Social Dilemmas 1
The Perceptions of Entitlement In Social Dilemmas
Benjamin Waughtal
Winona State University
Abstract
Social Dilemmas are situations in which personal interests are at odds with public or collective
interests. For example public television is free for all to view. However, if nobody makes contributions
or donations to public television it won’t be able to stay on the air. One variable that may influence a
person to make a selfish or cooperative choice is whether or not they are given the opportunity to
discuss the situation. Another variable that may influence a person’s decision is his or her perception of
fairness. The purpose of the present study is to examine whether discussion will lead to more cooperative
behaviors even among those led to believe they are entitled to win, or whether a sense of entitlement will
override cooperation. In this study participants played a game that worked on the same principles as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma two participants choose to either cooperate, which is a
task or choice that benefits both participants, or to defect, which is a task or choice that benefits them
self more than the other participant. In this study participants were playing for large and small pieces of
candy in one of four conditions, two conditions in which there was no discussion between participants
and two conditions in which participants were allowed to discuss the game. The hypothesis of this study
was that participants that were allowed to discuss would be more likely to defect if they felt some sense
of entitlement to the large piece of candy. This sense of entitlement was created by a pre-test participants
in this condition had to take to qualify to play for the large candy, the pre-test was loaded to make each
participant believe that they had done extremely well on it and their partner had not
The Perceptions of Entitlement In Social Dilemmas
A social dilemma is defined as a situation in which personal interests are at odds with collective
interests. In a social dilemma each group member is forced to make a choice between one of two
options. The first choice is to “Defect” or to make a decision that benefits the individual’s self-interests
most. The second choice is to “Cooperate” or to make a decision that benefits the group as a whole more
than the individual. In every social dilemma the most logical choice for the individual would be to
Social Dilemmas 2
Defect since this is the choice that most benefits them, however, if each member of the group makes the
same decision to Defect they are all worse off than if they were to choose to Cooperate. A real world
example of this type of situation would be the public television. Public television is free for all to view
but relies on donations to continue to broadcast. For the individual it is most beneficial to watch public
television without making any kind of donation, however if none of the public television viewers
donated money to the station it would be impossible for the station to remain on the air. Another
example would be people asked to keep the heat low in their houses to conserve fuel. As an individual it
is most beneficial and comfortable to keep the heat high and your house warm, only one person not
conserving fuel isn’t going to adversely effect the fuel supply. However if ever individual in the
population keeps their heat at a high level they will deplete the fuel supply and all end up freezing.
In a study by Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) a five-person investment game was set up, in
these five-person groups 100 “shares” were split up amongst them each player having more or less than
the others but never more than 50. At the beginning of each trial each player was also given $10 of startup money with which they had to make a choice of either keeping or investing. If they invested the
money they would have the chance to turn it into $15 or lose it all. Whether or not the player’s
investment money was increased or lost depended upon the other how many shares other players who
also invested contributed, the point total had to equal 51 points or higher. This study had two
independent variables; the first was whether or not participants were allowed to discuss their game
playing strategy and the second was whether or not the participant’s decision to invest or simply keep the
money remained anonymous. Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland found that participants that discussed the
game before playing cooperated significantly more than groups that did not discuss.
A similar study was done at Free University in Amsterdam (Tazlaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk,
2004). In this study participants believed that they were playing a social dilemma game with a partner,
when in fact they were playing with a computer-simulated partner. In the game participants had to give
their partner a number of coins each trial, 0 being the minimum and 10 being the maximum, coins given
to the partner were worth twice as much as the coins kept by the participant so it was beneficial to them
to give less coins. Participants believed these coins would be traded in for a reward at the end of the
experiment. In this study there was a condition in which “noise” was present, this took the form of the
computer “changing” the number of coins given by the simulated partner every so often. A no “noise”
condition was also present. As well as these two conditions there were conditions of communication and
no communication. In the communication condition the computer-simulated partner was “allowed” to
send a set number of messages to the participant telling them when there had been a change in the
number of coins given, “I wanted to give you six coins but the computer changed my decision. I think
Social Dilemmas 3
you only received three coins.” The results of this study found that noise exerted detrimental effects on
the cooperation group and communication reduced this effect to the level of the no noise group.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two-person social dilemma game, which gets its name from an
anecdote about to criminals who have together committed a crime and are being questioned by police.
