IAEA-CN-184/108
NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS INITIATIVE: HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
D. Lockwoooda M. Scholza, L. Blairb, E. Wonderc
a
b
c
United States National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, D.C.
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education
Oak Ridge, TN
Qinetiq North America,
Fairfax, VA
Dunbar.Lockwood@nnsa.doe.gov
Abstract. In September 2007, the United States (U.S.) Secretary of Energy announced the Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to revitalize the U.S. capacity to support IAEA safeguards. One of
the core pillars of NGSI is the Human Capital Development program. In this area, the primary goal is to
revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new
generation of United States talent. Specific objectives include: 1) developing and implementing a human
capital management strategy to provide qualified U.S. candidates to staff international safeguards positions
at U.S. national laboratories, the U.S. government, and the IAEA Department of Safeguards; 2) recruiting
highly qualified U.S. candidates to work at the IAEA; and 3) working to influence IAEA personnel policies
and practices to encourage greater continuity in key positions. This paper will provide a progress report on
recent accomplishments, and next steps with respect to this first NGSI HCD objective.
1.
The Human Capital Development Challenge and International Safeguards
Revitalizing the human capital resource base in international safeguards is one of the foremost challenges
facing the international safeguards community, the government agencies that play key roles in nonproliferation and international safeguards, and the laboratories and other technology developers that are a
primary source of new safeguards concepts and technologies. The generation of international safeguards
experts that is presently the backbone of these entities is rapidly moving towards a demographic cliff.
Within the next 10-15 years, many of the most knowledgeable international safeguards experts will have
reached retirement age. Unless the “pipeline” of such experts is filled with new recruits and “mid-career
changers,” the ability of the international safeguards system to meet the growing demands placed upon it
will be in jeopardy.
This human capital development challenge is widely recognized. In 2005, former International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General El Baradei expressed serious concern that a significant percentage
of international safeguards experts would likely retire in the near future, well before a new generation of
1
experts was ready to replace them. [1] Recognizing that such a weakening of the international safeguards
system could increase nuclear proliferation risks, President Obama has stated that his Administration is
committed to strengthening the IAEA by seeking to ensure that the Agency gets not only the authority,
information, and technology, but also the people “it needs to do its job” of verifying states’ compliance with
their safeguards agreements pursuant to their obligations under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).[2]
These demands are not simply for numbers of people, but also for a broader range of expertise and core
capabilities among safeguards specialists than heretofore has been the case. The IAEA and regional
inspection agencies, as well as a number of the countries that are central to the technology development
which supports international safeguards, are taking steps to understand the magnitude of the human capital
resource challenge confronting them. In response, they are putting in place education and training programs
to prepare the next generation(s) of international safeguards experts.
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Non-proliferation and International
Security is working to meet this challenge through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). A
fundamental objective of NGSI is to revitalize the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories'
safeguards technology and human capital base so the United States can more effectively support the IAEA
and ensure that it meets the current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system.
While NGSI has a U.S. domestic focus, its underlying purpose is international; we recognize that this
initiative cannot succeed as a purely domestic effort. Rather, our effort is intended to serve as a catalyst for
a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries.
Only by combining U.S. technical and scientific assets with the resources of international partners will we
be able to keep pace with the emerging safeguards challenges. The inclusion of NGSI in the NNSA
Strategic Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 2010-2014 reflects the NNSA Administrator’s priorities for
Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation in providing “U.S. political and technical leadership to revitalize
international safeguards and the safeguards technical base.”
Ultimately, the success of NGSI will rest heavily upon people—the human capital needed to develop
technologies and concepts, engage with the IAEA and our international partners in safeguards matters, and
assume positions within the United States Government with responsibility for international safeguards and
non-proliferation. One of the five “pillars” of the NGSI is specific to human resources.
Under its Human Capital Development (HCD) sub-program, NGSI has launched a number of initiatives to
start this effort, as discussed more fully below. We anticipate that as we move forward, our engagement
with the IAEA and international partners will intensify as we all come to grips with this challenge.
The emphasis in the NGSI HCD program, at least in its initial years, has been on programs aimed at
universities, especially at graduate levels among technical disciplines. This is a very deliberate decision
that reflects a perceived need to ensure that nuclear engineering students in particular be exposed to nonproliferation and safeguards, just as they must also be familiar with safety issues. Career paths tend to be
launched early, and the internship, course and instructional opportunities, and the fellowship programs are
all intended to attract some of the best and the brightest to the non-proliferation and safeguards fields, and
influence these initial career path decisions. Greater emphasis on mid-career technical development and
training will complement this initial programmatic emphasis, but we should be clear that the NGSI HCD
programs emphasize career paths and long-term engagement in a large field of endeavour in which
personnel will wear “multiple hats” and support many projects, hopefully over many years. This is a bit
different from the very focused training programs needed to prepare an individual to perform a very specific
job and related job requirements for a few years.
