ASEAN STUDIES CENTER REPORT
“Myanmar in ASEAN: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead
for the 2014 ASEAN Chair”
Ward 2, American University, Washington, D.C., December 4, 2013,
Prepared by
Dr. Pek Koon Heng
Director, ASEAN Studies Center
School of International Service
American University
January 16, 2014
INTRODUCTION
The ASEAN Studies Center’s symposium titled Myanmar in ASEAN: Opportunities and
Challenges Ahead for the 2014 ASEAN Chair was held at American University on December
4, 2013. It was funded primarily through a grant from the Department of State, with
additional support from The Asia Foundation and Freedom House. The off-the-record
presentations and dialogue with attendees focused on expectations for Myanmar’s
chairmanship of ASEAN throughout 2014, a demanding role it has never heretofore played
that includes organizing hundreds of meetings, leading discussion of the panoply of issues of
concern to ASEAN’s member countries and dialogue partners and playing host to world
leaders who will gather there toward the end of the year for the annual ASEAN Summit and
East Asia Summit (EAS).
The symposium was enriched by the active participation of high level Myanmar officials and
governmental advisors as well as a range of private sector individuals from that country.
Senior U.S. government officials also made presentations, as did many other up-to-date
regional and U.S.-based experts. One panelist participated by Skype from Singapore. Some
130 participants attended the symposium, many of them staying for most if not all of the
seven hours of its proceedings.
OVERVIEW
In addition to addressing specific challenges facing Myanmar as it takes on its responsibilities
as 2014 ASEAN Chair, the symposium also zeroed in on the long-term internal and
international issues it will inevitably address over the coming decade and beyond.
Although the symposium inevitably spent the bulk of its time talking about real and potential
problem areas, speakers without exception expressed great admiration and praise for
Myanmar’s remarkably ambitious steps toward greater political and economic liberalization.
Several noted that, in contrast to the situation some 10 years earlier when the country’s
internal conditions denied it the opportunity to take its place in the ASEAN chairmanship
rotation, there has been nothing but praise and encouragement surrounding the regional and
international response to its taking on that role today. Moreover, it was generally agreed that
2014 will offer Myanmar, as host to many senior level meetings culminating in the ASEAN
Summit and EAS, a rare opportunity to make a strong impression on the world stage. The
1 opportunity afforded by the glare of publicity will be great, but the challenges will be at least
equally daunting.
The most obvious challenges are logistical ones. As a low income country, which for the last
fifty years has had little intercourse with the rest of the world and has a weak physical and
manpower infrastructure, Myanmar lacks the human capital, the hotel rooms, the
telecommunications facilities – in short, the capacity – needed to ensure smooth functioning
of high-profile events. Indeed, it has had virtually no previous experience managing major
international conferences. As one Myanmar speaker noted, it faces a “tremendous job” of
building facilities (especially in Nay Pyi Taw, the new capital), finding and training staff to
attend the hundreds of ASEAN meetings that will be held during the year, and sorting
through the many outside offers of help from governments, NGOs and private consultants.
The U.S. government and other ASEAN member countries are already assisting with some
training and needed equipment, as it did for Cambodia when they was the Chair in 2012.
A second major challenge is to serve as an effective leader of substantive gatherings. This
task, which the Myanmar government is also addressing very seriously, puts emphasis on
maximizing positive results related to the ASEAN 2014 “theme” it has chosen: “Moving
forward in unity toward a peaceful and prosperous community” – i.e., the goal of making
substantial progress in each of the three “pillars” (political-security, economic and sociocultural) of the ASEAN Community envisaged for 2015 and beyond. Myanmar speakers
emphasized that they are determined to avoid any public breakdown of ASEAN unity such as
occurred over the South China Sea territorial issues at the 2012 Annual Ministerial Meeting
in Cambodia. They stressed that they will closely consult in advance with ASEAN fellow
governments and major outside powers to make sure that all interests are given full
consideration. At the same time, when it comes to the South China Sea, Myanmar is prepared
to play an active role in producing a Code of Conduct (COC) agreeable to all parties at some
point during the period of its chairmanship. While many observers both inside and outside the
region hope that Myanmar will take steps to strengthen the ASEAN Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) or will give a strong boost to implementing the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), it seems likely that Myanmar will
primarily direct its attention to moving forward in areas where there is already a strong
consensus, like on the ASEAN Community by 2015 and the South China Sea COC.
The third major challenge involves maintaining an orderly environment for the proceedings,
atmospherics that properly reflect Myanmar’s new freedoms while also demonstrating an
ability to prevent internal and/or external actors from exploiting the situation to advance their
own causes by embarrassing the government. While Myanmar spokespersons have made
assurances that “demonstrations” will not be tolerated, some observers point out that problem
areas such as lagging pace of reform, economic stagnation, remaining U.S. sanctions,
continuing military dominance, the treatment of the country’s ethnic minorities (notably the
Rohingyas, considered officially as “migrants” rather than as legitimate members of the
Myanmar polity) and uncontained communal violence between Buddhists and Moslems all
have the potential of impeding the smooth staging of leaders’ summits and other high profile
meetings. As one U.S. speaker commented, because the space for free expression has opened
up so quickly, there have inevitably arisen those who would abuse their new rights and in so
doing cause serious problems. Therefore, the government has had to find a generally
accepted, proper balance between openness and public order, or as one speaker put it,
between security and democracy. One senior Myanmar advisor to the presidency said that
his country is determined to avoid a situation similar to that of Thailand, which was deeply
2 embarrassed when street demonstrations spun out of control in Bangkok at the time of highlevel meetings while it was ASEAN Chair in 2009. To help minimize the chances for similar
disturbances during meetings in Myanmar, the U.S. has been helping train police and military
officers in managing military-civilian relations with effective communications and
coordinated effort by all interested parties.
Panelists and other speakers praised the government’s actions in freeing Aung San Suu Kyi,
opening up the parliament, releasing political prisoners, giving greater space to NGOs and
allowing much more freedom of the press, and remarked that difficulties were always
anticipated in a process that is so dramatic and has only been under way for very few years.
Many cited parallels with Indonesia’s experience in moving from military dictatorship to
parliamentary democracy in a remarkably short time, but also remarked that Indonesia’s
transition has now extended over more than a decade, that the country had a relatively vibrant
civil society even during the Suharto years, and that it faced only one severe separatist
movement (Aceh), while Myanmar still has several very active ones and full national
reconciliation remains high on its agenda.
In addition to bringing to fruition a comprehensive peace settlement with all the country’s
ethnic minorities, including most urgently the Kachins, Myanmar is also facing the challenge
of how best to make changes to its 2008 constitution, which is widely recognized as
inadequate for a truly democratic polity. Although the matter is currently being treated with
some urgency within Myanmar, particularly in light of national elections slated for 2015,
many issues remain to be sorted out, including the amount of regional decentralization to be
allowed, the degree of military involvement in the political process to be sanctioned and the
fate of provisions affecting Aung San Suu Kyi’s eligibility to become the country’s president.
While some participants considered these issues urgent ones, others cautioned that some
fundamental and contentious questions can perhaps be delayed until the country has had more
time to strengthen its institutional capacities. For example, one panelist asked, what good
does it do to say that a provincial area should have its own elected assembly when there are
no legal infrastructure extending that far, no bureaucrats with appropriate skills, no facilities
for meetings and no traditions for carrying out free and open local elections? Another
example of the lack of evenly paced liberalization throughout the country was offered by a
speaker who commented that a Kachin living in Yangon could freely criticize the government
but would get into serious trouble if he said the same words in Kachin State. These are some
of the problems, it was pointed out, that may be addressed but certainly will not be solved
during Myanmar’s year as ASEAN Chair.
Similar appeals for outside observers to take the long view when considering Myanmar’s
evolution, even under a best case scenario, arose during discussion of the country’s economic
situation and prospects. Myanmar speakers stressed that the country is very anxious to
properly husband the intense support and enthusiastic interest it is receiving from all the
governments and private investors who want in on the action. In so doing, it realizes that it is
still a very poor country, that a vigorous export-led growth strategy (one so successfully used
by its ASEAN neighbors in previous decades) might not be available to it and that its most
precious assets are its natural resources, many of which are currently being exploited by
international bodies that operated with minimal transparency. In addition to trying to make
those arrangements more transparent, the government wants future foreign direct investment
(FDI) to be handled right so that a large proportion of the profits can stay in the country and
be properly distributed. This line of thinking has led Myanmar to take a great interest in
3 applying the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) guidelines when securing
outside investments in its petroleum and minerals sectors.
