Competitive
authoritarianism
definition, main
characteristics, outcomes
Student name: Radu Ana-Maria
Professor dr: RafaƗ Czachor
Poland, Polkowice
2013
Attention
Definition
Authoritarianism describes a form of social control characterized
by strict obedience to the authority of a state or organization, often
maintaining and enforcing control through the use of oppressive
measure. Authoritarian regimes are generally considered to be
highly hierarchical.
Competitive authoritarianism:
- A regime that is democratic in appearance but authoritarian in
nature
- A civilian regime in which democratic institutions exist in form
but not in substance, because the electoral, judicial, media, and
other institutions are so heavily skewed in favor of current power
holders.
WHAT IS COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM?
"Politics ... is not like football, deserving a
level playing field. Here, you try that and
you will be roasted." - Daniel arap Moi,
President of Kenya.
Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian
regimes in which formal democratic institutions
exist and are widely viewed as the primary
means of gaining power, but in which
incumbents abuse of the state places them at a
significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents.
Such regimes are competitive in that opposition
parties use democratic institutions to contest
seriously for power, but they are not democratic
because the playing field is heavily skewed in
favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real
but unfair.
Daniel arap Moi
In competitive authoritarian regimes formal democratic institutions
exist but incumbents often violate these rules using mechanisms
such us bribery, co- optation and other subtle forms of persecution
to harass critics in such a way that the regimes fail to meet
conventional minimum standards of democracy. However,
democratic contestation is possible.
Hybrid regimes:
- Combination of
democratic and
authoritarian
elements
- Proliferation
after the Cold War
- Are not
unidirectional
The end of the Cold War posed a fundamental challenge to
authoritarianism. Single-party and military dictatorships collapsed
throughout post-communist Eurasia, Africa, and much of Asia and
Latin America.
At the same time, the formal architecture of democracyparticularly multiparty elections diffused widely across the globe.
Do you think that at the end of the Cold War the most of the
countries have opted for democracy?
Transitions didn't always lead to democracy, however. In much of
Africa, the former Soviet Union, and in parts of Central and
South-Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the Americas, new regimes
combined electoral competition with varying degrees of
authoritarianism.
Unlike the single-party or military autocracies that predominated during the Cold
War, regimes in Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere were competitive, in that opposition forces used
democratic institutions to contest vigorously—and at times successfully—for
power. Nevertheless, these regimes were not democratic. Government critics
suffered harassment, arrest, and in some cases, violent attacks, and electoral fraud,
unfair media access, and abuse of state resources skewed the playing field heavily
in favor of incumbents. We call such regimes competitive authoritarian.
Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated during the post-Cold War period. In
1995, at least 36 regimes were competitive authoritarian, which exceeded the
number of democracies among developing and post-communist countries.
Kenya
Malaysia
Mexico
Peru
Russia
Serbia
Slovakia
Taiwan
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Inattention was rooted in a pronounced democratizing bias that
pervaded the post-Cold War literature on regime change. Viewed
through the lens of democratization, hybrid regimes were
categorized as flawed, incomplete, or “transitional” democracies .
Assumed that hybrid regimes are- or should be- moving in a
democratic direction. Such assumptions lack empirical foundation.
Although some hybrid regimes democratized during the post-Cold
War period (Mexico, Slovakia, Taiwan), most didn't. In many
cases, regimes remained stable (Malaysia, Tanzania) or became
increasingly authoritarian (Belarus, Cambodia, Russia,
Zimbabwe). Others were unstable and authoritarian: autocratic
incumbents fell but their successors were also autocrats (Georgia,
Ukraine, Zambia).
Situating the concept
Competitive Authoritarianism
Democracy
Authoritarianism
Between Democracy and Closed
Authoritarianism
Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime
type, with characteristics of both democracy and
authoritarianism.