2. The Magnitude of the HCD Challenge in the United States
We have recently completed the first phase of a multi-year effort to better understand the dynamics of the
technical workforce at the DOE national laboratories that supports NGSI work on international safeguards.
This initial report by the Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education (ORISE) presents an assessment of
the age distribution and estimated attrition over the next 15 years of the scientists and engineers working on
NGSI-sponsored international safeguards projects at nine DOE laboratories.
Just over 600 lab technical personnel (this includes scientists and engineers in many disciplines as well as
social scientists, information management specialists, and a few lawyers) supported NGSI work in FY2009, the year surveyed and the first full year of NGSI. The study further divided this workforce into selfidentified international safeguards specialists and “support engineers and scientists” who might also have
some safeguards experience but who do not consider themselves to be “specialists.” The survey identified
250 international safeguards specialists who worked on NGSI-sponsored projects in FY-2009.
We learned many things about this workforce and the international safeguards specialists in particular. The
specialists tend to be both older and more highly educated than the broader population of U.S. scientists and
engineers engaged in research and development. Some 81% of international safeguards specialists possess
masters or doctorate degrees. Unfortunately, less than 20% of these same specialists are 44 years of age or
younger, while 41% are 55 or older. What this indicates is that in 15 years, the ranks of international
safeguards specialists in the DOE national labs will be devastated by retirements, and the current “pipeline”
of early and mid-career specialists (up to 44 years of age) must be fed vigorously to sustain the U.S.
national labs’ capacity to support international safeguards.
300
250
0
73
200
143
150
205
Retired or Resigned
Remaining Employed at Lab
100
50
0
FY-2009
FY-2014
FY-2019
FY-2024
Fig.1. Estimated Attrition Losses of FY-2009 DOE Lab
International Safeguard Specialists
Some 22% of the international safeguards specialists are nuclear engineers, with another 16% physicists and
14% chemists. Social scientists were 9% of this workforce, and no other individual engineering or scientific
discipline contributed more than 6%. Some 44% of the specialists reported working experience with the
IAEA, and 17% reported working experience in countries outside the United States. Among the
international safeguards specialists, 42% reported receiving formal international safeguards
training/education courses. The majority (58%) of the international safeguards specialists did not report any
formal training courses, but, rather, extensive work experience and on-the-job training. Of those who did
report formal training, 26% said they received this through the IAEA. However, those reporting such IAEA
training disproportionately are clustered in the 45+ age groups—none of the staff aged 44 or younger
reported receiving IAEA training.
This is cause for alarm as well; not only will our international
safeguards specialist workforce march off a demographic cliff, they will take their direct IAEA experience
with them.
The respondents who self-identified as international safeguards specialists were asked to provide
information about their international safeguards field(s) of specialty and work experience. This information
was used to identify the international safeguards core capabilities for each of these respondents based on a
set of 23 core capabilities defined for this assessment [3]. Based on breadth of scope, the 23 core
capabilities are divided into three groups: facility-level core capabilities, state-wide core capabilities, and
international-level core capabilities. It is important to note that the set of core capabilities presented in this
assessment is not meant to be definitive, but rather representative of the types of specialized capabilities
involved in nuclear non-proliferation international safeguards work. (We are revisiting this list in FY-2011,
and at present treat it and the associated survey analysis as illustrative rather than definitive.)
Table 1. List of International Safeguards Core Capabilities
Facility Level Core Capabilities
1. Nuclear Materials Accounting
2. Non-Destructive Assay
3. Destructive Assay
4. Containment Technology
5. Data Authentication
6. Surveillance Systems
7. Design Verification Technology
8. Safeguards Simulation & Modelling
9. Information Systems
10. Location-Specific Environmental
Sampling & Analysis
11. Safeguards Systems: Approaches,
Design, & Evaluation
12. Technology-Specific Proliferation
Risk Analysis
State-Wide Core Capabilities
13. State-Level Approach
14. State-Level Information Analysis
15. Satellite Imagery Analysis
16. Field Assessment Tools
17. Wide-Area Environmental Sampling
18. Proliferation Assessment
International-Level Core Capabilities
19. Non-proliferation Regime Expertise
20. Safeguards Agreements and
Legal Authorities
21. Non-proliferation/Safeguards
Policy Analysis
22. Safeguards Infrastructure Development
23. Safeguards Education & Training
The number of core capabilities per international safeguards specialist ranged from 1 to 8. Approximately
80% of the international safeguards specialists have 3 or fewer core capabilities. The arithmetic mean is 2.6
core capabilities per specialist and the median is 2 core capabilities. Of note, international safeguards
specialists whose information indicates those core capabilities most closely associated with nuclear
materials accounting tend to be among the oldest groups.
