Flooddefence:timeforaradicalrethink
DieterHelm
5thJanuary2016
1. Floodingcrisestendtofollowanestablishedpattern.First,thereis
immediatehelpandassistance.Thensecond,thereisa“review”.On
occasions,thisleadstoathirdstageofgenuinereform,butinmostcases
“stickingplasters”areapplied.Theseareincrementalandoftensensible,
buttypicallyfailtoaddressthecoreissuesandhenceprovideonlya
temporaryrespite.
2. Thereareverygoodreasonswhy”stickingplasters”willnotworkthis
time.Theconventionalapproachtoflooddefence,carriedoutbythe
EnvironmentAgency(EA),andfinancedlargelybytheTreasury,isatbest
inefficient.Sometimesitisevencounterproductive,encouragingthesorts
oflanduseandlandmanagementdecisionsthatcanactuallymake
floodingworseinthemediumterm.
3. Facedwithanunprecedentedexpectedriseinthepopulation,andamajor
housebuildingandinfrastructureprogramme,landuseisundergoingan
historicandprofoundchange.Flooddefencesandrivercatchment
managementwillneedtoadaptandadjusttothesechanges–butsotoo
willplanning,andagriculturalpolicy.Thisrequiresaradicalrethink,
treatingriversascorenaturalcapital.Therecentfloodsprovidethe
opportunitytodothis.
4. Therearethreestepstotherequiredrethink,andthesearesetoutinthis
briefsummarypaper.Thefirstistoworkouthowmuchflooddefencewe
need,andwhatitshouldcompriseof.Thisrequiresaneconomic
assessmentofthecatchmentsystemsandtheirnaturalcapital.The
secondstepistocreatealongerterm,sustainableasset-basedframework
andtheassociatedfinancialbasis.Atthecoreare:abalancesheet;an
assetregister;aregulatedassetbase;debtfinance;andacorporate
structure.Third,floodsdefenceneedsaproperinstitutionalcontext.
Flooddefenceneedstobeputonastand-alonebasis,allowingtheEAto
focusonenvironmentalprotection,structurallyseparatingout
operational,projectmanagement,catchmentmanagement,regulationand
catchmentplanningfunctions.Thepaperbringsthesethreesteps
togethertoproposeawayforward.
Theeconomicapproachtoflooddefence
5. Thefirststepistosortoutwhatsortsofflooddefencesweneed–whatis
theoptimallevelofflooddefence.Surprisinglyperhaps,theEAdoesnot
provideacredibleanswer,andtheansweritdoesprovideleadstoa
serousmisallocationofresourcesandsomeperverseincentivesforhome
buildingandwiderlanduse.
6. Theoptimallevelofflooddefenceisaneconomicconcept,andtakes
accountofthecostsandbenefitsofflooddefenceinvestments,discounted
backtothepresent.Itincorporatesriskanduncertainty,andrecognises
thatthisoptimallevelisveryunlikelytoprotectallpropertiesfrom
inundation.Itdoesnotevenrequireaspecificfocusonthoseproperties
mostatrisk.Insomecases,itmaynotbesensibletoprotectthosemostat
risk:thepropertiesmightnotbeworththecostsofprotectingthem.
7. Inapplyingthissortofeconomicappraisaltofloods,therearethreemain
complications.First,flooddefenceappliestorivercatchmentsandwater
systems,andnottospecificprojectsonastand-alonebasis–natural
capitalsystems.Second,landuse(andinparticulartheprotectionand
enhancementofupstreamnaturalcapital,agriculturalpracticeand
housingandindustrialdevelopmentsplanning)playsacriticalpartis
bothcausingandhelpingtoalleviateflooding.Third,therearepositive
andnegativeexternalitiesfromflooddefenceinvestments.Atworst,they
candisruptnaturalriverflowsandnegativelyimpactontheenvironment;
atbest,theycanyieldanumberofpositivebenefitstohealth,recreation,
andbiodiversity,andtherebyenhancesustainableeconomicgrowth.
8. TheEA’smethodologyisnotaneconomicone.Itsriskmanagement
strategy(assetoutforexampleinUnderstandingtherisks,empowering
communities,buildingresistance(2011))focusesonthosepropertiesat
mostphysicalrisk,butthisdoesnotprovideasensiblewayofevaluating
whatresourcesshouldbedeployedwhereandtowhosebenefit.The
TreasuryGreenBooktakesanoverwhelminglyproject-specificapproach,
ratherthanlookatsystem(andinthiscasecatchmentsystem)costsand
benefits.