Comparing Democratic, Competitive Authoritarian and Closed
Regimes
Democracy
Competitive Authoritarianism
Full
Authoritarianism
Status of Core
Systematically
Democratic
respected.
Institutions
Widely viewed as
(Elections,
only route to
Civil
power.
Liberties)
Competes on
Status of
more or less equal
Opposition
footing with
Exist and are meaningful, but
Nonexistent or reduced
Systematically violated in favor of
to facade status.
incumbent.
Not viewed as a viable
WideIy viewed as primary
route to power.
route to power.
Major opposition is legal and can
Major opposition
compete openly, but is significantly
banned, or largely
disadvantaged by
underground or in exile.
incumbent abuse.
incumbent.
Lower than democracy but
Level of
Uncertainty
High
higher than full
authoritarianism.
Low
Full authoritarianism
It is important to distinguish between
competitive and noncompetitive authoritarianism.
We define full authoritarianism as a regime in which no
viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for
executive power. This category includes closed regimes in
which national-level democratic institutions don't exist
(for example: China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia) and
hegemonic regimes in which formal democratic
institutions exist on paper but are reduced to facade status
in practice.
Competitive authoritarianism
Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished from full
authoritarianism in that constitutional channels exist through
which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for
executive power.
Elections are held regularly and opposition parties are not legally
barred from contesting them. Opposition activity is above
ground: Opposition parties can open offices, recruit candidates,
and organize campaigns, and politicians are rarely exiled or
imprisoned. In short, democratic procedures are sufficiently
meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas
through which to contest for power.
What distinguishes competitive
authoritarianism from democracy, however,is
the fact that incumbent abuse of the state
violates at least one of three defining
attributes of democracy:
- free elections
- broad protection of civil liberties
- a reasonably level playing field
Main characteristics:
- Elections
- Civil Liberties
- An Uneven Playing Field:
- access to resources
- access to Media
- Biased Referees: Uneven Access to the Law
Elections
In democracies elections are:
-Regularly held
-Competitive
-Generally free from masiv fraud
Examples:
- Russia 1996 (communist parties)
- Ukraine 1999
- Kenya 1992 and 1997
- Zimbabwe 2000
In competitive authoritarian regimes elections
are:
- Competitive, in that major opposition
candidates are not excluded
- Opposition parties are able to campaign
publicly
- There is no massive fraud
- Unfree and almost always unfair
Examples:
- Dominican Republic 1994
- Ukraine 2004
- Serbia 2000
Civil Liberties
In democracies, a broad range of civil liberties, including rights
of free speech and association, and a free press, are broadly
protected. Although these rights may be violated, such
violations are infrequent and do not seriously hinder the
opposition’s capacity to challenge incumbents. In closed
regimes, basic civil liberties generally either do not exist or exist
on paper but are so systematically violated that citizens, civic
and opposition groups, and media are not even minimally
protected from state abuse (for example Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan). As a result, much opposition activity takes place
either underground or in exile.
Measures political rights (PL) and civil liberties (CL) on a one-to-seven
scale. One represents the highest degree of “freedom” and seven the
lowest.
In competitive authoritarian regimes, basic civil liberties are formally
guaranteed and are to some extent protected in practice. Independent media exist
and civic and opposition groups are able to operate above ground, opening
offices, holding public meetings and demonstrations, and criticizing the
government in the media. Yet civil liberties are frequently violated. Opposition
politicians, independent judges, journalists, human rights activists, and other
government critics are subject to harassment, arrest, and in some cases, violent
attacks.
In some regimes, overt repression-including the arrest of opposition figures
(Belarus, Cambodia), killing of opposition activists (Cambodia, Haiti, Kenya,
Zimbabwe), violent repression of protest (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya), or closure
of independent media (Russia, Zimbabwe) is widespread, pushing regimes toward
full-scale authoritarianism.
Although civil liberties violations in competitive authoritarian regimes are not
systematic or severe enough to force opposition underground or into exile, they
clearly exceed what is permissible in a democracy.