The police however cannot prove their guilt, so they offer each of them a chance to confess. The police
tell the criminals that if one of them confesses and the other does not then the criminal who confessed
will go free while the other will receive the maximum sentence. If both criminals confess then each will
receive a minimum sentence. In this situation it would appear as if the most beneficial course of action
for the individual would be to confess, if one confesses and the other doesn’t then the first will go free
and if both confess then each will receive a minimal sentence for a crime they did in fact commit.
However the most beneficial choice in reality for both criminals would be to keep quiet as that would
lead to both going free. In this way the Prisoner’s Dilemma is different from most social dilemmas in
that all harm of defecting is focused squarely on one of the players; the harm is not spread out to group
or population. Another way that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is different from most other social dilemmas is
that an individuals behavior is not anonymous, that is not to say that all other social dilemmas are
anonymous just that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma a players behavior is known by the other with absolute
certainty. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be played in one of two ways. The first is the game in its
singular form; each player makes a single decision of whether or not to defect of cooperate. In this
variation of the game it is most beneficial to an individual player to defect, as this is their most beneficial
“play”. The second form of the game is the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this form of the game the
decision process is repeated in a number of trials, in this way both participants can be “punished” for
non-cooperative behavior by the other.
In a study by Swingle & Santi (1972) participants played a number of games, one of which was
an iterated form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each participant was seated in their own room with a game
counsel and an intercom on which the experimenter read directions to them. Each participant was trying
to accumulate as many points as possible, each of which could be traded in for half a cent after at the end
of the study. This experiment had three conditions; the first was no communication between participants,
the second was forced communication between participants, and the third was optional communication
between participants. Communication between participants was done by way of written message done so
after every fifteen trials. The results of the study showed that participants in both the forced and optional
communication conditions cooperated significantly more than the no communication condition, with the
optional communication condition being the most cooperative.
The need for equity is the belief that in all types of relationships there is a balance or fairness of
what an individual contributes to the relationship and what they receive from it. For example an
Social Dilemmas 4
individual whom has undeservingly received a larger reward or amount of credit will perceive an
imbalance and will often work to restore balance by relinquishing a portion of their reward or credit.
This also works the other way, an individual feels under compensated will seek out their fair share or
contribute less in the future. A study by Leventhal & Michaels (1969) examined the reward distribution
of participants working on a task in which equity was skewed one way or another. Participants in the
study were told that they would be working on a “field perception task” with a partner, the task was a 98piece puzzle and the partner was a confederate. The participant was seated in a room by themselves
where they worked on the puzzle for 10 minutes, at the end of which their work was collected and
“assessed”. Participants were told that they had completed a large or small portion of the task in a large
or small amount of time as compared to their confederate partner; they were then allowed to divide a
small cash reward between themselves and their partner. The study’s results supported the theory of
equity finding that participants who believed that they worked for a shorter period of time and
accomplished more than their partner rewarded themselves significantly more money and those who
believed they worked for a longer period of time and accomplished less than their partner rewarded
themselves significantly less money. When the amount of work completed was in accordance with the
amount of time allowed participants rewarded themselves and their partners equal amounts of money.
Previous research on communication in the majority of social dilemmas points to the conclusion
that intergroup communication causes higher levels of cooperation than conditions lacking
communication. The theory of equity states that individuals seek balance between contribution and
reward. The purpose of the present study is to examine the behavior of participants in a social dilemma
situation in which they are allowed to communicate but the contributions to the relationship are
perceived as skewed. It is hypothesized that because participants believe that they have contributed more
than the other the need for equity will override the increase in cooperation usually provided by
communication.
Method
Participants
Participants were 71 male and female undergraduate students at Winona State University who
volunteered to participate in the study. Participants were compensated for their participation with extra
credit points in a psychology course of their choosing. Each was also required to read and sign an
informed consent form before being allowed to participate in the study.
Social Dilemmas 5
Materials
The 22-question multiple-choice general knowledge test used in this study consisted of a range
of different questions from areas such as geography, biology, music, sports, and even fast food slogans.