9. Theconclusionthatfollowsisthatwedonothaveasoundbasisfor
decidinghowmuchtospend,andwhatandwheretospendit.Thereisan
urgentneedtoputtheanalysisonasoundeconomicfooting.
10. Worsestill,theEA’smethodologycancreateperverseincentives.The
consequencesofthephysicalmost“at-risk”approachareconsiderablein
determiningtheincentivescreatedforhousebuildingandother
developments.TheEA’smethodologyhasaperverseincentiveatitscore:
ifbuildingsareplacedathigh-riskfloodlocations,theywillbeprioritised
forflooddefence,sincetheywillbethemost“at-risk”.Giventhisobvious
consequence,theEAprovidesadvicetoplannersonproposednew
developments.Howeverthisisadvice,notprohibition,andiftheadviceis
eithernotgiven,orisrejected,theEAshouldthen-onitsown
methodology-prioritisethesenewpropertiesforfloodriskmitigation.
11. Housebuildingaffectsfloodriskeveniftheseareindirectly“at-risk”
areas.Thereasonsareobvious:newdevelopmentstypicallyreducethe
abilityoflandtoabsorbandholdrainwater.Itmattersgreatlywherethe
200,000newhomesperannumarebuilt.
12. Housebuildinglocationcanbefurtherperverselyincentivisedbyflood
riskinsuranceandemergencyfunding.Providinginsurancebelowthe
truecostsoftheriskinsuredleadstoadversesiteselection.Putanother
way,ifnewhouse-ownersfacedthefullcostsofbothfloodingto
themselves,andfloodingriskincreasestoothers,farmoreattention
wouldbepaidtothelocationofnewhousing.FloodReisthelatest
exampleofthedeliberateattempttocrosssubsidisepoorrisklocations–
onavoluntarybasis.
13. Emergencyfundingtohelphouseholdsrecoverfromfloodeventsisan
obviousresponsetothedistressanddamagecausedtothosewhose
housesareinundated.Manyhavelittlesparefinancialresources,and
insuranceclaimsandpaymentsandrepairstaketime.Itreplicatesother
emergencysituations–forexample,bailingoutretaildepositorsin
bankingcrises.
14. Yetemergencyaidcreatesbothmoralhazardandencouragesthe
selectionofinappropriatelocations.Intheabsenceofanysuchsupport,
andwithinsurancepricedatfullriskcost,houseswouldnotbebuiltin
areasatseriousrisk.Floodplaindevelopmentswouldsimplynothappen
asaconsequenceofthetruecostsoffloodingriskbeingpricedinto
houses.
15. Thereisasignificantdifferencebetweenexistinghousesandtheobvious
distressandhardshipcausedtothembyfloods,andthetreatmentofnew
housingdevelopments.Existinghousescannotbeeasilymovedtobetter
locations.Newhousescanbeputinbetterplaces.Intheabsenceofthe
appropriateprivateincentivesbasedonthetrueriskcosts,thealternative
isproperplanning,baseduponthespatialchoicesasifthedeveloper
facedthetrueeconomiccosts.
16. Theneedforsuchexplicitplanningregulationisallthegreaterasthe
governmenttargetsamajorhousebuildingprogramme.Thisreflectsthe
increaseinsingleandlowoccupancyhousingdemand,andthescheduled
populationriseofaround10millionoverthenexttwodecadesorso(a
morethan20%increaseinthetotalpopulation).Themajorinfrastructure
developments(inadditiontothehousebuildingprogramme)addtothe
floodingriskandtheimportanceofspatialplanning.Incombination,this
ispotentiallythelargestscaleallocationoflandformanydecades.The
scaleisawesome.
17. Theplanningsystemdoesnotcurrentlyproperlyinternalisethesetrue
costsoflocationaldecisions.Theresultisthatnewhousesandother
developmentsarebeingbuiltinthewrongplaces,andoncebuiltwill
presentalongtermandcontinuingfloodmanagementproblem.
18. Toaddtothefailurestoincentiviseappropriatelocationaldecisionsfor
housebuilders,agriculturalincentivesarealsoinconsistentwithefficient
flooddefence.