The survey also shows some of the ramifications of a “project-based” business model for international
safeguards work at the labs. Our international safeguards workforce works project-by-project for NGSI and
other sponsors, including IAEA, industry, and other federal agencies. Some 48% of the international
safeguards specialists reported that they work a person-month, or less, on NGSI-sponsored projects. NGSI
relies heavily on a smaller “core group” of international specialists who report they spend 600 hours or
more per year on NGSI work. This is approximately 25% of the international safeguards specialist cadre,
or about 62 people. Unfortunately, this core group is just as old, if not a bit older, than the specialist cadre
as a whole. This core group supports NGSI across multiple program areas, and the people in this core group
also tend to support multiple “core capabilities” needed to support international safeguards. They will
largely be gone within the next 10-15 years.
In FY-2011 we are further refining and expanding this analysis. Who else is sponsoring work for the
international safeguards specialists in particular? The IAEA? Industry? Foreign partners? Will the ranks of
the lab-based international safeguards workforce expand as the customer list grows beyond NGSI? What
were typical career paths for the international safeguards specialists? How can we use this information
strategically to ensure that our technical programs sustain and challenge the work force, and core
capabilities, we need to meet the safeguards challenges of the future? What are the new skill sets needed
for the transition to information-driven safeguards and the state-level approach? How should we “rightsize” the NGSI HCD initiatives so we are feeding the pipeline while not “overdriving” supply?
While refining our understanding of the challenge, we have launched a comprehensive HCD programmatic
initiative that is attacking this challenge on several fronts.
3. NGSI Human Capital Development Programs
Education and professional development form an important element of the HCD Strategy. The NGSI HCD
program targets students who are on the cusp of education and career path choices, and seeks to expose
these students to the safeguards field. In the first year of NGSI, a number of relevant activities were
initiated and have been incorporated into the on-going program. The range of the effort has expanded in
both FY-2009 and FY-2010, and we expect to further augment these efforts in FY-2011. There are four
main components of Education and Professional Development:
 Student Engagement and Educational Support including NGSI Summer Safeguards Internships and
NGSI Graduate Fellowships;
 University Engagement and Academic Program Development, including university and Service
Academy faculty development and academic course development;
 Technical Professional Development, including safeguards training, and cost-free expert
assignments at IAEA
 Support for NGSI Safeguards Post-Doctoral Fellows (post-doctoral fellows and highly qualified
M.S. and M.Engineering graduates) at the labs
NGSI offers university students the opportunity to pursue summer safeguards internships at U.S. national
laboratory locations. In its inaugural year (2008), the program drew 50 students from around the country.
In 2009, this number more than doubled, with 110 interns—representing more than forty U.S. and foreign
universities—participating in internships within the national laboratory complex. Roughly a third of all
interns were from nuclear engineering backgrounds, while 10% were international relations majors.
Approximately 50 of these interns also participated at the 2009 Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
(INMM) conference.
Interns work on a variety of hands-on safeguards projects with mentors at the National Labs. Recent intern
projects include developing tools for analyzing open-source information, conducting experiments that test
operations of monitoring systems for nuclear materials safeguards, analyzing non-nuclear weapons states’
views toward the Additional Protocol, developing a large high-purity Germanium detector array for standoff detection, modelling and simulation for Non-Destructive Assay, performing environmental sampling
and analysis, and working on authentication of safeguards data.
Short summer courses on international safeguards have been a staple of the HCD program’s outreach to
students. These courses, one to three weeks in length, are hosted at the national laboratories or nearby
universities. Some courses are focused on technical aspects and technical university students such as
engineers and scientists, while others are geared towards non-proliferation policy majors and political/social
scientists. In 2009, more than 150 students took part in these courses. About two-thirds are graduate
students or recent graduates. NGSI also co-sponsored in 2010 a three week Public Policy and Nuclear
Threats Training Program at the University of California-San Diego which drew some 21 participants,
including 16 graduate students (15 PhDs, 1 MA) and 3 researchers and postdocs.
The newest student-oriented program is the NGSI Nuclear Non-proliferation and International Safeguards
Graduate Fellowship for graduate students in nuclear engineering who identify non-proliferation and
international safeguards as a career interest and who will conduct graduate research in a safeguards-related
area. There are 10 NGSI Fellowship awardees beginning in the 2010-2011 academic year and we expect to
support up to 15-17 NGSI Fellowship holders in any given academic year once this is fully up and running.
