calls for the development of advanced recycling technologies (through the GIF program activities) with cost effectiveness in mind. There are a number of major challenges facing Gen IV R&D programs and opportunities for international cooperation, including: Complexity of the technologies: As the complexity of the technology increases, the difficulty of achieving success increases. Innovative R&D is very time-consuming, requires huge amounts of capital, as well as demonstration facilities. Fuel cycle and resource requirements: Several Gen IV reactor systems will require a closed fuel cycle foundation, which is not uniformly supported by all key policy makers in the U.S. system. While each country will choose its preferred fuel cycle option on the basis of many factors, economics will be particularly important. (Many Dialogue participants discussed the need to factor ways to make advanced technologies more affordable into the R&D decision-making process.) The economics of reprocessing, a key element of an advanced closed fuel cycle technology, is sensitive to high plant throughput. Regional or international centers that provide either sensitive services, or cradle to grave services, could take advantage of the economies of scale that will be needed for the advanced fuel cycles to be competitive. Intellectual property: International, as well as national, laws and practices are needed to protect intellectual property. This becoming an even more important issue as a result of multinational collaboration on RD&D. 4 .4 Regardng Commercal Deployment of Small-Scale Nuclear Reactors While most of the Dialogue was devoted to issues related to the deployment of large-scale nuclear power plants, recent advancements towards the commercialization of smallscale nuclear power plants was also reviewed. There are several potential opportunities for advanced, small, modular reactor technologies to be used in both distributed and gridconnected applications. Such facilities are seen as increasing the flexibility and security of electricity grids. Some note that the smaller-scale designs might provide terrorists with less attractive targets than large-scale nuclear facilities. Small sized reactors also have several uses in addition to base load electric supply, for example, in providing site power for remote oil and gas production or high demand applications like desalination. In addition, they could provide emergency backup to critical facilities in the event of an attack on the electric grid, such as secure/on-site power plant at military sites or for critical industrial complexes. Additional factors driving the small-sized reactor market include potential bottlenecks in the supply chain for large reactors and the difficulties obtaining a large qualified workforce to build and operate a large reactor.
Another intriguing possibility is to utilize self-contained, easily moved small nuclear power plants in less developed countries. In many developing countries, 1000 MWe plus s ize reactors are simply not compatible with countries’ transmission grids. Billions of people currently live without access to electricity and without adequate water supplies. The utilization of distributed nuclear power could provide a major new power option in many less developed countries. There are v arious proposals for various types of small-sized reactors that have potential applications in developed and developing countries alike. As noted in section 3.2, the Chinese are interested in commercial application of small modular pebble bed reactors. The Hyperion Power Module, based on reactor technology developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, is a sealed, 27 MWe reactor using uranium hydride fuel, which can be delivered on the back of a flat-bed truck at a cost currently estimated (by the reactor developer) at $25 million per unit beginning in 2014. The Babcock & Wilcox Company reports that it has provided nuclear power plants for
U.S. government applications and maintains the industrial capability to offer modular reactors in the 100 MWe range to commercial entities. It was noted that since China and the U.S. have an Agreement for Cooperation and as required by U.S. law, the DOE 810 technology transfer approvals 17 , B&W and China could cooperate on further commercial development and marketing of such reactors. Some liability issues would, however, have to be resolved first. NuScale Power is also interested in comm ercializing this type of technology. It is in the process of commercializing a modular, scalable 40 MWe light water reactor plant. It features a combined containment vessel and reactor system, and an integrated turbine-generator set. It is scalable in that as many as one to 24 units could be tied together within a single facility, with the ability to take out one unit at a time for servicing. NuScale make use of testing facilities at the Oregon State University to benchmark vendor and NRC safety evaluation models and is seeking certification by the NRC. T hroughout the dialogue, participants called for ways to accelerate commercial nuclear power cooperation between the U.S. and China on a government-togovernment level and throughout the commercial sector. Given the importance of developing nuclear trade between the two countries, and the necessity of ensuring safe and reliable plant operations, pragmatic and integrated cooperation is needed. In addition, global acceptance of nuclear power over the long term will depend upon viable solutions to nuclear waste and the creation of (even more) proliferation resistant technologies. Both China and the U.S. have the capability of leading in the creation of solutions to these issues. Specific recommendations coming from the dialogue include: 1 . As it becomes more clear that nuclear power will be an important part of China’s and the U.S.’s energy portfolio throughout this century and well into the next, so too does the need for adequate planning. To make the right decisions, energy policy makers need to expand their horizons to consider the longer term, i.e., past 2050, and what fuel cycle R&D must be initiated now. 2 . This dialogue represented a good first step to bring together some of the key players in the U.S. and
Chinese nuclear sectors. At a future meeting, the Dialogue could be enhanced by broadening participation. For example, the meetings should include Chinese counterparts to attending U.S. organizations, a diverse range of Chinese utilities, other U.S. reactor design vendors and representatives from U.S. national laboratories The U.S. government should continue to promote U.S.Sino cooperation, especially in the nuclear area. Such cooperation would be supportive of the ongoing efforts to expanded cooperation on fossil fuel and climate change efforts that will not only benefit each country, but also developing countries such as India and Indonesia. 4 . The U.S. nuclear industry is mature; many lessons have been learned with regard to how to structure a robust commercial program.
China could benefit from the
U.S.’s experience to create viable utilities, vendors, a worldclass regulator as well as supporting universities and institutes
. 5 . Commercial nuclear power deployment is a truly global endeavor demanding absolute quality assurance without compromise. There were several suggestions as to how it can be fostered: Increased engineering and construction cooperation by sharing best practices, utilizing 3D and 4D design techniques, better information management (taking advantage of communications devices such as “blackberries”), and adopting standardized barcodes. Assisting with the cultivation of China’s human resources by increasing opportunities for U.S. experts to do on-site training in China as well as for Chinese workers to come to the U.S. for training at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and utility facilities to witness U.S. “best policy and practices”. Developing a mindset of management and operational excellence by collaboration with organizations such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO.) The Chinese might best profit from the
WANO experience by all Chinese organizations participating in the same WANO center. Steps are needed by the Chinese government to raise the profile of the profession and encourage the universities to improve the number and quality of their degree-programs. The industry must continue to coordinate with the universities regarding their needs. China should be encouraged to implement establishment of independent testing labs as is now apparently authorized under the auspices of the Institute of New and Nuclear Energy Technology. 6 . The U.S. NRC should continue to aid China’s National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) in the development of its regulatory system and training of regulators. A follow-on dialogue should focus on obtaining more information to how China plans to ramp up its regulatory structure to meet the demands of a rapid deployment of commercial nuclear power across the spectrum of reactors it is currently planning. 7 . As the Chinese nuclear power industry matures, there will be opportunities for Chinese companies to provide services such as uprating, refueling, maintenance and outage control services.
Efforts to establish such cooperation should be initiated in the near term. 8 . To improve the commercial nuclear plant supply chain, China should consider establishing a qualified supplier list. In the process, Chinese companies fabricating components need better training with regard to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards code. 9 . Commercial entities in both the U.S. and China can take advantage of their competitive edges for mutual benefit. The U.S. has technical competitive edges and China has geographic edges vis-à-vis the developing market for nuclear power. U.S. and Chinese companies can jointly exploit these competitive edges to develop the South East Asian markets. 10 . One of the roadblocks to the development of cooperative opportunities is the U.S. visa issuance system. The Atlantic Council was encouraged to ask the U.S. Department of State to improve its processing of visa applications to significantly shorten the time needed for Chinese nationals involved in nuclear power to obtain a visa for travel to the U.S. Consider, for example, that France provides a dedicated consulate. It is important to recognize that U.S. authorities must take into consideration the security of nuclear facilities but that a better balance can be reached. This is a problem that can be solved. 11 . There is an opportunity for international cooperation on the development of a nuclear waste repository based on the experience the U.S. has already gained through 10 years of operation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) facility and through its Yucca Mountain site characterization and licensing activities. 12 . China’s 10 MWe High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) scheduled to be in operation by November 2013 in Shandong Province, could serve as an international experimental facility. The currently operating test pebble bed reactor has provided an opportunity for international collaboration. 13 . Cooperation on the development of advanced fuel cycle technologies, already underway in U.S.-China working groups, will provide significant opportunities to share rather than duplicate knowledge and funding. Generation IV (Gen IV) international collaboration on R&D is necessary and beneficial for all participants to share costs, facilities and experience.
Specific fuel cycle R&D opportunities proposed by the State Nuclear Power Technology corporation (SNPTC) include the following: Advanced fuel, such as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and metal fuel; Transmutation technology, such as fast reactor and accelerator driven systems; Reprocessing technologies, such as MOX spent fuel reprocessing, dry processing, on-site recycle; and, Repository design technology. 14 . The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) will provide a good framework to deal with intellectual property issues. If prototype or demonstration plants were to be built under the aegis of the GIF, it could also provide experience in dealing with legal and regulatory issues. Issues such as design ownership, who would build the facility, cost sharing would have to be addressed. As countries have vested interests in certain types of technologies, resolution of such issues may be difficult. 15 . The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): The U.S., which led the way in establishing the international collaborative effort to develop proliferation-resistant technologies and institutions, should take advantage of its leadership position to nurture and expand GNEP’s international activities. As in GIF, there are advantages to sharing technical expertise and pooling financial resources. GNEP is already in place and the Obama Administration can take advantage of the years of effort it took to set up the framework for international collaboration while adapting GNEP goals to current realities and domestic nuclear development policies. Consistency in U.S. nuclear energy policies, especially in relation to international efforts, is crucial to foster global acceptance of a safe, secure and sustainable nuclear power. The time for debate about the winners
and losers in the supply of energy is over.
Nuclear energy is needed more than ever as a non-carbon emitting source of electric supply and it can play a role in providing a secure, sustainable, affordable energy supply
.
The bottom line is that both the U.S. and China need a diversified energy production platform and technology portfolio, including a vibrant nuclear industry.
Given the necessity of using all the forms of energy at our disposal while transitioning to a de-carbonized portfolio relying increasingly on renewables, integrated solutions are needed. Recognizing that this is not an either-or world,
cooperation on nuclear energy can lead to expanded cooperation on other energy programs such as clean coal technology and renewable energy R&D.
As the scientists and engineers begin to work
together on nuclear programs, both will find ways to start other joint efforts.
Together the U.S. and China have the ability to set the standards for world’s upcoming climate negotiations. With 2 billion people in the world suffering from a lack of energy and facing increasing shortages of adequate water supplies, developed countries are in a position to spread the benefits of electricity around the globe. To do this, every available source of electric supply must be deployed
, and the U.S. and China, who will have the world’s two largest nuclear power programs in approximately 20 years, and who may also be the world’s top two economies, will be able to lead the way This Dialogue provided a very good information base and an excellent platform to help the U.S. and China to work together to bring the benefits of nuclear energy to our nations and to the others in this world suffering from a lack of the basics for life. The U.S. and China are the world’s largest energy consumers—and the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gasses.
Both countries must increase their use of nuclear power to help meet energy demands in a carbon-constrained environment
. Relevant government agencies and key stakeholders must educate their publics about the parameters involved in producing a diverse energy supply in order to understand the worth of sacrifices that will be needed. Cooperation between the U.S. and China will be mutually beneficial. It is to the
U.S.’s benefit that China designs and operates a safe nuclear power program. China is a significant market for the U.S. nuclear industry and provides an opportunity to maintain its manufacturing capabilities until its first new U.S. orders get underway. U.S. industry presence in China also increases relationships and communications thus improving U.S. security. The unprecedented transfer of nuclear technology to the Chinese will, in turn, help them develop clean sources of electricity sorely needed to address the fast growing needs of its economy and public. As
Chinese capabilities grow, the nuclear supply chain is reinforced, supporting further opportunities for U.S. companies to expand reactor sales abroad. American and Chinese companies together can take advantage of their mutual competitive edges in technology and geography to expand into new markets.
Cooperation and leadership are key and complimentary components in the U.S.’s and China’s efforts to ensure nuclear power’s contribution to meeting energy demand
.
Cooperation on technology development, human resources, security and safety will form the basis for their leadership on the world stage
.
Their combined actions will matter greatly in providing a quality environment

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] with adequate energy supplies
.
The world is watching! The Chinese participants signaled their desire to improve both government-to-government cooperation and commercial sector ties.
It appears that the U.S. government is equally interested in working with China to tackle the overarching challenges of developing a safe and secure commercial nuclear fuel cycle. By supporting and participating in this Dialogue, U.S. industry and government participants have demonstrated their commitment to dealing with the challenges to realize the burgeoning nuclear trade between the two countries.
(Michael Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, 6-7-12,
[“Thirst for energy driving China's foreign policy,” Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120607mr.html] E. Liu
SINGAPORE — The United States and China, the world's top users of energy, are heading in opposite directions. It is a trend that has major geostrategic implications for the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. is more certain that most of its future oil and gas will be produced at home. It is becoming less reliant on imported oil and natural gas as it ramps up domestic output and consumes fewer liquid fuels because of falling demand and energy saving advances, particularly in transport and industry. Meanwhile,
China is becoming ever more dependent on oil and gas shipped
or piped into the country, mainly from faraway sources of supply
that are often in
politically volatile parts of world, including the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia
. As a result,
Beijing's sense of insecurity about
future energy supplies is rising. China is modernizing its armed forces
not just to reclaim Taiwan by military means if necessary
. China wants to protect its
maritime trade routes and
secure access to offshore energy
, mineral and fisheries resources
in nearby seas, including the East China Sea
— where it faces conflicting claims to jurisdiction from Japan
—
and the South China Sea, where its claims to jurisdiction are contested by the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia and Brunei
. China also wants to enhance its security by establishing an offshore zone of influence that it will be able dominate, instead of the U.S. and regional allies. Despite America's recently declared strategic
"pivot" to Asia, its relative power and influence is declining. This is unlikely to change even if China's growth slows somewhat. As America gains energy security in a time of cost-cutting, it will have less incentive to continue expensive military protection of maritime supply lines in increasingly contested areas such as the seas off China's coast, the oil and gas-rich Persian Gulf, and around the Middle East and Africa, prompting
China
to extend its own military reach into the Indian Ocean
, through which so much of its imported oil and gas comes. This will heighten tensions with India
. Stephen Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government has projected the outcome of U.S.-China economic, military and energy trends in this way: "If
China
is like all previous great powers, including the U.S., its definition of 'vital' interests will grow as its power increases — and it will try to use its growing muscle to protect an expanding sphere of influence. "Given its dependence on rawmaterial imports (especially energy
) and export-led growth, prudent Chinese leaders will want to make sure that no one is in a position to deny them access
to the resources and markets on which their future prosperity and political stability depend. "
This situation will encourage Beijing to challenge the
current
U.S.
role in Asia. Over time, Beijing will try to convince other Asian states to abandon ties with America, and Washington will almost certainly resist these efforts.
An intense security
competition will follow." The most recent sign of this regional struggle for supremacy is in the South
China Sea
where China and the Philippines, an ally of the U.S., have been at loggerheads for nearly two months over ownership and control of Scarborough Shoal, a reef and fishing ground that is far closer to the Philippines than to China. Such disputes can be contained. Or they can lead to China prevailing over weaker, less determined opponents. Or they can result in armed conflict. If the U.S. or its ally
Japan became involved, there could be a wider war that would destabilize Asia
.
Is there a way for
China to emulate the U.S. and become substantially less dependent
on foreign oil and gas
?
Until 1993, China produced enough crude oil to meet its needs. But as growth surged, oil imports rose. China now imports 55 percent of its oil consumption, a ratio that is set to increase. Natural gas, the least polluting of fossil fuels, is on a similar trend line. By 2020, China's gas imports by pipeline and sea will make up nearly 33 percent of demand, up from around 20 percent now and none in early 2006, when China cease to be self-sufficient in gas.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
- Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University.
(Andrew, “Seizing the Highest High Ground: China’s Aerospace Development and its Larger Implications” February 21, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/IGSCwp003.pdf)
Beijing’s aerospace focus is normal for a rising great power
. All states seek security; potential great powers seek security through aerospace
. Countries of significant size, population, and development level naturally compete for great power status: contingent on regional domination
, it confers significant security
.
Regional domination hinges on military superiority
, especially capacity to determine the nature of conflict and to deter it before it occurs
(e.g. satellite detection of enemy military deployment followed by threats of sanctions if troops were not withdrawn
). Military capacity and societal support for governmental grand strategy demand economic growth. Dual use potential of most technology unites military and economic sectors. Therefore, both current and aspiring great powers strive to seize the
‘technological high ground’.
National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are
High in Asian Conflicts, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, Lexis
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe.
“Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.”
In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a
conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Jaime A.
(Beijing Bureau Chief and correspondent at CNN, Newsweek reporter, TIME magazine writer), 3- 30-
, CNN, “China works hard to project soft power,” http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/florcruz-china-soft-power)
After investing tens of billions of dollars in Southeast Asia, China has now decided that its vaunted economic power, which has bought it significant influence with regional governments, is not enough.
Beijing now wants to be loved, too. In this brave new world of Chinese diplomacy, language and culture -
- and, yes, pop songs -- are playing a major role in Beijing’s quest to be understood and, if all go well, win the affection of Southeast Asia's 600 million people. Its uncharted territory for a government that until recently appeared to care very little about how it was perceived outside of China. "The Chinese
government is paying much more attention to public diplomacy than before," said Yang Baoyun, a
Southeast Asia expert at Peking University in Beijing. "The government has realized that people are
important, and that cultural exchange can supplement traditional diplomacy." On Nov. 18-20,
Cambodia will host Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, and other world leaders at the ASEAN Summit. As the
United States pivots from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and re-engages with the 10 countries of
ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, much of the focus at the summit will be on
Washington's ability to revive its flagging diplomatic influence. But in the contest for public opinion, which the United States is accustomed to leading without challenge, the landscape is shifting. The
Chinese government, with the help of large companies and thousands of young language teachers willing to relocate overseas, has launched an ambitious cultural diplomacy effort designed to clean up
its image, which has been soiled by a number of high-profile scandals in the region, including investment projects that have resulted in land grabbing and environmental damage. To counter these negative perceptions, Beijing has overseen an explosion of language schools, exchange programs,
bookstores, and cultural corners. The effort began in earnest in 2004 when Hanban, an organization that falls under the Ministry of Education, began establishing Confucius Institutes at universities around the world.
(Eric, vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, “Memo to
Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Summer 2012, Online, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, accessed 7/19/13) PE
This will be an increasingly important issue because China is laying the groundwork for a long-term
relationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includes student exchanges and the
export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have spread like kudzu across Latin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004.
There is nothing inappropriate or frightening about student exchanges or language study. Indeed, U.S. and European officials understand that these initiatives are unrivaled instruments of soft power. They introduce
students to another culture and, presumably, provide them at an early age with positive impressions of
the host nation. As well, mastery of another language can lock in future patterns of trade and
investment, travel and tourism, research and scientific exchanges, and eventually, government-togovernment relationships.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran.” Chinese Soft Power in Latin
America: A Case Study” http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html- SJH
This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant influence in the region, while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years,
China's economic footprint in Latin
America, and its attempts to engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise, has expanded enormously. Understanding the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on
Chinese soft power in other parts of the world
as well. The Nature of Chinese Soft Power In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Cuban President Raul Castro watch signing of treaties in Havana after Hu signed dozens of trade and investment deals with Cuba It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology
. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.
The core of Chinese soft power in
Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous
business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally.
In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets. Despite China's impressive rates of sustained growth, only a small fraction of its population of 1.3 billion is part of the "modern" economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western goods. Estimates of the size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending on the income threshold used, although the number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, the sheer number of potential consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin American businesspeople, students, and government officials. The Ecuadorian banana magnate Segundo Wong, for example, reportedly stated that if each Chinese would eat just one Ecuadorian banana per week, Ecuador would be a wealthy country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin American countries as well.
In the commodities sector, Latin
American exports have expanded dramatically in recent years, including Chilean copper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In
Argentina, Chinese demand gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soy industry where none previously existed. During the 2009 global recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on a massive Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was perceived as critical for extractive industries throughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets such as the United States and Europe fell off. Beyond commodities, certain internationally recognized Latin American brands, such as José Cuervo, Café Britt, Bimbo,
Modelo, Pollo Campero, and Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class, which is open to leveraging its new wealth to
"sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export, including light manufactures and traditional products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple formal and informal barriers to entry.
Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this arena can be measured in terms of the multitude of business owners who are willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hours of their time and operate in China at a loss for years, based on the belief that the future of their corporations depends on successfully positioning themselves within the emerging Chinese market.
The hopes of selling products to China have also exerted a powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance the development of their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan
Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that nation as a bridge to China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in
November 2008. Governments in the region have also invested significant sums of money in the China-related activities of trade promotion organizations such as APEX (Brazil), ProChile, ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundación Exportar (Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities, with the objective of helping their nationals to place

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] products in those countries. Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC and fund elaborate pavilions in
Chinese culture and trade shows such as the Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort to help their countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment. China's combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread awareness of the possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin American countries in 2004, specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was actually referring to trade or investment has only called more attention in Latin America to China as a potential source of funds.
Although the expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize, today,
thanks to China's growing familiarity with doing business in Latin America, and its enormous financial reserves (including a foreign currency surplus that had reached $2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of
billions of dollars in the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3 billion commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Açu, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's
Petrobras for the development of its offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies.
For Latin America, the timing of the arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources in the region were frozen because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras has commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private sector activities in ways that
U.S. investors cannot.6
Influence of Chinese Entities and Infrastructure in Latin America. Although the presence of Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales by comparison to that of the
United States, it is growing and exerting an increasing weight in select countries.
(Nailene Chou teaches financial journalism at the School of Journalism and Communication,
Tsinghua University “Soft Power and China's Story in Latin America” Caixin Online 11.09.2011 http://english.caixin.com/2011-11-09/100324170.html)
The Spanish expression "cuento chino," or "Chinese story" is a synonym for "tall tale." It's a fitting expression for our times, since
China
's size, population and spectacular economic achievements of late have inspired grand fantasies across Latin America
.
¶
Barely a decade ago, China was the world's seventh-largest economy. Now, by the reckoning of the International Monetary Fund,
China will overtake the U nited
S tates and become the world's largest economy in 2016
.
¶ No wonder the developing world is held in thrall.
There's likewise
a prevailing readiness to accept and emulate China, which in turn has given China a golden opportunity to extend its cultural
soft power abroad
. Indeed, promoting soft power
overseas was a policy goal recently declared by the
Chinese government
. The initiative recognizes that a nation's success on the world stage, as Harvard University's Joseph Nye once said, "depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins." ¶ Yes, the story is important. Now, China needs a convincing narrative.
¶
The China-Latin
America attraction is easy to understand. China provides a growth model as a counterweight to the
United States.
Latin American countries have tried one failed development model after another only to find themselves, unlike the dynamic economies of
East Asia stuck in a slow-growth rut.
¶ State-led import substitution policies mired these countries in self-imposed isolation and inefficiencies. Neoliberal policies in line with the Washington Consensus led to dependency on fickle capital inflow.
¶ China's economic success, achieved via controlled economic liberalization and by expanding technical capacities in order to attract foreign investment, offers a viable alternative.
¶ In the second half of the 20th century, Mao Zedong's doctrine of guerrilla warfare – which once shone like a beacon guiding fervent revolutionaries in South America – faded into the Andean jungles. But since launching its capitalist transformation, China has avoided ideological exports. It carefully keeps a safe distance from leftist politics in Venezuela and Bolivia, while adhering to mercantilist policies: Doing business for business' sake.
¶ Latin American countries that today count China as their No. 1 trading partner, such as Brazil, Chile and
Peru, have benefited enormously as Chinese commodity purchases boosted export revenues and helped them weather the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast, countries overly dependent on the United States, such as Mexico, were hurt more than others during that recent downturn. With the U.S. economy in recession, cash-rich China is now in a unique position to invest in capital-intensive projects.
¶ "Cuento chino" is more relevant than ever this year amid buzz over an US$ 8 billion railroad project scheduled to link two Colombian cities: the port of Cartagena on the Caribbean Sea, and Buenaventura on the Pacific Ocean. This would be an engineering feat that arguably only the Chinese could accomplish: A 220-kilometer railway across floodplains and three mountain ranges, and through a region marred by drug-trafficking violence.
¶ The rail project's plans sparked wild speculation about China's intent and what some said was an unabashed incursion into
America's backyard. The story got more intriguing when the railway started being called a "canal seco," or "dry canal," by those who guessed ships would be ferried on railroad cars from sea to sea.
¶ Infatuation with China, however, can quickly turn to antipathy. An economic powerhouse China may be, but it can hardly be called a gentle giant. It's actually a voracious monster, gobbling crude oil, minerals and natural resources, wreaking havoc on the environment, blithely emitting unacceptable amounts of the carbon dioxide that causes global warming.
¶
China as "la fabrica del mundo" – the factory of the world – arouses fear and resentment, as more than 90 percent of Latin American manufacturing exports are threatened by Chinese competition. No wonder some 60 percent of all anti-dumping cases launched against China at the World Trade Organization were filed by Latin American countries.
¶
Latin America's perceptions of China are

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] still largely shaped by international media
. The Chinese government's soft-power Confucius Institutes, if managed well, could bring greater understanding of China.
¶ A Colombian woman I recently met said she is keen to learn the Chinese language but confesses she's more drawn to Tibetan Buddhism than the moral teachings of that ancient sage, Confucius. In predominantly Catholic countries, China as an atheist country does not go down very well.
¶
Bonding China and Latin America calls for a narrative that resonates
. For a country of 1.3 billion people with a per capita
GDP no higher than Colombia or Peru's,
China has
shared experiences and future hopes to tell to other emerging economies
.
Finding the right story will be crucial for soft power policy to succeed. Otherwise, the game will be lost even before it begins.
(Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, “Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)
Farther abroad, Beijing's soft-power influence is felt in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. The
BBC poll found that of seven countries in these regions, six have either a majority (Lebanon, South
Africa, Chile and Brazil) or a plurality (Argentina and Mexico) favouring Chinese influence in the world. It is particularly interesting that China receives favourable ratings from countries in Latin America whose
manufacturing sectors face significant competition from China. When asked about China's economic influence, 54% of Mexicans surveyed see it as positive, and only 18% have a negative view. The existence of like-minded states in these regions and the attractiveness of China's development model
have facilitated Beijing's quest for market, natural resources and political influence. Under President
Lula, Brazil has agreed to recognise China as a 'market economy', which would make it harder to impose penalties on China for dumping exports. Ideological sympathies were reported to play an important role in forging Brazil's policy toward China.35 In Iran, two of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's foreign-policy advisers are big champions of the Chinese model - former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati and his former deputy, Abbas Maleki.56 With their blessings, Iran looks to steadily increase its linkages with countries to its east, such as China and India.57

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Nicholas a Macquarie University Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), International Communication and is coordinator of the Line 21 project Academic and former diplomat with a research focus on country and regime branding and contemporary propaganda media. “Success of China's soft power campaign can't be gauged by rich countries” Global Times 7-7-2013 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794405.shtml#.Uelff43VCSo SCTM
US political scientist Joseph Nye claims that the leaders of China and Russia just don't get his concept of
"soft power."
¶
In an article published in Foreign Policy in April, he reminds us that soft power springs from individuals, the private sector and civil society. China and Russia, Professor Nye points out, "make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power."
¶
Clearly there is dissonance between Nye's soft power and the strategies followed by Beijing and Moscow in their respective pursuits of it. But are they all talking about the same "soft power?"
¶
Hong Kong University's
David Bandurski, charting the appearance of the term "soft power" in Chinese print publications from
1998 to 2008, has identified massive growth in the importance of the concept.
¶
Usage of "soft power" in
Chinese newspapers grew from a negligible number of appearances in 2003 to around 7,500 in 2008.
¶
A closer look suggests that China's increasing interest in soft power has less to do with Nye than it does with an ongoing focus on the unprecedented growth of its own national power and the need to measure it, assess it and control its implications.
¶
Usage of the term "comprehensive national power"
(CNP) first appeared in the mid-1980s, when it was suggested by some Chinese scholars considering various national power equations as methods for analyzing the international balance of power.
¶
Huang
Shuofeng of China's Academy of Military Science, a founder of the CNP concept, writes that the CNP
"refers to the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well."
¶
As Deng
Xiaoping once stated, "in measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides."
¶
As part of the CNP equation, the soft power concept, rendered in Chinese as ruanshili, has evolved in Chinese discourse into a range of concepts quite distinct from that envisaged by
Joseph Nye.
¶
As Nye has pointed out, polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in
Africa and Latin America, but not so much in the developed world.
¶
China's approach to soft power doesn't resonate as much with the rich nations of the world as it does with much of the developing
world where Beijing's traditional non-alignment and aid work has had positive reputational results.
¶
Similarly, as the same international polls indicate, China's reputation at home far exceeds its reputation within the developed world.
¶
An emergent China is unsurprisingly perceived far more positively by its own population relative to how it is perceived by publics in Europe, North America and developed East
Asia.
¶
Beijing's idea of soft power appears to be working relatively well across large tracts of the
developing world for whom its emerging success shines as a relevant alternative to Western models.
¶
Beijing's "internal" soft power also appears to be doing nicely in articulating China's national power
ascendancy to its own increasingly globalized population.
¶
And while many Western policymakers and media commentators pen a pervasive narrative of concern in relation to China's rise, how much of the rest of the world is actually listening?
¶
Does Nye's comment that China doesn't quite get his version of
soft power really matter? Probably not. They have their own.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jean, Director of Global & Area Studies Program at the University of Wyoming, Spring 05,
“China's prudent cultivation of "soft" power and implications for U.S. policy in East Asia”, Asian Affairs:
An American Review, 32.1, Academic OneFile)
China's patience, confidence, and rising economic power translate into a growing pool of "soft"
power, giving China increasing influence in East Asia and the global economic system. (1) China's policy approach represents the sophisticated neomercantilist view that globalization has altered the way nations compete for power. China acknowledges that acceding to international and regional rules-based organizations and agreements has become a sovereignty-enhancing mechanism rather than a limit to its autonomy. In the near future China will primarily follow agreed-upon international practices, although it is increasingly moving in position to directly shape the system itself. China's growing soft power is not inherently a threat to U.S. interests, but how the United States responds to this change in the coming years will shape prospects for future stability in East Asia and the global economic system. China's
"Good Neighbor" Diplomacy A few years ago China's dominance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
East Asian region, speedy regional economic growth, and military spending increases were cast in zerosum terms in East Asia, emphasizing the dangers associated with China's growing shadow. (2) Cognizant of this apprehension, China launched an aggressive campaign to alleviate those fears by establishing closer political, economical, and cultural ties with its neighbors. Tangible examples of China's new diplomacy include bilateral efforts along various fronts in the 1990s when it settled long-term border conflicts with Russia and Vietnam, adopted a pragmatic approach to settle disputes over the Paracel,
Spratly, and Senkaku Islands, and aided its neighbors during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Seeking a
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become a cornerstone of China's most recent efforts to promote the benign view of its rise. At the October 2003
ASEAN Summit, China continued FTA negotiations and broadened the dialogue to promote peace and security through China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)--the first of its kind that
China has signed with a regional grouping. China also proposed using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to form a conference to increase communication among Asian militaries. Although the ARF largely remains a confidence-building mechanism rather than a means of preventive diplomacy, it serves
China's goal to reassure other countries in the region as to its peaceful intentions. China has seized the political initiative from the Japanese who, in response, launched bilateral free-trade talks of its own and acceded to the TAC (Korea has made similar moves for FTAs with Singapore and Japan). China has broadened its efforts by seeking FTAs, outside the ASEAN structure, with Australia and New Zealand. A possible FTA with India has been discussed as well. The prominent exception to China's savvy diplomatic initiatives is its relationship with Taiwan. The dangerous zero-sum nature of China's rhetoric surrounding
Taiwan's recent election demonstrates the continuing sensitivity of the issue in Chinese politics.
However, because maintaining the cross-strait status quo is necessary for continued stability and economic growth, China has reason to opt for patience. Beijing's logical policy will be to maintain the status quo. China's Lure and Growing East Asian Economic Interdependence East Asian states and
Taiwan recognize that economically, China has become the new game in town. Asian trade is flourishing due to China's huge market for industrial components, raw materials, food, and other consumer products. A close relationship has developed between China's import growth and increasing
exports to other Asian countries. In contrast, Japan is now recovering from a decade-long decline and

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] its current recovery appears dependent on China. In 2003, growth of total exports of China's trading partners stemmed from exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC): almost a one-third increase for each of Japan and Korea's totals and a 68-percent increase for Taiwan, according to U.S. government reports. A large percentage of the trade with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is in the form of components destined for export to other markets as finished products--commonly, shipments to the United States.
States in the East Asian region recognize the need to take advantage of their closeness to China to
become an active supplier of fuel or intermediate goods in China's export engine. This trend is reflected in the increasing two-way trade between ASEAN countries and China since 1990--which ASEAN reports to be an average increase of 20 percent annually, while ASEAN-Japan trade is on the decline. In addition, China's willingness to tolerate trade deficits with regional states (such as the $14.8-billion trade deficit with Japan, $23 billion deficit with Korea, $16.4 billion deficit with ASEAN states, and $40 billion deficit with Taiwan in 2003 according to Chinese Customs statistics) adds to the interdependence, with China at the center. East Asian investment patterns further strengthen regional interdependence.
First, East Asian states invest heavily in China. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reports that
61 percent of China's FDI inflows in 2002 originated in Asia, with Hong Kong leading at 34 percent with the remainder of the figure attributed to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Macau, Malaysia,
Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Second, China has also begun to encourage outward FDI into East
Asia through its "Go Forth" policy. According to an United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) report, China's overall investment in ASEAN countries grew from $400 million in the 1980s to $2.9 billion in 2002. The investment is heavily resource-based, with oil and gas in Australia,
Indonesia, and Thailand, although Chinese manufacturing is poised to expand its investment. For example, Thailand seeks an opportunity for direct investment from China with the idea that Chinese companies may aim to escape regulatory barriers, overcapacity at home, and even higher land and labor costs in China by relocating to Thailand. As regional fears have calmed, a sense of common purpose has emerged. Growing economic interdependence with China provides new incentives for states in the
East Asian region to promote a stable framework for bilateral relations to maintain prosperity. Japan focuses on strengthening China's regional economic ties for development to prevent a pattern of power projection in the region. For other countries, the more formal stake in China's future development, such as ASEAN's FTA negotiations with China and Japan, gives them leverage in negotiations with both countries and "power of say" in the region's development. Even the Taiwan issue potentially reinforces the status quo. East Asian countries generally value stable economic ties over Taiwan's
independence and register little enthusiasm over Taiwan's quest for freedom.
, 0
– emeritus professor of strategic and defence studies at The Australian National University
(Paul, Winter. “Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, Issue 1.
Ebsco.)
The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia
, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union.
The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially
threatening than anywhere
in
Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist
across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup.
The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense
(about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world
except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders.
Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia's security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict
. There are positive

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view.
But there are a number of negative tendencies
that must be of serious concern.
There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences
in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control
. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, “Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)
Analysis and debate concerning China's rise is focused almost entirely on the economic and military
aspects of its growing power.1 Yet 'soft' sources of power - including culture, political ideology and
diplomacy - are increasingly recognised as essential components of Great Power status. It seems odd that the subject of soft power is either missing from discussions of China, or misapplied. While China is constrained in many ways in the exercise of such power, its soft-power resources are considerable and demand scrutiny.
(Barry, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, 2004, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment”, New York, Questia, p. 145-147)
The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region
. As a general rule, the status of great power
, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region
(Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The US clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it
(and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power.
China does not have that kind of geopolitical option
. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics.
China's global standing
thus depends
crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced
. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished
. Since the US is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if
China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India
. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves.
In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden.
The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first,
China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the US. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states
. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the US, and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the US uses the Organization of American
States.
If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the US and the EU in the global economy
. In the second scenario,
China inspires fear in its neighbours.
Japan's alliance with the US deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with US support
. Under the first set of conditions,
China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage.
Under the second set of conditions,
China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed.
The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce US-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the US and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does
China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)?
If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage
. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain.
What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state.
But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, “Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)
Foreign student enrolment has also seen dramatic growth. Within a decade, total enrolment of
international students in China (excluding those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) increased
threefold to no,844.6 Over 75% of students are from Asia, with South Korea and Japan consistently sending the most.7 A growing number of students, though, are from Southeast Asia, a region that accommodates the majority of overseas Chinese and has a centuries-old history of Chinese-language education. Students from Vietnam, for example, have increased more than sixfold over the past six years.8 While a major influx of international students in China is driven by the country's booming economy, this dramatic growth in foreign enrolments also reflects China's role as the cultural magnet
of Asia. According to the Ministry of Education, over three-quarters of foreign students went to China
to study academic disciplines of general cultural concern (Chinese language, arts, history, philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine).9
(China.org, 5/1/13, “Chinese gov't to support international students”, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-05/01/content_28704250.htm, acc. 7/19/13)
The Chinese government will support about 50,000 international students in China
in 2015, and the country will become the largest Asian destination for such students
in 2020, high-level Chinese officials said on April 25. About 320,000 overseas students came to China in 2012, the majority from South Korea and the United States, said Liu Jinghui, secretary-general of the China
Scholarship Council. Last year, the ministry implemented the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) for the education sector, she said. According to the plan, in 2015, the number of international students in China supported by the government's scholarship program will reach 50,000. While
Europe has become the second-largest destination for Chinese students abroad, "only about 35,000 students came from EU member states to study in China last year, so we will promote China's education system in Europe now," Liu said. Du Yubo, vice-minister of education, said that by
2020, about 500,000 international students will be in China, enabling the country to become the largest Asian destination for international students.
China and the European Union will deepen education and exchange cooperation
this year, said
European commission and Chinese government officials at the first meeting of the EU-China Higher Education Platform for Cooperation and
Exchanges, which was held on Thursday in Brussels. "
We should learn from each other's strong points, and boost cooperation
in various areas," Du said. In 2013, the Chinese government will provide
1,087 scholarships to 27 EU countries
, the ministry said. "
The Chinese government has been paying close attention to cooperation projects between China and Europe. Our cooperation has a long history, a lot of achievements and potential
," said Jan Truszczynski, director general for Education, Training, Culture and Youth of the European Commission. China has established 105 Confucius Institutes in about 20 EU member states, and joined hands with the European Commission to set up three programs in three Chinese universities. For instance, the EU has injected 17 million euros
($22.16 million) to establish the China-
EU School of Law with the China University of Political Science and Law,
one of the top law schools in the country.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Richard, Centre for European Studies and Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and
Management, June 2009, “Global Warming Politics: the EU, China and Climate Change”, http://sciencespo-globalgovernance.net/node/23, acc. 7/18/13)
The
European Union
(EU) and China were
to a large extent at the core of the process whereby climate change became a prominent issue in international relations. Supported by the sensitivity of European public opinion on environmental issue, its preference for multilateralism, and by its own policy expertise, the EU was from the onset very active in promoting international agreements on climate. As the U nited
S tates eventually failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol
signed by the Clinton Administration, and remained reluctant to negotiations on climate under Georges Bush presidencies, the EU was able to assume leadership among developed countries on the issue.
As evidence about human influence on climate change accumulated, the tension between energy-intensive modes of development and the capacity to mitigate climate change also became more apparent.
As the most populated and fastest growing economy of developing countries, China’s environmental policy and attitude with regard to climate change regime became increasingly scrutinized
. Its record of first CO2 emitter surpassing the USA for the first time in 2008 was widely noticed, and China is frequently vilainized for its dirty growth model and its global consequences.
China
nevertheless developed a significant policy to address climate and energy issues over the recent years.
To a large extent, the limited steps accomplished so far at the global level in climate change policy largely relied on the
convergence of policies and cooperation programs between the EU and China.
Mazo 10
– PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research
Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122
The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above preindustrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C
(O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to
be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state
failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is
no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the
best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Minxin, The Financial Times, 3/12/03, “A Docile China is Bad for Global Peace”, Carnegie
Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/12/docile-china-is-bad-for-global-peace/2vyo, acc. 7/19/13)
This question may strike many in Beijing as absurd. Keeping a low international profile, maintaining a stable relationship with the US and capitalising on globalisation to spur economic growth have served
the country well. Why change? Indeed, few would dispute that, on balance, Beijing's foreign policy has demonstrated increasing maturity and sophistication. Yet, China's handling of the crises in Iraq and
North Korea also shows the risks and costs of passivity. It is time the leadership re-evaluated the
geopolitical assumptions underlying Chinese foreign policy. In the crises in Iraq and North Korea, the desire to keep a low profile has led China to adopt a more ambiguous stance and lose whatever
influence it may have had in shaping their resolution. Unlike Russia, which has taken a more proactive approach, China has been missing in action. Its position on the use of force against Iraq is unclear. Its declared goal of keeping nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula has not been accompanied by
visible diplomatic measures. Inaction becomes harder to defend when one considers what is at stake for China. Its immediate economic interests in Iraq are modest. But because of its growing
dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which accounts for 60 per cent of imports, it may better serve its
interests by getting more actively involved and taking a clear stand. Quiescence risks marginalisation.
In dealing with an unfolding nuclear confrontation in North Korea, Beijing's inaction has disappointed
its friends and irked Washington. Although it does not have to toe the US line toward Pyongyang, China needs to come up with an alternative to Washington's policy of no negotiation. If it allows the crisis to spiral out of control, it could be dragged into a nuclear maelstrom with devastating consequences for
peace and prosperity in the region. In a world where the threats from rogue states and international terrorism are at least as dangerous as rivalry among major powers, Beijing can better defend its interests by modifying its diplomatic strategy. While it should continue a policy of co-operation with
the US, it must use its growing influence to assume a more active role in the international community.
This may require Beijing to break some old habits, such as its aversion to substantial participation in peacekeeping missions, reluctance to increase its financial contributions to the United Nations, and abdication of any leadership role in multilateral organisations. Chinese leadership will be necessary
above all in reshaping its own volatile neighbourhood. To be sure, its initiative to establish a free-trade zone with the Association of South-East Asian Nations is a good start. But Beijing can do much more to allay the fears of its neighbours about China's growing power. This may require it to adopt a new two-
pronged regional strategy. First, China should use its clout to push for regional integration and co-
operation. On the top of this agenda should be expanded regional free trade. Despite Tokyo's lukewarm response to Beijing's proposal for a Japan-China-Asean free trade agreement, China should continue to push this initiative. Second, Beijing needs to mend its frayed ties with Tokyo, where sinophobia is at a feverish level. To reassure Japan, China must be more transparent about its military modernisation, stop using Japan's war guilt as a diplomatic tool, and start treating it as a full co-equal partner in maintaining peace and prosperity in East Asia. A genuine Sino-Japanese reconciliation is the requisite for regional collective security. No doubt, this may seem an ambitious agenda for China's new foreign policy team. It also goes against ingrained thinking in Beijing's diplomatic strategy. But if Chinese leaders do not seize the current opportunity to reshape their regional environment, others will do it
for them - and not necessarily to their liking.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
,
– Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable
Development, AND Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act
Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open:
Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years.
This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the
Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection.
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious
, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.
At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack
1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident , leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities.
On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million.
Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.
But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).
The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees
Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last
1000 years.
The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…
The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger
…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.
4 These, of course, are not the only consequences.
Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use
.
Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions.
The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison.
How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes.
There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships
5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states.
The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Alan, Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry
University, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/373.full.pdf, acc. 7/19/13)
Competition for resources is now a key issue for all major powers. As the largest in population among all developing countries, and with the fastest growing manufacturing base, China’s need for natural
resources is truly enormous. One analyst recently showed that among 10 countries with populations of over 100 million, China is second from bottom as regards indigenous natural resources: only Japan is worse off. As population growth puts even more pressure on resources, effective political handling of
resource issues is thus essential, because shortages could threaten the future of the country.
Maintaining stable resource supplies, therefore, is a factor crucial to determining whether or not
China can continue its development trajectory in the 21st century.23 The West now fears competition
from China for access to global resources, particularly oil and gas.24 Henry Kissinger has mooted competition over hydrocarbon resources in coming years as the most likely cause of international conflict.25 As Hu Jintao showed at an Asian summit in 2005, Beijing leaders are also well aware of the issue. Hu stated that achieving balanced and orderly growth through proper handling of the energy issue is a Chinese priority: China would focus on energy conservation and effective use of resources, as well as fresh exploration and new imports. But to satisfy its demand for oil and other resources China must explore many different options on every continent.26 The government announced in 2002 a new policy encouraging its three major national oil corporations to ‘go out’ (zouchuqu) and ensure secure overseas energy supplies: through direct purchases, exploring and drilling programmes, constructing refineries, and building pipelines.27 The Chinese oil demand between 1993 and 2002 grew by almost 90%, and now stands at around 6 million barrels a day, some 40% of which has to be imported. Conversely, about
40% of oildemand growth worldwide from 2000 to 2004 is attributable to China.28 In November 2004,
Chinese President Hu signed 39 commercial agreements with Latin American countries; investments in
Argentina alone amounted to US$ 20 billion. On a later visit in 2005, Vice-President Zeng signed a key agreement with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on oil and gas explorations; China also announced it would extend favourable trade credits to Cuba. By 2005, China had offered more than US $ 50 billion of investment to countries within the US ‘backyard’, and has pursued a similar strategy in sub-Saharan
African countries. Chinese businesses are participant in many projects, including major infrastructure development; corporations also invest heavily in oil production, notably in the Sudan, Angola, and
Nigeria.29 An online newspaper report in December 2005 evidenced the fierce competition between
China and the USA for African ‘black gold’.30 China’s potential competition with the USA in West Asia
and North Africa could be an even more sensitive issue than that in Latin America and East Asia. ‘The potentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept US leadership and the prospect of competition between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses
particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East.’31 Frequent high-level exchange visits between Beijing and West Asian leaders endorse economic ties. Altogether, reflecting the title of a recent study, China is a future hegemon whose rise inevitably engenders new transnational dynamics.
We have therefore explored China’s need to avoid military conflict, its massive economic development, and its need to secure resources as important contexts for Chinese soft power in the