An Uneven Playing Field
Finally, competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by a highly
uneven playing field between incumbents and opposition. Although a degree
of incumbent advantage exists in all democracies, and although many new
democracies are characterized by widespread clientelism and politicization of
state bureaucracies, not all forms of incumbent advantage are compatible with
democracy. The question of where to draw the line between “acceptable”
incumbent advantage and a truly uneven playing field is a difficult one.
We employ the following criteria: an uneven playing field exists where (1)
state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends; (2) the incumbent party
is systematically favored at the expense of the opposition; and (3) the
opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously
handicapped. Three aspects of an uneven playing field are of particular
importance:
access to resources;
access to media;
access to the law.
Access to resources
Access to resources is uneven where incumbents use the state to create or
maintain resource disparities that hinder the opposition’s ability to compete.
Incumbents may make direct partisan use of state resources, while denying
other parties access to those resources. In a few cases, this state financing is
legal.
The executive branch made use of large “secret funds” to finance Socialist
campaigns, which went “a long way to compromise equal chances of
candidates”. Incumbents may also make systematic use of the state’s
infrastructure- including buildings, vehicles, communications equipment, and
personnel- for electoral campaigns.
Incumbents may use the state to monopolize access to private sector finance.
Governing parties may use discretionary control over credit, licenses, state
contracts, and other resources to enrich themselves via party owned enterprises
(Taiwan), benefit crony proxy-owned firms that then contribute money back
into party coffers (Malaysia), or simply corner the market in private sector
donations (Mexico, Russia).
Access to Media
Where opposition parties do not enjoy access to media that reaches the bulk
of the population, there is no possibility of fair competition. Media access may
be denied in several ways. Frequently, the most important disparities existed in
access to electronic media (television and radio), combined with highly biased
and partisan coverage.
In many post- Cold War regimes, the state maintained a monopoly over
television and most- if not all- radio broadcasting. Although print media was
often pluralist, with a diversity of independent newspapers and magazines
circulating freely, these papers were often confined to a small urban elite. In
poor, predominately rural societies (for example much of Africa), only a tiny
fraction of the population read newspapers.
In such cases, if radio and television are in the hands of the state, and state-run
channels are biased in favor of the governing party, opposition forces are
effectively denied access to the media.
Access to the Law
In many competitive authoritarian regimes, the courts, electoral authorities, and
other nominally independent arbiters of the rules of the game are not only controlled
by incumbents (via packing, blackmail, bribery, or intimidation) but also are
systematically employed as partisan tools against the opposition. Consequently, in
electoral, judicial, and other critical disputes, agencies that are designed to act as
referees rule systematically in favor of incumbents.
Incumbent manipulation of the legal system may affect political competition in
several ways:
- where the judiciary is solidly under the control of the governing
party, the government may violate democratic procedure with impunity.
- incumbents may engage in “legal” repression, or the discretionary use of
legal instruments- such as tax, libel, or defamation laws- as a weapon against
opponents or the media.
In many competitive authoritarian regimes incumbents pack judiciaries , electoral
comissions, and other nominally independent arbiters and manipulate via blackmail,
bribery, and/or intimidation. As a result, legal and other state agencies that are
designed to act as referees rule systematically in favor of incumbents. This allows
incumbents to engage in illicit acts- including violations of democratic procedure –
with impunity. It also ensures that critical electoral, legal, or other disputes will be
resolved in the incumbent’s favor.
THE RISE OF COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM
“ [ Why liberalize?] When you see your
neighbor being shaved, you should wet
your beard.
Otherwise you could get a rough shave.”
Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania
“ Don't you know how these Westerners
are? They will make a fuss [about electoral
fraud] for a few days, and then they will
calm down and life will go on as usual.”
Eduard Shevardnadze, President of
Georgia
Competitive authoritarianism is a post-Cold War phenomenon.
