Hussein’s Power 1
Saddam Hussein’s ambition power
During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88
Artavazd Knyazyan
American Government
Mr. Composto
May 5, 2014
Hussein’s Power 2
During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, both Iran and Iraq had paid $65 billion for
weaponry imported from foreign countries to support them during their war. From the help of
Saudi Arabia and other countries, Iran and Iraq obtained large amounts of munitions and
weaponry during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. Both sides were supported by advanced combat
technology such as fighter aircrafts, attack helicopters, tanks, heavy artillery pieces and armored
personnel carriers. Also both countries were equipped with nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons along with ballistic missiles. These arms trade during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 was
the main fact which made a major impact during the Gulf War of 1990-91. The wars damaged
both infrastructures and the citizens within their countries and Iraq appealed from the wars with
more victories than defeats which seemed to be leading over Iran and the course of the wars. The
facts that made Iraq victorious were as follows: The empowerment of Iraq, the impoverishment
of Iraq, Iraq’s quarrel with Kuwait and the US embrace of Saddam Hussein. Also the Gulf War
was considered an Arab civil war because it was the first time that an Arab state attacked and
invaded another Arab state.
During the Gulf War Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates of flooding world oil markets, which resulted in his use of military forces to take over
Kuwait on August 2, 1990. George H. W. Bush became involved and supported Iraq with
military equipment against Iran forces during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, which would lead to
the Gulf War.
The empowerment of Iraq
The powerful movement and method that Iraq used to empower themselves was their
capacity to import approximately three times much weaponry as Iran did during the Iran-Iraq
War of 1980-88. Iraq had also greater success in obtaining them by giving more advantages
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during wars. By the arms trade Iraq emerged from the 1980-88 conflict with well-equipped
military forces. Saddam Hussein gained more confidence in destroying Iran and which latter on
he decided to go and take over Kuwait in August 1990. “According to conservative estimates,
the two belligerents jointly suffered 367,000 dead and over 700,000 wounded during the war”
(Pierre, 1982, pp. 84, 14-54, 193-7). During the war, both Iraq and Iran experienced physical
devastation including the loss of human lives, destruction of cities, roads, bridges, refineries and
other forms of infrastructure. Both Iran and Iraq fought one battle after another trying to achieve
victory. At the beginning of the war in 1980 Iran obtained weapons from the United States
during the 1970s under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Iraq established arms-supply
relationship with France and the Soviet Union. Both countries had fought with their modern
combat systems from foreign suppliers such as tanks, artillery, aircrafts and so on. The United
States, France, and Soviet Union, had major influences over the war such as favoring one side or
the other to see which country would have more advantaged in military firepower. At the
beginning of the war major suppliers remained neutral in the conflict and avoided the delivering
of weaponry to either side. An example was when Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Iranian
territory which Iran had enough strength to push them out by themselves without any help and
support from foreign countries. When Iran invaded Iraq in July 1982, the major suppliers had
changed their attitudes; the United States started to aid Iraq directly and indirectly, France had
closer ties with Hussein and the Soviet Union joined the United States and France in aiding Iraq.
Other suppliers including Israel and North Korea became allied with Iran but Iraq was the
principal beneficiary of the arms flows. “Between 1981 and 1988, there was an arms-supply
arrangement which Iraq received 77% of external weaponry while Iran only received 23%”
(Cordesman & Wagner, 1990-1996, pp. 357-61, 431-3). This disadvantage from Iran’s side made
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them to use human-wave attacks against Iraqi positions which resulted in horrific casualty rates.
Iraq began to grow during this period because Hussein had superior access to ballistic missiles
and chemical-warfare technology; moreover, Iran obtained less-sophisticated weaponry and a
small number of missiles. When the Iran-Iraq War was coming to an end in 1988, Iraq achieved
major successes against Iran forces then Saddam Hussein had gained confidence which made
him to plan military actions against Kuwait. Also the Iran-Iraq War had impoverished Iraq
causing economical and political damages over the years. Then Iraq started borrowing heavily
from foreign countries to pay off and rebuild its damaged country (Bacevich & Inbar, 2003, pp.
54-65).