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
21st century.32 The author believes that the climate change is another factor which will become even more urgent and prominent in the immediate future.
, 0
(David, director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong
Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, post-doctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs,
“China’s Global Hunt for Energy”, September/October, proquest)
An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy
. A booming domestic economy, rapid urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter.
Now it is the world's second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China
Center for Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20 years. These new needs already have serious implications for China's foreign policy.
Beijing's access to foreign resources is necessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social stability, for the survival of the
Chinese Communist Party (
CCP
). Since China remains a relatively centralized, government-driven economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign
Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist
Party.
, 0
(
Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper)
August 3, 2005, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death” http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-
3/30931.html)
Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP
, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven
or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends
. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP
’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now
plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives
.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, “Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)
A most intriguing example of China's soft power can be seen in its relations with Taiwan. In 2005,
China launched a charm offensive against the politicians and people in the island by inviting opposition party leaders to visit the main-land, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland universities, and, through a zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan's fruit, offering export incentive perks to farmers in the south of Taiwan (traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). This 'hearts- and-minds' policy not only aims to reduce the perception of military threat from China, but also gives
the Chinese government leverage to exercise influence in Taiwan's political culture and society, and politically marginalise Taiwan's independence-oriented president, Chen Shui-bian. In part as a result of
Beijing's manoeuvres in recent years - and Chen's increasingly frustrated but worrisome responses - the
possibility for Taiwan independence seems more distant and difficult. Chen Shiubian has increasingly alienated American supporters in Washington who do not appreciate what they see as his provocative political stance on cross-Strait issues. In the meantime, some 1 million, or about 5%, of the Taiwan population lives and works in China, and Taiwan business has invested more than sioobn on the mainland. To be sure, some of China's influence over Taiwan is not so 'soft' at all: its military build-up along the Taiwan Strait, including the deployment of more than 700 ballistic missiles targeting the island, is a coercive threat aimed at thwarting independence moves by Taiwan. On the other hand, the
Taiwan legislature's inability or unwillingness since 2001 to appropriate funding to purchase some
$18bn worth of weapons offered by Washington - a seemingly wise course in the face of China's growing military clout - is another indication of the mainland's ability to shape policy decisions on
Taiwan in its favour. Beijing's influence still falls far short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens prefer a status quo which neither invites Chinese coercion (or worse) nor requires unification with the Communist mainland. But a combination of Beijing's soft- and hard-power instruments in recent years appears to have stemmed the political fortunes of the pro-
independence movement in Taiwan for the time being.
adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush,
0
[Michael, “A war like no other: the truth about
China's challenge to America”, p. google books]
War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the United
States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power
and thus leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states . It seems inconceivable,
in this day and age, that the United States
and China could
really wind up in war. Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined, the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them to worry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two huge powers ever to come to blows.
There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap- ter three, most of the reasons whv
China and the United States could
theoretically fight do not in the end hold water
. But the Taiwan problem is

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] different . Not only does it involve a third actor over which neither Beijing nor Washington has control.
Not only does it involve a territory that China sees as an integral part of its own nation and that the United States sees as a long-standing
, stalwart, and democratic friend
. In addition, the way that a China-Taiwan crisis could begin and escalate would hold the inherent potential for escalation to direct superpower war
. This chapter explains whv. The- next chapters get into the dynamics of what could happen if that war began, how it might be terminated before getting extremely serious—but also why it could be tough to control. The overall message is sobering.
Even if the chances of war
between the United States and China are less than 25 percent— indeed, even if they are less than 10 percent—they are far from zero. And given the enormous consequences of any such war, in terms ol immediate danger as well as lasting effects on the interna- tional system, every effort must be made to prevent it . World
War I did not seem very likely
to most world leaders in 1912 or 1913 either;
certainly a
horrible four-year struggle, followed two decades later by an even worse world war
, was not predicted.
We must avoid dire mistakes of that era and take seriously the possibility of a war
that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still. In short, the reasons whv that war could occur, are as follows: First. China really does consider Taiwan its own
, and even as it has arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1 Second,
Chinas military capabilities are growing
last even as Taiwan's begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunity—if it can keep the United
States out of the light
Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty' issue in away that China interprets as the pursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong
in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions could matter more than reality in such a situation
. Fourth, while Washington's commitment to Taiwan is long- standing, it is also somewhat ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real!)' would sit out a China-Taiwan war.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
“Three international organizations: China's economy has reached critical period of transition” Xinhua http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-hasreached-critical-period-of-transition.html SCTM
Xinhua Beijing, July 15 (Xinhua) (Reporter Hanjie An Bei) 15, National Bureau of Statistics released the first half of China's economy grew 7.6 percent, the Xinhua News Agency reporters Di Yishi and Jian Lianxian interviewed the IMF [microblogging], the Asian Development Bank, World
Bank [microblogging] three international institutions relevant experts.
¶ Look growth: Economic growth of 7.6% in the world what it means?
¶
'The U.S. economy is expected to grow 1.7 percent this year, the euro zone average negative growth, Japan may reach 2%, Russia is expected to increase 2% ......' In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Department chief economist Olivier Blanchard Seoul seems that
China's current economic growth is undoubtedly a major highlight of the global economy
.
¶
'The economic growth of 7.6% in line with expectations.' Asian Development Bank Resident Representative Zhuang Jian, senior economist, told reporters that although the year in the second quarter,
China's economic growth slowed down continuously reproduced, but the decline is
¶
Around the world, the world economy is still slow growth
, and presented 'three-speed' growth pattern:
China to lead the emerging market countries continue to maintain the 'fastest growing legion' advantage, the U.S. economy is steadily recovering, the vast majority of European countries are still struggling with difficult times.
¶ At the same time,
China,
Brazil, India and other emerging economies, growth is slowing collective confirms an important signal: After years of rapid growth
, the emerging economies are
gradually entering the 'deceleration zone.'
¶ Blanchard also noted that
China's economic growth slowdown
. Few days ago, IMF updated forecasts for the global economy of the agency predicted that
China's economic growth this year of 7.8%, compared with April predictive value of cut 0.3 percentage points . 'China is becoming an economic slowdown affecting the global economy is one of the three new risks.' Blanchard said.
¶ On Risk: China should avoid pursuing short-term economic growth superficial
¶
National Bureau of Statistics data show that the first half of the investment in China's economic growth is still the largest engine, contribution to GDP ratio reached 53.9%.
¶ Blanchard said that a large investment in China's economic growth, but a lot of investment from the shadow banking, which makes the
Chinese macro-control
policy-makers face a dilemma: If you continue to maintain high investment, it will exacerbate overcapacity and credit risk, but if the tightening credit control investment will result in slowdown in economic growth.
¶
'China should pay more attention to the quality of investment, to avoid the pursuit of short-term economic growth superficial
.' Zhuang Jian said.
¶ Zhuang Jian pointed out that the investment plays an important role in developing countries, China's current development is inseparable from the support of investment, but the investment structure and quality is very important.
¶ 'If there is insufficient economic structure adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure, continue to increase investment will only make the problem more severe overcapacity will further exacerbate the local debt and credit risks.' He said.
¶ In this regard, Blanchard believes that although
China's economy is still at risk
, but the macro-control policy makers, there is still enough space for policy control to prevent rapid decline in economic growth.
¶ Seeking good way: China's economy
has slowed down to a critical period of structural adjustment
¶
In a globalized world, China's economy can achieve sustained and healthy development of the global economy is essential.
¶
Blanchard noted that the global economy to achieve sustainable and balanced development, the major economies are facing the task of structural adjustment reforms. For China, a policy to focus on improving growth potential and increase spending on economic growth driven role. 'If say when the opportunity to achieve this transformation, it may be right now. '
¶ 'China's economy continues to years of rapid growth, has been the need to slow down to adjust the structure to the way a critical stage.' Zhuang Jian pointed out the factors supporting China's economic growth is changing,
China urgently looking for a new economic growth point
, and widespread Consensus is to slow down the growth rate, in both the economic growth, more emphasis on improving the quality and efficiency of economic growth.
(Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of
Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China
.
Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions
. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific).
A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession
and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a
political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(“Chinese slowdown casts shadow over world economy” Jul 17, 2013 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.html
SCTM)
LONDON:
China's slowdown cast a shadow over Europe and Asia
on Tuesday, sparking questions over
Beijing's ability to avoid a hard landing that would wreak havoc on the world economy
, analysts said.
¶ The nation's powerhouse economy slowed to 7.5-per-cent growth in the second quarter, down from 7.7 per cent in the previous three months, official data showed Monday.
¶ "
China is a key downside risk to the global economy
. Recent data does suggest that the economy is sluggish," VTB Capital economist Neil MacKinnon told AFP.
¶ "In addition, the authorities are concerned about the rapid rate of credit expansion and the impact it might have on inflation
. This rules out any near-term monetary or fiscal stimulus." ¶
New evidence emerged
Tuesday of the impact of slowing Chinese growth in Europe, which is still struggling to recover from the eurozone's long-running sovereign debt crisis.
¶
Investors in
Germany, Europe's biggest economy, turned gloomy this month on fears over falling exports to China
, in a stark illustration of the new globalised power of the Asian nation's industry and consumers.
¶
Germany's investor confidence index, calculated by ZEW economic institute, fell by 2.2 points to 36.3 points in July. That disappointed analysts' forecasts for an increase to 40 points.
¶ "New dark clouds have started to black out growth prospects of the German economy," said ING DiBa economist Carsten Brzeski.
¶
"These clouds are not coming from the South but from the East. The stuttering and now slowing Chinese economy is a clear cause of concern
(and) could become a new risk factor for the German economic outlook." ¶ China is now the fifth most important single export market for
German companies and accounts for some six per cent of total exports.
¶ The Asian Development Bank meanwhile warned Tuesday that China's slowing growth was weakening momentum and trimmed its outlook for developing Asia this year to 6.3 per cent, from 6.6 per cent.
¶
The sluggishness comes as
"
China is attempting to rebalance its economy away from investment towards a more consumer-driven economy
," said Currencies Direct analyst Alistair Cotton.
¶ But this rebalancing would present growth opportunities for the West, he noted.
¶ "The big winners, should they crack the market, will be consumer companies with strong brand identity," he said.
¶ "The losers are likely to be the countries supplying the raw materials for Chinese investment, conversely the ones that were doing so well in the last decade." ¶ Daiwa Capital Markets economist Chris Scicluna added that markets were eager to see an "orderly" Chinese slowdown that would not disrupt the world economy.
¶ "China's support for global demand has been welcome over the past couple of years as the West has had to work off the excesses of the pre-Lehman era," Scicluna told AFP, in reference to US bank Lehman Brothers whose collapse in 2008 triggered a global slump.
¶ "A slowing of China's growth, over the medium term, to a sub-7.0-per-cent rate was always inevitable as the economy matured.
¶ "The main concern is that the authorities there can engineer an orderly slowdown -- ie. one that does not see growth plummet sub-5.0 per cent and lead to financial and social crisis."
¶
Gekko Markets analyst Anita Paluch added that the West had relied on booming China to help overcome a fierce recession which followed the global financial crisis.
¶ "Slower growth will have impact on those countries who have strong trade links with China -- like Australia, Brazil and (the) South East Asia region -- as demand will fall," Paluch said.
¶
China is vital for the smooth functioning of global economies
because the Asian powerhouse nation is a major consumer of commodities, like crude oil, steel, and copper, and of manufactured products like cars and airplanes.
¶
At the same time, China is also widely regarded as the workshop of the world, and its vast factories benefit from low labour costs and high volume production.
¶ But the
International Monetary Fund cut its global economic growth forecast last week, citing the increased "possibility of a longer growth slowdown" in emerging market economies like China.
¶
Scicluna added Tuesday that all nations around the world needed to return to "appropriate" levels of growth to create a balanced global economy.
¶ "Over the long run we would hope to have all economies running at their potential," he told
AFP.
¶ "It will, however, be a long time before Europe's economies have returned to that position. My big fear is a very abrupt Chinese slowdown with disorderly consequences."
¶
But due to the poor quality of Chinese economic data and lack of information about risks in the Chinese banking sector, "it is difficult to gauge with any confidence the probability of that happening,"
he said.
Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage for TheAtlantic.com. “China’s economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
The Washington Post June 20 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-uphow-freaked-out-should-we-be/ SCTM
Thursday was a very bad day for
China
’s economy, the world’s second-largest and a crucial pillar of the global economy, with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of the U.S. financial collapse.
The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chinese leaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear to be causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it could see
China’s economy finally cool after years of breakneck growth, with serious repercussions for the rest of us
.
¶ Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been fighting rumors all day that it defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S. financial collapse. There’s no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on China’s banks. But the fact that the trouble has even gotten to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be.
¶
Here’s what has happened:
China’s credit market has been in a bubble for years
, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during the financial crisis.
All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts, and it all comes crashing down
, as happened the United States.
China’s economic growth has been slowing, making a similar a crisis more likely
. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster by basically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse meant to avoid The Big One.
¶ In a real, uncontrolled credit crisis like the U.S. financial meltdown, credit suddenly freezes up, particularly between banks, meaning that the daily loans banks were relying on to do business are suddenly no longer affordable. Banks with too many unsafe loans suddenly owe more money than they can get their hands on, sometimes leading them to default or even collapse. And that means that it suddenly becomes much tougher for everyone else – companies that want to build new factories, families that went to buy a home – to borrow money
. That’s an uncontrolled credit crisis, and a number of
China-watchers have been worried that China, in its pursuit of constant breakneck growth, could be headed for one.
¶ China’s central bank, which is likely to tamp down all that unsafe lending and over-borrowing before it leads to a crash, appears to have forced an artificial credit crisis. (It tested a more modest version just two weeks ago.) It looks like the People’s Bank of China has already tightened credit considerably, making it suddenly very difficult for banks to borrow money. Something called the seven-day bond repurchase rate, which indicates “liquidity” or the ease of borrowing money, shot way up to triple what it was two weeks ago.
¶ This pair of charts, from the economics site Zero Hedge, shows the eerie parallels between today’s freeze-up in the Chinese interbank lending market and what happened in the United States when
Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a global crisis that we’re still recovering from: ¶ That second chart shows something called the TED spread, a key indicator of credit risk and how easy it is for U.S. banks to lend to one another.
¶ Money markets in China have also skyrocketed to what the Financial Times’ David Keohane called “silly levels.” This chart, via Keohane and Reuters’ Jamie McGeever, shows the money market rates way, way, way beyond any high of the last five years: ¶ Here’s where things get a little confusing. Bloomberg News reported Thursday evening Beijing time that, as panic moved through the Chinese financial system, the country’s central bank stepped in and offered $8.2 billion in
“relief” to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which just happens to be both state-owned and the largest bank in the world. What does this mean? Maybe that Chinese leaders got cold feet and are trying to walk back the self-imposed crunch, maybe that China’s largest bank managed to negotiate some preferential treatment, maybe that leaders are worried their most important bank might actually be less healthy than they thought and want to protect it from default. Or maybe this is just part of the process of easing down the markets. But then the
Chinese Web portal Sina announced that the reports were false (thanks to Bill Bishop for this link), adding some unnecessary confusion and uncertainty to an already volatile situation.
¶
So what happens next? There are four categories of outcome. The first is that Chinese leaders back off on the credit crunch and nothing happens, in which case they’ll probably just try the strategy again later. The second is that they press on and it works miraculously, cleaning out the financial system without causing too much pain. The third is that this spirals out of control, maybe because Beijing underestimated the risk or acted too late, potentially sending the global economy lurching once more. The fourth, and probably most likely, is that this works but is painful, averting catastrophe but slowing the Chinese economy after 20 years of miraculous growth.
¶ Chinawatchers, who tend to vary widely in their assessments of the country’s economic health, seem to be converging on that fourth scenario, of a painful but necessary slowdown. Nomura, a Japanese investment bank, recently issued a note (via the Financial Times) addressing fears that
China could face a financial collapse. Their less-than-comforting caveat: “This is a tricky issue, as the definition of ‘financial crisis’ can differ among investors.” The bank predict that China will not slip into a full-on crisis, citing Beijing’s control over the financial system and unwillingness to let it go under. But the Japanese bank warned: “Nonetheless, we expect a painful deleveraging process in the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in the manufacturing industry and in non-bank financial institutions.” If that happens, China’s growth would slow even more
. HSBC just cut their prediction for
Chinese GDP growth rate from 8.4 percent in 2014 to 7.4 percent, still high but a major drop that could plunge farther. This would be difficult for China, which has built its economy – and political stability – on keeping high economic growth. Recall that the U.S. financial collapse was disastrous for America’s already unhealthy economic sectors: city budgets, real estate, news media. Something similar could happen in China, which is also facing a massive property bubble.
All of this could also be dire for the rest of the world, which is heavily linked to China’s economy and is still struggling to recover from the U.S. and European crises

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Cynthia J., director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Jeffery, career foreign service officer from the U.S. state of
Virginia. Davidow has served as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, as well as having been the U.S.
Ambassador to Zambia, Venezuela, and Mexico, “China, Latin America, and the United States,”
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, January 2011, page 7, Online, http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf, accessed 7/18/13) PE
In a keynote address, Enrique García, president and CEO of the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), a
Latin American development bank, indicated that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global economic crisis has not obstructed Latin America’s path to sustained economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 7 [to]–8 percent. This success is partially due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued central bank independence, and strict financial regulations. Strong regional growth rates and resilience in the face of the crisis can also be attributed to the favorable terms of trade between Latin America’s resource rich countries and China.
(Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, “Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon,” The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE
First, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it
diversifies the sources of finance – finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and
European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin American
growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth.
Chinese finance is more in tune with what Latin American nations
want, rather than with what western development experts say they "need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and micro-anti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans
tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of
$260bn.
Neither do Chinese loans come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their "conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
. [Michael, research associate, "Bush goes to Beijing, China goes to Latin America" Council on Hemispheric Affairs -- November 14
-- www.coha.org/bush-goes-to-beijing-china-goes-to-latin-america/]
Indeed the PRC has powerful motivations for such courtships: as China has industrialized its strategic ties to Latin
America have grown
. Demonstrably, the region has assumed an increasing importance as a source for vital agricultural and mineral resources
.
Beijing aggressively seeks growth and expansion
, and despite the altruistic and fraternal tones taken in its trade agreements, it is far from an eleemosynary gesture. Since it is possible that China’s neocolonial investment strategy could result in crises similar to those which traditionally have involved comparable U.S. interests in the past, it is possible that
China could
also emulate Washington’s provocative practices to protect its newfound engagements .
¶
As Beijing moves through the early stages of establishing close working arrangements with Latin American militaries,
China is
perhaps readying itself to ensure that its economic and strategic interests are being safeguarded in the event that regional developments threaten the significant funds it is now beginning to invest in such countries as
Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela
, Brazil and Argentina. In examining these ties, it helps to recall earlier U.S. strategies
that led to various categories of intervention in such countries as Cuba, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama, where an important military factor eventually came into play
. This is not to say that China will necessarily exactly emulate past U.S. behavior, but that it may unwittingly find itself heading down that road.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Antonio C. Hsiang Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets “China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem November]//BMitch
From 2000 to 2008
, Latin America had been a diplomatic battlefield between China and Taiwan
. During the eight years of his tenure,
Taiwan’s president
Chen Shui-bian pursu[ed] identity politics—at the
heavy cost of international isolation
, inflamed cross-Strait tensions and economic stagnation.
His tactics were often unnecessarily provocative
, ranging from calling for independence to renaming public buildings to emphasize Taiwanese identity.
Taiwan-U.S. relations are
, as a result, at their lowest ebb
in decades.44 In his final gambit, Chen insisted on holding a national referendum on whether the island should seek to join the United Nations under the name of Taiwan instead of its legal name, the Republic of China. Of course the Security Council, where China has a veto, would never have accepted Taiwan’s application.45 In March 2008, Taiwan’s voters rejected the referendum by a substantial margin and produced a government more favorable to the security across the Taiwan Strait. The mandate of president Ma Ying-jeou is founded on his promise to deliver tangible benefits from better relations with Beijing, including direct airline flights, an economic accord protecting investments, more tourist visits by mainlanders to Taiwan and a peace accord under which China would withdraw the thousands of missiles it aims across the strait.46 According to U.S. National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair, a retired admiral who heads 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, the United States must continue to “make sure that military adventures are unattractive” to both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
He
also cautioned that Taiwan has to realize that its long-term security lies in some sort of an arrangement with China
. It does not lie in military defenses. But
Taiwan has long held justifiable complaint about its international political isolation and
about
Beijing’s efforts to force nations to choose diplomatic relations
with either Taiwan or China.
The Taiwanese fear that if China’s policy prevails and renders them completely isolated
,
Beijing would face minimal international opposition to increased hegemony
over the island and, ultimately, to Taiwan’s unwilling absorption into the mainland.47 Therefore, according to
Chong-Pin Lin, president of the Foundation for International and Cross-Strait Studies and Taiwan’s former Deputy Minister of National Defense,
“
Beijing needs to think creatively about how to gradually allow Taiwan international space. This is a crucial subject
and necessary to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese people.”48
Proposed by President Ma Ying-jeou, the policies of “diplomatic truce
” and “modus vivendi” diplomacy have successfully improved cross-strait relations. China
also deserves
some credit for sharing some international space with Taiwan
. In November
2008, APEC issued a list of countries and leaders on which Taiwan was referred to as “Chinese Taipei” and Ma was listed with his official title and photo. “This was the first time that the country’s president was introduced in an APEC document and it shows that we have adopted the right strategies of no unification, no independence and no use of force,” according to President Ma.49 In addition,
Lien Chan,
Taiwan’s former vice-President, was able to attend the APEC meeting in Peru.
This is significant because
, while the one China principle has long been the political basis for the establishment and development of relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries and regional organizations, Lien’s participation suggests that Beijing currently has less interest to “isolate” Taiwan in Latin America
. On the last day of 2008, President
Hu Jintao offered six proposals
to promote peaceful development of cross-strait relationships in a speech to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the mainland’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” The six points Hu announced included:
1) an end to political confrontation under the “one China” principle, 2) economic cooperation, 3) promotion of Chinese culture, 4) intensified personal exchange with the Democratic Progressive Party,
5) adequate arrangement for Taiwan to participate in international organizations, and 6) a peace accord
.
According to The United Daily News, one of the biggest newspapers in Taiwan, the six proposals put forward by Hu Jintao on the cross-straits relationship are “positive” and “explicit.” In fact, most Taiwanese hold positive opinions about the six proposals and see goodwill and understanding in them. More importantly,
Hu’s remarks signal “that Taiwan’s aspiration for participation in international activities, or ‘greater international space’ in Taiwan’s parlance, could be realized through cross-trait negotiations
.”50
Until Ma was elected
as Taiwan’s president in March 2008,
Taipei and Beijing had frequently accused each other of using “checkbook diplomacy
” to lure the other’s allies in a long-running battle for diplomatic supremacy on the world stage.
This battle was particularly fierce in Latin America and seemed like a lose-lose proposition
for both China and Taiwan. As He Li correctly points out, “in the long run,
China is more likely to leverage its economic clout in the region to support its political preference,
pressing countries to fall in line on its

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] top foreign policy priority: its claims over Taiwan.”51 But
Beijing also understands well that China’s prospective success at sweeping Taiwan out from Latin America may force its hand from a de facto to a de jure independence.
Since Ma Ying-jeou took office, relations across the Taiwan Strait have been tremendously improved. Some potential candidates looking to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to
Beijing, such as Paraguay and Nicaragua, have been disappointed because China seems more concerned about sustaining “harmonious” relations with Taiwan
. In return, President Ma has carefully responded to
Beijing’s goodwill. He told the New York Times, “we are not dissatisfied with the fact they did not mention Taiwan,” referring to Hillary Clinton’s trip to Beijing.
All eyes are now on Latin America to see whether the “diplomatic truce” between China and Taiwan can be sustained
. 52 Conclusion
Latin America is now a key region for Chinese foreign policy
.
However,
China has maintained a low profile and avoided antagonizing the United States
in the region. It is exaggerated to accuse Beijing of challenging Washington’s “Monroe Doctrine” for three main reasons. First, both sides find the trade relationship to be largely beneficial. Thus, the relation between China and Latin America is characterized
far more by expanding trade flows and business connections
than by establishing traditional military or political ties. Such an approach would further allow China to side-step Washington’s Monroe Doctrine by pro-actively diffusing any allegations of a Chinese challenge to
Washington’s traditional sphere of influence. China supports its trade-oriented goals by behaving as a “responsible stake-holder” in Latin
America. Compare with Russia’s “security and military-technical cooperation” with Latin American countries, China’s engagements, from sending peacekeeping force to Haiti to donating aid to Cuba, have been far more constructive. China’s purchase of regional commodities has also been the main factor for Latin America’s economic growth in the last decade. In sum,
“the expansion of China … seems to be pulling and crowding in growth in the Latin American region
.”53 Second, China stands to gain tremendous international prestige by offering an attractive alternative model for Latin American economic development. Beijing’s emergence means that the Washington Consensus is possibly on the wane. As China formally became a member of Inter-American Development Bank in 2009, Beijing now can contribute more to Latin America’s development and thus aid global recovery. Third,
Latin American is now the proving ground for a “diplomatic truce” between China and Taiwan
. Responding to President Ma Ying-jeou’s diplomacy of
“modus vivendi,” Beijing allowed Lien Chan, Taiwan’s former vice-President, to attend the APEC 2008 in Peru.
So long as the “one
China” principle remains the political basis for Beijing’s relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries. China is content to share some of the spotlight with Taiwan, while reaping the multitudinous benefits of improved relationships
. The benefits extend beyond China and Taiwan, as the more stable the political relation between Beijing and Taipei, the more economic opportunity will be afforded Latin America and the United States.
(Lee J., Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. “The Chinese-Taiwanese
Conflict – Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America”
2009, http://www.lamp-method.org/ecommons/hunkovic.pdf
)
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war
, therefore, many countries
other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the U nited
S tates and China are the
two most dominant
members.
If China were
able to
successfully annex
Taiwan
, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism
in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat
. In any case, if China and the U nited
S tates engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected
by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Zhang, 4/28/13, “Mexico building bridges with China,” Market Watch, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mexico-buildingbridges-with-china-2013-04-28?pagenumber=1)//DR. H
Pena Nieto: Mexico is now working to promote its economic growth, more infrastructure and more opportunity for investment.
Yes, the trade flow is in deficit for Mexico. First of all we should be bringing Mexico to the attention of
China, so that we have more productive investment from China, which is only about $300 million today, and more productive investment also from Mexico to China, which is just over $90 million.
What I’d try to discuss with president Xi is that in this relaunch of the relationship we may find institutional mechanisms with more capacity to resolve any obstacle we might have had in the past, so that we may facilitate trade exchange.
This is a general interest of Mexico to boost the relationship with China, and for China to find in Mexico an opportunity of growth with the very broad market that Mexico has been able to build through free trade agreements with 44 nations. We can complement each other.
Caixin: China and Mexico compete in a number of export categories. How do you view this competition?
Pena Nieto: More than it being a competition, I think we should now see that in this new relationship and find complementarity in our productive capacities. In this way, we can have value-added on production in both Mexico and China, and for this to be generated for the whole world.
I think we could establish a linkage in a chain of greater value for production. We should also take advantage of the strengths that we have in different fields of the economy.
Caixin: In recent years, China has increased its involvement in Latin America via investment and infrastructure projects. In your view, what has China brought to this region?
Pena Nieto: Asia today is a region with important economic growth in a sustaining manner. It is also generating wealth for the world. China is the great engine of the economic growth in this region and of the rebalancing throughout the world.
Mexico is now working on structural reforms that will allow us to take advantage of having a stable macro-economic condition, low inflation and low level of public debt. It allows us to speed up the pace of economic growth.
Latin America is a region which is also growing, and Mexico is part of the region as a major gateway of access to two important marketplaces: the Latin American marketplace, which is the region that we are a part of, and also the North America market, with which we have a free trade agreement.
(William, research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, specializing in Latin
America and China, 4/2/09, “Is a “Win-Win” Relationship in the Cards for China and Mexico?” http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34793#.UdGeLvmgWuk)//DR. H
China is interested in oil anywhere and Mexico has a lot, mostly sold to the United States. The Chinese company Sinopec in particular has tried to become involved in this oil through the Mexican national company, Pemex, but without success. Blog comments by a journalist who accompanied Xi suggest both surprise and deep frustration among Chinese that Mexico turned them down, though also some satisfaction that the United States is not allowed to be involved either [10]. The result, however, given

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] maturing fields, declining reserves, corruption and stodgy thinking within Pemex, has made this business one of the least efficient in the world.
(Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H
Where the US leads, China follows close behind. Or is that vice versa? The question is especially pertinent in Latin America, where China’s president, Xi Jinping, is midway through a regional tour that culminates in Mexico before he meetsBarack Obama in California. What makes Mr Xi’s trip noteworthy is that it follows a similar regional tour by Joe Biden, the US vice-president.
For fans of a multi-polar world, Mr Xi’s trip illustrates how fast the world is changing – and how China is prepared to pay to expand its sphere of influence too: in Trinidad & Tobago, Mr Xi stumped up $3bn in loans.
Competing with China’s cheque book isn’t easy for the fiscally-constrained US. Latin American exports to
China have also grown 20-fold since 2000 to around $90bn today. Moreover, China is often prepared to assume the risk of lending to countries that the US and/or private investors are not – such as Venezuela.
But the competition for influence gets especially tough when US officials put their foot in it. Two months ago John Kerry, the US secretary of state, called Latin America“our backyard”. China used to feel deferential to that position, as did, sometimes, parts of Latin America. Clearly, that is not the case any more.
Still, one can overplay the two powers’ tussle for influence in the region. Take Mr Xi’s trip to Mexico, which ends on Wednesday. The two countries are major competitors in the production and export of manufactured goods. That is why Mexico was the last holdout to China’s accession to the World Trade
Organisation in 2001. In 2011, former president Felipe Calderon even met with the Dalai Lama in
Mexico’s presidential palace – quite a snub to Beijing.
Today, by contrast, the two countries are pledging a relationship based on sweetness and light.
President Enrique Peña Nieto even visited China in April as part of the reset, much of which is surely based on the expected liberalisation of Mexico’s energy sector – a key attraction for energy-hungry
China. Even as the Mexican economy becomes ever more closely entwined with North American supply chains, there is also talk by Mexican government officials that the two countries could become strategic allies in that they are both opposed to protectionism for the goods they produce.
That notion is interesting, if probably naïve. As Mexico looks increasingly towards the Pacific, via the
Pacific Alliance and the US-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership, China and Mexico will compete for markets even more so than they do now.
Moreover, China’s role in Latin America is also generating concern within the region, rather than just in
Washington. Ten years ago, Mexicans were shocked to learn that China produced more sombreros than
Mexico. Today, China produces more bikinis than Brazil. Many other Latin American countries have also

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] become disenchanted with their growing Chinese trade links given its alleged trade dumping, which they fear is hollowing out local industry.
In short, after a short but intense south-south love affair with China this century that pushed the US to one side, the region now has a better understanding of what both countries have to offer, and what they have to offer in return. (Mr Xi, for example, could take away from Mexico City some useful lessons on how to improve Beijing’s awful, smog-filled air.) Lately, there has even been some questioning about whether Latin America, with its long and understandable anti-Yanqui tradition, has pushed the US away too far. As a result, Latin America can now flirt with both. Indeed, Mr Xi’s trip, like Mr Biden’s, may be a sign of how Latin relations for both superpowers are moving from “patron” to “partner”.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(R. Evans, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,” NDU Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html
//EH)
Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets.
Despite China's impressive rates of sustained growth, only a small fraction of its population of 1.3 billion is part of the "modern" economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western goods
. Estimates of the size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending on the income threshold used, although the number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, the sheer number of potential consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin
American businesspeople, students, and government officials
. The Ecuadorian banana magnate Segundo Wong, for example, reportedly stated that if each Chinese would eat just one Ecuadorian banana per week, Ecuador would be a wealthy country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin American countries as well. In the commodities sector,
Latin American exports have expanded dramatically in recent years, including Chilean copper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In Argentina, Chinese demand gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soy industry where none previously existed. During the 2009 global recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on a massive Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was perceived as critical for extractive industries throughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets such as the United States and Europe fell off.
Beyond commodities, certain internationally recognized Latin American brands, such as José Cuervo, Café Britt, Bimbo, Modelo, Pollo Campero, and Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class
, which is open to leveraging its new wealth to "sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export, including light manufactures and traditional products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple formal and informal barriers to entry. Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this arena can be measured in terms of the multitude of business owners who are willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hours of their time and operate in China at a loss for years,
based on the belief that the future of their corporations depends on successfully positioning themselves within the emerging Chinese market. The hopes of selling products to China have also exerted a powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance the development of their nations. Chilean presidents
Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that nation as a bridge to China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2008. Governments in the region have also invested significant sums of money in the China-related activities of trade promotion organizations such as APEX (Brazil),
ProChile, ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundación Exportar (Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as well as representative offices in
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities, with the objective of helping their nationals to place products in those countries
.
Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC and fund elaborate pavilions in Chinese culture and trade
shows such as the Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort to help their countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment.
China's combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread awareness of the possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin American countries
in 2004, specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was actually referring to trade or investment has only called more attention in Latin
America to China as a potential source of funds. Although the expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize, today, thanks to China's growing familiarity with doing business in Latin America, and its enormous financial reserves
(including a foreign currency surplus that had reached $2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of billions of dollars in the region
, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3 billion commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Açu, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's
Petrobras for the development of its offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the timing of the arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact
, with major deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources in the region were frozen because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras has commented,
China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private sector activities in ways that U.S. investors cannot
.6
(R. Evans, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,” NDU Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html
//EH)
Beyond business ties, the PRC has an important and growing presence in the region's military institutions
. In addition to frequent visits by senior-level officers and defense leaders,
Mexico and almost all of the countries of South
America send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC,
including a 5-month course for midgrade officers taught in Spanish in Beijing.
Chinese-made clothing and nonlethal equipment are also becoming increasingly common within Latin American militaries.
In addition, thanks to opportunities provided by the regimes of
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia, the PRC has begun to sell sophisticated hardware in the region, such as radars and K–8 and MA–60 aircraft
. As happened in commercial industries such as motorcycles, cars, and consumer appliances,
Chinese military goods companies such as Norinco are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products
. Beyond Chinese corporations and military ties, the
PRC is also taking on a progressively important role in regional institutions, such as the
Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti
. Although the PRC has only observer status in the OAS, for example, its delegation is a strong contributor to the activities of the body
.9 With respect to the IADB, China has leveraged its seat at the table as an opening for doing business in the region, such as the $10.2 billion currency swap with Argentina, which it signed on the sideline of the IADB's annual meeting in March 2009. Also
, through its initial financial contribution to the IADB, the PRC became part of a special committee overseeing loans to highly impoverished countries in the region
, affording it expanded contacts with and subtle pressures over countries that do not currently recognize the PRC diplomatically, including Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the case of Haiti, Chinese leverage is further bolstered by having had police forces on the ground there since 2006, through
PRC participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.10

