Flooddefence:timeforaradicalrethink DieterHelm 5thJanuary2016 1. Floodingcrisestendtofollowanestablishedpattern.First,thereis immediatehelpandassistance.Thensecond,thereisa“review”.On occasions,thisleadstoathirdstageofgenuinereform,butinmostcases “stickingplasters”areapplied.Theseareincrementalandoftensensible, buttypicallyfailtoaddressthecoreissuesandhenceprovideonlya temporaryrespite. 2. Thereareverygoodreasonswhy”stickingplasters”willnotworkthis time.Theconventionalapproachtoflooddefence,carriedoutbythe EnvironmentAgency(EA),andfinancedlargelybytheTreasury,isatbest inefficient.Sometimesitisevencounterproductive,encouragingthesorts oflanduseandlandmanagementdecisionsthatcanactuallymake floodingworseinthemediumterm. 3. Facedwithanunprecedentedexpectedriseinthepopulation,andamajor housebuildingandinfrastructureprogramme,landuseisundergoingan historicandprofoundchange.Flooddefencesandrivercatchment managementwillneedtoadaptandadjusttothesechanges–butsotoo willplanning,andagriculturalpolicy.Thisrequiresaradicalrethink, treatingriversascorenaturalcapital.Therecentfloodsprovidethe opportunitytodothis. 4. Therearethreestepstotherequiredrethink,andthesearesetoutinthis briefsummarypaper.Thefirstistoworkouthowmuchflooddefencewe need,andwhatitshouldcompriseof.Thisrequiresaneconomic assessmentofthecatchmentsystemsandtheirnaturalcapital.The secondstepistocreatealongerterm,sustainableasset-basedframework andtheassociatedfinancialbasis.Atthecoreare:abalancesheet;an assetregister;aregulatedassetbase;debtfinance;andacorporate structure.Third,floodsdefenceneedsaproperinstitutionalcontext. Flooddefenceneedstobeputonastand-alonebasis,allowingtheEAto focusonenvironmentalprotection,structurallyseparatingout operational,projectmanagement,catchmentmanagement,regulationand catchmentplanningfunctions.Thepaperbringsthesethreesteps togethertoproposeawayforward. Theeconomicapproachtoflooddefence 5. Thefirststepistosortoutwhatsortsofflooddefencesweneed–whatis theoptimallevelofflooddefence.Surprisinglyperhaps,theEAdoesnot provideacredibleanswer,andtheansweritdoesprovideleadstoa serousmisallocationofresourcesandsomeperverseincentivesforhome buildingandwiderlanduse. 6. Theoptimallevelofflooddefenceisaneconomicconcept,andtakes accountofthecostsandbenefitsofflooddefenceinvestments,discounted backtothepresent.Itincorporatesriskanduncertainty,andrecognises thatthisoptimallevelisveryunlikelytoprotectallpropertiesfrom inundation.Itdoesnotevenrequireaspecificfocusonthoseproperties mostatrisk.Insomecases,itmaynotbesensibletoprotectthosemostat risk:thepropertiesmightnotbeworththecostsofprotectingthem. 7. Inapplyingthissortofeconomicappraisaltofloods,therearethreemain complications.First,flooddefenceappliestorivercatchmentsandwater systems,andnottospecificprojectsonastand-alonebasis–natural capitalsystems.Second,landuse(andinparticulartheprotectionand enhancementofupstreamnaturalcapital,agriculturalpracticeand housingandindustrialdevelopmentsplanning)playsacriticalpartis bothcausingandhelpingtoalleviateflooding.Third,therearepositive andnegativeexternalitiesfromflooddefenceinvestments.Atworst,they candisruptnaturalriverflowsandnegativelyimpactontheenvironment; atbest,theycanyieldanumberofpositivebenefitstohealth,recreation, andbiodiversity,andtherebyenhancesustainableeconomicgrowth. 8. TheEA’smethodologyisnotaneconomicone.Itsriskmanagement strategy(assetoutforexampleinUnderstandingtherisks,empowering communities,buildingresistance(2011))focusesonthosepropertiesat mostphysicalrisk,butthisdoesnotprovideasensiblewayofevaluating whatresourcesshouldbedeployedwhereandtowhosebenefit.The TreasuryGreenBooktakesanoverwhelminglyproject-specificapproach, ratherthanlookatsystem(andinthiscasecatchmentsystem)costsand benefits. 