The role of the United States in Myanmar’s future, as well as in its successful chairmanship
of ASEAN, was widely discussed. Its officials emphasized that the U.S. wants a stable,
peaceful, united and democratic Myanmar that plays a positive role in regional development
and welcomes its chairmanship of ASEAN, which has become a central focus of American
policy toward the region. Myanmar welcomes the great interest shown by the U.S.
government, business interests, NGOs and others, but has not seen much money pouring in,
attributing some – perhaps a great deal – of the slowness to the continuing U.S. sanctions put
in place during the days of harsh military rule. The U.S. official response was though it is
understandable that the government is anxious to produce demonstrable economic results,
actual progress in trade and investment relations between the two countries will develop
slowly, largely because of Myanmar’s lack of capacity to handle large influxes and the
understandable reluctance by American investors to proceed precipitously into uncharted
waters.
China-Myanmar relations, referred to by many speakers, were the central focus of one of the
presentations. That presenter emphasized that Chinese policy had suffered a serious setback
in recent years, and its policies have since become much more cautious and nuanced. The
Chinese leadership, it was surmised, seems to have concluded that if it does not overplay its
hand, Myanmar will in a few years recognize the futility of its current “democratic frenzy”
and “inflated sense of importance” and see that its true economic interests lie in close
association with China. Whether these suppositions are true or not, there was widespread
agreement that both China and Myanmar want to retain their amicable relationship and that
neither intends to undertake actions seen as harmful to the other, either during 2014 or
thereafter. Moreover, even in the political and economic distancing that has taken place over
the past two years, there have been no signs of diminution of the extremely close military-tomilitary ties between the two countries.
PROCEEDINGS
Opening remarks to the symposium were offered by senior officials of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar and of the United States Department of State.
The senior Myanmar official covered three main topics: the importance of the government
reform process, progress in Myanmar-U.S. relations and Myanmar as the 2014 ASEAN
Chair.
Regarding governmental reform, he stated that the wide-ranging democratic reform process
initiated in May 2011 has gained great momentum toward the goal of a peaceful, prosperous
and democratic nation, and has achieved impressive results. The first wave of reforms was
directed at political transformation, working toward peace and stability and consolidating
national unity. Nay Pyi Taw’s efforts in national reconciliation can be seen through the
signing of ceasefire agreements with almost all ethnic armed groups, adoption of an inclusive
political system and widespread adherence to democratic practices. The second wave of
reforms has included economic liberalization, financial reform, opening to foreign investors
and economic development. Economic measures have also included adoption of floating
exchange rates, fiscal and tax reforms, creation of an investment friendly environment,
liberalization of the government sector in the economy and initiation of environmental
4 protection norms. The third wave has concentrated on the establishment of a “clean
government,” ratification of the United Nations Convention on anticorruption, formation of a
regional anticorruption body, restructuring the government sector and institutional
infrastructure, and adopting a regulatory framework to facilitate business and trade
investments. Although Myanmar encounters challenges on its way to democracy and in its
striving for prosperity for all its people, the government is determined to overcome any
challenges ahead. It recognizes that to catch up with its more prosperous ASEAN neighbors it
has to redouble it efforts, as those nations are not standing still but instead are making even
greater progress of their own.
Regarding Myanmar-US relations, the official mentioned the importance of reciprocal actions
from both sides, the normalization of bilateral relations through the appointment of a U.S.
ambassador to Myanmar in 2012 and easing of sanctions. He attributed this progress to U.S.
recognition of Myanmar’s genuine reform effort in the direction of democracy, and stressed
that after the visit of President Obama in 2012, cooperation between two nations has been
strengthened. President Obama announced $170 million assistance over the next two years in
support of Myanmar’s programs aimed at building responsive governance, democracy,
human rights, rule of law and enhancement of human security. With respect to trade relations
the Myanmar official said that the value of total bilateral trade in 2013 has more than doubled
to $135.7 million, in comparison to $65.5 million in 2012. In addition, Myanmar since July
2012 has joined the U.S.-led Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). He concluded this part of his
remarks by calling on the U.S. to completely eliminate all remaining sanctions against his
country, a move he said would lead to higher trade and investment between the two countries
and benefit the Myanmar people.
Regarding Myanmar’s role as ASEAN Chair during 2014 the Myanmar senior official
assured the participants that Myanmar will resolutely and successfully perform its duty as
2014 ASEAN Chair. Myanmar will continue to participate actively as a responsible member
of ASEAN and fully supports its ultimate aims of enabling the people of the region to enjoy
peace and prosperity. Believing in the importance of an ASEAN that is capable of working
together in a unified manner, Myanmar formulated the theme of its 2014 chairmanship to be
“Moving forward in unity toward a peaceful and prosperous community.” During the course
of the year it intends to promote ASEAN unity through cooperation efforts that complement
and build on achievements made by previous ASEAN Chairs (so as to ensure “ASEAN
policy consistency, credibility and continuity”) and focus on timely publication of priority
action lines including the ASEAN Community road map, achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) and reduction of development gaps between ASEAN member
states. In addition, Myanmar pledges to collaborate between ASEAN members and the
grouping’s dialogue partners to work toward the ASEAN Community by 2015 and help
formulate a plan for the “ASEAN Community Beyond 2015.” Myanmar as ASEAN chair
will also spare no effort to engage ASEAN’s dialogue partners based on the central principles
of ASEAN centrality, equality and mutuality. Should issues arise between member states or
dialogue partners, Myanmar will recommend fair and balanced approaches for their
resolution based on peaceful, amicable means. The official also noted that Myanmar will play
the role of the U.S. dialogue partner (for ASEAN meetings with its dialogue partners) during
the next two years, thus strengthening bilateral relationships that are already growing stronger
through cooperation in the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Lower
Mekong Initiative.
5 In his opening remarks, the U.S. senior ASEAN official from the Department of State used a
theme of “opportunities and tests” of Myanmar’s chairmanship, a topic that has become a
matter of considerable discussion within his department. He noted that for ASEAN the year
2014 represents the confluence of two important “success stories”: (1) ASEAN’s success and
prominence as an institution as it advances toward achieving its goal of an ASEAN
Economic Community in 2015 and (2) the historic transformation of Myanmar over the past
few years.
The official cited several challenges facing ASEAN during the year that Myanmar serves as
its chair. For example, it will be urged to give a strong push to achieving the ambitious goals
of the ASEAN Economic Community; it will be asked to address issues related to climate
change and environmental initiatives, in which Myanmar has recently expressed great
interest; and it will be pushed to do more to help enable ASEAN countries to respond
effectively in cases of natural disasters (such as Typhoon Haiyan, which recently struck the
Philippines). Regarding the last issue, the U.S. will continue to play a key role in helping
ASEAN develop a more effective crisis response system. Finally, Myanmar will be called on
to ensure that ASEAN maintains its unity and centrality in the regional architecture that
includes such multi-regional forums as the EAS and ARF.
Regarding domestic progress in Myanmar the U.S. official noted that as it takes the
chairmanship of ASEAN a bigger spotlight will shine on Myanmar and its areas of progress
and remaining challenges will become more visible. This new and increased visibility will
present an opportunity to show the world how effective its domestic progress has been as
well as to demonstrate Myanmar’s capacity to exercise leadership in ASEAN and within the
broader region. In sum, 2014 holds great promise and the U.S. looks forward to continuing its
support of the positive trends of both Myanmar and ASEAN itself.
Following his remarks, the U.S. official answered several questions from the floor.
In response to a question on China and the South China Sea, the U.S. official said his country
has full confidence that Myanmar will work smoothly with the other ASEAN member
countries to develop a consensus position on an issue they all recognize as very important.
The U.S. has made it clear that the South China Sea issue should be on the agenda of the EAS
and other regional forums in which it participates.
With respect to cooperation with ASEAN in areas of nontraditional security such as
represented by the LMI, he said that the U.S. wants to focus on specific joint projects for
which cooperation with affected subregion countries can lead to building the “software” for
tackling nontraditional security issues. For example, the infrastructure processes of dam
building can include not only outside technical expertise but also the inclusion of other
parties such as health officials. In addition, regional working groups can be used to discuss
policy issues such as the effects of hydropower development, to explore related education
needs and to address concerns common to all of the affected parties. From the U.S.
perspective, the overarching goal of an effort such as the LMI is to create a platform for
discussion on policies and project implementation and afford an opportunity for the countries
concerned to identify what kind of help they may want from the U.S. and other partners. In
this respect, the LMI has already proven very successful.
