CH 8: Latin America's Uneasy
Progress
Monica Romero
INTL. 190
Peru's Transition to Democracy
• Alejandro Toledo's origins
• Reaction to Fujimori's autogolpe
• Toledo's Presidency
o poverty
o social inequality
Democratic Hopes in the Americas
• Pre-1980s Latin American Countries
• Latin America Today
Duvalier, Dictator of Haiti
Chile
Pinochet,
Dictator of
Challenges to Latin American Democracy:
Unanswered Social Problems
•
•
•
•
•
Poverty
Racial Discrimination
Police Corruption
Organized Crime
Gang violence
Favela (slum) in Brazil
CH 9: The PostCommunist
Divide
Sandy Martinez
INTL 190
What once was the Soviet Union..
The Social Divide
Deep historical/cultural legacies make the former Soviet
Union states less likely to join the European Union
4 Alternatives to Democratic Rule
• Army Rule
• Communist Rule
• Dictator
• "suspending" parliament
Current Post Soviet Union states
Falling back into Authoritarianism
" Over time, tensions, divisions, and disappointments for the
post-communist ear ave found expression in public support for
authoritarian nationalist parties and candidates and recurrent
political mainstreaming or 'legitimation of xenophobia'."
-page 194 (beginning of 3rd paragraph)
-sentiments against ethnic minorities
" Eastern Europe's populists do not act as if htey face a
political opponent (or ethnic, religious, or sexual minority)
with whom they can negotiate, but rather an enemy they
must destroy." - page 195 (mid page)
CH 10 Asian exceptionalism
http://www.transparency.org/polic
y_research/surveys_indices/cpi/201
0/results
Authoritarianism and
collectivism in Asian culture
How authoritarianism and
collectivism are embedded into
Korean daily life
Appearances can be deceiving
Authority and collectivism in
Korean politics and why despite
appearances its not a US type of
democracy
Puppeteer and his marionettes
Kim Dae Jung and the way he
accumulated power informally
Korean and Chinese factions
Authoritarianism and collectivism
extending to China
Work ethic in Asia
How Asians dedicate themselves to
people around them
Conclusion
AFRICA, OVERCOMING
PERSONAL RULE
Larry Diamond
Chapter 11
Monika Navarro
INTL 190
• Nigeria 1974 – first initial oil boom. At the time, Nigeria was a huge oil
exporter producing 2 million barrels a day
• Revenue had tripled leading the citizens to believe that there would be
hope of government spending and building as well as a transition from
military regime to a democratic society
• Economic boom did occur, but along with it came corruption on a
massive scale allowing for politicians and elites to become richer as the
poor lived poorly
• Independence gained in 1960. Its true mark of freedom was the
inauguration of Nigeria’s Second Republic on October 1, 1979
• Oil prices booming due to the Iranian revolution in 1979. Nigeria’s total
oil revenue in 1980 was $12 billion. On top of these revenues, the
government also borrowed any funds across seas would give them
• Public eye started to notice and take account of what was going on.
They wanted political change
• Nigeria in a trap of destabilized governing; stubborn politicians against
citizens who would not stand for authoritarian rule
The development trap
• Nigeria contains about 1/5 of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa,
about 700 million people in all of Africa. Nigeria is one of the most
important distributors of oil in the world, but also are within the lowest
percentile according to the Human Development Index
• Corruption and bad governing does not contribute to its already
struggling state. The quality of governance is a big contributor in how the
state is affected and runs . Africa remains one of the most corrupt and
badly governed regions in the world
• Argentine economists Daniel Kaufmann and colleagues developed, at
the World Bank Institution, 6 measures to assess a country’s quality of
governance: voice and accountability, freedom of expression and citizen
participation in selecting the government, government effectiveness (of
public services and public administration), quality of government
regulation, the rule of law, and control of corruption
The pathology of personal rule
• Dysfunctional development failures throughout Africa postcolonial times
• Aid is a huge contributor to funding majority of African countries. In some
cases, it accounts for over half of government budget. Both oil and aid
feed into ruling elites power contributing to economic irrationality
• Neopatrimonialism – draws from Max Weber, that in small, traditional
systems, highly personal and arbitrary rule converted ordinary people into
clients of the ruler rather than citizens with rights
• The right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to an office.
