“But China obscures” you say.
I reply. “China obscures but
there is clearness to be found;
look for it”
Pascal, Pensees
CHINA’S EMERGING SUPER
POWER STATUS IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
INTRODUCTION
INDIA AND CHINA
INDIANS DO NOT HAVE A
STRATEGIC CULTURE AND DO
NOT THINK STRATEGICALLY.
REPORT BY RAND CORPORATION (1996)
THE HYPOTHESIS
“China will emerge as a super
power by 2015 AD and if so,
what are implications for India
and how to meet this Challenge”
AIM
TO EXAMINE EXACT STATUS OF
CHINA AS A SUPER POWER BY
2015 AD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR INDIA AND ARRIVE AT A
SUITABLE STRATEGIC RESPONSE
SCOPE
PART 1 - CHINA, A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
PART 2 - CHINA AND THE WORLD
PART 3 - SINO INDIAN RELATIONS AND
THE STRATEGIC DIVIDE
PART 4 - VAIDATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS
PART 5 - INDIA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE
CONCLUSION
PART 1 - CHINA , A CURRENT
PERSPECTIVE
BIRTH OF PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
“ THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE
STOOD UP. THEY WILL NEVER BE
HUMILIATED. ”
MAO
ZEDONG
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY
1. CHINESE SENSE OF IMPERMANENSE
• GONG (ASSENT)
• SHOU (DECLINE)
2. RELATIONSHIPS
3.
COMPREHENSIVENESS.
• BAOGUO (PRESERVE THE STATE).
• BAOZHANG (PRESERVE THE RACE).
• BAOJIAO (PRESERVE CIVILISATION).
• BAOMIN (PRESERVE THE PEOPLE).
4.
DETERMINISM.
5.
STRONG STATE AND STRONG
NATION.
RUSSIA
CIS
MONGOLIA
NORTH
& SOUTH
KOREA
TAIWAN
INDIA
VIETNAM
ASSETS
1.
LARGE LAND MASS.
2.
VAST MANPOWER.
3.
NATURAL RESOURCES.
4.
PENINSULAR PROJECTION IN EAST
AND SOUTH CHINA SEA.
5.
NATURAL BARRIERS.
CHINESE CRESCENT OF INFLUENCE
FOUR POINT MODERNISATION
PROGRAMME
•
INDUSTRY
•
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
•
DEFENCE FORCES
•
AGRICULTURE
SEVEN LARGEST ECONOMIES BY
2010 AD
USA
-
$ 7, 859 b
JAPAN
-
$ 3, 714 b
CHINA
-
$ 3, 791 b
GERMANY
-
$ 1,525 b
FRANCE
-
$ 1,410 b
INDIA
-
$ 1, 330 b
UK
-
$
949 b
DEFENCE FORCES - FORCE COMPARISON
USA
RUSSIA
JAPAN
CHINA INDIA
TROOPS
1.37 m
1.00 m
.23 m
2.48 m
1.1 m
MBT
7684
15500
1080
8300
3414
APC
17800
10062
840
5500
1500
5699
6299
770
14500
4175
SUBMARINES
76
70
16
71
16
AC CARRIERS
12
1
-
-
1
AC
4994
1800
330
4041
774
ICBM/SLBM
1165
1363
-
450
-
ARTY
(DS)
PLA MODERNISATION PROGRAMME
•
DOWN SIZING.
•
NEW EQUIPMENT.
•
SU 30 FLANKERS AND SU 27 AC.
•
SU 27 CARRIER BORNE AC.
•
XIA CLASS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE WITH
SLBMs.
•
AC CARRIER.
PART 2 - CHINA AND THE WORLD

OVERVIEW.

SINO – US RELATIONS.

SINO – RUSSIA RELATIONS.

RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN UNION.

TAIWAN FACTOR

CHINA PAK NEXUS.

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN.

COMMENTS.
PART 3 - SINO INDIAN RELATIONS
AND THE STRATEGIC DIVIDE
 CHINA’S PERCEPTION OF INDIA.
 IMPLICATION ON INDIA’S SECURITY.
 FUTURE RELATIONS.
 THE STRATEGIC DIVIDE
PART 4 - VALIDATION OF
HYPOTHESIS
CHINESE INTENTIONS
SHORT TERM AIMS
•
CONSOLIDATE THE NATION STATE.
•
ENSURE UNHINDERED ECONOMIC
PROGRESS.
•
CREATE A SUPPORT BASE IN COMITY OF
NATIONS.
•
STRIVE FOR ECONOMIC AND
TECHOLOGICAL PARITY.
•
IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS.
LONG TERM AIMS
•
ACHIEVE PARITY WITH USA.
•
CONTROL WORLD AND ASIAN
AFFAIRS.
•
RESOLVE BORDER DISPUTES.
•
ENSURE CULTURAL, ETHNIC AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
AIMS AGAINST INDIA
• ENSURE ENCIRCLEMENT.
• FORCE PARITY BY PAKISTAN.
• BENIGN FRONT.
• PREVENT INDIA’S NUCLEAR POWER STATUS.
• COLLUSIVE SUPPORT FROM INDIA’S
NEIGHBOURS.
• LIMITED TO FULL SCALE WAR.
CHINESE CAPABILITIES
• ECONOMY.
• TECHNOLOGY.
• DEFENCE FORCES.
“ It is only a matter of Time”
Paul Kennedy
(Rise and Fall of Great Powers)
PART 5 - INDIA’S STRATEGIC
RESPONSE
•
A GEOGRAPHICAL DISADVANTAGE.
•
STRATEGIC ENCIRCLEMENT.
STRATEGIC RESPONSE
• NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DETERRENT.
• CONVENTIONAL FORCE PARITY.
• ENHANCE DEFENCE BUDGET.
• TRI-SERVICE DOCTRINE.
• INDIGENOUS R & D.
• DEVELOP ECONOMY.
• DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES.
•IMPROVE INFRASTRUCTURE IN BORDER AREAS
STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT
CONCLUSION
“ A man cannot be too careful,
in the choice of his enemies”
Oscar Wilde