With regard to prospects for private business relations between the U.S. and Myanmar, the
official said that significant obstacles remain and the process is going to take time. The U.S.
6 is actively studying what needs to be done in order to significantly open up opportunities for
commercial expansion.
Panel I: U.S.-Myanmar-ASEAN Outlooks on Myanmar as 2014 ASEAN Chair
A senior political advisor to President Thein Sein provided some background on his country’s
relationship with ASEAN since it was first invited to join in 1967. At that time it followed a
policy of strict neutralism and declined to become a party to ASEAN because of the existence
of U.S. military bases in two of the original member countries (Thailand and the Philippines).
Then in the early 1990s, when it showed interest in joining, it faced difficulties because it
was then ruled by a military junta. Finally it joined in 1997, but missed its first opportunity to
take on the chairmanship due to factors of internal instability and international pressure. Once
the new government (under General Thein Sein) was in place, it was agreed at the ASEAN
Summit in Bali in 2011 to allow Myanmar to assume the chair. He said that becoming
ASEAN Chair is important in helping Myanmar strengthen its political legitimacy, as
demonstrating that the reforms are not just new wine in an old bottle but are indeed
irreversible. In addition, the chairmanship demonstrates that Myanmar, a large country with a
big population and long history, now – after long years of isolation and relative decline – is
able to present itself as a responsible member of ASEAN. By serving responsibly as the chair
Myanmar will secure support from its friends and further boost its cooperation with regional
and global partners. Furthermore, by directly and indirectly holding and taking part in so
many ASEAN-related meetings, the people of Myanmar will gain a realistic understanding of
the international environment and the governmental capacity of the nation will be greatly
expanded. The government will exert its best effort to live up to this responsibility. It is a big
obligation, he said, but also a great honor.
At the same time, the advisor continued, the country faces many formidable challenges as it
tries to gain peace in the country and share the benefits of domestic reform across the
country. And all this is happening as the next general election (scheduled for 2015) is getting
closer. The chairmanship of ASEAN comes at a critical juncture in its reforms and it has to
take responsibility, even though the government has no experience with such an enterprise.
The advisor identified four types of challenges facing those responsible for working on
ASEAN matters during the coming year: (1) the diverse subject matter to be mastered; (2)
functions/meetings, numbering more than 1,000 that must be convened by the different
Myanmar ministries, plus the unprecedented logistical problems of handling so many visitors,
and even building the infrastructure to hold the Heads of State who will be arriving later in
the year; (3) the country’s limited capacity and resources; and (4) security and stability (what
happened in Thailand in 2009 must not occur). Substantively the Chair has three main
obligations: (1) to maintain the momentum of the region’s integration process, (2) to
effectively handle older issues that have been inherited, notably related to the South China
Sea dispute, and (3) to help build consensus on what ASEAN should look like in the years
beyond its goal of an ASEAN Community by 2015 with the three “pillars” (political-security,
economic and socio-cultural).
Finally, the advisor commented that the South China Sea dispute is “one of the big
headaches,” but Myanmar will approach this difficult situation with the intention of finding
areas of mutual trust and willingness to compromise. It will push forward to gain agreement
on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea and will take responsibility to mediate and
negotiate among all the stakeholders, and then will use its close relationship with China to
work toward resolving the issue in the right way. China has said its rise will be peaceful, and
7 it should be kept at its word. Moreover, Myanmar will not allow what happened in Cambodia
in 2012 (when there was an embarrassing public spat over this issue) to occur again.
The next speaker, taking a historical view, noted the country’s cyclical pattern of integration
or consolidation and of fragmentation. Currently, ASEAN is undergoing substantial
movement toward regional integration as it tries to establish an ASEAN community with a
common identity among nations with vastly different economies, religions, political systems
and historical experiences. This process is happening simultaneously with Myanmar’s
dramatic decision to reform itself and produce a common Myanmar identity and integrate its
many ethnic groups, environmental contexts and economic interests. Myanmar’s opening
should be seen in the context of ASEAN integration, and vice versa. In both cases one can
see attention given to economic liberalization, infrastructure development, attention to
foreign direct investment, social reforms, poverty alleviation, institutional and people-topeople connectivity and the need to find outside partners to assist with the implementation of
integration initiatives. The two processes, further invigorated by the U.S. rethinking of its
Myanmar policy in 2011 and the impetus afforded by the U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic
Engagement (E3) Initiative, are having a synergistic effect on one another. Myanmar’s
political reform, following on that of Indonesia just a few years earlier, gives new impetus to
democratic forces within the countries of ASEAN, while reformers within Myanmar are
incorporating ideas, even language, from ASEAN documents spelling out blueprints for
achieving the political-security, economic and socio-cultural goals for the three pillars of the
ASEAN Community by 2015. Myanmar’s assumption of the ASEAN Chair has opened it to
considering new initiatives for addressing its own internal issues. The historian presenter,
fully aware that trends toward consolidation have often been followed by periods of
fragmentation, as happened to the United States in the middle of the 19th century, commented
that the current trends in Myanmar appear very positive.
Participating by Skype from Singapore, the next speaker gave an ASEAN perspective on
Myanmar’s readiness to take on the ASEAN chairmanship. Initially commenting that
Cyclone Nargis in 2008 was probably the catalyst that propelled Myanmar toward seriously
changing its policies, this participant observed that becoming ASEAN chair is not so much a
reward to Myanmar as a conferring of high responsibility, particularly given the tremendous
number of meetings to be held and the wide range of issues to be addressed. In 2014 such
issues include the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN integration, human rights issues,
migrant workers, narcotics trafficking, disaster relief/response and many others. With the
eyes of the world on it, Myanmar is challenged to undertake a national effort as it prepares to
properly handle all the logistical and substantive issues that will come before it. Among the
substantive challenges will be finding answers to such questions as: Can ASEAN maintain its
centrality in the evolving regional architecture? Now that it has proven successful in fostering
regional economic integration, can it do the same in the political-security realm? Can it
substantially improve its capacity for conflict resolution and dispute settlement?
The following speaker focused on what Myanmar as ASEAN Chair means for the U.S.
America’s interests, it was maintained, revolve mainly around four issues. (1) The South
China Sea: Heretofore discussions on this issue between ASEAN and China have been
handled by the ASEAN Chair and Thailand, China’s ASEAN “dialogue partner.” Since
Myanmar in 2014 is both ASEAN Chair and the U.S. dialogue partner, the U.S. may gain an
additional channel (besides through Thailand) for reaching Chinese decision makers
concerned with this issue. (2) Human rights: This issue, currently moving at a glacial pace
through ASEAN, could get a real shot in the arm if Myanmar has something to offer, such as
8 establishing its own national commission on human rights. (3) The sleeper issue of
SEANWFZ (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone): Myanmar’s Foreign Affairs
Ministry is attracted to this concept and will be promoting it in 2014. Although the U.S. is
advancing its own Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), it might be amenable to pressure
from Myanmar to sign up for SEANWFZ as evidence that it has no nuclear ambitions in the
region. (4) Integration and trade policy: ASEAN is under pressure to complete the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations by 2015 in the face of the
ongoing (and in the view of many, competing) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations,
in which three ASEAN countries are also engaged. Myanmar may find even the fairly mild
RCEP provisions difficult to adopt, but will feel duty bound to push the idea forward.
Following the presentations by the four panelists, comments and questions were invited from
the floor. In response to a question regarding the possibility that foreign direct investment can
become an impediment to national integration, the senior economic advisor to President
Thein Sein said that the government intends to accept only FDI that supports responsible and
sustainable development and does not have a deleterious impact on the environment. The
level of social responsibility of the particular FDI, the degree to which it benefits social and
economic development and promotes national unity and solidarity, and the extent to which is
fosters balanced development between urban and rural areas of the country will also be
considered. Another panelist commented that military-dominated patronage politics in
Myanmar is still very much alive and can undermine efforts at reconciliation: the biggest
open question is what does reform actually mean in practical terms and who is going to
benefit from it? In answer to a question regarding whether the ASEAN Secretariat will be
standing by to back up Myanmar if issues come up that it cannot handle, the panelist in
Singapore responded that the Secretariat’s role is being enlarged in 2014, especially with
regard to dealing with challenges related to disaster relief. If a crisis of that nature should
occur, the Chair will coordinate with the Secretariat. In addition, a task force panel has been
set up in the Secretariat to help Myanmar handle its chairmanship duties.
