“NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC
DOCTRINE THAT ISN’T”
Presentation for Dept. of Politics & Public Administration,
University of Limerick 2011,
March 23rd, 2011.
Dr. Brendan Flynn
School of Political Science & Sociology,
Árus Moyola, NUI, Galway.
Galway City
Tel: +353 (0)91 493160
E: brendan.flynn@nuigalway.ie
School of Political Science & Sociology
This presentation as .ppt file can be
downloaded from my academic blog
http://brendanflynn.wordpress.com
Structure
I. Introduction.
II. Theoretical Reflection.
III. Background to NATO’s new strategic doctrine-why a strategic concept now?
IV. The recommendations of the Report of Experts
IIIa. Rethinking Article 5?
IIIb. And end to NATO unanimity decision-making?
IIIc. The nuclear question.
IIId. Co-operation with the EU: plus Berlin plus?
V. Implications for neutral states?
VI. Conclusions
At the Lisbon Summit on 19th November 2010 NATO formally
adopted a ‘New Strategic Concept’.
The full text of the document can be found here:
http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf
This relatively short document draws an much more detailed and
discursive “Report of Experts” from April 2010. The actual
strategy statement is Spartan and not very revealing of the wider
debates.....
BOTH documents should be read together...they reflect a debate
as such and rarely provide hard and fast new institutional
rules....where there are some divergences I will highlight it.
I. Introduction: a key question?
NATO: building something new.....or more of the same?
Photograph of a sign showing an artist's impression of the new NATO HQ, in front of the site in Haren, Brussels, where it will be built. Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NewNatoHQconstructionSite.jpg
II. Theoretical Reflection
Why bother study IR or security “doctrine” ‘soft’ data of documents-better to
study/explain ‘hard’ actions!
My approach here fits within a conventional ‘Social Constructionist’ account of
Security Studies-following Wendt/Ruggie which stresses the importance of
ideas in security policy and actors identities and perceptions....also the
normative implications of security doctrines......alongside an
acknowledgement of the importance of the state as a primary security actor,
territory/geography and other ‘hard’ variables in shaping security problems....
Studying NATO new security concept does not allow us to explain or predict
how NATO will evolve...but it reveals important divisions and issues within
the Alliance....and it can suggest changes in the doctrinal ‘software’ that rest
upon the institutional ‘hardware’.....this doctrine can itself be important and
criticized....not trivial....
Arguments offered:
Likely to be ‘more of the same’.....more ‘out of area’...BUT
‘out of area’ operations risk putting NATO ‘out of focus’...ignores Afghanistan
debacle....how does NATO extricate itself?
New Doctrine and Report of Experts is a relatively conservative
document....could have been more radical.....more specific.....etc.
The doctrine is not strategic but rather a diplomatic exercise in reassurance.
In particular it has little specific detail on how to ‘manage’ and deter Russia, postGeorgian War 2008.
Reflects thinking on war which arguably exaggerates unconventional threats and
places uncritical faith in ‘military transformation’ agendas (4th generation
warfare. etc.)
Implications for partnership with EU, and therefore EU neutrals, somewhat
unclear...except ‘more’ links are promised.....this is challenging given the
Afghan debacle.....will Afghanistan be dumped on the EU under the guise of
‘partnership’?
For much of the 1990s NATO had the mantra: “Out of area, OR out
of business”
BUT
For the last decade NATO’s out of area drift (in Afghanistan) now
risks slowly putting the Alliance “out of business”
Strategic concept does NOT address this.....
III. Background-why now a strategic concept?
60th anniversary ‘mood’?-Post Bush reconciliation?-Taking stock of
post-2001 security-Post Georgia 2008 crisis-alliance strains over
Afghan mission-new leaders-new opportunities?
IV. The Report of Experts-signposting the
doctrine or cooking it up?
“We have an open but fleeting moment to forge a more effective Atlantic partnership. We must
seize it now. European and North American allies have allowed their relations to become
discordant, yet the times demand vigor and unity. Courageous decisions need to breathe
new life and relevance into the Atlantic partnership, which must be recast to tackle a diverse
range of serious challenges at home and abroad.”
