17/10/1973:
Ten Arab nations
cut oil production
until Israel
withdraws
7/10/1973:
Syria captures
southern Golan
Heights
16/10/1973:
First Israeli
troops cross the
Suez Canal
8/10/1973:
Israel launches
first
counterattack
12/10/1973:
U.S. sends
additional arms
to Israel
22/10/1973:
Immediate
ceasefire called
by the UN
23/10/1973:
Fighting
continues
despite
ceasefire
28/10/1973:
The Arab Slide of Things:
Pre-War Ideology
 Sadat knew Egyptian military could not defeat Israel’s,
but wanted to cause just enough conflict to make
Israelis withdraw from Suez Canal so that peace talks
could begin.
 Sadat wanted to promote his image and gain the
popularity Nasser had by reclaiming the Suez Canal
and Sinai Desert for Egypt (which Nasser lost during
the 1967 War).
 Sadat also wanted to prove Egypt could hold its own
and “break the defeatist attitude of the population.”
The Arab Slide of Things:
Post-War
 During the war, Arabs used the “oil weapon,” halting oil
exports to the U.S. to punish them for their support of
Israel.
 War restored confidence in Palestinian troops and
people, and reminded the world of Palestinian
distresses.
 Egyptian and Syrian armies had proven Israeli military
was not invincible.
 The large number of human losses (8,500 Egyptian and
Syrian soldiers killed, almost 20,000 wounded) made
finding a peace agreement all the more sought after.
The Israel Slide of Things
Part I
 Before the Yom Kippur War, Israel still had control of
the Suez Canal and other lands.
 They believed that the boundaries gained after 1967
were vital for its national security.
 As tension between Israel and Arab Countries rose,
The USA advised Israel to not make the first strike.
 Due to their past victories, Israeli leaders were
convinced that any Arab attack would be suicidal.
The Israel Slide of Things
Part II
—The Defense Minister Dayan Claimed several days after
the initial attack on Yom Kippur that he had
information about it but decided against a preemptive
strike.
—Do to the attack, Israeli felt like they needed to protect
their land now more then ever.
—Despite their victory, their confidence had been
shaken and resulted in public anger at Prime Minister
Golda Meir.
Key Players
 Israel:
 United States
 Arab:
 Egypt
 Syria
 Iraq
 Jordan
 Soviet Union
Key Battles
 South:
 In Sinai, Egypt’s major military force crossed the Suez Canal and captured
Israeli positions on the Eastern front sending Israel’s defenders back
toward the desert. Egyptians overran Bar Lev line (the famous Israel
defense system) with heavy air and artillery assaults.
 By the end of the first week Egypt installed almost 100,000 men on the
East Bank of the Suez Canal.
 During the second week Israeli troops entered the West Bank of the Suez
Canal on Egyptian territory. Their aim was to surround the Egyptian
troops in the East Bank of Sinai and block their retreat across the Suez
Canal back to Egypt. The Israelis closed the Egyptians in two small areas
in Sinai; the Israeli troops had also gained control over the Third Army’s
supply of food and water.
 North:
 Syria attacked the Golan Heights to gain advantage over Israeli
settlements in valleys below. Equipped with 800 tanks Syrians crossed the
ceasefire line at four different points.
 By the end of the first week Iraq and Jordan supplied troops for Syrian
front.
 During the second week of war with fierce tank battles in Golan Heights
Israel drove back Syrians and moved towards Damascus.
Outcome of the Conflict
— Israel gained land in the Golan Heights and on the west
bank of the Suez Canal.
— Syria and Egypt held to their early victories and felt they
deserved the land lost to Israel both from the 1967 war
and the October War.
— UN was used as a last-minute
rescue operation with rapid
ceasefires instead of real,
preventative diplomacy
— Kissinger’s step-by-step plan was
induced
Works Cited
Fraser, T. G. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Basingstoke, Hampshire [England:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print.
Schulze, Kirsten E. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Longman, 1999. Print.
Stoessinger, John George. Why Nations Go to War. New York: St. Martin's, 1974.
Print.