Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in European Law and Governance
King’s College London
Working Paper Series
Working Paper No. 2010-01
Paper presented at the JMCE Research Student Workshop, 'Rethinking
Europe after the Financial Crisis’, King’s College London, 8 October 2010
The Spanish Model (or paradigm) of democratisation and integration into
Europe after the global financial crisis
Pablo Calderon Martinez, Department of Spanish, Portuguese and Latin
American Studies, King's College London
pablo-calderon_martinez@kcl.ac.uk
I. Theories of Democratisation, the Political Culture School and Spain in Europe.
In 1910 Jose Ortega y Gasset wrote in his essay ‘La Pedagogia Social como Problema
Politico’: “Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution”. This somehow oversimplified assertion became something of a Spanish obsession. And although the
Europe he envisaged as the solution to the “problem of Spain” was not the supranational beaurocracy that we now know, the “problem of Spain”, which was to remain
unresolved throughout most of the twentieth Century, was the same in 1910 than in
1975: economic and political backwardness relative to Western Europe. The
European Community proved to be crucial in solving some of the more urgent matters
in economic, political and social terms. The economic benefits the EC brought to
Spain are relatively easy to identify; even as recently as the period between 1994 and
1999 European aid represented an average of 1.5% of Spanish GDP.
This paper, however, presents an analysis of the Spanish transition to democracy
within the framework of European integration. I will focus my analysis on the
development of the political culture in Spain, which according to some modernisation
(Inglehart, Welzel and Lipset) and culturalist theorists (Diamond & Verba and
Huntington), is both a source and a result of changes in the political structure. The
question of whether political culture and internationalisation played a role in the
Spanish transition (or indeed any transition to democracy) is, in its own, a source of
intense debate in the transitological literature. This paper, however, aims to contribute
to the idea that Europe represented for Spain more than an economic and political
institutional arrangement; the Spanish democratisation and eventual integration into
Europe were overlapping processes that interacted at several levels with mass values
and orientations. Few analysts of the Spanish transition would challenge the view that
Europe offered, at the very least, a ‘systematically supportive’ influence for Spanish
democracy; ‘the fact that the EEC was solidly democratic and that it had “set up a
stable pattern of rewards and incentives” for would be members’, as Linz & Stepan
(1996: 113) argue, was at the very least, helpful to Spain’s transition and
consolidation. The degree of influence Europe had in the Spanish transition varies
considerably between authors and theories of democratisation. However, I believe the
Spanish transition (and indeed the similar experiences in Southern Europe) is a
powerful example of the cultural, social and ideological significance of Europe. In the
current political climate, and after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the debt
crisis spread throughout Southern Europe, it is becoming increasingly important for
Europe ‘to decide how it wants to be defined: by geographic boundaries, by treaties,
or by a shared common cultural heritage’ (Beitter 2003: xi). It is in this crucial
juncture that the debate over the cultural significance of Europe for the Spanish
transition becomes even more relevant.
This paper takes the specific example of the Spanish transition to illustrate how
European integration can be measured in more than political and economic gains. The
assumption that Europe is not just a geographical entity but that it is also a political
and cultural ideal (Lowell 2003: pg.122) is not new. Whilst there is a common set of
values emerging from the “Athens-Rome-Jerusalem” progression (D.W. Lovell 2003:
121) (or Levinas’s apparently simple definition of Europe as “the bible and the
Greeks”), the actual existence and weight of a supposed European culture is often
questioned. For some the formation of the European Communities was ‘accompanied
by an ideology of “Europeaness”’ (Pocock 1997: 301), but there is also a feeling that
the fact that no European “super-state” has emerged, means that the supposed cultural
affinity of the European states is of no major relevance. At the same time, Milward
argues that even if there is “something like a European culture” (somehow embodied
in its identity), it lacks the sense of allegiance national identities posses, and, what is
more, this allegiance cannot develop to the extent national allegiances have because
of the lack of recent European myths capable of evoking strong enough feelings
(Milward 1997: 5-21); or as put by a prominent theorists of European integration:
‘who will feel European in the depths of their being…who will die for Europe?’ (R.
Hudson 2000: 420).