Hamilton, Daniel (2009) Alliance Reborn An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century The Washington NATO Project. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494624&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
(L to R) Madeline Albright (Chair), Tomas Valasek (Centre for European Reform),
Hans Binnendijk (National Defence University, USA), General Rupert Smith (ex
BA).....etc....
An Atlanticist bias....?
From the Report of Experts
“NATO states cannot allow twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils
could not: divide their leaders and weaken their collective resolve. Thus the
new Strategic Concept must clarify both what NATO should be doing for each
Ally and what each Ally should be doing for NATO.” p.6
BUT what divides NATO today is conflict over what its supposed to do...and how to do it...the
Bush era was very divisive.....does this Strategy heal the alliance?
“Alliance members remain concerned about the possibility that regional disputes
or efforts at political intimidation could undermine security along its borders.
However, NATO must also cope with hazards of a more volatile and less
predictable nature-including acts of terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and
other advanced weapons technologies, cyber attacks....the sabotage of energy
pipelines, and the disruption of critical maritime supply routes. Often, an
effective defence against these unconventional security threats must begin well
beyond the territory of the Alliance.” p.7
BUT are the unconventional threats really as serious the old fashioned ones (Russia),
especially given Georgia (2008)?
“NATO is a regional, not a global organisation”, p.9
BUT at times the reports makes it seem as if NATO needs to become primarily a global
player....
Report of Experts suggests NATO’s ‘to do list’:
Consolidate old fashioned collective defence of the territory of the 28 members.....
Protecting against new unconventional threats (terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, cyber warfare, etc.)
Continuing out of area operations as essential to both traditional defence and
unconventional risks...
Transforming NATO militaries for greater ‘expeditionary’ potential for both
collective defence and ‘out of area’
Stabilising Afghanistan (before quitting?)
Better security consultations within NATO
Better ‘partnerships’ of need and value between NATO and the EU, UN, OSCE,
etc.
Being flexible about whether NATO leads or ‘enables’ missions with ‘others’.
Engaging with Russia
Keeping an open door on membership for Ukraine, Georgia, Balkan states?
NATO to remain nuclear armed , and keep existing weapons in place whilst
beginning dialogue with Russia on reductions.
Ensuring that NATO can make internal decisions without vetoes.
Engaging with public opinion to ‘tell NATO’s story’. (p.8-12)
Media response to the new strategy-lukewarm
The Economist (Nov. 11th, 2010)
“The new strategic concept itself should be easy to agree to. It is a sensible document..... The five principles
drawn up by Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn
earlier this year (2010) appear to have been accepted for now. These are that NATO remains a nuclear
alliance; as a nuclear alliance, member states share risks and responsibilities; NATO should reduce the role
and number of nuclear weapons; the allies should pursue territorial missile defence; and NATO should draw
up plans for future arms-control talks with the Russians. The nuclear issue, however, will not go away.”
http://www.economist.com/node/17460712?story_id=17460712
New York Times
“As NATO adopts a new Strategic Concept, it should also set out a NATO-Russia Strategic
Concept- a new strategy for NATO-Russia relations. This should set the goal of bringing
Russia closer to NATO (though not yet into NATO) through enhanced confidence-building
mechanisms, improved joint decision-making and expanded areas of practical cooperation.”
Antonenko, O. And I. Yurgens, Nov. 18th, 2010
Financial Times (Nov. 17th 2008)
“As well as finalising the alliance’s new strategic concept, they will discuss relations with Russia, as well as
progress in Afghanistan. As important, however, is a topic that is not on the agenda. Fiscal retrenchment will
severely constrain European defence spending over the next decade, leaving the US to bear a growing
share of the alliance’s burden...the thaw in relations with Russia should not be an excuse for Nato’s
members to scale back their military spending. Russia may currently be keen on detente. But it is not clear
whether this will remain the case after the presidential election in 2012. Even if Russia proves a more
benign neighbour, Nato members cannot afford to drop their guard.”
In practice much media attention went towards the presence of Russian
President Medvedev at the summit.... suggesting a ‘re-set’...but in fact
not really clear......