The test was meant to be somewhat difficult but not impossible. The prisoner’s dilemma game answer
sheet consisted of a simple choice of “Friend” or “Foe”, one of which was circled as the participant’s
answer, and a list of all the answer scenarios and their outcomes/rewards. The last thing that participants
did in each condition was filling out a survey about the game and the person participating in the game as
their partner. The survey given to participants had 9 items on it and was constructed using a Likert Scale
ranging from 1-7 in which 1 was “Not at all”, 4 was “Somewhat”, and 7 was “Very much”. The survey
was divided up into three constructs with three questions pertaining to each. The first of these constructs
being “Winning”. This was a measure of how much the participant wanted to win or receive the large
piece of candy by defecting. The second was “Fairness”, which was a measure of how fair the participant
wanted to be while making his/her decision in the game. The last of the survey constructs was
“Suspicious/Trusting”. This was a measure of how suspicious or trusting the participant was of the other
participant playing the game.
Table 1
Matrix of payouts given to participants depending on whether they chose to cooperate or defect.
Participant 1
Friend
Friend
Both participants receive a small
piece of candy.
Participant 1 receives a large
piece of candy & participant 2
receives none.
Participant 1 receives a large
piece of candy & participant 2
receives none.
Neither participant receives any
candy.
Participant
2
Foe
Foe
Design
The study was designed to examine the effects of two different independent variables, the
conditions of discussion between participants and the entitlement created by the bogus pre-test taken to
qualify to play for the large pieces of candy. Each of the two independent variables had two levels of
condition. For discussion the two levels were either participants were allowed two minutes to discuss
before they made their individual decision to defect or cooperate, or participants were not allowed to
Social Dilemmas 6
discuss their decisions at all. In one level of the entitlement condition participants took a bogus general
knowledge test to qualify to play for the large pieces of candy, the manipulation of this test will be
addressed in the following Procedure section. In the other level of this condition participants were not
required to take this qualifying test. Participants were randomly assigned to these groups using a random
number generator. The dependent variables of this study were whether or not participants of the various
conditions chose to defect or cooperate and also their responses on the survey described above.
Procedure
When both participants had entered the room each was given an informed consent form to read
and sign with a provided pencil. After each participant had completed the consent form they were given
a credit slip to fill out for their professor in order to receive extra credit for their participation, at this
time participants were also asked not to talk to each other unless directed to by the researcher. The
research then read a brief introduction to the game from a written out script; the script varied slightly
depending on which condition the participants had been assigned to. If the condition was one in which
participants were not required to take a pre-test the introduction was just a brief description of the
“Friend or Foe” game and its possible out comes. The introduction informed participants that in this
game they each would have to make a choice and depending on the way that they chose candy would be
awarded. The researcher then handed out answer sheets to the two participants and explained that each
would have to circle either “Friend” or “Foe” and described the payout matrix seen in Table 1.
In conditions in which discussion was not allowed the researcher would ask the participants to
circle their answers and then would give each the survey described in the apparatus section; the survey
was given before participants showed their answers to each other and the researcher so as not to bias its
results. In conditions in which discussion was allowed the researcher would inform the participants that
they would be allowed to discuss their decision for two minutes and that this was a time that other
participants had used to talk strategy or to bluff the other, this was done to inform participants what was
to be discussed with out biasing the discussion one way or the other. The researcher would then leave the
room for the two-minute discussion period. After he had returned participants were asked to make their
decision and the survey was given.
In the conditions in which the pre-test was given participants were told that they would be
playing a game called “Friend or Foe” in which they would have the opportunity to win candy. The
researcher explained that he had large and small pieces of candy however in order to qualify to play for
the large pieces of candy each participants had to take a general knowledge test and together score at
least 30 correct answers, if they failed to do so they would only be playing for the small pieces of candy.
After the tests were completed they were collected and “graded”. Bogus scores were written on the
Social Dilemmas 7
participants tests, each received a 20 out of 22 on the test, and were told that together they had scored 32
correct answers which was enough to play for the large candy. This was done to create idea that each
student had done more than the other to qualify to play for the large candy, to create a sense of
entitlement. The next steps were the same as the other conditions, the game and rules were explained,
participants either discussed or did not, and the survey was given. At the end of the experiment the
researcher explained what the experiment was designed to study and any deception used was revealed.
