A RESEARCH PAPER
on
Tackling the Burmese Regime’s Divide and Rule Policies
by
Elizabeth Hkawn Bu
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of
Educational Initiatives.
Introduction
Burma has been well known in the international community as a country that has had a very long lasting
dictatorship. Despite the existence of strong dissidents, the military regime has managed to survive for
more than half a century. Since the birth of the military regime in the mid 20th century, there have also
been many opposition groups, which fight for democracy and independence. Although opposition
groups can be divided into two major categories—pro-democracy groups and ethnic minority groups—
there are numerous fragmented groups within these categories. This situation allows the military regime
to survive by exercising divide and rule policies. In this essay, I will first highlight the tactics of divide and
rule policies practiced by the Burmese regime. The first section is meant to depict how the diverse
interests of ethnic groups and different political approaches of political parties and ethnic armed groups
generate the proper conditions for the military regime to implement divide and rules policies. In the
second part, the weaknesses of pro-democracy groups and ethnic minority groups are discussed so as to
point out what obstructs the democratization and national reconciliation processes in the country.
Finally, I will attempt to draw some possible methods to bring about unity among ethnic groups and
political parties and to reconcile the nation by suggesting that the National League for Democracy (NLD)
should put more effort into dealing with ethnic issues and by encouraging ethnic groups to build up
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alliances in fighting for democracy and genuine federalism through practicing more inclusive political
approaches.
Divide and Rule Policies of Burmese Regime
Divide and rule policies are used for many purposes: for handling political and economic issues
and strengthening the state’s control over the public. For example, divide and rule policies are
obviously used in Burma by the military government so as to disunite the ethnic groups and
opposition groups so that it would be much easier for the regime to remain dominant over all
the aspects of the country and steer the polity at will.
Burma is made up of many different ethnic-groups. I will sketch out how the characteristics of
multi-ethnicity give the regime opportunities to practice divide and rule policies. An ethnic
group, a social group or category of the population, in a larger society, is set apart and bound
together by common ties of race, language, nationality, or culture. Ethnic diversity is one form
of the social complexity found in most contemporary societies. Burma is a very ethnically
diverse country, and such characteristics influence the political issues of the country. All of the
ethnic groups are uniquely different from one another, which is, in a way, a ground to set one
particular group apart from others. As they have diverse languages, cultures and literatures,
and live in geographically different places, their interests are not the same. Burma’s military
regime uses this diversity to implement divide and rule policies in a very effective way. For
example, the regime may give different favors to different ethnic groups, causing one group to
feel discriminated against by other groups, which have supposedly better favors from the
regime. As a result, there arises inequality and disunity among ethnic groups. These situations
create the perfect conditions for the military regime to remain unchallengeable.
The regime’s practice of divide and rule policies can be seen clearly in recent political reform
processes. Take the ceasefire attempts of the government as an example. There are many
armed groups such as the KNU, KIA, SSPP/SSA, and so on. In negotiations with these armed
groups, the government’s ‘peace delegate’ to the KIO said the government wishes to talk to
ethnic groups individually, refusing to talk to the groups together as an alliance. This is a clear
sign that the union government is insincere toward ethnic nationalities, and is practicing ‘divide
and rule’ policies towards the different ethnic groups.
President Thein Sein is also playing the divide and rule game. We can see such acts of the
president by observing his words about ethnic issues. He has said that each ethnic armed group
should go and deal with its respective local state government individually to reach agreements
for peace or ceasefires. Every ethnic political organization understands that the first step for
peace is a ceasefire. However, to discuss ceasefires only with state governments would be
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ineffective and pointless as the local governments have no power over the Burmese Army,
which is attacking ethnic armed groups.
The ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is clearly concerned about any
coordination between ethnic groups, even among ethnic political parties that contested the
2010 elections. Five ethnic political parties - the Chin National Party, All Mon Region Democracy
Party, Salon-sawor Democratic Party, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, and the Arakan
National Progressive Party - recently formed a ‘brotherhood of ethnic parties’, and demanded
the government set in motion a ‘peace dialogue’ with all ethnic armed groups. Following the
group’s statement, the parties received pressure from the government to resign from the
ethnic alliance. The members of parliament of the ethnic parties, who had been appointed as
ministers in state governments, were encouraged to tell their mother parties to quit the
‘brotherhood’1. This proves that the USDP is attempting to not only divide ethnic groups but
also to hinder their efforts to cooperate.