Luncheon Keynote Address by Senior U.S. Government Official
At the symposium’s luncheon a senior U.S. official put current U.S. perspectives and policies
regarding Myanmar in the context of the Obama administration’s rebalancing, or “pivot,”
toward the East Asia and Pacific region and its desire to involve itself more deeply on a wide
range of bilateral and multilateral issues. For many years, he said, conditions in Myanmar
made it hard for the U.S. not only to engage with that country but also with the region as a
whole. However, Myanmar’s recent dramatic reforms have opened up a rare and huge
opportunity for the country to move ahead and for strengthening bilateral relations between
the two countries. The Obama administration will do everything it can to support and
encourage the reform and opening process, with the goal of helping create a stable,
prosperous, peaceful, unified and democratic Myanmar that contributes to the ASEAN region
and beyond. In the latter regard he encouraged Myanmar to discontinue its ongoing
cooperation with North Korea.
The official stressed that while it is important to recognize how much Myanmar has already
accomplished, dramatically symbolized by the freeing of former political prisoners. It should
also be noted that transitions – as we saw in the first years after the end of Suharto’s rule in
Indonesia – are often rocky. Clearly, tremendous challenges still remain. From the U.S.
perspective, the biggest issues are:
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National reconciliation: As Myanmar has faced armed struggle since its
independence, the achievement of a political agreement on a unified country is a huge
undertaking, yet one critical to the success of the country.
Constitutional reform: The current constitution is not consistent with full democracy,
and the U.S. hopes the reform process currently under way will produce an amended
constitution that properly addresses issues, such as qualifications of presidential
candidates, that meet the desires of the Myanmar people.
Economy: The government of Myanmar will have to produce tangible results that its
citizens can feel, especially in such areas as increased income and employment
opportunities.
Development of institutions: As it moves toward greater democracy, Myanmar will
need to address challenging, long-term issues related to reform of the mass media, the
electoral system, its police, its courts, local governance, and the most difficult
problem area of all, the legal infrastructure.
Communal, religion-based conflict: The current problems in the country, particularly
anti-Muslim violence, must not be allowed to fester. The opening up of political space
for the expression of personal opinions has also had the unfortunate consequence of
affording expanded opportunities for those who want to cause serious harm. From the
U.S. perspective and for the sake of Myanmar’s future, this problem area requires
urgent attention.
The U.S. realizes that Myanmar’s reformers, like successful reformers everywhere, are
feeling overwhelmed by all the hopes and demands placed on their shoulders, and wants to
help those reformers to the extent that is appropriate and desired, without being too
prescriptive. In some sensitive areas, such as military-to-military cooperation, progress will
be slow and the U.S. will proceed cautiously and on the basis of close consultation. In the
trade and investment area, however, the country is now much more welcoming for U.S.
businesses, which will not only be able to earn profits but also contribute to employment and
corporate governance.
During the question and answer session following his prepared remarks, the U.S. senior
official described sector specific reform as an important component of the broad effort to
create durable institutions of a democratic Myanmar. Recognizing that well-trained military
and police forces are essential to the nation’s future, the U.S. has been sending legal experts
to Myanmar to establish relationships and offer training in specific areas. Responding to a
question about Myanmar’s decentralization, the official said that the decentralization of
power has created new actors, which makes engagement by foreign entities more difficult, as
different people and institutions in Myanmar have different views on the measures needed to
move the country, or their part of, forward. That said, the U.S. has shown strong support for
the decentralization currently under way.
When asked about prospects for rolling back remaining U.S. sanctions and providing
urgently needed assistance for Myanmar in the area of capacity building, particularly in the
context of is ASEAN chairmanship, the official said that assistance levels are not linked to
the removal of sanctions. He acknowledged the need for more assistance, and said the U.S.
has been increasing its aid levels even with the present budgetary constraints. In response to a
question about U.S. goals for ASEAN in 2014 the senior official said that the U.S. fully
supports the ASEAN agenda and ASEAN’s centrality in the emerging regional architecture.
He added that disaster relief is a major priority for the region and relevant for ASEAN
10 consideration as well, but the tougher issues involved should be addressed in the context of
the East Asia Summit (which includes all the major maritime nations of the Asia Pacific
region).
With regards to the inter-communal violence in Myanmar, the official emphasized the
difficulty countries like Indonesia, that have recently moved away from autocratic rule, have
of determining how much and what kind of force to apply to control violence that is at once
intolerant and based on deep religious feeling. Asked for an update on cease fire talks
between the government and ethnic militias, he said that significant movement towards an
agreement has occurred during the past year and ethnic groups are collectively engaging with
the government, yet completion of an agreement remains in doubt, especially because of
continuing disagreements with the Kachin.
The official then elaborated on some of the U.S. government’s efforts to interact with the
next generation of Myanmar’s leaders, not only young political figures but also in the fields
of economics, environment, health care, education and culture. Although resources are
regrettably scarce, the U.S. has expanded its education and exchange programs and taken
many steps to promote dialogue among NGOs and other civil society institutions in the two
countries. While this movement is encouraging and important, there is an infinite amount left
to be done, he concluded.
In reply to a question about the U.S. stand on China’s assertive actions in the South China
Sea and its imposition of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around the disputed
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the official said that the U.S. is very concerned with that issue. The
U.S. had made a clear statement on the ADIZ, stating that it creates unnecessary tensions in a
region that already was very sensitive. The U.S. does not take a stand on the territorial issues
involved, but want claimant states not to take unilateral steps to change the status quo and
thus raise the possibility of conflict. Unilateral actions are risky and unhelpful, violating the
norms of cooperative behavior that contribute to a more peaceful region, so the world
community needs to take a joint stand against such actions
Panel II: Assessing Myanmar’s Political and Economic Transformation
The first speaker in the afternoon panel built his presentation around addressing five
questions related to internal political developments in Myanmar/Burma: (1) Has Aung San
Suu Kyi been right to say that Myanmar has not taken the necessary reforms? Though she
and many others might say that the reforms will not be complete until constitutional
amendments allowing her to compete for the presidency (as well as other critical measures)
are in place, there is no question that the reforms thus far have been substantial and gone
beyond what anyone anticipated. (2) Are the reforms reversible? Some say they are while
others say they are not. The reforms are unlikely to be reversed, but is there such a
possibility? Yes, anti-Muslim violence is expanding and could bring with it the danger of
martial law being imposed. If the reforms were to be rescinded, there would be civil unrest
greater than that during the events in 1988. (3) Are the reforms necessarily positive? For
whom? The answer here is one of economic benefits and their impact. So far we have only
very limited information on the tangible effects reform has had on various sectors of the
populace. While reforms have positively affected an urban population that is enjoying more
freedom, dramatic material benefits have yet to be realized. This will be a major future issue.
(4) Is Myanmar on the road to democracy? The junta has essentially maintained its control,
but the military has devised a system for improvements in human rights and other issues
11 without allowing the country to become a real democracy. One can call it a “modified
democracy.” Still, there are the beginnings of pluralism, for example, as seen in
disagreements between the executive and the legislature. And pluralism can be seen in the
actions of civil society actors. These trends are allowed so long as the military’s interests –
solidarity and sovereignty of the state – are maintained. (5) What are the implications of
reform for the planned 2015 elections? A major constitutional reform that would greatly
increase the number of candidates in those elections could come through amending the
constitution to give resources to state and regional legislatures. The military wants to keep its
25% of the seats in parliament. That is its end game, but the military parliamentarians are
beginning to work with their civilian counterparts and that trend could change the internal
dynamic. The military still controls all avenues of social mobility, but if it allows itself to
have a more balanced role, thereby fostering autonomy and social mobility, its role in society
will become much less important. The speaker concluded by leaving the participants with a
final, unanswered question: what will the U.S. position be in 2015 if Myanmar still has not
amended its constitution, but otherwise conducts free and fair elections?
The following speaker, drawing on her own experience in Myanmar, began by commenting
that there has been substantial progress in the country, particularly since the 2012 elections.
