The Origins of Post-Independence Political
Instability and Violence in Colombia and
Venezuela
Analysis and Application of Three Theoretical Frameworks
By:
Pim van Wegen
3478300
p.vanwegen@students.uu.nl
Address:
Zaagmolen 14, Houten, the Netherlands
Hand-in Date:
February 28th 2014
Master Thesis
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. E. Frankema
Pim van Wegen
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
Table of Contents
List of Figures and Maps
p. 4
Introduction:
Colombia and Venezuela: Uncertain Futures
p. 5
Chapter One:
The Theoretical Frameworks
p. 10
1.1
Social Orders: Limited and Open Access Orders
p. 11
1.2
Democracy: Democratization and State Capacity
p. 18
1.3
Colonialism: Postcolonial Development Related to
Colonial Institutions
p. 22
Chapter Two:
Pre-Columbian and Colonial
Northwestern South America
p. 29
2.1
Spanish Exploration and Settlement
p. 31
2.2
Habsburg Colonial Administration and Policy
p. 34
2.3
Bourbon Changes in Colonial Policy in the
Eighteenth Century
Chapter Three:
p. 38
Independence and the Rise and Fall of
Gran Colombia
p. 41
3.1
Origins of Creole Dissent
p. 42
3.2
The Wars of Independence
p. 44
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3.3
The Crises of Gran Colombia
3.4
Return to the Theories
p. 47
3.4.1
North, Wallis and Weingast’s Social Orders
p. 54
3.4.2
Tilly’s Democracy
p. 55
3.4.3
Mahoney’s Colonialism
p. 57
Chapter Four:
Nonparallel Development Between
1830 and 1930
p. 59
4.1
Conservative-Liberal Dichotomy in Colombia
p. 59
4.2
Caudillos, Venezuela’s Military and Coup d’états
p. 66
4.3
Economic Trends in the Nineteenth Century
4.4
4.3.1
New Grenadine Economic Change
p. 70
4.3.2
Venezuelan Discovery of Oil
p. 72
Return to the Theories
4.4.1
North, Wallis and Weingast’s Social Orders
p. 75
4.4.2
Tilly’s Democracy
p. 77
4.4.3
Mahoney’s Colonialism
p. 79
Popular Uprisings and Guerrillas
p. 82
Chapter Five:
5.1
5.2
5.3
Colombia
5.1.1
La Violencia
p. 82
5.1.2
Origins and Discourse of Guerrillas in Colombia
p. 88
Venezuela
5.2.1
Petroleum and Acción Democratica
p. 92
5.2.2
End of the Bipartisan System and Hugo Chávez
p. 97
Return to the Theories
5.3.1
North, Wallis and Weingast’s Social Orders
p. 100
5.3.2
Tilly’s Democracy
p. 102
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5.3.3
Conclusion:
Mahoney’s Colonialism
p. 103
Assessing Origins of Instability and the
Three Frameworks
p. 105
Bibliography
p. 111
Word Count
p. 114
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List of Figures and Maps
Figures
Figure 1
State Capacity Versus Democracy
and Crude Regime Types.
Figure 2
p. 21
Overview Table of Northern South America
(c. 1500 – c. 1780).
p. 29-30
Map 1
Relief Map of Northern South America.
p. 33
Map 2
Habsburg Administration of Spanish America
Maps
c. 1650.
Map 3
p. 35
Bourbon Administration of Spanish America
(Green Areas) 18th Century.
p. 39
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Introduction:
Colombia and Venezuela: Uncertain Political Futures
The South-American countries of Colombia and Venezuela have vibrant and violent
histories. Where Colombia experienced several civil wars during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, Venezuela witnessed a series of military regime changes that lasted
well into the second half of the twentieth century. Colombia has been in a state of civil war
since the 1960’s, when leftist-oriented guerrilla movements emerged throughout the
country. Only recently does the tide seem to change, as the presidencies of Uribe and
Santos increased military actions against the guerrillas since 2002. Last year the FARC
agreed to engage in peace talks with the Colombian government, after these guerrillas
suffered several military setbacks and the loss of notorious leaders.
Venezuela has a different story to tell altogether, where violence reemerged after a
somewhat peaceful thirty years of bipartisan government at the end of the 1980’s. Late
leader of Venezuela Hugo Chávez controlled the country since 1998 after winning the
elections. Despite attempting to seize control of the country through military action, Chávez
was sent to jail for only two years, after which he devoted himself to winning the elections.
After he succeeded in doing so, he started to dismantle democratic institutions that had
been developing since 1958. In 2013, Chávez died of cancer after winning a new term as
president during the elections of that year. His former vice-president and current president
Nicolas Maduro is currently criticized for demanding emergency powers, including the
right to rule by decree from Congress. Several protests have erupted in Caracas and other
Venezuelan cities within the last few months.
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The futures of Colombia and Venezuela seem uncertain. Though negotiations with
the FARC are still underway and Colombian president Santos seems optimistic, past
negotiations have so far led to no significant results. Both sides still continue to fight one
another during the negotiation process. Venezuelan president Maduro is reluctant to give up
his powers as he attempts to reform the Venezuelan economy, losing more popular support.
The death of Chávez may very well have ended an era of fragile political stability, whilst a
great deal of political stability may finally be achieved in Colombia for the first time in
over fifty years of civil war.
Looking from today’s perspective, many questions arise when looking at the
immediate histories of Venezuela en Colombia. Whilst Venezuela’s democracy may have
been jeopardized by the Chávez administration, the country had a long history of military
dictatorships and loose “warlord” confederations, achieving fragile stability at the expense
of the country’s development. Colombia had a violent history since the country achieved
independence in the early nineteenth century. Many civil wars, such as the ‘War of the
Supremes’ and the ‘War of a Thousand Days’ had a devastating impact on the country and
resulted in major losses of life. At a glance, the current civil war involving the guerrilla
movements seems like one in a dozen, but one cannot help but think about the relationship
between these various civil wars. Do these wars have similar causes? What are the
important factors which allow civil wars to erupt in both countries?
This thesis will examine political stability and the eruption of violence, examining
and analyzing the histories of Colombia and Venezuela in a comparative perspective, whilst
testing the applicability of several theoretical frameworks. It will attempt to portray the
political, economic and social histories of both countries from the sixteenth century to the
twentieth century. During these four centuries, indigenous societies were subjugated by the
Spanish and incorporated into their colonial empire. In the early nineteenth century, the
countries won their independence from Spain and created their own destinies. The analysis
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of over four centuries of history requires suitable theories that can aid in discovering and
the sources of political instability and violence.
The main question this thesis will answer is to what extent these frameworks are
suitable for discovering and analyzing the colonial and postcolonial sources of political
instability and violence in the histories of Colombia and Venezuela during the postindependence period. The first model used in this thesis is contemplated by Douglass C.
North, John J. Wallis and Barry R. Weingast in their book Violence and Social Orders
(New York, NY 2009). The authors distinguish between ‘open’ and ‘limited’ access
societies and the different ways in which these types of societies deal with potential
organized violence. The second framework is portrayed in Charles Tilly’s book Democracy
(New York, NY 2007) which focusses on the terms ‘state capacity’ and ‘democratization’.
Though not directly linked to violence eruptions, Tilly’s framework allows a portrayal of
the development of democracy and the capacity of state agents’ actions to have effect on
the country. This has been made visible using graphs offsetting the two factors. Needless to
say, the modern concept of democracy did not exist in colonial and precolonial South
America, so Tilly’s framework must be taken in lightly during these periods. The third
framework is conceived by James Mahoney in his book Colonialism and Postcolonial
Development (New York, NY 2010). In his book Mahoney develops a framework that
allows him to analyze precolonial and colonial conditions, of political, economic and social
origin, and see how these conditions are linked to postcolonial development.
Though these three frameworks have their pros and cons, this thesis will show that
when it comes down to political stability and violence, the model of North et. al. and Tilly
are well suited to this purpose, whilst Mahoney’s model has its qualifications but disregards
important elements and aspects that cannot always be implemented in a single model. In
this particular case study, geography plays one of the most important roles. Therefore it is
appropriate to highlight the key components of Colombian and Venezuelan geography so
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that political establishment, developments and structures of the colonial and post-colonial
era might be understood better.
Present-day Colombia and Venezuela are located in the northwest of South America
and border the Caribbean sea, hosting tropical temperatures. Colombia is distinguished by
the three branches of the Andes that are entrenched in the center of the country. These
mountains ranges are known as cordilleras. The present-day capital of Bogotá is located on
a plateau on the eastern cordillera. Inland temperatures are much lower than experienced
by Caribbean climates, mostly due to altitude. The highlands, plateaus and peaks can be
located over two thousand kilometers above sea level. One of the main rivers is the
Magdalena, which springs far inland to the southwest and then mouths into the Caribbean
sea to the north. To the northwest lie the tropical forests of Chocó, which in turn borders
the regions of Antioquia and Popayán to the south. The llanos, or plains, border the eastern
perimeters of Bogotá and stretch far into Venezuela. Finally, the southeast of the country is
characterized by the Amazonian rainforest. Because of this diversity, populations were
usually cut off from one another as geography split the regions into several isolated zones.
The major split and source of isolation can be seen between the cordilleras, where the
eastern is relatively isolated from its two western counterparts. The Spanish encountered a
great variety of indigenous tribes, ranging from hunter-gatherer groups to more complex
semi-polities such as the Muisca confederation. 1
Venezuela’s geography is different from Colombia’s though there are some
similarities. The Caribbean coast covers most of the north, bordered immediately by the
vast llanos to its south. The llanos forms the largest part of the country, divided by several
rivers such as the Orinoco which flows from the mountains inland to the coast. To the
southwest and -east the tips of the Andes and Guyanan highlands are located. There are few
1
Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia. Fragmented Land, Divided Society (New York, 2002), p. 3-7,
18-25.
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mountain pockets, such as the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, which are relatively isolated
from the rest of the country. Where Colombia was internally split into several isolated
regions, Venezuela’s vastness, relative emptiness and lack of population caused the Spanish
to become disinterested in the region for a long period of time. The arrival of the Spanish
decreased coastal populations heavily due to the spread European diseases, making the
region even more empty than before. 2 This shall be examined in chapter three.
2
Daniel C. Hellinger, Venezuela. Tarnished Democracy (Boulder, CO, 1991), p. 1-16; Safford and Palacios,
Colombia, p. 3-7, 18-25;
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Chapter One:
The Theoretical Frameworks
To aid in discovering the origins of political instability in Colombian and
Venezuelan history, and to monitor its course from the colonial period on, it is necessary to
use various political and economic models. The three main models and theories used in this
thesis must be outlined and explained in order to apply them to the histories of Colombia
and Venezuela from the pre-Columbian period on to the twentieth century. The books by
North et al., Tilly and Mahoney contain the frameworks that will be used. These theories
emphasize the development of postcolonial societies, how political violence emerges in
different societies and how it is kept in check. In addition, the establishment of
democratization in contrast to state capacity according to Charles Tilly, is also used.3 First
these “theoretical frameworks” are outlined, expanded and complemented by historical
examples and issues, used by these scholars themselves in their books. The works of North
et al. and Tilly comprise of generally applicable theories that bring most of human recorded
history into scope, whereas Mahoney’s framework focuses mainly on the American
continent, though examples of other regions are also made.4 In the case of this thesis, the
term ‘institutions’ refer to ‘the rules of the game’. They exceed legal or formal institution
and thus also include informal rules, whether of political or economic origin. Using these
models and theories not only provides scholars and historians with a means to study the
origins of violence, political instability and the development of institutions. Additionally, it
3
Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York, NY 2009); Charles Tilly, Democracy
(New York, NY 2007); James Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development. Spanish America in
Comparative Perspective (New York, NY 2010).
4
North et al., Social Orders, p. xiii; North’s title also implies examining all of recorded human history;
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 238-241, 254-257; Mahoney in these pages mentions Angola, Hong Kong and
Singapore as different British and Portuguese colonies where his model also applies.
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
allows historians to test and arbitrate the use of these models and thus see if these models
are applicable to the cases of Colombian and Venezuelan history.
1.1
Limited and Open Access Orders: Economic and Political Framework
The conceptual framework provided by Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry
Weingast in Social Orders will be examined first as their work is perhaps most important in
originating the sources of organized political violence. Their concepts of the ‘natural state’
and ‘open access societies’ are important in understanding how violence is and has been
contained by ruling elites.5 The book starts by describing the term ‘Social Order’ as the
order in which humans live and interact with each other and their environment. This
interaction changed several times in history. Before the discovery of agriculture, huntergatherer nomadic societies existed for thousands of years.6 The Neolithic agricultural
revolution and spreading of sedentary society is the first so-called ‘social revolution’ as
described by North et al.7 Throughout Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas, agricultural
societies existed until the Industrial Revolution took place. This second major social
revolution arose in the second half of the nineteenth century and radically transformed
societies into a new type of social order.8 These so-called social orders deal or repress
violence in different ways. The proposition of the authors is to describe “how societies
make the transition from one social order to the other”, whilst they also note each social
order’s characteristics.9 Agricultural and sedentary existence meant that various groups had
to compete with one another and thus were allocated into a constant state of war. Many
different groups fought each other for survival. At a personal level, violence can be
contained within small groups, but this becomes more and more problematic as the group
5
North et al., Social Orders, p. 2-3.
North et al., Social Orders, p. 1.
7
North et al., Social Orders, p. 1-3.
8
North et al., Social Orders, p. 1.
9
North et al., Social Orders, p. 1
6
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radically increases in size.10 So how do social orders contain violence, as it can never be
completely eliminated?11
The ‘natural state’, or ‘limited access society’, existed prior to the industrial
revolution everywhere and most nations today still fall in this category. In contrast, ‘open
access states’, or ‘open access societies’, have institutions and characteristics that contain
violence in other ways. Both types of societies have a number of characteristics and are
very different from each other. Natural states typically have to deal with slow-growing
economies that at the same time are vulnerable to negative shocks.12 They additionally have
to deal with these shocks at a much more frequent rate than open access societies. These
natural states are polities which are not governed through generalized consent of the
governed. This means they usually are not democratic. In most of these, power is only
shared by a limited, dominant coalition of elites.13 Another important feature of natural
states is the general lack of organizations within that society. As explained in Social
Orders, ‘organizations’ “consist of specific groups of individuals pursuing a mix of
common and individual goals through partially coordinated behavior”.14 In natural states,
the ability of the population to form these organizations is limited to the elites of that
particular society. Even so, these organizations exist only within the boundaries of the state
itself. Natural states have governments that are small, concentrated and centralized, without
too many kinds of layers.15 Social relationships are predominantly organized along personal
lines and is perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the limited access society.
Social hierarchies and privileges are on a personal level, laws are enforced on an unequal
basis and property rights are neither well-defined or secure. Within these societies it is
commonly perceived and understood “that not all individuals are not created or are
equal”.16 When examining these characteristics, it becomes clear that political and
10
The authors describe a situation where at a personal level, in a group size of 50 violence is containable, but
this becomes more and more problematic as this number increases; North et al., Social Orders, p. 14.
11
North et al., Social Orders, p. 13.
12
North et al., Social Orders, p. 12.
13
North et al., Social Orders, p. 12, 18-19.
14
North et al., Social Orders, p. 16.
15
North et al., Social Orders, p. 12.
16
North et al., Social Orders, p. 12.
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economic power resides within the elites of this type of society. Open access societies offer
a sharp contrast.
Open access societies are societies in which political and economic development are
linked and develop hand-in-hand.17 Institutions prevent political figures from manipulating
the economy for personal profit. This social order fosters greater economic competition,
which in turn allows greater political competition. This works both ways. In addition, the
economies of open access societies experience much less negative economic growth and
are much less vulnerable to shocks than their limited access counterparts. Thus, their
economies not only grow more but do so a lot faster.18 Open access societies are “rich and
vibrant civil societies with lots of organizations”, which are more in number and much
more complex than any limited access society is capable of containing.19 Finally, another
characteristic is that government structure is more extensive, layered and decentralized.
Such characteristics are possible when social relationships do not revolve around, and rely
as heavily on, personal relationships as would be the case in a limited access society. This
is of particular importance when it comes down to containing violence, as shall be
explained.
Limited access societies deal with violence and its causes differently than open
access societies. The authors wish readers to imagine a world in which different factions
are locked in stage of constant warfare with one another. They do not have to be specialists
in war but can also be armed defenders of their particular home and/or town. In this state,
neither one of multiple parties wishes to lay down weapons for the sake of peace, as they do
not trust other groups. This is also a state of equilibrium: This constant state of warfare
does not end by itself.20 In order for these factions to stop fighting each other, insurances
must be made. To each faction separately, it must at least appear as if living in peace is
17
North et al., Social Orders, p. 11.
North et al., Social Orders, p. 11.
19
North et al., Social Orders, p. 11, 16-17.
20
North et al., Social Orders, p. 18-19.
18
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more profitable than living in a state of war.21 This has to do with ‘rents’, or the extraction
of more revenue than is necessary to make ends meet. Rent is a term which expresses the
“return to an economic asset that exceeds the return the asset can receive in its best
alternative use”. This means that groups or individuals seek the best possible returns,
money, goods or otherwise, to maximize profit.22 Though individuals specialize in military,
political, economic or religious aspects of their society, they all pursue rent creation.23
So how does this relate to the problem of organized violence and political
instability? With the prospect of warfare equilibrium and the possibilities of rent creation,
the only way to ensure that violence between groups is reduced and contained is if the
parties believe it is in their best economic interests not to fight.24 As presented by the
authors, “if each… specialist captures a larger economic return… from the land, labor and
resources he or she controls when there is peace and if those rents are large enough, then it
is possible for both specialists to credibly believe that the other specialist is better off by
refraining from fighting”.25 This means that if the opportunity presents itself to have larger
returns during peace, these groups will work together rather than fight. Thus a dominant
coalition can be formed in which the members of groups can hold special privileges, such
as property rights and resource access. Then there is a group-wide respect for each other’s
privileges.26 There are thus incentives, not only to refrain from fighting, but also to keep the
state small and to limit access to positions of power. The ability to form organizations is
also limited because of this. Elites need these organizations to create and distribute rents to
the coalition, thereby maintaining each other’s privileges.27 The coalition itself is a socalled ‘adherent organization’, in which third-party enforcement is not needed to protect
internal agreements. Natural states restrict their amount in order to restrict access to
21
North et al., Social Orders, p. 18
North et al., Social Orders, p. 19.
23
North et al., Social Orders, p. 18.
24
North et al., Social Orders, p. 16-20.
25
North et al., Social Orders, p. 19.
26
North et al., Social Orders, p. 20.
27
North et al., Social Orders, p. 20.
22
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economic and political power. Coalitions emerge out of mutual interest to the different
groups involved and they keep each other in check.28
When these elements are jeopardized, elites may lose any incentives to support the
coalition, which could lead to (re)emergence of violence and disorder. Perhaps more
important to elites themselves is that this could also lead to the loss of rents.29 There are
internal as well as external factors that could contribute to this. Internally, the leaders and
members of the coalition are not fully aware of the consequences of their own actions.
Externally, fluctuations in the prices of grain due to bad harvests or technological changes
can have a negative impact that could change the economic interests of certain groups.30
Thus, these societies are subject to economic shocks that offset the “double balance”,
leading to civil war or other forms of political instability. The result of successful coalitionforming is a double balance in which violence potential and political power cross-connects
to economic power.31
In contrast to limited access orders, open access societies have lots of complex,
‘contractual organizations’ in which third parties are used to enforce internal arrangements,
even non-government parties. Large and multi-layered government and economic and
political co-development also characterize the open access state. How do open access
societies keep violence in check? The authors agree with Max Weber’s maxim that only the
state should have the monopoly on the legal use of violence.32 If implemented
satisfactorily, this not only does restricts organized parties from using violence legally, but
also provides an institution that helps giving society shape. Along with other institutions,
open access societies reduce violence through sets of rules, laws and boundaries, which
28
North et al., Social Orders, p. 16, 20.
North et al., Social Orders, p. 20.
30
North et al., Social Orders, p. 20-21.
31
North et al., Social Orders, p. 20, 55-62.
32
North, Social Orders, p. 22; As an aside of the discussion, one could question the implementation of Max
Weber’s maxim in the United States, as the constitution, or more specifically the Bill of Rights (2nd
Amendment) gives citizens the right to bear arms and form militias; National Archives, ‘Bill of Rights
Transcription Text’, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html (October 17th
2013); See: North, Social Orders, p. 27, 228-235.
29
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must be applied on an impersonal basis.33 This is critical. If rules are applied based on the
identity of the person, or any way applied on a personal basis, the state is automatically
assumed a natural state.34 Another important factor is the notion of equality. It is vital to
open access societies that citizenship is inclusive, as opposed to exclusive rights and
privileges that mark their counterparts.35 Democratic institutions must be capable of
assuring that the political party in power does not monopolize on the situation. Institutions
limit and restrict the use of power by politicians and prevent them from manipulating the
economy to their own interests.
The authors describe the following elements to be most important in repelling
violence in open access societies: Police and military forces must be subject to the political
system; the political system must be limited by institutions and triggers that minimize use
of illegal violence; a party can only remain in power if supported by broad economic and
social interests and is kept from manipulating the economy.36 The latter would mean that
the government has general consent of the governed. That can only possible through the use
of fair elections in which parties in power can be judged by the electorate. If they did not
perform satisfactorily, political figures in power could be dismissed from public office after
these elections. Note that the difference between the societies’ means of repelling violence
are tremendous. Whereas the limited access society does so through the creation of a
dominant coalition of the few, the open variant imbeds the economic and political inclusion
of all. Where one makes organized violence the least attractive alternative, the other
contains it through the capability of citizens to pursue their own interests, either politically
or economically. One is dominated by personal social relationships and personal exchange,
whilst the other strictly deals with people on an impersonal level, which applies to both
politics as well as economics.