The impoverishment of Iraq
As Iraq had purchased large amounts of weaponry and munitions in 1980-88 it made him
more powerful and had much more successes during wars. When the Iran-Iraq War was over,
Iraq faced the task of rebuilding its damaged infrastructures and also to pay back the loans to its
creditors. Saddam Hussein began to suffer political problems within Iraq. The source of power
from Iraq’s side was the acquisitions of modern weapons in the 1980s. “According to the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the US Library of Congress, Iraq spent some $47
billion on imported weapons between 1981 and 1988, or approximately $6 billion per year”
(Grimmett, 1988, p. 41). By getting those loans from foreign countries it created an economic
crash and a decline on receiving capital from exported oil by dropping its value from $26 billion
in 1980 to $10 billion per year. With the total war expenses that Iraq bought imported weapons
represented a big impact in the economy. Iraq borrowed heavily from France, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, the Soviet Union and the United Arab Emirates in order to get as much weaponry as
possible borrowing a total of $60 billion during the 1980s from these foreign countries. Saddam
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Hussein didn’t pay these loans when the war was still going but when the war ended on 8 August
1988, Iraq began to face the task of paying back loans to their creditors and to rebuild damaged
infrastructures. They had to pay off $60 billion on loans because of the devastation and
destruction experienced by Iraq during the war with Iran. “According to some estimates, Iraq
suffered losses over $100 billion, much of which represented damage to its oil industry”
(Cordesman & Wagner, 1990-1996, p. 2). Saddam Hussein was desperate to rebuild its country
again to make the economy flow but to do that, he had to borrow more money. The Arab oil
states were not participating again on lending large sums of loans to Iraq because they were
nervous on not receiving back these loans as they see that Iraq is having a huge debt to pay off.
The price of oil exported from Iraq had declined heavily because of elevated production in
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. From that point on Iraq started accusing Kuwait as the one
that flooded the oil prices and made Iraq’s economy to fall apart. It was a way from Iraq to point
out fingers over other countries without any proves and reasons to have these support of lending
loans and military assistance to Iraq (Bacevich & Inbar, 2003, pp. 65-68).
Iraq’s quarrel with Kuwait
During The Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait was the significant one rather than other different
creditors providing loans to Iraq “According to some estimates, Kuwait lent Iraq some $10
billion for military purchases during the 1980-88 conflict” (Freedman & Karsh, 1993, pp. 42-63).
When the war came to an end and Iran was defeated, Hussein believed that the loans that foreign
countries led to Iraq would be forgiven because of Iraq’s sacrifices during the war. When his
believe was not true at all, Saddam became angry but he pointed his angriness at the Kuwaiti
leadership and began making preparations against Kuwait. By the year 1990, Saddam Hussein
was having a big crisis in Iraq. As the oil prices rose, it didn’t fulfill necessary funds to rebuild
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its economy because of the low international prices from foreign countries. The income obtained
from oil exports was to support its military and also to pay off some loans to foreign countries.
Foreign lender such as the Arab states couldn’t be convinced in lending loans for the economic
reconstruction of Iraq’s economy. Besides reducing government spending and the size of the
military, Hussein decided to approach Kuwait for loans. The months before the invasion of
Kuwait, Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait with many crimes against the Iraqis people including:
(1) Kuwait reducing their oil prices which caused the oil production and exports of Iraq to fall.
(2) They had stolen oil from Iraq’s territory and (3) they occupied some territory portions in Iraq.
Kuwait is not forgiving Iraq the $10 billion or so that they loaned to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran
War for weaponry. From Saddam’s point of view, Kuwait had loaned Iraq billions of dollars
during the war with also the purpose that Iraq was not fighting for itself, they were also fighting
for the defense of other Arab states that faced a threat from Iran’s side. Saddam argued to other
Arab states that “The war was not Iraq’s private business but rather a defense of the eastern flank
of the Arab world against fundamentalist Iran. The Gulf States were not asked to pay with rivers
of blood for the protection of the own security, since Iraq did that on their behalf, they could not
expect to take a ‘free ride’ on Iraq’s heroic struggle” (Freedman & Karsh, 1993, p. 45). Kuwait
didn’t let any money at the end of the Iran-Iraq War to Iraq and the Kuwait’s leaders did not
have any obligation to pay wartime loans. Saddam Hussein became angrier which began to use
bad language and comments against Kuwait and the other Gulf nations. In February 1990,
Saddam had a meeting at the Arab Co-operation Council in Amman with the president Mubarak
of Egypt and king Hussein of Jordan to say that the Gulf States should agree on providing Iraq
with an economic assistance. “Let the Gulf regimes know” (Freedman & Karsh, 1993, pg. 45),
he said, “that if they do not give this money to me, I will know how to get it” (Freedman &
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Karsh, 1993, p. 45). This message was repeatedly said but still Kuwait refused to support Iraq
from the wartime loans. Saddam’s quarrel with Kuwait over the wartime loans appeared again
later that year claiming that Kuwait should refuse to cancel the debt and also end their theft of
Iraqi oil from the Rumaila oilfield. Kuwait should provide additional assistance to Iraq which is
equivalent to; Kuwait reducing their oil prices causing the oil production and exports in Iraq to
fall. Kuwait had stolen oil from Iraq’s territory. Also they occupied some territory portions of
Iraq and the defense of Iraq from Iran over the other Arab States. Iraqi forces were already
moving near the Kuwaiti border preparing for an attack. Still, the Kuwaitis refused to pay the
wartime loans, and on August 1990, Saddam gave orders for a full-scale invasion over Kuwait.