The current situation contrasts dramatically with that of 60 years earlier and there are many
reasons to be optimistic. Prominent activists have been released and members of the
opposition party now sit in parliament. Also remarkable are the new press freedoms and the
opening of space for civil society and international contacts. In contrast to just a few years
earlier, citizens can now retain possession of their own passports. She stressed, however, that
changes should be implemented even faster. Despite the transformations over the last few
years material changes for the average citizens have not been great and the state has been
slow to promote rule of law. The 2008 constitution does not promote due process and there is
no provision for democratic civilian control of the military, which is one of the biggest
challenges moving the transition forward. In addition, civil society institutions should be
given more political space. If the constitution proves a barrier to needed inclusiveness in the
society, there could be serious political deadlock. She added that greater attention to rule of
law will be crucial for strengthening the system of justice and furthering economic
development, for example, through establishing institutions that invite much needed foreign
investment. The banking system and regulations for FDI are only beginning to be developed.
A long-term effort involving capacity building and educational reform is also necessary,
because the education system was destroyed under the previous government. She concluded
her presentation by maintaining that the constitution should be amended before the 2015
elections, as otherwise they will not be free and fair, and foreign investment would be
discouraged.
The following speaker focused on Myanmar’s challenge in dealing simultaneously with its
responsibilities for managing the ASEAN meetings throughout 2014 and its domestic
responsibilities related to its ongoing reforms. In the process the government may in some
cases have to give priority to domestic issues requiring immediate attention. Internally
Myanmar is in the process of rethinking the role of the state and the role of citizens in
society. In the past the government represented the state but was not accountable to its
populace, but now citizens are increasingly holding their leaders accountable. Citizens are
asking what they can get from the state, and the government has to rethink how it responds to
such demands. In a major change, budgets are beginning to be developed at the local level,
rather than coming from the top down. Will this trend continue in future years? In addition,
progressive laws have been passed, but are being put into practice unevenly. Also causing
12 stress is the fact that peaceful demonstrations are now possible, but they require police
permission first. Members of civil society institutions have been very unhappy that they must
receive prior permission, especially when their requests are denied and they get arrested for
going ahead anyway with their planned demonstrations. Moreover, the situation in conflict
areas has changed very little compared to the central regions. In Kachin State arrests have
been occurring for actions that are allowed in Yangon, notably in the area of free expression.
Given the unevenness in implementation of laws across the country, it will be necessary to
spread the openness found in the country’s center to the rural areas, especially in the run up
to the election. Although the government wants to promote evenly-based development, there
are concerns among citizens that this will not consistently be the case, especially because
land confiscations continue to take place. Resolving the land issue will go a long way toward
convincing people that there will be even development, as will creating an even playing field
for new business elements to compete fairly with established businesses. These are some of
the big domestic issues that may not get proper attention because of all the resources devoted
to Myanmar’s responsibilities as ASEAN Chair.
The next speaker focused on Myanmar’s economy, with emphasis on the impact of
developments in the global economy. That International Monetary Fund Managing Director
Christine Lagarde recently visited the country, the first such visit by a senior IMF official,
reflects the fact that international financial specialists, having learned harsh lessons from
missteps in dealing with Indonesia during the 1997 financial crisis, are very interested in
Myanmar pursuing sound growth strategies. Of particular concern is that Myanmar not fall
victim to the “resource curse” in which, like many developing countries, it loses control over
its precious natural resources through mismanagement. He noted that the country’s resources
extracted under the previous administration did not bring positive results to the society as a
whole and cautioned the government to take its time and strengthen its capacity for
negotiating new contracts before responding to the demands of outside investors hoping to
cash in on a Myanmar “gold rush.” He also pointed out that the current international
economy is not favorable for Myanmar’s development, as the U.S. and Europe are facing
serious problems and in Asia the era of rapid export-led growth has ended. Lacking such
options, Myanmar may have to depend primarily on domestic sources of growth. Though
there may not be any easy options on the table, Myanmar businesses today have unreasonable
fears that liberalization within ASEAN, as it moves toward implementing the ASEAN
Economic Community, will disadvantage them. The speaker opined that Myanmar businesses
should have more confidence in themselves and also recognize that most companies in the
other ASEAN countries likewise fear being disadvantaged by the AEC’s liberalization
requirements. In addition, there will be considerable slippage and flexibility as ASEAN
countries go about implementing the policies they have collectively agreed on. For the time
being, Myanmar does not need to be concerned about attracting foreign capital; there is
plenty to go around, he stressed. The wise course is to take time, to not become preoccupied
with distractions and to undertake smart, manageable projects like the special economic
zones it is planning.
During the question and answer period, the previous speaker commented further that
Myanmar will find its own path in determining what growth model it should follow.
Outsiders, he said, should stay out of such internal policy debates, to which they cannot
usefully contribute, and back off while the debate continues. Another panelist commented
regarding the distribution of benefits throughout the country that highly centralized
governments, such as has been the case in Myanmar, do not well understand the issues facing
local communities in the hinterlands. Questions as to how best to handle and share the
13 benefits of extractive industries are going to be very hard to handle, especially since there is
very little trust among the affected parties in the local areas. At this point a Myanmar
government senior advisor commented that the relationship between the center and the
provinces is extremely important, adding that the 2008 Constitution has already given the
autonomy that ethnic nationals have wanted. The government knows that decentralization is
needed as a major step toward internal peace and the parliament could begin implementing
appropriate laws right now. However, the government currently lacks the capacity to deal
properly with decentralization and handle the budgeting implications that it would involve,
but is currently working hard to achieve that objective. Regarding state-society relations, the
senior advisor continued, contentious issues still remain, but one should also not lose sight of
the cooperative efforts that civil society and the state have successfully undertaken. For
example, laws affecting NGOs, once very repressive, have been transformed in ways that
now allow civil society representatives to meet regularly with the government and new
proposed legislation will permit civil society to play a larger role in the peace process.
Regarding the so-called “resource curse,” he continued, there is already consensus among
government, civil society and business that Myanmar should associate itself with the EITI
(the U.S.-led Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). He added that the U.S. should
strongly support such actions by Myanmar as it addresses the tremendous challenges on its
agenda.
The questions and comments then turned to discussion of the 2015 elections and possible
constitutional changes that might take place before then. One panelist commented that
making changes to the constitution will prove a very complex undertaking and the U.S.
should not push too hard for reform, but instead lower its sights and recognize that such
changes will take time. Rushing to make changes could be very dangerous, especially when
the country is undergoing an internal debate on the issues involved, some of which, like how
to deal with crimes committed under previous administrations, are very sensitive. Another
panelist agreed that the changes will take time, but hopes that the issues will be addressed
with some sense of urgency and active consultation among stakeholders. The process should
not drag on indefinitely and allow the government to take actions for which the citizens have
no constitutional protections. A senior Myanmar official commented that everyone in
Myanmar agrees that the constitution must be amended, but there are differing views on the
direction and speed of needed changes, and some are very worried about changes made
quickly and without proper consideration of their implications. Though admittedly at the
grass roots level there has been little material improvement in people’s lives, he continued,
the country is making great progress in building trust, especially if one compares the progress
over the past two years with the conditions in Indonesia two years after the fall of the Suharto
government. Myanmar must be realistic and consider what can be accomplished as it
proceeds step by step. The military has agreed to reduce its presence in the legislature. While
there is no time frame, this is a very positive development. Two years after Suharto,
Indonesia had only one internal issue to deal with, i.e., Aceh, and its parliament had a high
percentage of military members that took several years to reduce. In Myanmar there is an
ongoing peace process that involves talking to 17 armed ethnic groups with more than
100,000 well- equipped troops, larger than most ASEAN country national militaries. The
senior official commented that Myanmar is working hard on a ceasefire agreement that will
end the country’s chronic insurrections, but the problem cannot be solved within a very short
time. Trust must be strengthened between the government and the armed ethnic groups,
between the majority and the minorities, but trust- and institution-building takes time. The
problem is there might not be enough time, so expectations must be managed. The benefits of
the present reforms need to reach the grassroots, but the government lacks capacity to do that
14 as quickly as would be desirable. That said, there should be no doubt of Myanmar’s strong
commitment to building a democratic state. For the reforms to be successful, he concluded,
positive synergy between civil society and the government, as well as the majority Burman
and the minority ethnic populations will be crucial.
Before concluding this session the panelists made brief comments on the remarkable new and
hopefully permanent freedoms enjoyed by the Myanmar mass media and its positive
interaction with other increasingly vibrant civil society institutions.