19. AgriculturetakesupmostoftheUK’slandmass,anditisbothamajor
causeofincreasedfloodrisksandamajorpotentialmeanstoalleviate
theserisks.Yetagriculturalpoliciesandtheassociatedsubsidiespaylittle
ornoattentiontothefloodriskdimensions.Someparticularexamples
include:themuchgreaterexposuretorapidrunofffromtheplantingof
maize;thesoilerosionofsuchcrops;theimportanceofpastureand
grasslandsonrivermargins;theburningandencroachmentsonheather
moorlands;andhighstockgrazingdensities.
20. Thefarmingpracticesoftheupperreachesofrivercatchmentsare
especiallyimportantindeterminingfloodrisk.Thesearealsotypically
themosthighlysubsidisedtypesoffarming,withthelowestagricultural
yields.Thusthecoststooutputsofadaptingpracticearelowest,yetthey
havethehighestbenefitsinreducingfloodriskbyholdingwater.They
typicallyalsohavethegreatestvalueinnaturalcapitalforrecreation,
leisureandbiodiversity.
21. IntheSomersetLevelscase,thechangingfarmingpracticesdirectly
contributedtothesiltingofthetwomainrivers,andthereweredemands
fordredgingtodealwiththeconsequences.Upstreamfarmingpractices
havecontributedtothemorerecentfloodeventstoo.
22. SteponeistourgentlyreplacetheEA’scurrentappraisalmethodology
withonebasedoneconomics,andtherebyshapetheincentivesforhouse
buildingandagriculturalpractices.Flooddefencethenbecomesan
integralpartoftheeconomicsof(natural)rivercatchments.
Thefloodbalancesheetandfloodfinances
23. Havingworkedouthowmuchflooddefenceofwhatkindsisneededona
catchmentbasis,andincorporatedincentive-compatibleplanningandthe
redirectionofsomeagriculturalsubsidies,thesecondstepistoput
togetheranassetsregisterofflooddefenceinvestments,andtocreatea
balancesheet.Thisispreciselywhatthewaterindustryhashadtodo,
followingprivatisation,andwhateveryotherprivatisedutilitydoestoo.
Unlessyouknowwhatassetsyouhavegot,andthestatetheassetsarein,
itisnotpossibletoplanefficiently.
24. Theutilitiescanborrowagainsttheirassets–aslongasthedebtand
equityliabilitiesdonotexcesstheassetvalues.Thisholdstruewhenever
anassetisaddedwhichhasapositivenetpresentvalue(NPV).
25. Thereasonthisworksintheutilities,andthereforetheycaninvestinthe
optimalassets,isbecausetheyareguaranteedarevenuestreamto
remuneratethem.Theyhaveregulatedassetbases(RABs).
26. Forsomewhatobscurereasonsconnectedwiththebotchedfirstattempt
atwaterprivatisationinthelate1980s,whilstwatercompaniesfollowed
thispath–andhaveasaresultbeenabletomakesubstantive
investmentstoimprovewaterinfrastructure–flooddefencewassplit
fromthewaterauthoritiesandplacedinapublicsectoragency,the
NationalRiversAuthority(NRA),whichsubsequentlymorphedintothe
EA.
27. Theresulthasbeenthattheflooddefencecostsofarivercatchmentare–
unlikethewaterandseweragecostsoftherivercatchments–not
socialisedintoregularutilitybills.Inretrospect,thiswasprobablya
mistake–splittingoutdimensionsoftherivercatchmentsystem
managementreducedcoordinationincentives.
28. TheNRAandtheEAhaveasaresultrelieduponpay-as-you-go,Treasury
grantfundstoaconsiderableextent,thoughthesehavenowbeen
augmentedbyanextraordinarilycomplicatedsupportingstructureof
revenueflows.(Foraninsight,FigureEightofthe2011EApaperreferred
toabovegivesaflowchartonpage40).Thisisincontrasttothepaywhen-deliveredmodelforwater.
29. Thecreationofafloodassetbalancesheetforeachrivercatchmentisa
necessaryconditionforpay-when-deliveredinvestments,andthe
supportingborrowing.
30. Theadditionaladvantageofabalancesheetapproachisthatithelpsto
identifycapitalmaintenance–tokeeptheassetsingoodorder.Inthe
watercase,assetsaretreatedas“inperpetuity”andhencetheyarenot
depreciated.Insteadtheyaresubjecttocurrentcostaccounting.Giventhe
expectedlifeofmajorflooddefenceassets–betheyupstream
environmentallandmanagementsofmoorlands,floodplainmeadowsor
physicalbarriers–thisisalsotherightapproachforflooddefence.