Kulhanek (2011) argues that we should not over state the significance of the so-called ‘re-set’.....NATO its
ignoring Russia pet alliance the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).....”Russia’s strategic
anxiety is unlikely to have been alleviated by the reported progress at Lisbon...Moscow will not abandon
what it sees as its share of Europe’s balance of power, particularly as the issue of NATO military presence
near its borders remains unresolved...the question of the European missile defence system, however, ...is
likely to become the most contentious and potentially the most damaging issue...so far it seems that the
self-congratulation and mutual praise of the Lisbon summit has clouded the fact that surprisingly little has
been substantively resolved between NATO and Russia.”
See: Kulhanek, Jakub ‘Russia’s Uncertain Rapproachment with NATO’, RUSI Journal, Vol.156, No.1, pp.40-45.
The Group of Experts Report downplays conventional
war...and talks up unconventional threats....
“the likelihood of military conflict-whether international or civil is relatively low” p.15
YET.....
‘the Allies must pursue the goal of cooperation [with Russia] while also guarding
against the possibility that Russia could decide to move in a more adversarial
direction’, p.16.
Then go on to cite Iran and North Korea as serious concerns.....
This thinking is muddled. It privileges what is most probable to happen over what
would be most serious or substantive as a threat, even if less likely to happen.
The major threat of significance (but also remote) to the NATO members
remains arguably Russia. The conflict in Georgia should have been a wake-up
call. It could easily continue. Note also ongoing internal problems in Moldova
(with ethnic Russian enclave) and Kosovo.....also internal ethnic Russian
tension within Estonia/Latvia....
How can NATO engage with Russia on its ‘near abroad’....and how can the
Russians be deterred?
If Georgia was a full NATO member would this have (a) prevented Russian
aggression, or (b) not prevented the conflict, but actually, made it much more
serious....a limited NATO Russian war is possible.........?
“the pattern of great power struggles for primacy is far from over. What
matters is the need to avoid being over-impressed by the more active
conflicts of the moment, conflicts which, admittedly, are overwhelmingly
of an irregular character. There will be much terrorism and insurgency to
blight the future, especially the near term future. But the mischief
promoted by irregular conflict pales into near insignificance when
compared with the potential for harm that resides in great power
antagonism”.
p.383 Gray, Colin. S. (2005) Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London:
Phoneix.
POSSIBLE CONFLICTS WITHIN/NEAR EUROPE INVOLVING RUSSIA
IVa. Rethinking Article 5:
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right
of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.Any such
armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security .
The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949: Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
Report of experts advise that this be broadened to include non-armed attacks, such
as Cyber attacks (Estonia, 2008) and that it include attacks that occur outside
Europe/North America......but against NATO forces/citizens, or economic
interests? In the end the actual Strategic Concept simply restates Article 5 but
places it alongside of a discussion on ‘crisis management’ and novel
threats...beyond NATO borders.....
How wise& how workable?
Obvious risk here is that a broadening of Article 5 ‘guarantee’ will dilute it...and
reduce its effectiveness.....currently its a flexible ‘firewall’ or threshold...would
lowering that threshold merely be an invitation to test NATO? A recipe for overreach by NATO who can and will be easily now provoked anywhere in the
globe....and not even by an armed attack?
IVb An end to unanimity?
From the Report of Experts...quotes 2009 proposals
by Secretary General...which would....’
“preserve the consensus rule for the most important decisions such as
those involving Article 5 commitments, budgets, new missions, or new
members....[but would allow]...’means on less vital questions for Allies
to register concerns short of a veto...and establish the principle that the
implementation of decisions arrived at by consensus should not be
delayed by efforts to review those decisions at lower levels before they
are carried out’. p.35
The Secretary-General or NATO military leaders might also
have “pre-delegated authorities, based on agreed rules-ofengagement, to respond in an emergency situation such as a missile or
cyber attack.” (Ibid.)
This means some kind of shift to either simple or qualified
majority voting...like the EU....BUT must be agreed by all!