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H
China’s rise and U.S energy security
The U.S has more specific fears about energy being used as a weapon, in particular by the leading oil exporter in the hemisphere, Venezuela, which “has forged probably the closest relations with China of any Latin American country, and is planning to sell increasing amounts of oil to China as part of its effort to reduce dependence on the openly hostile US government.” [44] Hugo Chavez has described the U.S as imperialist in its dealings with Venezuela and the developing world. Despite this, Venezuela still supplies over 1 million barrels of oil every day to the U.S and remains its 4th largest oil supplier [45] although “Venezuela’s proportion of U.S oil imports is in decline, from 17 percent in 1997 to 11.8 percent today.” [46] Nevertheless, Chavez would dearly love to downscale this relationship, as his
“ultimate goal is to provide 15-20% of China’s oil import needs. Much of that might have to come from what the United States now receives.” [47] The U.S is not dependent on Venezuelan oil to the extent it is dependent on Canadian, Saudi Arabian, or Mexican resources, but the hegemon does not like to be forced into diversification at others behest.
Another worrying trend emerged for the United States recently. The “PDVSA and Exxon are locked in a fierce legal battle over compensation for the 2007 nationalization of a jointly owned heavy oil project in
Venezuela’s Orinoco basin,” [48] a dispute which has left Exxon out of pocket and several Venezuelan tankers that were heading for the U.S without a destination. Soon, the Associated Press got wind of the fact that Venezuela was now rerouting all the oil to China that had previously been on its way to the U.S refinery for Exxon Mobil Corp. [49] This is an isolated case, but it is also a microcosm of the potential future of Latin America as a whole – and certainly serves as notice that “developing Chinese interest in the region indicates that the U.S will face growing competition by other energy hungry nations and can no longer take Western Hemispheric energy for granted.” [50]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Xu Shicheng is researcher of the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, and Vice President of the Chinese Latin American Studies Association “Greater China-Latin America Global and
Regional Cooperation http://en.el-emergente.com/asia-pacific/china/greater-china-latin-america-global-and-regionalcooperation/#sthash.Xd9RwAKI.dpuf]//BMitch
China has maintained close contacts and dialogues with regional organizations for some years now, including the Group of Rio, the Andine Community, and the Southern Common Market ( MERCOSUR ). These links and
China’s dialogue with the region will only become stronger . In 2004, China was admitted to the
Organization of American States ( OAS) as a permanent observer . In the same year, China also become observer to the Latin American Parliament and, in 2008, entered the Interamerican Development Bank. China and Caribbean countries with diplomatic links have successfully hosted two instances of the China-
Caribbean Economic and Commercial Cooperation Forum.
This year’s edition will take place in Trinidad and
Tobago. The contacts and cooperation with these political and economical regional organizations are more and more intense.
In February of last year, the Latin America / Caribbean Unity Summit celebrated in
Cancun, Mexico, unanimously decided to establish the Latin America / Caribbean Community (CELAC), with the aim of increasing the right to have a Latin American voice at the international level . This Community will be officially established sometime in 2011 or 2012 and we anticipate that China will establish relations with this organization that encompasses all countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. China and 18 Latin American nations have actively participated in the conversations taking place in the East Asia-Latin American
Cooperation Forum . China, Mexico, Chile, and Peru, are APEC members and, within this framework, cooperation between
China and these three Latin American nations has grown. In the coming five years, more Latin American countries will participate in these dialogue forums.
Since 2007, to promote economic and commercial bilateral relations, the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, along with equivalent Latin American institutions and the Inter-American
Development Bank, has organized in four instances the China-Latin America Business Summit. The fifth edition will take place this year in Peru. In sum, over the last years, contacts between China and regional Latin American organizations have grown. In the next decade, as relations between both regions grow and become deeper, regional cooperation will only become stronger and will spur an important regional economic integration .
[Charles Grant has been director of the Centre for European Reform since its foundation in 1998. He is the author of many CER publications, including, most re c e n t l y, ‘European choices for Gord o n B rown’ (July 2007) and ‘Euro p e ’s blurred boundaries: re t h i n k i n g e n l a rgementandneighbourhoodpolicy’(October2006).He pre v i o u s l y worked at TheEconomist,writing abouttheCity,the EUanddefence. Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence atthe Centre for European Reform. He has written extensively on transatlantic relations,European foreign and security policy, and defence industrial issues. He previously worked as policy director and head of the security and defence policy divisionat the Slovak Ministry ofDefence. “Preparing for the multipolar world European foreign and security policy in 2020”]//BMitch
By 2020 the
world will need new institutions, both formal and informal, to manage the stresses and strains of globalisation
, especially in the spheres of economics
, the environment and security; and to accommodate the rise of new powers
. The post-Kyoto framework for tackling climate change will certainly require permanent institutions to make it effective. Similarly, attempts to control the proliferation and numbers of dangerous weapons generally require treaties and organisations that most governments sign up to. But many other challenges would be better served by small, informal groups of the most relevant countries.
For example, the world will want a smooth and stable energy market – one that avoids sudden fluctuations of price, or breaks of supply. A group consisting of the most important suppliers and consumers – say the US, the EU, China, Russia, India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia (and perhaps Iran, one day) – could co-operate to ensure a benign and predictable energy

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] market. Most other countries would be happy to follow the guidelines set by such a group.
The same principle could apply to global capital markets, which are dominated by just a few financial centres
(the Financial Action Task Force, a group of governments that tackles money laundering and terrorist financing, has established a good reputation). The i n t e r-linked problems of international terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration are also probably best tackled in informal forums.
Perhaps the grandest of the smaller groups will be that which replaces the G-8: by 2020 the club of the world’s leading economies will surely include Brazil, China, India and South Africa. So long as the smaller, informal groups set guidelines and benchmarks for others to follow, rather than rules and regulations, they will not undermine the formal institutions of global governance.
The EU should lead the way in establishing new bodies, whether formal or informal. One of its special contributions to the multipolar world is that it understands – better than any conventional power – the benefits of international co-operation, institutions and rules.
*Charles Kupchan is a professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations [No
One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, book]
For the West to speak out against political repression and overt violations of the rule of law is not only warranted but obligatory. But to predicate constructive relations with rising powers on their readiness to embrace a Western notion of legitimacy is
another matter altogether. Senator John McCain is off course
in insisting that "It is the democracies of the world that will provide the pillars upon which we can and must build an enduring peace."— On the contrary, only if the West works cooperatively with all regimes willing to reciprocate
— democracies and nondemocracies alike— will it be able to build an enduring peace
.
Terrorism
, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security
, water and food security
, financial crisis
— these challenges are global
in nature and can be effectively addressed only in partnership with a wide array of countries
.
It makes little sense for the West to denigrate and ostracize regimes whose cooperation it needs to fashion a secure new order ; the stakes are too high. Western countries only harm their own interests when they label as illegitimate governments that are not liberal democracies.
Recognizing the next world's inevitable political diversity and thereby consolidating cooperation with rising powers of diverse regime type is far more sensible than insisting on the universality of Western conceptions of legitimacy—and alienating potential partners .
The West and rising rest must arrive at a new, more inclusive, notion of legitimacy if they are to agree on an ideological foundation for the next world.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Wang, staff writer and economic observer at Worldcrunch. “In America’s Backyard: China’s Rising Influence in Latin
America.” Worldcrunch. 6 May 2013 http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)
China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with
Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these
countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug
trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that
the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.
China doesn’t pose a threat
Don,
“Does China represent an economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western
Hemisphere?” January 11, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254)
China’s emergence as a global economic force, surpassing in many ways the political influence the country wielded in the
1950s and 1960s
, is a development with profound and multifaceted implications for the Western
Hemisphere—implications that aren’t sensibly
encapsulated in terms like “threat” or “opportunity
.”
The important issue for the people of the Western Hemisphere is to understand the nature of those implications and to respond in a fashion that magnifies the gains for the region from China’s astonishing emergence.
Demonizing
(or sanctifying)
China is not a sensible response. One crucial aspect to understand about China’s emergence is that it is not an emergence,
but a reemergence.
Prior to Europe’s industrial revolution, global income was distributed largely on the basis of population because technology—and hence labor productivity—didn’t differ much.
China’s reemergence
, then, owes much to its ability to put in place policies that have allowed it to catch up with frontiers of technology and improved
productivity.
Learning which elements of
China’s success can be replicated should be a welcome
spur to development in
the Western Hemisphere .
Another crucial aspect of China is its sheer size—with all the demands that creates on resources and the environment. Higher terms of trade for commodities—a boon to the region’s commodity producers—owe much to the surge in China’s economy. At the same time, China’s surging greenhouse gas emissions, among the highest in the world, highlight the urgency of a coherent, global program to control such emissions. China’s sheer size, though, makes it more likely that the country will realize that its own actions will matter in solving this global problem.
The Western Hemisphere needs to contribute to the fashioning of global institutions that can accommodate China’s reemergence, providing an opportunity for China to share in the burdens of global macroeconomic, political and environmental stability that come with its
resurgence.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Chinese regional presence doesn't challenge US regional security or hegemony
Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good
Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)
Since the granting of port concessions in Panama to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa in 1999,
Chinese military
engagement with Latin America
has been one of the most broadly discussed, but
misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities in the region.2
The PRC’s military initiatives in Latin America are arguably
not the largest or most strategi-
cally significant part of its rapidly expanding interac- tions with the region
. Nor do they visibly threaten the
U nited
S tates
or undermine pro-Western regimes in the same fashion as Soviet military engagement
with Latin America during the Cold War.
The initiatives, however, are significant and growing, and continue to be a key to the evaluation by U.S. decisionmakers as to whether the Chinese presence in Latin America constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.
China will not harm regional US interests
Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good
Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)
In general, as this section has suggested, the course taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin America in the medium or long term is likely to dif- fer significantly from that witnessed with respect to Soviet military
activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from overtly provocative activities, such as the establish- ment of bases with a significant Chinese presence, overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateral military intervention in the
region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-US military alliances.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[t aylor Dibbert earned a BA in political science from the University of Georgia and a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) “Democratic Speed Bumps in Latin America” http://fpif.org/democratic_speed_bumps_in_latin_america/ Dec 9 2011]//BMitch
After a decade of growing popularity, democracy has hit a slump in Latin America
. A recent Latinobarómetro poll cited by The
Economist in late October underscores this point.
In all but three Latin American countries, fewer people than last year believe that democracy is preferable to any other type of government
. In the cases of Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the drop in support for democracy is significant
. The 2009 removal of democratically elected Manuel Zelaya and the post-coup human rights abuses of the government of Porfirio Lobo are obvious indicators that Honduras is on the wrong track.
Dozens of political murders have taken place in Honduras, and there has been little outrage from Washington.
Additionally, November’s presidential elections in Nicaragua and Guatemala
(and recent polling on Mexico’s 2012 election) reinforce the notion that many in the region have grown skeptical about democratic governance
.
Reasons to be Skeptical
Many reasons could explain this change
in perceptions.
Increased crime
— particularly around
the flow of illegal drugs
— is perhaps the most obvious factor. Latin Americans want law and order and are willing to overlook an administration’s democratic lapses to achieve domestic security.
As people get wealthier
, the
Latinobarómetro poll suggests, they expect
more and better government services
. This craving is understandable, although the highly inefficient tax regimes in the region make this difficult to achieve.
Large informal economies and numerous loopholes or exemptions to current tax collection systems pose challenges that most politicians have been unwilling to address
. For example, Mexico’s rate of tax collection is the worst of any country in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). But Guatemala’s is even worse; it was only 10.5 percent of GDP last year. The average rate in Latin
America is about 14 percent of GDP.
Legislative inertia is also a factor.
Since the end of military dictatorships
in
Latin America, many countries have been plagued by frustrating legislative gridlock.
“The truth is that people in
Latin America care very little about parties and congresses, and expect even less from them
,” according to a Brookings Institution analysis.
Global financial crises have also not helped
. In terms of economic prosperity,
Latin
America remains the most unequal region in the world
. During these crises, the poor and lower-middle classes prioritize meeting their daily needs
. If their ability to make ends meet declines, they tend to blame the ruling parties and give in to the temptation to simply “throw the bums out” and bring in new leaders
, regardless of their stances
on human rights, transparency, good governance, or the rule of law. At a time when electorates view their leaders as weak and ineffectual, those who promise a “strong hand” become more attractive. Backward Steps in Nicaragua, Guatemala During his campaign for a third term as president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega repeatedly reassured voters that he was a strong, experienced leader who knew how to get things done. To a certain extent, he is right:
Nicaragua has a history of economic volatility, but the situation has remained
relatively stable under Ortega
’s recent stewardship.
His anti-poverty programs and subsidies
, partly a result of generous Venezuelan loans, also helped persuade voters.
Nevertheless, from banished term limits to alleged corruption, and from a judiciary stacked with Ortega loyalists to convincing evidence of electoral fraud (which was not even necessary),
Ortega is
already well on his way to bringing Nicaragua back to the authoritarianism
that the country is all too familiar with. In 2006, Ortega was instrumental in changing Nicaraguan electoral law to lower the threshold for a first-round presidential victory from 45 percent to either 40 percent of votes cast or 35 percent, as long as there is at least a five-point difference between the first- and second-place candidates. In the 2006 presidential election, Daniel Ortega captured 38 percent of the vote, thereby precluding a run-off that many analysts believehe would have lost. Ortega accepted electoral defeat back in 1990, although Nicaragua has remained, at best, a fledgling democracy since then. Nicaraguans were again reminded of Ortega’s perennial presence on the Nicaraguan political scene in 1999 with the implementation ofel Pacto, or “the Pact,” an agreement reached between Ortega and then-President Arnoldo Alemán of the Partido Liberal
Constitutional. Although the two leaders were not close at the time, their two parties held almost all the power in the country’s National
Assembly. This “pact” shielded both leaders from criminal prosecution and consolidated power in the judiciary and the Supreme Electoral
Council. (This agreement is still in place, even though it has now become clear that Ortega has gotten more out of the deal than Alemán.)
Alemán still did get a 20-year prison sentence for numerous charges of corruption in 2003. In 2009, Nicaragua’s Supreme Court exonerated
Alemán; his conviction was conveniently overturned. Transparency International recently honored Alemán in their list of “The World’s Ten
Most Corrupt Leaders” in recent history. The 2009 Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruling that exempted Ortega from only serving two presidential terms sent a strong message that good governance in Nicaragua was waning
. Under the Nicaraguan constitution, presidents are not allowed to run for consecutive terms and are supposed to respect a two-term limit. But because Mr. Ortega essentially controlled the

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Supreme Court, its judges ruled that the previous laws constituted human rights violations and should not apply to him. Legally speaking,
Ortega could be president for the rest of his life. Nicaragua’s institutions were never particularly strong, but as its extremely politicized court makes clear, they are undoubtedly weakening under Ortega’s watch. Due to rampant fraud committed by Ortega’s Sandinista party in 2008 municipal elections, the EU and the United Statessuspended aid.
In Guatemala
, meanwhile, the incoming administration
of
Otto Peréz promises to be astep backwards in terms of human rights. Peréz held a number of high positions in the Guatemalan military during Latin America’s bloodiest civil war. Many voters were too young to remember the massacres
in the country’s western highlands, most of which occurred during the early 1980s. Crime statistics in Guatemala are atrocious
, and security was voters’ foremost concern throughout the campaign. Guatemala has one of the world’s highest homicide rates. In 2010, there were more than 40 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, rising to an astounding 110 per
100,000 in the capital. To put this in perspective, the homicide rate in the United States is less than five per 100,000. Guatemala’s neighbor
Mexico, which is in the throes of a bloody drug war, has a homicide rate of about 14 per 100,000. With a pitiful prosecution rate hovering around 2 or 3 percent, Guatemalan voters are desperate for a solution to what they consider their most pressing problem.
Peréz’s campaign slogan of mano dura — or “the strong hand” — promised to crack down on violent crime and pursue offenders relentlessly.
Security concerns dominated the presidential campaign
, as runner-up Manuel Baldizón also put an anti-crime message at the top of his agenda. Once in office, Peréz will likely involve the military in police matters, reversing a trend toward civilian control. Feckless Governance in Mexico
Mexicans
, meanwhile, have grown tired of the feckless governance the country has experienced since its “democratic breakthrough
” in 2000.
Nowhere is the lack of compromise or legitimate negotiation more obvious than in Mexico
’s federal legislature.
Under
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) leadership, legislative gridlock has plagued Mexican political life
for the past decade. President Felipe Calderón has fared slightly better than former President Vicente Fox, although frustration among the Mexican citizenry remains. Voters have finally gotten a taste of multiparty democracy and discovered how bittersweet it is. A recent report published by
Human Rights Watch, which documents widespread abuses by state security personnel and even judicial actors, has shown how damaging
President Calderón’s misguided “war on drugs” has been for ordinary Mexican citizens. Calderón’s egregious mismanagement of Mexican security policy has exacerbated citizens’ growing exasperation, and rightfully so.
Systematic and widespread abuses by state security personnel under the auspices of PAN “democracy” would make anyone question whether democracy has developed in Mexico over the past decade
. Certainly, the media environment has improved since 2000, and the country’s judicial system is more relevant and unbiased than it was under the rule of the long-serving Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI). Nevertheless, much of the political power in Mexico has moved from the federal executive to the country’s various governorships and, perhaps most tellingly, to Congress and key players within Mexico’s three big political parties. During the 70 years of PRI authoritarianism, political actors from disparate groups did not need to work together. Mexican politicians are still learning how to accomplish this. Calderon’s drug war has undoubtedly failed, but more fundamentally, Mexican citizens simply do not trust the country’s existing institutions, of which political parties would probably top the list. For next year’s presidential election, the PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, is the current frontrunner. As in Guatemala, many votersare too young to remember the authoritarian past and the PRI’s connection to it. In a 2010 Latinóbarometro survey that included 18 Latin American nations, Mexicans were more apathetic about democracy than anyone else. Nothing would indicate that things have changed since then. A recent UN study revealed that 36 percent of households were victims of crime last year, a year that witnessed around 22 million “common crimes.” This is not entirely drug-related violence; criminal activities are more pervasive than that. There is no evidence to suggest that these statistics will improve between now and next July’s presidential election. Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala may be bellwethers for a regional shift away from democracy, or they may simply be exceptions. The counter-examples of Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Panama suggest that democracy is not completely on the decline in the region. Nevertheless, challenges from crime to legislative gridlock are likely to persist in the region, and these challenges will put pressure on what are still fragile democracies
. U.S. Foreign Policy vis-à-vis
Latin America
There was a real and not unfounded hope that
the administration of George W.
Bush would make a concerted effort to engage with Latin America’s political leaders
. But after 9/11, the region fell to the bottom of U.S. foreign policy priorities.
The
Obama
administration has not done much better
. Plan Colombia and the Mérida initiative, which deal largely with security issues and fighting an unwinnable drug war, do not constitute a coherent grand strategy.
More recently,
U.S. policymakers have again been reminded of the tight links between energy security and national security. This provides another reason to strengthen U.S.-Latin American ties
, especially since
China’s influence in Latin America will only grow
over the coming decades. In 2009, China became Brazil’s biggest trading partner. Placing a greater emphasis on human rights and respect for civil liberties is crucial.
Washington’s lackluster response to post-coup violence in Honduras only encourages further democratic backsliding elsewhere.
Revisiting comprehensive immigration reform would be another good place to start. The devastating effects of the 40-year war on drugs are related to current violence in Central America. And yet, there is little to suggest that anyone in Washington is willing to reexamine U.S. drug policy.
As the United States shifts its focus to East Asia, reengagement with Latin America will probably be a gradual process. U.S. policymakers must approach the region with more nuanced strategies
. Latin America is not a monolithic entity, where a certain set of policy goals in one country will be relevant or entirely applicable to another. In spite of many

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] similarities, Mexico is not Guatemala. Andean nations should not just be lumped together in the same policy category. Although there are no easy answers, appreciating the specific context of each country will be essential.
Strengthening relationships must go beyond military or security-related bonds
. Right now,
American foreign policy in the region is unacceptable, counterproductive, and will likely presage a continued rise in authoritarianism
. Latin America is not the Cold
War hot spot it once was, but it is a region that still merits attention.
Diplomacy on the cheap usually produces
undesirable outcomes. The perpetuation of current U.S. policy will be no exception.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[VOA News, “Asian Security Forum Addresses Cyber Attacks, South China Sea” http://www.voanews.com/content/asian-security-forum-addresses-cyber-attacks-south-chinasea/1673025.html May 31]//BMitch
Defense officials from the Asia Pacific
region have begun an annual security forum with talks focusing on cyber security
, maritime territorial disputes and North Korea's nuclear program.
U.S. Defense Secretary
Chuck
Hagel said he will address cyber security Saturday
in his speech to the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore.
He told reporters on the plane to Singapore that the issue will also likely come up in a brief meeting with Chinese delegates on the sidelines of the conference
.
Recent U.S. reports said that Chinese computer hackers have stolen data from
dozens of
Pentagon weapons programs
and other defense technologies. "
There's only one way to deal with these issues and that's straight up,"
said Hagel. "
We intend to use all these venues, and that closer cooperation
and closer venue-building to hopefully get us in a position where we can get some better understanding
, closer understanding of what these rules of the road are." Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said in a speech
Friday that Southeast Asian nations need to find unity on the issue of the energy-rich South China Sea. He said any conflict could disrupt the region's economy and he urged all countries to agree on a code of conduct. "Maritime security and safety, as well as the freedom of navigation, have indeed caused deep concern to the international community," said the prime minister. China claims almost all of the South China Sea, which may be rich in oil and natural gas. Parts of the sea are also claimed by Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and territorial disputes in the waters are common.
[Andrew Nusca, “China, U.S. pledge to improve cybersecurity cooperation” http://www.zdnet.com/china-u-s-pledge-to-improve-cybersecurity-cooperation-7000017898/ July 10
2013]//BMitch
The United States and China have only just begun their fifth annual session on bilateral matters both political and economic
, but talk to improve cooperation on cybersecurity is already progressing
—even as former U.S. government contractor Edward Snowden remains at large aftermaking relevations about U.S. electronic surveillance activities.
Xinhua,
China's state news agency, reported today that discussion for the U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue
, or S&ED, has been "candid" and with the aim to enhance "mutual trust" and reduce
"mutual suspicion
."
The
overall sentiment seems positive
, Reuters notes in its own report on the summit, which takes place this week in Washington, D.C. There was widespread concern leading up to the meeting, held annually in alternating locations since 2009, that the ongoing Snowden affair would overshadow positive talks between the world's two largest economies.
"For many Chinese, it is bizarre that how Washington can continue to pose as the biggest cyber espionage victim and demand others behave well after former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden revealed that U.S. spy agencies hacked deep into China and other countries' computer networks, including those of government, military, research, educational and business organizations
," Yang Qingchuan wrote in recent commentary for Xinhua. But the tone this week has been optimistic, if a little cautious, China Daily notes, even as both countries engage in and defend cyber spying activities that aggravate the other. The attitude is a likely extension of the unprecedented, rather informal meeting between U.S. president Barack
Obama and China president Xi Jinping
in California last month. China vice-premier Wang Yang, China state councilor Yang Jiechi,
U.S. secretary of state John Kerry and U.S. secretary of treasury Jack Lew are co-chairs for the event; U.S. vice president Joe Biden delivered the opening address. "We don't have to agree on everything," Biden reportedly said during his address. "We have to trust."

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Antonio C. Hsiang Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets “China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem November]//BMitch
China has been rising in Latin America
since the twenty-first century for two reasons. “The first is the relative decline in the economic and political pre-eminence of the United States after its brief moment of unchallenged power at the end of the cold war…
The second
factor is that many Latin American countries have become more self-confident and bent on asserting
their diplomatic independence.”14 As the United States’
comparative position erodes and China gets more powerful
, some realists predict that, “The result of these developments will be tension
, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition.”
But for
G. John
Ikenberry
, professor at Princeton University, “
The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition
.
The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different
from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted
…
Today’s
Western order
, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join
.”15 Similarly, Fareed Zakaria also argues that, the greater the openness of the global system is, the better the prospects for trade, commerce, contact, pluralism and liberty. Any strategy that is likely to succeed in today’s world will be one that has the active support and participation of many countries…there are many good signs in the world today. The most significant rising power—
China—does not seem to seek to overturn the established order
(as have many newly rising powers in the past) but rather to succeed within it
.16 There are encouraging signs that the U.S. leadership shares Zakaria’s optimism that the interconnectivity of the global system serves a tempering function to China’s increasing power. It fact, as early as September 21, 2005, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick called on China to act as a
“responsible stakeholder” in global affairs. Later, when hosting Chinese President Hu Jintao in Washington in April 2006, former President Bush said, “The United States and China are two nations divided by a vast ocean — yet connected through a global economy that has created opportunity for both peoples. The United States welcomes the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous, and that supports international institutions.”17 Since then,
China has tried to play the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in global affairs, particularly in Latin America
. On the international level,
China’s rising levels of wealth and education, improvement of property rights and the establishment of the rule of law greatly contribute to the global political and economic development.
For Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, the fact that autocracies such as China are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests
that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rule-based economic system
. . . In the case of
China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states.18
While some argue that
a globally-ascending
China is a revisionist power seeking important changes
in the international system, most agree that China seeks the desired change in a patient, prudent, and peaceful fashion
. Americans who deal in foreign affairs especially appreciate the fact that
Chinese strategic thinking has moved away from notions of a global class conflict and violent revolution.
Instead, today's China emphasizes a
“peaceful rising
” in global influence while seeking a “harmonious world.”
Former Secretary of State Zbigniew
Brzezinski asserts that the Chinese emphasis on “harmony” can serve as a useful point of departure for U.S.-
Chinese relations
during the Obama presidency. Thus, “it is a task that President-elect Barack Obama – who is a conciliator at heart – should find congenial, and which President Hu Jintao – who devised the concept of ‘a harmonious world’– should welcome. It is a mission worthy of the two countries with the most extraordinary potential for shaping our collective future.”19
In Latin America, China’s engagements have been mostly politically neutral
. “Despite its disagreements with the United States about many issues,
Beijing has adopted a low-key approach and managed to avoid any public confrontation with the
United States
in the Western Hemisphere.”20 Nevertheless,
China's growing clout is hard to miss
. At the APEC summit in
2008, all eyes were on Hu Jintao as he declared that “China now wants to show it is a responsible stakeholder in the region,” according to Dan
Erikson, a specialist in ChinaLatin American relations from the Inter-American Dialogue.21 Compared with Russia’s involvement in Latin
America, which includes holding joint military exercises with Venezuela and selling arms to the region
, China’s engagement has been decidedly dovish.
Although the neo-conservatives loudly worry about China’s close relations
with
Venezuela,
“[the] oil interest actually plays a rather limited role in SinoVenezuelan ties
in the foreseeable

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] future.”22 This is because while China is obviously
keen to enter into oil agreements with Venezuela, Beijing has shown no intention to be drawn into any tensions
between Hugo Chavez and the U.S. government
[Wang Xiaoxia ( 王 晓夏 ) April 27, 2013 Economic Observer Online “In America’s Backyard:
China in Latin America” http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml
]//BMitch
Over the past five years,
Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade
to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011,
China has
overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin America’s second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy.
According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of
8.18 percent.
This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin America’s single dominant trading partner.
In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.
Some prominent Chinese have condemned the United States' high-profile “Return to Asia” strategy
, with its intention of “containing
China's front door.”
Shouldn’t the United States,
which put forward the Monroe Doctrine two centuries ago, also question how China is quietly arriving in America’s backyard?
An American Blind Spot? In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez,
Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South America’s "China factor" with some sordid conspiracy theory. Instead, they investigate Latin America’s subtle choice between China and the United States, attributing Washington's weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign policy and economic development, while China rises on the back of globalization. Since
1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its sphere of influence to Europeans, it has maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as the most important tool for the United States. Especially after the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used military means largely without restraint.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the threat of global terrorism. Latin America’s strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and more local ranking. The United States has shifted its focus in Latin America to specific issues such as illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The “realism” that ran through America’s foreign policy during the Cold War has gradually transformed towards “idealism,” which in consequence weakens its influence in Latin America. Under the doctrine of realism,
America broke any illusion of moral constraint in its foreign interventions; the protection of American interests was its pragmatic principle. Washington didn’t care that some Latin American countries were dictatorial or that they violated human rights, as long as their leaders firmly stood on the side of the anti-Communist camp. Since adopting idealism, America considers that whatever is best for itself is also best for the rest of the world. Its foreign policy is aimed at maintaining democracy, human rights and a free market economy around the world.
America began to demand that its former dictatorial allies quit their attachment to power and carry out a transition to democracy. Since 1989, the U.S. has pushed Latin American countries - many facing a severe debt crisis - to accept the “Washington Consensus”
oriented by market economy theory. The ultimate goal set by this theory may not be a problem. However, it did not pull Latin America out of the quagmire of its
“lost decade” of the 1980s. In the 1990s, Latin America suffered another severe economic downturn
, which exacerbated the division between the rich and the poor, leading to serious social problems.
The idealism exported by the
United States intensified the existing contradictions in Latin American society, and eventually led to the downfall of most of the brutal totalitarian military governments.
China as a New Favorite Initially,
China’s activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a problem that plagues China; and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose.
Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's secondlargest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security.
Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for
China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and
China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
American scholars, China's current practice isn’t much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that
China doesn’t care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries.
All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism.
Thus
China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries,
such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States
. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United
States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-forassets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence?
Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer
.
China's involvement in Latin America doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits
. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood; and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies.
Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.
- Professor of International Development at the University of East Anglia (Rhys, “China’s
Global Expansion and Latin America”, Cambridge Journals, 2010, http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)//KG
China’s main objectives in Latin America are to obtain secure sources of raw materials and market
access for its manufactured goods. It therefore has an interest in continuing economic and political stability in the region, and would not want to undermine this through a confrontation with the United
States. Populist nationalism in Latin America, although historically directed against the United States, could also adversely a ff ect Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, for example, expressed concerns over the implications for his country’s oil interests of institutional uncertainties created by the revision of the country’s constitution and bilateral investment agreements.66 Another factor that influences China’s policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America
or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically.67 As a result, China’s
policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological . Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of di ff erent political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identified closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by President Cha´vez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with which it has important economic links, such as
Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.
[Yuhan Zhang is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Lin Shi is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former consultant at the World Bank.
“Conflict between China and the US is not inevitable” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-notinevitable/]//BMitch

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
President
Xi Jinping’s official visit to the United States
in February 2012 — as China’s then vice president — suggests that conflict between the two states is not inevitable.
This goes against the ideas of American offensive realists, who
have publicly argued that conflict is an unavoidable
consequence of the will to survive, which requires large states to maximise power and pursue hegemony in their own regions. But
Xi’s visit saw China and the United States reach consensus on a number of important issues. They agreed to prioritise shared interests and mutual respect as
a means of ushering in an era of win–win cooperation
between China and the United States.
Xi’s visit had three main goals: first, to strengthen trust between the two powers through an official visit; second, to familiarise
American leaders with the basic political, economic, ideological and diplomatic style of China’s next leader; and, third, to consolidate Sino–US trade relations
. The timing of Xi’s visit coincided with the 40th anniversary of
President Nixon’s visit to China and the publication of the Sino–US joint communiqués, which played a critical role in normalising relations between the two states. Upon his arrival, Xi met with a number of former secretaries, including former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and
Madeleine Albright and former secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson. Xi also met with many policy makers from the current administration, includingPresident Barack Obama. His visit laid a good foundation for the positive development of China-US political and economic relations for at least the next decade. There are two key reasons for this. The first is that the visit successfully delivered the message that
China is willing to engage in political communication and economic cooperation with the United
States.
During meetings with current and former politicians, business people and the media,
Xi
repeatedly stressed the importance of cooperation and friendship between China and the United States. This message is necessary to reduce the possibility of future strategic misunderstandings, especially because the
United States, as a representative Western capitalist power, has been seen as ideologically prejudiced against China since the Cold War.
It is also timely because China’s rapid economic growth in the past decades has arguably aroused envy and fear in the United States and some European countries, which have been suffering from the consequences of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis.
These anxieties have hardly been assuaged by statements from a growing pool of commentators who predict that China will soon equal the
United States in economic power, and will eventually supplant its hegemony. But this prediction fails to account for the philosophical grounding of Chinese leaders, which indicates that China has neither the intention nor the capacity to challenge America’s hegemony. As Mao Zedong pointed out in the early 1960s, ‘We [China] are a socialist country. We do not invade other countries, not in 100 years or 1000 years’. Mao’s successors have consistently reiterated this principle and repeated many times that China will never seek hegemony. Xi’s visit served as another reminder that
China’s and America’s interests are in many ways aligned, and that there is considerable scope for the largest advanced economy and the largest emerging economy in the world to establish a new type of partnership.
Secondly,
Xi’s visit helped to further China-US trade and economic relations.
In recent years, as part of China’s ‘going out’ strategy, more and more state-owned enterprises and private companies in China have engaged in mergers and acquisitions activities in North America and Europe, with the intention of absorbing Western advanced technologies and management techniques. After Xi’s visit to the US, hundreds of accompanied Chinese entrepreneurs have now moved closer to possessing an accurate understanding of local policies and the investment environment in America. This deepening of China-US relations will encourage more
Chinese enterprises to invest in the United States. High-tech, clean energy and manufacturing industries are bound to become new hotbeds of bilateral cooperation in the next few years. The trade orders signed in Iowa and California by Xi’s team also included preferential agricultural policies for American farmers, which have been welcomed and endorsed by the federal government, state governments and the American public. Admittedly, the 2012 US presidential election campaign saw candidates from both the Democratic and the Republican parties score political points by criticising many of China’s policies, including its exchange rate and trade policies. But, overall,
Xi’s visit indicated that the future of China-US relations under his presidency will be shaped by cooperation, despite the intrusion of domestic politics.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Kayla, intern at VOX Global, Xiangming, founding Dean and Director of the
Center for Urban and Global Studies and Paul Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies and Sociology at Trinity College in Hartford, “China And Latin America: Connected And Competing –
Analysis,” Eurasia Review, June 17, 2013, Online, http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-andlatin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/, accessed 7/17/13) PE
China’s stronger economic ties with Latin America are generating concerns in some Latin American
countries that the Asian superpower is quickly outcompeting them. In the short term though, China’s
demand for raw materials helps to raise direct exports from Latin America. Since Latin American
countries and China have different export structures, the former is not as threatened by China’s rapid market penetration as assumed, with the clear exception of Mexico. According to Kevin Gallagher, a specialist on international economic development, “Mexico is the only country in Latin America whose comparative advantage has been moving in the same direction as the comparative advantage of [India and China],” and faces strong commercial competition.11 Interestingly though, the head-to-head
economic competition between China and Mexico has shifted around to either’s favor in turns.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Dinorah, associate professor of political science at Wichita State University and a member of the
Scientific Support Group of the AmericasBarometer. Elizabeth, associate professor of political science and Associate Director of the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. “Latin Americans’ Perception of the United States and China.” 24 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.americasquarterly.org/latin-americans-perceptions-united-states-and-china
The U.S. profile in the region remains comparatively strong in general, particularly among countries geographically close to the United States.
But what is the Latin American public’s expectation of future U.S. influence?
Figure 3 presents, on the left, responses to a question asking which country currently has the most influence in the region
. Forty percent selected the United
States
. But the right of the figure shows that only 30 percent of respondents believe the U.S. will be the dominant power in the future.
Interestingly, the difference in response rates in regard to China’s current and future influence is only marginal (3.5 percentage points), which indicates that important segments of the public perceive other Latin American countries
(e.g., Brazil) and non-Latin American countries
(e.g., Japan) as likely contenders for key influence in the future
.
(Shannon K., Senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, “China’s Economic Role in Latin
America,” Council of Foreign Relations, October 26, 2012, Online, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/, accessed 7/17/13) PE
There is much talk of China’s escalating economic influence in Latin America. But it’s worth looking at
what has (and hasn’t) actually happened in the three main ways that China interacts with the region’s economies: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and loans (from state-owned banks).
Trade is the most visible and important connection. Over the last several years, goods flowing back and forth have increased some 30 percent per year, bringing today’s total to roughly US$250 billion. This trade leans in
China’s favor, with a deficit (nearly all with Mexico) of nearly US$100 billion [dollars]. While sizable numbers, this is still just a quarter of Latin America’s trade with the United States. And it appears to be
leveling off, suggesting that China won’t overtake the United States as the region’s primary trading partner anytime soon.
This trade is also quite concentrated. Exports to China come primarily from
Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina, and are mainly raw materials (copper, iron ore, lead, tin, soya, and sugar). Of the goods China sends east nearly half go to Mexico—a mix of consumer goods and capital goods (equipment for production). Trade with China has expanded dramatically over the past decade.
But it is worth remembering that it both started from a low base and is unevenly distributed—affecting a few countries significantly and others very little.
(two BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern
Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism, “Latin
America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US?,” International Business
Times, June 28 2013 9:53 PM, Online, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-chinawhat-does-mean-us-1317981, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from
$13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent.
As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade,
adding up to $560 billion [dollars] in 2008. Notably, though, America’s trade participation in Latin
America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil.
(Jun 10, 2013, “U.S.-China: Competing over Central America and the
Caribbean?,” Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Online, http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-the-caribbean/, accessed 7/18/13) PE
The recent visits to Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S.
President Obama (and Vice President Biden to Trinidad and Tobago) suggest a handoff from
Washington to Beijing of the role as the region’s sugar-daddy, but not a strategic shift in influence. The presidents’ visits were similar in their innocuous itineraries. Both got pompous welcomes; met with
“real” citizens (Xi ate empanaditas de chiverre with a coffee farmer); and praised the bilateral
relationships. Both held sub-regional summits – Obama in San José and Xi in Port of Spain. Both
repackaged ongoing or recently negotiated projects as new “accords.” Obama pledged another $150
million [dollars] a year for funding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), part of the strategy started under President Bush to counter the drug trade and related threats. Xi got headlines in
Costa Rica for providing more than $1.5 billion for refinery and road projects and to purchase replacement taxis and buses from Chinese manufacturers. Significantly, China is also building Costa
Rica’s new National Police Academy – the sort of project Washington used to thrive on.
Zachary The University of Texas at Austin M.A., Latin American Studies, Energy Policy Activities and
Societies: Institute for Latin American Studies Student Association, President (2011) “U.S. image remains favorable across Latin America” Tico Times Thursday, http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-
Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013 SCTM
The
United States' public image greatly improved in Brazil and Mexico in the last year
, and many surveyed said that U.S. ties were still more important than those with China
.
¶ US-Chinese influence ¶ Latin American respondents said that the United States exerted greater influence over their countries than the Chinese but viewed Chinese acts more positively. Courtesy Pew Research Center ¶
Recent allegations that the United States
National Security Agency m ay have been spying on several Latin America n countries has done little to improve the U.S.’s image
abroad, but a new report
from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project shows that Uncle Sam has retained a favorable public image across the region
.
¶
U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent) and
Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in their favorable view of the United States.
¶ Argentina remains the Latin American country with the lowest approval of the U.S., coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of
Argentines surveyed did not have a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent approval rating recorded in 2007.
¶
Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report.
¶
Young college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view of the U.S. In Argentina, for example, people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32 percent approval for people older than 50.
¶ Latin America is no longer the United States’ backyard, but the
U.S. remains more influential than China in the region
.
All countries surveyed except Venezuela opined that the United States had a “great