31. Giventhattherevenuestreamisnolongersocialisedinwaterutilitybills
andgiventherivercatchmentratherthanlocalgovernmentspatial
dimensions,thebalancesheetapproachraisesaquestionwhichcannot
beavoidedifflooddefenceistobeoptimallyprovided:wherewillthe
moneycomefrom?
32. Notwithstandingthesearchforlotsofnew“partnerships”,localauthority
andadditionalanddiverserevenuesources,therearejustthreepossible
mainanswers:thetaxpayers;arivercatchmentcharge(likewaterbills);
andinsurersanddevelopers.
33. Taxpayerfundinghasmanyadvantages.Thegovernment’scostofcapital
isverylow,anditcanprovideflexibility–forexamplenowinthe
Cumbrianandnorthernfloods,andinemergencyaidtotheSomerset
Levelsin2013/14.
34. Thedisadvantagesarewellknown.Governmentsarewidelyregardedas
incapableofmakingcrediblelong-termcommitmentstofuturefunding,
andwhentheytrytodoso,theprivatesectordemandshighreturnsin
responsetotheperceivedlackofpoliticalcredibilityinsuch
commitments.PPPandPFIschemesareexamples,whichrevealthislack
ofcredibility.Fundingispartofthegeneralenvelopofpublicexpenditure
andhastositwithindeficittargets.Adverseeconomiccircumstanceslead
tothepossibilityofshort-termcuts.
35. Itisextremelyunlikelythatanygovernmentwillsolvethisproblem
whichhasbedevilledpublicsectorinvestmentforatleasthalfacentury.
Manyofficialsandmanypoliticianshavetriedto.Nonehassucceeded,
andthissuggeststheproblemisgenericandnotaflood-specificissue.
36. Thesecondrouteisafloodutilitycharge,leviedlargelyonariver
catchmentbasis.Thiswouldfollowthedefinitionofthewaterand
seweragecompanies,anditwouldprobablybemostefficienttoaddthis
tothewaterbills,thoughitcouldberaisedasaseparatefloodlevy.The
latterwouldrequireaseparatecustomerregisterandallthecoststhatgo
withthis.Ontheotherhand,locationalvariancecouldbemadevery
specifictoriskandmorefinegrainedriskcategories.TheEA’sfloodrisk
mapsareapotentialtooltothistargetingoflevies.
37. Thethirdroute–insurance-isatbestapartialone.Theindustrycould
useitschargebasetodirectfundstowardsthereductionofrisks.Itcould
dothisdirectly,oritcouldofferdifferentpremiatohouseholdersonthe
basisoftheriskavoidancemeasurestheymighttake.Thesemightinclude
notjustphysicalbarrierstowatercomingintotheirhouses,butgreen
roofs(asintheNetherlands),tiledratherthancarpetedfloorsandatthe
limitdownstairsareaswhichcanbefloodedwithoutsignificantproperty
damage.Anadditionalpressuremightcomeonwatercompaniesto
reducetheriskoffoulfloodingthroughbettermanagementofsewerage.
38. Ofthesethreeoptions,thefirsthasclearlyanddemonstrablyfailedto
deliveroptimalflooddefences–notjustintherecentfloods,butover
severaldecades.Thesecondandthirdarecomplimentary.Someelement
ofinsurancecontributionhasanobviousincentive-compatible
characteristic.Butinsurancecontributionsarelikelytobelimitedandfar
belowtherequiredrevenue.Thatleavesalevy–eitherdirectlyorvia
waterbillsorCouncilTax.Ofthese,waterbillsarelikelytobethemost
efficient,buttheremaybegreatertransparencyinfine-tuningthelevyif
itisonastand-alonebasis.
39. Thereasonwhypoliticianshaveshiedawayfromthelevyapproachis
thatthevotersappeartoberesistanttowhatwillbeperceivedasanew
andadditionaltax.Yetthisisanillusion:gettingtaxpayerstopayor
catchmenthouseownerswillmakelittlepracticaldifferenceifthecosts
aresocialisedwithinthecatchmentsystems,andiftheyarenot,thenthe
taxpayerroutefurtherinstitutionalisestheideathatothersshouldpay.
40. Inpractice,thetaxpayerrouteisunlikelytoproducetherequiredlong
termfunding.Thusopposingalevyisinrealityademandforthestatus
quotobecontinued,howbeitwithabitmoreTreasurygrant.Itsimply
doesnotmatchtheneedandcondemnsthesystemtoseriouslyand
permanentlysub-optimalflooddefences.