Consensus based de facto Vetoes are not a remote academic concern....have been used
by France, Germany, Belgium, and Turkey in 2003 over military cover for Turkey during
invasion of Iraq and Macedonian peace-keeping mission .....where EU took over from
NATO...operation Concordia
In fact this proposal is (a) not unproblematic to implement and (b) is as
likely to reinforce existing divisions than heal them.....because (c) it
may quickly mutate into ‘coalitions of the willing’.....
See: Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer (2009) ‘Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of
strategic change’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No.2, pp.211-226.
IVc. NATO is divided over ‘legacy’ tactical
nukes.....
Germans, etc., want them gone, other states want them to stay, US wants them to probably stay
and links their removal to Russian concessions...
General Roger Brady, USAFE Commander, is shown B61 nuclear weapon disarming procedures on a “dummy” in an underground Weapons Security
and Storage System (WS3) vault at Volkel Air Base, Holland, on June 11, 2008. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:703MUNSS061108.jpg
Report of experts tartly states the American line:
“Under current security conditions, the retention of some U.S forward-deployed systems on European soil
reinforces the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defence”, p.43.
However the Final draft of the Strategic Concept states at pt.26
“In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its
nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.
Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian of short range nuclear
weapons”.
This links possible removal of US ‘legacy’ tactical nukes to Russian moves on an estimated 2,000+
weapons.....some sort of minimal concession....
NOTE a recent reworking of Russian nuclear weapons doctrine in 2010 which is arguably modest and
somewhat reassuring:
“Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of
mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in a case of an aggression against her with
conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.”
NOTE: France remains aloof from the Nuclear Planning Group within NATO although it has rejoined the
Military Command Structure.....France was also reportedly ‘difficult’ on the Nuclear question in the run
up to Lisbon....
See: http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/02/new_russian_military_doctrine.shtml
and for full text (in a poor translation perhaps) see: http://scisec.net/?p=231
IVd Plus Berlin Plus...closer NATO co-operation
with the EU?
Partnerships are seen as multiple…formal/informal…within
PfP…partnership with UN…..Nato-Russia Council
On the EU: ‘detailed mechanisms for co-operation, these have not
always worked as well as hoped’…a reference to Berlin Plus assets
sharing agreement…but note policy of NATO ‘first refusal’
remains…this is problematic for EU….and perhaps a clearer division
of labour could have been offered?
Speaks of the need for ‘full complementarity’….’the EU will often have
more relevant expertise than NATO in countering non-military
threats’….but there is recognition that the Lisbon Treaty raises the
ambition of the EU to achieve a defence policy and capabilities……
Report of Experts states that ‘full complementarity is only possible if non-EU
NATO members and non-NATO EU members are accorded the same
degree of transparency and involvement when joint activities are
conducted’…….this implies Swedes/Finns/Irish should/could be allowed
participate more in NATO operations/decisions….and vice versa that
Turkish, Norwegians, Albanians could be participants in EU
operations/decisions…..note difficult ‘Cyprus’.....
BUT ….already happens…Nordic Battlegroup is a good example…combines
neutral Sweden, Finland, Ireland with NATO members Norway and
Estonia…..and EU mission in Darfur included non-EU member states
as participants…….
NOT CLEAR WHAT IS TO BE DIFFERENT ABOUT SUCH
PARTNERSHIP…except greater frequency/intensity…..
‘NATO should seek to agree with EU leaders on a plan for regular joint
participation in meetings, fuller communication between military
staffs, and more extensive coordination with respect to crisis
management, threat assessments, and sharing assets’, p.24.
In October 2010 an Irish Reconnaissance Unit of 100 troops was tested for readiness for service with the Nordic
Battle Group. See: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Organisation/Nordic-Battlegroup/News/IrishEvaluation/...and below neutral Swedish, Finnish and NATO Norwegian troops together within the NBG.
Source: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00060/Tre-presseoffTK_1352_60291a.jpg
In fact the obvious political question is whether NATO want or expect the
EU to replace them in Afghanistan…as indeed was done in Bosnia,
Macedonia and Kosovo…..