9. Theconclusionthatfollowsisthatwedonothaveasoundbasisfor decidinghowmuchtospend,andwhatandwheretospendit.Thereisan urgentneedtoputtheanalysisonasoundeconomicfooting. 10. Worsestill,theEA’smethodologycancreateperverseincentives.The consequencesofthephysicalmost“at-risk”approachareconsiderablein determiningtheincentivescreatedforhousebuildingandother developments.TheEA’smethodologyhasaperverseincentiveatitscore: ifbuildingsareplacedathigh-riskfloodlocations,theywillbeprioritised forflooddefence,sincetheywillbethemost“at-risk”.Giventhisobvious consequence,theEAprovidesadvicetoplannersonproposednew developments.Howeverthisisadvice,notprohibition,andiftheadviceis eithernotgiven,orisrejected,theEAshouldthen-onitsown methodology-prioritisethesenewpropertiesforfloodriskmitigation. 11. Housebuildingaffectsfloodriskeveniftheseareindirectly“at-risk” areas.Thereasonsareobvious:newdevelopmentstypicallyreducethe abilityoflandtoabsorbandholdrainwater.Itmattersgreatlywherethe 200,000newhomesperannumarebuilt. 12. Housebuildinglocationcanbefurtherperverselyincentivisedbyflood riskinsuranceandemergencyfunding.Providinginsurancebelowthe truecostsoftheriskinsuredleadstoadversesiteselection.Putanother way,ifnewhouse-ownersfacedthefullcostsofbothfloodingto themselves,andfloodingriskincreasestoothers,farmoreattention wouldbepaidtothelocationofnewhousing.FloodReisthelatest exampleofthedeliberateattempttocrosssubsidisepoorrisklocations– onavoluntarybasis. 13. Emergencyfundingtohelphouseholdsrecoverfromfloodeventsisan obviousresponsetothedistressanddamagecausedtothosewhose housesareinundated.Manyhavelittlesparefinancialresources,and insuranceclaimsandpaymentsandrepairstaketime.Itreplicatesother emergencysituations–forexample,bailingoutretaildepositorsin bankingcrises. 14. Yetemergencyaidcreatesbothmoralhazardandencouragesthe selectionofinappropriatelocations.Intheabsenceofanysuchsupport, andwithinsurancepricedatfullriskcost,houseswouldnotbebuiltin areasatseriousrisk.Floodplaindevelopmentswouldsimplynothappen asaconsequenceofthetruecostsoffloodingriskbeingpricedinto houses. 15. Thereisasignificantdifferencebetweenexistinghousesandtheobvious distressandhardshipcausedtothembyfloods,andthetreatmentofnew housingdevelopments.Existinghousescannotbeeasilymovedtobetter locations.Newhousescanbeputinbetterplaces.Intheabsenceofthe appropriateprivateincentivesbasedonthetrueriskcosts,thealternative isproperplanning,baseduponthespatialchoicesasifthedeveloper facedthetrueeconomiccosts. 16. Theneedforsuchexplicitplanningregulationisallthegreaterasthe governmenttargetsamajorhousebuildingprogramme.Thisreflectsthe increaseinsingleandlowoccupancyhousingdemand,andthescheduled populationriseofaround10millionoverthenexttwodecadesorso(a morethan20%increaseinthetotalpopulation).Themajorinfrastructure developments(inadditiontothehousebuildingprogramme)addtothe floodingriskandtheimportanceofspatialplanning.Incombination,this ispotentiallythelargestscaleallocationoflandformanydecades.The scaleisawesome. 17. Theplanningsystemdoesnotcurrentlyproperlyinternalisethesetrue costsoflocationaldecisions.Theresultisthatnewhousesandother developmentsarebeingbuiltinthewrongplaces,andoncebuiltwill presentalongtermandcontinuingfloodmanagementproblem. 18. Toaddtothefailurestoincentiviseappropriatelocationaldecisionsfor housebuilders,agriculturalincentivesarealsoinconsistentwithefficient flooddefence. 