Panel III: Myanmar as ASEAN Chair: Opportunities and Challenges
The final panel of the day was charged with addressing some of the specific issues that
ASEAN would be handling during its year as ASEAN Chair, including human rights,
economic issues, and maritime security
The first speaker, a senior advisor to the Myanmar government, began by noting the common
challenges that Myanmar and some other members are facing in terms of integrating into a
single ASEAN community, the goal for 2015. The four less developed countries in ASEAN –
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (the CLMV countries) – face a large gap with the
prosperous “ASEAN 6” (i.e., Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand). Thus, it is important for Myanmar to remind others of the development gaps
during 2014, as this disparity lies at the root of problems such as its exporting workers to
neighboring economies, like Thailand, where several million Myanmar workers are not
treated fairly. The government of Myanmar started to address this issue two years ago and
has cooperated successfully with Thailand in registration, documentation, and issuance of
work permits to these workers to ensure they are afforded legitimate working opportunities.
The issue of migrant workers is not being handled well regionally and there remain many
contentious issues to be negotiated between sending and receiving countries. These are some
of the “non-issues” which are not included in the original agenda of the ASEAN Economic
Community, but still need to be addressed. A related problem, he continued, is that the level
of financial institutional development across the region has not been equal. Vietnam, for
example, has been struggling with debt problems and how to manage capital flows, while the
Myanmar Central Bank, set up just a few months ago – previously it was a sub-unit of the
Ministry of Finance – still has a long way to go in managing both internal and external
operations. Lastly, another serious gap is the “capacity gap.” Myanmar faces challenges not
only with integrating with ASEAN but also internally in husbanding its precious resources,
so setting priorities is essential. To foster effective capacity building, the country needs onthe-ground, practical assistance. One model may be the (U.S.-funded) Fulbright School of
Economics Teaching Program in Vietnam, a quick-impact training and capacity-building
program. That sort of initiative is what is needed to help meet the practical challenge of
managing the ASEAN chairmanship. Another way of transforming the nation’s challenges
into long-term opportunities would be to draw on the extensive diaspora of Myanmar citizens
living abroad and encourage them to bring back their technical know-how and financial
resources to help the country during this transition period.
The next speaker provided the perspective of a U.S. foundation NGO, which is engaged in
trying to build foreign policy capacity for the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some
other institutions through on-site visits and study tours by foreign trainers and experts. He
said that evidence of Myanmar’s seriousness in taking on the ASEAN chairmanship is that it
has doubled the intake of foreign policy trainees especially interested in maritime law and
15 security issues and preparing them to deal not just with the South China Sea disputes but also
with how territorial issues are resolved through the International Court of Justice. In this
sense Myanmar is not simply looking at how to deal with China but also taking a responsible,
rules-based approach for addressing such problem areas. He said that his foundation gives
priority to helping with disaster management and held a resource methodology course to train
50 Myanmar officials in ways to gather information on this subject. Another priority, logistic
training, is particularly important for a country that has never had the chance to be the
ASEAN Chair, and its next opportunity will not come for another ten years. Its
responsibilities in 2014 will be an opportunity for the country to pull it off both logistically
and substantively. Other priorities of his foundation include natural resources management
and promotion of exchanges within the region, for example, by offering venues for exploring
the parallels between the experiences of Myanmar and Indonesia. In both countries the
military have provided many years of strong central leadership but are now stepping back
while still playing major supporting roles. Serious ethnic tensions continue to impede
progress toward national integration and gaining optimum results from natural resources
management presents on-going challenges. Another project mentioned by this speaker is to
organize high-level roundtables for experts to talk about ASEAN economic integration and
focus specifically on what Myanmar can do in the remaining period up to the realization of
the ASEAN Community by 2015 and in the years subsequent to that milestone having been
reached.
The following panelist was asked to address Myanmar’s chairmanship from the perspective
of countries to its west, notably India and Bangladesh. Referencing the work titled Enhancing
India-ASEAN Connectivity, he said that such integration and enhanced connectivity would be
very much in the interest of the U.S., which sees India and Bangladesh as important
connectivity partners within an Indo-Pacific geo-strategic concept. Commenting that the
changes now occurring in Myanmar would give new impetus to regional connectivity, he
urged the U.S. and India to work together in support of Myanmar’s economic development
and democratic consolidation, and noted that at the India-ASEAN 2012 Summit all the
countries present upgraded to becoming strategic partners. The potential economic benefits of
India-ASEAN connectivity would be substantial for India, as India and ASEAN together
constitute a quarter of the world’s population and India wants to expand its current trade with
ASEAN to $220 billion by 2020. For its part, while ASEAN-China trade has grown
dramatically, ASEAN wants to diversify its economic relations by looking west to India.
Under the Mekong-India Economic Corridor concept, plans are being made to enhance land
connectivity through a transnational highway that would help solidify Myanmar’s progress
toward democracy. Sea connectivity will also be enhanced through a new deep-water seaport,
for which the Asian Development Bank is ready to provide assistance and co-funding. The
speaker added that connectivity is not just about building infrastructure, ports, bridges and
roads, but it also will bring substantial improvements in governance, rule of law and fighting
corruption. China is already taking steps to meet Myanmar’s hardware needs (ports, bridges,
roads, etc.), but India can help provide some of the software, in such areas as reductions to
trade barriers, more efficient border procedures and regulatory reform, as well as to deal with
cross-border “virus” problems such as contagious diseases, environmental degradation,
human trafficking and other human rights challenges. With regard to economic challenges,
the panelist pointed to the fact that although the U.S.’s geostrategic policy embraces the
entire region under discussion and its E3 (Expanded Economic Engagement) Initiative is an
excellent step in the right direction, its centerpiece Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations
leave out key strategic partners such as India, Myanmar and the majority of ASEAN
countries.
16 The next speaker addressed Myanmar’s relationship with China and some of the problems
that have recently occurred. She pointed out that before 2004, when Myanmar was isolated
and had to rely on China for political and economic support, China was able to exploit this
dependence for its own economic benefits and strategic influence. Though the relationship
was not entirely a comfortable one from the Myanmar perspective, there were few problems
or conflicts. However, the landscape substantially reshaped when the Myanmar government,
to strengthen its domestic legitimacy, took the path of democratic reform. This change of
policy gained the approval of the democratic opposition within Myanmar as well as of
Western governments, which lifted many sanctions and freed Myanmar from its previous
dependence on China. Agreements reached with China before 2011, the details of which had
been suppressed for decades, were made public and quickly became the target for public
grievances by those arguing that they favored China and exploited the citizens of Myanmar.
Specific setbacks from the Chinese perspective were the suspension of Chinese projects,
diminished influence over Myanmar’s strategic choices and a perception that the U.S. was
succeeding in the diplomatic competition for Myanmar. After the initial shock of such
reversals, she continued, China has regained a normal state of mind about Myanmar: the
leaders concerned with Myanmar now believe that the country is going through a transitional
period characterized by a “democratic frenzy” and an “inflated sense of importance” due to
all the attention it is getting. They have concluded that it would be unwise for China to join
the competition for Myanmar’s favor at this point. Instead, they choose to wait for Myanmar
to finish shopping around and come to the realization that it has been hearing only the “lip
service” of Western country friendship, while China represents its “smarter choice” and best
hope for the future. Judging that Sino-Myanmar relations have already dropped to their
lowest point and will only improve, the Chinese believe that they must avoid over-reacting
and further damaging bilateral ties. The panelist commented that China may be quite wrong
in taking this approach, however, as there are reasons to think the situation may only get
worse if it does not start trying to warm up its relations with Myanmar. She noted that the
Chinese Foreign Minister has gone to all Southeast Asian countries except Philippines and
Myanmar and its current “charm offensive” (and significant economic deals) has not included
Myanmar. In addition to this lack of senior leader visits representing a clear sign of trouble,
China’s FDI to Myanmar dropped more than 90% in fiscal year 2012. The suspension of
high-value Chinese projects contributed to this sudden drop, but China appears disinterested
and unenthusiastic, a sharp contrast to its fervor prior to 2011. Although bilateral trade has
grown this year, most of the increase is attributed to only one project: the Sino-Myanmar Gas
Pipeline. Moreover, after previously being active in helping mediate the Kachin conflict, the
ongoing peace talks are now hosted in Myanmar, not China.