Institutionalandregulatorystructures
41. Stepthreerequiresafundamentalrestructuringoftheinstitutional
architecture,whichwascreatedasaresultoftwoseriouspolicymistakes
inthelate1980sandtheearly1990s.Thesewere:thewayinwhichthe
NRAwassplitfromthewaterauthoritiesatprivatisation;andthe
cobblingtogetheroftheNRA,HMIPandvariouswastebodiestocreate
theEA.Thesetwomistakeshavehauntedthemanagementofriver
catchmentsandflooddefenceeversince,andinthecaseoftheEAledtoa
numberofseriousmanagementproblemsattheNRAandthentheEA.
42. ThoughtheEAcouldinprincipleadministerautility-stylelevelsystem,
haveabalancesheet,andborrowforapay-when-deliveredsystemof
finance,itwouldbeaverydifferentorganisation.
43. TheEAwascreatedwiththeexplicitpurposeofproviding“Integrated
PollutionControl”.Yetbecauseofthepoliticalanddepartmental
squabblesatthetimeofitscreation,itendedupbeingamergerofthe
NRA,HMIPandvariouswastebodies.BecausetheNRAatthetimehad
over6000staff,andHMIPmuchless,andbecauseofthesheerscaleofthe
operationaldemandsoftheNRAactivities,itendedupbeinga
conglomeratedominatedbywaterandfloods.Thewidelyrecognised
resulthasbeenanoftenpoorlymanagedandpoorlyfocussed
organisation.
44. UnfortunatelyintherecentTriennialReviewoftheEA,theopportunityto
createasmaller,moretightlyfocussedEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,
shearedofitsoperationalactivities,wasmissed.1Therecentfloodgivesa
furtheropportunitytorethinkthiserror,andtocreateaseparateflood
defencebody.
1SeeHelm,D.R.(2013)TriennialReviewoftheEnvironmentAgencyandNaturalEngland.
Availablefrom:http://dieterhelm.co.uk/node/1413
45. Aseparateflooddefencebody,withabalancesheetandborrowing
capacity,wascontemplatedinthediscussionsleadinguptothefirst
NationalInfrastructurePlanin2010.Thesuggestionwasthatanew
floodsbodywouldbecreatedasautility,withautility-styleRABandthe
associatedregulatoryarrangements.Thiscouldbeasinglenationalbody,
oronacatchmentbasis.
46. Anewfloodsutilitywouldnotnecessarilybeaprivatecompany.Itcould
bestate-owned,thoughitmightneedacompanystructuresothatitcould
besubjecttothenormalaccountingandlegalframeworks,andhavea
balancesheetseparatefromthatoftheTreasury.
47. Theownershipissueisthereforesecondary,andturnsontheissuesof
efficiency,incentivesandpublicacceptability.
48. Theproblemofcoordinatingbetweenthevariousorganisationswithin
rivercatchmentswouldremain.Inparticular,thereisaneedto
coordinatewater,sewerage,agricultureandlanduse,planningandflood
defence.Localinitiatives,upstreamprojects,andahostofother
contributionswillallfeatureinarrivingatefficientsolutions.
Decentralisationandlocalismrequireasupportingoverarching
framework.
49. Inaseparatepaper,IhaveproposedaCatchmentSystemOperatormodel
andanoverarchingCatchmentPlan.2
50. Thefloodsutilitycouldbea“big”or“small”organisation.Thisturnson
whetheritcarriesouttheworksitself–assetmanagement,flood
monitoringandinformation,projectdevelopmentsandsoon–or
contractsouttoothers–forexample,watercompanies,contractors,
environmentalorganisations,landmanagersandotherspecialistbodies.
51. Afloodsutilityapproachcouldgoalltheway,backtotheoriginalwater
authoritiespre-privatisation,andpre-thesplittingoftheNRAandthe
waterandseweragecompanies(createdasaresultofthatsplit).
2SeeHelm,D.R.(2015).CatchmentsManagement,AbstractionandFlooding:thecasefora
catchmentsystemoperatorandcoordinatedcompetition.Availablefrom:
http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/node/1405.
52. Themergedmodelhasbothmoreandlessattractioninthepresenceofa
CatchmentSystemOperator,sinceitistheCSOthatdeterminesthe
optimalcatchmentinvestments,andcanusecompetitivetenderingtoget
worksdone.
