Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral
theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However,
there is one leading moral theory — consequentialism — which is confronted by a
demandingness problem. The demands the theory makes on us are so great (or so the
argument runs) that consequentialism must be rejected. It simply requires too much of us. Its
dictate that we should do what produces the best results as judged from an impartial
perspective would require, to take one example, foregoing most, if not all, non-moral
personal projects and devoting one’s life almost exclusively to alleviating the suffering of
those in need. We can call this the Demandingness Objection (“Objection”) to
consequentialism.
The core idea of my project is to direct attention to the ability of institutions to reduce moral
demands on individuals. Accordingly, I call my view institutional consequentialism.
Institutional consequentialism fits the larger, on-going and historical, and typically nonconsequentialist concern with the role of institutions in making morality ‘liveable’ for
individuals. It also follows the historically influential consequentialist preoccupation with
institutional design and policy (most recently Bailey 1997; Goodin 1995; Hardin 1988).
However, it departs from both traditions in crucial aspects: it is consequentialist (contrary to
the first) and its primary aim is to defuse the Objection (contrary to the second).
Furthermore, in yet another twist on the consequentialist tradition, the project builds on one
of the influential ideas of an avowedly non-consequentialist thinker: John Rawls (1971) (later
worked out in more detail by Nagel 1991). Adapting Rawls’s point about social justice to
consequentialist morality, I hold that a division of labour is justifiable: the demanding
consequentialist principle of beneficence regulates the design of a basic institutional
structure, whereas individuals ‘only’ have the duty to set up and maintain these institutions.
This idea helps to tackle the Objection since, arguably, even in our present world, setting up
and maintaining consequentialist institutions would be not nearly as demanding as
applying the principles ourselves.
The project works out this idea by facing several challenges. First, I set out to answer certain
pressing theoretical questions without which the project cannot get off the ground: can this
institutional division of labour be justified and can it be squared with the doctrine of
consequentialism? Second, I work out the best version of institutional consequentialism.
Here the most pressing question is whether rules should be incorporated in institutional
consequentialism and in what way. Third, I extend the so-constructed theory to the global
sphere. Our global problems - what justice, peace, or the environment would require on the
global scale – are extremely demanding and raise questions of their own: Do relevant global
institutions exist? Do we need them to exist? Can we create them if they don’t exist? Finally,
fourth, the project connects to the newest research in economics and political science to
answer the question: what institutional set-up are we looking for and how demanding
would it be to set up and maintain these institutions?
During my fellowship tenure I plan to occupy myself with tackling the first challenge. This
has two parts. First, Murphy (1998) has argued that demandingness considerations will not
give us what he calls dualism: the Rawlsian idea that different principles apply to institutions
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and to individuals. And, the thought is, we need dualism to substantiate the present
response to the Objection. Second, consequentialism, unlike, for instance, the Rawlsian
system appears to be a monist theory in Murphy’s sense: the same principle of beneficence
applies to individuals as to institutions. If so, the dualist solution is unavailable within the
confines of a consequentialist framework, regardless of our answer to Murphy’s problem.
In response to the first charge, I argue that one can keep dualism as the answer to the
Objection without going along with the stronger idea that it is the Objection itself that
necessitates our endorsement of dualism. I show, building on Miklós (2013), that there are
good reasons in favour of dualism that are not discussed by Murphy. Once these reasons are
on the table, one can hold that we should endorse dualism for these reasons and this will
still give us a response to the Objection as a side effect of the division of labour that dualism
secures for us.
In response to the second objection, I argue, building on the work of Scheffler (2005), that we
should introduce a distinction between two kinds of division of labour. The first, a division
of moral labour, is indeed one that consequentialism cannot appeal to since the division and
the resulting dualism are grounded in a pluralism of values that consequentialism does not
endorse. The second, an institutional division of labour, on the other hand, is something
consequentialism can endorse. The grounds for this endorsement range from
epistemological to moral considerations and I argue that consequentialism has no problem
appealing to them.
This is an interdisciplinary project that mixes traditional analytical philosophical
methodology with the empirical methods of the social sciences to achieve its main
objectives. However, in its first phase which funding is presently applied for, my
investigation is purely philosophical. In this phase I expect the project to produce two peerreviewed, high-quality journal publications thereby laying the ground for a further bid to
take the wider project forward to monograph stage.
References
Bailey, J. W. (1997), Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice, New York: Oxford University
Press
Goodin, R. (1995), Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press
Hardin, R. (1988), Morality Within the Limits of Reason, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago
Press
Miklós, A. (2013), Institutions in Global Distributive Justice, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press
Murphy, L. D. (1998), ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
27 (4): 251-291
Nagel, T. (1991), Equality and Partiality, New York: Oxford University Press
Portmore, D. (2011), Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, New
York: Oxford University Press
Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Scheffler, S. (2005), ‘The Division of Moral Labour: Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral
Pluralism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 79: 229-253
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