33
North et al., Social Orders, p. 23.
North et al., Social Orders, p. 23.
35
North et al., Social Orders, p. 21-22.
36
North et al., Social Orders, p. 22.
34
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Social Orders also discusses the transition through social revolution. It poses the
question how open access societies emerge out of their natural state predecessors.37 How
was it possible for this transition to take place, given the characteristics of the natural state?
The authors propose that certain “conditions must arise within a natural state that... puts
elites in a position where it is in their interest to move toward impersonal intra-elite
arrangements”.38 The authors’ book suggest three so-called ‘Doorstep Conditions’, which
define the in-between stages of this transition from a limited to an open access state. The
first stage is the establishment of the rule of law for elites.39 There must be institutional
arrangements that allow elites to treat each other on an impersonal basis as far as that is
possible. The second stage is the creation of ‘perpetually lived organizations’, both in
public and private spheres among the elite and state.40 Organizations of this category,
which exist independently from the personal lives of its members, continue the trend of
dealing with groups or individual on an impersonal basis. Finally, the third doorstep
condition for this transition is political consolidation and control of military forces.41 When
this occurs, then violence can be monopolized by the state according to Weberian
standards.
In sum, the elites must believe that it serves their own economic and political
interests to create, and safeguard, institutions and organizations which function and deal
with citizens on an impersonal level. It must be in their interests to allow greater economic
and political competition and to provide wider access in order to achieve this. Organized
violence and political instability emerge in open access societies when institutions fail to
provide greater access. When institutions that safeguard inclusion of the citizenry do not
achieve what they are supposed to do, it could have serious consequences.42 Rather than
causing immediate eruption of violence, political crises usually are solved through dialogue
‘pacts’. The authors propose that open access societies not only deal with these issues far
37
North et al., Social Orders, p. 25-29; 110-111.
North et al., Social Orders, p. 25.
39
North et al., Social Orders, p. 26.
40
North et al., Social Orders, p. 26.
41
North et al., Social Orders, p. 26.
42
North et al., Social Orders, p. 14-15, 121.
38
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better than natural states, but also have the ability “to experiment with new policies” which
can correlate with the wishes of citizens.43 The Great Depression of the 1930s caused
political problems in Europe and the United States, South American countries that were
also hit experienced military coups, disorder and violence, such as Argentina and Brazil.44
Open access societies can regulate and control organized violence with less effort than
limited access orders, but that does not mean they never experience eruptions of violence.
How does this relate to political instability and violence in post-independence
Colombia and Venezuela? First of all, Social Orders gives the various conditions which
determine if a state is either an open access or a limited access order. From that point, the
authors explain how political violence is sustained and how it can reemerge. The question if
political instability and violence can be explained through these terms will be answered in
the consecutive chapters. Some aspects cannot be accurately measured, such as the full
extent of organizations in Colombia and Venezuela during the various moments in time.
One the other hand, the politico-economic development and crises of both states can be
portrayed and discussed.
1.2
Democratization and State Capacity: Pinpointing Regimes in History
Although looking from a different angle than Social Orders, Charles Tilly’s book
Democracy does examine the establishment of democracy in history from another
perspective. The book not only focuses on its implementation and its origins, but also to
turning points in history where democratization and de-democratization have taken place.45
Tilly investigated several countries and historical scenarios where democracy either
developed or eroded. Some of the countries examined include Kazakhstan, France,
43
North et al., Social Orders, p. 136.
North et al., Social Orders, p. 136.
45
Tilly, Democracy, p. 59-66.
44
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Switzerland, South Africa, Russia, Spain and Ireland. Tilly’s view on Venezuela from 1972
on to 2006 will be of great use in the fifth chapter of this thesis.46
Tilly first and foremost examines the criteria used by civil rights watcher ‘Freedom
House’ in New York.47 Freedom House rates countries on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1
represents high levels of either political rights or civil liberties and 7 represents the lack or
low levels of the same.48 Following up on his Kazakhstan example, Tilly shows that in the
very first article of the country’s constitution, it is claimed that Kazakhstan is a
“democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are an individual, his life,
rights and freedoms”.49 However, it becomes clear that the Kazakh president Nursultan
Nazarbayev had made his way to securing welfare and political power for his own family at
the cost of individual freedoms.50
A Freedom House report respectively gave Kazakhstan a ‘6’ and ‘5’ for political
rights and civil liberties.51 Rather than trying to answer the various questions Freedom
House poses in order to answer if a regime is democratic or not, Tilly instead gives his own
criteria. As stated in Democracy, “a regime is democratic to the degree that political
relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually
binding consultation”.52 De-democratization offers the reverse process, where these terms
erode and become more narrow, unequal, unprotected and less mutually binding. Tilly
determines levels of (de-)democratization through these four terms. Breadth is the degree of
political inclusion, whereas equality looks at different “categories of citizens” and the
present inequalities between them.53 The amount of protection that citizens enjoy from the
legal system to secure their rights depends on the degree of nepotism and personal
46
Tilly, Democracy, p. ix, 2-5, 35-46, 71, 109, 129-136, 157,170-183.
Tilly, Democracy, p. 1.
48
Tilly, Democracy, p. 1-3.
49
Tilly, Democracy, p. 1.
50
Tilly, Democracy, p. 1-4.
51
Tilly, Democracy, p. 1, 3.
52
Tilly, Democracy, p. 14-15.
53
Tilly, Democracy, p. 14.
47
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vindication of state agents, as well as degree of transparent public processes and trials.54
‘Mutually binding consultation’ refers to the willingness and capacity degree of state agents
“to deliver benefits by category of the recipient”, thus making agents do their jobs.55
Looking back at the Kazakh example, Tilly notes that Nazarbayev increased the
capacity of the state at the expense of democracy.56 ‘State capacity’ can be defined as the
ability or extent of a state agent’s actions to have actual effect on society.57 High- or lowcapacity is determined by “the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing nonstate resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions… as
well as relations among… [the above factors]”.58 As such, ‘high-capacity states’ have
agents whose actions affect citizens greatly. The actions of state agents in a ‘low-capacity
state’ have minimal effort, no matter how high the input. Increasing the capacity of the state
does not make a country less democratic. In fact, both high-capacity and low-capacity
democracies exist, as do low- and high-capacity undemocratic societies. Tilly uses Jamaica
as an example of a low-capacity democracy.59 He notes the characteristics of these types of
states: “…[F]requent social movements, interest group activity, and political party
mobilizations… but less effective state monitoring, high involvement of semi-legal and
illegal actors in public politics, and… higher levels of lethal violence”.60 Violence thus is
more frequent in low-capacity states. Throughout history, most states fall in the lowdemocratic low-capacity category, with warlords, religious strongholds and the frequency
of civil wars and political violence. High capacity thus also involves control or containment
of violence by the state. Though high-capacity regimes diffuse violence they are not
necessarily democratic. Nazi-Germany is given as the paramount example of the most
extreme of undemocratic high-capacity regimes by Tilly.61
54
Tilly, Democracy, p. 15.
Tilly, Democracy, p. 15.
56
Tilly, Democracy, p. 3, 16-19.
57
Tilly, Democracy, p. 16, 34.
58
Tilly, Democracy, p. 16.
59
Tilly, Democracy, p. 20-21.
60
Tilly, Democracy, p. 20.
61
Tilly, Democracy, p. 18.
55
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Fig. 1 – State Capacity Versus Democracy and Crude Regime Types
Description: The figure offsets the terms state capacity and democracy on the x and y axes. Though Tilly does
not give absolute measurable figures, the purpose of these graphs is to visualize the changes regimes make
towards extending both democracy and state capacity. In addition, Tilly uses crude labels to characterize
regimes, as displayed on the graph
Source: Custom-made graph by author, original in: Tilly, Democracy, p. 19.
Tilly makes the variety between the extremities of state capacity and
democratization more visible using graphs, such as Figure 1. With the levels of democracy
displayed on the x-axis and state capacity on the y-axis, any regime at a particular point in
time can be pinned to its appropriate section of the graph. Numbers are ranged from 0 to 1,
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displaying either the extreme low and extreme high levels of either terms respectively.62
This method is thus not very specific nor entirely scientific, but can make trends more
visible. The examples given are rendered by Tilly as follows: Kazakhstan of 2006 would fit
in the top-left section, as Jamaica fits in lower right.63 Describing regimes to be either one
of the four categories in the graph can be useful in monitoring political developments and
crises in history. Tilly’s graphs do use lines to display development over time, but Tilly
does not state exactly how these results were obtained. Though it may not be clear how
Tilly achieved results in his framework, democratization and state capacity as terms are
very useful. Ultimately this thesis will also show that Tilly’s framework is too problematic
to be fully applicable, especially its graphs. Though the graphs are not precise, the terms are
indeed well-suited to characterize the political regimes of Colombia and Venezuela in the
post-colonial era.
1.3.
Postcolonial Development Related to Colonial Institutions
James Mahoney provides a framework conceived in the discussion on postcolonial
development and its origins in the colonial and precolonial eras. Though not focusing
particularly on violence itself, the framework seeks to find a balance in the current
dominant schools for explaining postcolonial development. One group of scholars focuses
on the establishment of institutions during the colonial period, whilst the other emphasizes
the predominant role of geography in the development of countries after gaining
independence.64 At the beginning of his book Colonialism and Postcolonial Development,
Mahoney differentiates between the notions of imperialism in contrast with colonialism.65
Imperialism is the establishment of asymmetrical relationships between the imperial power
and local population and does not inherently cause the loss of sovereignty of the same local
population. Colonialism is much more severe as it “renders subordinate… all prior political
62
Tilly, Democracy, p. 19; See also: Figure 1 (will be scanned and applied to appendix)
Tilly, Democracy, p. 19, 21; See also: Figure 2. (will be scanned and applied to appendix)
64
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 3-7.
65
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 2.
63
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entities that could once lay claim to” it. The new colony and its fatherland become the
“final authority over territorial inhabitants”.66 Other scholars categorize colonies into either
‘settlement’ or ‘extraction’ colonies. Yet others use the terms ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ to
explain differences in development. Mahoney believes that although they can be used, they
can only be applied to British and Spanish colonies and thus fail to encompass the whole of
European colonialism.67 A balance is needed between institutional and geographic factors,
as one group employs “vague conceptions” of institutions and the other does not take
geographical variety over time into account as thoroughly.68
Mahoney developed a framework that attempts to explain the extent of settlement
and implementation of institutions. In other words, he examines the level of colonialism as
well as the levels of postcolonial economic and social development. The differences in
prosperity and human welfare on a national level contribute towards establishing the level
of postcolonial development.69 Though his work focuses mainly on these developments in
Spanish America, he attempts to create a theory that can be generally used as a tool in
historical research and thus applicable to any overseas European colony throughout
history.70 His theory focuses on political, economic and social institutions, as well as the
expansion of wealth and human welfare in order to come to his conclusion.71 First of all,
‘development’ is characterized by Mahoney to be “the empowerment of individuals to meet
their justifiable interests”, where an increase in wealth and social welfare are the crucial,
but not the only components.72 Greater access to goods and services and advances in
education would lead to securing greater liberties, such as democracy.73 Given that relative
levels tend to persist over time, countries with higher levels of postcolonial development
66
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 2.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 23.
68
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 3.
69
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 3.
70
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 32.
71
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 6.
72
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 4.
73
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 4-5.
67
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are countries that have already been so for decades or centuries, with the origins in either
the precolonial or colonial era.74
Mahoney’s framework attempts to explain variations between levels of colonialism
and levels of postcolonial development. The European colonizers, whether British, French,
Spanish, Portuguese or Dutch, had very different institutions. These differences in turn had
consequences in the way the Europeans pursued the establishment of colonies.75 To make
these differences comparable into a framework, Mahoney divides the political economies of
these colonial powers into two major categories, each with their own characteristics. First
of all, there is the ‘mercantilist colonizer’, which pursues self-sufficiency.76 In addition to
seeking short-term accumulation of revenue to bolster their coffers, such as the extraction
of gold and silver, mercantilist colonial powers impose restrictions on trade, property rights
and economic participation.77 The societies that had mercantilist orientation were
hierarchical states with a privileged economic elite. On par with the mercantilist colonizer,
was the ‘liberal colonizer’, which had a very different approach in the means of
colonization and prospects of its rewards. Liberal colonizers tried to promote long-term
investment, looking at potential international market advantages.78 The state tried to impose
as few restrictions on trade as possible as well as less restrictions on property rights and
economic participation. The elite was market-based in the sense that it consisted of those
who made money through means of investment rather than defined social hierarchies
present in the mercantilist domain.79 The purpose for allowing this is the potential for
economic advantages whilst the state acts to protect trade and to ensure law and order.80
The importance of these two categories is that they were employed by different colonial
powers in different periods of history. First of all, Spain and Portugal were mercantilist
colonizers until approximately the beginning of the eighteenth century, when these powers
74
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 5-6.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 20-21.
76
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 21; According to Mahoney, interpreted as the “classical” explanation of
mercantilism.
77
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 21.
78
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 21-22; Mahoney explains that this is often called “enlightened mercantilism”, but
uses the term ‘liberal colonialism’ to avoid confusion.
79
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 21-22.
80
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 22.
75
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started to pursue the liberal form.81 Mahoney describes the ‘level of colonialism’ to be “the
extent to which a colonizing power installs economic, political, and sociocultural
institutions in a colonized territory”.82 Among other factors, forms of government, policing
units, courts, labor systems, trade policies, agricultural sorts, religion and family structure
are of particular importance to establish these institutions.83
The other variable in Mahoney’s model is the ‘level of complexity of precolonial
institutions’. These societies ranged from hunter-gatherer tribes to the complex and
advanced civilizations of the Aztec and Inca. According to the framework, the features of
the precolonial societies that already existed within a region rendered how Europeans
decided to pursue colonialism in that particular region.84 Areas with low levels of
institutional complexity have decentralized governments of non-bureaucratic character,
with no great division of labor, slavery nor intensive agriculture. These usually are
ethnically homogenous societies with a single language, kinship social relations and no
formal religion.85 In contrast, high complex societies are characterized by centralized,
bureaucratic government institutions, where slavery was implemented widely. A strong
division of labor, developed agriculture, multiple ethnicities and languages and class-based
relations were also present in these societies. Formal religion was used to legitimize the
rule of those in charge.86 Whilst there were also intermediate societies, Mahoney stresses
that variation within these levels gives different economic prospects for European
colonizers.
According to Mahoney, mercantilist colonies built upon precolonial societies of a
high level of complexity, achieve high levels of colonialism. If the precolonial society in
question was of low complexity, the level of colonization was also low. The level of
precolonial complexity is thus positively related to level of mercantilist colonization.87
81
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 22.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 23.
83
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 23.
84
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 24.
85
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 24.
86
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 24-25.
87
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 27.
82
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Mercantilists use the existing precolonial hierarchies and institutions in order to build upon
them. They expanded them and complemented them with their own, allowing a greater
scale of colonial settlement than possible in precolonial societies of low complexity. In
contrast, the lack of comparable preexisting institutions led to active resistance to coerced
labor.88 For liberal colonialism the rule is the opposite: In areas with high precolonial
institutional complexity, the level of liberal colonization is limited, whereas territories with
low complexity allow greater levels of colonization to take place. The reason why liberal
colonialism is marginal in high complex societies is because changing towards a liberal
political economy is too drastic and is thus likely to be widely resisted. Lower societal
complexity allows greater colonization because precolonial societies are limited in size and
extensity and thus can be swept aside with greater ease, allowing settlers to impose their
institutions whilst isolating the indigenous population.89
Mahoney links both types of colonialism to postcolonial development through
establishing relations between terms: Mercantilist colonialism is negatively linked to
development and liberal colonialism is positively linked to it. High levels of mercantilist
colonialism cause a tight grip on the economy by the placed elite. Institutions set up by the
mercantilist colonizers form “roadblocks to development”.90 Class-division and labor
institutions also cause long-term impoverishment of indigenous population. In contrast, a
low degree of colonization allows greater postcolonial development, because the elite was
already limited in size and power during the colonial era. Restructuring the economy is still
possible because of weaker restrictive institutions and thus low levels of mercantilist
colonialism forms an economic advantage.91
Liberal colonialism is related to development in a different way. High levels of
liberal colonialism cause higher levels of postcolonial development. The investment-elites
actively promote economic development on an autonomic level using already existing
88
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 26-30.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 27-30.
90
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 28.
91
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 28-29.
89
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colonial institutions.92 The combination of elite investment and liberal institutions cause
greater development which in turn allow the elites to develop and expand. The physical
isolation or destruction of the indigenous peoples in the short-term is a serious consequence
of liberal colonial practices.
In areas with low levels of colonialism, liberal institutions were implemented on a
more limited scale. In the need for elites to subjugate and control a complex society, these
institutions were more limited in number. The ironic establishment of a non-liberal elite
through liberal colonialism in these areas countered liberal economic processes that could
have developed in less complex precolonial situations. Imposing order was more important
here than establishing liberal institutions. This caused politically privileged elites to appear
that were “incapable of orchestrating postcolonial development”.93 Thus the conditions of
the precolonial society as well as the characteristics of the colonizer, whether mercantilist
or liberal, dictated the degree of colonialism. This in turn affected the level of postcolonial
development.
However, colonial policy in the Americas was not static. The situation becomes
more complex as colonizers moved from a mercantilist to a liberal colonial policy. This
happened in eighteenth-century Spanish colonies. What happens when a colony becomes
subject to both mercantilist and liberal colonialism? Mahoney’s framework gains further
perspective as he states that “postcolonial development is the product of both the level of
mercantilist colonialism and the level of liberal colonialism”.94 The level of complexity of
precolonial institutions is positively related to levels of mercantilist colonialism and
negatively to liberal colonialism. However, the precolonial society no longer exists and
Mahoney substitutes precolonial complexity with indigenous population size in order to
portray the transition. The size of the indigenous population is similarly negatively related
92
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 29.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 30.
94
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 31.
93
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to liberal colonialism. In turn, mercantilist colonialism is assumed by Mahoney to be
positively related to liberal colonialism. Thus the development that colonies have
experienced in the postcolonial era is the result of the effects of both policies.95
Colonialism has sections treating both Colombia and Venezuela. Mahoney renders
these countries to have experienced intermediate and high development in the postcolonial
era based on his findings.96 Though Mahoney’s work makes sense at a glance, it has some
problems that are not entirely left unresolved. The unintended spread of European diseases
is largely left out, despite its heavy toll on the indigenous populations of Central and South
America. Also, Mahoney champions the British as liberal colonizers. Yet the Caribbean
colony of Jamaica could hardly be described as in such terms. Despite low levels of
precolonial complexity, large amounts of colonization did not take place.97 In sum,
Mahoney’s model, in addition to that of North et al. and Tilly, also produces testable
variables when examining both Colombia and Venezuela over the course of time. Mahoney
has done this in his book in order to illustrate how his model works for different countries
in Spanish America.98 Starting at the end of the third chapter, the other frameworks will be
applied and tried.
95
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 31.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 260-262.
97
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 238; The only page in the book on Jamaica is page 238, with only one sentence
explaining the reason why large amounts of African slaves were imported to the island rather than European
settlers, in contrast with Mahoney’s own model. Climate could have played a role, as well as competition on
the international Caribbean market concerning the production of sugar, coffee and tobacco.
98
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 89-92, 105-109.
96
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Chapter Two: Pre-Columbian and Colonial Northwestern South
America
This chapter seeks to explore the socio-political composition of territories that
comprise the modern nations of Colombia and Venezuela prior to the encounter with the
Spanish and to create a chronology of the pattern of Spanish conquest and settlement. As
expressed in Chapter One, Mahoney believes that scholars usually pay too much attention
to either institutions or geography when it comes to discussing colonial development. This
chapter will set the stage for the post-colonial discussion by examining the pattern of
conquest, settlement and colonial policies of the Spanish empire in northwestern South
America. The following table (Figure 2) shows the main differences and similarities
between east (Venezuela) and west (Colombia) and shows how initial and colonial
conditions between these two differ significantly.
Conditions
West (Colombia)
East (Venezuela)
Geographic Diversity and
Great diversity in geographic
Some diversity but chiefly
Isolation
composition; mountain ranges,
composite of the llanos (plains)
plateaus and cordilleras make
and Caribbean coast; sub-regions
regions relatively isolated.
not so isolated as in New
Grenada; Relatively empty.
Indigenous Population
More numerous and diverse in
Chiefly nomadic hunter-
socio-political complexity; From
gatherers; European diseases did
hunter-gatherers to semi-polities;
hit populations, except those in
Euro diseases did less damage to
higher altitudes; Underpopulated.
cordillera populations.
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Habsburg Jurisdiction
Part of Viceroyalty of Peru;
Part of Viceroyalty of New
Own audiencia; relatively
Spain; Part of Captaincy of Santo
autonomous; bureaucracy
Domingo; periphery of colonial
established early.
interests and thus rented to
Welser Company; bureaucracy
established later.