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] deal” or “fair” amount of influence over their country and their economy compared to China
.
¶
While the
U.S. may have more impact, respondents said that China’s influence was seen more positively than the United States. Venezuela, Argentina,
Chile and Bolivia were among those that saw Chinese influence in a rosy light.
¶ During Chinese President Xi Jingping’s visit to Costa Rica in June, both countries’ leaders signed nearly $2 billion in trade and infrastructure projects, including the scuttled Moín refinery expansion project. ¶
Since Costa Rica switched its recognition to mainland China over Taiwan in 2007, the world’s second-largest economy has gifted the country a new $100 million stadium and $25 million towards the construction of a National Police academy.
¶ Popularity contests aside, most Latin
Americans surveyed said that the U.S. was the more important country to have strong ties with
.
¶
Research for the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey was based on telephone and face-to-face interviews under the supervision of the
Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Click here for a full breakdown of method by country.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, “China's engagement with Latin America: More of the same?,” Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE
I would argue, however, that deepening cooperation between China and Latin America is not
indicative of a balancing of relations or of genuinely horizontal engagement. In many cases, the
cooperation itself is limited, or is merely a short-term effort to secure access to new technologies or
scientific methods. In other cases, cooperative engagement should be thought of not as a leveling of
the playing field, but as an element of China’s ever-evolving economic statecraft. China’s cooperative
endeavors in Latin America and elsewhere are often seen as intervention in the affairs of China’s commercial actors to ensure a degree of “mutual benefit” in overseas dealings. Mutual benefit, a guiding principle of China’s external engagement philosophy, is thought to secure access to and postive relationships with countries and markets in the region.
(Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, “China's engagement with Latin America: More of the same?,” Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE
China’s academic literature on Latin America further illuminates its dominant view toward Latin
America. Of the existing Chinese-language literature on the China-Latin America relationship, the vast
majority seeks to derive jiaoxun or “lessons” from Latin America’s failed experiments in economic and social development. These “lessons” frequently are taught in China’s top universities, where students
encounter numerous charts documenting China’s and Latin America’s divergent paths toward economic development. The economic demise of Latin America – often linked to import substitution and/or failed neo-liberal policy -- is explained alongside China’s post-1979 growth miracle. Only one widely-published Chinese-language article looks to Latin America (and Brazil, in particular) for a viable development model. The article,lingyizhongjueqi, or “Another kind of rise,” considers Brazil’s approaches to dealing with rampant inflation and social inequality over the past three decades, suggesting that China might benefit from similar reforms.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jorge I., Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico, vice provost of international affairs, special advisor for international studies to the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences, and chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard
University, “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” Inter-American
Dialogue, June, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf)
Chinese academics also call attention to four problems in Sino-Latin American relations
, though they stress that the reasons for convergence outweigh those for divergence.
First, there is increased industrial competition, especially in textiles, where China has been hit by large anti-dumping duties
. One reason for its insistence in being recognized as a “market economy” is to limit the imposition of such penalties.
Second, China supports regional integration in Latin America and with the United States but worries about the use of trade barriers against outside countries such as China. Third, there are few cultural contacts between China and
Latin America and few of each other’s peoples speak the other’s language
; both sides suffer from information deficits regarding the other. Finally, Chinese academics fear that Taiwan may make diplomatic gains.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Stephen
, Master of International Relations from the London School of Economics, research associate with the Foreign
Policy Centre, London, “The Hard Truth About China’s Soft Power” November 24, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/41252.html
)
The recently finished Shanghai World Expo was China’s second coming out party, so-called, in three years. Like the Beijing Olympics before it, it went off without a hitch. Like the Olympics, it was widely declared a success. And it was. As an expo – a big, public event. But some had grander hopes for the Expo – namely, that it would ‘showcase China’s soft power’.
Prior to the Expo opening,
Jin Canrong of Renmin University’s School of International Studies predicted: ‘The message will remain one of how China's rise is characterised by soft power’. ‘The Expo is a very safe way for [the government] to show China's soft power’, concurred Ding Xueling of the Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology. As it happened, the events that swirled around the Expo’s closing weeks showcased something quite else: Why China doesn’t have much soft power and why the West, broadly defined, still has it in spades
. Harvard University’s Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’. He defines it as ‘the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion’.
For nations, according to Nye, soft power rests on culture, values and policies. It is therefore difficult to manufacture. Which brings us to China’s problem. Take Shanghai itself
– the city not the Expo site.
It is a tableau of Western soft power.
Young men while away evenings in Western bars,
playing not majiang but pool.
Young women self-consciously answer ‘Hello’ when their phone rings, before launching into Chinese. Expensively dressed Chinese drink at the
French-themed Bar Rouge, perched high above the grand, colonial-era Bund. During Halloween, skeletons, vampires and witches lurch merrily out of the darkness. The release of the iPad prompted scenes of public jubilation. And those people wearing Manchester United and Liverpool football shirts are not expats but locals. It’s to the great credit of Shanghai’s government and people that the city’s Western heritage has been preserved and enhanced. It gives Shanghai much of its character and marks it out from the megacities rising up around it. But
Western soft power undoubtedly remains on show in mainland China’s greatest city.
East of the Huangpu River, at the main Expo site
, the limits of China’s commitment to even pursue a soft power strategy
eventually became clear
. In September the Japanese government detained a Chinese fishing captain and a heated row over the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku islands flared up. Among its various responses,
China revoked an invitation to 1,000 Japanese youths issued by
Premier Wen Jiabao to visit the Expo. If the Expo was meant to ‘showcase China’s soft power’, the cancelled invitation did the exact opposite.
The young Japanese were finally re-invited after Japan released the Chinese fisherman.
Even more telling is that
, as the Expo came to an end, the standout soft power play came not from
China but from the Nobel Committee. It awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed critic of China’s government.
President Barack Obama reacted by urging China to release his fellow Nobel Laureate ‘as soon as possible’.
‘Political reform [in China] has not kept pace’, the president said. ‘The basic human rights of every man, woman and child must be respected’.
This was a pure exercise in soft power.
The Nobel Committee cannot coerce. It can only attract. It does so through its prestige and through the common recognition that it stands for certain principles. What happened next?
A media blackout punctuated by official criticism of Liu and the Nobel Committee
. A celebratory dinner abruptly broken up, with Liu’s friends and comrades hauled off to the slammer. The newly minted Nobel Laureate’s wife put under house arrest, her phone line cut. And now, reports of Liu’s supporters prevented from leaving the country.
Behaviour like this throttles the development of Chinese soft power
– values, culture and policies that can attract.
And the Nobel reaction is hardly an isolated event. China is still a nation where typing any of the forbidden words into a search engine causes the internet to reset
(‘The site could be temporarily unavailable or too busy’, Firefox artlessly suggests). And yet China has a lively Twitter conversation – evidence for the truism that bad laws tend to be flouted and invite derision and contempt. China’s leadership did not want the Nobel
Committee’s criticism. In 2008, it did not want Kevin Rudd’s. Australia’s then prime minister addressed students at China’s top university,
Peking. Speaking in excellent Chinese, Rudd presented himself as a zhengyou, which Rudd defined as a friend ‘who offers unflinching advice’.
Rudd raised the ‘significant human rights problem in Tibet’ and urged China to do more on climate change. Of course, no nation wants foreign criticism. But ignoring it is not always the best course. Jerome Cohen, another zhengyou and the doyen of Chinese law studies at New York
University, puts it bluntly: ‘Until the party leaders are persuaded to [embrace] the rule of law, China will not have soft power’. Some will disagree that China lacks soft power. They might point to China’s increasing influence in emerging economies. And it’s true, governments and businesses in Africa, South America and all parts of Asia are trading with China in increasing volumes. But how many of their elites would consider sending their kids to university in China ahead of the US or Europe? How many of their workers dream of migrating to China to start a new life? How many of their consumers watch Chinese

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
TV shows and use iconic Chinese brands every day?
How many nations are influenced by China through attraction not payment or coercion?
China has a long way to go before it develops soft power assets
that can significantly augment its foreign policy. But the good news for China is that the biggest obstacles are not inherent but a matter of choice.
David, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of ''China Goes Global: The Partial
Power.''“Falling Out of Love With China” The New York Times March 19, 2013 Lexis SCTM
Washington
¶
NOW that China is becoming a world power, it is beginning to recognize
the importance of its global image and the need to enhance its ''soft power
.'' It is tracking public opinion polls worldwide and investing huge amounts into expanding its global cultural footprint, ''external propaganda work'' and public diplomacy.
Unfortunately for China, that's not enough
.
¶
While pockets of positive views regarding China
can be found
around the world, public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal that China's image ranges between mixed and poor.
And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade,
European public
opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world
, but that is now matched in America and Asia.
¶
There are likewise increasing signs of strain with Russia
: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie lingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems stemming from Russia's military sales
to China
, immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition
in Central Asia.
¶
China's reputation has also deteriorated in the Middle East
and among the Arab League due to the country's support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central Asia.
¶
Even in Africa
-- where relations remain positive on the whole --
China's image has deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil and other raw materials,
aid projects that seem to benefit
Chinese construction companies as much as recipient countries and support for unsavory governments.
A similar downturn is apparent in Latin America for the same reasons.
¶
Finally, China's most important relationship -- with the United States -- is also troubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and deepening distrust.
(Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, “Sources and
Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc.
7/18/13)
The lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijing's friendship with dictators in the
developing world, creates a legitimacy problem. As Nye has pointed out, states most likely to project soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now emphasise liberalism, pluralism and autonomy.76 Beijing seems to express few qualms about cutting
political and economic deals with corrupt and even brutal, dictators. In July 2005, Beijing lavished honours on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (a disciple of the 'Beijing Consensus'), at a time when
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke of Mugabe's 'catastrophic injustice' in implementing his urban eviction programme.77 Beijing's close economic and political ties with such regimes help keep dictatorships afloat and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and political
change. In 2004, China also helped deflect US and other Western efforts to take tougher steps against
Sudan, which supplies nearly 5% of China's oil but has a notorious human-rights record, especially in its
Darfur region.78 China's close economic and political relations with Iran will also come under greater
scrutiny as the international community seeks to stem Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In justifying its

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] activities in Africa, the Chinese government insists 'business is business'.79 Yet coddling dictators can
antagonise democratic oppositions and may bode ill for sustaining Beijing's influence in those countries. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, for example, has made it clear that if it came to power it would not honour any loan repayments or deals signed by Mugabe.80 To the extent that soft power rests on legitimacy, China must also take growing international
commitment to human rights into account or else undermine its international standing at a time it is
trying to portray a more benign image. Not coincidentally the only three countries with a plurality viewing Chinese influence as negative (Germany the United States and Poland) are liberal democracies.
Moreover, legitimacy concerns undermine China's claim to moral high ground even at a time of overall
decline in US soft power.81 In a Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12% of the people queried in West European countries see the United States as the major power most likely to come to the aid of people threatened by genocide. No more than 3% said they would turn to China.82
(Zachary Keck; assistant director of The Diplomat, international current affairs for Asia-
Pacific region; “Destined to Fail: China’s Soft Power Push”; The Diplomat; 1-7-13; http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/4/)
Yet even as China inaugurated its first organization dedicated to enhancing Beijing’s soft power, a number of disparate events in China were illustrating why the CCP’s charm offensive is doomed to fail.
For example, in recent weeks the Chinese government has redoubled its efforts to censor the internet.
After social media users in China exposed a series of scandals involving low-level government officials, the CCP adopted new regulations that require internet service providers to quickly delete “illegal” posts and turn over the evidence to government officials. Additionally, after trying to require citizens to use their real names on social media sites like Weibo, the new regulations require citizens to use their real identities when signing up with an internet provider. More secretly, according to many inside China, authorities have been strengthening the great firewall to prevent users from employing various methods in order to gain access to a growing number of sites that are banned.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Dr. Adrian H. , author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, “Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States,” The Cuban
Research Institute at Florida International University, June 2009, online, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf, accessed 7/16/13) PE
As U.S. firms weather the recession and adapt to a global economic environment skeptical of short-term investments, partnerships with Cuba could offer some stable and constructive solutions. In March 2009 the Obama administration approved wider legal channels for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to
Cuba under the Omnibus Appropriations Measure (P.L. 111-8), providing a foundation for future industrial engagement. Likely next steps could include the authorization of trade in farm equipment, medical apparatus, and telecommunications products, niches that have already benefited from Chinese trade credits. Such steps would permit U.S. firms to compete and collaborate with Chinese
counterparts in Cuba, and as indicated by several recent legislative proposals in Congress, would advance U.S. strategic interests if extended to the oil sector.
(Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, “Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?,” Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as China’s president, from May 31st to June
6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijing’s strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and
Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation,
Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa
Rica and Mexico (pictured)—two countries that are at least as much a part of America’s orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the “Beijing Consensus”. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have
been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chávez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?
The short answer is: for simplicity’s sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as China’s is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuela’s oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by
Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the island’s latest fad.
However, as our story on Mr Xi’s visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard. China’s business
relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin
America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.
But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as
Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China’s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela,
deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Kaitlin Funaro is a GlobalPost breaking news writer. “Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America.”
Global Post 3 June 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-battles-usinfluence-latin-ame EW
Chinese President
Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region
. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a threeday visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties
.
The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States
. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods
. "China is a complicated case" for
Mexico, Aldo Muñoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "
It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal
."

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, “Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?,” Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as China’s president, from May 31st to June
6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijing’s strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and
Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation,
Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa
Rica and Mexico (pictured)—two countries that are at least as much a part of America’s orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the “Beijing Consensus”. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have
been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chávez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?
The short answer is: for simplicity’s sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as China’s is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuela’s oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by
Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the island’s latest fad.
However, as our story on Mr Xi’s visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard. China’s business
relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin
America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.
But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as
Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China’s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela,
deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. “CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?” Latin American Studies Association,
2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)
China also has an obvious interest in Venezuelan oil, and Chávez has visited China six times in his drive to win Chinese investment and energy purchases, and thereby create a soft balance to U.S. power. Yet by all accounts (i.e., Ellis and Halper), Beijing has been cautious in building relations with the volatile
Venezuelan caudillo. Chinese investment in Venezuela’s energy sector remains modest, and its
purchases of Venezuelan crude continue to fall well below the ambitious goals set by Chávez. As Luisa
Palacios points out in her essay in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere , there are technical obstacles: Venezuelan heavy crude is incompatible with existing Chinese refineries, whereas
geographic proximity to the United States makes it the more natural market for Venezuelan oil: travel time by tanker to the U.S. Gulf Coast is only five days, compared to forty days to reach China. Moreover, there is some evidence that China wants to avoid becoming embroiled in Venezuela-U.S. tensions and considers the confrontational Chávez something of a risky bet. Overall, Palacios concludes that,
although Chinese natural resource companies are slowly gaining a foothold in Latin America as part of their global drive to diversify their energy portfolios, the region is not poised to become a significant supplier of oil to China.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, “Perspective on the Future of China-Venezuela Relations,” Inter-
American Dialogue, March 22, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3266)
According to Matt Ferchen, however, the strength of the China-Venezuela “strategic partnership” will likely be tested in the coming years. China is unprepared for the possibility of significant political and economic instability in Venezuela
, he added, and is fearful of losing its preferred status in a post-Chávez government
. Ferchen agreed that economic complementarity exists between China and Venezuela
, and will play a role in future engagement, but
suggested that the extent of future cooperation between China and Venezuela will depend upon economic and political developments in the South American nation
. Andrés Rojas Jiménez explained that
China’s loans have done little to strengthen Venezuela’s economy. Following the creation of the China-Venezuela Joint Fund
, oil exports to China jumped from 95,000 bpd in 2007 to 460,000 bpd in 2012. But
Venezuela’s external debt also increased considerably.
In 2012, Chinese loans accounted for 25 percent of Venezuela’s total external debt. Venezuela is also increasingly dependent upon oil exports for economic growth
; exports of non-traditional goods are at the same levels as a decade ago.
PdVSA
, furthermore, has consistently fallen short of the eventual 800,000 bpd promised to China. Chinese entities recently criticized Venezuela for delays on certain projects, including some in the Orinoco.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Both the United States and China use infrastructure investment, diplomacy, and trade as leverage, but
Latin America wants to be seen as a socioeconomic partner, not a subordinate. The Pacific Alliance, for example, hopes to become a powerful bloc that can stand up to the world’s two super powers.
Comprised of Colombia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and possibly soon Panama, the Pacific Alliance is a new economic bloc that seeks economic integration oriented toward Asia-Pacific markets.
Additionally, the Pacific Alliance can become a springboard for other Latin American nations with a
Pacific shore to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free-trade agreement among Asia-
Pacific, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Canada, and the United States. Being part of the Pacific Alliance is significant, because for countries like Costa Rica, it would otherwise be an unlikely candidate for the
TPP. Taken together, the Pacific Alliance’s GDP totals $3 trillion, making it easier to integrate itself to the
TPP and for it to fight for better terms. The United States will still hold the lion’s share of the TPP with an economy that hovers around $13 trillion—but an alliance worth $3 trillion will give it more leverage than it would otherwise have. The battle for influence in Latin America may have the effect of pushing the countries closer together, allowing them to stand up to both the United States and China.
(Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-butus-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE
This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world
stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show.
Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Pinera of Chile visited the
White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice
President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.
(Global Times-Agencies; daily Chinese newspaper focusing on global issues;
“China, US not competing over Latin America: expert”; The Global Times; 5-31-2013; http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Ueh3dNKyDMU)
Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson
Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.
(“The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America.” Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW
The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region
.
Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823
Monroe Doctrine
, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy — which muddies its approach to trade and investment.
Washington’s domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words
— as has happened before
. China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology
. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there.
(Patricia Rey Mallen, covers Latin America for the International Business Times, Patricia holds two BAs from Universidad
Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of
Journalism. “Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean.” International Business
Times 30 May 2013. Web.) http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean-
1284839 EW
China's designs on Latin America have long been apparent, with imports to the Asian giant surging from $3.9 billion in 2000 to $86 billion in 2011
, as calculated by the Inter-American Development Bank. Now,
China seeks to start buying massive amounts of soy beans, copper and iron ore from Latin nations
, reports the
South China Morning Post
. The U.S., on the other hand, which has had deep involvement in many Latin
American nations for the past two centuries, has nonetheless been less than consistent in its recent trade policies
, said Boston University economist Kevin Gallagher, who has written about China's incursions in the region. “
The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer, but that’s not so easy because it doesn’t have the deep pockets like it used to
,” he told Bloomberg.
(Evan Ellis, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an analyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with China and other extraregional actors. “U.S.-China
Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America.” The Manzella Report 7 June 2013. Web.) http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america EW
Similarly, the willingness of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in
Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired “Western” corporations
. Indeed, so long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRC’s indifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices
, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents. Beyond ALBA,
Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption
. Argentina was able to remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells
75 percent of its output to the PRC.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jiang Shixue is a professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Vice President of
Chinese Association of Latin American Studies. “The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations”, China
& US Focus, November 3, 2011, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-insino-latin-american-relations/)
The
U.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded.
First, both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world.
In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-South collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development
in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America.
This outcome would
certainly
be welcomed by the United
States.
Second,
it is well-known that
Latin America
has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market
to stimulate growth. As a result,
China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with.
Third, China’s relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S.
China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence.
Fourth, China’s cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue.
China’s first policy paper on Latin America, published in
November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: “The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced.” Moreover, China’s military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere.
Finally, China does not wish to be used as a “card” against the
United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations.
It is encouraging to see that in the U.S. there are other voices commenting about Sino-Latin American relations. For instance,
Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, also said, “Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster [economic] performance.” In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, in June 2008, Daniel P. Erikson, then a senior researcher at the Inter-American Dialogue, pointed out that “while China’s expansion into Latin
America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game.
To the extent that China’s involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and wellbeing in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood.” Erikson added, “
China’s engagement in
Latin America is not yet a major concern for the United States
, and there are few signs of any real frictions between the two countries on that score.” So,
President Monroe does not need to roll over in his grave.
(Rhys, Professor of Development Economics, University of East Anglia, research focus on development in Latin America, MA from University of Cambridge, Doctorate of Philosophy from the
University of Sussex, “China’s Global Expansion and Latin America,” Cambridge University Press, http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)
Another factor that influences China’s policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically
. 67 As a result, China’s policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological.
Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of different political hues more recently
. China has not
been keen to be identified closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by
President Cha´vez in
Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile.
It also recognises the value of developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.
(Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, “China–Latin America Military Engagement,” API International,
February 2012, page 2, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-
2/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE
For the PRC, military engagement is one tool, among many, for building political good-will and
leverage in a country, in order to make it more likely that the regime will not oppose the entry of
Chinese products or act against its investments. Military activities are useful in this context because the armed forces remain an important political actor in most Latin American countries, although
thinking of the military as a political instrument is also consistent with both Chinese communist and pre-communist philosophy. Knowing and being on good terms with the military leadership of a Latin
American country helps the Chinese to understand the overall political dynamic of that country, anticipate actions that could be taken against PRC commercial interests, influence the political
leadership through military friends where necessary, and anticipate or avoid actions that could be taken by the armed forces in the political arena that could impact Chinese interests.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Dr. R. Evan Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics and is an Associate Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.
“The United States, Latin America and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?” Inter-American Dialogue,
May 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf)
In economic terms, the attractiveness of the US market and trade agreements between the United States and Latin
American countries condition where in the region Chinese investors calculate it profitable to go.
Chinese auto companies and other manufacturers investing in the Mexican maquiladora sector, for example, have been motivated in part by interest in exporting Chinese firms’ products to the US market under provisions of NAFTA.22
The possibility of countries in Latin America serving as export platforms for Chinese goods into the United States has also been mentioned
in the context of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and in the process of negotiating and securing approval for the Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).23 In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin
America,
US consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the region to purchase Chinese products.
At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United States from the region may include goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these companies naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to families in Latin America by immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of Chinese goods in the region.
The
ability of the
U nited
S tates to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the region’s receptivity toward the PRC.
The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin
America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis
, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments
, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which
Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally.
Attention also has been given to
India and other emerging markets
of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors
such as Russia and Iran.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba”, Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 168-168, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE
Cuban leaders have rejected the notion that they intend to follow a “China model” of development. A historically accrued wariness of excessive foreign influence has long coloured the character of the island’s international engagement, and relations with China appear to be no exception.
Spanish colonialism in the nineteenth century, along with US domination in the first half of the twentieth century and Soviet micromanagement in the second half each provoked strong nationalistic responses.
Cuba
learned from the Cold War that it was poorly served by Soviet-style centralised bureaucratic structures, an admission made by Fidel Castro himself (1988). In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the Cuban government began to experiment with decentralisation, manifested in the constitutional reforms of
1992, which facilitated the division of Havana into 93 (subsequently 105) Popular Councils, and the passage of Decree Law 143, which allowed local management of Havana’s historic centre, the country’s most dynamic economic zone. While the “revitalisation” of Old Havana under the Office of the Historian of the City was a considerable success, the broader push for decentralisation exhibited more ambivalent results. The liberalisation of resources and the devolution of executive capacities did not keep pace with local plans, and overly China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba 169 rigid structures of monitoring and compliance diminished local creativity (Fernández Soriano 1999).

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
, 06-12-
, Politico Live, “Report: No Chinese offshore drilling near Cuba,” http://www.politico.com/blogs/thecrypt/0608/Report_Chinese_arent_drilling_near_Cuba.html
The GOP is in the midst of a coordinated effort to slam Democrats for a seemingly outrageous contradiction: While Democrats—with the help of Florida Republicans—block oil drilling off the Florida
shore, China is doing just that a mere 60 miles off the coast of Cuba. Vice President Dick Cheney, House
Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) have all raised the specter of Chinese drilling off Cuba’s coast. In a recent speech, Cheney quoted a column by George Will, who wrote last week that "drilling is under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in
cooperation with Cuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are." The truth of that claim, however, is seriously in doubt. Democrats today pointed to a February 29, 2008
Congressional Research Service that found “[w]hile there has been some concern about China’s potential involvement in offshore deepwater oil projects, to date its involvement in Cuba’s oil sector has been focused on onshore oil extraction in Pinar del Rio province through its state-run China
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec).” Sen. Mel Martinez, a Florida Republican, took to the
Senate floor Wednesday and called the alleged Cuba drilling “akin to urban legend.”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jaime, Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American
Studies, University of Miami, author of multiple books on Cuba and Mexico, “What If...the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo?,” An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project, Issue
185, February 26, 2013, Online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue185.htm, accessed
7/18/13) PE
If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.
Trade - All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has very little credit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans.
- Cuba is not likely to buy a
substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred million dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in
any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and
Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S. - Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S. Nickel, one of Cuba's major exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported primarily to Canada. Cuba has decimated its sugar industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. for more sugar. Cigars and rum are important Cuban exports. Yet, cigar production is mostly committed to the European market. Cuban rum could become an important export, competing with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean rums.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Regenstreif 6/12 (Gary, Reporter, former Bureau Chief, Caracas, Buenos Aires & Rome; later, Regional
Editor, Western Europe; has overseen local-language news products in domestic markets for Thomson
Reuters; editorial liaison to several Thomson Reuters business units, leveraging news for commercial growth, “The Looming U.S.-China Rivalry Over Latin America” The Great Debate—Reuters, June 12,
2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latinamerica/)//MM
Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and
Washington’s sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to attain it.
Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the U nited
S tates need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals.
Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru’s leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation.
Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against
China — which has money to burn in the region.
“There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the] first time,” Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. “
There’s something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it.
Whether there’s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.”
The United States, Latin America’s largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains this position.
Washington has now signed free trade agreements with more than a third of the hemisphere’s nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with Latin America — more than three times the region’s commerce with China.
In Obama’s first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast.
China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the region’s powerhouse — largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy.
Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazil’s foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties.
Washington’s renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in
Africa.
China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West’s history of meddling in domestic affairs.
“It’s about influence and leverage,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, “…The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past.”
The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy — which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washington’s domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words — as has happened before.
China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there. Biden, in a May 29 speech in Rio de Janeiro, gushed about the progress made by Latin America and trumpetedthe region’s growing international stature.
“In the U.S.,” Biden said, “the discussion is no longer what it was when I was first elected as a young man: What could we do for the Americas?
That’s long since gone. The issue now is: What can we do together? We want to engage more. We think there’s great opportunity. We’re optimistic.”
As with many new starts, a recognition of past mistakes is in order. “For many in Brazil,” Biden said, “the United States doesn’t start with a clean slate. There’s some good reason for that skepticism. That skepticism still exists and it’s understandable. But the world has changed. We’re moving past old alignments, leaving behind old suspicions and building new relationships.”
China has particular interest in Mexico, the region’s second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City — investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Peña Nieto shared with Xi is that though Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China.
China is looking for even more however. It is eager to pursue a free trade agreement with Mexico, but Mexico City said last week it was too soon. Meanwhile, Mexico’s trade with the United States continues to flourish and it is due to displace Canada as the largest U.S. trade partner by the end of the decade, according to the Dialogue.
China is also considering joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which aims to boost trade among the Americas, Asia and Australia. The talks include the United States, Canada and other major economies on the Pacific rim.
Each superpower also brings baggage to the region. Washington still seeks to exert pressure on its partners. It has told Brazil, for example, that it has the responsibility to use its leverage with others, such as Iran. Meanwhile, “Chinese investment,” Farnsworth said, “doesn’t always bring with it good governance practices or anti corruption or environmental concerns.”
The different approaches suit Latin America just fine as it looks for continued growth. “
Latin Americas welcomes being courted by both superpowers,” Shifter explained.
Just as Latin America doesn’t want to rely too much on the United States, it also now doesn’t want to depend too much on Beijing, particularly in light of the China’s current economic slowdown.
“
It gives them options,” Shifter said about the different dynamics in play. “The U.S. relationship comes with more complications. The Chinese one comes strictly on the economic question. They’re very targeted, strategic in areas they want to support. They have a specific agenda. The U.S. agenda is more diffuse. Latin America welcomes both.”
(Global Times-Agencies, “China, US not competing over Latin America: expert,” 2013-5-31
1:13:01 , Online, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UebisNJtN2w, accessed 7/17/13)
PE
Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region.
Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and
Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and
Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March.
While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe
Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media
reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US and China
deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their
respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area.
"It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.
Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack
Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.
(Jianghou Zhou, Associate Professor of Asian Languages and Cultures, PhD, Baylor University “US-China Rivalry Still a mismatch”
April 14, 2011 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD14Ad01.html
)

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
China's soft power does not hurt global interests .
There is a view that soft power is becoming more important to a country's comprehensive power in international society, while hard power is becoming somewhat less important.
[13] Since the 1990s, China has achieved impressive gains in using soft power through implementing its "smiling" foreign policy, providing scholarships for foreign students in Chinese studies, financially aiding many countries, playing critical roles in many international organizations and meetings, and hosting the Summer Olympic Games in 2008. Joshua
Kurlantzick believes one of reasons for China's success is that China is using soft power to appeal to other countries and position itself as a model of social and economic success. As a result, China is winning friends and influencing people around the world almost as fast as the United States is doing the opposite. Chinese government spending on education is still low. In addition, overwhelming evidence suggests that Chinese traditional culture is waning on the mainland.
The
CCP has recently attempted to revive Confucianism to help in developing harmonious society, but
the result of this effort is uncertain. It will take a long time for the West to accept Chinese culture. While China's trade surplus exceeded $21 billion in 2010, its cultural trade deficit is growing.
According to a China Daily report in 2006, the ratio of China's imports of cultural products to its exports was 10:1, and is believed to be much higher today. This reflects that the influence of Chinese culture in the West is very limited.
More importantly, the CCP has not solved the puzzle of how to integrate its political system, one of the most important aspects of soft power, into the current mainstream of the global order
. The US is worried about
China's expansion in
Africa and
Latin America.
In fact,
China's policies toward Africa and Latin America obviously are more economically driven than cultural or political
.
The relationship between the two countries in Latin America and Africa in particular is not zero-sum.
China is acting similarly in Europe, the Chinese government has promised to help helping Spain and other European Union countries deal with their financial crisis and to regain market confidence. Ideologically and politically, the world today is still pretty much dominated by Western ideas and values. Most of the accepted "cosmopolitan values" originated in the West, such as human rights and democracy. According to Joseph Nye, despite China's efforts to enhance its soft power, the US remains dominant in all soft power categories. In terms of soft power influence, China is still no match for the US. And there is no telling how and when China will catch up with, let alone surpass, the
US in this regard. Non-democratic
China can peacefully co-exist with US
. Generally, Western societies view the political system in China as directly contradicting the core values of the West and see no fundamental way for the two sides to co-exist, because they assume that a democratic government would inevitably runs in conflict with a non-democratic one. However, this is a misconception. A democratic government does not necessarily make peace with another democratic one. For example, there are many conflicts between the US and other democracies. On the other hand, a democracy could make friends with a non-democracy, such as the US and Saudi Arabia. So there is no reason why US could not co-exist with China, non-democratic as it may be for the time being. To be sure, different nations have different national interests; and every nation puts its national interests as top priority.
Conflicts of interest between different nations are very normal
.
(Sebastian, graduate student at the University of Hong Kong and a contributor to
Foreign Policy in Focus, “South America awake to risks of China ties,” Asia Times, Apr 21, 2011, Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD21Ad01.html, accessed 7/19/13) PE
In the wake of US President Barack Obama's recent tour of Latin America, media reports and
commentators claimed that China has been economically outmuscling the United States in the region.
The reality, however, is that Beijing's economic presence has not come at the expense of the United
States. Although Washington still maintains an overwhelming edge, its influence is decreasing. This decline will be exacerbated by Obama's focus on boosting US exports to the region rather than importing more of Latin America's manufactured goods. True, China has become a key trading partner in
Latin America during the last decade. Sino-Latin American trade has risen from US$12 billion in 2000 to more than $140 billion today (though the region's trade deficit also rose from $950 million to $32 billion in 2009). Nevertheless, China's relations with Latin America need qualifying. In 2008, 90% of the region's exports to China originated in four South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru).
The disparity of trade with China explains to some extent the different growth patterns within subregions in Latin America. In 2010, Central America's economy grew by 4.9% while South America's expanded by 6.6%. The current trade dynamic between China and South America is becoming a
relationship of economic dependence that benefits Beijing. China is the largest export market for Brazil and Chile, and comes in second with Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Most exports consist of commodities such as iron ore, copper, copper ores and concentrates, and soya derivatives. In turn, up to
92% of Latin America's manufactured exports compete directly or indirectly with China's products,

{F ILE T ITLE } which ultimately results in deindustrialization for Latin America. In 2010, Brazil lost approximately
70,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector and $10 billion in income.
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. “CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?” Latin American Studies Association,
2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)
In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?
, the various contributors—
World Bank economists and consultants
, including renowned specialists in international trade— come down solidly on the side of opportunity.
This is not surprising: in the neoclassical
(or neoliberal) paradigm
dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually beneficial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus.
In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game!
In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin
America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolster s the U.S. economy
, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices). Some of the empirical methods used in China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin
America are nevertheless imperfect: trade data are somewhat outdated and insufficiently disaggregated to drill down to the level of particular products; there are possibly problems of endogeneity bias and reverse causality (as noted in the footnotes to page 32); and some trade models employ dangerously simplifying assumptions. However, the evidence is overwhelming that a burgeoning Chinese economy has given Latin America a measurable boost.
(Joseph S. Nye Jr; University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and author of “The Future of Power”; “Why China Is Weak on Soft Power”; New York Times; 1-17-12; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/why-china-is-weak-on-soft-power.html?_r=0)
As Han Han, a novelist and popular blogger, argued in December, “the restriction on cultural activities makes it impossible for China to influence literature and cinema on a global basis or for us culturati to raise our heads up proud.” The development of soft power need not be a zero sum game. All countries can gain from finding attraction in one anothers’ cultures. But for China to succeed, it will need to unleash the talents of its civil society. Unfortunately, that does not seem about to happen soon.
(“China, US not competing over Latin America: expert.” China Media 31 May 2013. Web.) http://www.chinamedia.com/2013/05/31/china-us-not-competing-over-latin-america-expert/ EW
While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday.
Some media reports described “dueling visits” by Chinese and US leaders
, and said that the “competition between the world’s two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display.”
Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other
.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can “carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages
.” Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that
China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area.
(Benjamin Carlson, GlobalPost’s senior correspondent covering China. “Chinese insider: ‘China’s rise is not America’s demise.’” Global Post 25 January 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130124/china-japantensions-Senkaku-Islands-conflict-zone-ruan-zongze EW
Online, nationalism is even more strident
. One Chinese web user mocked the “Japanese dogs [who] once again go to their daddy for support.” In Japan, commenters joked “Now that the US is really involved, China is scared out of its mind,” according to a translation by Tea Leaf Nation, an online magazine about China.
Remarking on the United States, Ruan said Beijing has no reason or desire for conflict with America. "We do not want a zero-sum game
," he said. "
We don’t want to say that China’s rise is the demise of the United States.”
-
(Wang, staffwriter for the economic observer one of the top three economic-focused newspapers in China and is well regarded for its in-depth special features and commentary, "in america's backyard: china's rising influence in latin america" http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-
039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)//AP
China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with
Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America
. Not only have these funds
been used in the field of oil production, but they
have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S.
For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Shixue, 11 (November 3 rd , Jiang, “The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations,” http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-sino-latin-american-relations/, amils)
The U
.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded
. First, both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world
.
In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-
South collaboration
. As a matter of fact, fur ther cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America
. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades
.
It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth
. As a result,
China is only one of the economic partners Latin
America has been trying to cooperate with.
Third,
China’s relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin
America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence.
Fourth,
China’s cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue
. China’s first policy paper on Latin America, published in November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: “
The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced.” Moreover,
China’s military relations with
Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These
principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China does not wish to be used as a “card” against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
JOSEPH S. NYE Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University “What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power” Foreign Policy APRIL 29, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_po wer?page=0,1 SCTM
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how
China has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power
. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid.
The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures.
But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment.
Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and
South Korea.
Even China's soft-power triumphs
, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale
. Not long after the last international athletes had departed,
China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains
. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu
Xiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message.
¶
China and Russia
make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power.
In today's world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility.
Government propaganda is rarely credible
. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal." But
soft power doesn't work that way
. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders.
¶ The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for China and Russia to succeed, they will need t o match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.
(Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
“Chinese Soft Power in Latin America,” China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE
The growth and exercise of soft power by the People’s Republic of China have limits that are important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to
U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap
between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each other’s culture and language, a lack
of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within
Latin America generally.
The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute
to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America.
One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant
portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chineselanguage programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning
Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures.
Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding
Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutes—such as the China Academy of Social
Sciences, which currently has the world’s largest Latin America studies program—and truly multinational
Chinese corporations—such as Hong Kong–based Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas
Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE—the general knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region.
Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of
Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived
as “not one of us”—a reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil.
Such
distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese
are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor
corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers
harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of China–Latin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.
(Pew Research Center, “America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s,” Global
Attitudes Project, Online, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remainsmore-positive-than-chinas/, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Publics around the world believe the global balance of power is shifting. China’s economic power is on
the rise, and many think it will eventually supplant the United States as the world’s dominant superpower.
However, China’s increasing power has not led to more positive ratings for the People’s
Republic. Overall, the U.S. enjoys a stronger global image than China. Across the nations surveyed, a median of 63% express a favorable opinion of the U.S., compared with 50% for China.
Globally, people are more likely to consider the U.S. a partner to their country than to see China in this way, although relatively few think of either nation as an enemy. America is also seen as somewhat more willing than
China to consider other countries’ interests. Still, both of these world powers are widely viewed as acting unilaterally in international affairs.
(Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics,
“Chinese Soft Power in Latin America,” China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Despite PRC “marketing efforts,” by contrast to the global impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is arguably one of the PRC’s weakest levers of soft power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese
culture arguably reflecting, more than driving, China’s influence in the region. Although some Chinese culture is reaching the Latin American mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally
limited and superficial, sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] those countries. Such perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense of mystery regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from the perceived
differentness of that culture and commercial competition from Chinese products.
(R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and an author and researcher on topic of Latin America’s relations with external actors, Ph.D in Political Science, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case
Study,” National Defense University Press, January, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-powerlatin-america.html)
The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have limits that are important to recognize
. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power.
Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each other's culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin
America generally
. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings
, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin
America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in
English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish
, although the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of
Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America
. Apart from major governmental institutes—such as the China Academy of Social
Sciences, which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies program—and truly multinational Chinese corporations—such as Hong
Kong–based Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE—the general knowledge of the region among
Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region
. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as "not one of us
"—a reality reflected even in
Chinese communities
, which often remain only partly integrated
, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation
.
Latin
American businesspeople
commonly express misgivings
, suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill
.
Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community
.
In the arena of China–Latin America military exchanges
, it is interesting to note that
Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United
States are not
.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jacques deLisle is the director of the Asia Program at FPRI, the Stephen A. Cozen
Professor of Law and professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania.
“Soft Power in a Hard
Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy” https://www.fpri.org/docs/delisle.chinataiwan_1.pdf) SJH
In much of the developing world, the apparent love affair with China likely remains shallow and fragile
. The ambiguous and much-debated China Model or Beijing Consensus is only superficially understood and disappointments that would accompany attempted implementation have not yet been encountered. The embrace of China may prove little more than an implicit quid pro quo for diplomatic support, modest development assistance and foreign investment. These are not the most pure or robust forms of softpower. In some cases and on some accounts, they do not even count as soft power. With China’s growing economic presence—concentrated in extractive industries, low-end service sectors, and manufactured exports—come looming and already-materializing risks to China’s image in Africa, Latin
America and elsewhere.
Complaints of labor abuses, neocolonialism, environmental degradation and hollowing out of labor-intensive local economic sectors have already begun to surface.
Nearer China’s periphery, economic integrationdriven bandwagoning with China is easily exaggerated.
As more careful analyses have pointed out, East and Southeast Asian states are wary of China, remain more attracted to U.S. values than PRC
ones, and have combined growing links to China with recommitments to ties with the United States through strategies that can be variously—if not wholly satisfactorily—characterized as balancing, double-bandwagoning or hedging.64 Throughout much of the non-Western world, seeming Sinophilia is to some extent super-ficial and self-indulgent tweaking of a sole superpower that is seen as havingbeen on a binge of neglect and abuse. According to major global public opinion surveys and influential Chinese scholars’ own estimates, China has scored only limited successes and still badly trails the United States in soft power.65 Second, as we have seen
, China’s soft power resources are plagued by internal contradictions
. To build and emphasize some dimensions is to undermine others. Playing up residual communism can narrow the relevance and appeal of the China Model. Trumpeting strong commitments to sovereignty can raise doubts— especially when Taiwan is the issue or when Beijing backs pariah regimes—about Beijing’s claims to be a benevolent, peace-seeking and responsible power. And so on. Third, key types of Chinese soft power resources remain thin. As many analysts at home and abroad have noted, China’s political institutions and official values do not enjoy broad appeal, nor does China’s record on socialequity, the environment, international human rights and other matters
.66 The international relevance, content and even existence of a China Model for development are as much foci of debate as they are rich sources of soft power that can alter foreigners’ attitudes and preferences in ways that serve Chinese interests.
China’s soft power remains heavily statist, lacking the popular culture, commercial and civil society dimensions that provide much of the might of American soft power
.67A slowing of China’s growth rate or rise in its perceived collateral costs is far from unimaginable and would dim the luster of the China Model.
Even continued success could sap soft power as a more prosperous China would become, like Taiwan, seemingly less relevant to the developing world. Fourth, China may suffer from a particularly pronounced case of the general problem that soft power resources can be difficult to deploy, especially to achieve affirmative (as opposed to defensive) policy aims. The attractive force of a China Model of development or vigorous defenses of sovereignty or traditional Chinese culture do not translate neatly or more than very indirectly into support in the international system for likely PRC policy agendas that go beyond defusing fears of a rising China.68 Many of China’s high-profile soft power-building international activities have been pro-status quo (for example, supporting a state-centric international system and a relatively liberal international economic order and largely accepting thenDeputy Secretary of State
Zoellick’s call on China to be a ‘‘responsible stakeholder’’) or have served values that are more like the
United States’ than the PRC’s (in the case of humanitarian and democracy-promotion agendas associated with UN peacekeeping operations and other PRC moves to engage with the international human rights regime).69 Seemingly more revisionist efforts (mostly on economic issues and especially with the advent of the 2008 global financial crisis) so far have been, variously, rhetorical, vague, tentative and not very influential.
Especially in the closing years of the twenty-first century’s first decade,
China has given reason to doubt its will or ability to stick to a line that will maximize its soft power. Some of what
Beijing says and does is bad for China’s soft-power influence with key international constituencies.
Examples include: newly haughty (if, on the merits, plausible) lectures about the shortcomings of

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
American-style capitalism and Washington’s regulatory regime; proud and sometimes strident nationalism at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and in response to perceived provocations from alleged foreign-backed separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang; high-profile actions against pro-democracy, prohuman rights and pro-civil liberties elements; declarations that Western-style democracy is not appropriate for China; and prominent statements implying or asserting that theworld needs to learn to deal with China on Chinese terms.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Peter is The Christian Science Monitor’s Beijing Bureau Chief and was educated in England and graduated from Durham University with an honors degree in Politics and Sociology “The rise of an economic superpower: What does China want?” The Christian Science Monitor November 5, 2011 Lexis
SCTM
With the United States it's cultural and political - the two countries share many interests that China doesn't," such as the promotion of human rights, democracy, and transparent governance, he adds.
¶ Indeed, for a government that says it is generally content with the current world order, Beijing is on unusually good terms with regimes cast out by that order, such as those ruling Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar), and Zimbabwe.
¶ "By making friends with dictators,
China challenges the [global] democratic system and works at cross purposes to the international mainstream,"
complains Mao Yushi, a well-known reformer who has mentored many of
China's leading economists.
¶ This does not inspire confidence in Western capitals but is less of an issue in developing countries, whose own experience with Western governments - under their rule or trading with them - has often left them feeling seriously hard done by.
¶
China has fewer opportunities to exert international political influence commensurate with its economic clout.
That's partly because few governments
around the world, and even fewer electorates, regard China's repressive, authoritarian one-party system as a model to be admired or imitated, regardless of its economic achievements.
¶ Though China's readiness "to voice different opinions from the only country in the world that has had a say up until now
... is attractive to other nations," says Gong Wenxiang, a professor at Peking University's Journalism School. "I can't see people being happy with a very strong power often
supporting dictators.
That
is not a positive image
."
¶
"
China is a power in terms of its resources, but it's not a power in terms of its appeal
," adds David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy program at
George Washington University. Deficient in soft power,
"it's not a model, not a magnet others want to follow."
¶
Nor does Beijing show much sign at the moment of seeking to push any particular model of governance or political mind-set
, which is music to the ears of men like Mr. Mende, the Congolese communications minister. "We don't believe in that trend of Western powers mixing with internal affairs of countries," he says. "We don't like people giving us orders. China is more about respecting the self-determination of their partner." ¶ That hands-off approach also steers the country clear of alliances that might enmesh
Beijing in the costly defense of other people's interests. Even those Pakistani officials who would like to play Beijing off against Washington recall that not once has Beijing stepped in to help Pakistan in any of its wars with India, all of which Pakistan lost.
¶ "
China wants to make the deals but not to shoulder responsibilities
," says Zhu, the Peking University international relations scholar. "We are far from ready, psychologically, to make ourselves a dependable power." ¶ The government's recent white paper acknowledged as much:
"For China, the most populous developing country, to run itself well is the most important fulfillment of its international responsibility." ¶
Recent events in Libya illustrate how far China is from playing a creative international diplomatic role. Throughout the crisis, Beijing was a passive, reactive bystander, going along with Western intervention. But, focused on protecting its oil interests above all else, it was the last major power to recognize the new Libyan government. That cautious attitude was on display again last week in China's reluctance to contribute as heavily to the eurozone's bailout fund as European leaders had hoped it would. China was not, after all, going to save the world.
¶ "
China's diplomacy is cost-benefit-oriented, not dealing in terms of global public goods
," argues Professor Shambaugh.
"It's a very self-interested country, looking after themselves." ¶ One result of that attitude? "
China is
rising, but we are a lonely rising power
," says Zhu. "The US has alliances; no one is an ally of China's."

