INCOSE Michigan – May Dinner Meeting
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA)
in Half the Time
Howard C Cooper, MS, DFSS-BB
May 13th, 2014
Introduction
● Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA) is
an analytical tool and structured method to:
– Recognize and evaluate the potential failure
of a product/process and its effects
– Identify and prioritize actions which could
eliminate or reduce the chance of a potential
failure
– Document the process
Before they are “baked” into a product
2
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
Common Types of FMEA
● Design FMEA
– Identify and mitigate potential design problems
early in the design cycle
● Process / Manufacturing FMEA
– Improve quality and reliability, during set-up of
initial manufacturing process
● Problem Solving / Six Sigma FMEA
– Understand failure modes and effects to identify
and solve quality or reliability issues
3
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
Where FMEA is Used
Common FMEA Usage
Product
Definition:
Customer
Reqmts:
Vehicle
Tech Specs
Key
product
characterist
ics,
Design
FMEA
Process
Definition:
Process
Flow
Diagram
(PFD)
Process
Failure
Mode
Analysis:
Process
FMEA
Mfg:
Control
Strategy:
Control
Plan, Error
proofing
Work
Instructions
&
Process
Monitoring
Six Sigma
FMEA
4
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
Prioritize Failure
Modes by Risk
Priority Number
Example Design FMEA
Cause
(What Failed)
Item
Local
Failure
Effect
Mode
locked up, or
open output
driver
Load
Controller
Next Level Up
Effect
On Vehicle Mission
Soldier(s)
SEV
(physical or
chemical
processes,
design
defects,
quality
defects, part
misapplication
, or other).
1.No provisioning of
MRF = 1 - Combat
power for vehicle start up Mission Failure on
100% of combat
missions. [System
Abort (SA)]
FM & Effects of
each failure
mode
2. No distribution of
power to hull and turret
systems (SA Example;
Generator Controller
Dead)
1. Over
Voltage,
2. Voltage
Transients
MRF = 1 - Combat
Mission Failure on
100% of combat
missions. [System
Abort (SA)]
Load
Controller
1. Over
Voltage
2. Voltage
Transients
Load
Controller
Control
Module
1.No provisioning of
MRF = 1 - Combat
power to vehicle start up Mission Failure on
100% of combat
missions. [System
Abort (SA)]
Items within the
system being
analyzed
ePDCM Failure
2. No distribution of
power to hull and turret
systems
MRF = 1 - Combat
Mission Failure on
100% of combat
missions. [System
Abort (SA)]
43v Transients Clamps on
all power supply inputs.
MIL-STD-1275 Compliant
Relay drivers and other
higher current loads have
transient protectoin.
5 degree C Thermal Margin
on PLCMs
3
5
5
1. Over
Voltage
2. Voltage
Transients
1. Over
Voltage
2. Voltage
Transients
43v Transients Clamps on
all power supply inputs.
MIL-STD-1275 Compliant
Relay drivers and other
higher current loads have
transient protectoin.
5 degree C Thermal Margin
on PLCMs
Transients Clamps on all
power supply inputs. MILSTD-1275 Compliant
Relay drivers and other
higher current loads have
transient protectoin.
5 degree C Thermal Margin
on PLCMs
Transients Clamps on all
power supply inputs. MILSTD-1275 Compliant
Relay drivers and other
higher current loads have
transient protectoin.
Field Failure
Detection Method
1629a
DVP&R
Detection
J1739
HALT tests
EMI CS-101 & MILPLCM Trip Status STD-1275
Reporting
Suseptability
PLCM Pass/ Fail Testing
Reprting
MIL-STD-810g
Environmental Life
Test
DET
RPN
DFMEA
FM
Problem
Report #
3
45
SPR00004339
3
45
SPR00004339
Relative
Occurrence
Root
Cause
5
PLCM Fault
indicated
OCC
Severity
5
PLCM Fault
indicated
Prevention
Design Controls
J1739
SEV X OCC X DET = (RPN)
3
HALT tests
EMI CS-101 & MILPLCM Trip Status STD-1275
Reporting
Suseptability
PLCM Pass/ Fail Testing
Reprting
MIL-STD-810g
Environmental Life
Test
3
HALT tests
EMI CS-101 & MILPDCM Trip Status STD-1275
Reporting
Suseptability
PDCM Pass/ Fail Testing
Reprting
MIL-STD-810g
Environmental Life
Test
2
HALT tests
EMI CS-101 & MILPDCM BIT Pass/
STD-1275
Fail Reporting
Suseptability
Testing
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
SPR00004200
3
45
SPR00004200
3
30
5
Example Process FMEA
Steps within the
process being
analyzed
Deteriorated life
of part leading
to:
- Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust through
paint over time.
