Health and Safety Executive The Fukushima Daiichi Accident – Report of HM Chief Inspector NuLeAF Meeting 21 October 2011 Andy Hall Deputy Chief Inspector (figure courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy) Introduction • • • • Outline of the accident Aims of the Chief Inspector’s Reports Openness and development of the project Conclusions & recommendations of Interim & Final Reports Accident Initiator 11 March 2011 • • • Magnitude 9 earthquake Subsequent tsunami 14-15m Fukushima 1 Immediate Consequences • Loss of all external power • Only 1 of 13 Emergency Diesel Generators remained available • Unprecedented devastation • Impaired infrastructure • Long-term developing scenario Fukushima Daiichi • Regulatory Design Basis tsunami of 3.1m, TEPCO 5.7m Power of tsunami Accident Characteristics Major external hazards affected site Station blackout Loss of some DC power Loss of ‘ultimate heat sink’ Failure to cool reactor cores Core melt and hydrogen generation Explosions Fission product releases over extended period Damage to reactor buildings Consequences over following days Reactor 1 Reactor 2 Reactor 3 Operating status Nominal full power Nominal full power Nominal full power Fuel condition Uncovered from ~1700 on 11/3/11, melted & relocated shortly afterwards Uncovered from ~1800 on 14/3/11, melted & relocated shortly afterwards Uncovered from ~0800 on 13/3/11, melted & relocated shortly afterwards Current fuel location Relocated to lower RPV head, possibly some in dry well underneath Relocated to lower RPV head, possibly some in dry well underneath Relocated to lower RPV head, possibly some in dry well underneath Lower PRV head condition Believed to be damaged, primary coolant appears to have leaked through lower head Believed to be damaged, primary coolant appears to have leaked through lower head Believed to be damaged, primary coolant appears to have leaked through lower head Primary containment vessel (PCV) and venting Wet-well venting from 1430 on 12/3/11. Explosion seen at top of reactor building 1536 same day Wet-well venting from 1100 on 13/3/11. Explosion heard at 0600 next day, believed to be in vicinity of pressure suppression pool Wet-well venting from 0520 on 14/3/11. Explosion seen at top of reactor building 1101 same day Radiological Source Terms NISA estimated source term from JNES accident calculations NSC estimated it from JAEA back-calculations from environmental monitoring These agreed on 1 – 2 x 1017 Bq of I-131 and 1 – 2 x 1016 Bq of Cs-137, i.e. ~ 10% of Chernobyl On this basis, the INES rating was increased to Level 7 on 12 April. Aims of Chief Inspector’s Reports Requested by SoS Energy & Climate Change Interim report published in May Aims: • to learn lessons • identify any UK vulnerabilities • take action to assure and improve nuclear safety Aims of Chief Inspector’s Reports Also asked to cooperate with other national regulators and international organisations, and to be open and transparent in preparing the reports Project Arrangements Set up a small core team within ONR Drew on technical inspectors for specialist advice Invited submissions from public via website Set up Technical Advice Panel Interim Report Conclusions 11 Conclusions To summarise: our review of the information available has not revealed any vulnerabilities with UK nuclear facilities or shortcomings in safety methodology that would require operations to be curtailed Interim Report Recommendations 26 Recommendations General: need for good comms, seek lessons for emergency preparedness & enhance openness For regulators: review standards/guidance and emergency preparedness, particularly for severe accidents For industry: review aspects of accident for implications, e.g. resilience, natural hazards, AC supplies, cooling, site/plant layout, human performance, emergency preparedness, data comms. Conclusions from International Reports Fukushima Daiichi was not adequately protected against the natural hazards that struck These were foreseeable – historical records of larger tsunamis striking East coast of Japan Original site safety case identified tsunamis as a threat –regulator accepted design height of only 3.1 m Operator increased this to 5.7 m after 2002, but appears to have only implemented improvements on Unit 6 Design Basis ‘Design Basis’ sets out events that plant must be designed to withstand and control For Japan, a Regulatory Guide sets out the ‘anticipated operational occurrences’ and ‘accidents’ that must be analysed This only requires a single failure of a safety system or component within it to be assumed following the initiating event Design Basis for Tsunamis Neither total loss of AC power nor loss of ultimate heat sink were design basis events Japanese Government report stated: • a trial tsunami PSA “indicated that the risk sensitivity of an event in which simultaneous functional losses of all the seawater pumps are generated due to tsunami was high” • “compared with the design against earthquake, the design against tsunamis has been performed based on tsunami folklore and indelible traces of tsunamis, not on adequate consideration of the recurrence of large-scale earthquakes in relation to a safety goal …” Safety Case Implications Safety cases need to be: • based on a structured analysis of a comprehensive range of possible events and hazards, both frequent and infrequent • updated in the light of new information and advances in technology Final Report Conclusions Six new conclusions • UK approach to designing against a wide range of events including natural hazards is sound • long-standing concerns over Sellafield Legacy Ponds & Silos means UK must continue to progress remediation & retrievals with vigour • Periodic Safety Reviews are essential for ensuring safety standards are improved in line with new technology & understanding Final Report Conclusions • the scope of operators’ Probabilistic Safety Assessments must be extended to cover severe accident conditions, to improve understanding for their management • additional information has reinforced Interim Report conclusions & recommendations • UK nuclear industry has responded constructively to Interim Report Final Report Recommendations Twelve new recommendations General: • support efforts to improve international peer reviews & further development of standards • review methods for estimating source terms, measuring environmental contamination and predicting dispersion & impacts • review planning controls for commercial & residential developments near nuclear sites • ensuring that ONR is open & transparent about its activities Final Report Recommendations For regulators: • ONR should expand its oversight of nuclear safety-related research, including UK capability, to ensure continuing access to sufficient expertise to perform its duties Final Report Recommendations For industry: • buildings and equipment needed for managing accidents, such as emergency centres, should be protected against hazards that could affect several at same time • they should also be capable of operating in the conditions, inc. severe accidents, for which they might be needed • continue to promote high levels of safety culture & nuclear professionalism Final Report Recommendations For industry: • give appropriate & consistent priority to completing Periodic Safety Reviews & implementing the identified improvements • develop Level 2 PSAs for all facilities that could have accidents with off-site consequences & use to further develop severe accident management measures •Report responses to recommendations to ONR by June 2012 To conclude Although some more detailed information may yet emerge, we already know enough to develop reliable conclusions & recommendations Everyone with responsibilities for nuclear safety must strive for continuous improvement Thank you for your attention … … any Questions?