There is another kind of separatist consequence of the 2008 constitution, which is affecting the
six self-administered zones. Those newly formed self-administered zones are Palaung
(Namshan and Manton townships), Kokang (Konkyan and Laukkai townships), Pao (Hopong,
Hshihseng and Pinlaung townships), Danu (Ywangan and Pindaya townships), Wa selfadministrated division (Hopang, Mongmao, Panwai, Pangsang, Naphan and Metman townships)
and Naga (Leshi, Lahe and Namyun townships). While most of these ethnic groups demand
certain autonomy or the rights to administer their regions, granting such self-administrative
power only to those particular regions should be interpreted as nothing other than evidence of
separatist policies. Therefore, this too is an obvious example of divide and rule policies. As a
result of these kinds of self-administered zones, the rival interests of political parties and ethnic
minorities arise, which lead to ethnic conflicts.
The regime also deals with urban and rural areas unequally. We can clearly see that the
government is implementing suppressive policies in rural areas, most of which are home to
ethnic minorities. One obvious example of such suppressive acts is taking place in Shan state.
The Burmese Army has reactivated the “four cuts” policy since the ceasefire groups in Shan
state dismissed the Border Guard Force program. The “four cuts” policy involves:
(1) Cutting and blockading of communications between armed rebel groups;
(2) Embargo restricting people and consumer goods entering rebel territories;
1
Independent Mon News Agency, ‘’Ethnic groups must be cautions of UNDP Government’s new ‘Divide and Rule’
policies’’, accessed on August 26,2011.www.monnwes.org
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(3) Search for and destruction of core members responsible for supply, information,
funds and recruits; and
(4) Embargo on trade to reduce rebel revenue. The previous four cuts campaign
launched in 1996-98 was unsuccessful. It caused the displacement of more than 300,000
people in 1,500 villages in 11 townships in Shan State.
This kind of suppressive policy threw the people in these impacted areas into despair. The
victimized rural dwellers, mostly ethnic minorities, have to struggle for their survival while
people in the urban areas are seeking opportunities to strengthen their prosperity. Here, we
can see that urban and rural areas are treated so dissimilarly by the regime that they are as
different as black and white.
Obstacles to democratic Burma
Amid the reforms so far initiated, obstacles to democratization have also become more obvious
as reformists’ efforts are being attacked by hardliners. It has been made clearer what prevents
us from becoming a democratic country. Reforms will be analyzed to highlight what obstacles
we are facing regarding the ongoing democratization processes in Burma.
One of the major obstacles lies in the very core of newly formed parliamentary. Before the
2010 election, military officers took their uniforms off and put on the suits of the Union of
Solidarity and Development Party on in order to keep their positions as elected officials through
the fake election. This has resulted in a quasi-civilian government, which is composed of exmilitary officers, including the so-called reformist president Thein Sein. The government is not a
genuine civilian government. Therefore, the very existence of ex-military generals and their
partners in the parliament stands as an obstacle to achieving democracy in Burma. No one can
deny that some changes have taken places in Burma, but it remains questionable whether
these changes will result in the genuine reform that the public wants or broaden the
democratic practices of the government. These attempts at democratization are largely under
the control of ex-military officers who would rather escape punishment for their past abuses of
power than cede ground to reformists.
The weakness of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy, can also be
seen as a preventive factor for national unity in Burma. As the regime in power is exercising
divide and rule policies, disunity among opposition groups or democratic forces allows the
regime to grow. Thus, this kind of fragmentation among opposition groups is an obstacle to
Burma’s transition to democracy, as it prolongs the life of the regime.