Americans in the other side believed for their own good that they should provide military
assistance or any other type of aid in order to establish a strong relationship with Iraq itself and
with Saddam Hussein (Bacevich & Inbar, 2003, pp. 68-72).
American’s embrace of Saddam Hussein
The United States did not directly arm Iraq in the 1980-88 war but they did it in several
ways which was permitting allies around the region to transfer their own US-supplied weapon to
Iraq allowing Iraq to obtain those products from the United States for military purpose. The allies
of the United States were not providing weapons to Iran which was known as Operation Staunch
while they encouraged them to sell weapons to Iraq. These movements were described ‘tilt’ from
US side towards Iraq. This led Saddam Hussein to not have any risks when he could invade
Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein had chosen to launch the attack over Kuwait, he had to analyze
the possible losses during the invasion. Saddam didn’t want to risk his own country and also to
give permission to an invasion if he believed the costs were excessive. He wasn’t worried about
Kuwaiti military force as he was with Iran “Kuwait’s army, in 1990, numbered some 20,300
Hussein’s Power 8
soldiers or about one-fiftieth of Iraq’s total troop strength” (The Military Balance, pp. 101, 104).
Saddam had one fact in mind which was possible counterattacks from major superpowers. He
saw that the risk of a counterattack were low so he decided to go ahead with the plan. Iraq
thought that it will have a different effect from their action and US leaders will behave
differently. Saddam didn’t take serious consideration from the White House officials. These
officials acted towards Saddam action as a peace policy. This policy was known in Washington
as ‘tilt’ towards Iraq. For example the United States toke side from Iraq rather than Iran in their
struggle and prepared different assistance to ensure that it will come to an end. Also the ‘tilt’ was
Bagdad’s direction during Ronald Reagan presidency in mid-1982, when Iranian military
became offensive and crossed into Iraqi territory. The US “would regard any major reversal of
Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat of the West” (Friedman, 1993, chaps 1-3, 8) so Reagan was
prepared to assist Iraq in different ways. The White House had major steps to strengthen Iraq
against Iran which includes: the delivery of credit by the Agriculture Department’s Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) for purchasing Iraq from American agricultural products, discovering
information about Iranian military positions, American military applications such as transport
planes, helicopters, and heavy trucks sold to Iraq. Iraq then transferred these weapons obtained
from the United States to allied regions such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
“Between 1983 and 1990, the CCC guaranteed $5 billion in commercial loans made to Iran for
the purchase of US agricultural products, most of which were never paid back” (Friedman, 1993,
pp. 94-108, 112; Timmerman, 1991, pp. 126-7, 131, 196, 225-6, 260). These loans were not
enough to feed its population, the troops throughout the war, and also the usage of these loans for
other sources of income to purchase military equipment. Iraq used some of these loans to
purchase hardware in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. The information that the US
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intelligence gave to Iraq in the war against Iran was very important including satellite imagery of
Iranian troops in major battle zones allowing Iraq to plan and calculate the locations of Iranian
offensive attacks and concentrates more in defensive forces giving further advantages. This
information passed through King Hussein of Jordan and delivered to Saddam Hussein but US
intelligence officials were located in Bagdad so it will facilitate the delivery of strategic data.
Both the United States and Iraq agreed on the transfer of weapons and other items, American
officials were aware that Iraq was using them in the war against Iran which was the very purpose
of US sales program. At the end the United States decided to let Iraq to transfer and sell US
weaponry to regional allies such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The retransfers of
weaponry were illegal under US laws but the Reagan administration gave approval to these
deliberations. Besides aiding Iraq with military support, the United States also made symbolic
gestures towards Iraq which mean aloud US approval on Iraq’s regime. These actions became
more important that the military and allowed Saddam Hussein to build up his army with the help
of the US government. One of the gestures was in February 1982 during the Reagan
administration he decided to remove Iraq from the list of countries accused on supporting
terrorism. US law also prohibited the delivery of any type of aid to countries named on the list.
