Zappa 1
Frank Zappa
Dr. Jeremy Kirby
PHIL 389
April 11, 2012
I Really Just Want to Believe Batman Exists
Claims concerning the nature of existence have persisted in the philosophical community
for eons; of particular interest are works by Bertrand Russell, Amie Thomasson, and Stephen
Yablo. In these works, the authors attempt to explain how language accounts for typical
problems regarding the nature of non-existents. In addition to puzzling through competing
theories and presenting new or reconceived theories, Yablo elaborates on the debate between
Quine and Carnap, which he believes demonstrates two differing approaches (quizzical and
curious) to the problem of existence. When these competing theories are weighed against one
another, Thomasson’s conceptualization of fictional objects as artifacts does the best job
explaining how language accounts for non-existent objects, particularly fictional characters.
In response to Frege’s theory of language and existence, Bertrand Russell offered his own
account in his work “On Denoting.” The article discusses the problem of propositions and how
phrases like “The present king of France is bald” seem to focus on a non-existent subject. Frege
and Russell both ask how we, the listener, make sense of statements that do not refer to any
existent thing; Russell offers a compelling theory to explain how we understand propositions.
For example, Russell dissects the phrase “The present king of France is bald,” breaking it down
into three separate claims: (1) There is at least one person who is the present king of France. (2)
There is at most one person who is the present king of France. (3) Whoever this person is, he is
bald. If understood in this way, the subject of the phrase is no longer the non-existent present
Zappa 2
king of France; rather, the subject becomes “one person,” which is a tangible, existent object
(Russell, 55).
In addition to helping us understand the way we make sense of sentences containing nonexistents, Russell’s theory allows for us to make sense of sentences asserting and denying the
existence of certain objects (“Pegasus does not exist”). When these propositions are broken down
into the three component parts Russell suggests, he is able to assert the proposition’s uniqueness
(there is at most one and at least one person) and shift the subject to an actual object, thus
predicating the term “one person” (Russell, 47 ). In cases where the speaker asserts that an object
does not exist, this method separates the proposition into three separate claims making the
subject into “everything.” If understood this way, the phrase “Pegasus does not exist” means
“Everything fails to Pegas-ize.” If everything fails to be Pegasus, then we are talking about
everything that exists. The typical problems associated with non-existents are thought to dissolve
when faced with Russell’s theory.
However, the heart of Russell’s argument rests on the assumption that non-existents do
not refer. To some, this assumption is unwarranted and ensures that fictional objects and
characters will need to be addressed with theories like Russell and Frege’s. If we adopt
Meinong’s conception, however, we have no need to replace the subject “present king of France”
or “Pegasus.” These objects are simply things that subsist rather than exist. This conception,
Russell argues, allows for objects like “the round square” to “subsist,” which does not explain
how we understand them (Russell, 54). We still might ask, with regards to Meinong’s theory,
what exists and what subsists; however, simply questioning whether or not certain ideas or
concepts exist can be problematic in itself. Yablo, in his critique of Quine and Carnap, shows
different approaches to these ontological questions, offering the possibility that we are mistaken
Zappa 3
because we ignore the context in which we ask ourselves ontologically philosophical questions
like whether or not numbers exist.
Yablo believes that philosophers address ontological existence claims in one of two
ways: the first option is the quizzical, the other curious. A quizzical approach doubts there is
much information to be gained by questioning the existence of Chicago, numbers, and other
abstract objects (Yablo, 231). The curious, often associated with analytic philosophy, is more
concerned with finding the answers to the ontological existence questions raised (Yablo, 230231). The quizzical approach is underrepresented in the philosophical community today; Yablo
argues that this is because of Quine’s devastating refutation of Carnap’s conception of the
analytic/synthetic distinction and the ensuing discussion of the external/internal distinction (232).
Though Yablo feels the quizzical camp may have interesting information to offer to the debate,
but ultimately asserts that Quine’s theory is better suited to deal with existence claims:
Quine’s idea was that our ordinary methods could be ‘jumped up’ into a test of literal
truth by applying them in a sufficiently principled and long-term way. I take it as a given
that this is the one idea with any hope of attaching believable truth values to
philosophical existence-claims. (Yablo, 259)
Yablo then concludes that most philosophical questions are likely “moot,” and that Quine would
solve any important philosophical existence claims satisfyingly.