Moreover, given decisions by Dutch to withdraw in 2010, Canadians to
withdraw 2011, and British, Polish and even American troops to begin
drawing down troops levels thereafter (2014 is the exit date)……the
pressure is really on ISAF and those remaining….notably
Germany…..the Germans….may in a few years attempt to switch the
mission to a smaller EU operation focused on training/humanitarian
aid…..there is currently only a small EU police training mission…….
This could massively test EU capabilities and political consensus…..given
level of conflict in Afghanistan….
There is also a brief suggestion for the establishment of a NATO/EU
defence capabilities agency…….
In fact EDA-NATO cooperation is not that new.....EDA are seeking to “develop
Staff to Staff contacts...to ensure the appropriate level of transparency and complementary between EDA
and NATO on improving the availability of helicopters, within the framework provided by the EU-NATO
Capability Group.”
See: http://www.eda.europa.eu/EDAVacancies/Notice.aspx?IDVano=167
This EU-NATO capabilities group was established in May 2003...and its job is to ensure no duplication nor
excessive ‘double hatting’ in procurement and allocation of resources (such as helicopters).....not clear what
moving it to ‘Agency’ status will mean....see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm
“We must stop wasting valuable money and effort by duplicating our
capabilities and development programmes. Forces are national, and
the EU and NATO have exactly the same needs”,
speech by NATO -ex-Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, July 2008 (see: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID27900518-FFEEBFEC/natolive/opinions_7879.htm?selectedLocale=en)
BUT....Darfur showed up serious weakness in willingness/ability of EU
and NATO states to provide non-combat helicopters.......see
http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/helicopters, and
see also Pop, Valentina (2008) ‘NATO and EU to pool helicopters and air
carriers’, October 2nd, at http://euobserver.com/9/26843
Partners, Competitors, Alternatives?
The idea of partnership with the EU….seems
reasonable…..but should the relationship be more
a functional division of labour (soft/hard
security…more civilian/military)…and is there
merit in institutional competition/redundancy…EU
defence identity emerged in part as a hedge
against US unwillingness to commit ground troops
in Yugoslavia (1993-1995)….and further threats of
US divergent interests….that logic remains valid
today….
V. Implications for Neutral States
The debate about whether to join NATO outright or remain neutral has become
less relevant because as NATO becomes more ‘partnered’ and
‘flexible’….neutral states can work with NATO and operationally deploy in
practice…..the only thing they don’t get is the Article 5 guarantee but this is
likely to be made more flexible anyhow to cover areas beyond the 28 formal
member states……and not even armed attacks…..
Centre-Right governments in Finland and especially Sweden have
pursued greater co-operation on security matters with EU and
NATO….it is possible Sweden may formally drop
neutrality….however, crucially, opposition Social Democrats in both
countries remain wedded to some version of flexible neutrality and
do not support formal membership of NATO. This suggests
continuities alongside evolutionary ‘partnering’ through the
EU/NATO. Yet, if BOTH of these states were to formally join NATO
outright…..this would isolate Ireland’s position….however, why
should they join outright? They can instead co-operate. What might
make them join formally would be some kind of Russian
‘aggression’….
European post-neutrals are quite a puzzle...
“the resilience of military non-alliance in both these countries (Finland and Sweden)...has to do
with the persistence of a strategic feedback mechanism. In Finland, military non-alliance,
substantiated with a credible national defence, is still the least bad option to protecting its
territorial integrity to Russia. In Sweden, the wish to maintain national autonomy towards the
United States prevails”...‘Finland’s outspoken readiness towards future NATO membership
is primarily a signal to the Eastern neighbour: should Russia turn capricious or even hostile,
Finland will not hesitate to seek further security guarantees through a military alliance’ (but
perhaps an EU one NOT NATO?) (p.378)
Moller, Ulrika and Ulf Bjereld (2010) ‘From Nordic Neutrals to post-neutral Europeans:
Differences in Finnish and Swedish policy transformation’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 45,
No.4, pp.363-386
I would add here....
Importance of normative security discourses of key Social Democratic Parties
Continued Nationalism in the face of Globalization
The ambiguity of EU and NATO shifts.....which on the one hand demand a response but on the
other hand prolong the benefts of ‘ambiguous neutrality’
They are becoming Irish in their neutrality...”we are all ambiguously neutral now!”