Although I agree with the notion that European identity will probably never be strong
enough to challenge individual nationalisms, I believe Europe was in the 1970s and
1980s enough of a significant socio-cultural entity to have a singular effect in the
Spanish transition. In this paper I argue that Spain was a success not only because of
its ability to consolidate democratic institutions and a successful market economy in
record time, but also because it succeeded in ‘inducing cultural changes that made it
part of the European community of nations.’ (Encarnación 2001:61) Although not
without its problems, the Spanish transition succeeded in developing a strong market
economy within the framework of integration into Europe, raising the level of welfare
indicators to Western European levels, establishing a robust democracy (despite being
marred by ETA terrorism, the 1981 coup attempt and some economic crises)
(Waisman 2005: 1-3), internationalising its bourgeoisie and transforming the identity
of Spanish society1.
I certainly believe that the success of the Spanish transition boils down to far more
than just being in ‘a good neighbourhood’ (Waisman 2005: 9). Other countries (such
as Mexico for example) have embarked in similar processes of economic integration
with advanced democracies and received considerable aid but have not been able to
replicate the Spanish success. The very nature of the European integration project,
however, stimulates social cohesion and equality among the member states, making
the democratic nature of the Union one of its main characteristics. Sebastian Royo
proposes that the integration processes in Spain was a key part of its social and
cultural transition to democracy; it was internationalisation that forced Spain to
embark on a process of social and cultural self-examination and self-rediscovery and
deal with issues such as nationality, citizenship, ethnicity and social policies (ibis:
538). If we, as Royo suggests, understand the European aspirations of the Spanish
state (both its elites and citizenry) as a key factor in its attempt to democratise, then
we can assume that analysing this process will help us understand the success of the
Spanish transition.
1
A quick glance at the Eruobarometers and World Values Surveys from the last years shows that the
views and attitudes towards democracy, the rule of law, interpersonal trust, etc. of the majority of the
Spanish society has changed drastically since the end of the dictatorship.
Before going any further, though, I would like to switch my attention to the debate
over the role political cultures play in democracy and why it is that, in this context,
Spain is considered a democratic success. As proponents of the political culture
school, Inglehart and Welzel offer a detailed definition of democracy, together with a
scale to ‘measure’ democracy and a clear distinction between formal and genuine
democracy. For these authors democracy is a result of deep-rooted orientations that
motivate the members of a society ‘to demand freedom and responsive government –
and to act to ensure that the governing elites remain responsive to them’ (Inglehart
and Welzel 2005: 2). From this perspective democracy is a phenomenon that lies on
the individual values and is then projected towards the political system. They also
claim that ‘formal democracy can be imposed on almost any society, but whether it
provides genuine autonomous choice to its citizens largely depends on mass values’
(ibis: 149), which falls in line with the basic claim of the political culture school that
‘political institutions and mass values must be congruent in order to produce stable
and effective regimes’ (ibis:158). Here also lies the distinction between formal (when
the institutions and the mass values are not congruent) and genuine democracy (when
institutions and mass values are in alignment).
The proposition that there are certain values and attitudes that fit democratic regimes
is not new. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville refers to a certain virtue
in societies that successfully establish democratic regimes; he writes that ‘although a
democratic government is founded upon a very simple and natural principle, it always
presupposes the existence of a high degree of culture and enlightenment. At the first
glance it may be imagined to belong to the earliest stages of the world, but a maturer
observation will convince us that it could only come last in the succession of human
history’ (Tocqueville 2006: 3592). Here Tocqueville refers to democracy as a form of
government (or a regime) and not as a ‘tribal’ form of organisation (as it was
experienced by the Greeks for example). Huntington also explores the idea that
democracy needs certain pre-conditions; in his view, democratic leaders cannot
‘through will and skill create democracy where pre-conditions are absent’
(Huntington 1991:108). He then goes on to explain that the Third Wave of
democratisation was only possible because several factors made it a possibility in
much of the developing world. This included socioeconomic development and
responsible elites, of course, but also changes in the international scene and, most
importantly for this study, cultural changes (mainly religious).
However, probably the first major work that looks at the political orientations of
culture is Almond & Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963). In this study of five
‘democracies’, the authors provide a solid theoretical framework for the study and
analysis of political cultures. Political culture is, according to them, a manifestation of
the general cultural attitudes of the population; no political culture can go against the
general cultural traits of a given society. Political culture in general is the group of
‘specifically political orientations-attitudes towards the political system and its
various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system’, hence, the
‘political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientations
towards political objects among the members of the nation’ (Almond & Verba 1989:
12-13).