Part of his conclusion rests on arguments made regarding the analytic/synthetic
distinction, which in turn invites a metaphorical/literal distinction (Yablo 233). Here, “[n]ot even
Quine considers it ontologically committing to say in a figurative vein that there are Xs” (Yablo,
233). Carnap relies on “a standard to which all meaningful talk is subject, an appropriate sort of
discipline or rule-governedness” (Yablo, 233). This makes his conception of existence contextdependent, and to a certain degree Yablo agrees, noting that the curious approach is a
Zappa 4
traditionally analytic methodology used in philosophical contexts. When discussing existence
within a specific framework, the question of existence is internal. Curious (or analytic)
philosophers are typically more concerned with these types of questions; Yablo believes these
sorts of questions may be pointless since they are only important in the one context. Quine,
typically read, believes existence is derived if and only if “it is a commitment of your best
theory, i.e., the theory’s truth requires it” (Yablo, 245). The metaphorical/literal distinction is
fuzzier and harder to distinguish than the distinction between analytic and synthetic; thus, if
existence-questions were of any real interest, Quine’s theory would have solved them. Since it
does not solve some of the questions, they are pointless questions and Yablo recommends simply
adopting Quine and dismissing a large portion of existence-questions (Yablo, 259-260).
For Thomasson, questions of existence are rooted in an understanding of fictional objects
and characters as artifacts of their creators; in this sense, their existence is dependent on actual
people (Thomasson, 59). This conception, better than perhaps Quine or Russell, offers an
explanation for why fictional characters in particular go on existing long after the authors who
created them have died, and how many of us recognize these characters as something that
appears to refer. Two similar characters, for example, are easily distinguishable if their creators
are two independent authors; an artifactual account of fictional characters and objects is
supported by this observation (Thomasson, 60). Perhaps most interestingly, this particular theory
has the potential to widen philosophical surroundings, meaning “the ontology of fiction can thus
serve as a model for the ontology of other social and cultural objects in the everyday world”
(Thomasson, 64). Confining our understanding of existent objects to “real entities” can be
damaging and is sometimes referred to as the “Russelian rut.” In our everyday lives and
embedded in our cultures is the overwhelming presence of fictional characters and objects for
Zappa 5
which we share an understanding. Thomasson’s unique approach is one that blends Meinong’s
broad acceptance of objects both real and imagined with the careful consideration of Yablo when
he dissects the real issues undercutting Quine and Carnap’s dispute.
One might interpret Thomasson’s theory as one that suggests ignoring the question “Does
Sherlock Holmes exist?” in favor of a question about the character’s origin. Similar to Yablo’s
question about our approach and agenda when we question the existence of abstract entities,
Thomasson is deflecting question about characters’ existence in favor of a more thoughtful
examination of the creation and tradition of fictional entities. Their unique conception and “life”
after the death of their respective authors makes fictional characters objects in the sense that they
were “created at a certain point in time, not merely discovered or picked out” (Thomasson, 65).
They exist, at first as characters created by writers, and later continue to exist as characters to
which a large audience shares access. This conception solves a persistent problem with
Meinong’s conceptualization, which claims fictional characters are simply picked out or
discovered among an infinite or untold number of characters authors peruse during moments of
inspiration.
Many philosophers who address the problem of non-existents refer to Meinong and his
initial theory; Russell, Yablo, and Thomasson each reject his theory writ large, but they use his
broad conception of existence as a standard against which they may measure their own theories.
Russell, seeing that Meinong’s theory fails to make a truly compelling case for the
existence/subsistence distinction, offers a unique and logical way of dissecting propositions
concerning non-existents so that they refer. Yablo, exploring Quine and Carnap’s theories,
asserts that the problem of non-existents is not of any particular interest to the philosophical
community since he believes Quine’s theory is the most practical and useful of the theories.
Zappa 6
According to Quine, existence depends simply on the utility and usefulness of the object in
question’s existence. The many distinctions we wrestle with when trying to accommodate more
extreme or confusing cases of existence are only interesting in philosophical contexts, and have
no real-world application. The problem, for Yablo, is a non-problem. In contrast, Thomasson
believes our inability to explain the existence or role of non-existents in language and
philosophical ontologies to be a result of ignoring these objects’ and characters’ artifactual
backgrounds.