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Leibniz-Institut fur Globale und
Regionale Studien, “The Dragon in the Backyard: US Visions of China’s Relations toward Latin America”
2013, http://www.gigahamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf)//MM
In the future
, however, there might be concerns with regard “to rapidly advancing Chinese capabilities, particularly in the fields of intelligence, communications, and cyber warfare, and their possible application in the region.”
In general, there have been some concerns that China has been using surveillance facilities in Cuba to intercept US radio and telephone transmissions and to practice cyber espionage.
During the first cycle of debate about China’s presence in Latin America, the “Taiwan factor” was an important topic given that
(at that time) the region (including the Caribbean) contained 12 of the 25 countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Therefore, it was speculated that China would try to lure away Latin American countries and, as a result, negatively a ff ect Taiwan’s international status. This topic later received less attention in the United States because China only achieved some limited success – that is,
Costa Rica ceased to recognize Taiwan – and also su ff ered setbacks with regard to small Caribbean islands. Today, 11 of the 23 countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan are still located in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The second cycle of US concern regarding the “dragon in the backyard” started at the beginning of this decade
. The US economy had been debilitated by the financial crisis of 2007–2008, while Chinese trade with Latin America was still growing at high rates. Between 2000 and 2011, US participation in Latin American exports and imports went down from 59.7 percent to 39.6 percent and from 50.4 percent to 30.1 percent, respectively. During the same period, Chinese participation in Latin American exports and imports grew from 1.1 percent to 8.9 percent and 1.8 percent to 13.8 percent, respectively. In Brazil (a key country), China overtook the United States as the most important trade partner. In 2011, China was the first or second most important destination for exports in 7 out of 18 Latin American countries (CEPAL 2012). Moreover, trade with China was increasingly supplemented by Chinese investment and Chinese credits. As Gallagher et al (2012: 27) found, “China has committed approximately 75 billion USD in loans to Latin American countries since 2005. China’s loan commitments of 37 billion USD in 2010 were more than those of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the US Ex-Im Bank combined for that year.” In 2009, China also joined the Inter-American Development Bank. China lends money to countries such as Ecuador,
Venezuela and Argentina, which have problems borrowing money in the global financial market. Chinese banks do not attach political conditionality to their loans. However, they do generally tie their loans to the purchase of Chinese goods. Around two-thirds of Chinese loans combined a loan agreement with an oil sale agreement (oil for loans). Chinese loans are also used for infrastructure projects.
Di ff erent Types of Challenges for the United States Taking a broader look at the current perceptions of the challenges that China’s activities in
Latin America present to US interests, one can di ff erentiate between economic, military, and geopolitical challenges, on the one hand, and direct and indirect challenges as well as normal challenges and challenges in extraordinary situations
, on the other hand. However, in recent documents and declarations, t he US government’s reaction to China’s growing presence has generally been quite muted.
In their Key Strategic
Issue List for 2012/2013, the US Army War College lists five issues for the Western Hemisphere (Strategic Studies Institute 2012); one of which is the need to assess the strategic implications of increased Chinese engagement in Latin America. In contrast, the 2012 and 2013 briefings of the Congressional Research Service on Key Issues for Congress in Latin America and the Caribbean do not mention China. Moreover, in an
October 2011 hearing before the Committee on Foreign A ff airs of the House of Representatives on Emerging Threats and Security in the
Western Hemisphere, China was not a very prominent topic – being mentioned only twice. Responding to one representative’s questions as to whether China’s activities in the Western Hemisphere were considered a serious emerging threat, Philip Goldberg, head of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, answered that there were some economic challenges and some minor diplomatic challenges related to the fact that both China and Brazil are involved in the BRICS group.
However, China’s weapon sales to the region are not seen as a major security problem.
From a broader perspective, however, the delivery of Chinese military equipment to Latin America and Chinese-
Latin American military cooperation are seen with mixed emotions. China has increased personnel exchanges and institutional contacts with Latin American militaries and has participated with the military police
in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004. Much more important from the US point of view are

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] military sales to Latin America – starting with unsophisticated items such as personal equipment and military clothing, and moving up to more sophisticated military equipment such as aircraft (fighters and transport) and radar and telecommunication systems (also for civilian use).
China’s main clients have been Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia
(Ellis 2011a). On the one hand, China’s donations or sales of military equipment at relatively low prices were perceived as a contribution to the ability of poor governments in the region to assert control over national territory and to confront drug tra ffi cking. On the other hand, the willingness of China to sell low-cost arms to countries in conflict with the US, such as Venezuela, undercuts the ability of the United States to impose sanctions or controls on the arms purchases of such countries (Ellis 2011a, 2012). However, only in an extreme case of open hostility between the United States and China would China’s military cooperation with and weapon sales to Latin America become a genuine security threat to the United States
. In such a context,
China would be able to create diversionary crises or conduct disruption operations in close proximity to the United States – for example, by trying to close o ff strategic choke points such as the Panama Canal
(Ellis 2011a) or using the presence of Chinese logistic companies in major Latin American ports. But for the moment, as one specialist argues (Ellis 2011a: 9), “nothing in the public discourse of the
Chinese leadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that Latin America is considered in the short term as a base for military operations.”
Nevertheless, the US expectation is that “Chinese military engagement with Latin America is likely to be a growing and enduring part of the regional dynamic” (Ellis 2011a: 46).
There are some minor concerns with regard to the expansion of ties between organized crime in China and Latin America, especially with regard to tra ffi cking (of humans, narcotics/precursor chemicals, contraband and arms) and money laundering
(Ellis 2012b). But these developments are not blamed on the Chinese government. In general, US and Chinese cooperation in chemical control and counternarcotic operations is evaluated as positive. In a 2011 congressional hearing, Daniel L. Glaser, assistant secretary for Terrorist Financing at the
Department of Treasury, denied there was any Chinese activity in the region that would raise illicit-financing concerns and argued that cooperating with China will be part of the solution for the problem (U.S. House of Representatives 2011). There have also been criticisms that
Washington has been overly complacent with regard to the geo-economic implications of China’s entrance into the Americas and the loss of markets due to Chinese advances in trade and investment (Farnsworth 2012). However, other analysts see Chinese investments in Latin
America as having had a limited impact on US interests. Sullivan (2013), for instance, points out that the United States remains the single largest trading partner for many Latin American countries and that US trade with the region (800 billion USD) was more than three times the amount of China’s in 2012. While the purchase of goods from China has, to some degree, displaced Latin American purchases of products from US companies, Ellis (2012a: 5) makes the point that “in many cases US-registered companies actually produce part or all of their products in the
PRC or they source components there, increasing the competitiveness of those goods as they sell them to Latin America and other markets.”
Nonetheless, deepening economic relations between China and Latin American countries may have an indirect, negative impact on US-Latin American relations
(Ellis 2012a; Farnsworth 2012) by undermining the ability of the United States to pursue its agenda in the region.
These growing relations with China send the signal to
Latin American governments that economic development can be achieved without adhering to Western proscriptions.
Regimes hostile to the United States can turn their backs on Western lending institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank. Thus, countries could sidestep the negative consequences of actions deemed hostile to the interests of the United States and US companies – for example, defaulting on loans or nationalizing industries, amongst other things.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Erich, Der Spiegel writer, “China’s Soft Power is a Threat to the West” July 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/chinas-soft-power-threat-unitedstates/story?id=11277294#.UdGkavlwex4)//MM
'21st-Century Economic Weapon'
Beijing recently imposed strict export quotas on rare earths, resources that are indispensable in high technology, where they are essential to the operation of hybrid vehicles, high-performance magnets and computer hard drives. Some 95 percent of metals such as lanthanum, neodymium and promethium are mined in the People's Republic, giving Beijing a virtual monopoly on these resources. It clearly has no intention of exporting these metals without demanding substantially higher export tariffs. In fact, China apparently wants to prohibit exports of some rare earths completely, starting in 2015. Concerned observers in Japan have described the valuable resources are a "21st-century economic weapon." The Chinese have dismissed protests from Washington and Brussels with the audacious claim that World Trade
Organization (WTO) rules allow a country to protect its own natural resources.
China, a WTO member itself, is now playing a cat-and-mouse game with the organization. Despite several warnings, Beijing still has not signed the Agreement on Government Procurement, and it continues to strongly favor domestic suppliers over their foreign competitors in government purchasing. To secure a government contract in China, an international company has to reveal sensitive data as part of impenetrable licensing procedures and even agree to transfer its technology to the Chinese -- often relinquishing its patent rights in the process.
China, for its part, is waging a vehement campaign in the WTO to be granted the privileged status of a "market economy." If it succeeds, it will be largely spared inconvenient anti-dumping procedures in the future. But do China's Communist Party leaders seriously believe that the rest of the world will actually reward them for their dubious trading practices?
The answer is yes, and they have good reason to be optimistic. When it comes to diplomacy, Beijing knows how to win. Whether it's at the
have paid particular attention to nations with large oil and natural gas reserves, such as Venezuela, Kazakhstan and
Nigeria, but
Beijing has forgiven billions in loans to African nations and pampered them with infrastructure projects.
What Beijing is not demanding of these countries is even more telling. Unlike Washington, London or
Berlin, the Chinese do not tie their development aid to any conditions relating to good governance
.
While the West punishes authoritarian behavior by withholding funds (and, in some cases, indirectly threatens "regime change"),
Beijing has no scruples about pampering the world's dictators by building them palaces and highways to their weekend villas -- and assuring them territorial integrity, no matter what human rights violations they are found guilty of.
Opportunity, Not Problem
China has friendly relations with some of the world's most problematic countries, including failed states and countries on the brink of failure such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Myanmar and Yemen. "For the West, failed states are a problem. For China, they're an opportunity," writes
American expert Stefan Halper in the magazine Foreign Policy, referring to these countries as "Beijing's coalition of the willing."
The diplomatic weapon is having its intended effect
. Already, the pro-Chinese voting bloc led by African nations has managed to obstruct progress in the WTO. Meanwhile in the United Nations, the People's Republic's influence is clear: Within the last decade, support for Chinese positions on human rights issues has risen from 50 percent to well over 70 percent.
Washington, in turn, is no longer even included in certain key groups. The United States was not invited to take part in the East Asia Summit, and it was denied the observer status it had sought in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a sort of anti-NATO under China's de facto leadership that includes Russia and most of the Central Asian countries. Iran, on the other hand, was.
A Model Worth Emulating
Of course, none of this means that the West has already lost the battle for influence in
Africa,
Latin
America
and Asia.
While Beijing cozies up to dictators, an approach the West cannot and should not take,

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
America and Europe can compete, and even excel, in another area: by offering the ideal model of a democracy worth emulating.
There has been much speculation in recent months that developing countries could be increasingly eyeing China's blend of a market economy and Leninism, economic diversity and strict one-party control as an attractive alternative to democracy.
The United States engages too little in self-reflection while the Europeans are too involved with themselves, and both make themselves less attractive as a result, says former Singaporean diplomat and political science professor Kishore Mahbubani. He believes that China's momentum is ultimately unstoppable. Many people in the West who have always viewed trade unions as disruptive and given little heed to human rights violations agree with him.
But even though the People's Republic may have become more attractive for some authoritarian rulers, only a few see it as a model. Beijing has already installed more than 500 Confucius Institutes around the world, in hopes of promoting what it views as China's cultural superiority. One of the results of a 10-fold increase in scholarships at Chinese universities is that almost twice as many Indonesians are now studying in China as in the United States.
But whether it's Harvard, high-tech cell phones or Hollywood, people in many parts of the world still see the West as the home of everything desirable. Besides, many who flirt with Chinese-style dirigisme see it only as a transitional phase that makes sense from an economic point of view, and that ultimately -- as in South Korea, for example -- leads to a democracy with functioning institutions.
More Forceful Approach Required
What no one in
Asia,
Latin America
or Africa wants is another messianic US president in the vein of George
W. Bush, who believed that he could forcefully impose the American model on other countries.
Many people in developing countries can easily distinguish between pompous arrogance and healthy self-confidence.
And especially in
China, people tend to regard an excessive willingness to compromise as a weakness, and the stubborn adherence to one's own positions as a strength.
Chancellor Angela Merkel, the woman at the helm of the world's former top exporting nation, ought to take a much more forceful approach to dealing with the leaders of the current export champion than she did during her recent visit to Beijing. She ought to point out that Germany has to draw the line somewhere: for instance, that it will not support China's bid for preferential status in the WTO as long as Beijing violates its rules. She should also make clear that Germany will not condone the ongoing industrial espionage activities of Chinese agents in German hightech centers, the continued illegal copying of patents and the fleecing of German small and mid-sized companies in China.
When China asks for the lifting of visa restrictions, Germany should ask the Chinese what it can expect in return. And Berlin needs not be concerned that China could react to such criticism by no longer doing business with Germany. The People's Republic acts out of self-interest and needs the West about as much as the West needs China. Besides, the Chinese are used to playing hardball.
Ironically, Taiwan serves as a prime example of how to deal with Beijing. In a SPIEGEL interview 15 years ago, then Prime Minister Lien Chan complained to me that the People's Republic was cutting the ground from under Taipei's feet. He said that, although only 30 nations recognized
Taiwan at the time, that would change. But it didn't. In fact, the total is now only 23 nations.
Nevertheless, Taiwan's new leadership is taking a pragmatic approach and, realizing that it cannot win against China, has decided to embrace the mainland Chinese. After tough negotiations, the Taiwanese are now making deals with their big brother. In a trade agreement signed in late
June, Taiwan achieved a reduction in Chinese tariffs on $13.8 billion (€10.6 billion) worth of goods it sells to China each year, while Beijing came away from the trade deal with a reduction of tariffs on only $2.9 billion of the goods it exports to Taiwan.
"We did not make any compromises when it comes to our independence, and we achieved a favorable agreement," says Wu-lien Wei, Taiwan's representative in Berlin. Perhaps one needs to be Chinese in order to avoid being ripped off by Beijing.
(Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, “China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, and Africa” April
2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN25 OVERVIEW China’s growing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is a fairly new phenomenon that has developed over the past several years. Beginning in April 2001 with President Jiang Zemin’s 13- day tour of Latin America, a succession of senior Chinese officials have visited Latin American countries to court regional governments, while Latin American leaders also have been frequent visitors in Beijing. China’s primary interest in the region appears to be to gain greater access to needed resources—such as various ores, soybeans, copper, iron and steel, and oil—through increased trade and investment. It is also likely that Beijing’s additional goal is to isolate Taiwan by luring the 12 Latin American and Caribbean nations still maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan to shift their diplomatic recognition to China. While China’s economic linkages with Latin America have grown, the U.S. advantage of geographical proximity means that the PRC presence is likely to remain dwarfed by U.S. trade with and investment in the region. Moreover, although many Latin American countries welcome Chinese investment, some have viewed China as an economic threat, and are concerned that both their domestic industries and their U.S. export markets will be overwhelmed by Chinese competition. Nevertheless, some analysts maintain that Beijing’s growing role in the region may have longer-term implications for U.S. regional interests and influence
.
DIPLOMACY Bilateral Relations and Competition With Taiwan Of the 33 independent countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region,

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
China currently has official diplomatic relations with 21, while the remaining 12 nations maintain relations with Taiwan
(see Table 1). For ideological reasons,
Communist Cuba was the first nation in the region to recognize China back in 1960, while Chile under Socialist President Salvador Allende was the second in
1970. Mexico established relations with China in 1972, and most South America nations did so in the
1970s and 1980s, including Argentina and Brazil, which were run by military dictatorships at the time.
In addition to Cuba, nine other Caribbean nations have diplomatic relations with the PRC, five of which have had relations since the 1970s.
Over the years, China has signed a variety of bilateral partnership agreements with several countries in the region in order to strengthen relations. The most politically significant of these are known as ‘‘strategic partnership agreements.’’
To date, China has signed such agreements with Brazil
(1993)
, Venezuela
(2001)
, Mexico
(2003)
, and Argentina
(2004)
. Additional ‘‘cooperative partnership’’ or ‘‘friendly and cooperative partnership’’ agreements have been signed with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Peru
.26 In the 1980s, China began to augment its expertise on Latin America through agreements for Chinese officials to travel to the region to study Spanish, and through the development of think tanks such as the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the
Department of Studies about Latin America of the Chinese Communist Party.27 For many of the region’s nations, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, there has been a political dynamic in China’s expanding economic linkages and foreign assistance.
China, with some success, has been trying to woo countries away from recognizing Taiwan. Taiwan’s official relations in the region now include five Central American countries, six in the Caribbean, and one in
South America. For decades, Taiwan was a consistent provider of financial assistance and investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to nurture its remaining official relationships, a policy often referred to as checkbook or dollar diplomacy. But Taipei now is hard- pressed to compete against the growing economic and diplomatic clout of China, which in recent years has stepped up its own version of checkbook diplomacy.
Since 2004, three countries in the region have switched their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC: Dominica in March 2004, Grenada in January 2005, and most recently, Costa Rica in June 2007.
Dominica severed relations with Taiwan in 2004 after Beijing trumped Taiwan’s $9 million in assistance with a pledge of $122 million in assistance to the tiny country over six years.28 Grenada switched its recognition to China in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan that devastated the island in September 2004 and destroyed a new cricket stadium that Taiwan had helped build. Disappointed about Taiwan’s response after the hurricane, Grenadian Prime Minister visited China and received support for the rebuilding of the cricket stadium, with workers supplied by China, as well as other grants, support for the agricultural sector, and scholarships.
Most recently, Costa Rica under President Oscar Arias switched diplomatic recognition to China in June 2007 in large part because of growing trade relations in recent years and the prospect for increased Chinese trade and investment. China is now Costa Rica’s second largest trading partner, after the United States, and the two countries are considering a free trade agreement. China’s overtures in the Caribbean experienced a setback in May 2007 when St. Lucia switched its diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan after ten years of recognizing the PRC. The diplomatic switch was related to the ouster of Prime Minister Kenny Anthony’s St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) from power in December 2006, and the election of a new government led by the United Workers Party (UWP). (In 1997, the ruling SLP government under Anthony had orchestrated a diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China.) Taiwan’s promises of assistance to the new UWP government in 2007 includes support for public health, education (including the provision of computers and scholarships), and development of the agricultural sector. Regional Organizations
Despite the setback with St. Lucia, the PRC’s ability to develop and expand contacts with Taiwan’s friends in the region has been facilitated by a decision by the Organization of American States (OAS) in May 2004 to accept China as a formal permanent observer in the OAS. The OAS has 35 members, including the United States and all 12 of the region’s countries currently conferring diplomatic relations on Taiwan. Some 60 countries worldwide are OAS permanent observers, but Beijing has strongly objected to Taiwan’s efforts to seek observer status. In addition to the OAS, China has participated in several other regional organizations. Dating back to 1975, China has often sent its observers to the annual meetings of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the organization set up in the aftermath of the 1967 signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in the region. The PRC has been an observer since 1994 to the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), a 12-member regional organization focusing on trade integration and the goal of a common market. China is a member of the East Asia-Latin American Cooperation Forum (FOCALAE), an organization first established in 2001 that brings together ministers and officials from 33 countries from the two regions for strengthening cooperation in such areas as education, science and technology, and culture. The PRC also is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that annually brings together leaders of 21 Pacific rim na tions (including Taiwan as ‘‘Chinese Taipei’’) as well as the Latin American nations of Chile, Mexico, and Peru. More recently, in March 2007, China signed an agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to formalize talks on the PRC’s request to become an IDB member. The bank has launched an internal discussion on whether to accept China as a member. If accepted, China would join Japan and Korea to become the third Asian country to join the IDB. China is already a member of the Caribbean Development Bank based in Barbados.
China has also helped support UN peacekeeping operations in the region through its contribution of a ‘‘special police’’ peacekeeping contingent of 125 personnel as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) that began in 2004. This marked Beijing’s first deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere. MINUSTAH’s mission, which was due to expire in mid-October 20007, was extended for another year until October 2008. In 2005, China reportedly put pressure on Haiti to switch its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC as a condition for supporting the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission, but Haiti has retained its relations with Taiwan.29 Analysis
For now, it appears that China and Taiwan will continue to battle for diplomatic recognition, using the prospect

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] of increased aid, trade, and investment to sway the decisions of the remaining dozen nations recognizing Taiwan
. Some observers maintain that key countries to watch include the Central American countries of Nicaragua and
Panama, the Caribbean nation of the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay, the sole South American nation that continues to recognize Taiwan.30
In the aftermath of Costa Rica’s June 2007 decision to switch diplomatic partners, Chinese officials predicted a domino effect in which other countries would switch their recognition to China, but Taiwan launched an initiative in the region in order to counter China’s attempts to tempt additional countries to switch sides that appears to have been successful in the short term. Nevertheless, over the long run, China’s sheer economic size and power bodes well for its ability to entice Taiwan’s remaining 12 allies in Latin
America and the Caribbean to switch diplomatic sides
. Beyond competition with Taiwan, China’s diplomatic efforts in the larger countries of the region appear to be geared at strengthening relations and expanding cooperation with nations that have potential resources and investment opportunities that could help feed China’s resource needs and expanding economy. These diplomatic overtures in
Latin America also satisfy China’s efforts to foster relations with other developing countries worldwide and its promotion of South-South cooperation. A 2006 study by the Inter-American Dialogue examined the 1991—2003 UN voting records of several major Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela—and concluded that the increased Chinese trade with the region in recent years has had no discernable effect on the voting behavior of these nations. The study also looked at several countries having diplomatic relations with
Taiwan—Costa Rica (before it switched diplomatic relations to the PRC), Panama, and Paraguay—and found little difference in voting coincidence with China between countries that recognize China and those that recognize Taiwan. Cuba, for political reasons, stands out as the
Latin American country with a high voting coincidence with China, although increases in economic linkages do not appear to have had an impact on Cuba’s voting behavior.31 While countries in the region that recognize Taiwan often speak out in favor of its inclusion at the UN and its various agencies, this is not always the case
. During a vote in 2007 on Taiwan’s membership in the
World Health
Organization
(WHO), Panama and Nicaragua both abstained, while Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan at the time, voted against its membership
.32

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Pavlos, reading for a PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of
Cambridge. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge and a BSc in
Politics with Economics from the University of Bath, “Chinese Soft Power: Sources and Implications for the US” December 21, 2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sourcesandimplications-for-the-us/)//MM
China’s rise
, fuelled by more than three decades of ‘miraculous’ levels of economic growth, has equipped Beijing with an impressive and quite unique set of ‘powers’
(Lampton, 2007).
Economic power
is at the heart of all other aspects of
Chinese power. It has enabled investment in the rapid modernization of the
People’s Liberation Army (
PLA
) (Tkacik,
2007), as well as related ‘asymmetric capabilities’
(Shirk, 2008:194) as cyberwarfare (Fritz, 2008) and advanced military space technology (Logan, 2007). Moreover, it has allowed Beijing to maximize its security through deals advancing China’s energy security and securing key raw materials. These issues, and their implications for US security interests, are extensively studied in Washington (e.g. Waldron,
2005; Ridley, 2005; Office of the SoD 2009, 2010). Apart from economic realpolitik, as in the form of securing resources and capacity for economic warfare[1] (Segal, 2004:169-170),
China’s economic growth, has also energized Beijing’s ‘soft power’.
Soft power, coined by Nye in 1990, can be broadly defined as non-coercive, co-optive power- the power of attraction. The attractiveness of a state is affected by its culture, history, membership and role in international institutions, as well as its economic performance and stature (Nye,
1990:167). Other crucial sources of soft power are ‘political ideology and diplomacy’ (Gill and Huang, 2006:17). China’s economic power is the key motor behind its mounting soft power. This paper focuses on China’s soft power, with a view to delve deeper into the latter’s impact on the
US and its interests. It begins with an analysis of the sources and complex structure of China’s soft power. Subsequently, it assesses how the US may be affected by Beijing’s co-optive power, with an emphasis on both direct and indirect aspects of that influence. It looks at China’s ideational influence in its near abroad, the MENA region and Latin America to shed light how Beijing’s influence may affect American interests.
It closes with an analysis of China’s augmenting soft power in multilateral settings, and how this may on occasions marginalize US influence.
America remains the most powerful state in the international system. No country in the world has more ‘global’ interests than the US. China’s growing soft power affects American interests around the world therefore, a thorough assessment of this process is imperative. II. The Sources of Chinese Soft Power: Economic Performance, an Alternative Development Model and a Unique Culture Economic Performance The preeminent source of China’s attractiveness is its economic performance. The ability to maintain close to 10 percent growth for over three decades (Kaplan, 2010:22), enjoy substantial stability and lift 300 million people out of poverty[2], together constitute an unprecedented achievement (Ramo, 2004:10-11). Beijing has realized these achievements following a novel, unconventional, non-western development path.
Underlying driver behind the Chinese development model is innovation. The continuation of the ‘Chinese miracle’ depends greatly on incessant innovation, which ‘cuts time-to-reform’ and is ‘the only cure for the problems of change’ (ibid.:15). Innovation increases the ‘density’ in the
Chinese society, which in turn decisively boosts economic growth (ibid.:13-16). Cultural values, as national ‘pride of culture’ may also increase density (ibid.:33); the CCP recognises and uses this accordingly. Economic and Political Ideology
Beijing has embraced many of the key tenants of capitalism and is largely a market economy
(McKinnon, 2010:504), with a ‘Chinese twist’,
that
Halper (2010:10) calls ‘state capitalism’ or
‘market-authoritarianism’
. The CCP largely controls key business sectors, owns firms of strategic importance, and restricts political liberties with a view to ensuring stability (Halper, 2010:30). The ‘Chinese way’ to economic growth and development is increasingly emulated around the world.
The illiberal nature of Chinese ‘market-authoritarianism’ means developed democracies are unlikely to be lured and show any keenness to emulate this model
(Nye, 2006:9). Reversely, growth and development
, without western democracy[3] seems a particularly luring
‘package’ to various illiberal regimes across the developing world, and especially in Africa and the
Middle East
(Gill and Huang, 2006:20).
The ideology of self-determination and the inviolability of sovereignty which Beijing puts forth simultaneously, further attract those illiberal states which are worried in the light of a more interventionist West
[4] (Halper, 2010:31). The Beijing Consensus ‘
The Beijing Consensus’
(BJC) is a concept / theory, first discussed by Ramo (2004) and further developed by Halper (2010), which draws together the different aspects of Chinese soft power, delineates the powerful links between economic and soft power, and explains China’s muscle
. Ramo (2004:11-12) explains the three central theorem’s of the BJC: a) the key to development is ‘bleedingedge innovation’ to ‘create change that moves faster than the problems change creates’; b) fundamental need to shift development’s focus to individuals, their ‘quality-of-life’ with sustainability and equality as priorities; c) a security doctrine which stresses self-determination, through the use of leverage and asymmetry. Halper (2010:32) explains that deliberately or not: ‘
Beijing is inadvertently promoting a

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] most troublesome export: the example of the China model’
. While many Americans see the BJC as a challenge, an increasing number of nations, especially those ‘tired of others interfering’ see Beijing and the BJC as a great opportunity (Vogel, 2006:16).
(Sergio, Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires,
“The Relationship between China and
Latin America: Realities and Trends,” Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America, Wilson
Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//MM
SOFT POWER
During the last decade, China has successfully pursued an aggressive image-building policy.
Confucian globalism, the purported existence of a harmonious society, and the image of China as a multicultural country have proved to be useful rhetorical tools to gain support for China’s emerging economic and political global status.
Political discourse and the government’s promulgation of the idea of China’s “peaceful rising” try to counter negative perceptions about its military empowerment and growing international political influence. China has been successful in shaping a reputation as a responsible world leader.
As a result of high profile diplomacy, China is now perceived as a constructive power
committed to the maintenance of international peace and stability.4 In LAC, public opinion of China is positive.
When Chinese leaders speak out about their aims and goals in the region, they utilize concepts like growth, mutual benefits, non-interference in internal affairs and, most importantly, development. To Latin American reformers, progressives, and left-leaning political leaders, these precepts sound much better than the free trade policies or neoliberal trade approaches linked with hemispheric North–South economic asymmetries and high social costs
. One must remember that an essential element of
Latin American political culture is the refrain of political utopia. Intellectuals, leftist political forces, and social actors find this notion congenial, in contrast to the pragmatic views coming from the North and perceived as part of a negative agenda. Chinese discourse engenders a sense of an altruistic, revolutionary model. Political doctrine also provides a framework for understanding China’s use of diplomatic terms such as friendship, cooperation, and mutual benefit in order to shape a positive agenda on both sides.
For instance, recent attempts to recast state-private sector relationships in LAC are similar to China’s “state capitalism” model in which the state—not the market—maintains high regulatory power over the economy. Leadership style is another point of mutual identification.
China’s
“fourth generation” political leadership’s social and economic priorities—such as welfare needs, income redistribution, social stability, environmental sustainability, and anti-corruption campaigns—are similar to the main goals pursued by Latin American political leaders in their respective nations. For China, official and non-official diplomacy are two sides of the same coin, as evidenced by the relationship between China and Latin American political parties. The Chinese Communist Party (ChCP) has historical relations with traditional Latin American parties such as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico), the Justicialista party (Argentina), the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Peru), and the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua).
These country’s political experiences provide a good empirical model for transitional ruling parties like ChCP in discussing the role that it will play in the coming decades. Given new social conditions in China, ChCP’s self-characterization as a “progressive” party
(so denominated by President Hu) also provides common ground for an inter-party dialogue with Latin
America’s left-oriented political forces in order to improve south–south relationships, reach consensus on international issues, facilitate contacts between younger leaders, and promote mutual political affinities.
(Mark P.—Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-large to Combat Trafficking in
Persons at the US Department of State, “The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama” World Affairs
Journal, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/world/valuevalues-soft-power-under-obama/p26212)//MM

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
The Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power
, particularly in its relations with three countries—Iran, Russia, and Egypt— where it might have made a difference not only for those countries but for American interests as well
. His reaction to the challenges these countries have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power itself that Obama doubts, but America’s moral standing to project it.
Perhaps the most striking example of a lost opportunity to use moral soft power was in Iran. In March 2009, President Obama made an appeal in a video to Iran for a “new beginning” of diplomatic engagement. In April 2009, he said in an address in Prague that in trying to stem Iran’s nuclear arms efforts, his administration would “seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect.” Two months later questions arose about President Ahmadinejad claiming victory over Mir Hussein Moussavi in the presidential election on June 12th. Within three days, there were large demonstrations in Tehran, Rasht, Orumiyeh, Zahedan, and Tabriz.
As Iranians took to the streets, Obama had to choose whether to associate the US with the protestors or preserve what he appeared to believe was a possible channel of dialogue with Ahmadinejad on Iran’s nuclear program. For several days, the American president deliberately refused to embrace the Green Movement swelling in Iran’s streets to protest a stolen election—reaching up to three million in Tehran alone.
Temporizing, he said, “It is up to Iranians to make decisions about who Iran’s leaders will be. We respect Iranian sovereignty and want to avoid the United States being the issue inside of Iran.”
But it was inevitable that the US would be scapegoated by Iranian leaders for meddling, even if it chose moral inaction. As Council on Foreign
Relations President Richard Haass wrote in Newsweek seven months later: “I am a card-carrying realist on the grounds that ousting regimes and replacing them with something better is easier said than done. . . . Critics will say promoting regime change will encourage Iranian authorities to tar the opposition as pawns of the West. But the regime is already doing so. Outsiders should act to strengthen the opposition and to deepen rifts among the rulers. This process is underway . . . . Even a realist should recognize that it’s an opportunity not to be missed.”
Eventually, probably as a result of the influence of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose opposition to Iran’s leadership she established as a senator, administration policy became more forthright. A year after the protests began, the president signed into law targeted sanctions on the
Revolutionary Guard. Yet failing to clearly side with Ahmadinejad’s opponents in 2009 represented a serious loss of US credibility. It also failed to encourage the moral “change” that Obama had appeared to invoke during his campaign. Soft power and its ability to strengthen the protest movement was squandered.
Early and active US backing for a more unified opposition might have buoyed and strengthened the Green opposition and helped it to better take advantage of subsequent divisions in the regime: parliamentarians petitioning to investigate payoffs to millions of people to vote for
Ahmadinejad, friction between Ahmadinejad and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and efforts by the Revolutionary Guard to assert prevalence over politics.
By supporting the opposition in Iran through soft power, the administration would not only have associated the US with the aspirations of the people in the streets of Tehran but also advanced the objective of dislodging a potentially nuclear rogue state.
It is particularly ironic that Obama policy toward Russia should have eschewed the projection of soft power given that the NSC’s senior director for Russia and Eurasia, Michael McFaul, is the administration official most closely identified in his career with the cause of democracy promotion. In Advancing Democracy Abroad , published just last year, he writes, “
The American president must continue to speak out in support of democracy and human rights. Shying away from the ‘d’ word . . . would send a terrible signal to the activists around the world fighting for human rights and democratic change. . . .
American diplomats must not check their values at the door.
” In the book, McFaul offers an ambitious vision linking values to stability for Russia and Eurasia: “In Eurasia, a democratic Russia could become a force for regional stability . . . not unlike the role that
Russia played in the beginning of the 1990s. A democratic Russia seeking once again to integrate into Western institutions also would cooperate more closely with the United States and Europe on international security issues.”
But in its haste to “hit the reset button” on bilateral relations, the Obama White House ignored McFaul’s counsel. Instead of approaching the
Russians with a set of firm moral expectations, the administration has courted President Medvedev as a counterweight to Putinism (missing the fact that rather than a countervailing force, Medvedev was, as noted in a US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Robin to Putin’s Batman).
As events would show, Medvedev offered no real obstacle to Putin’s resumption of the presidency after a hiatus as prime minister to satisfy term limit laws. Nor, for that matter, is there any significant difference in policy between the Medvedev era and that which preceded it in terms of issues such as the occupation of Georgian territory, internal corruption, or silencing remaining independent media or business figures.
Instead of establishing a foundation of clear principles in his reset of relations with the Putin regime, President Obama has seen relations with
Russia in terms of a larger picture of strategic arms control. He believes proliferators like Iran and North Korea can be restrained if the major nuclear powers reduce their stockpiles, in fealty to the premises of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Hence, the New START Treaty was his singular focus with Russia and the grounds for his appeasement of Putinism. He seems never to have considered asserting a soft power that would have signaled to Russian opposition figures like Boris Nemtsov—badly beaten in December 2010 after flying home from speaking in the US—that the US places little trust in bargains with leaders shredding the rule of law in their daily governance.
The Russian security state has chosen to cooperate with the US in a few areas it has concluded are in its own interest. It allowed passage of a watered-down UN Security Council resolution 1929, imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, and cancelled plans to sell the S-300 air defense system to the Ahmadinejad regime. It has also cooperated on counterterrorism and US military access to Afghanistan. Yet would the
United States have been unable to secure this discrete cooperation without “checking our values at the door,” in Michael McFaul’s phrase?
The United States has achieved no cooperation from Russian leaders on issues such as the rule of law and an end to systematic intimidation and the arrests of opposition, press, and business figures, and indeed threats to American businesses’ private property rights and safety. Leaders of the Solidarity opposition movement continue to be detained, environmental nonprofits continue to be raided for trumped-up tax and software piracy irregularities, lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in detention, and journalist Oleg Kashin was, like Boris Nemtsov, beaten.
There is no evidence of concerted bilateral pressure by the Obama administration to protest Russian unwillingness to protect freedoms for its citizens.
The lack of linkage between “realist” hard-power issues (such as nonproliferation) and domestic

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] values (such as the rule of law) has limited rather than increased US influence with Russia.
The Carnegie
Endowment’s Matthew Rojansky and James Collins rightly conclude: “If the United States erects an impenetrable wall between bilateral cooperation and Russia’s domestic politics, the Kremlin will simply conclude Washington is willing to give ground on transparency, democracy, and rule of law in order to gain Russian cooperation on nonproliferation, Afghanistan, and other challenges.” Indeed, in June 2011, the undeterred Russian regime barred Nemtsov’s People’s Freedom Party from running in the December 2011 parliamentary elections.
President Obama has selected Michael McFaul to be his ambassador to Russia. Sadly, dispatching the first non-diplomat in that role in three decades, not to mention a man whose vision of a just Russian policy for the US is at odds with the administration’s own practice, is unlikely to dislodge this values-free approach.
(Mark P.—Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-large to Combat Trafficking in
Persons at the US Department of State, “The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama” World Affairs
Journal, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/world/valuevalues-soft-power-under-obama/p26212)//MM
Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions, and the rise of
China, India, Brazil, and other new players
on the international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability to confront terrorism, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, pandemic disease, mass atrocity, or tyranny
.
Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it, “the indispensible nation.”
Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role as catalyst.
That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of America’s foreign policy assets
— particularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egypt— suggests that he feels the country has so declined, not only in real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft power
. In the
1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy.
Applying it,
President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies, pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the
Philippines) to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in
Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down—over Foggy Bottom objections.
This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.
For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for
Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrain’s, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside other ones.
To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to be
China.
Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast.
When the American president has no problem with France combining hard and soft power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jonah, freelance writer and researcher, Kirsten, PhD student in Latin American history at Yale University, “Spotlighting U.S. Soft-Power in Latin America” Jan 15 2007, https://nacla.org/news/spotlighting-us-soft-power-latin-america)//MM
While the U.S imperial presence has emerged as a more or less acknowledged fact of the 21st century, popular references to U.S. power often gloss over a complex, amorphous system of organization and domination.1 What debate and discussion of empire there is in the United States has been almost entirely confined to its most pronounced, military expressions.
Yet in terms of the actual administration and continuation of the current global order, the military occupation of foreign territories is looking more and more like an Achilles’ heel.
And while the Bush Administration is clearly not averse to deploying “hard power,” it has also expanded key civil and political mechanisms
—“soft power”— in order to safeguard U.S. interests worldwide.
The “promotion of democracy,” for example, emerged as a central expression of U.S. soft power during the Reagan Administration. In 1983,
Reagan launched the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), with the mandate to “foster the infrastructure of democracy” around the world. “I just decided that this nation, with its heritage of Yankee traders, ought to do a little selling of the principles of democracy,” Reagan explained in a speech at the Endowment’s inauguration.2 Since then, the NED and other democracy-promoting governmental and nongovernmental institutions have intervened successfully on behalf of “democracy”—actually a very particular form of low-intensity democracy chained to pro-market economics—in countries from Nicaragua to the Philippines, Ukraine to Haiti, overturning unfriendly
“authoritarian” governments (many of which the United States had previously supported) and replacing them with handpicked pro-market allies.
Over the past 20 years, the “Yankee traders” at the NED and elsewhere have expanded “democracy promotion” into a multibillion-dollar global industry. As President George W. Bush correctly pointed out to members of the International Republican Institute (IRI, a key U.S. democracypromoting institution) last year, “the business of promoting democratic change” is a “growth industry.”3
Like many other industries in the United States and Europe—and despite passionate rhetoric praising the efficiency of unregulated markets— the “democracy business” is highly subsidized. In 1980, the United States and the European Union each spent $20 million on democracy-related foreign aid. By 2001, this had risen to $571 million and $392 million, respectively. In 2006 the United States is projected to spend $2 billion on
“democracy assistance,” while in 2003—the latest figures available—the EU spent $3.5 billion.4
By combining cooptation, coercion and deep pockets, groups like the NED and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have at times allied themselves with antidemocratic elites, and at other times capitalized on movements and individuals that were genuinely dedicated to democratizing their countries, setting the parameters of the debate by positioning a particular definition of pro-market representative democracy as the only antiauthoritarian option.
U.S. and European organizations have disbursed massive amounts of money, funding some groups and projects while ignoring others, favoring those who share their general ideological conceptions while isolating those that do not
. There is very little transparency involved in the process. Thanks to serious limitations in freedom-of-information legislation in the United States and elsewhere, curious parties have trouble tracing grants that are often passed along a chain of sub-grantees. Accurate information about which groups receive funding and why is extremely hard to come by.
Of course,
First World governments clearly have a large stake in the spread of a particular kind of democracy
. That’s because, as a former assistant secretary of defense suggests in a recent book for the Council on Foreign Relations,
“contrary to what some believe, democracy and capitalism do not spread inexorably on their own.”5 The statement could, perhaps, be restated to say, “capitalist democracy does not spread inexorably on its own.”
In Latin America, however
, a new generation of left and center-left leaders is challenging U.S. power in the region and experimenting with home-grown alternatives to the Washington Consensus of restrictive democracies and elite-based economics
.
These movements are
articulating more expansive conceptions of both economic and political life, demanding
(and in some cases practicing) the democratization of both
, as Zander Navarro notes in these pages.
This cresting “pink tide” has already radically turned around Venezuela and Bolivia, with Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay and Brazil cautiously moving in similar directions
. And more than any other single year, 2006 brought this hemispheric political shift into focus, with 10 presidential elections in the region
—all of which included credible challenges to U.S. interests.
Most of these left and quasi-left leaders (and the national interests they represent) are actually quite compatible with

