• Force planning constructs since the end of the
Cold War
• The Quadrennial Defense Review: what’s next?
• Opportunity to create new Service visions
What is a Force Planning Construct?
Guidance on the size (capacity) and shape (mix of capabilities) of
U.S. Armed Forces needed for a range of planning scenarios
Includes assumptions on the nature of the operating environment,
frequency and concurrency of contingency operations, steady-state
and surge requirements, force availability, etc.
2
SITUATION:
PEACETIME
ENGAGED IN
ONE MRC
MRC #1
OVERSEAS
PRESENCE
DEMOCRACY
PEACEKEEPING
FORCES
ENGAGED
OVERSEAS PRES.
STRAT LIFT
ACTIVE
FORCES
ENGAGED IN
SECOND MRC
MRC #2
WIN
MRC #2
RESERVE
FORCES
WIN
MRC #1
RESERVE
FORCES
POST-CONFLICT
STABILITY OPS
PEACEKEEPING
OVERSEAS PRES.
OVERSEAS PRES.
DEMOCRACY
OVERSEAS PRES.
HA/DR
STRAT LIFT
STRAT LIFT
STRAT LIFT
NUKE DETER.
NUKE DETER.
NUKE DETER.
ACTIVE FORCES
RESERVE FORCES
ACTIVE FORCES
RESERVE FORCES
ACTIVE
FORCES
POST-CONFLICT
PERIOD
STABILITY OPS
PEACEKEEPING
HA/DR
STRAT LIFT
NUKE DETER.
FORCES
AVAILABLE
RESERVE
FORCES
SHIFTING TO
TWO MRCS
HA/DR
STRAT LIFT
NUKE DETER.
STRAT LIFT
ACTIVE
FORCES
RESERVE FORCES
RESERVE FORCES
RESERVE FORCES
• Assumed a force that was properly sized for 2 major regional
contingencies (MRCs) could also support smaller-scale
conventional operations (“lesser included cases”)
3
Major QDR Objectives
• Preserve the Bottom-Up Review force planning approach,
create a rationale for cuts to force structure and personnel
• Address requirements to support multiple, concurrent
smaller-scale contingencies
• Continue capability enhancements to support operations to
halt invasions (e.g., improved surveillance and precision strike)
Most significant cuts
Army
Navy
Air Force
Marine Corps
Active Personnel
Reserve Personnel
Civilian Personnel
Active Divisions
Reserve Personnel
Aircraft Carriers (Active/Reserve)
Air Wings (Active/Reserve)
Amphibious Ready Groups
Attack Submarines
Surface Combatants
Active Fighter Wings
Reserve Fighter Wings
Reserve Air Defense Squadrons
Bombers (Total)
Marine Expeditionary Forces
FY1997 Programmed Force
1,450,000
900,000
1997 QDR
1,360,000
835,000
800,000
640,000
FY1997 Programmed Force
10
582,000
11/1
10/1
12
73
128
13
7
10
202
3
1997 QDR
10
530,000
11/1
10/1
12
50
116
12+
8
4
187
3
4
Major Objectives
•
•
•
•
Size for homeland defense and smaller-scale contingencies
Accept risk in the second of 2 major theater wars
Deter forward to prevent conflicts, rather than respond to crises
Shift from optimizing for conflicts on the Korean and Arabian
Peninsulas to a broader range of scenarios
Major Forces (Active/RC)
1-4-2-1
1 Defend the United States;
Deter aggression and coercion forward in
4 critical regions;
Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major
while preserving the option for decisive
2 conflicts
victory in one of those conflicts – including the
possibility of regime change or occupation; and
a limited number of smaller-scale
1 Conduct
contingency operations
Divisions
10/8
1/1
USA Cavalry Regiments
Enhanced Separate Brigades
15
Aircraft carriers
12
Air Wings
10/1
USN Amphib Ready Groups
12
Attack Submarines
55
Surface Combatants
108/8
Fighter Squadrons
46/38
USAF Air Defense Squadrons
/4
Bombers (combat-coded)
112
Divisions
3/1
3/1
USMC Air Wings
(3 MEFs) Force Service Support
3/1
Groups
5
“Michelin Man”
Active Partnering
& Tailored Shaping
Homeland
Defense
Consequence
Management
Global
Deterrence
• Support wartime requirements
• Change the capabilities mix, forces
sized about right
• Prioritize capabilities for 4 focus areas
• Build partner capacity
Interdiction
Active Partnering
& Tailored Shaping
Stability
Operations
War on Terror
Irregular Warfare
Train &
Equip
Information
Operations
Transnational
Deterrence
Foreign Internal
Defense
Counterinsurgency
Active Partnering
& Tailored Shaping
Forward
Presence
Regional
Deterrence
Information
Operations
Conventional
Campaign(s)
Stability Ops
Reconstruction
Consequence
Mgmt.