The NLD is the strongest opposition party and is said to be leading the democratization process
in Burma. All opposition parties and ethnic armed groups have been fighting for real democracy
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in Burma as well as their own ethnic rights. In general, we are all riding in the same boat which
boards on a democratic bank and encompasses minorities’ interests, but the NLD seems to
concentrate only on democracy and neglects ethnic minorities’ interests. For instance,
regarding the ongoing civil war in Kachin state and sectarian conflict between the Arakan and
Rohingya, the NLD has only given speeches, issued statements and offered some humanitarian
aid to the affected areas, rather than offer hands-on participation. Based on this kind of
negligence regarding ethnic issues, ethnic minority groups have lost confidence in the NLD. This
situation makes an alliance among democratic forces, opposition groups and ethnic minorities
hard to achieve.
Ethnic leaders do not want to affiliate with the NLD because they think that their roles will
simply be lost if they do. Although most people admire Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, strong
nationalism undermines her role and prestige because she is a member of the Burmese ethnic
group which is has historically been the main enemy of the ethnic minorities. Therefore, it is
evident that disunity among ethnic minorities and the main political party, and lack of mutual
trust among them, are obstructive to the democratization process in Burma.
Poverty and lack of education also weaken the attempts to democratize the country. The
people of Burma have lived under the authoritarian regime for more than five decades. They
were living in darkness because people were provided no electricity, poor education, no access
to the Internet, no freedom of expression, no freedom of press, and insufficient employment.
They have been stricken with such poverty that they do not even know their rights. People have
been brainwashed by the ruthless government’s violent actions. They have been forced to
become accustomed to this system year by year. The education system has also deteriorated
since 1988. This worsens poverty by diminishing the peoples’ employability. Making the public
uneducated and extremely poor is one of the most effective suppressive tactics of the ruthless
military government.
Finally, the weak political participation of the public is also a factor that slows down
democratization in Burma. Because of the poor education system, the people lack knowledge of
politics which makes them fall prey to the military government. Furthermore, people become
uninterested in political issues and are even hostile to political activities because the
government has been prosecuting political activists very seriously. Witnessing the punishment
and torture of politicians has deterred the public from participating in the political process. As a
consequence, the role of civil society in the country’s changing political system has been
weakened, and the democratization processes are taking much longer than they should.
In short, the existence of hardliner ex-military generals in the core of parliament seeking to
protect themselves from reformists is the major obstacle for democratization in Burma. The
fact that the major opposition party, the National League for Democracy, ignores ethnic
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minority interests is also a factor that weakens democratic alliances in pressurizing the regime
to transform into a democratic government. In addition, the diverse political interests of
numerous ethnic groups causes many conflicts among the ethnic groups themselves and among
political parties. This has resulted in the instability of democratization processes and the
longevity of the regime’s divide and rule policies. Finally, poverty, poor education, public
hostility to politics, and weak civil society make the government undemocratic.
Road maps to reconciliation
In the transitional period, we have an example in the 2010 election of a political process which
was neither fair nor free. There was a lack of voter education and many people did not know
how to vote or participate. It is, in my opinion, extremely important to adequately prepare for
the upcoming 2015 election. The 2015 election will be the best opportunity for pro-democracy
forces to gain seats in the parliament. Therefore, I think we need to have a strategic plan in
place in order to bring about the best possible results for this election.
In order to make a strategic plan for a transition to democracy and national reconciliation,
negotiation between democratic forces, ethnic political parties and armed groups should be
undertaken as the first step in order to create common political ground. This is the most
challenging task for both ethnic minorities and opposition parties.
National reconciliation does not appear to be an easy task for Burma. However, there was an
occasion in which ethnic minorities and the Burmese ethnic majority reached an agreement.
Looking to history, the 1947 Panglong Conference was a milestone in the politics of Burma
because it was the very precondition by which Burma gained independence from the British
colonial government. I think this kind of negotiation would be a very effective way to bring
about another national reconciliation in contemporary Burma. In the 1947 conference, leaders
from ethnic minorities such as the Chin, Kachin, and Shan signed the Panglong agreement in
order to gain independence from British colonial rule. General Aung San and four ethnic leaders
agreed to sign, promising “right to exercise political authority of administrative, judiciary, and
legislative powers in their own autonomous national states and to preserve and protect their
languages, cultures, and religions in exchange for voluntarily joining the Burman in forming a
political union and giving their loyalty to a new state” (Silverstein in Lehman, 1981: 51).