University engagement manifests itself in a number of ways. NGSI’s strategy for such engagement
involves promoting lab-university partnerships, leveraging regional networks and contacts, identifying and
supporting university faculty who champion safeguards curriculum, and engaging both public policy and
nuclear engineering schools to promote an interdisciplinary approach. In fiscal year 2009, NGSI sponsored
over forty guest lectures by lab safeguards experts for both policy- and technical-oriented university courses
at the undergraduate and graduate levels. In 2009 and 2010, the national laboratories also worked with nine
U.S. universities to initiate collaborations between Lab-based international safeguards experts and
university faculty, with the goal of developing new university courses on international safeguards and nonproliferation. These nine universities were the University of Florida, Georgia Tech, University of
Michigan, University of New Mexico, North Carolina State, Oregon State, University of Tennessee,
University of Washington, and Washington State. Four of these schools offered a three-credit
undergraduate/graduate course focused on nuclear safeguards and/or non-proliferation in the first two
semesters of 2010. NGSI has sponsored two workshops for university faculty on non-proliferation and
safeguards education and technology.
NGSI also coordinates closely with the NNSA Office of Non-proliferation Research and Development
(NA-22), which funds peer-reviewed, competitively-selected university R&D proposals for work on
advanced detectors and sensors, safeguards technologies, etc. Funded R&D opportunities are critical to
growing the engagement of leading university nuclear engineering and physical science professors in the
safeguards field. This not only helps push the state-of-the-art in technical spheres, but also creates research
opportunities for graduate students and university post-doctoral fellows, who will go on to continue their
work at the labs or as university professors.
As important as it is to attract the best and brightest students into the non-proliferation and international
safeguards fields, technical professional development, particularly for mid-career lab professionals who
might be interested in a new career direction, is going to be vital to meeting NGSI human capital needs.
NGSI thus supports exposing lab staff to international safeguards, including through guest technical
presentations and training opportunities. Lawrence Livermore and Idaho National Laboratories have
developed, with NGSI support, a series of videocast lectures on international safeguards. Los Alamos
National Laboratory repeated an NGSI-sponsored student summer course on safeguards for lab staff who
had shown interest in learning more about safeguards as a potential career path.
The initial survey data from the ORISE study show the need for mid-career professional development
support. Just 19% of the international safeguards specialists are in the 44 and younger category. This
group spans the ranks of those just starting out to those who are in the mid-career stage. The good news is
that the level of interest among lab staff in learning more about international safeguards and potential career
options appears to be high. The challenge is to convert this interest into career path decisions and provide
professional development and training opportunities to enable mid-career entrants to the field to contribute
productively as quickly as possible.
The NGSI Post-Doctoral program is also very important in providing an NGSI HCD-funded entry way for
new PhD and M.Engineering graduates into the national laboratory safeguards workforce. NGSI funds
post-doctoral fellows at Idaho, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and
Savannah River National Laboratories. This program is in its second full year, so we do not yet have
much experience on which to base an expectation as to the percentage of NGSI post-doctoral fellows
expected to become regular lab staff and support specific NGSI projects. Nonetheless, the NGSI PostDoctoral fellow program lines up well with the Graduate Fellowship program, as fellowship holders should
become excellent candidates for hire by the labs, and the post-doctoral program creates an entry-point into
the labs.
NGSI has also taken steps to enhance the recruitment of strong U.S. candidates for safeguards positions at
the IAEA. NGSI funds the costs of a recruiter on the staff of the International Safeguards Program Office
at Brookhaven National Laboratory, and has taken steps to improve early awareness of IAEA employment
opportunities among lab staff and to work with lab management to address certain impediments to lab staff
taking positions at the IAEA, such as smoothing the way to returning to the lab workforce once the term of
the IAEA position is over.
NGSI is also working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in developing a training curriculum for
training lab technical personnel and candidates for IAEA inspector positions on uses of safeguards
equipment in which INL has invested its own resources to establish a training bed at the lab. This program
will serve multiple purposes, including professional development and mid-career training as well as
enhancing the strengths of U.S. candidates for IAEA positions.
4.
Observations on Our Experience
We expect to develop a more refined understanding of our requirements as we continue the ORISE HCD
needs study, and we have not yet touched the issue of needs from other U.S. federal agencies or industry.
The survey information we have seen so far confirms what anecdotal data had earlier suggested was the
case, and supports a number of the HCD initiatives we have launched.
The NGSI efforts to engage students and faculty have noticeably gained traction since first begun in 2008;
these students demonstrate sustained commitment and interest in the non-proliferation/safeguards field.