Bourbon Jurisdiction
Own Viceroyalty (New Grenada);
Part of Viceroyalty of New
relatively more autonomous than
Grenada; Own Captaincy;
during Habsburg period;
relatively more autonomous than
bureaucracy and creole elite
during Habsburg period;
elaborated.
bureaucracy and creole elite
elaborated.
Economy Orientation
Mineral-oriented; export of
Caribbean-oriented; Largely
precious metals and some
agricultural exports; Encomienda.
agriculture; Economienda.
Settlement
Main settlement centers in
Small coastal settlement in
sixteenth and seventeenth
sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries; Pockets around native
centuries, but more intensive
settlements; extended in
colonization in eighteenth; Most
eighteenth century.
settlement near coast, few inland.
Fig. 2 – Overview Table of Northern South America (c. 1500 – c. 1780).
Description: A list of characteristics of northern South America (present-day Colombia and Venezuela) based
on the findings of Chapter Two of this thesis. The first column contains the various themes whilst the second
and third columns give short information related to those themes. The second column focusses on the regions
of present-day Colombia, or the West, whilst the third column focusses on present-day Venezuela, or the East.
Sources used: Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 27-63; Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 106-123; Mahoney,
Colonialism, p. 106-157; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 1-18; Chasteen, Blood & Fire, p. 61-97; Fisher, ‘Imperial
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Rivalries’, p. 178-187; Rowen, King’s State, p. 92; Bakewell, A History, p. 121-132; Encyclopaedia
Brittannica, ‘Charles V’.
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2.1
Spanish Exploration and Settlement
The earliest Spanish explorers came into contact with the tribes along the Caribbean
coast in 1499 and 1501.99 They had identified the areas of the mouth of the Magdalena
River and the bays of Santa Marta and the Cartagena area. The Gulf of Urabá became the
division point between two areal projects of settlement: Veragua, from the Gulf westward
and New Andalucía, from the Gulf to the Guajira peninsula.100 In 1510, explorers started to
make move through the forests of Chocó in northwest Colombia. The famous conquistador
Francisco Pizarro had made his way to Incan Peru from Panama, before an expedition
under command of Sebastián de Belalcázar made its way from Peru into southwestern
Colombia in 1535, reaching the upper Magdalena River valley and Antioquia three years
later.101 Several other expeditions took place from the Caribbean coast, from settlements
such as Santa Marta and Coro in northern regions of today’s Venezuela.102 The indigenous
tribes had to cope with an increasing demand of food and gold from the Spanish, no matter
if they treated them with belligerence or welcome.103 Safford notes that either way, the
tribes eventually rebelled against the Spaniards.104 Most of the indigenous populations in
modern-day Colombia were not hit by European diseases as much as elsewhere, forcing the
first Spanish settlements to scattered throughout the territory, isolating the natives.105
The experience on the Caribbean coasts offers a sharp contrast. Instead of three
separate exploration launching points and extensive exploration, Venezuela, or “Little
Venice”, received very little attention from Spanish conquistadors and settlers. The legend
of El Dorado motivated explorers to go further inland but the area of Venezuela itself did
not foster extensive Spanish settlement in the early years colonization. Caracas, modern
99
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 27.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 27.
101
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 27.
102
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29.
103
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29.
104
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29.
105
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29, 35.
100
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Venezuela’s capital, was not founded until 1567, whilst Bogotá, founded over fifty years
earlier, had an adult male Spanish population of over six hundred by that time.106 On the
coast, disease-surviving members of indigenous tribes were enslaved and incorporated into
the encomienda: A system in which tribal leaders employed tribesmen through forced labor
in order to pay tribute to their Spanish overlords.107 This method was used throughout the
Caribbean but Venezuela did not receive the profits which were expected. This has been
accredited to native resistance and general impoverishment of the vast emptiness that the
regions was at the time.108 During the first half of the sixteenth century, Venezuela was
“rented” to the German bank of Welser, as a means to pay off debt and to gain some profit
out of the country.109 It is important to realize that at this period in time, the kingdom of
Spain was closely linked to the Habsburg Empire in Europe and thus connected to Germanspeaking lands through its rulers.110 Holy Roman Emperor Charles V was joint ruler of
Spain and the Habsburg possessions in Europe and had sanctioned the Welser firm to invest
in the land. However, this firm “abandoned hope of profit” and returned ownership of the
land back to Charles in 1546.111 Coro, Cumaná and few other Spanish towns were the only
ones in the region which were primarily serving as military outposts rather than settling
areas. Caracas became the chief center of colonial administration in the area because of the
wheat and cacao production in the vicinity. Cacao export to other regions such as Mexico
grew from that period onward.112
For both areas however, it took decades before more extensive settlement took
place. Whilst being dependent of the native populations, Spanish towns were erected to
both defend the interests of the Spanish empire and to dig into natural resources. It would
seem that as the enslaved natives had died out, or if the sources of precious metals in a
106
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29, 32-33; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 1, 15; Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 91.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 16; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 35, 37-38; Susan Elizabeth Ramírez,
‘Institutions of the Spanish American Empire’, in: Thomas H. Holloway (ed.), A Companion to Latin
American History (Madden, MA, 2008), p. 107.
108
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 16.
109
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 16; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29; Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 91.
110
Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Charles V’ (version September 22th 2006),
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/107009/Charles-V (November 8th 2013).
111
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 16; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29.
112
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 89-90.
107
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particular region were exhausted, settlers would lose interest and towns could die out as
well.113 The indigenous tribes were exploited and had to pay tribute to the Spanish, conform
to the system of encomienda.114 The natives in Colombia were generally much numerous
and organized than their Venezuelan counterparts, because of the greater extent of
population sizes and survival of the diseases brought by the Europeans in three
cordilleras.115 In Venezuela, there were generally less people, who were more resistant to
attempts of exploits and most of which had died due to the aforementioned diseases.
Map 1 – Relief Map of Northern South America
The splintered Spanish settlements of the sixteenth century were surrounded by
indigenous communities. In many ways, the geographical factors that isolated these
communities from each other in the centuries prior to the Spanish arrival also played a part
113
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 106.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 106.
115
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 106-107.
114
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in Spanish colonial life: It caused the Spanish towns to be isolated from one another.116
Travel and communication was difficult and in addition to the pattern of conquest, these
conditions caused several Spanish settlements to be clustered and established under a
separate, more or less self-sufficient, colonial administration.117 The interior highlands were
split into two regions that were relatively insulate of character. The central cordillera
formed the great obstacle in connecting the two as it was virtually impassable, and as
rebelling indigenous tribes attacked those that dared to cross it.118 The West had been taken
by the forces which had marched from the Peruvian mountains to Popayán and Cauca,
whilst the East had been secured by men whom campaigned south and east from Santa
Marta to the Muisca territory of modern day Bogotá. Explorer Gonzalo Jiménez de
Quesada called the area New Granada, laying the foundations for the future claim to it.119
Until about 1549, the chief administrative center of most of Colombia was Quito, in
modern day Ecuador.120
The next sections focus on colonial administration. Why is it important to fully
explore Habsburg and Bourbon colonial rule? By showing the structures of this
administration, the role of the indigenous peoples, Spanish settlers and their offspring
becomes more clear. The caste system among other institutions, were the sources of
discontent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
2.2
Habsburg Colonial Administration and Policy
Spanish colonial administration in the Habsburg era took place in many different
ways and on many levels, ranging from royal appointees to local councils to influential
116
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 35, 39.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 39.
118
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 39.
119
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 29-32, 39.
120
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 39-40; Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p.107-109.
117
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clergy. The Spanish territories in the Americas were divided into two major Viceroyalties:
New Spain and New Castile (Peru). The Viceroyalty of New Spain was seated in Mexico
City and supervised the Mexican, Caribbean and North American territories. The
Viceroyalty of New Castile governed Peru and most of Spanish South America.121
Map 2 – Habsburg Administration of South America c. 1650.
The king in Spain appointed viceroys to represent the interests of the Spanish
monarchy in the New World and as such, these two men had significant power and
authority.122 Viceroys usually held office for five or six consecutive years and played an
executive role, serving as civil bureaucrats. They made laws and issued edicts in their
respectively assigned territory. The five or six year term was meant to prevent individuals
from gaining too much personal power. However, the king could assign former viceroys to
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107-110; John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood & Fire. A Concise History of
Latin America (2nd edition, New York 2006), p.61-62.
122
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107.
121
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another viceroyalty than they previously had served.123 Serving as viceroy in both
viceroyalties was seen as the paramount of successful career in Spanish America. The
viceroy was also in charge of keeping public order and had influence in nominating and
appointing high clergy officials. Distance formed a considerable boundary when the
viceroys had to deal with Spain or the more peripheral regions of America. In the extreme,
correspondence could take years. During the Habsburg era, most of modern-day Colombia
was part of the Viceroyalty of New Castile, whilst Venezuela was but a fraction of the large
Viceroyalty of New Spain. This implies that the two countries were part of two separate
spheres of influence, both geographically and politically.124
The viceroyalties were subdivided into so-called presidencies, captaincies and
governorships, where the viceroy enjoyed political authority over the inhabitants.125
Regions outside of Mexico and Peru formed these presidencies and the most remote regions
formed captaincies. Though governorships lay within the boundaries of the viceroyalties
and audiencias, they commonly were situated along the frontier and some were promoted
to captain generals.126 Important presidencies were the ones stationed at Panama, Quito and
Chile among others.127 Captaincies were governed by a captain general, an executive of
civil character. Captain generals were usually selected from peninsular-born Spaniards,
rather than criollos, white Spaniards born in America.128 The remoteness of the captaincies
from the main centers of power made these captain generals very influential figures. The
audiencias, or supreme tribunals, the judiciary power in the Spanish American world.
These established gradually throughout the viceroyalties.129 The first audiencia was created
in Santo Domingo and over the course of a hundred and forty years, more were established
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107.
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107.
125
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107; Bakewell, A History, p. 121.
126
Bakewell, A History, p. 121.
127
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107.
128
Criollos, or creoles, were whites sons of peninsular Spaniards that were born in Spanish America;
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 106; Chasteen, Blood & Fire, p. 97; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 54, 56-57;
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 17.
129
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107, 110; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 39.
123
124
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in Mexico, Guatemala, Guadalajara, Panama, Peru, Bogotá, Charcas (modern Bolivia),
Quito, Chile and finally Buenos Aires.130 Most of the oidores, or judges/hearers, were
mainly peninsular Spaniards. At the end of the Habsburg era, more criollos/creoles joined
their ranks. Municipalities of the Spanish colonial world in America had councils
(cabildos) where councilmen (regidores) passed local laws that affected the Spanish
settlers.131 They were headed by local governors (either alcades mayors or corregidores),
sometimes also supervised the indigenous populations of a region.132
Colonial government thus was elaborate and relatively decentralized. Another
institution of considerable importance was that of the secular Catholic Church, which had
the task to educate the inhabitants about Christian values and scripture.133 Being part of the
few that were able to read and write, the clergy organized education by establishing schools
and universities, read aloud public edicts and letters, and provided the means for followers
of the parish to be able to communicate through writing.134 In addition, they also recorded
and kept census through regular church-related documents, such as marriage contracts.
Through finance, the church gained influence in local politics, but ultimately the patronato
real “gave the king a veto over high ecclesiastical office and… to administer ecclesiastical
jurisdictions and revenues and veto papal bulls”.135
Jurisdiction over New Granada first fell in the hands of the presidency in Quito
before the foundation of the audiencia in Bogotá in the year 1546. After an audiencia was
established in Quito in 1563, much jurisdiction of the western cordillera was returned to
the city.136 Unlike New Granada, the area that become known as Venezuela was integrated
as a captaincy within the boundaries of New Spain. A political split was visible at an early
stage, as the regions were relatively autonomous from each other. New Granada and
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 110.
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 111; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 35; Bakewell, A History, p. 110, 120123.
132
Bakewell, A History, p. 121-122; Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 110-111.
133
Ramírez. ‘Institutions’, p. 111.
134
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 111.
135
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 112; Bakewell, A History, p. 131-132.
136
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 39.
130
131
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Venezuela did not receive similar levels of attention until the changes of regime in Spain
during the first half of the eighteenth century.
2.3
Bourbon Changes in Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth Century
With the death of “the bewitched” Charles II, the Habsburg branch of Spanish
monarchs had died out. This unleashed the Spanish War of Succession, in which the
Bourbon monarchy of France intended to place a member of the Bourbon family on the
throne of Spain.137 This challenged the Austrian Habsburgs, who had supplied Spain with
kings from Charles V onwards. The war ended in 1713 with the Peace of Utrecht, when the
two sides of the conflict agreed that Spain would have a Bourbon king. However, it was
prohibited that France and Spain could be ruled by the same monarch.138 With the new
dynasty in charge, colonial policy changed.139 On the administrative level, a new
viceroyalty was created to govern New Granada. It took twenty years for the viceroyalty to
be effectively and fully established. In doing so, New Granada was no longer subordinate to
Lima, but became much more autonomous.140 In the south, another viceroyalty had also
been established, covering the territories of present-day Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and
Uruguay.
John Fisher, ‘Imperial Rivalries and Reforms’, in: Thomas H. Holloway (ed.), A Companion to Latin
American History (Madden, MA, 2008), p. 178.
138
Fisher, ‘Imperial Rivalries’, p. 179; Herbert H. Rowen, The King's State. Proprietary Dynasticism in Early
Modern France (New Brunswick 1980), p. 92.
139
Fisher, ‘Imperial Rivalries’, p. 185.
140
Fisher, ‘Imperial Rivalries’, p. 186; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 59.
137
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Map 3 – Bourbon Administration of Spanish America (Green Areas) 18 th Century.
An important feature of the new administration was the gradual introduction of
“free trade”, a process that covered most of the second half of the eighteenth century.141
Until then, only Cartagena, Santo Domingo, Panama, Lima and Veracruz had exclusive
trading rights.142 Free trade reached Venezuela relatively late and was still limited by
1789.143The commercialization of the colonies lead to an elaboration of a growing creole
elite, which had increasingly more influence and access to administrative positions.144
Fisher, ‘Imperial Rivalries’, p. 186-187; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 60.
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 113.
143
Fisher, ‘Imperial Rivalries’, p. 186.
144
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 56-59; Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 106, 110-111.
141
142
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Venezuela’s position changed due to the Bourbon reforms. Where it had been the
complete periphery and was largely ignored until the first half of the eighteenth century, the
Caribbean plantation economy started to swell during this period. Venezuelan trade
flourished under the auspices of the newly-founded Caracas Company that held monopoly
trade rights.145 At that point, Venezuela’s prime source of income was agricultural exports,
which included cacao, coffee, tobacco and other plantation crops.146 The dependency on
slaves jeopardized further growth possibilities as slave population declined, and less slaves
were brought to Venezuela.147 In addition, the Caracas Company trade monopolies and the
plantation-oriented economy halted the growth of an urban merchant class. Venezuela may
have developed significantly in the eighteenth century, the level of settlement and
development were not on a scale that was comparable to the Río de la Plata region of the
same era.148 Bourbon administrators of the late eighteenth century pursued higher revenue
collection, and proceeded to raise taxes all over the colonies.149 The growing discontent in
the colonies grew significantly after the Venezuelan cacao uprising of 1749, when the
residents of Quito revolted twenty years later. Though, these revolts were not in favor of
independence, they were directed against the policies of “bad government”.150
In sum, the factors given in Figure 2 represent the major conditions of colonization
and colonial administration. They are important when considering the sentiments of the late
eighteenth and early twentieth century. Not only did these elements lead to the
independence of northwestern South America from Spain, but also to the independence of
Venezuela and Ecuador from Gran Colombia.
145
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 136; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 17.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 137-138; Hellinger, Venezuela, p.17-18.
147
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 141.
148
Mahoney reports that Argentina became a new principal center of colonialism, whereas the regions of
Colombia and Venezuela both experienced intermediate levels of development during the Bourbon era;
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 140.
149
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 63; Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 157.
150
Chasteen, Blood & Fire, p. 87.
146
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Chapter Three: Independence and the Rise and Fall of Gran
Colombia
This chapter deals with the Spanish American Wars of Independence, the immediate
establishment of Gran Colombia and its breakdown into separate states. The first half of the
nineteenth century was the era of revolution, where the America-born descendants of
Spanish settlers mobilized the masses against their Spanish rulers. People such as Simón
Bolívar led the Wars of Independence and established many new Spanish American states,
including what was to become Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.151 The rest of the former
Spanish American mainland colonies also experienced waves of revolution and established
the independent states of Mexico, Argentina and others. As had formally been the case
during the Bourbon period, the territories that comprise modern Colombia and Venezuela
were united under a single banner. This state that emerged from the Wars of Independence
was Gran Colombia, referred to in English literature as “Greater Colombia” to contrast it
with the modern republic.152 Bolívar remained in the spotlights as president of this new
constitutional republic, although he died in 1830 deeming America “ungovernable”.153
The following chapter examines the root causes of the Wars of Independence on a
political and economic level, as well as its consequences for the immediate post-colonial
period. In addition, the political institutions of Gran Colombia will be examined, from its
foundation to its dissolution and Venezuelan secession in 1830.154 The political and
constitutional changes of Bolívar’s Colombia were numerous, but this section zooms in on
the changes leading to the foundation and fall of Gran Colombia in 1831. Chapter Four
focuses on the rest of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Though the
Colombian republic altered greatly, Venezuela retained most of its current territorial
151
Bolívar became president of Gran Colombia, dictator of Peru and president of Bolivia within a few years;
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 199; Rodríguez, ‘Process’, p. 207-208.
152
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 104.
153
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 276 ; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 129-310.
154
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 129-131.
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borders throughout the nineteenth century.155 Both countries suffered from similar
problems, though when examining their situations more closely, they seemed to have
different issues and the states responded to the spread of violence in very different ways.
3.1
Origins of Creole Discontent
The Viceroyalty of New Granada faced a series of crises of authority in the last
decades of the eighteenth century.156 In 1765, an estimate of ten thousand people protested
against higher taxes and the monopoly of sugar cane liquor in Quito.157 This caused a chain
reaction as other regions experienced many riots throughout New Granada. At this point it
became clear that the colonial government lacked the military forces needed to repress the
population. Viceroy Messia de la Zerda admitted that he did not have the forces he needed
to bring an end to the riots, let alone to stop rebellion.158 Reoccurring war with Britain was
putting pressure on the inhabitants of Spanish colonies to pay for the armed forces. This
was not only was the case in the 1760s. During the next decade, more and more protests
occurred aimed against the trade monopolies and restrictions on tobacco and sugarcane.159
TobLocations where tobacco could legally be grown became more limited. Sales of
sugarcane, the product which is used to produce aguardiente liquor, was also placed under
stricter regulations over the course of thirty years.160 Cane liquor generated ever more
revenue for state coffers between 1730 and 1760, but also caused further discontent among
the population, as they were denied opportunities for production. For both tobacco and
155
Venezuela and Ecuador seceded after the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830. In addition, Colombia lost
modern Panama at the turn of the next century; For more on Panama, see: Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p.
216-221.
156
For the purpose of avoiding confusion, New Granada refers roughly to the region currently occupied by the
nations of Colombia and Panama. As New Granada, Venezuela and Quito (Ecuador) formed the state of Gran
Colombia in the wake of revolution, it is necessary to stress that the inhabitants of New Granada shall be
referred to as New Grenadines so that they as a group are set apart from Venezuelans and Ecuadorians.
157
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 64.
158
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 64.
159
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 64-65.
160
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 63-65.
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aguardiente, retail prices were doubled in 1780, as a means to generate further revenue for
colonial coffers. Gutiérrez de Piñeres, chief administrative officer of the New Granadine
Viceroy, reinstated the obsolete Armada de Barlovento tax, which effectively doubled sales
taxes in New Granada.161 It led to riots occurring in protest against the tax, but the rioters
also added the aguardiente monopoly and tobacco restrictions to their list of grievances.
The Comunero rebellion erupted as a result of these riots. The rebels consisted mostly of
militias formed by poor farmers who were hurt most by higher taxes and trade monopolies.
This rebellion is notable for being the initiative of the poorer social classes in which they
expressed active resentment towards the Spanish, whom were “considered arrogant and
insensitive”.162 In addition to demanding the annulment of the raised and imposed taxes of
the previous decades, the Comuneros insisted more creoles to be appointed administrative
functions.163 Though the significance of the revolt is arguable, the main causes for the
rebellion continued to play an important role in the decades after.
During the 1790’s, many Spanish officials feared that the Revolutionary War in
North America and the French Revolution were “spreading poison”.164 The writings of the
French philosophes, especially political thinkers such as Montesquieu and Voltaire,
undermined the foundations of established monarchy.165 Though some creoles embraced
the ideas of the Enlightenment and the Revolutions, few of those creoles such as Manuel
del Socorro Rodríguez, protégé of the viceroy, felt alarmed. Unlike the popular Comunero
uprising, supporters of the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolutions were
to be found among the creoles.166 Thus, only those belonging to the creole upper classes
were motivated to end colonial rule in Spanish America.
161
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 65.
Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America. Empires and Sequels 1450-1930 (Oxford 1997), p. 286-287;
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 66-67.
163
Bakewell, A History, p. 287-288; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 67.
164
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 69.
165
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 70.
166
Including Simón Bolívar; Bakewell, A History, p. 288-289; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 70, 80.