19. AgriculturetakesupmostoftheUK’slandmass,anditisbothamajor causeofincreasedfloodrisksandamajorpotentialmeanstoalleviate theserisks.Yetagriculturalpoliciesandtheassociatedsubsidiespaylittle ornoattentiontothefloodriskdimensions.Someparticularexamples include:themuchgreaterexposuretorapidrunofffromtheplantingof maize;thesoilerosionofsuchcrops;theimportanceofpastureand grasslandsonrivermargins;theburningandencroachmentsonheather moorlands;andhighstockgrazingdensities. 20. Thefarmingpracticesoftheupperreachesofrivercatchmentsare especiallyimportantindeterminingfloodrisk.Thesearealsotypically themosthighlysubsidisedtypesoffarming,withthelowestagricultural yields.Thusthecoststooutputsofadaptingpracticearelowest,yetthey havethehighestbenefitsinreducingfloodriskbyholdingwater.They typicallyalsohavethegreatestvalueinnaturalcapitalforrecreation, leisureandbiodiversity. 21. IntheSomersetLevelscase,thechangingfarmingpracticesdirectly contributedtothesiltingofthetwomainrivers,andthereweredemands fordredgingtodealwiththeconsequences.Upstreamfarmingpractices havecontributedtothemorerecentfloodeventstoo. 22. SteponeistourgentlyreplacetheEA’scurrentappraisalmethodology withonebasedoneconomics,andtherebyshapetheincentivesforhouse buildingandagriculturalpractices.Flooddefencethenbecomesan integralpartoftheeconomicsof(natural)rivercatchments. Thefloodbalancesheetandfloodfinances 23. Havingworkedouthowmuchflooddefenceofwhatkindsisneededona catchmentbasis,andincorporatedincentive-compatibleplanningandthe redirectionofsomeagriculturalsubsidies,thesecondstepistoput togetheranassetsregisterofflooddefenceinvestments,andtocreatea balancesheet.Thisispreciselywhatthewaterindustryhashadtodo, followingprivatisation,andwhateveryotherprivatisedutilitydoestoo. Unlessyouknowwhatassetsyouhavegot,andthestatetheassetsarein, itisnotpossibletoplanefficiently. 24. Theutilitiescanborrowagainsttheirassets–aslongasthedebtand equityliabilitiesdonotexcesstheassetvalues.Thisholdstruewhenever anassetisaddedwhichhasapositivenetpresentvalue(NPV). 25. Thereasonthisworksintheutilities,andthereforetheycaninvestinthe optimalassets,isbecausetheyareguaranteedarevenuestreamto remuneratethem.Theyhaveregulatedassetbases(RABs). 26. Forsomewhatobscurereasonsconnectedwiththebotchedfirstattempt atwaterprivatisationinthelate1980s,whilstwatercompaniesfollowed thispath–andhaveasaresultbeenabletomakesubstantive investmentstoimprovewaterinfrastructure–flooddefencewassplit fromthewaterauthoritiesandplacedinapublicsectoragency,the NationalRiversAuthority(NRA),whichsubsequentlymorphedintothe EA. 27. Theresulthasbeenthattheflooddefencecostsofarivercatchmentare– unlikethewaterandseweragecostsoftherivercatchments–not socialisedintoregularutilitybills.Inretrospect,thiswasprobablya mistake–splittingoutdimensionsoftherivercatchmentsystem managementreducedcoordinationincentives. 28. TheNRAandtheEAhaveasaresultrelieduponpay-as-you-go,Treasury grantfundstoaconsiderableextent,thoughthesehavenowbeen augmentedbyanextraordinarilycomplicatedsupportingstructureof revenueflows.(Foraninsight,FigureEightofthe2011EApaperreferred toabovegivesaflowchartonpage40).Thisisincontrasttothepaywhen-deliveredmodelforwater. 29. Thecreationofafloodassetbalancesheetforeachrivercatchmentisa necessaryconditionforpay-when-deliveredinvestments,andthe supportingborrowing. 30. Theadditionaladvantageofabalancesheetapproachisthatithelpsto identifycapitalmaintenance–tokeeptheassetsingoodorder.Inthe watercase,assetsaretreatedas“inperpetuity”andhencetheyarenot depreciated.Insteadtheyaresubjecttocurrentcostaccounting.Giventhe expectedlifeofmajorflooddefenceassets–betheyupstream environmentallandmanagementsofmoorlands,floodplainmeadowsor physicalbarriers–thisisalsotherightapproachforflooddefence. 