US officials were aware in 1982 that Iraq had a terrorist like Abu Nidal but it was not considered
that important than aiding Iraq at the time where Iran was appearing the winner of the war. Iraq
began using chemical weapons in big scales in 1982 to destroy and protect Iraq from Iranian
human-wave attacks. By the middle of 1983, these chemical weapons were used regularly. In
December 1983, the United States restored the relationship again with Iraq and supported them
with agricultural credits and other forms of assistance. The United States did not care about Iraq
using chemical weapons but the aid from the United States came to an end when it was reported
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that “Iraq had used these chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in the town of Halabja in
March 1988, causing an estimated 5,000 deaths” (Cordesman & Wagner, 1990-1996, pp. 370,
517; Timmerman, 1991, p. 293). The United States didn’t oppose to such actions but we can see
that Saddam Hussein viewed the United States as a country that didn’t challenge even the type of
behavior Iraq had when they killed 5,000 Kurdish civilians. The supports that Iraq obtained
during the Iran-Iraq War created a friendship with Washington which decided to not break their
relationship when the war will came to an end. By earning that Iran was expanding its chemical
weapons capability and developing nuclear weapons, the United States continued in 1989-90
providing Iraq different forms of aid, including intelligence information and CCC credits. When
the conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait came to an end many people saw Iraq as threatening of the
Gulf States which Iraq seemed to be the some sort of “king” of the Gulf regime (Bacevich &
Inbar, 2003, pp. 72-82).
The Gulf War as an Arab civil war
The Gulf War was considered an Arab civil war because it was the first time that one
Arab state militarily invaded and occupied another Arab state. The invasion of Iraq caused
Kuwait to not form part of the Arab governments because Kuwait opposed Iraq and joined to the
Americans. The ‘civil war’ in terms of politics in the Gulf crisis can be seen as the alliance of the
Arab states such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
monarchies with the United States to go against Saddam. Balance of powers was considered in
order to create a balance the power among the Gulf and Arab states because at some point
Saddam could turn against any other Arab country pushing them to the United States. For
example Egypt was against Iraq because the way they described social science to the people and
to balance it with Iraq’s power, Egypt made closer ties with the United States. Syria was ruling
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like Iraq by the Arab nationalist Ba’th Party and aligned with the United States. The PLO was
strong in financial ties with Gulf States and supported Iraqi in the crisis rather to improve its
relationship with the United States. Any succeed from Saddam’s side could destabilize the
Syrian Ba’th regime domestically and regionally. The ability the Hussein’s regime had and those
that he allied (Jordan, Yemen and the PLO) made regional pressures. The Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait did not change at all the Arab world. All regimes that fought the Gulf War were still in
power. After the Gulf War some Arab states experienced the Gulf crisis which created new
political movements like moving towards democracy but it didn’t work at all. To have stability
of the Arab regimes they had to face big pressures after the Gulf crisis. It turns into a competition
which reflected Arab governments trying to destabilize Arab leaders but it failed because these
Arab regimes have strengthened their control over their states and their societies from the 1950s
and 1960s (Bacevich & Inbar, 2003, pp. 93-98).
In conclusion for most Americans, the Gulf War began on 2 August 1990 with the
invasion of Iraq over Kuwait driven by the anxiety of having a great amount of power from
Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War was part of the Iran-Iraq War and we can’t really understand the
reasons of those ties during those events. Maybe it was because the United State could gain
profits by having closer ties with Iraq in order to obtain exported oil from Iraq to the United
States. Iraq was supported in different parts but the sales of arms to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War
fulfills many key points for the 1990-91 Gulf conflict: (1) the means of having all of the
munitions supplied to Iraq; (2) the motive which was a desire to eliminate the amount of debt
from having to pay for all those weapons which the victim that Iraq blamed was Kuwait; (3) and
the aid from international countries such as a consistent alignment with US from Iraq’s behavior.
Saddam Hussein had the victorious feeling but then there was a financial crisis in Iraq because
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the loans that foreign let to Saddam Hussein was only for the usage and improvements of the
military and not for the wellness and growth of the society.
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