162
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Creoles had been socially set apart from peninsulares from the beginning of Spain’s
colonial era well into the early nineteenth century.167 From the point of view of the creoles,
they lacked access to the highest offices of colonial administration and ecclesiastical
positions.168 Despite the comunero rebellion, most high offices continued to be occupied by
peninsulares. Whilst this did not lead to creole uprising itself, it did form the basis for
mutual mistrust between the two groups throughout Spanish America during the 1790s and
the first decades of the nineteenth century.169 Among the educated creole elites, some
families were descendants of the sixteenth-century Spanish conquerors and made their
fortune through the establishment of slave-labored estates throughout the countryside.170
Mistrust between peninsulares and creoles got worse when Napoleon invaded Spain in
1801 and 1807. Incarcerating king Charles IV and his son Ferdinand, Napoleon had
effectively seized control of the Spanish court. Guerilla resistance sprung up throughout the
Spanish countryside, and their leaders formed the central Junta, literally ‘meeting’, in the
city of Seville. The Junta’s members claimed to be the true political authority of Spain in
absence of the king.171 They demanded to be recognized and supported by the colonial
administration in the Americas, much to the irritation of notable creoles. Though they
supported the effort against the French, the Junta’s demands were perceived as a display of
arrogance and patronization in the eyes of the creole elites.
3.2
The Wars of Independence
With the peninsula unstable as a consequence of French incursion, many creoles
believed that the Junta needed Spanish America more than they needed them. The Junta
167
Bakewell, A History, p. 216-217, 289; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 82-83.
Rodríguez, ‘Process’, p. 197; Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 110-111.
169
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 80, 82-87,;
170
Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 106; Chasteen, Blood & Fire, p. 97; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 54, 5657; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 17.
171
The term ‘junta’ is used as described in the Encyclopaedia Britannica; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p.
80; Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Junta (political comittee)’,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/308374/junta (November 20 th, 2013).
168
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proposed to form a representative government where Spanish Americans would be
represented in the form of the 1812 Cádiz constitution. However, despite approximately
equal sizes in white population, Spanish American dignitaries were only assigned one third
of the available seats. This constellation rendered that New Grenada would have but one
dignitary.172 Eventually, the establishment of the Junta itself formed the basis for several
independent Spanish American Juntas to appear, despite the resistance of vice regal
authorities and peninsulares.173
Fears that the colonial administration would eventually succumb to collaboration
with the French regime became more real in 1810, when the central Junta collapsed and
only Cádiz still housed guerrilla leaders.174 Camilo Torres, a public advocate of creole rule
over Spanish America, wished the area to “imitate the conducts of the North Americans…
[and to] follow in… [their] steps”.175 The years afterward are referred to as the period of the
patria boba, or ‘foolish fatherland’.176 During this period, the creole junta in Bogotá had
overthrown the Viceroyalty, but failed to unite the rest of New Granada.177 Several regional
juntas and governments popped up, such as in Cartagena and Medellín. Both of these did
not support the authority of the Junta in the former viceregal capital. The former even lead
the charge against the efforts of Bogotá.178 In Venezuela, creoles claimed to have founded a
new and independent republic.179 A new constitution had been signed but left many of the
colonial structure intact and fortified creole power. It was conform with the existent system
of social differentiation. However, not all creoles fought for independence, but others
affiliated themselves with the Royalists.180
In sum. these revolts were instigated by the fact that Napoleon invaded the Iberian
peninsula. The earthquake that struck Caracas in 1812 was used by the clergy to proclaim
172
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 82.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 81-83.
174
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 85.
175
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 86.
176
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 63; Rodríguez, ‘Process’, p. 203-204.
177
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 89.
178
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 89-90.
179
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 19.
180
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 63.
173
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that the revolution was against God.181 After Napoleon was defeated in Spain, the
monarchy was reinstalled in 1814 and the Spanish made military efforts to restore order in
the colonies.182 Though Simón Bolívar and his forces put up resistance, the Spanish
eventually reestablished control over Spanish America.183 In his Cartagena Manifesto,
Bolívar stated that it was “disunity, not Spanish arms, [that] returned [them] to slavery”.184
The same Manifesto sums up the many problems that ultimately led to the republics
downfall. These included the reliance on militias rather than professional soldiers, financial
incompetence, the earthquake and, more importantly, the “religious fanaticism unleashed
by the event.185 One of the most important factors leading to the defeat of early
independence efforts, was due to racial division. Non-white laborers that worked on the
farms of the creoles opposed Bolívar and other creoles. 186 El Libertador (the Liberator)
was forced to retreat to Haiti and asked financial and military support from Britain.
In 1819, Venezuelan and New Granadine forces under command of Simón Bolívar
earned a great victory at the famous Battle of Boyacá, causing the viceregal court in Bogotá
to flee the city.187 This caused Spanish officials in other major population centers to be
driven out as well. Later that year, the Republic of Colombia was proclaimed at the creole
Congress of Angostura.188 The new republic officially comprised territories of New
Granada, Venezuela and Quito, though the latter was not represented at the congress.
During the ratification of the newly made constitution at the new Congress of Cúcuta,
Quito, again, was not represented. The representatives that were present were forced by
181
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 1-2, 66-67.
Lynch, Bolívar, p. Rodríguez, ‘Process’, p. 206.
183
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 70-71.
184
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 67.
185
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 67.
186
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 81-83; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 19.
187
Rodríguez, ‘Process’, p. 206-207; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 97-98.
188
To avoid confusion, the term Greater Colombia, or Gran Colombia, is used by historians to distinguish the
state from the modern Republic. As such, Gran Colombia shall be used henceforth to describe this premodern republic. Angostura is known today as Ciudad Bolívar in Venezuela; Rodriguez, ‘Process’, p. 207;
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 97-98.
182
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Bolívar and the army to ratify the constitution .189 It would seem that Gran Colombia was
united at the tip of a sword. However, over the course of two years, general Antonio José de
Sucre and Bolívar succeeded in defeating remaining Royalist forces.190 The new republic
gave Bolívar tremendous powers as its president. His actions on the battlefield showed that
his will was absolute.191
At this time, it became obvious to the independence-forces that Spain was not
willing to send a new army to the Americas..192 In 1820, the newly adapted Cádiz
constitution caused division among the Spaniards at home and among the Royalist forces in
the Americas. Whilst Bolívar’s advance from the north was halted in 1823, the Cádiz
Constitution had been abolished once more, causing a rift between constitutional and
absolutist supporters. In Argentina, independence-forces under command of general San
Martín caused Royalists to fight a two-front war against both Martín and Bolívar. The Wars
of Independence ended when the last of the Royalists in Upper Peru surrendered to General
Sucre. Naming the region after the Liberator, Sucre founded the Republic of Bolivia.193
Examining the time span, from the coerced ratification in 1821 to Bolívar’s death in
1830, Gran Colombia as state did not last very long. Venezuela and Quito seceded from the
republic in 1830 and internal political divisions caused great instability, as will be
examined in the next section.
3.3
The Crises of Gran Colombia
The formation of various juntas and “independent governments” throughout the
confines of New Granada can be seen as early displays of regionalism and profound local
political interests. Through division by geography, Gran Colombia was internally split into
Rodriguez, ‘Process’, p. 207-208.
Rodriguez, ‘Process’, p. 208.
191
Rodriguez, ‘Process’, p. 208.
192
Rodríguez, ‘Process’, p. 206.
193
Rodriguez, ‘Process’, p. 208.
189
190
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sub regions which operated individually from each other.194 In New Granada this was even
more the case as the cordilleras created pockets of isolated populations. The forests of
Chocó, Antioquia and Popayan were also separated from these two other regions, as
expressed in the introduction. The llanos divided Venezuela too, as the vast plains
separated the Caribbean coast from the inlands.195
Depending on how one may look at it, regions which had nothing to do with each
other before Spanish conquest had been placed under a central authority that was remotely
related to them.196 The umbrella-like viceroyalties of New Spain and New Castile had also
divided the regions administratively. After the Bourbon revisions, areas that previously had
little to do with each other were placed under a single colonial administration in Bogotá.
The territorial boundaries of the New Granadine Viceroyalty formed the basis for the
foundation of Gran Colombia.197 Similarly, the Congress of Cúcata also established Bogotá
as capital of the new republic. Despite its foundations and the unity during the Wars of
Independence, the creoles disagreed on how this new country needed to be shaped
politically.
The constitution of the republic, as adopted by the Congress in 1821, begins
certifying the republic’s relationship with the Spanish monarchy, describing the republic to
be “forever, and irrevocably, free and independent”.198 In some ways, the constitution is
modelled after the United States. An example of this is the bicameral division in legislation,
expressed in both constitutions as ‘Senate’ and ‘(House of) Representatives’.199 The creoles
194
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 8-9, 18-19, 27.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 8-9; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 4-7.
196
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 21, 27, 29.
197
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 108.
198
Simón Bolívar et al., ‘Constitución Grancolombiana de 1821’, Title I, Section I, Article 1,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/1821-grancolombiana.pdf (November 23rd, 2013).
199
Bolívar et al., ‘Constitución’, Title IV, Sect. I, Art. 40; ‘The Constitution of the United States: A
Transcript’, Article 1, Sect. 1 (Version November 23 rd, 2013),
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html (November 23rd, 2013); Safford and
Palacios, Colombia, p. 108.
195
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questioned whether the new republican government should either be centralist of federalist.
The centralists wanted to give the executive branch extensive powers, whilst the federalists
wanted a system that was comparable to the United States.200 Bolívar favored the centralist
variety, which the constitution did ultimately embed. This gave the president great powers
and established intendants that governed large amounts of territory.201 Provincial governors,
as well as the intendants, were hand-picked by the president and served as his “direct
agents”.202 However, there was no legislative system as there was in the United States at the
time.203 Though the new republic did formally establish a presidency with four-year terms,
Bolívar remained undisputed leader for nearly nine years. As for five of those years he was
not present in the country himself, but led the military forces in Peru. Still, the constitution
had an overwhelming centralist flavor, though the federalist-oriented delegates at Cúcata
insisted that federalism would guarantee individual rights and freedoms better. Despite this,
Bolívar was convinced that the earlier attempts to adopt federalism were responsible for the
failure of the first attempts of revolution in the decade before.204 As such, a majority did
ultimately agree upon a centralist republic, perhaps persuaded by the need for strong
leadership to fight the remaining Royalist forces.
The constitution did assure the dominance of the creole elite through the limitation
of suffrage and indirect elections, though it did have some progressive points that are well
worth noting.205 Officially, slavery was reduced by the “law of free birth”, which allowed
children of female slaved to become free.206 In the western mining regions this might have
been of some consequence, as the percentage of slaves in correspondence to the population
size was much higher than in the eastern highlands of New Granada. Overall however, this
measure was not that far-reaching, as the percentage of slaves was probably no more than
200
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 108.
Rodríguez, ‘Process’, p. 208.
202
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 108.
203
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 108.
204
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 107.
205
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 108.
206
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 108-109.
201
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four percent of the population at the time. Similarly, attempts were made to turn the
indigenous peoples into formal citizens, even giving opportunities for public office and
abolishing the tributary system of old.207 On a nominal level, every free man born within
the territories of the republic was considered to be a Colombian citizen.208
Despite winning its independence, the republic had great financial problems that
could not be resolved quickly. First of all, Bolívar’s military forces had to be paid. Even
when the war in Peru was over, Gran Colombia still fielded a large standing army.209
Secondly, the new officials tried to make revenue collection more fair, basing it on income
rather than property. The officials realized that practices from the colonial era, such as the
trade monopolies, had to be avoided. Yet in practice, many of these monopolies (except the
aguardiente monopoly) still existed or were reintroduced after 1821.210 It became clear that
newly introduced taxes such as the contribución directa (‘direct contribution’) were not
effective. The new government simply could not enforce the correct collection of these
taxes.211 Given that the government was unable to collect taxes effectively, the reliance on
forced loans rose. Safford describes this vicious circle, noting that many people feared that
giving correct numbers would result in forced loans. So despite the intentions to revoke the
colonial taxes and monopolies that had caused the discontent of the 1790s, the republic
either reinstated or did not get rid of these measures at all.212
Early republican politics proved to be troublesome as regional and political
differences became more apparent. Primarily, most Venezuelans were discontent about the
instatement of Bogotá as the capital of the republic. Due to sheer distance and reachability,
the Venezuelans feared that the inhabitants of New Granada would monopolize government
207
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 109.
Bolívar et al., ‘Constitución’, Tit. I, Sect. II, Art. 4.
209
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 111.
210
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 110-111.
211
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 110.
212
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 110.
208
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offices and positions.213 Whilst the Quito region was not represented at all, the Venezuelans
felt that Caracas was underrepresented at Cúcata.214 The military had taken key positions in
government. Bolívar’s assertion of the Presidency and General Francisco de Paula
Santander’s position as Vice-President were examples of this.215 Civilian administrators
feared the power of the military was too great. The military wanted judiciary privileges that
would give them special status, whilst the civilian delegates at Cúcata turned towards the
opposite direction, stating that soldiers should not be allowed to vote. Tensions between
Venezuelans en New Granadines grew in the late 1820’s, as did the tensions between civil
and military branches. As early as 1821 Venezuelans questioned whether the government
should motion towards federalism and oppose Bolívar. Vice-President Santander had been
in charge of government while Bolívar was campaigning in Peru. Venezuelan llaneros,
mounted riders of racially mixed origin, had been essential in Bolívar’s wars against the
Royalists.216 Opposition to the centralist government in Bogotá grew among the llaneros.
The uneasy relations between the New Granadines and Venezuelans escalated when a
llanero was accused and tried for allegedly terrorizing a Bogotán neighborhood in 1824.
When the Venezuela-born president of the Court did not sign the llanero’s sentence, he was
removed from office, angering many llaneros.217 One of these llaneros, José Antonio Páez,
urged Venezuelans towards separatism after the government in Bogotá had pressed charges
against him for abusing power in 1826.218
Bolívar’s centralist government was thus not unchallenged. The strained relations
among the New Granadines and Venezuelans were complemented by the dichotomy
between centralists and federalists. The federalists, too, were divided among regional
213
Even by modern standards with the exemption of airtravel, the distance between Caracas and Bogotá is
tremendous, counting over a thousand kilometers (over six hundred miles). More so, as a Captaincy General,
Venezuela was somewhat independent of Bogotá from early on. ‘Distance Calculator – Americas’,
http://www.javascripter.net/math/calculators/distancecalculatoramericas.htm (November 24 th, 2013); Safford
and Palacios, Colombia, p. 116.
214
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 116-117.
215
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 105, 115; Lynch, Bolívar, p. 218.
216
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 117; Lynch, Bolívar, p. 113-115; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 19.
217
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 117.
218
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 117.
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boundaries. Vice-President Santander represented the New Granadine federalists whilst
Páez represented the Venezuelan separatists. Santander opposed the centralist elements of
the 1821 constitution. Federalists reviewed the republic’s new Bolivarian constitutional
designs of 1826 as a means of establishing “a constitutional monarchy in republican
dress… [which would] violate the fundamental republican principle of alteration in
power”.219 Santander did not publically support this claim, but it shows the rising tensions
between the groups supporting centralism and federalism.220
As tensions grew, Páez and Venezuelan separatists rose in rebellion in 1826.
Bolívar intended full military crackdown in response but Páez proved capable of resisting
the military forces. Ultimately, Bolívar was compelled to make considerable concessions,
virtually making Páez the effective ruler of Venezuela and granting him full amnesty. 221
According to Santander and others, the efforts of government to reassert control over
Venezuela and to allow “constitutional processes” to contend with Páez’s rebellion, were
wasted. Thus the incident was considered a sign of weakness and a “slap in the face” to the
Gran Colombian government.222 In the essence, Bolívar undermined his own government’s
ability to deal with military uprisings.223
Not long after Páez’s rebellion had ended in 1827, Gran Colombia’s end was near.
Santander and the federalists continued to receive more support whilst support for
centralism slowly withered. The constitutional convention of Ocaña in 1828 vied to reform
the constitution, but the Santanderistas proved able to stop further centralism dead in its
tracks.224 The results of the convention were inconclusive and a frustrated Bolívar left the
219
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 121.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 123; Lynch, Bolívar, p. 228-230.
221
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 120-121; Lynch, Bolívar, p. 219, 221, 225, 227.
222
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 121-122.
223
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 122.
224
The political supporters of General Santander, the ‘Santanderists’; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 123;
Lynch, Bolívar, p. 228-229.
220
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convention and assumed absolute dictatorial power.225 Bolívar and his supporters combined
the 1821 constitution and the Bolivarian reforms to establish a new government, which
made Bolívar a de facto dictator until a new constitution was written.226 Bolívar removed
opposition by abolishing the vice presidency and sending Santander away as ambassador to
the United States. Peru and the Cauca rose in rebellion against the Bolivarian regime not
long after these events, whilst in Venezuela the separatists became more agitated. They too,
rose in rebellion once more.227 Under command of Páez, Venezuela seceded from the Gran
Colombia in January 1830. Attempts to save a united Gran Colombia though yet another
congress failed. The physically and mentally exhausted Bolívar left Bogotá and announced
he would not be eligible for reelection. The capital became the center of violence as the two
polarized political groups fought one another in the streets.228 In December 1830, Bolívar
died whilst the republic descended into chaos between 1830 and 1831. Its military was
reduced significantly through Venezuelan and Ecuadorian secession and removal of
Bolivarian supporters in the army.229 Though Páez established Venezuela as an independent
republic, he dominated politics as the sole military leader (caudillo) for twenty years.230
225
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 124; Lynch, Bolívar, p. 230, 233-234, 239.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 125; Lynch, Bolívar, p. 233-234, 239
227
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 127; Lynch, Bolívar, p. 270-272.
228
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 130.
229
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 130-131.
230
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 20.
226
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3.4
Return to the Theories
3.4.1 Social Orders
The Bourbon reforms that were carried out at the beginning of the eighteenth
century started to generate different problems at the end of the century. The natural state, or
limited access order is clearly visible in the colonial system. The republic of Gran
Colombia naturally remained within the boundaries of the limited access model. For the
descendants of the Spanish settlers, the upper layer of colonial administration remained in
the hands of peninsular viceroys and other offices. The creoles themselves however, were
part of the upper layer of the Casta.231 Thus even with creole consent, both the colonial
regime and the republic operated without the general consent of the governed, one of the
critical elements of limited access societies. More so, organizations in both periods were
limited to the state itself and companies that monopolized resources. Also, social
relationships seemed to operate among personal lines: The peninsulares and criollos
formed the upper layer of the social hierarchy and had special privileges in government.
Even among the two groups there were differences in privileges and administrative
opportunities. The trading monopolies that limited trade and caused general discontent in
the 1780s must have limited economic growth. The amount of organizations were limited to
the state and the trading companies that monopolized the tobacco and sugar cane trade.
Independence movements were rooted in the economic situation of the second half of the
eighteenth century. The question that remains unanswered is if the creoles enjoyed
immediate economic advantages from independence. As the top layers were uncertain
about the composition of the newly independent government and Gran Colombia collapsed
only a few years after its creation, this question cannot be answered. As a consequence,
pursuit of rents must have been an element in the colonial setting, but not necessarily in the
231
Caste-system; Ramírez, ‘Institutions’, p. 107.
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immediate postcolonial setting. Considering these factors, it is clear that the limited access
order is applicable to the end of the colonial period, rendering it a “basic natural state”.
However, there are major differences between the colonial period and the Gran
Colombia era. First of all, as expressed, citizenship was extended to all those that were born
free in republican territory. Though the creoles retained rights to participation in
government and the social hierarchy continued to exist, the application of the framework
would suggest that ‘Doorstep Condition 1’, the rule of law for elites, was achieved.
However, the state remained small and centralized, especially due to Bolívar’s efforts.
More so, Venezuelans and Ecuadorians felt underrepresented at the constitutional
congresses and even in administration in Bogotá. Geography and distance from the capital
were contributing factors to this. The republic started to crumble as early as Páez’s
rebellion in 1827. This seriously damaged Bolívar’s authority. The model applied, it seems
that the double balance was broken from that moment on. More so, it would seem that the
balance was not so much based on economic advantages between elites of different regions,
but more on the distribution of political power and violence potential. It must be concluded
that this distribution of power motivated Paéz to secede Venezuela, largely because of the
general poverty the country was in and no immediate increase in rents were gained.
3.4.2 Democracy
Though some problems such as travel distance and communication remained
obstacles for agents of the state during both periods, it would seem that state agents had
greater effects during the colonial regime. For a period of over two hundred years the
colonial system kept the population under control. The Bourbon reforms may have
established smaller viceroyalties, but this resulted in greater state capacity. These different
regions had their own relationship with Spain and had little to do with one another. This
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autonomy was key: Many Venezuelans found it difficult to cope with the idea of being
subordinate to Bogotá, whereas under their own Captaincy General, Venezuela had been
somewhat autonomous as region. However, despite greater state capacity at the hands of
Bourbon reforms, the creoles in general became discontent with the privileges of the
peninsulares. The new republic tried to change colonial constructs, but ended up
(re)implementing them. The fact that the same taxes of the colonial regime were reinstated
supports the idea that state capacity was dropping. Discontent of the federalists and the
separatists did little to improve the situation. Federalists became more disillusioned and
more convinced Bolívar was at the head of a constitutional monarchyhe discontent of the
federalists and separatists caused the government’s general authority to wither further.
Bolívar’s usurpation of dictatorial powers after the failed Ocaña congress adds to this.
Ironically, Bolívar’s own actions led to decrease in authority. The constitutional constructs
were undermined by Bolívar’s personal decrees such as the granted amnesty to Páez and
other rebels. As they could no longer be judged by the legal system, state capacity dropped
further.