31. Giventhattherevenuestreamisnolongersocialisedinwaterutilitybills andgiventherivercatchmentratherthanlocalgovernmentspatial dimensions,thebalancesheetapproachraisesaquestionwhichcannot beavoidedifflooddefenceistobeoptimallyprovided:wherewillthe moneycomefrom? 32. Notwithstandingthesearchforlotsofnew“partnerships”,localauthority andadditionalanddiverserevenuesources,therearejustthreepossible mainanswers:thetaxpayers;arivercatchmentcharge(likewaterbills); andinsurersanddevelopers. 33. Taxpayerfundinghasmanyadvantages.Thegovernment’scostofcapital isverylow,anditcanprovideflexibility–forexamplenowinthe Cumbrianandnorthernfloods,andinemergencyaidtotheSomerset Levelsin2013/14. 34. Thedisadvantagesarewellknown.Governmentsarewidelyregardedas incapableofmakingcrediblelong-termcommitmentstofuturefunding, andwhentheytrytodoso,theprivatesectordemandshighreturnsin responsetotheperceivedlackofpoliticalcredibilityinsuch commitments.PPPandPFIschemesareexamples,whichrevealthislack ofcredibility.Fundingispartofthegeneralenvelopofpublicexpenditure andhastositwithindeficittargets.Adverseeconomiccircumstanceslead tothepossibilityofshort-termcuts. 35. Itisextremelyunlikelythatanygovernmentwillsolvethisproblem whichhasbedevilledpublicsectorinvestmentforatleasthalfacentury. Manyofficialsandmanypoliticianshavetriedto.Nonehassucceeded, andthissuggeststheproblemisgenericandnotaflood-specificissue. 36. Thesecondrouteisafloodutilitycharge,leviedlargelyonariver catchmentbasis.Thiswouldfollowthedefinitionofthewaterand seweragecompanies,anditwouldprobablybemostefficienttoaddthis tothewaterbills,thoughitcouldberaisedasaseparatefloodlevy.The latterwouldrequireaseparatecustomerregisterandallthecoststhatgo withthis.Ontheotherhand,locationalvariancecouldbemadevery specifictoriskandmorefinegrainedriskcategories.TheEA’sfloodrisk mapsareapotentialtooltothistargetingoflevies. 37. Thethirdroute–insurance-isatbestapartialone.Theindustrycould useitschargebasetodirectfundstowardsthereductionofrisks.Itcould dothisdirectly,oritcouldofferdifferentpremiatohouseholdersonthe basisoftheriskavoidancemeasurestheymighttake.Thesemightinclude notjustphysicalbarrierstowatercomingintotheirhouses,butgreen roofs(asintheNetherlands),tiledratherthancarpetedfloorsandatthe limitdownstairsareaswhichcanbefloodedwithoutsignificantproperty damage.Anadditionalpressuremightcomeonwatercompaniesto reducetheriskoffoulfloodingthroughbettermanagementofsewerage. 38. Ofthesethreeoptions,thefirsthasclearlyanddemonstrablyfailedto deliveroptimalflooddefences–notjustintherecentfloods,butover severaldecades.Thesecondandthirdarecomplimentary.Someelement ofinsurancecontributionhasanobviousincentive-compatible characteristic.Butinsurancecontributionsarelikelytobelimitedandfar belowtherequiredrevenue.Thatleavesalevy–eitherdirectlyorvia waterbillsorCouncilTax.Ofthese,waterbillsarelikelytobethemost efficient,buttheremaybegreatertransparencyinfine-tuningthelevyif itisonastand-alonebasis. 39. Thereasonwhypoliticianshaveshiedawayfromthelevyapproachis thatthevotersappeartoberesistanttowhatwillbeperceivedasanew andadditionaltax.Yetthisisanillusion:gettingtaxpayerstopayor catchmenthouseownerswillmakelittlepracticaldifferenceifthecosts aresocialisedwithinthecatchmentsystems,andiftheyarenot,thenthe taxpayerroutefurtherinstitutionalisestheideathatothersshouldpay. 