Results
A Cronbach’s Alpha test was conducted to test the reliability of the measures of Winning (.525),
Fairness (.843), and Trust (.775); again each of the scales consisted of three questions. This was a 2x2
Factorial design, a univariate analysis of variance was done on the three constructs of the survey:
Winning, Fairness, and Trust. The means and standard deviations for each condition and each variable
are found in Table 2.
Table 2: List of means and standard deviations of dependent variables for each condition.
DV’s
Winning
Fairness
Trust
Discussion
Entitlement
No Entitlement
M(SD)
M(SD)
No Discussion
Entitlement
No Entitlement
M(SD)
M(SD)
2.08(1.02)
6.17(.935)
6.23(.995)
2.93(1.27)
5.39(1.52)
4.94(1.38)
2.22(1.20)
6.18(.834)
6.37(.823)
3.10(1.07)
5.47(1.74)
4.88(1.46)
Winning
According to the survey results there was not a significant interaction between Discussion and
Entitlement ( F(1,67)= .005, p-value=.944). Participants in the discussion conditions wanted to win (get
the large piece of candy by defecting) significantly less than participants in the no discussion conditions
( F(1, 67)= 9.882, p-value=.002), there was not a significant difference in the entitlement conditions for
Winning ( F(1,67)= .312, p-value=.579).
Fairness
The results also showed that there was not a significant interaction between Discussion and
Entitlement ( F(1,67)= .011, p-value=.917). However they did show that making a decision, which was
fair, was significantly more important to the participants in the discussion conditions ( F(1,67)= 5.749, p-
Social Dilemmas 8
value=.019). There was not a significant difference in the entitlement conditions for Fairness ( F(1,67)=
.024, p-value=.875) and
Trust
Finally there was not a significant interaction between Discussion and Entitlement ( F(1,67)=
.124, p-value=.725) in the Trust condition. Participants in the discussion condition were significantly
more trusting than participants that did not discuss
( F(1,67)= 24.056, p-value<.001). There
was not a significant difference in the entitlement conditions for Trust ( F(1,67)= .019, p-value=.894).
Discussion
The results of this study did not support the hypothesis. Feelings of entitlement created by the
pre-test did not cause participants to be significantly less likely to cooperate when allowed to
communicate. However the results did show that participants that were allowed to discuss while playing
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game were significantly more likely to cooperate with the other player as
measured by the amount they wanted to win, be fair, and their level of trust.
The data from this study seems to support the previous research done on communication
between individuals faced with a social dilemma; communication significantly increased the amount of
cooperation between participants as well as positive overall feelings toward each other. This information
is extremely valuable in many “real world” situations in economics, foreign affairs, and business.
Knowing that communication can increase positive perceptions and cooperation could create an outcome
beneficial to all parties involved or even defuse a hostile situation. However I am still convinced that
there is a point where communication does the opposite and actually works to breakdown cooperation
due to a sense of entitlement or need for equity held by the parties involved. I believe that if a stronger
sense of entitlement were to be created in the same situation participant need for equity would either
override the benefits of communication or be strengthened by communication. Future research using a
different means of creating entitlement may show this.
For now the research indicates that when faced with a social dilemma the key factor in creating a
cooperative outcome is communication. Past and present research shows that communication strengthens
positive perceptions of others and the cooperative ways they work together, even when made to believe
they are more deserving than the others.
Social Dilemmas 9
References
Kerr, N., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. (1994). Communication, commitment, and cooperation in
social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(3), 513-529.
Leventhal, G., & Michaels, J. (1969). Extending the equity model: Perception of inputs and
allocation of reward as a function of duration and quantity of performance. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 12(4), 303-309.
Swingle, P., & Santi, A. (1972). Communication in non-zero-sum games. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 23(1), 54-63.
Tazelaar, M., Lange, P. V., & Ouwerkerk, J. (2004). How to cope with "noise" in social
dilemmas: The benefits of communication. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 87(6), 845-859.