- Impaired
function of
hardware.
RPN
Insufficient
chromate
coating over
specified
surface.
Detec
Manual application of
chromate conversion
coatings on exposed
aluminum substrate
(to retard corrosion)
Occur
Potential
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure Mode Failure
3 Visual check each hour 1/shift for film thickness
(depth meter) and coverage.
5
75
Spray head clogged
- Viscosity too high
- Temperature too low
- Pressure too low.
2 Visual check each hour 1/shift for film thickness
(depth meter) and coverage.
3
30
Spray head deformed due
to impact.
2 Visual check each hour 1/shift for film thickness
(depth meter) and coverage.
2
20
Spray time insufficient.
1 Operator instructions and lot
sampling (10 doors/shift) to
check for coverage of critical
areas.
2
10
Potential
Cause(s)/Mechanism(s)
of Failure
3 - Front Door L.H.
5 Manually inserted spray
head not inserted far
enough.
Sev
Item
Process Function
Current Process Controls
Detection
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
6
Typical FMEA Process
1. Assemble team of people with diverse
knowledge of process & product
2. Bound the problem
3. Identify functions
4. Identify potential failure modes
5. Populate FMEA details
6. Prioritize failure modes based on RPN
7. Mitigate failure modes
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
7
Mission to Improve FMEA Development
● Challenge
Current FMEA problems:
Opportunity:
Time consuming
Rapid (> 2x faster)
High rate of missed critical failure
modes
Critical failure modes are given
top-priority
Ad hoc identification of failure
modes
Process-driven identification of all
failure modes
Disjointed, undirected timeconsuming discussion
Focused, efficient development
effort
Allows prioritization only after
FMEA development
Prioritization can happen before
FMEA development
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
8
Improved FMEA Process
• In 2012, GDLS developed process to prepare
‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ FMEA at greatly
reduced time and cost
• Process involves four primary tools:
Block / Process
Diagram
p-Diagram
Decomposition
Table
FMEA
Major innovation:
Decomposition Table identifies and prioritizes
Failure Modes (FMs) into FMEA. Focuses analysis
on critical failure modes
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
9
Step 1: Bound the System
Boundary Diagram / Process Flow
Vehicle
Structure
What
Mount
Engine
Seal /
Flat
Flange
Elbow
90
VBand
Exhaust
Brake
(valve)
VBand
Flex
Pipe
VBand
Muf f ler
Insulation
VBand
Exhaust
Pipe
Exhaust
Out
Mount
Vehicle
Structure
Identifies and verifies:
1. System functions: lines crossing the dotted boundary
2. “Items” within the dotted line system boundary
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
10
Step 2: Characterize the Process
P-Diagram
What (From Boundary Diagram)
Why
Green blocks, identify functions of the system (or process)
Yellow blocks ~ Noise Factors, Blue block, Control Factors,
Pink blocks ~ Error States
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
11
Outstanding Problem & Opportunity
● Boundary or Process Flow Diagram
– Identifies “Items” for the FMEA, but not the
Failure Modes (FM) of those “items”
● P-Diagram
– Identifies system functions or requirements
(even noise factors) but not the function or FMs
of the “items”
● Opportunity
– Develop a table that will identify and link “items”
to their functions, and to their functional FMs
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
12
Step 3: Map Functions to Failure Modes
2. Attenuate
NVH
Contain Heat
X
X
X
X
Secure
Hardware
Functions:
Provide Flow
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Contain Exhaust
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Attenuate NVH
System Functions
"Design"
Functions:
P-Diagram
X
X
X
X
X
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Partially Restrict Exhaust
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table
Hardware:
Boundary /
Process
Diagram
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
X
13
Step 3: Map Functions to Failure Modes
2. Attenuate
NVH
Contain Heat
X
X
X
X
Secure
Hardware
Functions:
Provide Flow
Need to
Identify Item /
HW Functions
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Contain Exhaust