Although a few competitive authoritarian regimes existed during the interwar
and Cold War periods, they proliferated after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Key
changes in the international environment created conditions that were highly
favorable to the emergence and survival of competitive authoritarian regimes.
The end of the Cold War led to a withdrawal of external support for many
superpower-sponsored dictatorships. Beginning in the late 1980s, both Sovietand U.S.-backed dictatorships faced a precipitous decline in external military
and economic assistance, which eroded the capacity of many autocrats to
maintain themselves in power.
States became bankrupted, patronage resources disappeared, and in many
cases, coercive apparatuses began to disintegrate, leaving autocrats with little
choice but to liberalize or abandon power.
Outcomes
Diverging Outcomes: Competitive Authoritarian Regime
Trajectories, 1990-2008
Competitive authoritarian regimes are marked by an inherent tension. The
existence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas of contestation
through which oppositions may legally- and legitimately- challenge
incumbents.
At limes, authoritarian governments manage these arenas of contestation
without difficulty. When incumbents enjoy broad public support and/or face
very weak opposition, they may retain power without egregiously violating
democratic institutions. However, the existence of multiparty elections,
nominally independent legislatures, judiciaries, and media creates opportunities
for periodic challenges, and when incumbents lack public support, these
challenges may be regime-threatening.
Most frequently, opposition challenges take place at the ballot box, as in Serbia
(2000), Kenya (2002), Ukraine (2004), and Zimbabwe (2008). However, they
also may emerge from parliament (for example Russia in 1993 and Belarus in
1996) or the judiciary.
Competitive authoritarian regimes followed three distinct paths between 1990
and 2008 (Table).
- The first is democratization, or the establishment of free
and fair elections, broad protection of civil liberties, and a level playing field.
Democratization may be overseen by authoritarian governments.
- The second outcome is unstable authoritarianism, or cases that undergo
one or more transition but do not democratize. In these cases, authoritarian
incumbents were removed at least once but new governments were not
democratic. Successors inherited a skewed playing field and politicized state
institutions, which they used to weaken and/or disadvantage their opponents.
- The third outcome is stable authoritarianism. In these cases, authoritarian
incumbents or their chosen successors remained in power for at least three
presidential/ parliamentary terms following the establishment of competitive
authoritarian rule.
This diversity of outcomes challenges the democratizing assumptions that
underlie much of the post—Cold War literature on regime change. Neither the
breakdown of authoritarian regimes nor the holding of multiparty elections
necessarily led to democratization during the post-Cold War period.
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes Trajectories 1990- 2008
Democratization
Benin
Croatia
Dominican Republic
Ghana
Guyana
Macedonia
Mali
Mexico
Nicaragua
Peru
Romania
Serbia
Slovakia
Taiwan
Ukraine
Unstable
Authoritarianism
Stable
Authoritarianism
Albania
Belarus
Georgia
Haiti
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Moldova
Senegal
Zambia
Armenia
Botswana
Cambodia
Cameroon
Gabon
Malaysia
Mozambique
Russia
Tanzania
Zimbabwe
Linkage, Incumbent Capacity and Regime Outcomes
Conclusion
Disincentives for party- building were particularly strong in the
post-Cold War period, as politicians could rely on mass media,
rather than organization, to make electoral appeals.
Consequently, where post-Cold War incumbents did not inherit
strong parties- as in Haiti, Peru, and much of African and the
former Soviet Union- governing parties were almost invariably
weak.
Post-Cold War regime outcomes are far more patterned than
contingency, choice centered, and institutional design approaches
would suggest. In fact, two broad structural factors- linkage and
the organizational power of incumbents- take us a considerable
way toward explaining variation in the trajectory of post-Cold
War competitive authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarian methods do not produce independence: they
reinforce dependence. Elaine Heffner
Bibliography
• Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, Competitive
Authoritarianism, Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War,
Cambridge, University Press, 2010
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