Thomasson’s account, which focuses on the linguistic role of storytelling and the realworld objects with which characters and objects are often associated, is the most generous that
does not assert the real physical existence of Pegasus, the round square, and the character
Sherlock Holmes. In some ways, this is the most intuitive response, since we often associate
characters with their authors. As argued above, whenever we are confused about similar fictional
objects, we defer to their creators for definitive answers regarding their “identities.” Perhaps
Russell’s theory could accommodate this by understanding statements like “The present king of
France is bald” to mean, “the fictional entity known as ‘the present king of France,’ conceived by
me, is bald.” This way, we acknowledge that the abstract entity is abstract and fictional without
also asserting that these things simply do not exist. There is no reason to claim “Everything fails
to be Pegasus” when we can simply refer to the Greek authors who inspired and created the
fictional creature we understand to be Pegasus. According to Thomasson, it might be thought
that Pegasus does in fact exist through its continued use and presence in literature both old and
new.
Similarly, Yablo’s argument may also be able to work in conjunction with Thomasson’s
artifactual theory. Perhaps it is useful and essential to our ontology and overall theory of
Zappa 7
language to grant fictional objects and characters existence; otherwise, our language is severely
flawed and we rely on this flawed system in order to communicate and make sense of the world,
physical and not, that surrounds us. The metaphorical/literal distinction, similar to the
internal/external distinction, is not important when characters are dependent on intentional acts
of creation. These fuzzy distinctions disappear in Thomasson’s distinction, which also avoids
problems commonly associated with Sartre and Meinong (Thomasson, 70). Even though Yablo
seems to lament the complete abandonment in the face of Carnap’s “loss” to Quine during a
debate concerning existence, ontology, and the analytic/synthetic distinction, Yablo dismisses
the problems even Quine’s theory fails to address (Yablo, 259-260). These complicated cases do
not create problems in Thomasson’s theory, which is simple in that abstract entities exist when
they have been intentionally created by a person.
Thomasson’s theory does not answer the problem of certain abstract entities; her focus on
fictional characters prevents the theory from explaining in real detail how we understand abstract
entities like “April” and “Chicago.” These are not intentionally constructed concepts that we
repeatedly associate with a particular author or creator. Rather, “April” is a socially agreed-upon
abstract entity that persists much like a fictional character persists through our repeated exposure
to him or her through literary works. Though we might understand abstract entities in this way,
the argument for their existence is not as compelling as her argument regarding fictional
characters. Here, Russell’s theory provides the most consistent answer, though his theory does
not seem to adequately capture how we understand fictional characters.
An important facet of human life and our linguistic tradition, fictional characters must be
included in a competitive ontological theory. Their presence across all cultures alone makes their
inclusion in any ontological theory temptingly necessary. Both Russell and Quine seem to want
Zappa 8
the speaker to refer to fictional characters as fictional characters. We must qualify statements
about Holmes by prefacing them with “In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s books,” or “the fictional
character Sherlock Holmes.” These qualifiers either alter the context of the discussion or create
space for Holmes as a sort of object insofar that he is an acknowledged character. However,
when these sorts of phrases are included, otherwise perfectly comprehensible statements like
“Sherlock Holmes is my favorite fictional detective” do not make sense. Similarly, to say the
fictional character Holmes is a detective is actually false since fictional characters cannot be
anything other than fictional characters. Thomasson’s theory, which establishes fictional
characters as intentional artifacts, makes it possible to discuss Holmes as a fictional character
and as Holmes, an inhabitant of a created literary world.
Humanity’s rich storytelling tradition hints that we are committed to fictional characters;
this paves the way for other fictional entities to exist similarly. Though there may not be a
singular author or creator for these other abstract objects, they can be thought to exist in a similar
manner. They are tied to reality and existence through our continued understanding of these
words and phrases as communicative tools. In this sense, Thomasson’s argument is markedly
different than either Russell’s or Yablo’s; her attention to the importance of fictional characters
as functioning abstract entities in our day-to-day ontologies remains an unanswered strongpoint
in her argument for fictional characters as artifacts.
Zappa 9
Works Cited
Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting.” Logic and Knowledge. The MacMillan Company: New York.
1956. Print.
Thomasson, Amie. “If We Postulated Fictional Objects, What Would They Be?” Fiction and
Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 1999. Print.
Yablo, Stephen. “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?” Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume 72. pp. 229-283. 1998. Print.