Regarding how Myanmar’s serving as ASEAN Chair might affect bilateral ties, Chinese
analysts are optimistic that the chairmanship will be advantageous for them. China has
overall grown more confident about its ties with ASEAN countries and believes Myanmar as
Chair will be duty bound to downplay any bilateral concerns and will take actions in the
context of the overall health of China-ASEAN relations. In addition, since Myanmar has
vowed to pursue a balanced foreign policy, China thinks it is unlikely Myanmar will push for
China-unfriendly moves on the South China Sea. In other words, though problems exist in
the bilateral relationship, Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN will not lead to their
significant deterioration. Looking at the situation from Myanmar’s perspective, the panelist
commented that the ASEAN chairmanship will enhance its international status, boost
domestic pride and increase the government’s popularity, all of which will strengthen
Myanmar when dealing with China, including through its participation in ASEAN’s
17 collective bargaining strategy to hold China to regional norms and regulations as spelled out
in the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the proposed Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea.
In the question and answer period the previous speaker was asked about how external factors
might have contributed to changes in Sino-Myanmar relations. She responded that although
China did not do anything intentionally, otherwise it would have adopted a different strategy,
but its activities in Myanmar definitely contributed to the Myanmar people’s desire to reduce
dependence on China and end their isolation, so Beijing is now left with having to accept the
reality and not “cry over spilt milk.” Another panelist offered the opinion that the primary
causal factor was Myanmar’s recognition that it was slipping further and further behind its
neighbors in the world’s most dynamic region, to which another panelist added that it had to
do with Myanmar being a member of ASEAN and going to all these high-level meetings and
seeing what other countries were able to accomplish over a 35 year period. The senior
Myanmar official maintained that the primary changes had come from within, but added that
external influences have been positive. Its leaders wanted to catch up with the rest of the
region and follow the path of other ASEAN one-party states that have transformed
themselves to become economic leaders.
Responding to a question about on-going military visits between Myanmar and China, the
panelist, who focused on Sino-Myanmar relations said those visits, the only highlights of
bilateral ties of the past year, point to the fact that China has different relations with different
political forces inside Myanmar and the military relationship, unlike that in the political and
economic spheres, is not experiencing serious problems. Though China considers Myanmar’s
military the most pro-China force in Myanmar society, and feels comfortable dealing with it,
China will not interfere in Myanmar’s domestic affairs or necessarily hopes the reforms will
be reversed.
Continuing the discussion of what forces are driving Myanmar’s reforms, one panelist
suggested that it would be prudent for outsiders to have low expectations for Myanmar to
make substantive progress in the near term, either internally or in its ASEAN chairmanship
role, while others countered with the argument that lowering the sights discourages forward
motion, so setting goals is essential, even when in the end they cannot be completely realized.
Another said that the domestic reforms – democratic consolidation, rule of law, the
environment, human rights – are “a very long game” and cannot be addressed only at home,
but also have crucial international dimensions. Even keeping the ball moving forward is a
success. If one does not set high goals, he added, one would not get to go anywhere at all.
A senior Myanmar presidential advisor speculated that the most important factor in the
reforms was the personal commitment of President Thein Sein, who had earlier been exposed
to international influences and was greatly influenced by Cyclone Nargis in 2008. When
serving as chair of the National Recovery Commission to work on post-Nargis recovery
plans, the President personally observed the devastating effects of the cyclone in the part of
the country where he was born. The experience gave him an understanding both of the
daunting challenges of disaster recovery and also the opportunities for benefiting from
multiple sources in the international community. With respect to Myanmar’s 2008
constitution, he continued, while it is easy to criticize it as flawed and undemocratic, it has
also produced some major, positive changes, such as separating the parliament from the
executive branch, providing a mechanism for resolving conflicts between those two branches,
and reducing the military’s influence. The government is hopeful that it can do more than
18 simply “keep the lights on” during its ASEAN chairmanship. The Asian Games (held in Nay
Pyi Taw, Yangon and other cities in December 2013) are giving logistical experience to those
planning the ASEAN events in 2014. On the substantive level, Myanmar will try to align its
ASEAN chairmanship obligations with its internal reform priorities. The ASEAN
chairmanship should push Myanmar reforms, he said, even if Myanmar cannot do much
pushing as the ASEAN Chair. Another panelist responded that he hopes Myanmar’s
chairmanship will prove a substantive as well as a logistical success. If not ASEAN’s
centrality in the larger regional architecture could start to come into question. This is a real
opportunity for Myanmar to step up to the plate; just to make it a logistic success would be a
lost opportunity. For example, Myanmar, now facing criticism for its treatment of the
Rohingyas and the recent communal violence involving Buddhists and Moslems, could use
the existence of its own human rights commission to lead the effort to strengthen AICHR,
which is now essentially just a toothless tiger.
Summary and Wrap-up
The chair of the summary and wrap-up session commented that what has been happening in
Myanmar is very heartening and represents one of the most important changes in Southeast
Asia since Indonesia’s democratic transition in 1998. At the same time it should be
recognized that Myanmar is only a couple years into what is likely to be a long-term, yet
momentous transformation. For that reason, he said, there are severe limitations on how
much can be predicted about its future. At the same time, though their understanding is
imperfect, knowledgeable outsiders, including those in foreign think tanks and academic
institutions, have roles to play in spreading awareness, exploring the deeper dimensions of
various factors at play and even making recommendations for consideration by stake-holders
within and outside the government. The exceptional richness of this symposium’s sessions
has in large part been due to the participation of so many authoritative figures and other
experts from Myanmar itself.
The chair of this session went on to make the following points:
Southeast Asia is a very different region than it was in 1967 when ASEAN was
formed. There was no sense of regional identity then; India and China were at loggerheads;
India was distracted by problems in its neighborhood; and China was promoting subversive
communist activities Southeast Asia. At best nobody paid attention to Myanmar; at worst
they tried to take advantage of it. But now, Myanmar is emerging in a new ASEAN in which
all member countries wish it to succeed, and nobody is going to undermine the changes it is
trying to make. The region does not face the problems dividing the countries of Northeast
Asia or South Asia. Myanmar is lucky to be in a good region and should take full advantage
of that fact.
Regarding Myanmar’s domestic politics, while one’s cautious optimism is driven
more by hope than hard evidence, the reforms to date are probably irreversible. The
benchmark for change (for the international community) should not be constitutional reform,
but free and fair elections. It does not make sense for Myanmar to change the constitution too
rapidly. It was good to hear that military parliamentary representation is not set in stone.
Maybe Myanmar will turn into a localized version of a Western democracy. The military
does not want to talk about federalism, but many people in Myanmar want it and the
constitution does provide for some decentralization. Decentralization in Indonesia (not
outright federalism) provides a great model. Finally, if President Thein Sein does not run in
19 the next election, we should hope that some of the outstanding advisers he has brought in will
be kept on.
The symposium did not deal as much with economics as would have been desirable.
Myanmar’s economic prospects are constrained by the international landscape it must work
with. The countries that are engaged in Myanmar (like Japan) are not doing very well, and
having missed the window on rapid export-led industrialization, Myanmar will find it very
hard to catch up with the other countries in the region. The “resource curse” is a reality; many
of the mining contracts given by the previous government will be difficult to re-negotiate and
are not transparent. No one knows if they are bringing fair value to the people or the
government of Myanmar; there is a very powerful link between the military and political
elites and economic development. Myanmar is rich in resources, but they have to be
developed equitably and the government has to legitimize itself through effective economic
development policies.
Myanmar’s bilateral relationship with the U.S., given the issues that have divided
them in the past, is “not too bad.” There is much good will toward Myanmar in the U.S.
executive branch, but progress is constrained by past and present sanctions. It is good to put
our thinking about U.S.-Myanmar relations in the context of the Obama administration’s
rebalancing toward Asia. Though U.S. military objectives in Asia are key to the rebalance
policy, military-to-military relations between the U.S. and Myanmar will not significantly
improve anytime soon. Nonetheless, the tilt toward Asia gives another rationale for
improving bilateral ties. Over the longer term, a serious problem will develop if the U.S.
military fails to find ways to improve relations with the Myanmar military, which in turn
would enhance the latter’s ties with China. The military is such an important player in the
reform agenda that it has to be kept happy, engaged and satisfied. If weapons sales are not a
current possibility, expanded training and educational exchange opportunities are options the
U.S. military should be considering.