Subordiantes pay loyalty to their personal patrons, not to laws and
institutions
• Personal VS National
• Prebendalism – Richard Joseph of Northwestern University, a political
scientist and leading scholar of Nigeria and Africa, refers to this
corruption as prebendalism
Africa’s (somewhat) new political era
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Personalization and concentration of government power remains in African
realities. What is different? “Life Presidency” is no longer there
By the end of 2006, almost 23 African states were democracies; changes in
electoral malfeasance, corruption, and ruling party dominance, civil society, and
the press. General transformation across the continent was extraordinary
Ghana emerged as one of Africa’s most liberal and vibrant democracies.
Africa’s average levels of freedom improved according to Freedom House scale
Prior to 1990, African leaders left power violently do to a coup or assassination.
In the 1990s, peaceful exists occurred in ways of electoral defeat or voluntarily
resignation. This became the norm
Foreign pressure influencing presidential constrain?
Another emerging trend: civil society. Associations sprouting all around, which
allow for great force for political accountability which challenge the president
Trade unions, student associations, human rights associations, women’s and
civic education groups, election monitoring networks
The barometer of democracy
• Growing public demand for democracy. 62% of the public in 18 countries
said that democracy was preferable to any other government
• Almost ¾ of Africans reject the option of military rule for their country
• More patience growing for democracy
• Satisfaction on the other hand is lower then the patience. With the
survey given with the Afrobarometer (cofounded by political scientist
Michael Bratton), you see that Africans want certain democratic things,
but do not see them happening in Africa
• The understanding of democracy and demand for it is there. The
postcolonial generation knows its political knowledge and seems to be
the generation that is achieving the democratic reforms
Can democracy in Africa really work?
• No region has more countries that straddle the divide between
democracy and pseudodemocracy that Africa. Independent and effective
electoral administraion has become institutionalized in some African
countries, South Africa and Ghana, but in most of Africa, civil liberties
are constrained, opposition rights are tenuous, and elections are riddled
with malpractices, which is fair to even ask if some of these regimes are
even democratic in any case
• On April 12, anti-monarchy protests occurred in Swaziland. Police have
been violent towards members of political parties, journalists, and union
members, and reports on them being detained across the country. There
is strong support for the monarchy and current political system remains,
but the planned peaceful demonstrations may further inflame the desire
for democratic change. The pro-democracy movement which includes
labour and trade unions and political parties like People’s United
Democratic Movement, have been failed to be acknowledge by the
government increasing their discontent.
CH 12: Can The Middle East
Democratize?
Kirsten Noel
INTL 190
Introduction
•
•
•
•
•
Egypt: Hosni Mubarak
Syria and Lebanon
Jordan: King Abdullah
Iraq
Freedom House: states that in 2005, the Middle East had a
"positive regional trajectory", though at times only modest
changes were made
The Cycle of reform
- Diamond: tactical liberalization
o
ex: Jordan, Bahrain, Iraq, Egypt?
reasons for temporary reform:
 more foreign aid and investment because of increased political transparency
 increased support of internal and external populations
 regional trends
 maintenance of hegemonic monarchy
 Western pressures
o reasons for returning to authoritarian rule:
 Increased Islamic influence
 ethnic complexities
 proportional representation
 refugees
 strategic role with the US and Europe
o
Islamic Fundamentalism
• causes of Islamic electoral gains
• the need for Islamic parties in genuine democracy
• necessary steps for Islamic parties
o Illuminate gray areas in their doctrines and intentions
“personal religiosity does not have much impact in shaping
commitment to democracy; rather it is education that
matters.”
Requirements of a Genuine Democracy
....are the opposition parties and Western
powers ready and willing to share democratic control
with Islamic parties?
• feelings of powerlessness = predictor for a political
Islamist orientation
• Diamond : religion and society are not the real problem,
but rather the regimes and the region's distinctive
geopolitics
• better democratic governance= solution to radical Islam
Current Events: Egypt
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2011/04/13/wats
on.mubaraks.detained.cnn?iref=allsearch
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countries
andterritories/egypt/index.html
The general theme of the readings
• Diamond postulates that overall, citizens under
authoritarian regimes desire genuine democracy, but lack
the opportunity to do so because of the personal interests
of the ruling elite.
• How then can democracy be established in these
underdeveloped countries?
o from the bottom, up?
o through foreign assistance?
o redistribution of power?