Major Combat
WMD
Operations
Elimination
6
• Multiple scenario cases for near-term (next 5 to 7 years) and
mid- to long-term (years 7 to 20) planning
• Preserved 2 war planning requirement, prioritized capabilities
that can rapidly “swing” between theaters
• Project power in anti-access/area-denial environments
Mid- to Long-Term
Scenario Case
Scenario Case
Scenario Case
Major stabilization
operation
+
Deter and defeat a
highly capable
regional aggressor
+
Support civil
authorities in response
to a catastrophic event
in U.S. homeland
Deter and defeat
regional aggressor #1
+
Deter and defeat
regional aggressor #2
+
Enhanced homeland
defense posture
Major stabilization
operation
+
Long-duration
deterrence operation
in separate theater
+
Medium-sized
counterinsurgency
operation
+
Support civil authorities
in homeland
or
or
7
• No longer size for large-scale, long-duration
stability operations
• Asia-Pacific rebalancing
• Another nuclear forces cut may be possible
Steady-State
‒ Support continuing counterterrorism operations
‒ Sustain other “steady-state”
mission demands
o
Maintaining a stabilizing
global presence
o
Nuclear deterrence
o
Homeland defense, defense
support to civil authorities
o
Lesser contingencies
Surge (Illustrative)
Theater #1
‒ Combined arms campaign in all
domains to defeat acts of aggression
+
Theater #2
‒ Deny the objectives of / impose
unacceptable costs on an
opportunistic aggressor in 2nd region
+
Homeland Defense
‒ Defend the homeland and provide
support to civil authorities during
consequence management events
8
COCOM Force Requirements
STEADY-STATE
OPTEMPO
SURGE
OPERATIONS
PHASE 4/5
OPERATIONS
Theater #2
Deny Objectives / Impose Unacceptable
Costs on Opportunistic Aggressor
Theater #1
Combined Arms
Campaign to
Defeat Aggression
Presence
Defeat
Homeland Defense
Support to Civil Authorities / Consequence Management
Steady State: Nuclear Deterrence, Support to Counter-Terrorism Operations
Air Force Rotation Goal
Active
1:3 (1:4 desired)
Rotation Policy
Reserve 1:5 (AF 1:10 volunteerism)
Component
Full Mobilization
No force rotation
Rotation Policy
1:2 Active
1:5 Reserve
9
Rotational
Post-surge
rotational
Examples
Air superiority fighters, bombers
Low-density, high-demand
Examples
Majority of the fighter force
Theater mobility
Strategic mobility
10
11
Change surge scenarios to enable force
structure/end strength cuts
(e.g., adopt new operational concepts that emphasize
global surveillance and strike, cyber, SOF, “swing”
forces, undersea warfare, etc. vice deploying forces to
engage in major ground operations)
Increase timing
between major warfights
Decrease steady-state and long-term
rotational requirements
In other words, “do less with less”
12
Post Surge
Rotation
1:2 Active
1:5 Reserve
These changes could have
profound implications for
the Air Force’s AC/RC mix
Decrease
New planning
scenarios that change
Post Surge requirements for
Rotational rotational forces
Demand Changing COCOM
requirements for
rotational forces
Supply
A smaller overall force
due to budget cuts
Increase
AC/RC mix more
AC/RC mix may favor
similar to a peacetime forces with greater
steady-state mix
rotational availability
AC/RC mix may favor
forces with greater
rotational availability
13
Predominately Air and Naval Capabilities
Predominately Ground and Expeditionary Capabilities
• Expeditionary Crisis Responses
Capability Requirements
• Building Partner Capacity
• Sustained Counter-Terrorism
Operations
• AirSea Battle in the
Western Pacific
• Hybrid Major Contingency
• Global Swing Forces
• Joint Theater Entry Operations
• WMD Elimination Operations
Expeditionary Combat Support, Force Enablers,
Force Generation Capabilities, etc.
Range of Defense Planning Scenarios
14
“The fundamental element of a military service
is its purpose or role in implementing military
policy … the strategic concept of the service…a
description of how, when, and where the military
service expects to protect the nation against
some threat to its security.”
“Changes in the principal threats to the
security of any given nation … must be met by
shifts in national policy and corresponding
changes in service strategic concepts”
— Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, 1954
• Operational domains that are increasingly
contested
New visions
• Asia-Pacific rebalancing
should consider:
• Growing need for systems that are survivable,
persistent, multi-mission capable, and can
operate from access-insensitive areas
15
Future Pacific?
Future Gulf?