40. Inpractice,thetaxpayerrouteisunlikelytoproducetherequiredlong termfunding.Thusopposingalevyisinrealityademandforthestatus quotobecontinued,howbeitwithabitmoreTreasurygrant.Itsimply doesnotmatchtheneedandcondemnsthesystemtoseriouslyand permanentlysub-optimalflooddefences. Institutionalandregulatorystructures 41. Stepthreerequiresafundamentalrestructuringoftheinstitutional architecture,whichwascreatedasaresultoftwoseriouspolicymistakes inthelate1980sandtheearly1990s.Thesewere:thewayinwhichthe NRAwassplitfromthewaterauthoritiesatprivatisation;andthe cobblingtogetheroftheNRA,HMIPandvariouswastebodiestocreate theEA.Thesetwomistakeshavehauntedthemanagementofriver catchmentsandflooddefenceeversince,andinthecaseoftheEAledtoa numberofseriousmanagementproblemsattheNRAandthentheEA. 42. ThoughtheEAcouldinprincipleadministerautility-stylelevelsystem, haveabalancesheet,andborrowforapay-when-deliveredsystemof finance,itwouldbeaverydifferentorganisation. 43. TheEAwascreatedwiththeexplicitpurposeofproviding“Integrated PollutionControl”.Yetbecauseofthepoliticalanddepartmental squabblesatthetimeofitscreation,itendedupbeingamergerofthe NRA,HMIPandvariouswastebodies.BecausetheNRAatthetimehad over6000staff,andHMIPmuchless,andbecauseofthesheerscaleofthe operationaldemandsoftheNRAactivities,itendedupbeinga conglomeratedominatedbywaterandfloods.Thewidelyrecognised resulthasbeenanoftenpoorlymanagedandpoorlyfocussed organisation. 44. UnfortunatelyintherecentTriennialReviewoftheEA,theopportunityto createasmaller,moretightlyfocussedEnvironmentalProtectionAgency, shearedofitsoperationalactivities,wasmissed.1Therecentfloodgivesa furtheropportunitytorethinkthiserror,andtocreateaseparateflood defencebody. 1SeeHelm,D.R.(2013)TriennialReviewoftheEnvironmentAgencyandNaturalEngland. Availablefrom:http://dieterhelm.co.uk/node/1413 45. Aseparateflooddefencebody,withabalancesheetandborrowing capacity,wascontemplatedinthediscussionsleadinguptothefirst NationalInfrastructurePlanin2010.Thesuggestionwasthatanew floodsbodywouldbecreatedasautility,withautility-styleRABandthe associatedregulatoryarrangements.Thiscouldbeasinglenationalbody, oronacatchmentbasis. 46. Anewfloodsutilitywouldnotnecessarilybeaprivatecompany.Itcould bestate-owned,thoughitmightneedacompanystructuresothatitcould besubjecttothenormalaccountingandlegalframeworks,andhavea balancesheetseparatefromthatoftheTreasury. 47. Theownershipissueisthereforesecondary,andturnsontheissuesof efficiency,incentivesandpublicacceptability. 48. Theproblemofcoordinatingbetweenthevariousorganisationswithin rivercatchmentswouldremain.Inparticular,thereisaneedto coordinatewater,sewerage,agricultureandlanduse,planningandflood defence.Localinitiatives,upstreamprojects,andahostofother contributionswillallfeatureinarrivingatefficientsolutions. Decentralisationandlocalismrequireasupportingoverarching framework. 49. Inaseparatepaper,IhaveproposedaCatchmentSystemOperatormodel andanoverarchingCatchmentPlan.2 50. Thefloodsutilitycouldbea“big”or“small”organisation.Thisturnson whetheritcarriesouttheworksitself–assetmanagement,flood monitoringandinformation,projectdevelopmentsandsoon–or contractsouttoothers–forexample,watercompanies,contractors, environmentalorganisations,landmanagersandotherspecialistbodies. 51. Afloodsutilityapproachcouldgoalltheway,backtotheoriginalwater authoritiespre-privatisation,andpre-thesplittingoftheNRAandthe waterandseweragecompanies(createdasaresultofthatsplit). 2SeeHelm,D.R.(2015).CatchmentsManagement,AbstractionandFlooding:thecasefora catchmentsystemoperatorandcoordinatedcompetition.Availablefrom: http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/node/1405. 52. Themergedmodelhasbothmoreandlessattractioninthepresenceofa CatchmentSystemOperator,sinceitistheCSOthatdeterminesthe optimalcatchmentinvestments,andcanusecompetitivetenderingtoget worksdone. 