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Attenuate NVH
System Functions
"Design"
Functions:
P-Diagram
X
X
X
X
X
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Partially Restrict Exhaust
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table
Hardware:
Boundary /
Process
Diagram
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
X
14
Step 3: Map Functions to Failure Modes
2. Attenuate
NVH
Contain Heat
X
X
X
X
Hardware
Functions:
Secure
Identify
Functions
Provide Flow
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Contain Exhaust
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Attenuate NVH
System Functions
"Design"
Functions:
P-Diagram
X
X
X
X
X
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Partially Restrict Exhaust
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table
Hardware:
Boundary /
Process
Diagram
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
X
15
Step 3: Map Functions to Failure Modes
2. Attenuate
NVH
Contain Heat
X
X
X
X
Hardware
Functions:
Secure
Identify
Functions
Provide Flow
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Contain Exhaust
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Attenuate NVH
System Functions
"Design"
Functions:
P-Diagram
X
X
X
X
X
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Partially Restrict Exhaust
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table
Hardware:
Boundary /
Process
Diagram
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
X
16
Step 3: Map Functions to Failure Modes
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
2. Attenuate
NVH
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Contain Heat
Partially Restrict Exhaust
X
X
X
X
Hardware
Functions:
Secure
Identify
Functions
Provide Flow
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Contain Exhaust
P-Diagram
Attenuate NVH
System Functions
"Design"
Functions:
X
X
X
X
X
Hardware:
Boundary /
Process
Diagram
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
X
17
Decomposition Table Structures FMEA
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table
Secure
X
X
X
X
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Partially Restrict Exhaust
“X” indicates a
Function (and 4
FMs in the FMEA)
X
2. Attenuate
NVH
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Contain Heat
B-Diagram or
Pr-Flow Chart
Provide Flow
Hardware
Functions:
3-4 FMs per
Function
From
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
Contain Exhaust
functions
translate
to FMs
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Attenuate NVH
"Design"
Functions:
System Functions
X
X
X
X
Hardware:
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
X
18
3 Purposes of the Decomposition Table
• Ensures all items are captured into the
FMEA
• Ensures multiple function items and their
potential failure modes are identified into
the FMEA
• Provides opportunity to identify and
prioritize by criticality of hardware or
process functions before populating failure
modes into the FMEA
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
19
Decomposition Table Prioritizes Functions
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table (with Maximum Criticality Scored)
Restrict Exhaust
5
2
2
2
4
1
3
2
2
1
Contain Heat
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
3
15
Attenuate NVH
Severity:
Provide Flow
Hardware:
2. Attenuate
NVH
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Functions:
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Secure
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Likelyhood of Failure: 1 - 5
System Functions:
"Design"
5
3
3
3
3
10
6
Criticality #
rather than “X”
6
10
20
12
9
10
10
5
12
3
9
3
6
6
3
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
6
20
Preparation Flow into Decomp Table
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table (with Maximum Criticality Scored)
Engine
Seal /
Flat
Flange
Elbow
90
VBand
Exhaust
Brake
(valve)
VBand
Flex
Pipe
VBand
Muf f ler
Insulation
VBand
Exhaust
Pipe
Exhaust
Out
3
15
5
10
6
10
20
12
Restrict Exhaust
Mount
5
2
2
2
4
1
3
2
2
1
Contain Heat
Vehicle
Structure
Severity:
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Attenuate NVH
Hardware:
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Provide Flow
1. P-Diagram Ideal Functions – to
Design Functions in F-H Decomp.