As for democratization, the implementation of elections was a step forward, but
after the ratification of the 1821 constitution, the centralists and federalists at the
subsequent congresses could not agree over the form of government. Gran Colombia
revolved around the military and around Bolívar personally. Citizenship was extended
however, even if only slightly in practice. In sum, political inclusion was not broad, not all
inhabitants were considered equal and the legal processes were infringed by Bolívar.
The patria boba period in the 1810s saw numerous juntas and governments pop up
throughout the territories, but did not last and returned to colonial levels. Afterward, statecapacity remained relatively the same and autonomy rose slightly, as the 1821 constitution
was implemented when the Patriots were in pursuit of the common enemy. However, both
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receded after 1826, when Bolívar was keen to continue the centralization process and his
authoritarian regime undermined both state’s capacity and democracy.
3.4.3 Colonialism: Economic Trends
The above chapter has examined the differences between institutions of the colonial
and immediate postcolonial era. As stated above, it became a financial necessity to reinstate
the same taxes and monopolies that had caused great discontent during the latter half of the
eighteenth century. Independence thus did change much. The first five years of the republic
were bent on the liberation of Peru and the territories of modern Bolivia. Though
Mahoney’s framework focuses on long-term postcolonial development, something that is
not applicable to the confines of this chapter, some details can be noted.
Mahoney states that Colombia “had not received the kinds of institutions and actors
needed for growth via agricultural exportation in the world economy”.232 It this case,
intermediate levels of mercantilist settlement would have led to intermediate levels of
liberal reform. It depended on mineral exports as a source of revenue.233 Further, Gran
Colombia only succeeded to change colonial institutions on a minimal level. The
Bolivarian constitutional reforms of the Ocaña congress were believed to shelter “a
constitutional monarchy in republican dress” in the eyes of the federalists.234 Bogotá
remained the capital of the region in the colonial and postcolonial era.
232
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 150.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 160-161.
234
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 121.
233
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Venezuela offers a sharp contrast, where during the Bourbon reform period
settlement started to increase only after the 1770s.235 The earlier restrains, such as the
Caracas company, were abolished and competition between independent merchants allowed
markets to flourish.236 In fact, Venezuela was one of the few colonies that was allowed to
trade with territories not controlled by Spain, such as Dutch and French colonies. The
region became more autonomous as a result. The Venezuelans found it hard to trade in this
autonomy when Gran Colombia was founded. According to Mahoney’s theoretical
framework, Venezuela became a “rising periphery” and would receive a higher amount of
economic development in the postcolonial era. The next chapters show that such
development hardly took place until the second half of the nineteenth century.
235
236
Mahoney, Colonialism. p. 137.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 138.
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Chapter Four: Nonparallel Development Between 1830 and 1930
Colombia and Venezuela followed different political and economic paths after the
collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830. This chapter will deal with the main theme of
postcolonial development in both economic and political terms. As a whole century
contains a lot of events and key developments, this chapter has been split into an economic
and political theme. For Colombia, the primary concern is to display the political
opposition between centralists and federalists, which continued well into the century. For
Venezuela, it will be emphasized that the strength of the military and the caudillos played
an important part in society and the subsequent civil disorders of the century. 237 Similarly,
the economies of Colombia and Venezuela developed differently and will also be discussed
in this chapter, from the fluctuations in export to the discovery of Venezuela’s oil deposits.
Both countries experienced several civil wars and military coups well into the twentieth
century, yet this chapter will deal with a hundred year period from approximately 1830 to
1930. After examining political developments, attention will be paid to economic and social
development.
4.1
Conservative-Liberal Dichotomy in Colombia
As examined in the previous chapter, the process of independence in northwestern
South America was accompanied by a united force against Spanish rule. However, once the
Spanish were indeed gone, the new citizens of Gran Colombia had different ideas on how
the newly-created state should look like. Bolívar’s centralist attempts to gain further power
for the presidency were opposed by Santander and others. They wanted to found a federal
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 20-25, 32; Bakewell, A History, p. 388-390; Caudillo, or “little chief”, is a term
used to describe military leaders of South America that established a type of military dictatorship involving a
network of local caudillos and militias.
237
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government in the style of the United States in North America. Eventually, war erupted as
Páez rebelled twice between 1826 and 1830. During the latter, he declared Venezuela’s
independence from Gran Colombia. This action had permanently split Venezuela from
political union with New Granada.238 Though significantly smaller than its former form, the
Conservative-Liberal tug of war continued to be fought in New Granada.239
The country’s political composition switched from a centralist-federalist debate to a
conservative-liberal one, though these two parties changed in form and size over the course
of time and even split into several factions.240 Scholars David Bushnell and Jonathan
Hartlyn identify several major points of civil war and political instability during the
nineteenth century.241 The first of these conflicts involved the rebellions against Bolívar’s
assumed dictatorship in the years of 1827-1830.242 Within New Granada, moderate
Bolivarians led rebellions against Bolívar himself. Though not engaged against Simón
Bolívar directly, Santander became a rallying point for moderates and federalists whom
opposed Bolívar’s centralism. The moderate Bolivarians became known as ‘conservatives’
in modern historiography, whilst the Santanderistas became known as ‘liberals’ in the
upcoming years.243 The dissolution of Gran Colombia did not stop civil conflicts from
arising. Within a decade another major conflict arose between the conservatives and
liberals which escalated into the ‘War of the Supremes’ between 1839 and 1842.
José Ignacio Márquez became president in 1837 after obtaining most votes of all
candidates in the 1836 elections.244 However, he did not obtain an absolute majority and a
238
Again, this chapter refers to New Granada as the territories of modern Colombia and Panama. Colombia
refers to the Republic or United States of Colombia with and without Panama depending on the context.
239
Hartlyn, Coalitional Rule, p. 19-20.
240
Hartlyn, Coalitional Rule, p. 20-21; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 134-135.
241
Bushnell, ‘Politics and Violence’, p. 13-14; Hartlyn, Coalitional Rule, p. 21-26.
242
Bushnell, ‘Politics and Violence’, p .13; Hartlyn, Coalitional Rule, p. 21.
243
The followers of Santander will also be referred to as Santanderists; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p.
146.
244
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 145.
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separate congress had to conclude his victory. Whilst trying to remain politically neutral,
supporters of former president Santander became critical of Márquez’s administration and
quickly accused him of having “Bolivarian sympathies”.245 Though Márquez did not
visibly change policy from the previous Santander regime, Márquez did however ally
himself with two moderate Bolivarian Generals, Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera and Pedro
Alcántara Herrán.246 The liberal Santanderists feared that Mosquera would change the
character of the army into an overwhelming Bolivarian order. They were proved right when
Mosquera started to remove officers that were open supporters of Santander. Supporters of
the fallen dictator Rafael Urdaneta, whom had been shunned after the establishment of
Santander’s presidency in 1832 were reincorporated into the army. It seems the accusations
only became true after alleging the charge. Meanwhile, the liberal press were also
convinced that Márquez dealt with religious extremists of the so-called Sociedad Católica,
or ‘Catholic Society’, which tried to put religion on the political agenda.247 Ironically,
religious revolts erupted in the region of Pasto against the Márquez regime in 1839 and in
this case the accusations of the liberals proves less than true.
Liberal criticism of the moderate Márquez regime was accompanied by rebellion of
General Obando, whom had led revolts against Bolívar a decade earlier. His reconciliation
and subsequent escape led to a second rebellion, which in turn caused a chain reaction of
revolts supporting “federalism” through the country.248 The war lasted until 1842,
approximately twenty-six months. The war had taken such a turn for the worse that the
government asked the president of Ecuador, General Flores, to aid in the war by sending
troops to the Pasto region.249 This intervention was perceived by many regional groups as
weakness and served as further excuse to rebel against the Márquez government. However,
the regional movements had been defeated in the long run and Herrán’s success had seen
245
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 146.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 146.
247
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 148.
248
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 148-149.
249
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 148.
246
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him rewarded. He succeeded Márquez as president in 1841 and the conservatives had
gained the upper hand in Colombian politics for the next two decades.250
The War of the Supremes was but one of several conflicts in the century, where
scholars Bushnell and Hartlyn both give a number of about fourteen conflicts between 1828
and 1900.251 Most of these conflicts concerned the conservative-liberal dichotomy. When
either party was in power, the other had objections that eventually led to local or even
national rebellions.252 Some situations led splinter liberal factions to rebel against other
liberals, as happened in the 1854 coup led by José María Melo.253 However, Bushnell notes
that the coups that took place in 1854, 1867 and 1900 passed without a great deal of
bloodshed.254 When examining Bushnell’s list of conflicts in Colombia’s history, one
notices that in most cases liberals challenged conservative or fellow liberal governments,
with exception of the 1851 conservative uprising.
Colombian nineteenth century history is loosely divided into three political periods.
The first period is the emergence of conservative and liberal parties. In turn, the second
period was politically dominated by the liberals. The third period shows a change in
political dominance where the conservatives reemerged as the most dominant party.255 A
few events during these periods do require some attention, such as the permanent abolition
of slavery in 1851. From the Pasto region and parts of the Cauca valley, conservative
supporters rose in revolution against the liberal government.256 Among the reasons for
rebellion, the paramount cause was accredited to the slave owners that resisted the abolition
of slavery. However, it seems that different regions had different reasons for rebelling. One
of the leaders in the Cauca region expressed that financial compensation for loss of the
250
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 148-151.
Bushnell, ‘Politics and Violence’, p. 13-14; Hartlyn, Coalitional Rule, p. 21-24.
252
Bushnell, ‘Politics and Violence’, p. 13
253
Bushnell, ‘Politics and Violence’, p. 13-14.
254
Bushnell, ‘Politics and Violence’, p. 13-14.
255
Hartlyn, Coalitional Rule, p. 21-24.
256
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 205-207.
251
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slaves was lacking, the Antioquia conservatives were more disturbed by liberal attacks
upon the church.257 As motives for rebellion differed between regions, it seems that the
conservatives were not united in their cause.
Similarly, the liberals too were divided into several factions that spoke out against
and even fought each other. The country had been transformed from a centralist state into a
federal one after the liberal revolution against the conservative government of 18591862.258 Mosquera had been a centralist during his term as president in the 1840s, but
switched sides and became military leader of the rebellion in the name of federalism.259 It
had been one of the few rebellions and civil wars that had succeeded and resulted into the
adaptation of a new constitution in 1863.260 The liberal representatives of the various states
gathered at Rionegro, Antioquia, to discuss and write a federal constitution. However, the
liberals were divided into radicals and moderates who distrusted one other fiercely. Radical
liberals feared that Mosquera, as a caudillo, was becoming a dictator on the laurels of his
victory over the conservative regime.261 Mosquera and radical liberals differed in ideas on
many subjects, including state authority over the Church and the exact powers of national
government. The result was that the 1863 constitution was an unclear document that caused
debate over the extent to which the national government was allowed to restore order in the
various states.262 Though liberal dominance had been established through civil war, radical
liberals were not content with Mosquera. Through a coup d’état, Mosquera was deposed in
1867.263 For the next two decades, the radical liberals dominated Colombian politics.
Colombia’s government changed once again in name and form in the 1880s. This
heralded the third period in Colombia’s history of the nineteenth century, known as La
257
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 206.
Bushnell, ‘Politics and Violence’, p. 13, 16; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 221-223.
259
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 225.
260
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 224.
261
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 225-226.
262
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p, 226.
263
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 226-227, 230.
258
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Regeneración, or ‘the Regeneration’.264 Religion became the fuel for conservative
sympathies after two decades of radical liberal domination. Many non-radical liberals even
formed an alliance with the conservatives against the radical government. One moderate
liberal, Rafael Núñez, criticized the radicals believing that federalism and liberalism “had
carried the country to catastrophe”. He proclaimed that the country needed a centralist
constitution “that would recognize Catholicism as a core element of social cohesion”.265
Under the federal constellation, there was no strong government. On both national and state
level, government was understaffed and thus did not have the possibility to manage the
country effectively. Certain regions and states felt part of an oligarchy of the radicaldominated states, even to the point where the latter gained many serious benefits.266
Conservatives, instigated by Catholic priests, rebelled in 1876 but were defeated
after eleven months.267 In the years after, Núñez gained the support of the conservatives
against the radicals and was elected president in 1880 for a two year term. The radical
liberals however did not see the project as “an advanced form of Colombian Liberalism”,
but instead rose in rebellion in 1884. The radicals were defeated through the foundation of
the national reserve army by Núñez and his conservative supporters.268 The new
constitution of 1886 created the ‘Republic of Colombia’, a republic which identified
Catholicism as a key “element of nationality and social order… [whilst] recognizing
religious toleration”. Especially this last element effectively combined liberal and
conservative interests. As a centralist government, the president had more powers and was
elected for a six-year term.269 Recovering from the blows dealt by the Mosquera restrictions
264
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 239, 241.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 241.
266
The Northern Railway project was funded by 67% of the national transportation development budget,
which was only beneficial to one-third of the Colombian states: Cundinamarca, Santander and Boyacá;
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 243-244.
267
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 244.
268
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 245-246; ‘Constitution of the Republic of Colombia (7 th August,
1886)’, https://archive.org/stream/constitutionrep00cologoog#page/n6/mode/2up (December 9 th, 2013), Title
I, Article 4.
269
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 246; ‘Constitution (1886)’, Title XI, Art. 114).
265
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and weakening the liberal establishments of previous decades, the Church too was gaining
from this new constellation.270
The constitution of 1886 was reformed several times, but its essence lasted until
1991. Núñez’s death in 1894 divided the political scene once again however, where both
liberals and conservatives were internally divided over the future of Colombia. Independent
liberals started to become more concerned with the Regeneration movement, whilst the socalled ‘Historical Conservatives’ were concerned about the government’s fiscal problems.
Liberals took up the fight against the government first in 1899.271 The consecutive ‘War of
the Thousand Days’, as the civil war eventually became known, had three important
outcomes. First of all, the loss of life was the worst in the country’s history, estimated to be
nearly one hundred thousand. Secondly, the Republic lost Panama, due to its declaration of
independence with support and protection of the United States in 1903.272 Thirdly, the
conservatives remained the dominant party for another thirty years, until approximately
1930.273
270
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 246-247.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 250.
272
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 251.
273
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 251; Hartlyn, Coalition Rule, p. 24.
271
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4.2
Caudillos, Venezuela’s Military and Coup d’états
In the above section, one can see the political changes within Colombian history and
how the two major liberal and conservative parties have dictated the country’s course into
disorder. It is notable that the country only experienced few military coups, where the most
prominent of these was that of Mosquera of 1867. Venezuela offers a sharp contrast, where
the military had been much more prominent in the aftermath of Gran Colombia’s
dissolution and Venezuela’s secession. José Antonio Páez and his associate riders, the
llaneros, dominated Venezuelan politics for over twenty years after the end of the war and
the 1831 secession.274 Páez had gained support from the population but did little to improve
the general poverty of the country. The country itself became a formal republic, but one
way or the other a military man or landed oligarchy ruled over the country during the
nineteenth century.275
The figure of Bolívar remained a great source of inspiration for various caudillos to
challenge the government that was in place at any particular point during the nineteenth
century. Paéz and his followers became known as conservatives, or godos, much like their
counterparts in Colombia at the time.276 Many different kinds of people stood opposite of
Paéz. The allies of Bolívar, rival caudillos and even landowners opposing the elite formed a
conglomerate of different political attitudes. This liberal ‘party’ allocated various interests
against “the little chief”.277 The liberals adhered the ideals of Bolívar, rather than his
actions during the his lifetime. They favored decentralized government, extended suffrage,
the right of free press and dissemination of Church power, whereas the conservatives
274
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 20.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 20-21.
276
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 23-24.
277
Caudillo is a derivative of cabo, or ‘head’, much like the Italian capo; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 23;
Bakewell, A History, p. 388.
275
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sought to preserve a centralist government.278 Peter Bakewell generalizes the wide-spread
conservative movements of Latin America to seek “the preservation, as far as possible, of
the social and political conditions of late colonial times”.279 It seems that this applies to
Paéz and his llaneros only slightly. Venezuela’s semi-independent status as a captaincygeneral during the colonial period was one of the reasons why Paéz and his followers did
not accept being subordinate to a centralist government in Bogotá.
While Paéz was in control, little was done to develop the country. Whilst Paéz did
establish peace for a period of somewhat fifteen years, discontent grew among liberal
supporters. The conservatives became less popular during the 1840s. The government faced
two rebellions in that decade, which ended in Paéz’s favor.280 John Williamson, a
contemporary United States diplomat, believed that it was the caudillo himself that
prevented Venezuela from imploding and spiraling into chaos.281 Another rebellion finally
toppled the Paéz regime in 1848-1849. Though the exact causes of rebellion may be
disputed, it seems that Paéz was using nearly fifty percent of the state budget “to keep
unruly local caudillos in line”.282 Also, much to the irritation of Bolivarian supporters, the
size of the army was reduced. The economy grew little during this period. In fact, the landowners were more often than not just as poor as the people who worked on their land and
resorted to violence to defend their property from “avaricious merchants”.283
While the central government may have been replaced by a liberal one in 1849, the
countryside continued to be infested with unrest and violence.284 British gunboats had
arrived near Venezuelan shores to coerce the government into paying off debts and loans.
The Venezuelan National Bank ultimately dissolved in 1850 as a consequence of the
278
Bakewell, A History, p. 394.
Bakewell, A History, p. 394.
280
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 24.
281
Ewell, Venezuela and the United States, p. 38-39, 47.
282
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 24.
283
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 24.
284
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 24-25.
279
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governments incapability to deal with the economic crisis. The liberals did not improve
conditions much either. Slavery was no longer important for the country’s economy and in
most regions was not even practiced anymore. The abolition of slavery in 1854 was granted
by a conservative president, exemplifying that slavery had indeed “become obsolete” in the
Venezuelan economy.285 The country was large, but also relatively empty and
underpopulated. The government tried to develop and ‘civilize’ Venezuela through the
promotion of European immigration. The creole elite that exploited most of the population
and kept most Venezuelans poor also looked down upon them as “racially inferior”.286
Instead, they hoped that immigrants from Europe would hit these three birds with one
stone. It had backfired: Europeans did not find Venezuela an attractive place of settlement
given the political instability and impoverished condition the country was in.287 As such,
little changed between 1849 and 1855, though universal male suffrage was adopted in the
latter year.288
José Gregorio Monagas, successor to Paéz, was ousted from power in 1858. For the
next five years. conservatives and liberals fought each other in a devastating civil war. The
centralist government supporters fought the rebelling federalists. This conflict became
known as the ‘Federal War’.289 It is estimated that somewhere between sixty and a hundred
thousand men died in this war, approximately five percent of the total population of
Venezuela at the time. Though the war had ended in 1863, the situation in Venezuela was
anarchic. Violence persisted until Antonio Guzmán Blánco, a general affiliated with the
Federalist block, seized control of the government. He managed to bring the caudillos
under his banner. Ironically, the new system Guzmán introduced was centralistic and forced
285
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 25.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 25.
287
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 25.
288
Malcolm Deas, ‘Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador’, p. 516
289
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 26.
286
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local caudillos to become more dependent on central government.290 Ground won by the
federalists was reversed as Guzmán made centralization efforts.
To keep the peace, Guzmán ordered the imprisonment and execution of his political
opponents. After the last conservative generals were defeated, he began to envision a
Venezuela that, over the lapse of four to five decades, would “assume… a role similar to…
the United States”.291 Guzmán was too optimistic of his regime. He found that the liberals,
despite his centralist reform plan, would be content with him if the conservative oligarchy
would be disseminated.292 Guzmán’s power relied on the support of the liberals, the
military and the caudillos. Guzmán ruled for seventeen years, until he voluntarily retired
from public office and left Venezuela in 1888.293 In sum, Guzmán’s regime implemented
some reforms, but the caudillos were still too influential to allow his efforts to bear fruit.
Of the various political institutions or factors that dominated the political scene, the
caudillo is perhaps the most important to understand nineteenth century Venezuela.
Caudilloism brought forth fragile political stability, as easily overturned as established.
From 1888 to 1899, there was no clear national leader and central government in Caracas
had no authority in the surrounding regions.294 In 1899, another military man tried to unify
the country in the spirit of the federalist revolution of 1858. General Cipriano Castro and
his right hand man, Juan Vicente Gómez hailed from the southwestern region of Venezuela,
the Andean region of Táchira. Accompanied by some fifty men, Castro and Gómez
marched on Caracas in an attempt to restore order. Many joined their cause and Castro’s
followers grew to considerable size.295 His opponents in Caracas underestimated him. They
290
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 26.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 27.
292
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 27.
293
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 28.
294
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 28, 30-31.
295
Some two thousand soldiers and officers under their command entered Caracas in 1899; Hellinger,
Venezuela, p. 31.
291
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were more fearful of his nationalist counterpart and competitor, Jose Manuel Hernández.296
Likewise, the regional caudillos expected Castro to simply restore the antecedent
presidency as the head of caudillo alliance. However, Castro planned reforms to do away
with caudilloism by creating a national professional military that supported a centralist
state.297 The supremacy of Castro’s new military was proven at the battle of La Victoria,
where the Caracqueño prominent Manuel Antonio Matos gathered sixteen thousand troops
to defeat Castro’s government. Though outnumbered two to one, Castro defeated Matos’
forces and the remaining caudillos fled. Goméz took charge and subsequently wiped out the
remaining caudillo-led forces in their home regions separately.298 In total, twelve thousand
had died in the conflict. Castro’s time as leader of Venezuela lasted for about eight years.