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] capitalist democracy on their own
. But the leftward shift represents not just the election of cooptable presidents, but the radicalization of the citizens who voted for them
.
The 2006 electoral cycle, then, seemed a tremendously charged moment in two key respects. The year promised intriguing and dramatic changes in Latin America’s political climate, with progressive movements mounting strong and successful challenges in a number of the region’s most critical elections. On the flip side, however, Latin America’s shift to the left was widely interpreted as a threat by the Bush Administration.
Considering the volatility
—and the stakes— of this political moment, we felt that some serious debate and discussion about
“ pro-democracy” interventions were in order
.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Jonah, freelance writer and researcher, Kirsten, PhD student in Latin American history at Yale University, “Spotlighting U.S. Soft-Power in Latin America” Jan 15 2007, https://nacla.org/news/spotlighting-us-soft-power-latin-america)//MM
Our interest in these issues, and our awareness that they would likely never make it into the mainstream media, spurred us to organize an academic conference in order to generate a more serious and theoretical discussion about U.S. democracy promotion in the context of Latin
America’s leftward turn.
With questions and criticisms of our own, we sought to create a space in which both proponents and dissenters could address certain questions: What is the link, if one exists, between
U.S. political policies and U.S. economic policies toward Latin America? Why has the U.S. policy of democracy promotion provoked criticism from certain Latin American leaders, civil society groups and general publics? Is critics’ use of the term “intervention” misplaced in this discussion, or not? What sorts of social and political movements does democracy promotion encourage, and which does it discourage or ignore? And, finally, does the recent rise to power of leaders whose views diverge from the Washington Consensus stand as a measure of democracy promotion’s failure, or of its success?
We wanted to hold a debate, but one in which marginalized (but by no means marginal) critical positions were fairly represented; for this reason, we gave the event the provocative title “In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Electoral Intervention in the Americas.” The idea was to bring
“democracy promoters” and their critics together; we hoped that instead of both sides speaking into the wind, they could actually speak to each other. It seemed simple enough on paper.
But dragging representatives from the various ends of this highly polarized debate into a room together turned out to be no mean feat. The leading critics of democracy promotion, some of them already our friends and colleagues, were relatively easy to enlist; the practitioners and proponents of democracy promotion, however, were more difficult to convince. In several confidential conversations with individuals we had asked to be panelists (and who declined), we were accused of setting up “an ideological trap,” of being “inflammatory,” of inviting critics whose published works were supposedly “sheer fantasy” with “no commitment to the truth” and informed that the presence of certain of our more critical colleagues had significantly “chilled” the response of the Washington community to what otherwise might have been a well-received— i.e., moderate—event.
As organizers, we genuinely sought to begin a high-level and public discussion that, as far as we could tell, wasn’t taking place in Washington’s boardrooms
. It was frustrating, yet telling, to discover the extent to which certain sectors were uninterested in having that discussion, and to see the ways in which the very idea of a trenchant debate was dismissively labeled a
“trap.” The democracy promoters who did agree to come represented their positions with grace and aplomb, and engaged in an honest and direct interchange of ideas with their opponents. But the road to that interchange was, unfortunately, paved with rejection letters from other members of “the Washington community.”
The conference took place at Yale University—hardly the world’s most subversive location—in April 2006, and once we were finally able to get everyone into the auditorium together, the discussion was extremely lively.
Panelists debated the very meaning of democracy, the long history of U.S. interventions in Latin America, the issue of American credibility on the world stage, the implications of the 2006 electoral cycle in the hemisphere, and more. Because of the depth of the conversation and its timeliness, NACLA—whose Contributing Editor Fred Rosen participated in the conference as a moderator—graciously invited us to share this discussion by devoting this Report to our special forum on democracy promotion.
This Report, “In the Name of Democracy,” features seven of our conference panelists—Greg Grandin, Jorge I. Domínguez, William I. Robinson,
Michael Coppedge, Zander Navarro, Bryant Garth and Héctor Mondragón—who agreed to rework their panel presentations into short essays for this issue. Grandin and Domínguez establish a historical context for the debates, while Robinson and Coppedge’s incisive, and competing, analyses of the contested definitions of terms such as “democracy,” “intervention” and “polyarchy” establish a theoretical context for the contributors’ broader discussions. These broader discussions address the failure of the Washington Consensus to protect economic rights in
Latin America; the United States’ low credibility when it comes to promoting democracy; the role of local Latin American elites in inviting U.S. political and economic collaboration; the mechanics by which democracy promotion is actually conducted; and the need for socially responsive forms of democratic governance that respond to the stated desires of Latin American publics.
In our continuing efforts to make these discussions public and open, we hope that policy makers and critics from across the political spectrum will become increasingly motivated to participate and to engage one another’s ideas, not only within Washington but also across the North-
South divide. The very nature of the democratic ideal demands that any efforts in the name of “democracy,” whatever one’s definition of the term, take place in the open air, with the full light of scrutiny upon them.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, “China in Latin America:
Hegemonic Challenge?” NOREF—Norwegian Peace-building Resource Centre, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf)//MM
Introduction
Ever since
President James
Monroe
’s 1823 declaration that European powers must respect the western hemisphere as the U.S. sphere of influence, the United States has been the dominant economic, political and military power in Latin America.
As such, it has faced a series of challengers, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union and Japan.
In the last two decades, the rise of the
People’s Republic of China (
PRC
) has been reshaping the politics and economics of the region.
How far has the PRC become the new hegemonic challenger? China has not sought a strategic confrontation with the United States in Latin America, as the USSR did in the Cold War. However, against the background of U.S.–China rivalry and potential confrontation over such issues as Taiwan, this could change in the future
.
In the meantime, China’s economic weight offers its Latin American partners a new freedom to defy U.S. interests
, should they choose to.
China plays three major roles in Latin America: as an insatiable consumer of commodities; as an exporter of cheap manufactured goods; and as a lender and investor.
The region’s importance to a rising China is underpinned by its resources: Latin America has the world’s largest reserves of silver, at 49% of the global total, copper, at 44%, and tin, at 33%. It also has at least 16% of the global oil reserves and the largest quantity of arable land in the world. China plays a flexible hand in different countries, within the framework of a regional strategy. Although China’s policy papers treat Latin America as a region, this does not get in the way of China’s ability to work with local differences in pursuit of its objectives: in
Venezuela, for instance, China offers large loans in exchange for oil, whereas in Peru it favours direct investment in the mining sector.
One of
China’s political objectives is to further the OneChina policy, which states that diplomatic relations with the PRC require a country to break official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan)
, as discussed, for example, in China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025. htm).
More than half of the countries in the world that still recognise the ROC are in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Costa Rica’s recognition of the PRC in 2007 was followed by the Chinese purchase of
US$300 million in Costa Rican bonds, an investment of $74 million in a football stadium in the capital and, in 2012, a free trade agreement.
Similar packages are on offer, no doubt, for other nations willing to switch. China has tried to foster good relations around the world to facilitate its smooth ascendancy to great power status. In Latin America, this creates a delicate balance between national interests and the desire to avoid prematurely antagonising the United States.
China sees Asia as its own sphere of influence
, and the Obama administration’s “pivot” – a “rebalancing” of U.S. foreign policy towards Asia – has raised hackles in Beijing
.
The PRC, until now, has been willing to tread carefully in the U.S. backyard
, promoting soft power but playing down specific political challenges to the U.S., including from its Latin American partners. Resource exports China’s primary resources imports are largely concentrated in four countries: Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru, which together account for 90% of the region’s exports to China. Agricultural products make up 30% of those exports, according to the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), with about 65% in minerals and resources. for China’s trade partners, the risks are resource dependency, currency overvaluation and the possibility that other sectors of their economies will become uncompetitive. It also renders them highly vulnerable to price and demand fluctuations, whilst tethering them to unsustainable commodity-led growth with the associated negative environmental impacts. few partner countries are investing sufficiently in economic, social or environmental protection to offset these risks. Chile is the only nation in Latin America that has used its revenues to create a sovereign wealth fund. Chile’s Pension Reserve fund and its Economic and Social Stabilization fund have total assets of more than $21 billion, the latter supporting the national budget when copper prices are low. China’s dependency on relatively few regional suppliers also carries risks for China. The total of soy and iron exports from
Latin America to China represent more than half of China’s imports of these commodities, offering the producer countries the potential to act as a bloc, were they so inclined.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”
NDU Press, 1 st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM
Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan.
For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbea n.
Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC,
China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the
PRC could bring.
When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of
$300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to
Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee.
In part, such Chinese generosity was directed toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their diplomatic posture.13
Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of economic incentives to competitively "bid" for diplomatic recognition, since Costa Rica's switch, the allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing diplomatic posture by Panama nian president Richard Martenelli,
Paraguay an president Fernando Lugo, and
Salvador an president Maricio Fuenes—although all did so prior to assuming office.
(LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University,
Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin,
“Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America” April 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM
Latin America has been a major battleground of the “foreign policy war” between China and Taiwan over international legitimacy, recognition, and status. China’s quest to recover what it calls “the province of Taiwan’’ is one of the top issues on its foreign policy agenda
. Its strategy against Taiwan has been both bilateral and global. Bilaterally, China has used a mix of economic diplomacy and military and political moves to keep Taiwan from claiming independence.
Globally, China’s strategy has focused on developing an international united front designed to marginalize Taiwan.
Fearing Taiwan’s push for international recognition will lead to its declaration of independence,
Beijing is determined to contain Taiwan in every corner of the world, especially in Central America and the
Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan. Of the 23 countries that recognize Taiwan, twelve are in Latin
America and the Caribbean. If these states were to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the damage to Taiwan’s political confidence and its claims of legitimacy as a state would be seriously undermined.
Taiwan has 23 million people and well protected territory.
Yet, of the United Nations’ 193 member states, only 23 recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.
According to then-prime minister of Taiwan Yu Shyi-kun in 2002,
Taiwan’s allies in Latin America and the Caribbean “have helped us a lot and therefore we consider this an area of maximum diplomatic importance.”
2 Under such circumstances, the strategic competition between China and Taiwan has been intensified in a region far away from Asia.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University,
Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin,
“Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America” April 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM
COMPETITION
One of the main goals of Taiwan’s foreign policy is to maintain full diplomatic relations wherever possible. To achieve this goal, Taiwan’s government has been promoting trade
and investment, offering economic assistance and increasing international agreements. Twenty years ago, Taiwan sold more goods to Latin America than mainland China did. Yet today, Taiwan’s trade with the region is lagging far behind that of China.
In order to reinforce diplomatic relations and take advantage of Central American countries’ close economic ties with the United States under the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), Taiwan has been embracing free trade agreements (FTAs) with the nations in the region. So far,
Taiwan has achieved some limited success. Three countries have entered into FTAs with Taiwan. All three are Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in
Central America—Panama, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Taiwan is also in FTA negotiations with Honduras and El Salvador, another two of its 23 diplomatic allies. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Taipei want to sign an FTA with Paraguay, the only ally of Taipei in South America.
China is a relatively new player to Latin America. Both its trade and investment have soared there since the late
1990s. Sino-Latin American trade reached $50 billion in 2005, with China emerging as the region’s third largest trading partner. China is also investing more in Latin America than any region outside
Asia
. In addition, since 2004 China has deployed peacekeeping forces in Haiti. China has participated in peacekeeping missions in many parts of the world, but has never sent combat troops as peacekeepers.3 It should be noted that Haiti does not have diplomatic ties with the PRC.
Beijing-Taipei competition for recognition demands a greater share of financial resources.
Huge amounts of
Chinese aid to Latin American countries have often prompted Taiwanese offers of even greater aid in an attempt to compete directly with
China and to offset Chinese influence. Beijing states that China has provided Caribbean countries with economic assistance without any preconditions. Nonetheless, all these recipient nations maintain full diplomatic relations with the PRC. With its middle class increasing, China has become the world’s fastest growing tourism source nation in the world. To further relations with the region, Beijing is also working to encourage its citizens to tour Latin America. Six Latin American nations have gained Approved Destination Status (ADS) from the Chinese government, with Cuba being the first one in 2003. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile followed in 2004, and Mexico and Peru in 2005. In the
Caribbean, China has listed Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Dominica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and
Jamaica as tourist destinations.
For years, Taiwan defined itself as “free China,” the democratic counterpart to
“Communist China.” As China liberalizes and increases its integration with the global economy, the contrast is not quite as sharp as before
. Meanwhile, there are significant changes in Chinese foreign policy. With the end of the
Cold War, Beijing is concerned with exporting goods and services rather than exporting revolution. As a result, promoting regional economic development and stability have become one of the major policy goals of Beijing in Latin America. As David M. Lampton, director of China
Studies at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies observed, although other nations generally do not wish to emulate China’s political sys-tem, its combination of high-speed economic growth and apparent stability is a development path that appeals to many.4
(LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University,
Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin,
“Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America” April 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM
IMPLICATIONS Indeed
, the increased profile of the
People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in Latin America and its partnerships with Latin American countries have a number of implications.
The Chinese presence has increased pressure on Taiwan to maintain its formal diplomatic presence in Latin America. Given that Latin American states now seek to play an increased role in the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, they are inclined to seek a closer relationship with the PRC
, one of the permanent five in the UN Security Council. The PRC has major resource interests in Latin America, and the region could help China mitigate its severe shortage of energy. Chinese active pursuit of energy in the region has political implications as well.
According to Taiwanese professor of international trade Antonio Hsiang,
China’s expanding energy purchases in South
America will have a negative impact on Taiwan’s relations with its diplomatic allies
.5

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
For instance, Paraguay, a member of the South American Common Market (Mercosur), is surrounded by other member countries of Mercosur, including Brazil and Argentina, all of whom have diplomatic relations with China. Argentina acknowledged it had teamed up with Brazil to try to force Paraguay into switching its diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing.6
Latin America has found the rivalry between
China and Taiwan beneficial; it has been able to obtain loans, credits, trade concessions, and investments from both the PRC and Taiwan as it has attempted to play one against the other. The growing influence of the PRC could lead to tension with the United States, given that Latin America is a region where many countries heavily depend on the United States for trade and investment.
At the same time, deep-rooted anti-U.S. feeling persists. China’s growing dependency on imported oil and gas has put it at odds with U.S. foreign policy in countries such as Venezuela. As China turns into a growth engine, a growing number of countries are benefiting from its tremendous economic development, and are reluctant to antagonize Beijing. Latin Americans themselves have no problem viewing investments by and trade with Asian powers such as China and Taiwan in their countries as a counterbalance to the United States. With the Western powers caring little about poor countries, some in Latin America have begun to see China and Taiwan as potential trade allies and partners, as well as providers of economic opportunities. Latin America has found the rivalry between China and Taiwan beneficial; it has been able to obtain loans, credits, trade concessions and investments from both the PRC and Taiwan as it has attempted to play one against the other. China’s rapid economic growth and its huge potential market have contributed to greater willingness in Latin America to explore alternative arrangements.
China might have a confrontation with the United States in some places in the world, but definitely not in Latin America, a region long considered the backyard of the United States. Beijing has approached many international issues more from a pragmatic than a principled standpoint. Chinese foreign policy has shown dramatic changes that underscore Beijing’s putting a priority on economic growth and on assuming a larger role in regional and global affairs. Beijing has tried to fit into the U.S.-dominant international system as a “responsible stakeholder,” as suggested by then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 2005. In the Western Hemisphere, China has begun to participate in multilateral for a where the United State has heretofore played a prominent role, such as the Organization of American
States (OAS). In China’s backyard, the United States has played a critical role over the issue of political/ security interactions across the Taiwan
Strait. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington could help maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
On the other hand, Beijing worries that in the diplomatic rivalry between Taiwan and China, Washington still favors Taiwan and prevents China from developing full diplomatic relations with Latin American countries.
In addition, Beijing believes that Washington has a hidden agenda to prevent China from becoming a full member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
China’s growing influence in the region may compel Washington to pay greater attention to Latin
American and Caribbean leaders when they complain about the neglect from Washington.
PROSPECTS The struggle between Taiwan and China for international recognition is likely to intensify this year, because this the year China will host the
Olympics and the year Taiwan might make major moves toward statehood or state-like status. Taiwan has competed and will compete well with the PRC over a small number of countries on its aid program list, utilizing a large amount of foreign reserves and an increasing number of
FTAs.
For Taiwan, Latin America is crucial due to the fact that slightly more than half of the countries with which Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations are in this area
. For the PRC, Latin America has become increasingly important, but still it is regarded as a region of relatively low priority for the pursuit of its grand strategy. Latin America and the
Caribbean represented 3.5 percent of China’s total foreign trade in 2004, and this percentage has remained consistent over the years. China has moved cautiously from a radical to a more pragmatic approach to achieve its goals in Latin America, and is expanding in the region quietly and cautiously. Without any doubt, China will certainly assume an increasingly important role in Latin America. However, China is still a long way from threatening or even really competing with the influence of the United States in Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than Sino-Latin America trade. The struggle between Taiwan and China for international recognition is likely to intensify this year, because this is the year China will host the
Olympics and the year Taiwan might make major moves toward statehood or state-like status. In the future,
China’s growing involvement could have serious political and military implications.
At present, the most important dimension in the relations between China and Latin America is no doubt economic.
China will continue leveraging its economic clout in the region to support its political preferences, pressing countries to fall in line regarding its top foreign policy priority: its claims over Taiwan. Over the long run, due to China’s growing economic might and soft power, as well as the changing dynamics of Latin American domestic politics, it might become increasingly difficult for Taiwan to compete with the PRC in Latin America.
(Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, “China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, and Africa” April
2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE The exact level of China’s foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean is uncertain, but reportedly the region receives about 10% of China’s foreign aid worldwide, far behind assistance that China reportedly provides to Asia and Africa.54
Aid to the region appears to focus on bilateral assistance rather than through regional or multilateral institutions, with the objectives of strengthening diplomatic relations and isolating Taiwan.
55 Particularly in the Caribbean and Central America,
China has used assistance in recent years as part of its checkbook diplomacy to entice countries in the region to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, while a number of countries in the region have been adept at playing the two countries against each other in order to maximize financial benefits
. As noted above, Chinese assistance to Dominica and Grenada was instrumental in those countries deciding to switch diplomatic recognition. Costa Rica was also rumored to have been offered substantial assistance, although Costa
Rican officials maintain the prospect of increase trade and investment was the primary rationale for the switch. In preparation for the Cricket
World Cup 2007 played in the Caribbean, China provided assistance and workers to build cricket stadiums in Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada,
Jamaica, and even St. Lucia, which subsequently switched its diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan. China also had built a cricket stadium in
Dominica in 2004. China also has provided assistance for housing, education (including scholarships as well as the construction of schools), health (including the construction of hospitals), and other infrastructure such as railways and highways. In recent years, China also has provided additional types of assistance to the region, including disaster assistance, debt forgiveness, and concessional loans. In the aftermath of such natural disasters as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes, China often has responded with assistance. For example, China provided hurricane reconstruction assistance to Grenada in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan in 2004. In August 2007, China provided support to Peru in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in the southern part of that country. While most of China’s debt forgiveness has been for low-income
African countries, China announced in July 2007 that it would write off over $15 million in debt owed by Guyana, one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere.56 In terms of concessional loans, China’s Export-Import Bank provided a $12 million loan to Jamaica in the water sector in
2000. In addition to Jamaica, China has signed concessional loan framework agreements with three other countries in the region— Suriname,
Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago.57 In September 2007, China announced that it woul d provide about $530 million in favorable loans over three years to Chinese companies investing in the Caribbean.58 In early November 2007, China and Venezuela agreed to establish a joint development fund (with a $4 billion contribution from China and a $2 billion contribution from Venezuela) that would be used to finance loans for infrastructure, energy, and social projects in both nations.59 China also has increased student and educational exchanges with the region. In
2006, it established the first Confucius Institute in the region, in Mexico City, with the goal of promoting Chinese language and culture. While the lack of data on Chinese foreign assistance going to the region makes it impossible to compare Chinese and U.S. assistance levels, it is safe to assume that U.S. assistance is far greater. Looking at 2005 statistics comparing foreign assistance levels from developed countries to Latin
America and the Caribbean, the United States was by far the single largest bilateral donor to the region, accounting for 29% of the $4.6 billion in bilateral assistance.60

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Robbie Ferguson, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, 7-23-2012, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/
In political terms too;
the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that
China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China.
It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market.
Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC
“has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position.
Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the
PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding.
Indeed by the start of 1998
“the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,”
[58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶
Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in
Latin America, the US
A
would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the
Taiwan Strait.
A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the
West.
As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and
Taiwan, so might its ambitions.
The U.S.
A
might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand
the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.
William Lowther, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS – many of them are familiar with its work – 3-16-2013, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US
, a new academic report concludes. “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and
China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS
’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study
, the report emphasizes
that
Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while
at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense
. “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible
, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements
,” the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the
US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a
Taiwan crisis
. “
This is a
classic recipe for
surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,”
Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future
Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor
, because
the fate of the island is intertwined
both with the legitimacy of the C hinese
C ommunist
P arty and the reliability of US defense commitments
in the Asia-Pacific region.”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Lee J., Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. “The Chinese-Taiwanese
Conflict – Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America”
2009, http://www.lamp-method.org/ecommons/hunkovic.pdf
)
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war
, therefore, many countries
other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the U nited
S tates and China are the
two most dominant
members.
If China were
able to
successfully annex
Taiwan
, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism
in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat
. In any case, if China and the U nited
S tates engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected
by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, “China in Latin America:
Hegemonic Challenge?” NOREF—Norwegian Peace-building Resource Centre, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf)//MM
U.S. reaction The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to date to China’s increasing presence in Latin
America. In a striking acknowledgement of China’s importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for mutual transparency through the U.S.– China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintao’s visit to
Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded China’s standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to China’s action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign. The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished fears of Chinese competition for the region’s energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian markets, and China’s success in locking up the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than 50% of its oil to the
U.S., down from 80% in the past. There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of
Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about China’s still modest military sales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuela’s 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from
China.
Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles to the “China threat”.
Regardless of whether there is any real “threat” to the U.S., key decision-makers have not reacted
. China’s presence in Latin
America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future
. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region
, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasing competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China
Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard
. At that point, the traditional Latin
American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.
(Joshua, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Charm
Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (Yale University Press, 2007), “China’s
Latin Leap Forward,” Portions of this article are drawn from South of the Border: China’s Strategic
Engagement in Latin America and Its Implications for the United States, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/latin_leap.pdf)//MM
In fall 2004, the president of China, Hu Jintao, embarked upon a trip to Latin America that sometimes seemed more a coronation than a diplomatic offensive. In Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Argentina, Hu was received with the highest honors of a state guest, while local legislators battled to hold receptions for him and for the delegation of Chinese businesses searching for new investments in the region. Latin businesspeople hosted Hu at barbeques and welcomed him into their factories. Latin leaders recognized China as a market economy, one of
Beijing’s major goals, and lavished praise on Hu, with the Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, announcing, “We want a partnership that integrates our economies and serves as a paradigm for South-South cooperation.” Hu also delivered concrete signs of China’s growing relationship with Latin America. The Chinese leader signed $30 billion worth of new investment deals, upgraded bilateral trade ties with Brazil and announced an “all-weather strategic partnership” with the Latin giant, and signed some 400 agreements with Latin American nations on a

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] range of topics. Shortly after Hu’s trip, Chinese vice president Zeng Qinghong led his own entourage of Chinese officials and business leaders to
Latin America, where they signed a new deal on oil and gas exploration with Caracas and offered Venezuela $700 million in credits. Hu’s grand tour of Latin America surprised many U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders, who have long considered the region the United States’ natural sphere of influence, and who have not contended with another external competitor in the region in decades. An article published in Foreign
Affairs wondered if Washington was “losing Latin America.” A Senate aide told the New York Times, “They’re taking advantage of it. They’re taking advantage of the fact that we don’t care as much as we should about Latin America.” Congress convened hearings to examine China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere, and the White House instituted a dialogue with China to explore the two powers’ aims in the region.
Behind China’s Offensive In truth, neither the accolades for Hu nor the fears of China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere accurately capture the current state of Beijing’s dynamic new engagement with Latin America. China clearly has a strategy designed to increase its influence in developing regions—Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America—because Beijing believes it can wield greater influence there than in developed nations in Northeast Asia, Europe, and the United States. China has enjoyed considerable success in achieving its initial goals in
Latin America, which include revamping Beijing’s global image, isolating Taiwan, and securing access to commodities, among other targets. At this point, China has made few difficult demands on countries in Latin America, so, for now, nations in the region get a free ride from China’s involvement, benefiting from aid, investment, and diplomacy without having to make significant sacrifices to win Beijing’s favor. Yet, as China expands its presence in Latin America, many of its policies could risk a backlash, lessening its ability to threaten U.S. interests in the region. Until the past decade, Chinese relations with Latin America were extremely limited, and Latin America generally was a low foreign policy priority.
China’s history of fomenting ideological revolution in the developing world alienated conservative governments in Latin America. After 1949,
Taiwan developed close links with, and established aid pipelines to, countries in the Western Hemisphere. Even Cuba, a fraternal communist country, was not close to Beijing. Though Cuba was the first Latin nation to recognize Communist China, Cuban leaders criticized Chinese policies at a public rally in 1965, and later complained about China’s move towards capitalist economics, with Fidel Castro memorably describing Deng Xiaoping as a “numbskull.” Havana and Beijing did not reestablish full ties until 1989. China’s leaders also felt little domestic pressure for a more outward-looking foreign policy. Still recovering from the Maoist era and focused on internal economic reforms, many
Chinese questioned China’s ability to become a regional power or even a global actor. A poll taken by the research organization Horizon Group in 1995 asked Chinese citizens their views of the “most prominent countries in the world”; one-third ranked the United States most prominent, with only 13 percent choosing China. Making relations tougher for China, Beijing was not a major aid donor and did not participate in Latin
America’s multilateral institutions. Until the late 1990s, China’s economy had little need for Latin American exports, which were largely commodities. In 1975, Sino-Latin American trade totaled only $476 million; even 15 years later, total twoway trade totaled less than $3 billion.
By 2001, some of the impediments to Chinese influence in Latin America had begun to disappear. Between the late 1970s and 2001, Beijing abandoned its support for communist insurgencies, established diplomatic relations with more than ten Latin nations, and opened its economy to the point that it began to require significant commodities imports. In 2003, China became the world’s second-largest importer of oil, after the United States, and the International Energy Agency estimates that China will import as many as 6.9 million barrels of oil per day by 2020, making it by far the largest consumer. Furthermore, as economic growth, state-sponsored nationalism, the initial outreach of Chinese businesses, and the spread of higher education in China created a worldlier, more confident citizenry, its population put pressure on the leadership for a more proactive foreign policy. Concurrently, China’s leadership itself was becoming more engaged with the world, as the generation of leaders around Deng, many of whom had never studied outside China, passed from the scene. In 2001, Jiang Zemin embarked upon the most ambitious Latin American trip undertaken by any Chinese leader. Jiang’s trip was followed by a series of high-level visits to Latin
America. Defense Minister Chi Haotian met with the Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces, and National People’s Congress chairman Li
Peng traveled to Uruguay, Argentina, and Cuba. At the same time, the Bush administration, which had come into office vowing to pay greater attention to Latin America, assigned the region a low priority after 9/11 and then further alienated many Latin American nations by appearing to tacitly support a 2002 coup attempt against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, a populist but elected leader. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one recent Zogby International poll of Latin American opinion leaders found that some 80 percent viewed President Bush unfavorably, and when
Bush visited Argentina in November 2005 to attend a trade summit, tens of thousands of protesters greeted him. China’s Goals and Strategies
Since 2001, China’s goals, strategies, and tools of influence in Latin America have come into clearer focus. As in its relations with developing regions like Southeast Asia, China has several obvious goals. China wants to ensure its access to the region’s oil, gas, copper, iron, and other important resources. Unlike most Western energy companies, which operate independently from the state and rely on global markets to set prices, many Chinese firms retain close ties to the government, which distrusts global energy markets. Chinese leaders fear that, in a conflict with the United States, Washington might be able to cut off international supply lanes or pressure American allies not to supply China.
Consequently, Chinese firms search for equity stakes in oil overseas and try to “secure the entire supply chain in critical industries,” according to one observer. 1 In other words, China wants to control the entire process, from oil field to tanker. And Latin America is the current center of
China’s global strategy. China also clearly seeks to diminish Taiwan’s formal and informal ties to Latin America, a region where Taiwan still retains formal links with Panama, Paraguay, and Guatemala, among others. In addition,
China wants nations that already recognize Beijing to not only adhere to the One China policy but also to prevent Taiwanese officials from participating in nongovernmental regional forums like the Organization of American States.
China also may wish to prevent governments from entering into bilateral free trade deals with the island.
Beijing also intends to promote itself as a benign, cooperative presence—as a different, more accommodating external power than the United States.
If China is perceived as a benign actor, as a nation that does not threaten the region economically or militarily, it will be easier for Beijing to expand trade, boost its diplomatic offensive, and even broaden military-military cooperation such as selling arms, securing strategic shipping lanes, and developing joint training programs with nations like Venezuela
. Ultimately,
Beijing might even be able to use its engagement with the region to diminish U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere
, or at least pressure Washington to commit more resources to the hemisphere— resources that might otherwise be deployed in

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Beijing’s backyard, Southeast and Northeast Asia
. The “Win-Win” Strategies China has adopted several strategies. First, its leaders enunciate a doctrine of “win-win” relations, highlighting that even as China rises to great power status it will not interfere or meddle in other countries’ internal affairs—a sharp contrast with the United States, which has a history of interventions in Latin America. Instead, Chinese leaders insist, Beijing will listen to other countries’ needs and craft responses accordingly. During the 2004 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Chile (APEC includes several Latin American nations), President Bush focused on counterterrorism cooperation and WMD proliferation. China focused on new investment in Latin America, generating favorable media coverage.2 China’s win-win rhetoric also capitalizes on the fact that elites and publics in newly democratic nations in the region, like Mexico, often resent U.S. criticism of their human rights records. When these countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes, pressure on human rights resonated favorably with democrats. But today some of the same democrats resent Washington’s censure, which they see as demeaning and failing to recognize their nations’ progress.
In Mexico, when U.S. officials criticized authorities for alleged use of torture,3 Beijing responded by initiating a discussion on human rights, implicitly designed to portray both China and Mexico as unfair targets of American criticism. As part of this strategy, Chinese leaders emphasize their empathetic understanding of issues confronting developing nations. In Brazil, Hu announced that China would always “stay on the side of the developing countries,” and Hu then met with the leaders of Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa in an attempt to build a broader alliance of leading developing countries.4 Lower-ranking officials constantly echo this message. In an address, National People’s Congress vice chairman
Cheng Siwei said, “both [China and Latin America] belong to the developing world and have identical or similar views on many issues.” Chinese officials also have cultivated close relations with Brazil at the World Trade Organization, positioning the two countries as champions of the developing world at the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun. Additionally, Chinese leaders portray their own country as a model of statedirected economic development that has delivered two decades of powerful growth. This can resonate in Latin America, where the neoliberal economic model touted by international financial institutions—the model known as “The Washington Consensus”—failed to deliver broad economic growth during the 1990s. Indeed, in a poll of the region taken in 2002, a mere 35 percent of Latin Americans said the state should allow the private sector to control economic activity, suggesting the level of frustration with neoliberal economics. Populist, state-centered, often antiAmerican movements burst into the forward in Venezuela, Bolivia, and other countries. Another study showed that support for democracy was declining sharply, with more than 50 percent of Latin Americans agreeing with the statement, “I wouldn’t mind if a non-democratic government came to power if it could solve economic problems”— sentiment that could prove consistent with China’s model of an economic opening combined with political control.5 China’s strategy also includes a focus on nations in the region whose bilateral relationships with
Washington are strained. This is most obvious in Venezuela, but it is also noticeable in Ecuador, where in December 2004—after Washington cut off military assistance when Quito would not agree to exempt U.S. soldiers from prosecution at the International Criminal Court—China invited Ecuadorian officials to Beijing and offered a pledge of new military assistance.6 Similarly, after the left-wing populist Evo Morales won the presidency in Bolivia late last year and Washington responded by proposing cuts in aid, China invited Morales to Beijing. There, he proclaimed China an “ideological ally” and asked it to help Bolivia develop its reserves of natural gas.7 China also has become what one observer called “a born-again multilateralist.” Though its older leaders viewed multilateral organizations as limiting China’s power, the generation under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao takes the opposite view—they see joining multilateral groups as a way to reduce fears of China.
Consequently, they have enthusiastically embraced regional multilateral groups, from the Organization of American States (where China is now an observer) to the Inter-American Development Bank (where China has applied for donor status). It does not hurt that, as Washington has paid less attention to regional multilateralism, Beijing’s participation has made it look better by comparison. As China has upgraded its strategy towards Latin America, it has honed specific tools of influence as well. China’s aid to Latin America, almost nonexistent ten years ago, now tops
$700 million per year, according to an analysis by the National Defense University. Beijing adds to its aid by forgiving or rolling over Latin
American debts, as it did with some $1 billion worth of Cuban debt. Much of this assistance goes towards infrastructure, such as railways in
Jamaica and Argentina.8 Some of this construction would benefit Chinese firms involved in extractive industries, but it also would address a critical need in a region contending with crumbling roads and ports. China’s aid also targets nations in the region where Taiwan has traditionally been an aid donor. In Dominica, formerly an ally of Taipei, the prime minister reportedly requested nearly $60 million in aid from Taiwan in
2004. When Taiwan provided Dominica with $9 million, China responded by offering the former British West Indian colony roughly twice as much, and Dominica switched recognition.9 Taiwan may offer a new package of $250 million in aid to Latin America, but it cannot match
China’s largesse, especially as Beijing’s currency reserves continue to grow.10 Along with aid, Beijing has encouraged its own companies in strategic industries to invest in Latin America. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation selected some 30 top Chinese companies to take the lead in overseas investment. As they look overseas, these national champions enjoy benefits that will help them compete, including low-interest funding from Chinese banks primarily controlled by the government. In 2004, for example, the consulting group Accenture reported that China Development Bank provided Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei with a
$10 billion low-cost loan to help it develop internationally competitive mobile phone sales. Beijing appears to be actively pressuring state-linked oil and gas firms to increase acquisitions overseas. In interviews with CLSA Asia Pacific Markets, a leading research company in China, stateowned resources firms acknowledged that Beijing had been pressuring them to invest abroad, though they insisted that their own management made the final decisions. Indeed, nearly 53 percent of China’s investment abroad in 2004 was concentrated in extractive industries.11 Owing to this focus on resources, commodity-rich Latin America received more Chinese investment in 2004 than any other region of the world.12 Since overall net foreign investment in Latin America had been falling, this Chinese investment is even more important. China’s embrace of free trade also burnishes its image. Some potential deals, like one with Mercosur, the South American free-trade bloc, will not be as comprehensive as any agreements signed by the United States, but Beijing can present itself as a faster-moving trade partner than Washington. And, being first to sign trade agreements with the most developed countries in a region, like Chile, serves a useful purpose. Since Chile is already open to foreign competition, it will not be drastically impacted by an FTA, allowing China to combat the impression that a trade deal means being flooded with cheap Chinese goods. China advertises its increased aid, investment, and trade agreements through effective public diplomacy, such as the promotion of Chinese language and cultural studies. Across Latin America, China is likely to establish Confucius Institutes, language and culture schools paid for by Beijing and set up at local universities. The results are evident: the number of Argentines studying Chinese reportedly tripled in 2005, and the new Mandarin program at the University of Buenos Aires has enrolled more than 1,000 students in two years.13 The new public diplomacy also includes setting up networks of informal summits and meetings, either in China or in Latin America, designed to bring together Chinese and Latin American opinion leaders. These summits allow China to subtly emphasize its role as a potential business partner and as a counterbalance to U.S. influence. These informal summits include the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum,

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] initiated by Beijing and attended last year by nearly 1,000 officials from China and the Caribbean, the Latin America-China Friendship Societies, and other forums.14 China’s formal diplomacy backstops this public diplomacy. For upwards of 15 years, Beijing has begun to retire older, more ideological diplomats, replacing them with a younger generation. As one recent case study found, beginning in the 1980s, Beijing began to upgrade the quality of its diplomats in the Western Hemisphere. It sent 110 young Chinese officials to a university in Mexico to learn Spanish. It improved the capacity of its own think tanks focusing on Latin America, rewarding specialists and ensuring that better research was available on the Western Hemisphere. And China kept its Latin America specialists focused on the region, so that someone like Jiang Yuande, China’s ambassador to Brazil in 2006, already had a 30-year tour around the Portuguese-speaking world in countries like Angola and Cape Verde.15
Measuring China’s Progress For now,
China’s strategies and tools of influence appear to be working.
Beijing has successfully decreased Taiwan’s formal and informal relationships in Latin America.
In addition to convincing
Dominica and Grenada to switch recognition,
China has opened commercial relations with Guatemala, often the first step towards switching recognition.16 China also has
opened a commercial office in Haiti, another Taiwanese ally, and kept Taiwan from obtaining observer status at the Organization of American States17
;
Haiti, Panama, and the Dominican Republic no longer support Taiwan’s presence in the United Nations
.18
Within a decade, Taiwan may well have no formal allies in Latin America. Beijing also has boosted trade ties.
Trade volumes between China and the hemisphere have grown from only $200 million in 1975 to roughly $50 billion in 2005, though the United
States accounts for more than 40 percent of Latin American exports.19 The tide is turning, however: Argentina’s exports to China rose by more than 40 percent between 1998 and 2004; Venezuela’s exports to China over that same period grew by more than 19 percent; and Colombia’s exports grew by nearly 10 percent.20 China still lags far behind U.S. trade with the region, however—the United States normally accounts for half of total Latin American trade, while China is less than 5 percent. The United States’ annual investment in Latin America ordinarily tops $30 billion; China’s total investment is still less than $5 billion.21 Meanwhile, Chinese firms seem to be succeeding in their strategy of amassing resources. In Venezuela, the region’s major oil producer, China National Petroleum Corporation has established a joint venture with Petroleos de Venezuela, the state oil company—once a relatively well-governed firm but now headed by Chavez loyalists. Ultimately, Chinese firms may operate as many as 15 oil fields in Venezuela.22 In Peru, an arm of China National Petroleum Corporation has purchased a stake in Pluspetrol, which has oil fields along the Ecuadorian border.23 Chinese firms also have expressed interest in upgrading Peru’s pipeline infrastructure, to better bring oil to Pacific ports.24 Perhaps most important, Beijing has convinced much of Latin America that it can be a benign and constructive actor, a drastic change from regional perceptions of China only 15 years ago, when it was either not on radar screens or was viewed by many as a rising threat. Limited polling suggests that most of the hemisphere enjoys a generally positive view of China. Even in
Mexico, whose export sectors compete directly with China and whose press has highlighted the negative impact of China’s economic growth on
Mexican textiles and other industries, a comprehensive opinion survey taken in 2004 shows that Mexicans worry about Chinese economic competition but that “the development of China as a world power rank[s] at the bottom of the list of threats that Mexicans consider critical.”25
This sentiment potentially boosts Beijing’s influence. In democratic nations, leaders can move closer to China, since public sentiment supports better relations, including, potentially, closer military ties.
In less democratic nations, like Venezuela, where a small circle of elites make decisions, China’s appeal serves the same function, allowing them to build consensus on warmer relations with Beijing.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Ellis 11 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will,
Good Business, and Strategic Position” August 11, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1077.pdf)//MM
Chinese military thinkers, as others around the world, recognize the implications of the emergence of the PRC as a principal global actor, including the need to prepare for large-scale hostilities to protect these global interests
. Although the PLA is very careful to cast its military preparations as “defensive” in nature
, debates within the PLA over the need to develop a “deterrent force,” and references to an “active defense”16 implicitly acknowledge that Chinese thinkers have contemplated the necessity of carrying a future conflict to the adversary
. Moreover, although the PRC currently lacks the capability to project significant military capability beyond Asia
, the pursuit of “defense in depth” by the PLA Navy foresees conducting the battle as far away from its shores as capabilities will allow, while references in the 2008 Defense White Paper to close coordination between military struggle and political, economic, and diplomatic endeavors17 suggest a global approach to thinking about warfare. Nothing in the public discourse of the
Chinese leadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that Latin America is considered in the short term as a base for military operations.
Nonetheless, in the long term, when the PRC is both economically and militarily more powerful than it is today, the ability to deter a strategic adversary such as the United States through holding it at risk in its own theater, and to disrupt its ability to project power at home before those forces can reach the PRC, is consistent with the aforementioned concepts, including a holistic, asymmetric approach towards warfare
.18 Within this broad approach,
China’s military ties in Latin America afford geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of U.S. forces, creating diversionary crises, closing down strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, or conducting disruption operations in close proximity to the United States.
Military Sales to Latin America. As with military sales by other countries,
Chinese military sales to Latin America help the
PRC to strengthen its ties with the purchasers by meeting their specific needs, and by tying those nations logistically to Chinese maintenance and training infrastructures. Such transactions also help the PRC to develop and sustain its own national defense industry, and earn export sales revenues
.
Innocent or not, Chinese arms sales to Latin America are arguably one of the most closely watched facets of China’s engagement with Latin
America. Although U.S. leaders such as Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Mora have observed that Chinese arms sales can contribute to security in the hemisphere,46 many politicians and other policymakers look at such sales as indications that Chinese activities in the region constitute a threat to U.S. national security
. In general, PRC military sales to Latin America have followed the pattern of its commercial sales. The first Chinese defense goods sold in the region were relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated items such as military clothing and personal equipment. In some cases, such goods entered Latin American militaries as donations, such as the annual $1 million dollars worth of hats, gloves, and other nonlethal equipment donated by the PLA to Colombia.
Frequently, Chinese goods have been offered by third party importers, representing companies such as the China North Industries Corporation
(NORINCO) in the PRC, but licensed to do business with Latin American militaries. As with commercial goods, China’s ability to sell sophisticated military hardware to Latin America has been impeded by concerns over quality, as well as the difficulty of maintaining and supporting the equipment. Such concerns have been particularly acute with respect to materiel such as ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and communication systems, regarding which lives on the battlefield could depend on the proper functioning of the equipment. The lack of a
Chinese military presence in the region has compounded such concern; the absence of sales of Chinese gear in Latin America meant that
Chinese military goods were “unproven” in the region, and thus more difficult to sell. Moreover, without a Chinese military presence in the region, maintenance and obtaining spare parts for Chinese goods were, in the minds of many leaders, a great risk.47 Despite such obstacles, as in the commercial realm, with time, the PRC and its defense companies have begun to move up the value-added chain to sell increasingly sophisticated military goods in Latin America. In doing so, it has exploited opportunities provided by regimes hostile to the United States, such