The idea that culture matters in political systems has been a central issue in works by
Huntington, Ronald Inglehart, Arend Lijphart, Fukuyama and even Parsons.
However, Inglehart has based his theory on the premise that political culture is a link
between socioeconomic development and democracy (an expression of
modernization). He not only believes that political culture does not depend on the
political structure, but claims that ‘democratic institutions seem to depend on
enduring cultural traits such as life satisfaction and interpersonal trust’ (ibis: 1209).
In Inglehart’s view, the values and orientations that define political culture change as
result of socioeconomic development. As an advocate of modernisation theory he
makes use of political culture as a link between socioeconomic development and
modernisation. By his own words he does not believe in neither cultural nor economic
determinism, but rather acknowledges that ‘unless economic development is
accompanied by certain changes in social structure and political culture, liberal
democracy is unlikely to result’ (Inglehart 1988: 1220). What is true is that he does
places the causal flow from socioeconomic development and political culture to
political structure and the political system; political regimes are the outcome of
socioeconomic development and political culture.
Acknowledging that neither political culture nor socioeconomic development are on
their own enough to establish democracy, as proposed by Linz & Stepan and
Diamond, Linz & Lipset, I will, however, depart form the assumption that political
culture plays an important part in successful democratisation. Hence, I will look at the
process of internationalisation in Spain during its transition to democracy.
II. The Spanish Transition to Democracy and Europe
There is little doubt that Spain embarked on an ambitious process of
internationalisation which transformed not only its international standing in the world
(i.e. the end of ostracism and autarchy), but also its internal political and social
structures. These changes in their political and social structures presented new
opportunities in the structures of power; an economy opened to international markets
and investment benefited different groups outside the dictatorial elites. The
emergence of a new bourgeoisie challenging the old established elites, combined with
an ever-growing pressure from abroad, led to a further push towards democracy.
What is more, internationalisation (and the economic development associated with it)
‘thrust the country into ever greater cultural and economic integration with a world
whose most desired markets, capitals, goods, technology and ideas are controlled
primarily by democracies’ (Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1995: 22). It is my view that
Europe conditioning the access to these resources to democratic development was a
big factor in the Spanish transition. At the same time, the European Community (EC)
was for Spain a platform from where opposition to the regime could express itself (as
in the 1959 Munich Congress of the European socialist parties), a common goal that
brought together leaders from all the political spectrum (in the 1977 elections
virtually no running party rejected accession into the EC), a destination for large
masses of legal and constructive migration that alleviated the pressures of
unemployment in Spain (during and after transition), a historical opposition to the
Franco regime (even though Poulantzas claims it was merely symbolic), an important
source of financial aid, and a general framework of reference for Spanish society.
In the view of many scholars, the EC represented for the architects of Spanish
transition an objective in which everyone could agree. Although it is hard to challenge
the assumption that integration with Europe meant a great deal for the Spanish state
and society, not all the scholars can agree on what it meant for the process of
democratisation. On the one hand, authors like Yunuen Ortega and Josep Colomer do
not pay much attention to integration with Europe or internationalisation as a whole in
their analyses of the transition. On his comparative studies between Spanish and
Mexican democratisations, Yunuen Ortega (2001 & 2008), however, does find a
strong correlation between democratisation and the emergence of a civil society,
popular movements and the political parties; all of which are manifestations of
changes in the political culture. In his view, Spanish transition was not a swift and
agreed pact between the elites, but the consequence of social mobilisations by
students and workers, the organisation of all the opposition parties in favour of a
democratic programme, and, particularly, the transformation of the PSOE into a
centrist force capable of governing (Yunuen Ortega 2001: 293). On the other hand,
Colomer’s game theory analysis of the Spanish transition interprets the whole process
as an elite driven event in which rational choice dominated the scene; in Colomer’s
view once a specific set of events took place (mainly the surprising naming of Suarez
as successor to Ariaz Navarro as head of government), rational choice dictated there
could only be one outcome. Although integration with Europe does not figure
prominently in either of their analyses, Yunuen Ortega does acknowledge that Europe
played a very important role in the reinvention of the PSOE as a truly euro-socialist
force (Willy Brandt of the German SPD and Olot Palme of the Swedish Social
Democratic Party established tight links with the PSOE leadership) (ibis: 135).