2. Attenuate
NVH
Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Functions:
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
Secure
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Likelyhood of Failure: 1 - 5
"Design"
System Functions:
3
3
3
3
12
3
9
3
6
9
10
10
5
6
6
3
6
Mount
Vehicle
Structure
2. B-Diagram or Process Flow inner
blocks go to Decomp. Table
3. Identify all ‘Item’ Functions needed to
accomplish each System Function
4. Mark with an “X” or with a “Criticality #”
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
21
Step 4: Use Decomp Table to Fill FMEA
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table (with Maximum Criticality Scored)
1
1 Function
(measurable output,
design requirement)
3
15
5
10
6
10
20
12
Restrict Exhaust
5
2
2
2
4
1
3
2
2
1
33
Contain Heat
22
5. Exhaust
Brake
Engine
Slowing
Attenuate NVH
Severity:
V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
Flat Flange
Seals
Muffler
Insulation
Isolation Mounts
Exaust Brake
Flex Pipe
Elbow
3. Limited
thermal
transfer
to vehicle
Provide Flow
Hardware:
2. Attenuate
NVH
1
Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Functions:
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the Vehicle
Secure
(Ideal Functions from PDiagram / Functions
(lines crossing boundary
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Likelyhood of Failure: 1 - 5
"Design"
System Functions:
3
3
3
3
12
3
9
3
1
4
6
9
10
10
5
2
Item
1. Transfer Exaust from
Engine out of the
Vehicle
V-Band Clamps
6
6
3
6
3
Potential Failure Mode
Local
Effect
Exhaust leak
4
Next Level Up
Effect
Loss of 1. Transfering Exhaust from Engine to
out-side the Vehicle
Loss of Securing
Partial Securing
Intermittent Securing
FMEA filled in from F-H Decomp Table
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
22
Benefits of Improved FMEA Development
Pareto Chart (80/20 Rule)
Four Step FMEA Process:
● Organizes and speeds FMEA failure
mode identification
● Ensures all hardware-functions and
FMs are identified
● Prioritizes critical hardware-functions
for FMEA analysis
● Provides power of 80/20 Rule on FMs
for best Reliability Growth
● Focuses attention and time on
mitigation of “significant few” (the most
critical failure modes (FMs)
F-H Decomp Table now being used on
multiple GDLS Contracts: for DFR, to
facilitate earlier diagnostics planning, to
meet Weight and Testability Requirements
Addressing most critical FMs yields
greatest reliability growth.
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
23
Cost Savings Attributed to New Process
Savings Calculation
Before vs, After
Facilitator Cost
(savings to GDLS)
Previous Programs doing DFMEA without 'F-H Decomp'
Start SFR
FCS
01-Mar-06
Stryker-SMOD 01-Jan-10
Average:
End PDR
15-Dec-09
15-Dec-10
Weeks
185
50
117.5
Rel-Heads Hrs/Week Total Hrs. $Rate/Hr.
Total $
3
35
19,425
$77
$1,495,725
4
35
7,000
$77
$539,000
3.5
Average: $1,017,363
2013 Programs using 'F-H Docomp Tool/Method' for DFMEA
Start SFR
End PDR
Weeks
Stryker+Tr
16-Oct-12
Stryker-ECP
01-Oct-12
Abrams ECP1
04-Feb-13
Average:
15-Mar-13
20
1
35
700
$77
$53,900
27-Sep-13
50
0.65
35
1,138
$77
$87,588
14-Aug-13
27.3
1
35
956
$77
$73,574
32.43
0.88
931
$77
$71,687
Facilitator
Savings X 3
for FMEA
Team, X 3
Programs in
2013 = Total
Savings
Rel-Heads Hrs/Week Total Hrs. $Rate/Hr.
Savings on
Facilitator Cost
Total $
Savings
$1,424,038 Savings over FCS - DFMEA Facilitator
$467,313 Savings over SMOD - DFMEA Facilitator
$945,676 Savings over FCS & SMOD Average, for DFMEA Facilitator
X3 Facilitator labor Savings over SMOD baseline, for DFMEA Team (3-8)
$1,401,939 Average 2013 FH-Decomp Program Savings over SMOD baseline - DFMEA Cost
X3 Three 2013 Programs: Stryker+Tr, Stryker-ECP and Abrams ECP1
$4,205,817 Total 2013 Savings from using FH-Decomp to prepare DFMEA
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
24
Questions?
Presenters:
Howard C Cooper, MS, DFSS-BB
DFR Reliability Engineer
cooperh@gdls.com
Mark Petrotta, MS, DFSS-MBB
Engineering Process Excellence
petrotta@gdls.com
25