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, whose political orientation and inability to acquire Western military technology have led them to look to
Chinese equipment. The first major breakthrough for the PRC in making military sales to Latin America was arguably Venezuela’s 2008 announcement that it would purchase K-8 (Karakorum) aircraft, co-developed with Pakistan.48 Venezuela’s decision to purchase the aircraft was driven in part by its inability to purchase U.S. fighters, or spare parts for its existing fleet of U.S. aircraft, as well as successful U.S. efforts to block other Western countries from selling to Venezuela similar aircraft that incorporated U.S. technology.49 The agreement to ultimately purchase a total of 18 K-8 aircraft from China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), along with armaments and a supporting logistics package, was made in August 2008. In the second half of 2009, 11 Venezuelan pilots and 56 technicians were sent to China for training on the aircraft as pilots and maintenance and logistics support staff.50
The first 6 K-8s were officially received in March 2010,51 with the other 12 arriving in August. They were assigned to the 12th Fighter Air Group, based at the air base Rafael Urdaneta de Maracaibo, and to the 15th Special Operations group, at the air base Vicente Landaeta Gil de
Barquisimeto. 52 As a result of Venezuelan satisfaction with the transaction, the number of K-8s desired was expanded to 40. In addition, the
Venezuelan military leadership has been evaluating the more capable Chinese L-15 Air King, with a proposal by Hongdu Aviation Industry
Corporation to sell the Venezuelans 24 of the aircraft.53 Despite highly positive statements by the Venezuelan leadership regarding the K-8s, and the increase of the purchase to 40 aircraft, the acquisition has had its problems. In January 2010, one of the K-8s piloted by a newly trained
Venezuelan crashed on takeoff at the military airport in Barquismetro, near Caracas.54 While the Chinese blamed improper maintenance by the recently trained Venezuelans, the Venezuelans pointed the finger at the Chinese for poor translations of the aircraft technical manuals into
Spanish. Beyond fighters, the government has also declared that it will purchase 10-12 Y-8 Chinese medium military transport aircraft, each capable of carrying up to 88 persons or 20 tons of cargo.55
(Alan W., senior fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes The
Dowd Report, a monthly review of international events and their impact on U.S. national security,
“Countering China’s Reach in Latin America ,” February 10 th , 2012, ASCF, http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas
//EH)
The JFQ study adds that
China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions
.”
Most
Latin American nations
, including Mexico, “ send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.
” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.”
The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that
Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region
, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.” Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match,
China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as
Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, “China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, and Africa” April
2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN China’s increasing linkages with Latin America and the Caribbean prompted growing concerns in Congress about China’s intentions in the region beginning in 2005. House and Senate subcommittees held hearings that year on China’s role in Latin America, while the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, established by Congress, held hearings on China’s global expansion, including in the Western Hemisphere. A flurry of other research studies emerged on the issue, examining a range of issues related to China’s growing involvement in the region. In congressional testimony and other statements, Bush
Administration officials have downplayed concerns about potential threats to the United States emanating from China’s engagement with Latin
American nations, although they have maintained that the United States needs to be watchful of China’s actions in the hemisphere. In April
2005 testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Roger Noriega stated that ‘‘China’s influence in the region is minimal today,’’ and that while China’s presence in the hemisphere is growing, ‘‘it is safe to say the United States has been and will continue to be the long-term partner of preference.’’ 61 At the same hearing, then Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs Rogelio Pardo-Maurer testified that there was no ‘‘evidence that Chinese military activities in the Western Hemisphere, including arms sales, pose a direct conventional threat to the United States.’’ Nevertheless, both officials cautioned that the United States needed to be aware of China’s actions in the region. Noriega maintained that the United States would continue to monitor China’s outreach to Latin America, just as it monitors China’s outreach around the world.
Pardo-Maurer maintained that the United States needs ‘‘to be alert to rapidly advancing Chinese capabilities, particularly in the field of intelligence, communications, and cyber warfare, and their possible application in the region.’’
U.S. officials have suggested that Chinese engagement with Latin America could lead to increased U.S.-
Chinese cooperation. At a September 2005 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemi sphere Affairs Charles Shapiro maintained that China’s engagement with the region could ‘‘lead to increased cooperation between China, the United States, and other Latin American and Caribbean governments on matters affecting regional stability, especially terrorism, transnational crime, and counternarcotics.’’ 62 In April 2006, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas
Shannon visited Beijing as part of the first U.S. consultations with China on Latin America. Prior to the trip,
Shannon acknowledged that China ‘‘is an increasingly important player’’ in Latin America, and that it was important for the two countries to ‘‘understand what each other is up to in the region.’’ He maintained that the United
States sees ‘‘the region as having achieved a consensus about democracy, free markets and protecting the security of the democratic state,’’ and that the U.S. ‘‘interest is to make certain that China respects this larger consensus.’’
63 Shannon described the consultations as constructive and positive, with China assuring the
United States that it has no plans to seek greater influence in the region beyond expanding trade.64 After several years of increased Chinese engagement with Latin America, most observers have concluded that China’s economic involvement with the region has not posed a threat to
U.S. policy or U.S. interests in the region. In terms of economic, political, and cultural linkages, the United States has remained predominant in the region. U.S. trade and investment in Latin America dwarfs that of China, while the future growth potential of such Chinese economic linkages with the region is constrained by the advantages conferred by U.S. geographic proximity to Latin America. Moreover, migration patterns to the United States from the region give the United States greater cultural ties and longer-term economic importance to the region than China could ever have. For example, remittance flows from the United States to the region amounted to $60 billion in 2006—a sum greater than both foreign aid and portfolio investment flows to the region, with remittances making a significant contribution to the economies of several Caribbean and Central American nations. In its policy toward Latin America, China has been careful not to antagonize the United
States in the region, and appears to understand that the United States is sensitive to involvement in its neighborhood. China has taken a lowkey approach toward the region, focusing on trade and investment opportunities that help contribute to its own economic development and managing to avoid public confrontation with the United States.65 Even Chinese relations with Venezuela are focused on oil resources rather than ideological rapport. China reportedly does not want to become a pawn in a dispute between Venezuela and the United States.66
Moreover, China reportedly has concerns that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s efforts at spreading his populist agenda to other countries in the region could unleash instability and ultimately be detrimental to Chinese trade and investment interests in the region.67
Nevertheless, other observers contend that China poses a potential threat to U.S. influence and interests in the region. First, some maintain that by presenting an alternative political and economic model—rapid economic growth and modernization alongside political authoritarianism—the PRC undermines the U.S. agenda to advance political reform, human rights and free trade in the region.
68
According to this view, the
Chinese model could help strengthen anti-democratic and anti-U.S. political

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] leaders and actors in some countries.
Second, according to some analysts, China’s regional presence ultimately could have significant strategic implications for the United States in the event of a possible military conflict with China. In this scenario, China could use its human and commercial infrastructure in the region to disrupt and distract the United States in the hemisphere
. According to this view, China’s increased presence in the region could also provide the country with new opportunities to collect intelligence data against U.S. forces operating in the region
.69
(Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, “China in Latin America:
Hegemonic Challenge?” NOREF—Norwegian Peace-building Resource Centre, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf)//MM
Loans-for-oil deals, in which loans are tied to oil-export agreements, have accounted for over half of China’s loans to the region since 2006 and
91% of them have gone to Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil (http://ase.tufts. edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChinesefinanceLatinAmerica. pdf).Venezuela has negotiated four such loans, totalling $32 billion, since 2008. Brazil signed one for $10 billion in 2009 to fund an offshore oil project using Chinese inputs. Ecuador signed a $1 billion loan-for-oil agreement in 2009 and a second one in 2010. In July 2011, it added a third for $2 billion. The sales are contractually agreed, but the price paid follows the market. Chinese loans to Latin America indicate that China funds different projects from its Western counterparts or the international financial institutions (IfIs). Whereas Western and IfI loans cover a range of governmental, social and environmental purposes, Chinese banks focus 87% of their loans on the energy, mining, infrastructure, transport and housing sectors. The benefits to China are that better infrastructure can facilitate the exports of resources, as well as providing contracts for
Chinese companies. Between 2005 and 2011, the Chinese lent $33.7 billion for housing and infrastructure projects, compared with $4.4 billion from the Inter-American Development Bank and nothing from the World Bank, which favoured lending in microfinance, antipoverty and health programmes. President Hugo Chávez, amongst others, has praised the fact that
Chinese money comes with few strings attached. Some governments are tempted by
the lack of stringent environmental, labour or social requirements; others are attracted to
China for political reasons.
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia prefer to avoid World Bank loans because they dislike the economic liberalism of the institutions and the supervision that comes with the money.
Mexico, Colombia and Peru continue to borrow from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for projects in which the requirement to purchase from China, or give contracts to Chinese companies, would be inappropriate or burdensome. China, despite relatively high interest rates, serves as the lender of last resort for Ecuador and Argentina, which face international funding difficulties arising from their respective defaults in 2008–9 and 2001.
The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and social landscape in a number of ways
.
The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for market reasons unconnected with a political project, since these countries are building societies that are more consonant with U.S. than Chinese values. In other cases, however, the availability of Chinese funds signals a loss of political leverage for the United States and permits the survival of anti-U.S. governments – in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance – that wish to pursue more radical political and social models
. China, however, has exercised caution at times in its readiness to deploy lending. In November 2004, when Argentina’s President Kirchner secretly requested Chinese support to pay off Argentina’s debt to the International Monetary fund (IMf),
China refused, apparently to avoid a direct challenge to U.S. influence.
(R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”
NDU Press, 1 st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM
Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and Western Institutions.
China's historical status as a
"leader of the developing world" positions it as the natural ally of the new generation of Latin
American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales.
During his first trip to Beijing

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] after being elected president, for example, Morales proclaimed himself to be a "great admirer of Mao," while Chávez has exclaimed that Mao and South American revolutionary icon Simón Bolívar would have been "great friends." While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases, the position of the PRC as a geopolitical "alternative" to the United
States shapes the way that they court the Chinese.
In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the anti-U.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with the United States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K–8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.
11
(Joshua, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Charm
Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (Yale University Press, 2007), “China’s
Latin Leap Forward,” Portions of this article are drawn from South of the Border: China’s Strategic
Engagement in Latin America and Its Implications for the United States, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/latin_leap.pdf)//MM
How Much of a Threat? Despite China’s successful engagement with Latin America, its growing presence in the region does not necessarily yet threaten U.S. interests. Thus far, there are few signs that Beijing seeks to directly challenge Washington’s substantial military relationship with Latin America
. On his trip to Latin America in 2004, Hu Jintao did not visit Colombia, perhaps because he did not want to be seen meddling with the closest U.S. ally in South America. Some of China’s relations in the region could benefit Washington. China’s growing economic relationship with Latin America may prompt Beijing to take a stronger interest in regional security and thus share important regional burdens with the United States. Indeed, as China becomes more influential, it could help mediate conflicts, as it has done with North Korea in Northeast Asia. It also may play a larger role in peacekeeping operations, as China has already begun to do in Haiti. In addition, as China absorbs more of Latin America’s resources, it will provide funds for Latin governments to pay off their external debts, reducing the possibility of further financial instability in the region, potentially diminishing the flow of Latin America’s economic migrants. Despite its initial gains, though, China could founder, as Latin Americans learn more about its strategies. Less than two years after
China and Brazil’s courtship, strains have developed in Beijing’s relationship with the largest nation in South America as a flood of Chinese imports has not been matched by Chinese consumption of Brazilian goods. Other Latin American nations echo the same complaint. Argentina has imposed new non-tariff barriers on categories of Chinese imports.26 Moreover, many opinion leaders perceive Beijing as an unfair competitor, due to Chinese labor practices, dumping, undervaluing its currency, and state support for certain industries.27 Some states, such as
Ecuador, already fear that while China provides a welcome alternative to the United States, developing close links with Chinese oil and gas firms will leave them completely reliant on Chinese investment.28 This fear of domination may be one reason why Ecuador is weighing a slowdown on approving Chinese investments in Ecuadorian petroleum.29 Latin American companies also fear that Chinese firms will sign joint ventures and then force them to work as subcontractors and not as partners, as China National Petroleum Company allegedly has done with the
Ecuadorian firm Dygoil.30 Eventually, Beijing could end up looking little different to Latin Americans than the old colonial powers, who mined and dug up the region, doing nothing to improve the capacity of locals. If Chinese investment focuses on extractive industries and adds little to the skills of the local workforce, the region could become trapped in a pattern of mercantilism with China, in which it sells natural resources to buy higher-value manufactured goods, without developing a cadre of local-country managers for Chinese firms. Latin American leaders and publics also recognize that China’s supposed dedication to developing nations is not always trustworthy, and that China’s economic model may prove no more effective than the neoliberal model. China’s own socioeconomic inequalities have exposed some of the failings of Sino-style development. Some scholars even express concerns about the “Latin Americanization” of China—i.e. that China is becoming as economically unequal as Latin America.31 China’s push could eventually constitute a threat to U.S. political, security, and economic interests. China’s focus on energy could complicate U.S. access to resources. Global reserves of cheaply obtainable oil are decreasing rapidly, and Latin American imports—particularly from Venezuela—are among the nearest and cheapest for the United States. Since reserves in most of Latin America are projected to begin declining by the end of this decade, these imports will become even more crucial to U.S. energy needs.32 Venezuela has not only threatened to cut off all U.S. shipments but also has said that it plans to boost exports to China from the current 140,000 barrels of crude oil per day to 500,000 barrels.33 Even as Venezuela increases shipments to China, U.S. demand for oil is unlikely to decrease—forecasts suggest imports could rise by as much as 60 percent in the next 20 years. Growing U.S. demand, combined with a shift in Venezuelan exports, could force Washington to become vastly more dependent on Middle Eastern oil.34 This has obvious security consequences.35 Furthermore, as it has done in Asia,
China could use its cooperative agreements in Latin America as building blocks for more substantial strategic partnerships that resemble formal alliances. These alliances ultimately could be used to counter U.S. regional interests
. In Central Asia, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was dismissed for years as a talk shop. But China used it to build closer ties with Central Asia and to promote regional support for a reduction in U.S. military bases. Worse, if Beijing’s influence undermines democratization in Latin America, it could bolster

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] authoritarian leaders in the region
. Finding another major source of economic assistance and diplomatic support might allow actors like Chavez more freedom to undermine U.S. counter-narcotics and counterterrorism initiatives in
, for example, Colombia.
The best way for Washington to guard against these possibilities
, however, is
not to inflate the Chinese threat but to re-engage with Latin America, rebuilding a comprehensive relationship with this region
—not only with a few key allies like Colombia. China’s success in the Western
Hemisphere derives in good part from failed U.S. policies, such as an overemphasis on counterterrorism and overreliance on a small number of conservative leaders to make policy in the region. Such a renewed relationship could begin by addressing what Latin America scholar Julia Sweig calls the “80/20 problem,” in which Washington relies on elites—20 percent of the population—to understand entire countries. Interacting with the “other” 80 percent of populations, including more contacts with non-governmental organizations, political activists, advocates for the poor, and religious leaders, would foster deeper ties. Washington also could re-emphasize core U.S. strengths.
When Latin Americans perceive the United States as helping them achieve a free, rights-oriented system, America’s appeal in the region surges
. As Sweig writes, during the 1990s Washington often “set forth a positive agenda” in Latin America by backing civil societies recovering from years of war and promoting democracy. “Latin America welcomed the new approach...the message from the North was largely positive, inclusive, and respectful,” Sweig notes.36
If Washington returned to that approach, China’s leap forward would surely slow down.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(R. Evan, expert who focuses on defense transformation and Latin American security issues, U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, June 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf an associate with Booz, Allen &
Hamilton, Inc.)//MM
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
It is not necessary to postulate Chinese troops and bases in Latin America in order to conclude that an expanded Chinese presence in the region has enormous consequences for U.S. national security
, and as such, warrants serious examination. During the past century, the U.S. military was deeply engaged in the politics of Asia, consistent with the view that such global engagement made our own hemisphere more secure.
In the present century
, by contrast, the United States repeatedly will be forced to choose how much Chinese engagement in our own hemisphere we can afford to ignore on the grounds that it does not constitute an “immediate threat.”
In general, the Chinese presence in Latin America reflects significant erosion in the relative power and geopolitical position of the U nited
S tates, and the advent of a new century in which the United States is preoccupied about Chinese adventurism in the Americas, balancing out traditional Chinese concerns about the U.S. presence in Asia.
The
dynamics and potential consequences of these trends range from economic damage to the United States to the potential for significant crises which, if mismanaged, could bring about direct conflict between the U nited
S tates and China in this hemisphere
.
Some of the most immediate consequences of the current Chinese engagement in Latin America involve the economic security of the United
States and the livelihood of U.S. citizens. To the extent that Latin American countries sign free trade agreements both with China and with the
United States, American markets will become increasingly open to duty free Chinese products―something that China has never been able to obtain through direct negotiations with the United States.129 The free trade accord that Chile has negotiated with the United States, for example, in combination with the one that Chile is currently negotiating with China, raises the possibility that Chile (or other Latin American nations pursuing similar agreements) could be used as a “pass through,” country, by which Chinese goods were sold without tariffs to U.S. markets. Although the U.S.-led initiative for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is currently experiencing difficulties, its achievement would compound U.S. vulnerability to this Chinese competition.
(Cynthia A., Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, “U.S. Responses to China’s Growing
Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere” Enter the Dragon? China’s
Presence in Latin America, Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//MM
CONCLUSIONS Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for
Washington over the past five and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reflects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin The basis to Beijing’s involvement in this region is largely the opening left by Latin America’s virtual despair and utter frustration with the lack of ability to get Washington to engage in this region. CONCLUSIONS
Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past fi ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reflects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China.
But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the
Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin America–U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefit for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater
Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition.
Pure economic theory, however
, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conflicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is significant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade
. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America.
To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the United States
. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without
Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its
Latin American neighbors. Washington should not blame Beijing for moving into an area made attractive because of historic and current absence of consistent U.S. policies.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H
We have detailed China’s growing challenge to US dominance in Latin America, dealing for the most part in economic terms, but
“some believe that China’s economic challenge inevitably gives rise to a simultaneous military threat.”
[97]
Denny Roy suggests that:
If China fulfils its expected potential, it will soon be a power in the class of 19th century Britain, the
Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Pacific War Japan, and 20th century America.
Each of those countries used its superior power to establish some form of hegemony to protect and promote its interests.
There is no convincing reason to think
China as a great power will depart from this pattern.
[98]
This is a central tenet of the China threat, that a rising power will seek
– to borrow a phrase – its ‘place in the sun’ at the expense of global stability.
The history
of the world suggests
that “ prosperity and advancement will naturally strengthen China’s military power
– something that worries the United States.” [99]
The U.S is worried because in our current unipolarity, global stability is intrinsically linked to the permanence of the hegemon.
The Director of the Asian Studies Centre at the Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes, has been quoted as saying that
“China’s grand strategy was to gather as many friends and allies as possible to counter U.S dominance in the region”
[100] in an attempt to “balance against US power.”
[101] The idea that
China is trying to create an anti-U.S coalition
is a frequently cited one, as many pundits think that China’s aim is
“undermining the
United States around the world and raising China to a position of dominant international political and military power.”
[102] This point of view is held by a vocal minority who choose to interpret Chinese actions as designed against the
United States.
Military build up and U.S concerns
The U.S is concerned with the potential for China to attain a forward base from which to disrupt key
U.S interests.
The Commander of the Southern Command General Bantz J. Craddock told a hearing of the House Armed Service
Committee that:
The PRC’s growing dependence on the global economy and the necessity of protecting access to food, energy, raw materials and export markets has forced a shift in their military strategy. The PRC’s 2004 Defence Strategy White Paper departs from the past and promotes a power-projection military, capable of securing strategic shipping lanes and protecting its growing economic interests abroad. [103]
The key idea here is that
China might begin to exert itself and the U.S may find that it is not the only player in the Latin American equation
. To give you an idea of how alien and disturbing a concept this is to the U.S, the Western hemisphere is not even considered a part of the ‘game board’ in grand strategy analyst Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s ‘The Grand Chessboard’
[104].

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, “China–Latin America Military Engagement,” API International,
February 2012, page 4, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-
2/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE
Chinese decision-makers, as others around the world, recognize the implications of the emergence of
the PRC as a principal global actor, including the possibility that it may have to one day fight a major
war involving not only Asia, but other theaters of operations in which it has interests, or where it might wish to hold its would-be adversary at risk. While there is nothing to suggest that the PRC desires or anticipates such a struggle in the short term, it is reasonable to anticipate that its military strategic
thinkers are preparing for the possibility. To this end, China’s military ties in Latin America afford
geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of US forces, creating diversionary crises or conducting disruption operations in close proximity to the United States.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Michael E., Director of Research, Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow,
Foreign Policy, Center for 21 st Century Security and Intelligence and Gen. David, former director of the
CIA, “Fund—Don’t Cut—U.S. Soft Power” Brookings Institute, April 30, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/04/30-us-soft-power-ohanlon-petraeus)//MM
The president’s budget proposal is now on the streets of Washington, D.C. Currently, it would protect funding for the State Department and the
Agency for International Development and related activities from further cuts. The combined annual budget for development aid, security aid and diplomacy has averaged close to $60 billion over the past half decade. That is now slated to decline to about $50 billion, partly due to reduced war-related costs. But this amount could come under intense scrutiny. Moreover, if there is no grand bargain between the president and the Congress, sequestration could force reductions of a further 10 percent.
Such an outcome would be bad for our nation’s security. As each of us has testified on Capitol Hill in past years
America’s ability to protect itself and advance its global interests often depends as much on its “softer” power as it does on our nation’s armed forces.
For example
, though Latin American countries were themselves primarily responsible for their progress, the headway many of them made in stabilizing their countries in recent years has been a big plus for American security, too — and American aid had a role in that progress
.
That is part of why we have supported a budget deal that would repeal sequestration and achieve most further deficit reduction through savings in entitlement spending with similar increases in revenue generation.
Implicit in our approach was the thinking that lawmakers should avoid the temptation to gut foreign aid
just because it generally lacks a strong constituency in the
United States.
America’s spending on development and diplomacy and security aid — the so-called 150 account — has strengthened under Presidents George
W. Bush and Barack Obama. That has been a positive and long overdue development. Funds for diplomacy and development were starved in much of the 1990s. Some of the reductions in that earlier period were warranted, admittedly, as aid then was not always as productive as it might have been.
Today, we are arguably doing a good deal better. Various forms of development assistance and aid have, in fact, produced impressive results on a host of fronts in recent years. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a major initiative of Presidents Bush and Bill Clinton and now
President Obama, has played a significant role in helping to turn the tide against the HIV/AIDS epidemic — even if more work remains to be done. Development assistance has also helped more than 600 million people move out of extreme poverty, achieving one of the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals several years before the 2015 target date.
Moreover, as John Podesta has recently written, in this century alone, aid has helped reduce the global childhood mortality rate by one-third
— impressive, even if only halfway toward the U.N. goal for 2015.
The maternal mortality rate has been reduced by almost half, as well.
And progress has been seen in other sectors — such as agriculture, energy and other realms, including many in the combat zones where each of us spent considerable time in the past decade
.
America deserves considerable credit for much of this progress, as the U.S. is the world’s largest aid contributor, at roughly $30 billion in 2012.
The United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan round out the rest of the top five donors, each providing from $10 billion to $15 billion a year.
But relative to our economy’s size, America does not do more than its fair share; it provides just 0.19 percent of gross domestic product in development aid, similar to Japan’s level but less than half that of the three big European donors listed above, and less than a third the U.N. goal of 0.7 percent of GDP. Private donations improve our net national position somewhat, but only to an extent. The State Department budget is still less than 5 percent of the military’s — and the number of Foreign Service officers worldwide is less than half the number of soldiers in a single Army division.
Given our military contributions to international stability and the global economic growth that results from that stability in various areas
,
American foreign aid
doesn’t need to grow substantially. But it should not be cut further
. Consider some of the ideas we might want to consider in the years ahead. These should not be unconditional offers of help but would require the right kind of cooperation from key nations abroad whose future stability is central to our own security:
A possible deal to help Egypt revive economic growth and service its debt after a two-year economic downturn following its Arab Spring; this would be contingent on President Mohamed Morsi respecting the Egyptian constitution and helping us with Middle East peace;
A possible proposal to help Pakistan reinvigorate its energy sector, which currently holds back the country’s growth and compromises its quality of life; this would be contingent on Pakistan contributing more to security in the region and to pursuing reforms that reduce disincentives for significant private initiatives in the energy arena;

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
A major push with other donors to help countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo reform and strengthen their security forces;
Aid for transitional governments in Libya, Yemen and Mali, and perhaps someday Syria, to get on their feet so they can stabilize, develop security forces, police their own territories and prevent terrorists from establishing sanctuaries;
Ongoing help in future years for Afghanistan’s government provided that it takes steps toward better governance and a sound election in 2014.
This agenda need not break the bank; even taken together, development aid and assistance and these initiatives would not remotely add up to another Marshall Plan. But this discussion suggests that our security will be improved by sustaining foreign aid in the years ahead rather than by making further cuts.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(professional services firm deeply rooted in the field, with a network of investigators that operates across the Americas, “Iran: Expanding its sphere of influence in Latin
America” Open Briefing—the civil society intelligence agency, February 6, 2013, http://www.openbriefing.org/regionaldesks/americas/iran-sphere-of-influence-in-latin-america/)//MM
Background
State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening state-to-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally.
Recognizing Tehran’s growing influence in its “backyard,”
President Barack Obama signed the Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a “comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners.
The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has opened six additional embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4 billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011. Exports from Argentina to Iran, its secondlargest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011.
Not surprisingly, one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with fellow “anti-imperialist” Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin
America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters.
In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who later defended Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program. In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a distance.
In 2013
Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the
Western Hemisphere
. Chávez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. On 31
January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s (IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart from such public overtures, Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region.
More recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence:
On 21 January 2013, German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of Tahmasb Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director.
Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German authorities confiscated the check while they investigate.
On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the
Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007.
Commentary
Although Iranian influence on a certain segment of Latin America, namely
the Bolivarian Alliance (Alianza
Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, or “
ALBA
”), its burgeoning prominence in the politics of non-ALBA
Latin states should worry the U.S
. In 2009 the Argentine delegation walked out on Ahmadinejad’s speech at the U.N. In 2011, they sat and listened as he verbally attacked Western powers.
In the eyes of the United States, the Countering Iran Act is grounded in the precedents of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the Roosevelt
Corollary (1904).
Both axioms invoke the United States’ right to intervene in the event that a non-

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] hemispheric actor disrupts regional peace and safety. That precept justified action against “Soviet” communism in Latin America during the Cold War
, though since the 1990s,
Washington’s perennial preoccupation with other areas of focus across the world significantly diluted any remnant soft power threat the Monroe Doctrine may pose in Latin America in 2013.
For its part, an Iranian military commander already predicted the failure of the Countering Iran Act, noting the legislation will not deter Iran from continuing to engage Latin America. For both Iran and its ALBA allies, U.S. annoyance is a motivating factor to move forward with cooperation, not a deterrence.
So far in 2013,
Iran is gaining ground as support for the U.S. and E.U.
erodes.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, “Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon,” The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE
Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's
iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades.
In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when environmental concerns are at an all-time high.

{F ILE T ITLE }
GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Shixue, 11 (November 3 rd , Jiang, “The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations,” http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-sino-latin-american-relations/, amils)
The U
.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded
. First, both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world
.
In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-
South collaboration
. As a matter of fact, fur ther cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America
. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades
.
It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth
. As a result,
China is only one of the economic partners Latin
America has been trying to cooperate with.
Third,
China’s relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin
America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence.
Fourth,
China’s cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue
. China’s first policy paper on Latin America, published in November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: “
The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced.” Moreover,
China’s military relations with
Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These
principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China does not wish to be used as a “card” against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Zachary Keck Asst Editor @ The Diplomat “Destined To Fail: China’s Soft Power Push” http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/?all=true Jan.]//BMitch
In a little noticed event on New Year’s Day, China inaugurated its first non-profit organization dedicated to the promotion of soft power—China
Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA). Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi attended and spoke at the unveiling ceremony for the group, which elected as its president Li Zhaoxing, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's Congress. Addressing the group after the vote, Li told its members that the CPDA would mobilize and coordinate “social resources and civilian efforts” towards the goal of
"promoting China's soft power." In some ways,
China’s desire to strengthen its soft power capabilities seems
entirely logical
. After all, ancient Chinese leaders masterfully wielded soft power. And as China’s economic power has risen in recent years, the
Chinese government has adopted various measures to enhance China’s soft power, such as establishing globalnews services (most recently,
China Daily’s Africa Weekly) andConfucius Institutes across the world.
Outside of China some have spoken of a Beijing
Consensus that is supposedly supplementing the Washington Consensus
in terms of the most favored politicaleconomic model. Yet even as China inaugurated its first organization dedicated to enhancing Beijing’s soft power, a number of disparate events in China were illustrating why the CCP’s charm offensive is doomed to fail.
For example, in recent weeks the Chinese government has redoubled its efforts to censor the internet.
After social media users in China exposed a series of scandals involving low-level government officials, the CCP adopted new regulations that require internet service providers to quickly delete “illegal” posts and turn
over the evidence to government officials
. Additionally, after trying to require citizens to use their real names on social media sites like Weibo, the new regulations require citizens to use their real identities when signing up with
an internet
provider. More secretly, according to many inside China, authorities have been strengthening the
great firewall to prevent users from employing various methods in order to gain access to a growing number of sites that are banned
. China is hardly the only government concerned about the political instability unfettered internet access can generate. In fact, last month China joined 89 countries in supporting a United Nations telecommunications treaty that over 20 nations opposed over fears that it would open the door to greater government control over cyberspace. But while China’s suppression of information may resonate with
political elites in authoritarian states, the world is living in the information age
and attempts to restrict the flow of information for political reasons will not endear China to the global masses that soft power seeks to attract
.
China’s internet policies
also conflict with the
stated goals of its soft power offensive in more concrete ways as well.
For example, one of the primary goals of the CPDA is to increase the number of people-to-people exchanges with other countries
. However, if the CCP is successful in preventing users from accessing popular sites
like Facebook,
Twitter, You Tube, and the New York Times, it is likely to discourage foreigners from living or studying abroad in
China
. Similarly, blocking access to these sites inhibits communication between Chinese and foreigners over cyberspace
. Along with tighter restrictions on the Internet,
Chinese authorities have also increased their scrutiny on media outlets
, both domestic and foreign. Domestically, the CCP ushered in the New Year by closing downthe fiercely liberal magazine, Yanhuang Chunqiu, ostensibly because its registration had been invalid since August 2010. Then, on Friday, 51 prominent journalists issued an open letter demanding the resignation of Tuo Zhen, the Communist Party’s propaganda chief in Guangdong Province, who they accused of “raping” the Southern Weekly’s editorial page when he allegedly altered its annual New Year’s Greeting right as it went to press, and without the knowledge or consent of the editor. The journalists were later joined by over two dozen prominent academics from the
Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan who published their own open letter calling for Tuo's resignation. Southern Weekly (also referred to as Southern Weekend) is a highly regarded reform-minded Guangdong newspaper, and its annual New Year’s Greeting has traditionally pushed the bounds of acceptable political discussion in China. This year’s editorial originally parodied Xi Jinping’s "Chinese Dream" by calling for the realization of the “dream of constitutionalism in China” where civil rights and the rule-of-law are respectedand upheld. After Tuo’s changes, the editorial expressed gratitude to the Communist Party for helping the country achieve the Chinese Dream. According to David Bandurski, editor of China Media Project,"
This kind of direct hands-on interference is really something new” and extreme even by China's strict regulation of domestic media. Indeed, after the government tried to silence the growing outrage over Tuo's actions, including by shutting down Southern Weekly staff members' personal Weibo accounts, the entire editorial staff at the newspaper decided to stage a strike, marking the first time in over two decades that the editorial staff of a major Chinese newspaper has gone on strike over government censorship, according to the South China Morning Post.
China also continued its campaign against foreign journalists and news organizations
last week when Chris Buckley, an Australian-national and China correspondent for the New
York Times, was forced to leave the country because Beijing wouldn’t renew his visa. Following Buckley’s departure the New York Times said its

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
China bureau chief, Philip P. Pan—author of Out of Mao’s Shadow—has been waiting since March to receive his own credentials. Beijing later claimed Buckley hadn’t submitted the proper paperwork, but his case follows on the heels of Al Jazeera’s Melissa Chan’s expulsion from the country and the Washington Post’s Andrew Higgins finally ending his three-year quest to gain reentry into China, which failed even after the newspaper enlisted the help of Henry Kissinger. Thus, the more plausible explanation for Buckley’s inability to renew his visa is that Beijing is retaliating against foreign journalists because of the extraordinary reporting organizations like the New York Times have been doing on politically taboo subjects in China, such as stories on the enormous amount of wealth the families of senior leaders have accumulated. This reporting is also why the websites of the New York Times and Bloomberg News are no longer accessible in China, and why reporters from these organizations weren’t able to attend the unveiling of the Politburo Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress in November. Finally
, the
CCP’s soft power offensive is doomed to fail because of its ability to tolerate
(much less cultivate)
“cultural ambassadors.” In the realm of soft power, a county’s entertainers, artists, and intellectuals are some of its strongest assets.
One needs only to look to South Korean rapper Psy, and the “flash mobs” he’s inspired in places as varied as
Jakarta, Bangkok, Sydney, Dhaka, Mumbai, Dubai,American college campuses and shopping malls, Taipei, Hong Kong, and, yes, the Chinese mainland. A country as large and dynamic as China undoubtedly has many potential worldwide celebrities. And yet, as a China Daily op-ed points out, China “is still far from making a product like
. Chin a does export a large amount of cultural products every year, but few of them become popular abroad.” The major reason China fails to export its cultural products
, as Peng Kan, the author of the op-ed rightly notes, is that
“Government organizations and enterprises are the main force behind the exports….But these organizations and enterprises… cannot promote satires like Gangnam Style through official communication channel. But cultural products without entertainment value rarely become popular in overseas markets
.” Indeed, it’s telling that China’s most popular non-governmental figures abroad are all opponents of the CCP.
One such individual is democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo, who celebrated his 57th birthday on December 28th and the 3rd anniversary of being sentenced to an 11-year prison term on December 25th. This sentence only increased Liu’s international stature where he has been celebrated widely and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 (which the CCP responded to by placing his wife under house arrest). Indeed Liu’s international renowned was on display last month when 134 Nobel laureates sent Xi Jinping a letter urging him to release
Liu. Eclipsing Liu in popularity at least in the West, however, is Ai Weiwei, the famous Chinese artist and dissident. Ai Weiwei’s remarkable artistic talent made him famous in some circles, initially including the CCP and across the globe before his turn to social activism. It is undeniable, however, that much of his popularity has come from his courageous and witty challenge to Communist Party rule in China. It is this charismatic political dissent that explains why documentaries of him win at Sundance, Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times interviews him while visiting China, and his “Gangam Style” parody becomes an instant You Tube sensation, despite the fact that its underlying political message is lost on almost all its viewers. China is hardly alone in making dissidents it persecutes famous internationally. In fact, this problem is practically inherent in authoritarian states (just ask Vladimir Putin). There’s a nearly universal tendency for people to sympathize with an
“underdog” who is courageously battling a powerful force like a government, which is why a Tunisian street vendor setting himself on fire can spark uprisings throughout the Arab world, and David and Goliath is one of the most recognizable stories from Jewish and Christian religious texts. But this fact does not make Liu and Ai Weiwei any less damaging to the CCP’s ability to project soft power. Symbolic figures like Liu and Ai
Weiwei ingrain into people’s minds the perception that the CCP is synonymous with injustice. And hardly any emotion is as universally held as the righteousness of justice, however one defines it. On a more primeval basis, people are attracted to confidence, and attempts to suppress information and dissidents creates the perception that, despite all its power and remarkable achievements, the CCP remains at its core fearful and paranoid
. Few people are attracted to, much less want to emulate, those they consider fearful or paranoid. Which is why, despite China’s ancient history of soft power, and the soft power individuals like Ai Weiwei command, modern China’s soft power will remain limited under the current political
leadership.
[Joseph Nye- Indict him. I dare you. He invented Soft Power which is everything Your internal links are based off of “What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?page=0,1 April 29 2013]//BMitch
When Foreign Policy first published my essay "Soft Power" in 1990, who would have expected that someday the term would be used by the likes of Hu Jintao or Vladimir Putin? Yet
Hu told the Chinese Communist Party
in 2007 that China needed to increase its soft power
, and Putin recently urged Russian diplomats to apply soft power more extensively.
Neither leader
, however, seems to have understood how to accomplish his goals
.
Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants
, and that can be accomplished in three main ways -- by coercion, payment, or attraction.
If you can add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots and sticks
.
For a rising power like China whose growing
economic and military might frightens its neighbors into counter-balancing coalitions, a smart strategy includes soft power to make China look less frightening
and the balancing