53. Itisalsoaquestionofurgencyandtiming.WhilsttheEAmayarguethat nowisnotthetimetobreakitup,sinceinvestmentisurgent,inpractice thisisspurious.Nowispreciselythetime,andifitisurgentthenthe watercompanieshavethecapabilityandscale–aswellasaccessto borrowingandfinancialmarkets–whichtheEApatentlydoesnot,and arguablyneverwill.UndertheCSO,therewouldbelotsofopportunities forcompetitivebiddingandnewplayersfromacrossthespectrum–from watercompaniestowildlifeorganisations,farmersandmanyothers. Aproposedwayforward 54. Themostimportantsinglesteptobetakennowisanexplicitrecognition thatthestatusquoisnotonlyunsustainable,butisneverlikelytobe sustainable.Theworstreactiontothecurrentfloodscrisiswouldbemore ofthesame–abitmoreemergencyfunding,andabitlargerEAbudget. 55. Aradicalrethinkstartswithworkingoutwhatanoptimalflooddefence systemwouldlooklike.TheEAhasnevercarriedoutthisexercise,andits appraisaltechniquesarenotdesignedtosothis.Theyareaimedat physicalrisks.Economics,andeconomicassessment,hasunfortunately beenlargelyalientotheEA’sapproachtoflooding.Therehasneverbeen afullcomparativeefficiencyauditofitsperformance,suchasthoseto whichthewatercompaniesareregularlysubjected. 56. Thesecondstepistorecognisethatpay-as-you-gointhepublicsectorwill alwaysbesubjecttowiderandshorter-termfiscalconstraints.TheCSR processwillneverdelivertheappropriatefunding.Therightapproachis pay-when-delivered,withborrowingfinancinginvestment.Thisrequiresa floodsbalancesheet. 57. Thefloodsbalancesheetshouldincludetheassetsandidentifythecapital maintenancerequirements.Theliabilitiesaretheborrowingstofinance theassets. 58. Therevenuetosupporttheinvestmentscancomefromtaxpayers,butin practicethisdefaultstothecurrentCSR-typeapproach.Itissimplynot credibleasaroutetowardsamoreoptimalsetofassets.Iftaxpayers continuetoprovidetherevenue,thenthestatusquoislikelytobethe outcome. 59. Someformoffloodslevyshouldbeappliedatthecatchmentlevel.The optionsareafloodslevy,anadditiontowaterbills,orinsurance contributions.Sincetherisksareatthesystemlevelforthecatchmentas awhole,itfollowsthatsomedegreeofsocialisationofthecostsis inevitable,andthereisobviousscopetoaddwidersocialconsiderations intothecalculationoflevy–ashappenswithwaterbillsnow. 60. FlooddefenceshouldbesplitoutfromtheEA,andnewflooddefence companiescreatedonacatchmentbasis(withinasingleoverarching structureorreplicatingthecatchmentmodelthattheNRAinheritedfrom thewaterauthoritiespre-privatisation). 61. Thenewstructureshouldbecorporate,andcouldbeintheprivateor publicsectors.Thecrucialpointsare:theabilitytoborrow;the requirementforariskregister;andtherequirementtotradesolvently. 62. ThecreationofCatchmentSystemOperatorsrendersthequestionof integrationwithexistingwatercompaniesandcoordinationasecondary issue.Practicalitypointstoafullreintegration,butthisisnotanessential partofthemodeladvocatedinthispaper. Conclusions 63. Thegovernmentnowhasanopportunityandachoice.Itcanmuddleon withtheexistingmodelandaddsomeimmediate“stickingplasters”.It canincreasethefundingandtrytoimprovetheEA’smodellingand management.Or,itcanseizetheopportunitytoradicallyrethinkand restructureflooddefencesintheUK.Ifittakestheformerroute, ministerswillneedtokeepsparesetsofwellingtonbootsatthereadyfor futurefloodemergenciesandcrises,andhouseholderscanexpectmore sceneslikethoseintheSomersetLevels,inCumbria,Yorkandelsewhere toreoccur–againandagain.Ifittakesthelaterrouteitcansortoutflood defencesforageneration.Intheprocess,itcouldprovideaviablelong termfundingmodel.Forgoodmeasure,itcouldadopttheCatchment SystemOperatormodel,increasecompetitionandefficiencyinproject developmentandassetmanagement,anditcouldmaketheEAamuch morefocussedEnvironmentProtectionAgency.Thelatteriswhatthe governmentshoulddo–urgently.