Despite his role in getting rid of caudilloism, Castro failed in modernizing the country and
the same problems that existed in the decades before persisted after the turn of the century.
His achievement was that he helped create a base for political stability.
After leaving for Germany to treat illness, Castro was replaced by his right hand
Goméz in 1908. Goméz continued Castro’s work in centralizing the state and eliminated
caudilloistic elements in Venezuela. Rather than establishing democratic or federal
institutions, Castro and Goméz appointed fellow Andeans to positions in government. He
relied on them for support of his regime.299 Perhaps the most important development during
Goméz’s dictatorship was the discovery of oil deposits which quite literally fueled
Venezuelan development in the decades after 1920.300
4.3.1 New Grenadine and Colombian Economic Trends
296
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 32.
Under Paéz en Guzmán, regional militias and local caudillos dealt with insurrections and revolts and
generally operated with a great deal of autonomy; Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 32.
298
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 34.
299
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 36-37.
300
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 38-39.
297
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From the late colonial unto the postcolonial periods, interregional trade within New
Granada was limited. Though the area was diverse in geography, most regions produced
similar types of goods.301 Manufacture of artisan-made goods especially took place in the
eastern highlands, as well as the Pasto region in the West, the rest of the country also
produced these goods to a lesser degree.302 The production of crops was also widely ranged.
In the postcolonial era, the populated mountainous regions produced at least two starchenriched foods, such as potatoes, maize, rice or plantains. Among the fruits and other crops
produced widely throughout Colombia was sugar cane, which was used to make liquor
(aguardiente).303 Even leather and leather manufacture were widespread. Perhaps the most
important explanation for this widespread production is the fact that the country had
isolated pockets, as illustrated in Chapter Two of this thesis.304 Limits in communication
and travel may have forced the local population to a large variety of goods in order to
become more or less self-sufficient. This undoubtedly had its effects on interregional trade.
Before 1870, no major improvements in transport and infrastructure, such as the Northern
Railway project, had taken place.305
As for foreign trade, Colombia’s income from export had been limited in the
nineteenth century. The main export product had been precious metals such as gold and
silver, yet the total gold production had somewhat stagnated in the nineteenth century.306 It
accounted for over 73% of the total export value between 1834 and 1845, with other goods
such as cotton, hides and tobacco accounting for less than 5% per product.307 At the same
time, the total value over the course of the century seems to have fluctuated from
approximately 1.8 million to 3.5 million pesos.308 The total value had dropped from levels
in 1810, probably from the chaos of the decade and never fully recovered until the period
301
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 161; Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 150, 160-161
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 161.
303
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 161.
304
See Chapter Two; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 161
305
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 162.
306
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 164.
307
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 165.
308
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 164.
302
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1887-1890. In the early half of the decade imports had risen but exports were incapable of
sustaining these costs.309 From 1853 onwards, coffee became an increasingly more
important source of exports. Palacios’ table in his book Coffee in Colombia, 1850 – 1970,
shows that an estimated 2.5 million kilograms of coffee were exported between 1854 and
1859.310 Between 1906 and 1909, this number had expanded to 37 million.311 Colombia had
sustained several financial crises over the century, but it seems that political crises only
were only slightly connected to economic stagnation. The conservative uprising against the
nominal abolition of slavery was an example of this: Though the slavery had been reduced
in the early nineteenth century through the “law of birth” of the Gran Colombian era, very
few regions still had large slave populations. Still, the official abolition did instigate
conservative supporters to take up arms.
4.3.2 Venezuela’s Development and the Discovery of Oil
Venezuela is a different story. The area was not as isolated or divided as
Colombia’s inland and was instead more closely connected to the Caribbean world. Paéz
had perhaps achieved a measure of political stability for a fifteen year period, but
Venezuela’s economy had stagnated. Landowners and peasants alike were driven into debt,
which inspired the liberals to take action against the conservative-backed government.312
Also, the policy of the government to encourage European immigration had its downsides
for the local population. They were denied land and thus were forced to provide cheap
labor.313
309
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 165.
Palacios, Coffee in Colombia, p. 19.
311
In the notes of Palacios’ book, the figures are represented by 60-kilogram bags and thus the above figures
are converted and interpreted from the book’s own. In addition, Palacios acknowledges that a “great part of
Colombian coffee is exported through Venezuela”, which may affect the numbers of direct export.
Nevertheless it serves an example of an expanded cultivation of coffee trend throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries; Palacios, Coffee in Colombia, p. 19, Table 2, Source notes I.
312
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 24-25.
313
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 25.
310
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One can expect that the years of anarchy that Venezuela experienced would have a
terrible effect on economic development. In the years before the Federal, the prices of
export products such as leather, coffee and cacao had decreased severely.314 In the case of
cacao, its price dropped nearly fifty percent. The urban merchants also increased the price
of meats in Caracas and other cities, whilst they wished to pay less for cattle.315 This
situation served as an excuse for Monegas to ousted from power by both conservatives and
liberals. Until Guzmán restored order in 1870, federalists and conservatives did not offer
plans of economic reform.316 Even though Guzmán made efforts for economic innovation
as well as other ambitious projects, in the end he still relied much on the export of
agricultural products.317 Despite this, one major development during Guzmán’s dictatorship
caused a significant boost to development: The arrangements with the Compañia de
Crédito,318 Through these arrangements between Guzmán and the company, the Compañia
functioned as the central bank during Guzmán’s dictatorship.
Though funding major construction projects and public buildings, the ones who
profited most from these arrangement were the financial elite.319 Hellinger concludes that at
the end of Guzmán’s reign, “in many respects, Venezuela was less developed than when he
had begun”.320 Foreign exports had stagnated though large amounts of cash and foreign
finance projects had invested in the country. Further, Guzmán had even given European
companies exclusive rights to resources with little gain in return and promised a minimum
seven percent profit, which made these projects cost more money than sustaining them.321
At the end of the century, Venezuela was still largely poor and mainly agricultural.
314
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 25.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 25-26.
316
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 26.
317
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 27.
318
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 27.
319
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 27.
320
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 28.
321
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 28.
315
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The most significant factor in Venezuelan development in the striking of oil
deposits. Oil had already been found in the Maracaibo region in the sixteenth century,
where its properties were unknown and was mainly used by the natives to repair canoes.322
During the reign of Gómez, Venezuela started to become a more centralized state in
earnest. Also German and French companies started to build railways and electricity grids
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.323 Where foreign investors had some
interest in Venezuelan goods, this exploded after discovering the largest oil deposit in the
western hemisphere. Petroleum exports grew after the First World War had ended.
322
323
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 1, 34.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 34.
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4.4
Return to the Theories
4.4.1 North, Wallis and Weingast’s Social Orders
The political and economic situations of nineteenth-century Colombia and
Venezuela as illustrated above, are somewhat compatible with Social Orders. Especially
considering the concept of natural states, where access is limited, it seems that both
Colombia and Venezuela clearly qualify as natural states. Despite efforts made to expand
the citizenry and extend suffrage, the creoles remained in power in both countries. The
liberal-conservative dichotomy exemplifies the coalition-rule of the elites, where conditions
change and in turn the interests of coalition members change. In Colombia, Márquez’s
regime had built upon Santander’s presidency of the years before. However, he was
mistrusted through his allegiance with the Bolivarian generals Mosquera and Hérran.
Liberal fears of a Bolivarianized military proved to be true only after the charge and
Márquez’s so-called alliance with the Sociedad Católica was false. According to the
framework, the conditions had to change for the interests of the coalition members to
change. The source of this cannot be found in the economic field. Until 1870, no major
changes in transport were made that could alter the economy greatly. Profits however did
drop generally over the century, but it seems that general mistrust between and within
political factions seem to foster these rebellions.
The later rebellion of the conservatives against the abolition of slavery is an
interesting point when considering the framework. According to Social Orders, the pursuit
and generation of rents drives elites into conflict. The rebellion of the conservatives hardly
benefitted them in such a way, nor did the abolition truly hurt their pockets. However, it
does seem clear that political motives, not economic ones, were truly responsible for the
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rebellion. The fact that the liberals were in charge and the conservatives simply did not trust
them seem to be more leading elements rather than pursuing rents.
In addition, the newly made constitution of 1863 showed unclear lines and rules
about the federal government’s abilities to intervene in states to restore order. In that case,
the general authority of the state was difficult to pinpoint. Though the military was reduced
in power, unlike Ecuador and Venezuela, several coups did take place without too much
bloodshed. Most bloodshed was of civil cause, during both the War of the Supremes and
the War of a Thousand Days.
Venezuela does however perfectly exemplify the success and failure of the double
balance to take place. The caudillo system is a coalition of several local caudillos and
militias. This system aided in the stability of Paéz’s rule, as well as other caudillos of the
century such as Guzmán. Only Castro and Gómez wished to rid themselves of the system in
order to achieve greater political stability, which Gómez succeeded in doing. The period
between 1888 and 1899 was anarchic and show a nineteenth century version of the authors’
warfare equilibrium: There was no clear leader and caudillos ruled in their home regions
independently. Castro’s and Gómez’s reforms and the establishment of a professional army
rid Venezuela of the caudillos but also created a new coalition. The elites of Caracas and
Venezuela became important allies in Gómez’s centralization plans. During his reign,
political stability returned and centralist reforms were made in the years before the
discovery of Venezuelan oil.
Venezuela’s economy stagnated and, despite efforts, did not manage to enrich the
country. The country remained as poor at the beginning of the postcolonial era. Perhaps it is
the failure of the caudillos to do anything about this that caused their regimes to fall. The
caudillos examined in this chapter seemed content to be at the head of a coalition,
cooperating with the wealthy elites of Caracas. In this sense, developing the country
became second priority to sustaining this coalition. It is hard to say if this resulted in the
generation of more rents for the elites.
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Thus it seems that North et al.’s model can also be used to a considerable extent. In
Colombia this is more problematic, but overall the conservative and liberal parties can
represent such coalitions. Of the doorstep conditions, perhaps only the rule of law was
established in Colombia. However, this was jeopardized by the fact that even rule of the
state was not accepted in many cases. For Venezuela, the models seems even more
adaptable, where the caudillo system represent a raw form of coalitional rule. As for rents,
one can wonder if rent generation and political stability are related to one another during
this period.
4.4.2 Tilly’s Democracy
In both Colombia and Venezuela, attempts were made to democracy to include
more citizens. As for civil liberties, slavery was abolished in both countries. However, there
are clear signs that white elites still controlled most rights. In Venezuela even, this elite
minority tried to promote European settlement in a vain attempt to ‘civilize’ the country.
Still, liberals wished to pursue the ideals of a democratic federal government. At the same
time, conservatives generally aimed to make the government more centralized. This is
where Colombia and Venezuela clearly differ. In Colombia, conservatives wanted to revive
Bogotá as the center of power it had been during the colonial period. Liberals however
wanted to expand the state and create multiple layers of government. The three political
periods as observed in the above could serve well in illustrating Colombia’s path along the
axes lines. Beginning in 1831, Colombia loses significant plots of land and the peoples that
came along with it. As Venezuela was separately treated in the last chapter, it should also
be treated as such in this one. For the graph the change in state capacity is thus minimal, as
only the secession of Ecuador should be taken into account. Democratization was minimal
in the direct aftermath of Gran Colombia’s dissolution. Whilst the line between
conservatives and liberals was still unclear before 1840, this changed significantly after the
War of the Supremes when the conservatives become dominant for two decades after.
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Therefore, 1842 could be placed on the graph as an increase in state capacity at the cost of
democracy, because centralized government of this type limits inclusion.
Attempts to further centralize were stalled by liberal uprisings ultimately leading to
the liberal revolution of 1859-1862 after which a new liberal constitution was adapted. So
1863 becomes a new pinpoint on the graph: The new constitution embodies further
democratization through the establishment of a federal system. However, as the new
constitution was unclear about federal authority, state capacity should be decreased. If there
is not clear authority, it makes sense that federal state agents cannot carry out their job
effectively.
Finally, the Regeneration renders a revival in state capacity during the 1880s with a
victorious cooperative alliance between moderate liberals and conservatives against the
radical liberal government. Whilst a new constitution was written and severed both
conservative and liberal interests, federal government was dismantled and a centralized
government revived. The church received benefits which it had lost during the Márquez and
liberal periods. Thus, through these elements, state capacity increased and democratization
remained roughly the same during the period. The 1886 constitution is not much more nor
less democratic than its predecessor, despite federal dismantlement.
For Venezuela, the picture is quite different. The caudillo era is roughly comparable to the
connotation in Tilly’s work of a low-capacity undemocratic state. Caudillos were in the
essence not much different than warlords choosing to support a primes inter pares as
president. Thus, between 1831 and 1863 little changed in terms of state capacity and
democratization, as both these variables dropped significantly after Venezuela’s secession.
This counts for the Paéz era up to the time of Guzmán’s reign, when Guzmán tried to make
the local caudillos more dependent upon central government. However, it was not until
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Castro and Gómez that state capacity was increased significantly. This centralization
process persisted until the striking of oil and continued well after that. However,
democratization was still left behind as Gómez continued to serve as dictator.
In sum, the paths that Colombia and Venezuela followed different greatly as illustrated in
Figures 4 and 5.324 Where the Venezuelan nineteenth century is characterized as a lowcapacity undemocratic period up to 1920, Colombian history is much more vibrant.
4.4.3 Mahoney’s Colonialism: Postcolonial Development
Previous chapters have treated only singular aspects of the framework from
Mahoney’s book Colonialism. This section will focus on the final aspect of his framework,
the pattern of postcolonial development. As examined in the previous chapters, Colombia
was noted by Mahoney to be the semi-periphery of Spanish colonial possessions in the
New World during the Habsburg and Bourbon periods. This was due to the fact that
Colombia had precolonial societies that varied in complexity from hunter-gathers to semipolities throughout the country. Venezuela was the periphery during the Habsburg era but
became a rising peripheral colony that experienced a great of liberal colonial settlement.
Venezuela’s indigenous peoples were less varied in complexity than Colombia’s, but were
also far less numerous.
At the end of his book, Mahoney concludes that Colombia experienced an
intermediate level of postcolonial economic development, whilst Venezuela endured a
higher degree of economic development than other countries.325 When considering
Mahoney’s framework, this is indeed the most logical outcome. In theory, Colombia
324
325
See Appendix, Figures 4 and 5.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 260.
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experienced and intermediate level of mercantilist colonialism, it also contained a relatively
high level of indigenous populations. The level of liberal colonialism, positively related to
the former and negatively related to the latter, must have been intermediate as well.
Considering the intermediate level of liberal colonialism, Colombia indeed falls into
intermediate development category. Mahoney claims that “liberal reforms… nevertheless
helped save… [Colombia] from a much worse destiny”.326
Mahoney’s portrayal of Venezuela’s path is consistent with his own model.
According to Mahoney, the region had a very low level of mercantilist colonial settlement
and a small group of indigenous peoples, liberal colonialism had a much greater chance to
develop. Similarly, the level of postcolonial development should be higher. Mahoney
believes that Venezuela’s trajectory is the “[m]ost satisfactory outcome”, where
“mercantilist peripheral status [was] combined with liberal core status”.327 To further
legitimize his claim to Venezuela’s path, Mahoney states that the country’s “slave-based
economy saw the introduction of more considerable mercantilist institutions and actors”.328
However, the country “was the site of new settlement patterns” and benefited from reforms
that allowed a “late colonial efflorescence”.329
Though explained by Mahoney, this hardly seems to fit the picture as portrayed in
the previous chapters. When considering the nineteenth century, one cannot help but think
that Venezuela experienced less development than Colombia. The economies of both
Colombia and Venezuela experienced some progression, but only at the end of the century
did this become truly visible. Especially considering Venezuela, Mahoney’s framework
does not seem to fit. However, it must be noted that Colonialism covers the whole
trajectory of postcolonial development well into the twentieth century and thus the
326
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 261.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 261.
328
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 261.
329
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 261-262.
327
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nineteenth century is only one half of the story. Yet it cannot be ignored that Venezuela
was still largely impoverished after a period of more than eighty years and that Colombia
seems to have been better off. In order to come to a more full conclusion regarding
postcolonial development, the next chapter deals with the aftermath of Venezuela’s oil
strike and the politico-economic developments of the twentieth century.
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Chapter Five: Popular Uprisings and Guerillas
Previous chapters have dealt with history up the turn of the twentieth century and
analyzed the divergent developments of Colombia and Venezuela. Now attention will be
paid to the twentieth century. The liberal-conservative struggle did not end at the turn of the
century. The War of the Thousand Days war ended with reestablished conservative
hegemony.330 At this point however, the political situation becomes more difficult to
examine. The two major political parties are internally divided into several factions. Both
Colombia and Venezuela start to industrialize in the first half of the twentieth century.
Venezuela’s oil gave the country a great deal of income in addition as the Acción
Democrática political movement of Rómulo Betancourt tried to pursue democracy. In the
end however, democracy failed to grasp At the end, another return to the frameworks is
necessary to recap the fifth and final chapter of this thesis.
5.1.1 La Violencia
The conservative hegemony that was won through the War of the Thousand Days
ended in 1930, when different factions within the conservative party splintered and voted
for different candidates for the presidency.331 The National conservatives favored their
candidate over the Historical candidate. The fracture led to the election of a liberal
president for the first time since the beginning of the Regeneración period.332 Enrique
Olaya Herrera was a moderate liberal and won the elections with only 45% of the total
330
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 251; Hartlyn, Coalition Rule, p. 24.
William Avilés, Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia (Albany, NY,
2006), p. 28.
332
Charles Bergquist, ‘The Labor Movement (1930-1946) and the Origins of the Violence’, in: Charles
Bergquist (ed.), Ricardo Peñaranda (ed.) and Gonzalo Sánchez (ed.), Violence in Colombia. The
Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective (Wilmington, DE, 1992), p. 51-52.
331
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votes.333 His candidacy was perhaps also linked to the economic devaluation of Colombia
by the United States’ government report of 1927. Olaya had been ambassador in
Washington and through his connections with American bankers he promised more foreign
investment in Colombia’s economy in his election program.334 Whilst in 1929, the Great
Depression began in the United States and Europe, Colombia was one of the few countries
in which the effects were minimal.335 Though foreign investments were further cut and the
country’s internationally stored reversed shrunk, it was the coffee market that led the
country back up. The typical symptoms of the Depression, such as unemployment and
acute deflation were counteracted by a value increase of both coffee and gold, two of
Colombia’s important export products.336 Olaya’s administration did not manage to restore
the influx of foreign investments however. As a consequence, the liberal government relied
on export-oriented development as established by the conservatives.337 Bergquist describes
the industrialization that took place in Colombia during the 1930’s as “import-substituting”,
meaning that light manufacture goods were starting to be produced in the country rather
than imported.338 Greater and more advanced forms of industrialization only took place
after the Second World War had ended.
Despite the fact that Olaya’s liberal administration had taken on a semi-centrist
form, a particularly new institution developed after 1930: The government had passed a
labor law which sought to promote “responsible labor” through the establishment of
organizations.339 This led to the creation of Colombia’s first labor federation, the
Confederación de Trabajadores Colombianos (CTC).340 During the same decade, militant
333
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 266-267.
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 57.
335
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 268.
336
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 274.
337
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 57.
338
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 57.
339
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 57.
340
This name can be literally translated as the ‘Confederation of Colombian Workers’; Bergquist, ‘Labor
Movement’, p. 57.
334
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organizations appeared, such as the Communist party which allied themselves with the
labor union and the Liberals.341
Interestingly, the reforms made by the Olaya administration were immediately
abandoned by its successors.342 Their reasons for doing so had to do with organized labor
itself: The establishment of the CTC and its close ties with the government and Liberal
party meant it had lost its position as an independent organization.343 The potential threat of
organized workers as perceived by “the ruling class” was neutralized. In this case, the elites
had taken the initiative to organize labor along the lines of government and thus dismantle
potential insurgency.344 Also, whilst the Great Depression did not hit Colombia as hard as
other countries, the demand for labor did fall. As a consequence, militant rural workers
were hard pressed and their organizations left “extremely weak and vulnerable”.345 Over
time, the government became more repressive towards organized labor reaching its
pinnacle after World War II. Many Liberals disagreed with the centrist tendencies of
successive administrations after Olaya’s term ended in 1934. These “dissident” Liberals
organized themselves into the Union Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria (UNIR), or
National Leftist Revolutionary Union under the leadership of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.346
Gaitán, like the Communists, tried to challenge the traditional parties by organizing the
rural workers “into a political force”.347 However, both Gaitán and the Communist party
tried to “crack the electoral monopoly” of the Liberals and Conservatives, but were
unsuccessful and abandoned the organization of coffee workers.
Gaitán was an important figure for the events after 1945. Unions and leftist
organizations were oppressed by Liberal administration. The Liberal party had become
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 57-58.
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 58.
343
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 58.
344
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 58.
345
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 58-59.
346
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 59; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 291-292.
347
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 59-60; Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 29.
341
342
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divided into two camps, with one side supporting the government and the other supporting
dissident Gaitán. This division led to the Conservatives winning the 1946 elections in the
same way the Liberals won the 1930 elections.348 The years that followed were described as
La Violencia, or The Violence.