‘As you know we have already been involved in NATO led crisis
management operations as a result of cooperation that exists
between the EU and NATO in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Afghanistan…so
it is important to point out that relationships between these
organisations have to be considered but there’s no one questioning
our particular position in relation to our domestic policy.’
Taoiseach Brian Cowen, Galway September 14th, 2010.
‘And we have a range of opt-outs and legal guarantees that copper
fasten our position, so I don’t see any danger in this’.
Foreign Minister Micheál Martin, Galway September 14th, 2010.
From: de Bréadún, Deaglán and Arthur Beesley (2010) ‘EU-NATO ties will not affect Irish Neutrality, says Cowen’, The
Irish Times, Tuesday September 14th.
Closer and systematic partnership between NATO and EU may however
create ‘contagion risks’ as regards public support for overseas peace
missions…..especially if NATO ‘pass the parcel’ of Afghanistan/ISAF to
EU…..this suggests for neutral states it is rational to keep a distinctive EU
security identity/profile viable…..
NATO states have seen dropping support for their Afghanistan mission and
overall a drop in support for NATO…..would such a mission also undermine
support for EU peace-keeping?
For Ireland in particular participation in any Afghanistan mission would be
challenging and likely unpopular……
Operationally it would be feasible at the level of our commitment to the
Nordic Battlegroup (operational from January 2011)……above this
level it would be riskier and as costly as the Darfur operation……
Any such mission may well have a UN mandate but would be closer to
the ‘peace-enforcement’ end of the Petersberg tasks….
Existing Irish Defence doctrine is minimalist on
co-operation with EU and NATO:
“Participation in peace support activities by Ireland in the European domain will take
place in the context of the Petersberg Tasks and when authorised by the UN.”
Participation in PfP does not involve membership of NATO and will not bring
Ireland into any form of alliance involving mutual defence commitments. It does
not constitute or imply any undertaking or intention to become a member of
NATO at any time in the future. Participation in PfP does not affect Ireland's
long-standing policy of military neutrality nor is PfP in conflict with our traditional
support for UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, it will enhance our capacity to
contribute to such operations.” Irish Defence White Paper (February 2000). p.67
See:http://www.defence.ie/website.nsf/fba727373c93a4f080256c53004d976e/93191a155924dad5802570c8005065d3/$FILE/whiteppr.p
df
Ireland will have a new Defence Whitepaper for
the period 2011-2020.
http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/Speech+ID/EC201FB306D8D6168025776600590780?OpenDocument
Issue of joining NATO or EU alliance is constitutionally impossible with
referendum changeIreland has formally firmed up her neutrality as a result of Nice/Lisbon
referendums……but in fact….this may be less relevant if EU/NATO
partnership becomes more routine…….casual...incestuous.....?
Key issues for Ireland may be the debate about whether a UN mandate
should remain necessary for overseas missions…whether EU or NATO
brokered….(Fine Gael currently appear to favour abandoning this, see Fitzgerald, Mary (2010) ‘Fine Gael want
review of ‘triple lock’ troop deployment system, Irish Times, Sept 4th.)
Another key focus should be the nature of such missions….are they high
intensity ‘peace-enforcement’….if so is that appropriate…..
Should we express some limits on partnership with NATO through EU
security policy….?
How will we respond as other neutrals become perhaps closer/routine
NATO partners…..?
If EU chooses to move towards formal defence alliance we cannot
constitutionally participate….is it not in our interest for EU to remain
distinct from NATO….and leave NATO to lead on military defence?
VI. Conclusions
The Report of Experts/Strategic Concept is a mixed bag..not very
strategic…does not heal NATO..a divided alliance….with less focus
than ever….
However rumours of NATO’s demise are overstated….many reasons why
states want it to remain the predominant security institution for
Europeans…..
Implications for neutrals are not clear…but does closer co-operation with
NATO erode neutrality…or in fact pragmatically side-step the issue…?
NATO strategic debate reflects recent academic thinking on
security/war….whose consequences may be profound….However, a
shift away from ‘war between states’ may be both misguided and
controversial
ENDS