Course title: Ethics
Instructor: Simon Rippon
Number of credits: 2
Semester: Winter, 2012-13
Time and location: M 15:30-17:10, Room 411
Course status: Mandatory for two-year MA students in the first year
Description
This course is an introduction to ethics and metaethics. It will introduce the main
metaethical views and the main normative ethical theories. A normative ethical theory is a
first-order theory about how we should determine the answers to substantive ethical
questions, such as: What should I do? What kind of person should I be? We will discuss
three main types of normative ethical theory: consequentialism, deontology and virtue
ethics. A metaethical view is a view about the metaphysics and epistemology of morality. We
will discuss realist and anti-realist metaethical views.
Course Goals
The main objectives will be for students to learn about the differences between the main
approaches to normative ethical theory and metaethics, and to improve their skills of
philosophical reasoning and writing.
Learning outcomes
By the end of the course, students will be able to:
 demonstrate a clear understanding of the nature of consequentialist, deontological
and virtue theoretic approaches to normative ethical theory
 explain the strengths and weaknesses of different positions in metaethics
 analyze and charitably reconstruct ethical arguments from readings, and summarise
them clearly and succinctly
 perform their own evaluation and critique of the validity and soundness of
arguments, both orally and in writing
Weekly schedule
Week
1
Topic
Moral Error Theory
Readings (M=Mandatory; R=Recommended)
M: J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New
York: Penguin, 1977), chap. 1, “The Subjectivity of Values.”
R: Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better
Believe It,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25, no. 2 (1996):
87–139.
2
Moral Reasons and
Motivation
M: Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–113.
R: Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical
Imperatives,” The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (July
1972): 305–316.
Christine M. Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical
Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 1 (January
1986): 5–25.
3
Moral Relativism
M: Gilbert Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended,” The
Philosophical Review 84, no. 1 (January 1975): 3–22.
R: Bernard Williams, “The Truth in Relativism,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75, New Series
(1974-75): 215–228.
4
Contractarianism
M: David P. Gauthier, “Morality and Advantage,” The
Philosophical Review 76, no. 4 (October 1, 1967): 460–475.
R: Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, chap. 5.
5
Sentimentalism
M: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, book II, part
3, section iii; book III, part 1, sections i-ii; Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals, section ix, part 2.
R: John McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in
Mind, Value, and Reality (Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Mass, 1998), 131–149.
6
7
Non-Cognitivism
Utilitarianism
M: Charles Leslie Stevenson, “The Emotive Meaning of
Ethical Terms,” Mind 46, no. 181 (January 1, 1937): 14–31.
R: Simon Blackburn, “How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist,” in
Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 166–181.
M: Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the principles of
morals and legislation, chs. 1-4.
R: Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (April 1, 1972): 229–
243.
8
Rule Consequentialism
M: Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A RuleConsequentialist Theory of Morality (Oxford University
Press, 2003), 1–30, 93–102.
R: James Lenman, “Consequentialism and Cluelessness,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, no. 4 (Autumn 2000):
342–370.
2
9
Deontology and AgentRelative Reasons
M: Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. IX.
R: Amartya Sen, “Rights and Agency,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 11, no. 1 (Winter 1982): 3–39.
10
Deontology: Kant
M: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals, trans. Mary J Gregor, sec. I.
R: Christine M. Korsgaard, “Kant’s Analysis of Obligation:
The Argument of Groundwork I,” in Creating the Kingdom
of Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 43–
76.
11
Contractualism
M: T.M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in
Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard
Arthur Owen Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), 103–128.
R: Michael Otsuka, “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the
Claims of Individuals,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, no. 2
(2006): 109–135.
12
Virtue Theory
M: Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and Abortion,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 3 (Summer 1991):
223–246.
R: Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy
79, no. 8 (1982): 419–439.
Requirements
Regular attendance, carefully completing the assigned readings before class, and active
participation in discussions will be expected.
In addition, there will be the following assignments, for which questions will be provided:
1) Two 2-page informal position papers during the term
2) For one-year MA students only: 2,500 word (maximum) final paper
Assessment
For two-year MA students: in-class written examination as part of the Theoretical
Philosophy Final Examination at the end of the first year.
For one-year MA students: 20% participation; 20% position papers; 60% final paper
3