The Violence was a period where the division in the Liberal and Conservative
parties span out of control. Gaitán had created a popular front which aspired to break
through traditional bipartisan politics. His campaigns positioned “the people” versus “the
oligarchy” that ran the country. His program was also increasingly feared to be a “disguised
socialist program” by his opponents. Gaitán managed to rally both the urban and rural
population that was against the Liberal and Conservative governments of the previous
decade.349 He managed to portray his vision in a theatric way, as became evident in the socalled ‘March of Silence’ that took place on February 7th 1948.350 Gaitán’s charisma and
vision rendered his supporters angry with the established oligarchic elements of Colombian
politics. This anger turned to violence two months later, as government was preparing the
city for the Ninth Pan-American Congress to take place.351
After leaving his office on the Ninth of April, Gaitán was assassinated in the streets
of Bogotá.352 This unleashed a wave of violence and riots by Gaitán’s infuriated supporters
against the established order. The riots became popularly known as the Bogotazo.353 Angry
mobs had destroyed hundreds of building and ransacked stores. Gaitán’s killer, Roa Sierra,
was captured by the enraged mob, lynched and dragged through the streets towards the
Bergquist, ‘Labor Movement’, p. 69.
Gonzalo Sánchez, ‘The Violence: An Interpretative Synthesis’, in: Charles Bergquist (ed.), Ricardo
Peñaranda (ed.) and Gonzalo Sánchez (ed.), Violence in Colombia. The Contemporary Crisis in Historical
Perspective (Wilmington, DE, 1992), p. 80-81.
350
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 81.
351
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 81.
352
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 81; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p, 348; Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 29.
353
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 78, 81; Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 29.
348
349
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presidential palace.354 The next day, the Conservative president announced he would form a
bipartisan government, naming a Liberal as minister of interior.355 In this sense, the
government gave in to the uprising.
La Violencia did not end there. The “capitulation” of the Conservatives proved to be
temporary. The Liberal-Conservative dichotomy had not changed with this new alliance. In
1949, the alliance broke as Loreano Gómez, a Radical Conservative, was nominated for the
presidency of 1950-1954.356 The Liberal party withdrew from the bipartisan government
and abstained from voting in the elections of 1950 in protest.357 Gómez and the other
conservatives wanted to prevent another April 9th from happening and made their way to
further weaken existing unions through purge and imprisonment of its leaders. After
Gómez was elected president, he committed the government to extreme repression. In the
eyes of Gómez, “the Liberal path… [placed] Colombia on the brink of falling behind the
Iron Curtain”.358 In the countryside, pro-government armed peasant forces, the so-called
Chulavitas, terrorized towns in search of liberal supporters.359 The country was in a state of
terror by these Chulavitas, which made their way to assassinate and persecute their
enemies. Both Ospina and Gómez used assassins, called pajaros, or ‘birds’, to “engage in
selective killings… of Liberal partisans”.360 Their violence only intensified after Gómez’s
election. For the Liberals and their popular supporters, the only option left to them was to
engage in armed resistance.361
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 81; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 348.
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 84; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 348.
356
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 348; Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 30
357
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 348; Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 84-85.
358
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 86.
359
Named after the predominantly conservative community of Chulavita in Boyacá, where the first of these
peasant policemen were recruited during the Ospina administration (1946-1950); Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p.
85, 87; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 350.
360
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 30.
361
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. ; Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 32.
354
355
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In the eyes of other Conservatives, Gómez became too extreme. In 1953, Gómez
was removed in a military coup by fellow a conservative, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.
Rojas intended to restore order, but after his rule was extended to 1958 by the National
Assembly in 1954, he started to act as he pleased. He attempted to gain more powers for
himself and his personal political movement.362 By 1955, Rojas had become a common
enemy for the Liberals and the Conservatives for differing reasons. Rojas alienated himself
from the conservative party through his populist movement and labor union, whilst Liberals
were still being persecuted throughout the country. Both parties formed a “civil front”
against Rojas at the end of that year.363 Whilst Rojas had an ambitious program to improve
housing, health and education, his continuing alienation of potential allies climaxed in early
1957. The Archbishop warned him not to nominate himself for the presidency and Bogotá
became the center of widespread strike.364 Unwilling to break the new uprising in the
capital, Rojas simply resigned and left a military junta in charge to work together with the
two parties until a new government could be formed. This ended the period of The
Violence, yet many problems continued to be unresolved well into the period after.
For the time being, a National Front had been put in place which put aside the
differences between the two major parties.365 Up to the 1980’s, the National Front tried to
modernize the country without major changes in social stratification.366 Instead, growth in
agricultural exports and capital investments in agriculture were the main objectives for the
government. The main source of disgruntlement for many Colombian during the time, was
that the pueblo were excluded from policy- and decision making.367 Though officially a
democracy, it seems to be more than clear that the National Front was run by the economic
elites that excluded the popular majority from such decisions. More so, this newly created
362
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 323-324.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 324; Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 31.
364
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 324.
365
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 32-33
366
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 18-19, 32-33.
367
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 34-35.
363
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alliance began to use the military to uphold the situation, though the country was still filled
with self-defense militias long after 1958.368
5.1.2 The Origins and Discourse of Guerrillas in Colombia
So far, the communist influence in Colombia had been persecuted by the Ospina
and Gómez administrations. During La Violencia, peasants had openly resisted armed
forces and bandits that supported the government. This had happened in a relatively
organized way, where people, both liberal and conservative alike, had formed militias to
protect themselves from the army and chulavitas. These militias had adapted hit-and-run
tactics which had changed the character of civil war in Colombia entirely.369
Gonzalo Sánchez describes three types of regions where guerrillas could consolidate
their strength: The first of these were areas of resent settlement, such as the communities of
southern Tolima and Sumapaz near Bogotá. In these regions, people were politicized by
Gaitán’s popular movement and the Communist party, the Partido Socialista
Revolucionario.370 The second areas were located in the “open frontier”, such as the llanos
and the middle Magdalena River valley, where settlement was getting under way. Thirdly,
but less so, predominantly agrarian regions that were relatively isolated from the centers of
power with a large Liberal support base. These guerrillas followed the example set by men
such as Guadalupe Salcedo and Juan de la Cruz Varela.371 Many of these groups popped up
all over the country, which all acted autonomously and initially in self-defense.
368
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 33,35;
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 90-91.
370
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 92.
371
Sánchez, ‘The Violence’, p. 92.
369
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Though La Violencia as a period in Colombian history ended in 1958, armed
Liberal and Conservative self-defense groups continued to exist throughout the country.
The government adopted a counterinsurgency policy and used the military to flush out
remaining groups throughout the country.372After 1961 the guerrillas started to transform
into political revolutionary movements. These movements aspired to “revolutionary
transformation of the social order and the state”, in addition to protection from the military
and paramilitary organizations, the Autodefensas.373 One of these revolutionary guerrillas
movements, was the infamous Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, more
commonly known today by its abbreviation, FARC.374
Many future guerrillas and paramilitaries originated in the Liberal- and Communistsupporting peasants that had taken up arms in defense against the army and the chulavitas
and rival communities. In the regions of south Tolima and Sumapaz, these self-defense
groups proved successful in preventing other armed communities from overtaking them. By
1958, they were present in a vast area south of Bogotá and achieved the loyalty of the
peasant population.375 The transformation of guerrilla groups to revolutionary movements
should be viewed in the context of the Cold War. The early 1960’s witnessed Fidel Castro’s
successful Communist revolution in Cuba. This inspired many groups in Spanish America
to take up arms or transform into revolutionary guerrillas. One of these groups, the ELN
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or National Liberation Army) was founded in response to
the successful revolution in Cuba.376 So-called foquista movements such as the ELN, vied
to take control of the state in the style of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.377 In 1964, the
Communist-oriented self-defense groups in southern Tolima moved from defensive
372
Aviles, Global Capitalism, p. 36-39.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 354
374
Translated as the ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 354
375
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 354.
376
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 354.
377
Foquista is derived from the word foco, which is used to describe revolutionary camps as nuclei of activity
in a particular region; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p, 357.
373
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strategy to offensive guerrilla tactics.378 They had done so in response to the government’s
policy of active military counterinsurgency, which targeted all self-defense organizations.
The Tolima group officially became a communist guerrilla movement after reestablishing
themselves as the FARC in 1966. Through only two of the numerous guerrilla groups
which were founded in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the foquista ELN and FARC continue to
operate today.
Though being founded in the 1960’s, the number of guerrilleros remained relatively
small until the end of the 1980’s.379 It is ironic that only after the Cold War had ended
leftist guerrillas started to become far more numerous in Colombia. The movements in
general started to become more associated with the narcotics trade over during the 1980’s
and 1990’s, especially the FARC.380 Their numbers started to swell and over the course of
fourteen years, their number quintupled.381 How was this possible? After the Betancur
administration, the leftist guerrillas became “reinvigorated” through governmental
measures and underhanded attacks by the government.382 A potential peace was shattered
when the FARC established a political party, the Patriotic Union (UP), during peace
negotiations. Both military and paramilitary actions against the Union Patriotica‘s
members during the 1980’s led to that party’s decimation, breaking the FARC’s trust in
future possibility of political reincorporation.383 Colombia became influenced US president
Reagan’s Neoliberalism, whilst resources and political openness continued to be confined
to the elites.384 Meanwhile, protests for reforms by civilians were countered by military
action in 1988 and afterwards.
378
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 355.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 360.
380
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 356-357.
381
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 362.
382
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 45,
383
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 45.
384
Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 44-46.
379
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The FARC is one of the few guerrillas to continue to operate today. Others, such as
the Moviemento 19 de Abril or ‘19th of April Movement’ (M-19), met their ends by
government forces. In 1986, M-19 seized control of the Palace of Justice in an attempt to
enforce demands for reform.385 The movement’s plan to seize the Palace was ill-conceived
and poorly executed however, killing many civilians working there and enraging the
general populace. The government responded with serious firepower, in which important
leaders of M-19 died. This act caused M-19 to lose a great deal of popularity and
disappeared in the three years after the attack.386
Only in recent years does the FARC seem to be in decline. The Uribe and Santos
regimes had put up the pressure and managed to free several important political hostages,
including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.387 Since August 2012, the
guerrillas have been engaged in peace talks with the Colombian government after releasing
the last of their political prisoners earlier that year.388 Military actions against the FARC
will continue, but current peace talks have so far led to an agreement on the FARC’s
political future should peace be achieved. Current president Juan Manuel Santos, former
defense minister of the Uribe regime (2002-2010) publically stated that he believed that
peace could be achieved in 2014.389
5.2.1 Petroleum and Acción Democratica
385
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 360; Avilés, Global Capitalism, p. 43.
Safford and Palacios, Colombia, p. 359-360.
387
Jim Bitterman / CNN, ‘Betancourt, U.S. contractors rescued from FARC’ (Version July 3rd 2008),
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/02/betancourt.colombia/index.html (January 25 th 2014).
388
BBC News, ‘Q&A: Colombia peace talks’ (Version September 2 nd 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19875363 (January 22nd 2014). Reuters, ‘Colombia, FARC
agree on rebels’ future if peace signed’ (Version November 6 th 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/us-colombia-rebels-idUSBRE9A50JM20131106 (January 22nd
2014).
389
BBC News, ‘Colombia President Juan Manuel Santos hopes for peace’ (Version January 24 th 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-25890231 (January 25th 2014); CNN Español, ‘Santos:
“Podemos llegar a acuerdos con FARC este año”’ (Version January 23rd 2014)
http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2014/01/23/juan-manuel-santos-frente-a-frente-con-ana-pastor-podemos-llegar-aacuerdos-con-farc-este-ano/ (January 25th 2014).
386
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The Venezuelan military dictator Juan Vicente Gómez ruled until his death in 1935.
Seven years before, communists and students had organized a protest against his
government. The established dictatorship had perhaps rid the country of caudillismo, but
the country remained under effective military rule. During his reign, Gómez found himself
sitting upon the largest oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere, yet Venezuelans lacked
knowledge and expertise to fully exploit it.390 Venezuela was however sovereign over its
own territory, in contrast to other oil-producing regions that formed part of European
powers.391 This allowed a position of bargaining in which European companies were
allowed to extract oil in exchange for taxes and rents.392 Despite this initial position, the
lack of knowledge and colonial property rights hindered the extraction of oil and
Venezuelan profits for some time.393 In 1929, the Venezuelan state was receiving over 187
million Bolívares (Bs.) for taxes on oil extraction over the course of seven year, becoming
the prime source of income among the major exports within a decade.394
Despite initial profits, minister of investment Gumersindo Torres presented the idea
that if business-related import tariffs had not been dissolved, this number could have been
even more.395 He argued that it would have been more profitable to keep the importcustoms tax and to have dissolved the exploitation tax. As the opposite had been the case
between 1922 and 1929, the state missed an opportunity to receive Bs. 31 million more.396
This indicates the degree of knowledge of petroleum-related economics gomecista
Venezuela had in 1929. The situation of Venezuela was still dire despite the thirty years of
stable rule under the Andean dictators Castro and Gómez. The death of Gómez in 1935 saw
390
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 41.
After World War I, British and French Middle-Eastern colonies, such as modern Iran, Iraq etc. in addition
to League of Nations’ dependencies, controlled many of the Middle East’s oil supplies.
392
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 41.
393
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 42-43.
394
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 38, 42-43.
395
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 43.
396
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 43.
391
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yet another Andean general thrust into power. Eleazar López Contreras was chosen by the
cabinet to succeed Gómez as president in January 1936.397 He appealed to the general
public for support and released political prisoners. However, Contreras was not trusted by
associates of the late Gómez. That year, the governor of Táchira, Eustoquio Gómez,
attempted to remove Contreras from power through a coup d’état.398 The attempted coup
failed and Eustoquio was killed. The army remained loyal to Contreras. The Venezuelan
people became infuriated with the coup attempt and unleashed a revolt that targeted the
former dictator’s clique.399 In Caracas and Maracaibo, many homes were burned by angry
mobs, whilst strikes erupted among the workers in the developing industrial sector. In the
countryside, the Venezuelan campesinos attacked the homes of landowners and local
officials that were related to the gomecista regime.400 The violence continued well into
February. More protests broke out as the government put restrictions on the use of
constitutional rights during the crisis.401 Government troops committed an atrocity by
opening fire on unarmed civilians on the 14th of February, causing Contreras to fire the
governor of Caracas’ federal district.402 In response to these violent events, Contreras
announced his reforming “February Program” which ambitiously intended to improve
healthcare and education, “welfare of citizens, labor rights… and investment in
communications and transportation”.403
Romúlo Betancourt comes into the picture into the picture at this point. Betancourt
had been an associate of the Revolutionary Party of Venezuela (PRV) and wished to
improve the position of the Venezuela’s workers.404 The gomecista regime left Venezuela
undeveloped and semi-feudal and the PRV believed “that a workers and peasant alliance
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 47, 58; Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 732
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 47, 51.
399
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 47, 51.
400
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 51.
401
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 52.
402
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 52.
403
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 52; Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 732-733.
404
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 52.
397
398
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would bring about immediate socialist revolution”.405 In the December of 1936, the PRV
and other affiliated communist groups staged strikes aimed to improve worker conditions,
secure higher wages and legal recognition of a trade union.406 The last of these demands
failed to be met and Contreras became anxious towards the leftist organizations that caused
the strike. Contreras turned to, Congress which was dominated by gomecista affiliates.
They had passed an anticommunist law, which in practice was expanded to all leftist
political groups. Open political activity was forbidden after 1937.407 From 1936 to 1939,
before his capture and subsequent exile, Betancourt developed his “reformist agenda”.408
His plan for metaphorically “sowing the oil” included: The establishment of a political
democracy; higher taxes on petrol; European companies’ recognition of Venezuelan labor
laws; “opposition of fascism at home and abroad”; industrialization and development; the
enforcement of the 1936 reform program; and the facilitation and organization of unions.409
After Isaías Medina Angarita succeeded Contreras as president in 1941, Betancourt
returned from his exile.410 Though Betancourt’s Acción Democratica, or Democratic Action
Party (AD), became legal, by 1945 it was still a “brash and inexperienced minority
party”.411
Medina’s term also saw a firmer hand when it came down to dealing with oil
companies on Venezuela’s shores.412 The law of 1943 required oil companies to share fifty
percent of their profits with the nation, a considerate step forward. Royal Dutch Shell, Gulf
and Standard Oil, the major companies that accounted for 98% of all oil extraction, were
reluctant to abide the new law, but the Medina regime made priority to reinforce this new
law.413
405
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 51.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 512.
407
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 733
408
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 54.
409
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 54-56.
410
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 53, 58-59; Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 733.
411
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 741.
412
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 734
413
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 729, 734.
406
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At the end of Medina’s term in 1945, the AD demanded free elections, or at least to
nominate a successor to facilitate the road to such elections.414 At this time, the army was
still under strong gomecista sway. Officers of a military group, the Unión Patriótica
Militar, or Military Patriotic Union (UMP), wanted to see that changed. They presented the
AD with a scheme to stage a coup.415 This group of officers would hand over control of the
government to AD in return for holding free elections. Their goal was to depoliticize the
military and install professional criteria for high-ranked officers, “assignments, and other
military affairs”.416 Since gomestica elements blocked the personal ambitions of these
military men, they sought a civilian group to join them for the sake of legitimacy.417
Because Medina did not offer any promises of future elections, the adecos agreed to
participate in the coup.418 After discovering the coup and arresting Marcos Pérez Jiménez,
one of these officers, Caracas rose in revolt against Medina in October 1945.419 The period
after Medina became known as the trienio adeco: The three years of AD dominance of
Venezuela.420
Ironically it was a military coup that helped lay down the potential foundations of
democracy. Up to 1948, Betancourt served as provisional president of Venezuela. Four
public elections took place during his time as provisional president, including elections for
the Constituent Assembly, municipal councils, Congress and the presidency.421 AD won
these elections with a median of seventy percent of the votes. Also, multiple parties sprung
up after 1946, including the Christian Democratic party. Believing that a disciplined
political party was “the key to success”, Betancourt and AD wished extend party
414
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 59.
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 59.
416
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 59-60; Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 742.
417
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 742.
418
Adeco is an abbreviation for members and supporters of the Acción Democratica; Hellinger, Venezuela, p.
60.
419
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 742-743.
420
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 58, 60.
421
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 743.
415
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membership and leave “no single district or municipality without its AD headquarters.422
Between 1941 and 1948, the membership of AD grew from eighty thousand to half a
million. Betancourt’s party was so successful that competing parties were incapable of
challenging AD’s dominance, even in the regional political arena.423
Despite the ratification of a new constitution in 1947, the military had turned against
Betancourt and the AD party. Their policies, as well as their approaches to the conditions of
laborers had caused great uncertainty and criticism. Especially traditionalists were
suspicious of AD party and its radicalism.424 A campaign led by AD against past corruption
led to a great deal of resentment, as people feared AD was targeting those whom they
perceived to be “honest men”, such as former president Contreras.425 When the military
thought that AD would expand civilian power at their expense, the officers of the UMP
offered an ultimatum to Betancourt’s successor, Rómulo Gallegos.426 When Gallegos
refused, he was arrested and replaced by Pérez Jiménez, one of the UMP officers that had
put Betancourt in power. Together with Delgado Chaubald and other military men, Pérez
set up a military Junta to rule the country. They had done so for the next decade, with
himself as leader of the Junta after 1954.427
Junta-rule of the 1950’s had become synonymous with mismanagement and
corruption. The government faced serious financial problems after concessions in the oil
sector and the subsequent Suez crisis.428 Eventually Pérez had lost the base support of his
power: The military was alienated by the fact that Pérez was drawn more and more towards
to the United States.429 Additionally, he posed that Venezuela should become a bulwark
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 743.
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 743.
424
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 745.
425
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 746.
426
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 745-747.
427
Tilly, Democracy, p. 167.
428
Tilly, Democracy, p. 167.
429
Tilly, Democracy, p. 167
422
423
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against Communism, yet granting the oil companies more profit in exchange for support,
and the banning of moderate parties such as AD saw the most sectors of popular support
crumbling. In 1958, the military launched another coup and forced Pérez Jiménez to flee
Caracas.430
5.2.2 End of the Two Party System and Hugo Chávez.
Over the next decades, AD was allowed to return to public politics after being
officially banned for nearly ten years. Charles Tilly describes Venezuelan politics after
1958 to be mostly of civilian character up to 1992.431 Venezuela, along with other oilproducing countries, founded the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries, or
OPEC in 1960.432 The government attempted to gain greater control over oil and began to
nationalize the oil industry from 1972 onward.433 During this period, both AD and the
Christian Democrats, the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente, or
COPEI, became the main “elite” parties of Venezuela’s democracy. These two moderate
parties alternated between regimes for the coming decades.434 Though the majority of
Venezuela’s export was subject to oil prices, when OPEC septupled oil prices in 1973, the
extra revenue was used to expand public works. This was the pinnacle of Venezuelan
democracy.
Though having experienced a relative wave of prosperity, Venezuela’s capital
became engulfed by violence during president Carlos Andres Pérez’s second term (1988-
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 752-753.
Tilly, Democracy, p. 168.
432
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 759.
433
For anyone interested in a full chronology of Venezuela’s oil policies and developments, Anibal
Martínez’s book Venezuelan Oil. Development and Chronology provides an extended timeline and tables to
complement historic research; Martínez, Venezuelan Oil, p. 148, 158
434
Ewell, ‘Venezuela’, p. 747; Tilly, Democracy, p. 168.