53. Itisalsoaquestionofurgencyandtiming.WhilsttheEAmayarguethat
nowisnotthetimetobreakitup,sinceinvestmentisurgent,inpractice
thisisspurious.Nowispreciselythetime,andifitisurgentthenthe
watercompanieshavethecapabilityandscale–aswellasaccessto
borrowingandfinancialmarkets–whichtheEApatentlydoesnot,and
arguablyneverwill.UndertheCSO,therewouldbelotsofopportunities
forcompetitivebiddingandnewplayersfromacrossthespectrum–from
watercompaniestowildlifeorganisations,farmersandmanyothers.
Aproposedwayforward
54. Themostimportantsinglesteptobetakennowisanexplicitrecognition
thatthestatusquoisnotonlyunsustainable,butisneverlikelytobe
sustainable.Theworstreactiontothecurrentfloodscrisiswouldbemore
ofthesame–abitmoreemergencyfunding,andabitlargerEAbudget.
55. Aradicalrethinkstartswithworkingoutwhatanoptimalflooddefence
systemwouldlooklike.TheEAhasnevercarriedoutthisexercise,andits
appraisaltechniquesarenotdesignedtosothis.Theyareaimedat
physicalrisks.Economics,andeconomicassessment,hasunfortunately
beenlargelyalientotheEA’sapproachtoflooding.Therehasneverbeen
afullcomparativeefficiencyauditofitsperformance,suchasthoseto
whichthewatercompaniesareregularlysubjected.
56. Thesecondstepistorecognisethatpay-as-you-gointhepublicsectorwill
alwaysbesubjecttowiderandshorter-termfiscalconstraints.TheCSR
processwillneverdelivertheappropriatefunding.Therightapproachis
pay-when-delivered,withborrowingfinancinginvestment.Thisrequiresa
floodsbalancesheet.
57. Thefloodsbalancesheetshouldincludetheassetsandidentifythecapital
maintenancerequirements.Theliabilitiesaretheborrowingstofinance
theassets.
58. Therevenuetosupporttheinvestmentscancomefromtaxpayers,butin
practicethisdefaultstothecurrentCSR-typeapproach.Itissimplynot
credibleasaroutetowardsamoreoptimalsetofassets.Iftaxpayers
continuetoprovidetherevenue,thenthestatusquoislikelytobethe
outcome.
59. Someformoffloodslevyshouldbeappliedatthecatchmentlevel.The
optionsareafloodslevy,anadditiontowaterbills,orinsurance
contributions.Sincetherisksareatthesystemlevelforthecatchmentas
awhole,itfollowsthatsomedegreeofsocialisationofthecostsis
inevitable,andthereisobviousscopetoaddwidersocialconsiderations
intothecalculationoflevy–ashappenswithwaterbillsnow.
60. FlooddefenceshouldbesplitoutfromtheEA,andnewflooddefence
companiescreatedonacatchmentbasis(withinasingleoverarching
structureorreplicatingthecatchmentmodelthattheNRAinheritedfrom
thewaterauthoritiespre-privatisation).
61. Thenewstructureshouldbecorporate,andcouldbeintheprivateor
publicsectors.Thecrucialpointsare:theabilitytoborrow;the
requirementforariskregister;andtherequirementtotradesolvently.
62. ThecreationofCatchmentSystemOperatorsrendersthequestionof
integrationwithexistingwatercompaniesandcoordinationasecondary
issue.Practicalitypointstoafullreintegration,butthisisnotanessential
partofthemodeladvocatedinthispaper.
Conclusions
63. Thegovernmentnowhasanopportunityandachoice.Itcanmuddleon
withtheexistingmodelandaddsomeimmediate“stickingplasters”.It
canincreasethefundingandtrytoimprovetheEA’smodellingand
management.Or,itcanseizetheopportunitytoradicallyrethinkand
restructureflooddefencesintheUK.Ifittakestheformerroute,
ministerswillneedtokeepsparesetsofwellingtonbootsatthereadyfor
futurefloodemergenciesandcrises,andhouseholderscanexpectmore
sceneslikethoseintheSomersetLevels,inCumbria,Yorkandelsewhere
toreoccur–againandagain.Ifittakesthelaterrouteitcansortoutflood
defencesforageneration.Intheprocess,itcouldprovideaviablelong
termfundingmodel.Forgoodmeasure,itcouldadopttheCatchment
SystemOperatormodel,increasecompetitionandefficiencyinproject
developmentandassetmanagement,anditcouldmaketheEAamuch
morefocussedEnvironmentProtectionAgency.Thelatteriswhatthe
governmentshoulddo–urgently.