UK Bases
Aviano AB
22x greater
than Iraq’s
landmass
Taiwan
Strait
Denied
Areas
Key Considerations
• Increased depth of
the battlespace
• Close-in bases at risk
• Average range to
possible target areas >
1,200 nautical miles
• Campaigns may be
protracted
2,355 nm
1,850 nm
Denied
Areas
1,500 nm
1,000 nm
Tehran
Andersen
AFB
Denied
Areas
Sea
Base
2,400 nm
Northern RAAF
Bases
Potential target sets
much greater in
size, more timesensitive, more
mobile, better
concealed, better
hardened, deeply
buried
2,200 nm
Diego
Garcia
16
• A future force capable of attacking the full range of targets in contested
environments
– Greater focus on preparing for potential Asia-Pacific operations
• America’s “swing force” that can rapidly deploy to a 2nd theater to deter
or spoil opportunistic acts of aggression
• A force that takes full advantage of new technologies (unmanned, DE,
other) to maintain freedom of action in the air, space, and EM spectrum
Balancing mix of
short-and long-range
Creating resilient
forward postures
Fully harnessing the
robotic revolution
Dominating the EM
spectrum
17
• Improve the ability of aircraft carriers to project power ashore and
into contested areas
• Take advantage of manned and unmanned undersea capabilities
that can operate in denied areas
• Take advantage of new technologies that could create
cost/exchange ratios favorable to the United States
• Prepare for operations that may be of long duration
Getting the future
carrier air wing right
Harnessing the potential
of cyber & DE
Expanding payloads of
the submarine fleet
Developing the right
PGM magazine
18
Space Assets
More Dispersed, Resilient
Basing Posture
Air-Breathing,
Long-Endurance
Communications Relays
Aerial
Refueling
Standoff Strike
Platforms
Undersea LandAttack Capacity
Penetrating
Munitions
Standoff Strike
Platforms
Carriers with Longer
Range Air Wing
Capabilities
Next Generation
Jammers
Penetrating
Bombers
Electronic
Warfare
Expendables
Penetrating, Carrier-based
Multi-Mission UCAV
19
• Focus on rapid crisis responses
– Not a second land army
• Distributed operations in the Pacific and Middle East
– Work with allies and partners to establish forward
expeditionary operating locations
• Joint theater entry ops (different than traditional “forcible entries)
Right-sizing
expeditionary lift
Modernizing the
STOVL force
Supporting capabilities
for distributed ops
Fielding next generation
EW capabilities
20
• New approaches and
capabilities for imposing costs
in the Pacific and Persian Gulf
• Focus on preparing for hybrid
and counter-WMD operations
• Land-based sea control
Land-based longrange strike
Leveraging the indirect
approach: SFA, BPC
Land-based
sea denial
Air and missile
defense
21
Early 1990s: End of Cold War >> shift to conventional theater
contingency scenarios
2001: 9/11 >> address homeland defense requirements
2002-2013: Iraq, Afghanistan >> major expansion of SOF, CT,
unmanned aircraft, building partner capacity, etc.
Today
• End of 12 years of war >> no large-scale stability ops
• Pacific rebalancing, A2/AD challenges, WMD
proliferation, hybrid conflicts >> time for a new FPC
rather than an “update” that sustains the status quo
22
35%
1993 BUR
Today
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
Service Shares of the
Base Defense Budget
Air Force
Navy & Marine Corps
Army
Defense-Wide
FY92
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
0%
Does not include funding for overseas contingency operations
23
24
Baseline:
No Additional Cuts
FY14 President’s Budget
(In FY14 Dollars)
Scenario B: Half Sequester
Scenario A: Full Sequester
Full Sequester
Half Sequester
FY2014-18
-$260 B
-$56 B
FY2019-23
-$261 B
-$191 B
Two FYDP Total
-$522 B
-$247 B
25
Example exercise
results for a full
sequester scenario
• Accelerated next bomber procurement
• Funded new stealthy, multi-mission remotely piloted aircraft
• Added precision-guided munitions to help offset force cuts
$150 B
• Invested in airborne directed energy weapons
$100 B
$50 B
$0 B
-$50 B
-$100 B
-$150 B
-$200 B
-$250 B
-$300 B
-$350 B
26
Example exercise
results for a full
sequester scenario
• Traded military and civilian personnel,
contractors, to support modernization
• Reduced near-term readiness FY14-18,
fully restored readiness for FY19-23
$150 B
$100 B
$50 B
$0 B
-$50 B
-$100 B
-$150 B
-$200 B
-$250 B
-$300 B
• Traded DoD TACAIR for long-range
capabilities
– Kept Air Force above 1,000
combat-coded fighters
• Traded non-survivable RPAs for a new
generation of stealthy, multi-mission
unmanned vehicles
• Reduced strategic and tactical airlift
-$350 B
27