430
431
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1993).435 The country became troubled lingering debts. Because of its reliability on oil,
major crises such as the of the early 1980’s caused drops in petrol prices, which left its
marks on the Venezuelan economy.436 Various banking scandals and charges of corruption
had also left its stains on the established democracy. Promising price containment and
further public work expansion, Andres Pérez became pressured to submit to an austerity
program for lifting the country’s international debts a year after his reelection.437In
response, the populace took to the streets in resistance. By March 1989, violence had
erupted in the streets of Caracas, marking the beginning of the Caracazo.438 An event
similar to its Bogotan counterpart, many stores were sacked and anger was directed towards
the government.439 Three hundred people were killed and ten thousand troops entered the
city to restore order. There was also talk of massacres and potential military coups, entering
Caracas in a state of anxiety.
Two attempts to military coups in the aftermath of the Caracazo were made in 1992
and 1993. Whilst Carlos Andres Pérez tried to remain in power, the Moviemento
Bolivariano Revolucionario or MBR 300, decided to oust Pérez from power. Claiming to
represent the popular forces of the country, this group of disgruntled military men,
including paratroop officer Hugo Chávez, attempted their coup d’état in 1992.440 The
popular insurrection the MBR had tried to upstart did not come however and thus the coup
attempt had failed. Chávez was sentenced to prison for his attempt.441 A year later however,
despite having one of their prime leaders in jail, MBR tried to gain power once more. Pérez
had been impeached for corruption and was replaced by Rafael Caldera. New violence
erupted as some of the country’s banks collapsed and new uncertainties emerged. In
response to the new violence, MBR reportedly hijacked a television station, casting a
435
Tilly, Democracy, p. 168;
Martínez, Venezuelan Oil, p. 181
437
Tilly, Democracy, p. 168.
438
Hellinger, Venezuela, p. 192-194; Tilly, Democracy, p. 168; Kozloff, Chávez, p. 45
439
Tilly, Democracy, p. 168.
440
Kozloff, Chávez, p. 46-47.
441
Kozloff, Chávez, p. 47
436
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televised message from Chávez in prison that the MBR had taken over the country.442 This
new coup failed again however, though Chávez was released in 1994.
Chávez entered public politics, addressing the issues that AD and COPEI had left
behind. He blamed Neoliberalism for the emergence of slums and corruption scandals,
identifying himself with Pope John Paul II.443 After gaining more popularity over the
course of four year, Chávez was elected president in 1998 through a landslide victory.444
The new Bolivarian constitution dismantled freedom of press, gave the president the right
to dismiss congress and allowed Chávez to remain in power for fourteen years. Surviving
other coup attempts, Chávez remained Venezuela’s leader until his death in March 2013,
when he lost the fight against cancer.445 Chávez’s second, and current president of
Venezuela Nicolas Maduro, took charge after his death, but the November presidential
elections of last year are showing that political is wavering.446 Maduro was given by
parliament the right to rule by decree, allowing singular rule. Protests in November make
the future of Venezuela’s politics uncertain.447
5.3
Return to the Theories
442
Tilly, Democracy, p. 169; Kozloff, Chávez, p. 53-57
Chávez claimed that like the Pope, he too was against implementation of “savage” neoliberalism; Kozloff,
Chávez, p. 56.
444
Tilly, Democracy, p. 169.
445
BBC News, ‘Iconic Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez dies (Version March 6 th 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-21679053 (January 26th 2013).
446
Reuters UK, Daniel Wallis and Efrain Otero, ‘Opposition marches in Venezuela ahead of local elections’
(Version November 23rd 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/23/uk-venezuela-oppositionidUKBRE9AM08V20131123?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews (January 26 th 2014); BBC News,
447
Wallis and Otero, ‘Opposition marches’.
443
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5.3.1 North, Wallis and Weingast’s Social Orders
Over the course of the twentieth century, it seems that neither Colombia nor Venezuela
have fully changed from natural states to open access states. Whilst Colombia had to deal
with the Violence and subsequent guerrilla mobilization that continues onto this day, the
country did manage to subject the military to politics at a relatively early stage. As for
Venezuela, military coups and contained political elite render the country a mature natural
state.
Considering the relative weakness of the Colombian state to fully subjugate
guerrilla armed forces during the second half of the twentieth century, North et al.’s
framework would suggest that changed economic interests and subsequent failure in
negotiation would cause civil war to erupt.448 Has this been the case up to Gaitán’s
assassination and following Bogotazo? The dominant Conservative coalition did break
down in 1930, as the major party could not decide collectively on a potential successor.
This lead to new liberal coalition. Though not hitting Colombia too harshly, the Wall Street
Crash did perform as a catalyst for Liberal government to take on centrist policies. In this
sense it seems the new coalition undermined itself immediate after its birth, as other liberals
started to rally around Gaitán in the following period. However, the introduction of
populism and other political ideologies is what changed economic interests: Gaitán rallied
the workers and his UNIR tried to “crack the electoral monopoly”. Though the country was
still ruled by elites at the time of Gaitán’s assassination, even La Violencia did not expand
the electorate as yet another coalition of the elite parties was formed. From the perspective
of civil war, the government’s harsh actions to rid the countryside of the Self-defense
groups is what led to the organization of the FARC and other guerrillas. Conform with the
framework, it would seem that from the 1960’s on, it is in the interests of both the FARC
448
North et al., Social Orders, p. 21.
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and government to continue to fight.449 Though from a first glimpse it would seem that the
end of the Cold War might have marked the end for Communist revolutionaries, the FARC
became an autonomous organization relatively early and their numbers only swelled after
the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. It also seems that strikes by the government against
guerrillas during peace talks furthered mistrust in a peaceful resolution. Thus, in the last
century, Colombia swung between the Basic and Mature Nature State labels as examined in
Social Orders.
The doorstep conditions however are somewhat problematic when discussing
Colombia. First of all, the Independence Wars and Gran Colombia’s fallout made the
military a weak institution. The Rojas Pinilla coup was the last of few military coups in the
country’s history and eventually civilian resistance led to the end of Rojas’ regime. Thus
one can say that the third doorstep condition, the consolidated political control of the
military, was achieved relatively early. However, it seems that this doorstep condition was
undone during the Violence and not regained until very recently. As for the other doorstep
conditions, the rule of law for elites may have been established at the end of La Violencia,
when the elites formed an alliance. However, the fact that opponents of the regime were
hunted down, persecuted and killed suggests that relationships were still categorized along
personal lines. Until the turn of the century, access was still limited in Colombia.
Venezuela’s stance in the discussion rests equally in the limited access category.
The several dictatorships and coups during the century would suggest as such. Venezuela
did have a strong military, which formed the most basic of political alliances in the age of
caudillismo. Even after Castro and Gómez, the elite continued to rule in limited fashion.
For the trienio and the period between 1958 and 1988, it did seem however that Venezuela
too could move in direction of an open access society. However, the military was not
consolidated by politics at all. The military coups are proof that the military continued to
449
See: Chapter One; North et al., Social Orders, p. 21
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function as a political factor. The AD and COPEI became the dominant elite parties during
the period 1958 and 1988 and alternated in regimes. However, economic interests changed
as well, as thirty years of cooperated leadership between both parties still rendered the
overwhelming majority impoverished. Also alleged corruption formed an important factor
during the Caracazo. If relationships during this time were not along personal lines, they
were after 1991, when Chávez came into the picture. Chávez’s failed coup attempts were
superseded by legal attempts to seize power through elections, as he highlighting the
country’s impoverished state. After succeeding in winning the 1998 elections, Chávez
remodeled the state, eliminating access once more through the dismantling of democratic
institutions.
5.3.2 Tilly’s Democracy
In terms of state capacity and democratization, Colombia witnessed a period of a minor
increase in state capacity from 1930 to 1946. The liberal regime failed in making the
country more democratic as labor organization became threatened after 1934. Gaitán’s
popular movement tried to make the difference, but his assassination and La Violencia,
showed the government’s incapability to deal with it. In 1958, the National Front did
reestablish civilian rule, but since power was shared equally between the elite parties,
democratization is reduced at the expense of reestablishing state capacity. Further attempts
to consolidate order were coupled with government attacks against self-defense groups
which led to guerrillas and paramilitaries. As these groups gained strength at the expense of
the government, Colombia was slowly turning into a low-capacity democracy, falling
dramatically after 1980 and recovering after 2000.
Venezuela’s path is displayed in Democracy up to 2006, showing that the gomecista regime
increased state capacity whilst consolidating the undemocratic regime. Tilly shows that
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between 1935 and 1945 democratization took place. However, this thesis has examined that
Rómulo Betancourt’s party was outlawed and himself exiled for two years, hardly a
statement arguing for democratization. In 1945 AD took power with military support, so
the trienio must be properly displayed in the graph. Also the beginning of Pérez Jiménez’s
leadership of the Junta is shown as a turning point by Tilly, yet the end of the Junta in 1958
seems more justifiable. Until 1990, democratization took place according to Tilly, which is
conform with the above study. Chávez’s coup attempts and election in 1998 did see state
capacity increase at the cost of democratization.
5.3.3 Mahoney’s Colonialism
As this chapter has attempted to analyze the situations of Colombia and Venezuela
in the postcolonial twentieth century, it becomes clear that Mahoney’s framework does not
sufficiently explain how the situations of countries can emerge. The premise of his book
Colonialism is to find a conceptual framework that is applicable to former Spanish
American colonies. Yet some factors that have contributed greatly to the development of
these former colonies are only partially explained and only partially contribute to the
overall picture.
With some exceptions, Mahoney’s framework does seem to fit for Colombia. The
combination of moderate colonization of both mercantile and liberal types seemed to give
the wealthy elites some possibilities to develop the country in the twentieth century.
However, development outside the cities was cut short by guerrilla movements. The regions
were the guerrillas originated, such as Sumapaz and southern Tolima, were places where
new towns were economic prosperity and development was very recent. Yet the failure to
address issued caused by development aided in establishing a support base for the FARC
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and other movements. According to Mahoney, “Liberal colonial reforms in… Colombia
nevertheless helped save [the country] from a much worse destiny”.450
In his conclusion, Venezuela is set apart from other countries in the fact that slavelabor in the cacao sector was a powerful mercantilist institution in a colony which was
relatively empty.451 Apart from the fact that this is a major contradiction to the subsequent
implemented logic, Venezuela remained a relatively empty country even after the
colonization period. Gómez and his predecessor Castro rid the country of caudilloism and
developed the state before oil was struck. The profits of oil may have been limited in the
early years, but as examined Venezuela eventually nationalized its oil and its wealth flowed
through the hands of the few. Even by 1991, four out of five Venezuelans were living in
poverty, whilst mostly cities such as Caracas experienced wealth. Though Mahoney
attempts to balance institutions with geographical factors, he underappreciates the fact that
Venezuela sits upon one of the largest oil reserves in the world and the largest in the
western hemisphere.
450
451
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 261.
Mahoney, Colonialism, p. 261-262.
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Conclusion:
Assessing Origins of Instability and Violence, and the Three
Frameworks
This thesis has covered a great deal of Colombian and Venezuelan history, ranging
from colonial times into the dynamic twentieth century. The purpose of this thesis was to
apply the models and frameworks as found in the works of North et al., Tilly and Mahoney
and assess their worth in finding the origins of nineteenth and twentieth century instability
and violence. The theoretical frameworks as found in Social Orders, Democracy and
Colonialism, were used in the previous three chapters of this thesis. Through examining
literature and assessing the found data with the frameworks, several conclusions have been
found which are of great importance when discussing nineteenth and twentieth century
violence.
An important factor that contributed to Colombian and Venezuelan history was
geography. The Andes mountains cut deep into the Colombian heartland. The three fingers,
the cordilleras, not only made it difficult to travel in-between regions, but cut off
populations and communities from one another. The results were visible well into the late
nineteenth century, as the isolated regions within Colombia did not specialize in particular
products that could be traded in the national market. Traveling in-between or along the
three cordilleras had to be done by mule until the development of railroads, highways and
aircraft. These regions of Colombia were not only self-reliant, they also were more difficult
to control by authorities. During Spanish colonial administration, Colombia as a region
gained a greater level of autonomy during the Bourbon reforms. A more direct link to Spain
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was created when New Granada received its own viceroyalty. Greater autonomy was
necessary to govern the vastness of the Spanish empire in the Americas.
Geography also is important for Venezuela’s situation. Unlike Colombia, Venezuela
consisted largely of vast plains which even during late colonial times were still very
sparsely populated. Until the Bourbon reforms, Venezuela remained the periphery of
Spanish colonial interests: Explorers went further inland in search of El Dorado sparing
almost no attention to “Little Venice”. Despite differences with Colombia in terms of
geography, the region still enjoyed a great deal of autonomy during the colonial period. The
establishment of Caracas’ own audiencia and Captaincy-General are prime examples of
this. This relative autonomy was tarnished when Simón Bolívar’s Gran Colombia
concentrated power in Bogotá and left Venezuelans feeling ‘subjugated’ to a distant capital
city. Considering the country’s geography, especially the llanos, it comes to no surprise
that the mounted llaneros emerged as a powerful military and political force that
contributed greatly to Venezuela’s independence from Spain and Gran Colombia.
Another important factor in the histories in both countries is the military, which was
weakened in Colombia after the Wars of Independence, but remained very strong in
Venezuela for long afterwards. Because of this weakened military, it makes sense that most
civil wars Colombia faced in its nineteenth- and twentieth-century history were of civil
character. The army only played a minor role in politics during this time, with only few
military coups being successfully executed. Army presence overall was limited and perhaps
because of this civil wars had much greater amounts of civilian casualties. The weakness of
the army persisted well into the twentieth century. After Gaitán’s assassination, bands of
Chulavitas terrorized the countryside and communities could only rely on themselves,
leading to the establishment of self-defense units and eventually paramilitaries and
guerrillas. Venezuela’s strong military presence explains why the country had been ruled
by military caudillos and dictators during the first century of independence. Violence in this
case was restricted to armed military groups and different caudillos attempting to seize
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control of the presidency. Venezuela during the nineteenth century can be characterized as
a coalition of warlords, achieving the most minimal levels of political stability. This only
changed with Castro’s and Gómez’s efforts to rid the country of caudilloism, establishing a
stronger base for their rule. It was a military coup that enabled Betancourt’s Acción
Democratica to lay the foundations for future democracy during the trienio. Similarly, it
was a military coup that ended it three years later. The most recent military coups of
Chávez in 1992 and 1993 may have failed, but he still won the elections and continued to
rule until his death in 2013.
The frameworks that have been described in chapter one and used throughout this
thesis have most definitely contributed to the above conclusions. In trying to understand
how dominant coalitions contain violence, the framework by North et al. not only makes
sense, but also seems to be applicable for both Colombia and Venezuela in their colonial
and post-colonial discourse. Though the framework is acknowledged by the authors to be a
selective view of history, it does prove its worth for discovering sources of political
instability and violence. This included the twentieth century world. The real only issue with
applying the framework is related to the pursuit of rents. The formation of alliances and
coalitions in the limited access model, seems fully applicable and can be seen as a
characteristic in both Colombia and Venezuela during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. According to the framework, the two countries failed to meet the three doorstep
conditions needed for a transition to an open access society. The most sensible of these
three conditions that Colombia failed to achieve was the consolidation and subordination of
military groups to the government. This was evident due to the collapse of Gran Colombia
as well as the conservative and liberal uprisings throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
Venezuela failed to do this in a different way. There, the military seized or
attempted to seize control of the government since independence up until 1993. It played an
important part in Venezuelan politics throughout its history and the country either was
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incapable to subordinate the military to the political system, or found it undesirable to do
so. Looking at the coups of 1945 and 1948, perspectives are mixed. The military group that
proposed the coup wanted an end of nepotism and gomecista favoritism in the military.
That same group established a ruling Junta only three years later. Immediate successors of
the military-oriented regimes were criticized by opposing groups in nearly all cases, as
early as Paéz and as late as incumbent president Maduro. Whilst examining history through
the framework of Social Orders, this research has gained a new perspective on Colombian
and Venezuelan history.
Tilly’s Democracy also served in the discussion of political stability, but in another
way than Social Orders. The application of his framework to earlier periods is problematic,
as no regime ever was democratic in the modern sense until the nineteenth century.
Democratization thus is not a measurable figure for use in his graphs until the nineteenth
century. As a means to resolve this issue for earlier periods, democratization could be
replaced by governmental autonomy. Autonomy is a measureable figure of great
significance to the colonial and immediate post-colonial world, as this thesis has shown.
Though democratization and autonomy are not necessarily related to one another, it is a
good alternative in order to compare regions to one another in this extent. Attempts to
recreate or display a region’s discourse in a graph such as Tilly has done does not seem to
be scientifically credible. Tilly himself does not fully explain the use of the criteria to
determine a regime’s position within the graph. However, looking at the terms
democratization and state capacity, major policy changes and altering of political systems
could categorize regimes into the four different corners of Figure 1. Colombia’s path during
the twentieth century seems to fall into the low-capacity democratic category. Thus, the
terms state capacity and democratization are useful terms, but the visual display in the form
of graphs needs to be readdressed. It is currently suitable only for displaying political trends
but not for pinpointing regimes on an exact basis.
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
Finally, Mahoney’s framework is compelling for understanding the great picture of
post-colonial development in South America. Mahoney’s analysis of the former Spanish
colonies in America is a clever attempt to orchestrate a single framework usable for all
former European colonies. However, the research done for this thesis has revealed some
issues and portrays a very different view of history than Colonialism does. Colombia is
described by Mahoney to be intermediately developed. Its colonial institutions “helped save
[the country] from a much worse destiny” than others. Its overall economic development
relied heavily on exports of minerals and later agricultural products with little manufacture.
Overall, this seems to be conform with Colombian history as portrayed in this thesis.
There are a number of shortcomings when applying the framework to Venezuela.
First of all, Venezuela’s categorization as highly developed is particularly difficult to grasp
when the country was very poverty-stricken throughout most its history and even today.
For a very long period after independence, Venezuela remained poor, uneducated and
underdeveloped. It relied heavily on agricultural exports as an integrated part of the
Caribbean economy. The fragile political system restricted development greatly throughout
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The discovery of the largest oil deposits in the
Western Hemisphere provides an anomaly. The striking of oil marked the beginning of a
great amount of foreign investment by the oil companies in order to extract the oil. First
only these companies benefited from this, whilst profits were not very high for the
Venezuelan state. Through the efforts of Acción Democratica and its prime leaders, the oil
industry became nationalized and continued to enrich the state more and more. Investment
in the country’s development and social stratification however, remained of secondary
importance to Venezuela’s leaders.
Though Mahoney admits that Venezuela has certain qualifications, his view of
Venezuela during the colonial period is also problematic. Describing Venezeula as a core of
Bourbon ‘liberal’ colonialism and classifying the country as a highly developed society
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
does not correspond with the findings of this thesis. Though the Venezuelan state started to
develop considerably during the Gómez regime even before the discovery of oil deposits,
too little justice is done to Venezuela’s geography. Sitting on one of the largest deposits of
oil in the world must have been a considerable factor, but Mahoney underappreciates such a
factor in his framework. Mahoney’s model seeks to offset precolonial as well as colonial
conditions in relation to postcolonial development. However, he does not state when such
development actually takes place. It is unclear if Colonialism examines short-term or longterm postcolonial development. Thus the timespan of two centuries is too large a margin to
make such a framework fit, especially if this should be applicable to countries that became
independent during both the early nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. Though the
development of the Venezuelan state took place before discovering oil, its exploitation
undeniably gave the country an advantage over its neighbors. At a glance, Mahoney’s
framework may fit for other Latin American countries, but Venezuela does not fit the
picture. He sets out to balance geographical, political and economic factors, but leaves the
geography underrepresented in his model.
The research question asked in the introduction was as follows: To what extent are
these frameworks suitable for discovering and analyzing the colonial and postcolonial
sources of political instability and violence in histories of Colombia and Venezuela during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?
In conclusion, the framework of North et al. is most logically best suited for this
purpose. Social Orders can be used to discover the origins of political instability and
violence, as this research has shown. North et al.’s is perhaps a selective view of history,
but for Colombian and Venezuelan history the model mostly works. Tilly’s Democracy is
problematic when pinpointing regimes on an exact basis in his graphs, especially in predemocratic times. However, the terms ‘state capacity’ and ‘democratization’ are useable
tools when trying to underline dramatic changes in political regimes and political
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
instability. As for Mahoney, Venezuela forms an obvious exception to his work. Despite
this, he has a measurable, logical basis that could be used if various other factors, such as
geography, are taken into greater account.
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
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Thesis – Colonialism and Development in Comparative Perspective
Images
Title Page:
Ricón Parra, Juliana, ‘Colombia: United in a March Against the FARC’ (version February
2008), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/02/05/colombia-the-world-united-in-amultitudinary-march/ (February 9th 2014). Text reads: ‘I am Colombia. No more lies. No
more kidnappings. No more dead. No more FARC’.
Map 1:
Treehouse Maps, http://www.treehousemaps.com/mims/ml/TGR22V_L_NSouthAmerica.png (February 25th 2014).
Map 2:
Ramírez, Susan Elizabeth, ‘Institutions of the Spanish American Empire’, in Thomas H.
Holloway (ed.), A Companion to Latin American History (Madden, MA 2008), p. 107.
Map 3:
Encyclopaedia Brittannica, ‘Viceroyalty of New Granada, http://media1.web.britannica.com/eb-media/10/126810-004-9A7D560A.jpg (February 25th 2014)
Word Count
28,008
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