Nevertheless, in both analyses Europe plays an almost circumstantial role.
At the other end of the spectrum we have authors such as Crespo MacLennon,
Holman and Álvares de Miranda who regard the process of European integration as a
central element in the Spanish transition. Álvares de Miranda addresses not only the
issue of Europe representing a platform for the opposition to the Franco regime
(FAES 2003: 101), but he also refers to the sentiment that Europe has represented,
before, during and after transition ‘something deeper than a Common Market, which
supposes a compromise made by the Spanish society in full knowledge that European
integration represents the best guarantee for democratic stability and a Spanish
presence in the international arena’2 (ibis: 109). Using a less exuberant and more
academic language, Crespo MacLennan presents a very good analysis of the role
Europe played in the consolidation of the Spanish democratisation, including his
views on the Spanish double transition: the transition to democracy and the
international transition. The main idea of his analysis falls in line with one of the main
arguments of my research, and that is that:
There is no doubt that Spain’s geographical position, placed in the southwest of
the democratic Western Europe, was going to determine the choice of moving
towards democracy; had Spain had as a northern neighbour the United States,
where security was a priority over democratic principles, the political destiny of
Spain could have taken a different turn, or maybe none and simply continue with
an authoritarian system.3 (Crespo MacLennan 2004: 152)
‘La España democrática antes, durante y después de la Transición ha optado por integrarse en la
Europa de las Comunidades, que quería decir algo más profundo que un simple Mercado Comun
europea y que, supone, un compromiso asumido por los españoles con la conciencia de que la
integración europea es la mayor garantía para nuestra estabilidad democrática y nuestra presencia en el
orden internacional’
3
‘No cabe duda que la situación geografica de España, en el suroeste de la democrática Europa
occidental iba a determinar la elección de caminar hacia la democracia; de haber tenido como vecino
septentrional a Estados Unidos, donde la seguridad primaba sobre los principios democráticos, el
destino político del país podia haber tomado otro rumbo, o quizás ninguno y simplemente optar por la
continuidad de un sistema autoritario’
2
He argues that for the majority of Spanish society integration with Europe was not
only synonymous with democratic consolidation, but also with economic, political
and social modernisation (ibis: 203). In his view, Europe represented progress and
development not only because ‘Spaniards understood themselves as members of a
common civilization with the rest of Europe’ (Waisman 2005: 7), but because it
represented everything that Spain could not achieve under Franco. Franco was, from
the outset, anti-European, and he made of the Pyrenees a political and cultural frontier
(MacLennan 2004: 11). He tried very hard to make what he believed was the Spanish
‘exceptionalism’ a cultural trait, however the majority of the Spaniards wanted to be a
part of Europe. The 1970 preferential agreement Spain signed with the EEC was not
very different to the ones the EEC signed with Tunisia, Morocco or Israel; it was like
if the EEC did not want to acknowledge Spain was a part of Europe (ibis: 98). The
notion that Spain would never join the European project without democracy was a
main source of descent within the regime itself. The Spanish exiled opposition had
some influence in Europe and lobbied in the main European capitals against the
regime; it also became evident to business elites that they were not going to be able to
access the European market as long as the Franco regime was in power, and even
some of the regime’s leadership (Rafael Calvo Serer, Jose Maria de Arielza, Joaquin
Ruiz Martinez, etc.) abandoned Franco because of the way his regime was perceived
in Europe (ibis: 100).
The pillars of Spanish economic growth (tourism, direct foreign investment, foreign
currency sent by emigrants and agricultural exports) depended on their relationship
with Europe, and the fact was that the Franco regime made that relationship harder
than it needed to be. Spanish business and political elites, as well as society as a
whole, understood this, but so did European leaders and publics. A series of summary
executions in 1974 (most notably the Catalan anarchist Salvador Puig Antich), the
unconvincing nature of the 1975 Arias Navarro reforms and the events in Portugal all
gave new impetuous to a new wave of condemnation in Europe (ibis: 149). The press
in Germany, France and Britain were ruthless in their condemnations, which lead to
the Franco regime hardening its position against Europe. This reaction in Europe was
in stark contrast to the lack of attention in the U.S., who continued its relationship
with Spain without judging or even expressing concern. The fact was that by the time
of Franco’s death two things were clear: that Spanish society was eager to join Europe
on economic, political and ideological grounds, and that Europe would not accept
Spain until it became democratic.