Regarding Myanmar’s foreign policy options, India’s interest in connectivity with
ASEAN through Myanmar opens many possibilities. For Nay Pyi Taw, greater connectivity
involving India would be a win-win situation. As for its relations with China, Myanmar can
be expected to pursue a balanced policy of seeking good relations with both China and the
U.S. It certainly does not want to provoke China, which is good news for both ASEAN and
Myanmar itself, as well as for China’s strategic thinkers.
Finally, it is remarkable that less than a year ago there were strong voices protesting
Myanmar’s becoming ASEAN Chair, but now no one protests it. That is a huge change.
Domestically, having been given that responsibility certainly enhances the international
prestige of the government. Though there will be difficult challenges ahead related to the
enormous number of meetings to be held, including the country’s lack of capacity to handle
huge events, Myanmar is as ready as anyone can expect it to be given the circumstances.
Myanmar is not going to just “emerge” into the world with no challenges, but none of those
challenges give reason for the international community not to support the most important
change in Southeast Asia for a long time.
In the question and answer period a senior Myanmar advisor said that a major substantive
challenge is the need for the government to pay greater attention to the issue of transparency.
It is very significant that Thein Sein himself puts strong emphasis on Myanmar’s application
to join the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative), in which Indonesia is the only
20 current member from ASEAN. Myanmar is very keen on that opportunity, because – as
everyone has emphasized – escaping from the resource curse is one of the highest priorities
on the agenda for the next generation. Myanmar is the last frontier with a huge untapped
natural resource base. Handled properly, the whole region will benefit. The ASEAN
chairmanship will give Myanmar a chance to do that. Myanmar is hoping that domestic
compromises can be finalized, so that it can promote the EITI idea as ASEAN Chair to
inspire Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to address their natural resource management issues
within the larger context of accountability and transparency.
Responding to a question about people-to-people exchanges with China that previously were
quite active, the senior advisor said that such contacts have been negatively affected by
Chinese investments that have gone wrong, but it is now time to intensify the level of citizen
engagement between the two countries. Currently the government is trying to work closely
with civil society in China and have NGOs in the two countries link up in areas where they
have common objectives. Another positive development is that the Chinese are inviting civil
society organizations to visit China, so more and more people-to-people exchanges are
happening.
In reply to a question regarding ASEAN’s “democratic deficit” – in spite of Indonesia’s
transition – the chair said that if Myanmar moves toward a democracy (not a Western-style
one but an Indonesian-style democracy, which is still a very high standard), that will be very
beneficial to ASEAN. However, democracy is less important than human rights. No one will
fault Myanmar on democratic accountability so long as human security and human rights are
protected. There are many imperfect democracies, but as long as basic human rights are
respected, and people do not have to live in fear, that should be the first priority. Democratic
transition is not good enough without safeguarding human rights and civil liberties in
Myanmar.
21 SYMPOSIUM PRESENTERS AND PARTICIPANTS
ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES
Ms. Zin Mar Aung (presenter)
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Mr. Koko Hlaing (presenter)
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Dr. Charmaine Misalucha
U.S.-ASEAN Fulbright Scholar (The Philippines), American University
Dr. Zaw Oo (presenter)
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Ms. Moe Thuzar (presenter via Skype)
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore
Dr. Maitrii Aung Thwin (presenter)
National University of Singapore
UNITED STATES
Dr. Amitav Acharya (session chair)
American University
Mr. Nathaniel Adams
World Faiths Development Dialogue, Georgetown University
Ms. Vickie Alexander
Department of State
Mr. Michael Anderson
Malaysia-America Society
Mr. Michael Anderson
U.S. Agency for International Development
Mr. John Andre
Nathan Associates Inc.
Mr. Tom Andrews
United to End Genocide
Mr. Noelan Arbis
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Ms. Maureen Aung-Thwin
Open Society Foundation
22 Ms. Linnea Beatty
Department of State
Ms. Rebecca Bermari
Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)
Mr. Ivan Boekelheide
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Ms. Flora Bracco
U.S. Campaign for Burma
Mr. John Brandon (presenter)
The Asia Foundation
Ms. Nadia Bulkin
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mr. Anthony Cauterucci
Deloitte
Mr. Atley Chock
The Solidarity Center
Ms. Priscilla Clapp
Consultant
Mr. Aaron Connelly
Albright Stonebridge Group
Ms. Amy Conrad
Department of State
Ms. Kelley Currie
Project 2049
Prof. Catharin Dalpino (presenter)
Department of State
Mr. Arthur Dymond
Department of State
Mr. Alexander Feldman
U.S.-ASEAN Business Council
Dr. Christina Fink (presenter)
George Washington University
Ms. Anne Flaker
The Asia Foundation
23 Mr. Billy Ford
Freedom House
Mr. Michael Fuchs (address)
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Strategy and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Ms. Ronna Freiberg
Legislative Strategies, Inc.
Mr. Mark Gellerson
U.S. Agency for International Development
Ms. Christine Gettings
American University
Ms. Sue Gunawardena-Vaughn
Freedom House
Ms. Cambria Hamburg
Department of State
Dr. Pek Koon Heng (session chair)
American University
Mr. Joshua Huck
Department of State
Dr. Thomas Jandl
American University
Ms. Esther Joe
Department of State
Mr. Nyane Khet
Department of State
Mr. Dany Khy
U.S. Agency for International Development
Mr. David Kramer (session chair)
Freedom House
Mr. David L. Kim
The Asia Foundation
Ms. Lynn Kuok
Harvard Kennedy School
24 Ms. Daisy Liu
ConocoPhillips
Mr. Keith Luse
Consultant
Ms. Rebecca Mann
IBI International
Ambassador Scot Marciel (address)
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
Ms. Stacey May
Department of State
Mr. Roland Maung
Department of State
Dr. Nimai Mehta
American University
Ms. Meredith Miller
The National Bureau of Asian Research
Ms. Erin Murphy
Inle Advisory Group
Dr. Terry Myers
National Defense University
Mr. Anthony Nelson
U.S.-ASEAN Business Council
Ms. Phuong Nguyen
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Thu Nguyen
Department of State
Mr. Ted Osius (presenter)
National Defense University
Ms. Phoebe de Padua
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Steward Pierce-Gardner
Nathan Associates Inc.
25 Ms. Melissa Rann
Department of State
Mr. Ike Reed
Department of State
Mr. Lex Rieffel (presenter)
Brookings Institution
Ms. Lea Rivera
Department of State
Mr. Daniel Roarty
U.S. Agency for International Development
Ms. Jocelyn Roberts
Department of State
Ms. Isabel Rutherfurd
Freedom House
Mr. Jonathan Sacks
Financial Institutions Consultant
Mr. David Sequeira
Department of State
Dr. Vibhanshu Shekhar
Independent scholar
Ms. Chihiro Shikata
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mr. Edmund Sim
National University of Singapore Law School
Mr. Myint Soe
Foreign Service Institute, Department of State
Mr. Sophat Soeung
Voice of America
Dr. David Steinberg (presenter)
Georgetown University
Ms. Yun Sun (presenter)
Brookings Institution
Mr. James Wallar
Nathan Associates In
26 Mr. Mark Walter
Nathan Associates Inc.
Dr. Carola Weil (session chair)
American University
Mr. Jaeson Wells
Department of State
Mr. William Wise
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. Kean Wong
Independent scholar and journalist
Mr. Daniel Wu
White & Case, LLP
Dr. Michael Yahuda
George Washington University
Ms. Linda Yarr
George Washington University
EMBASSIES
Mr. Khairul Azam Bani
Embassy of Malaysia
Ambassador U Kyaw Myo Htut (address)
Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Dr. Yili Jiang
Embassy of People's Republic of China
Mr. Mikkel Kinch-Jensen
Embassy of Denmark
Mr. Daw Phoo Pwint Ko Ko
Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Ms. Clara Koh
Embassy of the Republic of Singapore
Ms. Konstantina Kostova
Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America
Ms. Kate Longhurst
Embassy of Australia
27 Mr. Daw Aye Sandar Lwin
Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Mr. U Ye Lwin
Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Ms. Nitya Menon
Embassy of the Republic of Singapore
Mr. Lam Pachapor
Royal Embassy of Cambodia
Ms. Bounthala Panyavichith
Embassy of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Ms. Corina Reyes
Embassy of the Philippines
Ms. Arjaree Sriratanaban
The Royal Thai Embassy
Mr. Min Thein
Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Mr. U Min Thein
Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Ms. Chen Yun
Embassy of the People's Republic of China
26 STUDENTS FROM AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND OTHER D.C.-BASED
UNIVERSITIES
28