Realizing the merit of the Panglong Agreement and implementing those policies could bring
about a genuine union in contemporary Burma.
The breaking of promises made in the Panglong Agreement greatly contributed to the
separation of the country into several parts and diminished the confidence of minorities in
Burmese politicians. Thus the best potential way to reconcile the country might be to revive the
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values of the Panglong Agreement and/or to initiate a Panglong-style conference, as Aung San
Suu Kyi has said.
In addition, we need to work on reconciliation within ethnic minorities in order to create a
common political stance. There is a high degree of diversity in Burma. For example, Burma is
made up of seven divisions and seven regions, five self-administered zones and one selfadministered division. Each state is rich in different natural resources. An abundance of jade
exists in Kachin state and Arakan state is rich in natural gas. Therefore, the different conditions
in ethnic regions require different policies. Nevertheless, all of the ethnicities have a similar
ambition, which is to have genuine federal democracy. This is the ground on which we can build
an alliance in democratizing the country. If democracy is perceived by all of the ethnic and
political parties as their chief political goal, reconciliation could be achieved. However, it is very
important for pro-democrats and federalists to educate the public in a more effective way than
they are doing now. A better understanding of nationalism and democracy should be conveyed
to the public to prepare for reconciliation.
In my point of view, religion also plays an essential role in Burmese politics. 80 percent of the
people are Buddhists, and the rest believe in Christianity, Hinduism and Islam. Therefore,
religious leaders can play influential roles in advocating a unified vision to ethnic leaders. For
instance, the Mon National Democratic Front (1990 winner party) and the All Mon Regions
Democracy Party (which won some seats in 2010 election) merged into one due to pressure
from their religious leaders. This shows that religion is an effective tool for unification in ethnic
and sub-ethnic groups. To present a unified democratic front, it is crucial to convince religious
leaders to lead their respective followers into such an alliance. This can be done by eliminating
tension among ethnic groups through religious teachings. Upon relaxation of tension among
ethnic groups and pro-democracy forces, conditions would be more suitable to achieving
national reconciliation.
However, equality should be carefully taken into account while negotiating with ethnic groups
since they are very much afraid of the ‘tyranny of majority’. Therefore, in the formation of any
alliance between ethnic groups and different political parties, each group should be
represented equally and combine only for their common goal.
The NLD should first conduct trust building work with ethnic minorities. Obviously, it should
continuously pressure the government to stop fighting in ethnic regions. Most people are
expecting the NLD to not only democratize the country but also to protect ethnic minorities’
rights. Therefore, the NLD should not act in a way that is solely focused on achieving democracy
and downplays ethnic minorities’ interests. To solve the political problems of Burma, it is
necessary to approach democratization and national reconciliation in a balanced way that
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promotes political stability. This approach will enhance the democratization process, and vice
versa.
Another important thing that the NLD should do is prepare for the 2015 election by attracting
the confidence of ethnic minorities. Though ethnic groups are suspicious of the NLD’s political
stance, most people realize that the NLD is the strongest opposition party in the country and
that they diligently fight for democracy. Here, the NLD should put more effort into dealing with
the interests of ethnic groups so that it can earn their confidence. If the NLD could gain the
confidence of diverse minorities, it is very likely that it will at least gain a good number of
parliamentary seats through 2015 election, if not defeat the USDP outright. The problems of
the country would be dealt with more democratically as a large number of NLD members take
positions in the parliament.
The ongoing transition to democracy generates a good condition for the ethnic groups and
opposition groups to be engaged in democratization processes, which necessitates them
building a strong alliance to enforce the reformists’ initiatives. Without mutual trust among
them, there will remain difficulties in democratizing the country as it struggles with the
hardliner stakeholders of the ruling fake civilian government.
Democracy education is crucial to laying the seeds of democracy because the processes of
democratization will be significantly accelerated if people are more exposed to knowledge of
democracy. The whole population of Burma should be well-informed about democracy and
democratic government. This also demands strong consciousness-raising activities for the
public. In my opinion, the concept and principle of democracy should be introduced in the
beginning of the school curriculum. This kind of democracy education initiative can make the
public understand what democracy is and how a democratic government work. If they know
about democracy, they will become more involved in political affairs and thus enhance the
democratization processes of the country.