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] coalitions less effective. For a declining power like Russia (or Britain before it), a residual soft power helps to cushion the fall.
The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture
(in places where it is attractive to others), its political values
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies
(when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). But combining these resources is not always easy
.
Establishing,
say, a Confucius
Institute
in Manila to teach Chinese culture might help produce soft power
, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the Philippines over possession of Scarborough Reef
. Similarly, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft power, strengthening positions of the Russian language," but as Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the dispute with Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world ... and because it has little soft power -- that is, social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness."
Much of America's soft power is produced by civil society -- everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture
-- not from the government
. Sometimes the United States is able to preserve a degree of soft power because of its critical and uncensored civil society even when government actions -- like the invasion of Iraq
-- are otherwise undermining it. But in a smart power strategy, hard and soft reinforce each other. In his new book, China Goes Global, George
Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how
China has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid
.
The Chinese style emphasizes highprofile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment.
Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Even China's softpower triumphs
, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale.
Not long after the last international athletes had departed, China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the
Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message.
China
and Russia make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power.
In today's world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda.
For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal." But soft power doesn't work that way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders.
The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for China
and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies.
Unfortunately
, that is not about to happen soon.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[James, is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and has written for the magazine since the late 1970s. “China’s Biggest
Challenge Is Aerospace” http://www.wired.com/business/2012/06/st_essay_china_aerospace/ 6.18]//BMitch
From the outside, the only question about China’s nonstop growth is which milestone the country will roar past next. China is already the second-largest economy in the world, after not making the top 10 just a generation ago. According to some growth-rate predictions, it’s now within a generation of overtaking the US and becoming number one. And by many measures, it’s already in first place: New roads built, cars bought, mobile phones in service, Internet users signed on—based on these and other categories, the center of the world’s economic activity has moved to China.
From inside China, things look dicier
.
The country has plenty of problems
: an environmental catastrophe that has made cancer the leading cause of death, tensions that arise in one of the most unequal societies on earth, challenges to the legitimacy of the only major government that does not let its people vote
. And while Americans and other outsiders fear that China has devised the economic model of the future, many of the country’s leaders worry that the model has run its course
.
Even in China there are only so many dams to be built, high-speed railroad lines to be laid, brand-new cities to be populated. China has proven that you can move people en masse from rural poverty to urban factory life in a single generation, by embracing the role of outsourcing workhouse of the world. But
Chinese economists fear that this may turn into a low-wage trap that will keep the country from creating the kind of large professional, high-end entrepreneurial, and upper-middle classes that the US has long enjoyed
. Thus the Chinese determination, spelled out in its 12th Five-Year Plan to “move up the value chain.” Can it succeed? Will the next Apples, Facebooks, and Googles arise in China? How much do the current Pfizers, GEs, and Boeings have to fear? The answer will be found in apex industries, those clusters of businesses whose vitality signals the presence of surrounding networks of high-value skills, technologies, and operational competencies. Wildlife biologists look for healthy populations of amphibians— newts, frogs—to indicate the broader health of a wetland environment. Similarly, economic analysts can look to the status of pharmaceutical industries (which reflect a strong research culture), university complexes (whose ability to draw and hold the world’s talent reflects the attractiveness of a society), and venture capital and info-tech industries (which depend on openness) to judge overall economic vitality. And in
China they should be looking at aerospace. Aerospace has long been an American bulwark.
In most years
Boeing is the nation’s leading exporter. America has more airports, builds more airplanes, trains more pilots, and arranges more of its economy around aviation than any other country, by far.
China would very much like a piece of this
—to have Boeings, NASAs, Cessnas, and fully fledged GPS systems of its own. The 12th Five-Year Plan lists aerospace as a symbol and target of China’s “high-value” ambition.
Over the next few years, the country will attempt to re-create all of America’s 100-year aerospace history
: from the glamor and popularization of flying in the Lindbergh era of the 1920s, through the airport-building boom of the 1940s and
1950s and the moon race in the 1960s, to the routinization (and immiseration) of airline flight now. OK, the Chinese hope to skip the immiseration. Otherwise they’re trying to do it all, with 100 airports under construction, several airliner models being developed, and a business-jet culture taking hold. The most ambitious of these efforts, a moon shot, reveals the least about the country’s high-value potential. In a sense, it’s a flying version of the Three Gorges Dam, one more massive public-works effort. The more significant apex-industry test is whether the Chinese system can integrate the complex array of tasks necessary to build safe airplanes and manage safe airlines, at much higher volumes and on tighter schedules than they currently do (like those in the US and Europe). Targets include shared public and private responsibility for safety, shared military and civilian control of airspace, international standards applied in a domestic setting, and the balance between strict bythe-book procedure and individual initiative that keep aerial challenges like the “Miracle on the Hudson” landing from turning into tragedies.
“
This industry is the perfect test case of economic maturity,
” a longtime Boeing and FAA employee named Joe
Tymczyszyn told me in Beijing, where he has moved to help the Chinese develop their aerospace industry.
So to truly understand how close China is to realizing its potential, keep your eye on the skies.
[Keith, “China Is Said to Be Bolstering Missile Capabilities” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/asia/chinasmissile-advances-aimed-at-thwarting-us-defenses-analysts-say.html Aug 24]//BMitch
HONG KONG —
China is moving ahead with the development of a new and more capable generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles
and submarine-launched missiles, increasing its existing ability to deliver nuclear warheads to the United States and to overwhelm missile defense systems
, military analysts said this week. Over all,
China’s
steady strengthening of its military capabilities
for conventional and nuclear warfare has long

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ] caused concern in Congress
and among American allies in East Asia, particularly lately as China has taken a more assertive position regarding territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas. The Global Times, a newspaper directly controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party, reported Wednesday that China was developing the capability to put multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. But the newspaper disputed a report in Jane’s Defense Weekly that the latest Chinese ICBM, the Dongfeng-41, had been tested last month. A Pentagon spokesman asked to comment did not directly address the potential new Chinese missile capability, but said
the United
States “remains committed to maintaining healthy, stable, reliable and continuous military-to-military relations with China and regularly discusses ways to reduce tensions and build trust in the region.”
The spokesman, Lt. Col. Damien Pickart, said the United States carefully monitored China’s military developments and urged China “to exhibit greater transparency regarding its capabilities and intentions.
” Larry M. Wortzel, of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a panel created by Congress, said that China was developing the capability to put as many as 10 nuclear warheads on an ICBM, although dummy warheads could be substituted for some of the nuclear warheads. The dummy warheads would have heat and electromagnetic devices designed to trick missile defense systems, he said. “The bigger implication of this is that as they begin to field a force of missiles with multiple warheads, it means everything we assume about the size of their nuclear arsenal becomes wrong,” said Mr. Wortzel, who is a former military intelligence officer and retired Army colonel. China has separately tested submarine-launched missiles in recent weeks, which it could use to outflank American missile detection systems, Mr. Wortzel said. Most of the radar arrays that the United States has deployed against ballistic missiles were built during the cold war to detect attacks over polar routes. Sun
Zhe, a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, said that
China was developing its military forces only in response to continued efforts by other countries, particularly the United States, to improve their own forces. “We have again and again said that we will not be the first country to use nuclear force,”
he said. “We need to be able to defend ourselves, and our main threat, I’m afraid, comes from the United States
.” China’s development of long-range missiles is part of a much broader military expansion made possible by rapid budget growth in tandem with the Chinese economy
, which had an output of $7.5 trillion last year, compared with
$1.2 trillion in 2000. China began sea trials last year for its first aircraft carrier, a retrofitted version of a Soviet vessel, and has begun talking this summer about the eventual construction of up to five aircraft carriers. China also began conducting fairly public flight tests in January last year for the J-20, its new stealth fighter jet. The scale of China’s strategic missile program is much more secret. The Pentagon estimates that China currently has 55 to 65 ICBMs. China is also preparing two submarines for deployment, each with 12 missiles aboard, Mr. Wortzel said. Those forces are dwarfed by those of the United States, which is cutting its inventory to 1,550 strategic nuclear weapons by 2018 under the latest arms control agreement with Russia. Western forecasts vary on how many of the new Dongfeng-41 missiles China will produce, with 20 to 32 mobile launching systems planned. The mobile launchers make it harder to find and destroy a missile before it is launched. If each missile has
10 nuclear warheads, that could result in a few hundred to several hundred nuclear weapons. But Tom Z. Collina, the research director of the
Arms Control Association, said that China might not actually deploy multiple warheads without first developing and testing smaller warheads.
And China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, agreeing not to conduct further nuclear tests. The United States has tried to reassure Russia and China that its limited ballistic missile defenses are designed only to shoot down one or a few missiles launched by a rogue state. But missile defense advocates in the United States favor more ambitious, and also far costlier, systems, a spirited debate that has been followed with nervousness in Moscow and Beijing.
The United States has been considering where it can best place additional high-tech radar systems designed to track ballistic missiles. American forces currently have one in northern Japan and others that are deployed from time to time at sea.
The Wall Street Journal reported this week on discussions of whether to put two more on land, in southern Japan and in Southeast Asia. American officials have repeatedly said that their main concern is North Korea, which has been testing long-range missiles and developing nuclear weapons. But Chinese officials and experts have been suspicious that American defense systems are aimed at their country’s forces as well. “I have no doubt that one of the goals of the missile defenses is to contain threats from North Korea, but objectively speaking, a high-tech expansion of U.S. military biceps impacts
China, too,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing. He added that discussions had taken place in
China on whether to develop missile defense systems as well.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Andres Malamud
Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon “Overlapping Regionalism, No Integration: Conceptual Issues and the Latin American Experiences” http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/26336/RSCAS_2013_20.pdf?sequence=1]//BMitch
In Latin America, regionalism has evolved through segmented proliferation rather than enlargement, and through goal-transformation rather than goal-attainment
. The reasons for these unexpected developments can be summarized as follows. First, economic facts trump political will.
National economies are non-complementary and outward-oriented, imposing a low ceiling on potential gains from integration
– as Burges (2005) has shown.
Might any institutional arrangement compensate
for this shortcoming? The answer to the above question is negative
, as form has trumped function.
Institutional deficits
as in MERCOSUR or institutional precociousness or “surplus” as in CAN have prevented functional spillover from taking place
(Malamud and Schmitter 2011). So what about pragmatic fixes?
These fixes have not worked
either, as ideology has gradually trumped pragmatism
. Departing from its initial simplicity,
Mercosur
, which had originally learned more lessons from the CAN failure than from the EU success, has increasingly become largely rhetorical
(Malamud 2005b; Doctor 2012). As the results show, though, programmatic affinity and identity politics is no substitute for the convergence of interests
. Today’s landscape of Latin American integration looks like Jean Monnet’s blueprint upside down: rather than “petits pas, grands effets”, the reality reflects “grands mots, petits effets”. But why talk about integration if it does not deliver?
For some groups and observers, regional organizations
– especially Mercosur – have become an existential end per se rather than a means to an end.
Just as citizens are expected to defend their country without questioning its raison d’être, inchoate regional identity rather than interests or reasoning are frequently at the root of the defense of regional would-be polities – a suggestive constructivist turn. For others, usually including scholars, politicians and bureaucrats, regional organizations offer attractive opportunities to make a living: a new discipline for scholarly specialization, good salaries in region-funded contracts, academic and political tourism, and the prestige of belonging to a small group of iniziati
. In this case, it is not identity or advantage arising from dismantling state borders but rather particularistic interests that lie behind the defense of regionalism. For their part
, statesmen know that sovereignty is not relinquished by signing papers so they are free to continue to establish and relaunch regional organizations without integrating anything, and they can use regionalism as a foreign policy resource to achieve other ends such as international visibility, regional stability and regime legitimacy
(Merke 2010; Spektor 2010).
Expressions such as “token integration’
(Nye 1968: 377),
“ ceremonial regionalism
” (Montesinos 1996), and “integration-fiction
” (Peña 1996) have been coined to portray
Latin American integration, with its combination of high-toned rhetoric and dismal performances.
It often seems that decisionmakers and their followers want to talk integration into existence. However absurd this may appear, this behavior is far from unreasonable, since politicians know that praising integration gets them support, while actually engaging in it would have material costs. Thus, talking without doing is not necessarily a sign of corruption, ignorance or cultural atavism: given the dim conditions for Latin
American integration, it is simply a rational decision.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
[Charles Chong-han Wu is a doctoral candidate of Political Science, specializing in International
Relations, International Conflict, and Research Methodology “The Strategic Triangle: US-China-Taiwan
Relations” http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/the-strategic-triangle-us-china-taiwan-relations/
December]//BMitch
When it comes to the US-China-Taiwan relations, the initial assertion tells us that without US backing, declaration of de jure independence is simply not a feasible option for Taiwan
. But the complicating factor is that Washington not only has an interest in the security of Taiwan but also in stable relations with China
, particularly after growing bilateral ties. Thus, the maintenance of the status quo turns out to be US policy, too
. To achieve such a goal, the US has adopted strategic ambiguity as the cornerstone of its policy toward the cross-Strait relations for the past few decades. The United States adopts the one-China policy to soothe Beijing’s worry that Taiwan may formally secede from China, but at the same time warns China that military action against Taiwan cannot be tolerated. Consequently,
Washington tries to persuade Taiwan not to provoke China, but also promises to provide some kind of security guarantee
to defend it against a possible Chinese attack. Nevertheless, t he US leaves open what kind of option it will take in case of an emergency between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait.
This is the essence of the policy of strategic ambiguity.
The most obvious effect of strategic ambiguity is its impact on the intentions of
China and Taiwan.
On the one hand,
China is deterred from launching an unprovoked attack on Taiwan
due to the huge costs involved in a potential big war against the United States.
Taiwan
, on the other hand, is constrained from taking any drastic step that will provoke China and thus get the US trapped in a crisis
. Strategic ambiguity offers a policy tool to prevent China and Taiwan from getting into militarized conflicts
. The concept of strategic ambiguity has been evolving over time. Several policy approaches have been designed by Washington, one of which is dual deterrence.
According to Richard Bush,
Washington delivers “both warning and reassurances toward both Beijing and
Taipei.”
One example was the 1995-96 missile crisis. During the crisis, the Clinton administration sought to restrain both sides from taking confrontational postures toward each other. When China fired missiles near the island, Washington immediately dispatched two aircraft carriers to demonstrate its determination to maintain stability. The Bush administration has been more pro-Taiwan. Aaron Friedberg, a national security advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney, proclaimed that Washington would not accept an outcome imposed by force “under any circumstances.” This seems to give a green light to Taiwan independence. However, it raises the question whether the United States will take the high risk of waging war on a nuclear power. Such a posture would obviously invite doubt in the policy circles in Washington with regard to national security interests to help fight for a non-American territory, especially when the costs are extremely high.
In a nutshell, there have always been some doubts about whether the US would really honor its commitment to Taiwan.
Therefore, three questions are related to the credibility of US security commitments. First, does
Taiwan’s move toward de jure independence serve American interests? To many policy-makers in
Washington, the answer is probably not as shown by the successive US administrations’ actions.
Washington views any deviation from the status quo highly risky. Secondly, does Taiwan deserve long-term American security commitments? One the one hand, Taiwan does possess something valuable to the US such as democratic, strategic, and economic values. But on the other hand, as the
US switches its global policies to the war on terror and world economy, and needs China’s support in these areas, Taiwan’s importance to the US diminishes.
This is the reason why some scholars like Boston College
Professor Robert Ross argue that “Taiwan is a vital interest of the PRC but ‘does not entail a vital interest of the United States.’”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Thomas, inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, former Research director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, “Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United
States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations,” Maureen and Mike
Mansfield Foundation, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/pubs/pub_pdfs/One%20Step%20Fingar.pdf)
The United States and China have an additional incentive to cooperate and avoid antagonistic behavior in Northeast Asia, namely, the strong desire of others in the region to escape having to make either/or choices about alignment
. Other states want to maintain good relations with both and to avoid jeopardizing the dependent dimensions of their relationships with both China and the U.S. Thus, for example, Japan and the ROK do not want to put their economic dependence on China at risk by having to side with the U.S. against China. They also want to avoid jeopardizing the security benefits they derive from U.S. extended deterrence by having to tilt toward China in order to protect their economic stakes
. Moreover, in a region where balance of power thinking is endemic, all prefer the benefits they think they derive from their relationships with both of the major players.
This is strikingly different than the situation during the Cold War when all willingly practiced what Mao described as
“leaning to one side.” No one wants to draw a line through the region with adversaries grouped on either side.
Preferences of and pressure from others in the region will reinforce already strong desires in Washington and Beijing to avoid confrontation
.
A2: Heg Mpx
(Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-butus-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE
Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations as marking the
end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy.
To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. “CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?” Latin American Studies Association,
2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)
Some realists posit that conflict
, even of a violent nature, is unavoidable between rising and declining powers
, citing as examples the twentieth century wars between Germany and the Allied powers, and between China and Japan. The transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States was more peaceful but facilitated by common political institutions and similar visions of the desirable international order, and by a demographic overlap that is largely absent from U.S.-China relations. Jack S.
Levy argues that traditional power-transition theorists
speak of a single, hierarchical, international system and neglect key issues in global regional interactions.
Specifically, he asks, Will China compromise core strategic interests of the United States at the regional level, including in the Western Hemisphere?
The simple fact of geographic distance eases the dangers that China might pose to the interests of the United States
or, for that matter, of Latin America. Further, as the liberal institutionalist G.
John
Ikenberry suggests: “The United States is a different type of hegemonic power than past leading states— and the order it has built is different than the orders of the past.
It is a wider and deeper political order than the orders of the past.” In this more optimistic view, China will surely seek a greater voice in global institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund and the World Trade Organization; but so long as the reigning powers are flexible and accommodate legitimate Chinese interests, tensions
stemming from China’s rise can be managed, and China can be integrated into the existing world system as a “responsible stakeholder,”
in the words of former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. Ultimately, human agency matters: How will individual leaders in Beijing, Washington, Brasília, and other
Latin American and world capitals interpret their own long-term interests, and how will they reconcile them with the interests of others? Will they imagine zero-sum games and thereby deepen the challenges to security inherent in an anarchic international system, or will they seek to avoid mutually destructive conflicts by adjusting to new power relations and by strengthening consensual international norms?

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Hiscock 5/16 (Geoff, former Asia business editor for CNN.com and is the author of “Earth Wars: The
Battle for Global Resources,” published by Wiley, “China Eyes Arctic Options in Energy, Transport” CNN,
May 16, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/16/business/china-arctic/index.html)//MM
(CNN) -- China's energy imports are so fundamental to its survival and development that China's new leadership has taken extraordinary steps to secure future supplies.
In a flurry of official visits over the past two months involving President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi,
China has sought to bolster its energy relations with big strategic neighbors Russia and India, key energy exporters Indonesia, Brunei and South Africa, emerging resources suppliers such as Tanzania and the
Republic of Congo in Africa, and renewable energy pioneer Germany.
In addition,
China hosted a visit by Australian leader Julia Gillard, whose discussions with Xi and Li touched on clean energy expertise and the burgeoning resources trade between the two countries.
China's push for energy security and its willingness to buy assets around the globe may drive up costs for other energy importers like India, Japan, South Korea and Europe.
They will have to compete with China through a combination of co-operation, conservation and technological advances.
But Xi maintains that China's investments are creating development opportunities for the rest of Asia and the world.
"The rest of Asia and the world cannot enjoy prosperity and stability without China," Xi told the Boao Forum held on the Chinese island of
Hainan island last month.
Next week,
Xi will visit the oil and gas-rich countries of Mexico and Trinidad & Tobago.
He will follow that with a two-day summit with U.S. President Barack Obama in California on June 7-8, where a packed agenda of political and commercial issues almost certainly will touch on energy.
China's big three state-owned oil and gas entities CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec already are investors in
North American energy assets.
There has been a spate of Chinese oil and gas investments in Africa, the Middle East, Russia and
Australia -- part of a multi-pronged push for the world's second largest economy to meet its energy needs.
In Moscow,
Xi and
Russian President Vladimir
Putin agreed to cooperate on oil and gas pipeline developments from Siberia to China, while state-owned Rosneft struck a deal with China's biggest oil and gas producer, China National Petroleum Corp, giving CNPC access to Arctic resources.
CNPC also agreed to buy more oil from Rosneft under a new 25-year loan deal, and to work with Russia's biggest gas exporter Gazprom on a new gas pipeline into China.
"Chinese-Russian cooperation in energy is manifold, comprehensive and full-fledged," Xi said.
But price, technology and the environment may all conspire to limit the China-Russia energy trade. The harsh operating conditions and environmental hazards of the Arctic may limit chances for cooperation. Big projects such as Yamal LNG in northwest Siberia are behind schedule because of the limited Arctic infrastructure.
As the technology improves,
China stands to benefit from gas and oil shipments via the Arctic Northern Sea
Route, but that will require massive investments in icebreakers and ice strengthened tankers.
China is spreading its energy bets, not wanting to become too reliant on any one place given the volatile political situation in many energy-providing countries.
Saudi Arabia has long been a valued supplier, as has Angola, while Iran and Iraq are coming back into contention. Sudan, Oman, Kuwait and Kazakhstan are other substantial exporters.
Australia is emerging as a key provider to China of liquefied natural gas
(
LNG
) from its North West Shelf operations -- where CNPC has invested 10% of the future Browse project.
North America could also become a competitive supplier of LNG after 2015 as a result of its shale gas bonanza that is rewriting the global energy trade outlook. CNPC and China's two other main state-owned oil and gas entities, Sinopec and CNOOC, have invested in Canadian and
U.S. oil and gas projects.
China has its own substantial shale gas reserves in areas such as the Sichuan and Tarim basins, of which 36 trillion cubic meters could be recoverable, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Besides government deals,
China is leaning more on the expertise of international oil and gas majors.
Shell has a government-approved production sharing contact with CNPC in a shale gas exploration block in the Sichuan basin. Chevron has begun a shale gas drilling program with Sinopec. ConocoPhillips, Total, BP and ExxonMobil also have shale aspirations in China.
In the meantime, gas piped from Central Asia has been a mainstay of China's economy.
This year Turkmenistan will pump more gas through its 1830 kilometer Central Asian Gas Pipeline to China. Last October,
CNPC began work on one of China's biggest infrastructure projects, the $20 billion, 5000-kilometer pipeline from Xinjiang in the northwest to Fujian province on China's southeast coast. Completion is expected in 2015, and most of the gas will come from Central Asia, with about 5 billion cubic meters from Xinjiang.
Later this year, there will be another option when the new 770 kilometer gas pipeline from Myanmar's Kyaukpyu port in the Bay of Bengal to
Kunming in Yunnan province is expected to becoming operational, supplying up to 12 billion cubic meters a year of gas drawn mainly from
Myanmar's offshore fields.
All of these developments underpin one fundamental fact: China's appetite for energy is voracious, and growing.
Cordova 6/2 (Javier, AP writer in San Jose, Costa Rica, “China’s President Visits Latin America, Eyes
Mexico’s plans to Open Energy Sector” June 2, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/02/china-president-visits-latin-america-eyes-mexico-plans-toopen-energy-sector/)//MM
MEXICO CITY –
China has invested heavily in resource-rich Latin America in recent years
, striking major trade deals with governments from Venezuela to Argentina. Now its president is reaching out to one of the few countries in the region where ties have been slow to develop: Mexico.
President Xi Jinping's three-day visit starting Tuesday comes as Mexico debates opening its highly regulated energy sector to more foreign investment.
China's president has said he plans to address Mexico's large trade deficit with the Asian power and discuss ways to increase Mexican exports.
Analysts say that could mean oil, which Mexico has and China needs to fuel its expanding economy and the cars of its growing middle class.
"Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and
Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. "Clearly there is an interest by China in
Mexican oil."
The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in the United States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica.
China and Trinidad have had diplomatic ties for almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa Rica is the only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China.
U.S. trade still dwarfs China's for the three countries Xi is visiting. But China's trade with Costa Rica and with Mexico has tripled since 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund.
Relations with Mexico had been chilly in the past
, especially when former President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and harmed Chinese-Mexican relations."
President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in December, has been aggressive so far about changing that, and the two new presidents reportedly hit if off on a personal level when Pena Nieto visited China and met with Xi in April. That resulted in an unusually quick diplomatic follow-up, just two months into Xi's presidency.
During the April talks,
Xi said "he is committed to working with Mexican authorities to help Mexico export more
," Mexico's vice minister of foreign relations, Carlos de Icaza, told The Associated Press.
That's key for Mexico, because its trade deficit with China is exploding, far surpassing that of any other Latin American nation.
While China is looking to assure supplies of raw materials, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long been dominated by its superpower neighbor to the north.
"In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I think it has arrived to stay, the world's second economic power," De Icaza said. Mexico "has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation that has such great strategic value."
De Icaza said the countries hope to sign at least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit.
Mexican exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as copper and lead.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according to the U.N. economic agency for the region.
Many countries balance those imports by sending China raw materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina. But
Mexico's exports go overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border.
Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes.
"China needs to guarantee oil for its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said.
At the same time,
Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people."
State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been minimal.
Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported.
Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and about 7 percent to the "Far East."
It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives.
In April, during Pena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec.
Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well.
"China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the
Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs."
Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla said her country is looking for agreements in the areas of clean energy, public transportation and student exchanges after Xi arrives Sunday. The government also wants to give a final push to negotiations for the joint construction of a $1.3 billion refinery on Costa Rica's Caribbean coast.
Reuters 6/21 (“UPDATE 1—China’s Iran Crude Imports Jump Ahead of U.S. Sanctions Waiver” June 21,
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/china-oil-iran-idUSL3N0EX17B20130621)//MM
*
China's May crude imports up 49.5 pct from April
* Iran imports jump in final month before U.S. waiver renewed
* Iran crude imports up 6.4 pct in May from year ago
* Jan-May Iran crude imports up 10 pct from same period 2012
BEIJING, June 21 (Reuters)
- China's average daily crude imports from Iran jumped nearly 50 percent in May from the previous month
, back around levels before sanctions were slapped on the Middle Eastern country over its disputed nuclear programme two years ago.
The jump in China's imports of Iranian crude to 555,557 barrels per day (bpd) came just before the
United States renewed the country's waiver on U.S. sanctions
aimed at cutting off Iran's oil revenues and bringing it to the negotiating table.
But industry sources with knowledge of China's crude imports said the surge from Iran may be due to the timings of cargo arrivals and how they were counted by the General Administration of Customs (GAC). The sources said China's two main importers - Sinopec Corp and Zhuhai
Zhenrong - do not usually vary their term crude imports widely month-to-month.
China, the world's second biggest oil consumer, bought 2.36 million tonnes of Iranian crude in May, equivalent to about 555,557 bpd, data from the GAC showed on Friday.
That was up 49.5 percent from the 371,500 bpd of Iranian crude that China imported in April, the data showed. The May level rose 6.4 percent from 521,936 bpd a year earlier.
China and other buyers of Iranian oil including India, Japan and South Korea have been pressured by U.S. and European sanctions since early last year to cut imports.
The United States in early June renewed waivers on sanctions for China and other Asian countries in exchange for their reducing purchases of crude from Iran.
China's imports for the first five months of the year were up about 10 percent from the same period a year ago. The import figures for May and year-to-date contrasted sharply with China's oil shipments from Iran in 2012, when the intake of Iranian barrels was about 438,448 bpd, down
21 percent versus 2011.
The U.S. and European measures aimed at Iran's oil exports cut them to their lowest in decades in
May and have been costing the country billions of dollars in lost revenue per month. Washington is now seeking to cut Iran's oil shipments further through tighter sanctions.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
India, Iran's second largest customer, cut its Iranian crude imports
12.2 percent in May compared with a year ago. South Korea reduced its imports of oil from Iran by 8.3 percent from the month compared to
May 2012.
China has repeatedly voiced its opposition to unilateral sanctions outside those by the United Nations, such as those imposed by the United States.
China's total crude imports in May inched up 0.4 percent from a year earlier to 5.64 million bpd, customs data showed earlier in the month.
(Reporting by Judy Hua and Fayen Wong; Editing by Tom Hogue)
Ighobor 13 (Kingsley, Public Information Officer, Strategic Communications Division at the UN headquarters, New York, “China in the Heart of Africa” Africa Renewal Online, January 2013, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2013/china-heart-africa)//MM
"China’s gift to Africa.” The new headquarters of the African Union, a towering 20-storey building in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is so called because
China picked up the $200 million tab for the state-of-the-art complex. Ethiopia’s tallest building, completed in December 2011 in time for an AU summit the following month, includes a 2,500-seat conference hall. The gift prompted Ethiopia’s late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to refer to
Africa’s current economic boom as a “renaissance,” due partly to China’s “amazing re-emergence and its commitments to a win-win partnership with Africa.”
Not all Africans have welcomed China’s gift. West African political commentator Chika Ezeanya considers it an “insult to the AU and to every
African that in 2012 a building as symbolic as the AU headquarters is designed, built and maintained by a foreign country.” However, as African leaders savoured the swanky complex in January, they took turns thanking China.
China’s largess to Africa is not new. Previously China had either donated or assisted in building a hospital in Luanda, Angola; a road from Lusaka,
Zambia’s capital, to Chirundu in the southeast; stadiums in Sierra Leone and Benin; a sugar mill and a sugarcane farm in Mali; and a water supply project in Mauritania, among other projects. At the fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Beijing in July 2012, Chinese
President Hu Jintao listed yet more, including 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centres and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centres.
African leaders continue to insist that the relationship with China is not a one-way street and that it includes more trade than aid. Indeed, trade between Africa and China was $166 billion in 2011, according to the Economist, a UK weekly. “The good thing about this partnership is that it’s a give and take,” Faida Mitifu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s ambassador to the US, told the Reuters news agency.
Eye on the pie
What then is China taking?
In China Returns to Africa, a collection of essays published by Columbia University
Press, the editors Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira note, “The overarching driver has been the Chinese government’s strategic pursuit of resources and attempts to ensure raw material supplies for growing energy needs within China.” The world’s second-biggest economy currently buys more than one-third of Africa’s oil.
In addition,
China’s industries are getting raw materials such as coal from South Africa, iron ore from
Gabon, timber from Equatorial Guinea and copper from Zambia.
Chinese industries also require new markets for their products and Africa is a potentially enormous outlet. “China is repositioning itself continuously for the new Africa that’s emerging,”
says Kobus van der
Wath, founder of Beijing Axis, an international advisory and procurement firm based in Beijing.
Chinese products have flooded markets in Johannesburg, Luanda, Lagos, Cairo, Dakar and other cities, towns and villages in Africa. Those goods include clothing, jewellery, electronics, building materials and much more. “Even little things like matches, tea bags, children’s toys and bathing soaps are coming from China,” says Bankole Aluwe of Alaba market in Lagos, Nigeria.
African consumers like Chinese products because they are affordable. “Chinese goods are cheaper than those from Europe and North America. In our business, price is very important to customers,”
Mr.
Aluwe says.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Ighobor 13 (Kingsley, Public Information Officer, Strategic Communications Division at the UN headquarters, New York, “China in the Heart of Africa” Africa Renewal Online, January 2013, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2013/china-heart-africa)//MM
Western concerns
In the view of David Shinn, former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, the West is nervous about China’s activities in Africa. Mr. Shinn adds that China’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries and its fast approach to aid delivery make it more attractive than Western donors, whose aid often comes with demands to improve human rights and democracy.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently warned against a “new colonialism in Africa,” in which it is “easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave.” It was a veiled jab at China, according to the Guardian, a UK newspaper. But Ms. Clinton’s point echoed across the continent, and it appears that African leaders are now treading cautiously.
South African President Jacob Zuma warned in July that the current “unbalanced” trade pattern is unsustainable. He was referring to the tendency of Africa to export raw materials to China while largely importing only cheap manufactured goods. Maged Abdelaziz, the UN
Secretary-General’s special adviser on Africa, told Africa Renewal that the continent must develop a strategy for its dealings with emerging economic giants such as China, Brazil and India.
Along this line, talks began in South Africa in June 2011 to merge three regional trade groupings (the East African Community, the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Southern African Development Community) into a “grand free trade area” incorporating 26 countries with a combined gross domestic product of $1 trillion. Such a combined strength could give Africa a more assertive voice at the negotiating table.
The China-Africa relationship will get stronger. The editors of China Returns to Africa sum it up: So long as Africa’s development requires huge foreign investments, so long will China continue to be relevant. “Irrespective of the concerns being voiced in some circles in Africa, Chinese involvement is widely considered to be a positive-sum game.”

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
GEN 13 (GEN—Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News, Ricardo Camargo Mendes, Caio Jacon,
“Despite Serious Challenges, South America Has Biotech Potential” “Despite Seroius Challenges, South
America Has Biotech Potential”)//MM
Biotechnology is widely believed to be the next technological frontier for South American countries, given the region's biodiversity, high availability of fertile lands for biomass production, and recent economic growth.
However, the development of this industry in the region still faces serious challenges, including low research and development (R&D) spending, reliance on public funding, lagging innovation, structural heterogeneity, weak intellectual property protection, a lack of coordination between private and public sectors, and other structural deficiencies that may jeopardize the region's ambition to be a major player in the scientific breakthroughs biotechnology promises to bring about.
The region is mainly a consumer of technologies developed elsewhere, but there are many reasons to believe that this current scenario can change.
The world needs more food as well as sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels, and South America is uniquely positioned to help solve both issues. Since the last decade, the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has grown substantially in farmsteads across Argentina and Brazil—and to a lesser extent in Paraguay and Uruguay—leading to increased productivity. Argentina's biodiesel production has increased to the point where the nation is a key exporter, and, with its enhanced sugarcane, Brazil remains the most efficient producer of bioethanol
—and is now pursuing more efficient methods of producing cellulosic ethanol. Chile, which currently does not have any competitive advantages in traditional biotechnology, is working on increasing funds to finance modern biotechnology
R&D. Clearly, South American countries have successful stories to share with the world.
The outlook for the biotechnology industry is, however, more important than its current footprint. Investments in R&D, although still insufficient, are increasing. Governments are seeking mechanisms to attract private investments while increasing public funds.
The number of students seeking advanced degrees in the field is growing, and biotechnology clusters are being formed worldwide. Brazil, the largest country in South America, accounts for more than 50% of the biotechnology R&D investments in South America.1
Argentina
Most of the activities—and successes—in South America are related to traditional biotechnology
.
Modern biotechnology requires skilled labor and large R&D funding, both of which the majority of countries in the region lack. According to the
World Bank Data Catalog of South American countries Brazil spends the largest share of its gross domestic product (GDP) on R&D (1.08% in
2008). By comparison, the US devoted 2.79% of its GDP to R&D activities in the same year
. The only other country in
South America to spend more than 0.40% of its GDP on R&D in 2008 was Argentina, which invested 0.52%.2
With its vast availability of land,
Argentina is already the second largest producer of biodiesel in South America and produces the largest amount of genetically modified crops among South American countries
. In the
1990s, Argentina created the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (National Agency for Scientific and Technological
Promotion), which created several funds for the development of new technologies. A significant share of these funds was devoted to biotechnology, including Argentina's Technological Fund (FONTAR), the main source of finance used by biotechnology firms. Law 26.270/2007,
Promotion of the Development and Production of Modern Biotechnology, was also approved in accordance with the 2005–2015 strategic plan for the Development of Agricultural Biotechnology (resolution 293/2005 of Argentina's Ministry of Economy and Production) to foster investment and research in modern biotechnology.3
Chile
Chile differs from other South American countries in land availability and origin of funds.
The country is a long, narrow territory compressed between the ocean and the Andes Mountains, but its extensive coastline gives Chile an advantage in producing biofuels from algae
. Because land scarcity has given Chile a competitive disadvantage in firstgeneration biofuels, investors in the region pay greater attention to second-generation biofuels
. Chile has also managed to mobilize private funds to promote R&D. For instance, Burrill & Company has established a presence in Chile (as well as in Brazil), and has created the Burrill Chile F3 Life Sciences Capital Fund with $50 million of committed capital.
This investment fund is aimed at life science companies that, among other activities, develop research in agricultural and marine biotechnology, industrial biotechnology, and biofuels
.4 The main public agency for financing in Chile is the CORFO

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
(Production Development Corporation) through InnovaChile, and Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad (Innovation Fund for
Competitiveness) also finances research. However, R&D investment still represents a low percentage of Chile's GDP, and the success of biotechnology in Chile will depend on the country's ability to increase access to funds. Private investment should play a key role in this process as well.
Mackler 08 (Bruce, a senior advisor in FDA matters, “Latin American Biotech Steadily Emerges” GEN—
Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News, Vol. 28, No. 19, Nov 1, 2008, http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/latin-american-biotech-steadily-emerges/2669/)//MM
The excitement generated by “
Biolatina
” held last month in Sao Paulo, Brazil, confirmed that biotechnology is emerging in
Latin America as a major economic sector
, building momentum with new technologies and partnering opportunities.
Fundação
Biominas, the prime organizer of Biolatina, believes that the meeting contributes to a more favorable business environment in Latin America, facilitating the creation and development of biotechnology companies
.
Brazil is the preeminent Latin American country in terms of the number of biotech companies— there are 71 established biotechnology companies in Brazil.
Approximately 10 Brazilian biotech companies have fully emerged from academic and research programs, and they are perceived to have excellent chances of success through partnering and providing products for the local market.
The remaining 60+ Brazilian biotech companies are still academically based and success is less certain.
To drive the development
of these nascent firms
, the Brazilian Innovation Agency recently announced a three-tiered funding program
. Although there was broad approval of the program at the meeting, many local biotech executives wondered whether this funding will drive academic expectations of company valuations too high and whether there will be sufficient local venture capital community to fund these companies once the federal funds are exhausted.
Several speakers provided insights into the realities of corporate relationships, private and public funding, governmental policies, regulations, and clinical studies. Steven Burrill, president of Burrill & Company, provided his perspective on the biotech industry over the last year, and his analysis and predictions through 2020. He believes that Latin American biotech companies can compete globally with their health-, agriculture-, and biofuels-related technologies.
Mark Edwards, founder and managing director of Recombinant Capital (now part of Deloitte), subsequently examined the realities of alliances between academic and corporate entities. This topic was especially important to the Brazilians that see partnering as central to the development of biotech in Latin America. Christian Suojanen, secretary general of the European Federation of Biotechnology, further counseled the nascent industry to focus on its strengths and comply with international standards.
The regional nature of the Biolatina meeting was exemplified by the diversity of groups participating from all over Latin America. Neos is a private technology transfer office located in Santiago, Chile. It was formed in 2003 to facilitate the spread of Chilean and Latin American innovations across developed countries. Its goal is to serve “as a connecting channel between universities and state companies, so as to detect and seize the synergies that provide value to local technological innovation.”
Octantis, another Chilean initiative that counsels developing companies, has invested over $20 million into firms operating out of its incubator in Santiago, Chile. Ocantis also advises clients to visit the U.S. to obtain partnering exposure and raise funds.
These Chilean efforts, like those of Fundacao Biominas in Brazil, are examples of private-sector entrepreneurial efforts to create and foster commercialization of local technological innovations. In the U.S., Europe, and Japan such efforts are coordinated by trade association.

{F ILE T ITLE } GBS 2013
[A UTHOR N AME ]
Sarmiento-Saher 6/7 (Sebastian, an editorial assistant at The Diplomat, “Is Xi’s Chinese Dream
Compatible with Latin America’s?” The Diplomat, June 7, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/isxis-chinese-dream-compatible-with-latin-americas/)//MM
As Chinese President Xi Jinping concludes his trip to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), including Mexico, it is worth probing the trip for what it can reveal about Beijing’s future in the region and beyond.
Mr. Xi visited Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, and Mexico – countries that are important in their own way. Trinidad and Tobago is a pearl in the Caribbean for its steady economic development and oil and gas reserves, which have made the country a regional petroleum hub. Costa
Rica is one of the world’s oldest democracies, a key player in renewable energy, and is considered a success story in a troubled neighborhood.
Mexico has the second largest economy in Latin America with an attractive oil industry that could be improved and opened through reforms.
Taken together, these countries offer what China is looking for: a stable and reliable source of energy to fuel its own economy.
Beyond securing resources, Mr. Xi may also be using this trip as a PR opportunity to improve China’s image in the developing world
. While
Beijing emphasizes its “peaceful rise” in geopolitics, it is also trying to fight the perception that China’s size and stature in the world economy are crowding out other emerging countries, and dominating its smaller partners. With this Latin American tour,
Mr.
Xi was hoping to demonstrate that states of any size or condition can have a harmonious relationship with China.
Despite these good intentions, China’s economic ties with Latin America are complicated by the fact that their economies are not entirely complementary.
While Chinese trade and investment with Latin American countries have grown rapidly over the past several years, the rise in Sino-LAC business has also been accompanied by significant competition between both sides. China’s demand for commodities has benefitted Latin American countries and firms that export resources ranging from soy beans to oil. On the other hand, the sheer scale and competitiveness of Chinese industry has put pressure on manufacturers across Latin America.
Mexico in particular has been bearing the brunt of Chinese manufacturing competitiveness both in its primary export market, the U.S., and at home
. Added to that is the pressure of a large trade deficit in which Mexico imported
Chinese goods valued at US$57 billion while only exporting US$5.7 billion to China itself last year.
Despite a chill in relations between China and Mexico in recent years, both countries have new leaders in Xi Jinping and Enrique Peña Nieto who have signaled their intention to reset relations. With Mr. Peña Nieto’s visit to China in April and Mr. Xi’s trip to Mexico about to end, both sides appear to be interested in finding areas where they can cooperate for both sides’ benefits and downplaying competition. For instance, if
Mr. Peña Nieto is able to make needed reforms in Mexico’s oil industry, China could become a big investor and consumer in that field.
Additionally, both leaders have signed agreements in mining and infrastructure, agreed to China purchasing US$1 billion worth of Mexican goods, and opened the Chinese market to Mexican pork and tequila.
Still, while Chinese investment in the infrastructure and industries that focus on the extraction of natural resources and pledges to import more from other countries are good, but they cannot completely paper over the difficulties Mexico has encountered in competing with Chinese manufacturing
. For example, while it is true that Mexico has regained competitiveness and market share vis-à-vis China as a result of exogenous factors, this trend alone might not guarantee long-term survival. In 2003, both countries made two million cars per year – today,
China produces 20 million while Mexico only makes 2.5 million. Additionally, Latin American countries’ hopes of moving into high-end manufacturing could be dashed by China’s desire to do the same.
This does not mean that the good intentions between China and Latin America are doomed to be overshadowed by zero-sum competition for market share. Chinese cooperation gives LAC countries the opportunity to address other sources of growth and development, such as improving domestic governance and strengthening regional integration. Rather than looking inward, initiatives like the Pacific Alliance could leverage Latin America’s proximity to the United States or ties to Europe as a new base from which to assemble and export Chinese goods.
Alternatively, LAC countries could become part of a broader value chain where their trade with China in finished goods declines relative to trade in intermediate goods. In other words, Latin American states could join countries like Taiwan and South Korea in supplying China with components for the production of finished products.
While competition between China and Latin America will not go away anytime soon, Xi Jinping’s visit to the region and a greater willingness to cooperate from both sides show that economic rivalry can be managed to a certain extent. Whether Mr. Xi’s visit is the prelude to a new era of enhanced ties or a rehash of Beijing’s previous policies to secure more sources of energy in the region will depend not just on good will, but also on how leaders can develop creative solutions that extend benefits to as many parties as possible. As Sino-Latin American relations continue to evolve, many in the Americas should expect more developments to come from across the Pacific.