Crespo MacLennan is not alone in giving Europe a prominent role in the Spanish
transition. Otto Holman’s analysis of the Spanish democratisation offers a view of the
transition based on economic considerations. He explains that Spain’s integration into
the global network of trans-national production has made of Spain, and the capital
based in it, ‘part and parcel of globally operative processes of class formation and
increasingly state-civil society configurations’ (Holman 1993: 8). The investment of
foreign capital in Spain (mainly European) changed the structures of power and the
means of production; Spain was very much on the trail towards European integration
when fordism was introduced and new international bourgeoisies took over the means
of production (bis: 46). The fact that Spain’s economic growth focused on the
development of a domestic market only put more pressure on Franco’s regime as it
was inevitable that this would reach a point when it would need join the European
markets. Since there is evidence to support the idea that Spain was never going to join
Europe without democracy, we can assume that Europe’s investment in Spain could
have only helped the prospects for democracy. The Franco regime was economically
integrated with Europe before the democratic regime achieved political integration;
evidence of this is the fact that there were basically no economic reforms during
transition to democracy (ibis: 109).
For Holman the relationship between Europe and the Spanish transition was
completely the opposite. In his view ‘the whole effort to incorporate Spain into the
EEC was based less on economic grounds and more on the political basis’ of securing
democratic consolidation; ‘Western Europe sought to envelop Spain in such a vast
network of NATO, EEC and European relations’ that the question whether Spain
belonged to the first world or not was to be settled (Holman 1989: 12). In Holman’s
view Europe was a social and political element in the Spanish transition above the
economic aspect. He argues that a larger flow of people between Spain and Europe,
and closer economic ties made Spanish society resemble more other European
societies; Spain became ‘more urbanized, modern and – at least by economic criteriamiddle class’ industrialisation changed the face of society in the urban setting, the
same style and music, and almost the same pornography, are now available in Madrid
as in Copenhagen or Amsterdam (ibis: 184).
In my view, Carlos Waisman also presents a balanced analysis of the particularities
behind the Spanish transition. One of the social factors he proposes (besides the
memory of the civil war and the strength of the civil society) is the ‘positive exemplar
effects of European capitalist democracies, deriving of a common collective
“European Identity”’ (Waisman 2005:6). The actions by most political and economic
elites at the time support the idea that ‘none of the major social and political forces in
the country could conceive a future separate from that of its neighbours’. The first two
democratic elections in Spain showed that the majority of the public shared this idea.
This general perception ‘had a consequential corollary: the acceptance of the
economic and political institutions created by Western Europe after World War II as
the only reasonable model for Spain’ (ibis: 7). The Cold War context, in Waisman’s
opinion, gave the Spanish transition a huge international relevance; it gave the EC a
sense of identity and purpose whilst it represented a major strategic goal for the US in
Europe. These political and social factors meant it would have been very hard for
Spain not to accept the ‘institutional package consisting of an open market economy,
a sustainable welfare state, and liberal democracy’ (ibis: 8).
III Conclusions and Considerations
The recent financial crisis hurt the economies of Southern Europe particularly hard.
The debt crises in Greece, Portugal and Spain have had severe social consequences;
the recent general strike in Spain on 29th September is evidence of the social impact
economic austerity is having and will continue to have. European financial
institutions (non less than the Euro itself) have come under attack and European unity
was tested. This paper, however, has tried to illustrate how the European Union has
historically meant more than economic security to the Spanish state. The Spanish
model or paradigm of democratisation shows how integration into Europe helped
transformed not only Spanish institutions but also the political culture and mass
values of the Spanish society. After a “parenthesis” in Spain’s socio-cultural
“Europeaness”, the Spanish transition marked the return of the country as a
fundamental part of the new Europe. I believe the recent financial crisis will not
change the fact that, at least for Spain, Europe has become far more than an
institutional arrangement; Europe is, after all, the solution to the ‘problem of Spain’.
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