Levitsky and Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Cambridge University: New York.
Chapter 1-2.
What is competitive authoritarianism?
- Regimes that have competitive but unfair election
- “Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal
democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining
power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant
advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition
parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not
democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents.
Competition is thus real but unfair”
- Democracy as Schumpeterian definition + civil liberty
- Full Authoritarianism: a regime in which no viable channels exist for opposition to
contest legally for executive power
- Competitive Authoritarianism differs from FA in that constitutional channels exist
through which oppositions groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power.
Elections held regularly and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting
them. Democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to
take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power
- Differs from Democracy in that incumbents abuse of the state violates at least one of
three defining attributes of democracy: i) free elections ii) broad protection of civil
liberties and iii) a reasonably level playing field
Elections, Broad protection of civil liberties, and a reasonably level playing field
- Elections: opposition candidates are rarely excluded but there may be fraud,
manipulation of voter list, or falsification of results
- Civil Liberties: rights of free speech, press, and associations – are partially respected.
Journalists, and opposition politicians may be subject to harassment and arrest. Legal
repression such as heavy tax/ libel and defamation -> seriously hinder opposition’s
capacity to organize and challenge the incumbent government
- An Uneven Playing Field: i) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends ii)
incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of the opposition, and iii) the
opposition’s ability to organize and compete in election is seriously handicapped –
access to resources (incumbent’s use of the state to monopolize access to privatesector)/ access to media/ biased referees (uneven access to the law)
Democracy
Status of Core
Democratic
Institutions
(elections, civil
liberties)
Systematically
respected. Widely
viewed as only rout
toe power
Status of
Opposition
Competes on more
or less equal footing
with incumbent
Level of
Uncertainty
High
Competitive
Authoritarianism
Exist and are
meaningful, but
systematically
violated in favor of
incumbent. Widely
viewed as primary
route to power
Major opposition is
legal and can
compete openly, but
is significantly
disadvantaged by
incumbent abuse
Lower than
democracy but
higher than full
authoritarianism
Full
Authoritarianism
Nonexistent or
reduced to façade
status. Not viewed
as a viable route to
power.
Major opposition
banned, or largely
underground or in
exile
Low
Table 1.1
Argument:
- Post Cold War, international community began to withdraw support for
authoritarianism/ if democratic rule adopted, military/economic/financial support ->
more costs for elite to maintain dictatorship -> elites adopted formal architecture +
weak civil society = multiparty elections with some form of authoritarianism.
- Incumbents’ capacity to hold onto power depends:
i)
Linkages to the West (density of ties with US/EU): Countries without close
ties with the West, domestic factors mattered more.
ii)
Incumbent’s organizational power: scope and cohesion of state and
governing party structures: incumbent’s with more organizational power can
suppress the rise of opposition well thereby allowing the CA to survive. If
underdeveloped, less stable regimes are more vulnerable to opposition and
turnover.
iii)
Western Leverage: State’s vulnerability to western democratization:
“democratic pressure”.
Implications:
- Previous literature on regime change focuses on i) increase in social wealth/rise in
equality (Lipset 1959/1981, Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, Boix 2003, P and
Limongi 1997) ii) increase in civil society or opposition (which leads to
socioeconomic change, rise in the cost of repression (Dahl, 1971)) strength leads to
democratization .
- Competitive Authoritarianism argument emphasizes: international influence
(Western linkage) of regime change
- Questions: Why did we see more successful democratization in Eastern Europe and
Americas, not Africa and Soviet Union where domestic factors were more important
in their regime change? – Huntington (1991)’s argument of the role of diffusion
-
“relatively neutral transmission of information across borders” mattered in the Third
Wave democratization is somewhat insufficient, why we see the waves in particular
regions but not others?
Democracy and the rise of organized labor/ mass protest leads to democratization
argument (RSS 1992, Bunce and Wolchik 2006) is insufficient – most of the CA
countries had weak and fragmented societal groups!
Logics of Competitive Authoritarianism:
- More reliance on informal institutions: discrepancy between formal rules and actual
behavior (organized corruption, repression, privatized violence)
- Succession Politics
- Party Behavior: Following election rules + other strategies to compete on a skewed
playing field (election boycott/thug mobilization)
Research Method
- Medium N Studies
Chapter 2
How Western Linkage influence actors’ preferences and interests?
- Cost of government abuse
- Create domestic constituencies for democratic behavior
- Shape distribution of power and resource
Figure 2.2
Western Linkages – high -> Democratization
- med/low
Organization Power - high -> Stable authoritarianism
- med/low
Western leverage – high : unstable authoritarianism
Low: stable authoritarianism
Alternative Explanations”
- Modernization/inequality/econ development argument: the previous authoritarianism
did not represent the rich + global finance makes redistribution spending more
difficult even in advanced democracies
- Economic growth mediated by organizational power
- Institutional design argument: but impact of institutional design in CA is unstable/
and weak ruler may be the outcome of previous authoritarianism
- Role of leadership: may be less important overtime than structural factors
Conclusion: Post Cold War regime changes may be much more patterned than we think –
international and domestic structural factors may be important!