Most importantly, I think it is a very good starting point for advocates of national reconciliation
to cooperate with the recently formed United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The UNFC,
an alliance of ethnic armed groups founded in early 2011, aims to protect minorities’ rights
against the threats posed by the government and military. As the UNFC’s core intention is to
accelerate the progress of federalizing the country in a way that prioritizes the interests of
diverse ethnic groups, multi-parties or multi-ethnic groups can begin the reconciliation process
by participating in the UNFC’s work.
Since the objective of the UNFC is to negotiate at the state level with the government, it is
appropriate for ethnic groups and opposition parties to encourage the implementation of the
UNFC’s plans. Though the UNFC should be praised for its work to effect positive changes in the
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country, it seems to have been formed in a rather random manner. It should come up with
more explicit approaches to its goals. For example, instead of only responding to the acts of the
government, it should initiate negotiations or dialogues with both non-minority groups and the
government. In my opinion, enhancing the workability of the UNFC and enforcing its
cooperative attempts will propel the processes of national reconciliation and democratization
in the country so as to fulfill popular desire for genuine federal democracy in Burma.
Last but not least, I think that better participation of women in Burma’s political affairs is
needed in order for negotiators to be better equipped in solving political problems. To me,
weak engagement of women in politics leads to weak negotiating abilities. According to IDEA2,
“women should be included around the negotiating table because their experiences, values and
priorities, as women, can bring a perspective that can help find a solution to the conflict.”
Therefore, I think that we should try to create a political approach which is more inclusive,
giving equal opportunities to minority groups and women. Balanced participation of different
political activists and different genders will be a valuable instrument in the transition to
democracy and national reconciliation in Burma.
Conclusion
It is obvious that disunity among opposition parties and ethnic groups has been one of the
major factors that enhances the effectiveness of the military regime’s divide and rule policies in
Burma’s politics. The NLD’s inability to embrace ethnic groups in its democratizing processes
and sole focus on tackling the regime make it easier for the regime to enact its separatist
policies. Furthermore, the NLD’s emphasis on dealing with the military regime erodes
minorities’ confidence in the NLD because all the ethnic groups feel that they are oppressed by
Burmese military. This gap between the NLD and ethnic groups is the place where divide and
rule policies are implemented.
Ethnic groups’ strong desire to be independent from Burmese influence enhances the divisions
among opposition forces. This is the consequence of long lasting suppression by the military
government, which has imprinted a strong hatred in the mind of ethnic people. For example, as
the government intensifies fighting against ethnic armed groups, the hostility of ethnic groups
toward the Burmese government becomes so great that they come to hate the Burmese
ethnicity. The consequence of this is the obvious growth of separatist spirit in the minds of
ethnic minorities, which in turn provides the perfect conditions for the divide and rules policies
of the regime. The NLD should recognize the ethnic groups’ deeply imprinted hatred as one of
2
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 1998.
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the largest obstacles in the democratization and national reconciliation processes. On the other
hand, the ethnic groups should try to realize the nature of genuine federalism instead of trying
to reach political goals, which are largely derived from their hatred of the military regime.
To create democracy and genuine federalism in the country, opposition parties and ethnic
groups should have a clear plan for long term political processes. Unification should be
implemented through a binding law which will encourage coalition and cooperation among
different parties. Women and minorities should also be given equal opportunities to participate
in the political affairs of the country, both to protect their rights and to express their political
stances. These kinds of inclusive political approaches would be instrumental in democratizing
the country and for building unification among diverse groups.
Upon understanding these aspects of Burmese politics, it becomes evident that the non-ethnicbased political parties - especially the NLD - and ethnic groups have to build a strong
mechanism of cooperation between them. Finally, each political party and ethnic group should
realize that peace and reconciliation can be achieved only through negotiation with so-called
enemy parties or opponent parties. As the famous leader of South Africa, Nelson Mandela said,
“You don’t make peace by talking to your friends; you have to make peace with your enemies.”
Pro-democracy groups and ethnic groups in Burma should initiate dialogues with their
opponents.
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