Of tracked 2008-2009 NGSI Human Capital Development program students/interns:
• 36% are returning for another safeguards internship in 2010
• 23% were converted to U.S. National Laboratory staff
• 18% have gone on to pursue a non-proliferation- or safeguards-focused Masters or PhD
• 5% are now in Junior Political Officer (JPO) positions at the IAEA
The number of students in NGSI-sponsored summer courses has grown from just over 40 in 2008 to almost
170 in 2010. The inaugural group of 10 NGSI Safeguards Graduate Fellowship awardees began in
September, 2010. Student enrolment in the university safeguards courses funded by NGSI has proven
gratifying—often reaching 10-15, with many commenting on how the course opened a new horizon for
them. We are now turning more strongly towards encouraging and facilitating entry into safeguards among
mid-career professionals. The serious gap in the 35-44 year old group shown in the ORISE requirements
study must be addressed, as this is the age bracket that should be yielding more senior technical experts and
managers, and into which we must draw personnel who might be interested in a new career path. This will
require more extensive outreach and training, as well as sustained and growing project funding to attract
and support these new staff.
We also look forward to engaging our foreign partners on how they are meeting their internal human capital
needs and to sharing experience with them. Another NNSA paper at this symposium addresses this
engagement more extensively.
The NGSI HCD program’s efforts to strengthen the safeguards workforce domestically have significant
implications for the international safeguards system, particularly because of the leadership role U.S.
laboratories play in developing safeguards technology and the importance of United States Support Program
tasks; each of these are key to strengthening the international safeguards system as we try to address
emerging and evolving challenges of the 21st century.
The international community faces a similar human capital challenge. Several reports, statements, and
anecdotal evidence suggest a significant percentage of IAEA and European safeguards experts will retire
soon. In 2008, IAEA officials estimated that more than a third of senior IAEA staff are expected to retire
by 2011 [4] and more than half by 2013. [5]. In 2005, an IAEA report indicated that some 60 percent of the
IAEA posts subject to geographic distribution would become vacant in the next 7 years. [6] These reports
also indicate that there is no new cadre of experts ready to take the place of those retiring. U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) data from 2004 revealed that less than 10 percent of applicants
to inspector positions at IAEA were considered well qualified. [7] In 2008, fewer than 20 percent of the
IAEA’s safeguards inspectors were under 40 years old. [8] Despite its expanding workload, the IAEA
regular safeguards budget has remained essentially flat in real terms for nearly two decades [9]. The
combination of growing workload, increasing complexity of the work, and anticipated retirements poses
particular challenges to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. [10]
The convergence of these factors in recent years has challenged the IAEA’s ability to carry out its
safeguards mission effectively. Without a large-scale international effort to address this requirement in
the near future, the effectiveness and therefore the credibility of the IAEA’s safeguards system may
begin to significantly erode.
References
[1] Report by the Director General to the 49th IAEA GC, August 19, 2005; Government Accountability Office, GAO06-93, “IAEA Has Strengthened its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be
Addressed,” October 2005. For a summary of NNSA’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative see
http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/news/2329.htm; “Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons on the Future of the
Agency,” May 23, 2008; See also the Graham WMD Commission Report, December 2008.
[2] Posted in April 2009 on www.White.House.gov, under the Homeland Security Agenda item. During his April 6,
2009 luncheon address to the Carnegie Endowment’s Annual Conference in Washington, DC, Deputy Secretary of
State James Steinberg said, “We should explore means of augmenting the IAEA's safeguards authorities, and the
Agency should receive the increased resources it needs to carry out its rapidly growing responsibilities."
[3] The set of core capabilities was developed for this assessment by staff at NNSA NA-241 (formerly NA-243) with
input and review by subject matter experts at DOE national laboratories.
[4] Jill N. Cooley, IAEA, “Building Safeguards Expertise: Projected IAEA Needs,” Next Generation Safeguards
Initiative Workshop, Washington, D.C., September 11-12, 2008: “In the next 3 years, approximately 35 percent of
senior staff will retire.”
[5] Alicia de Reynaud, Head of the IAEA’s Safeguards Programme & Resources Office, Presentation to the NGSI
Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for IAEA Safeguards, Brookhaven National Laboratory, October 22-23, 2008. See
also the Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) on the Future of the Agency, GOV/2008/22-GC (52)
INF/4, May 23, 2008, p. 29: “Half of [the Secretariat’s] top management and its senior inspectors are expected
to…retire in the next five years.”
[6]
2005
IAEA
report:
“Personnel
Staffing
of
the
Agency's
http://iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/GC49Documents/English/gc49-14_en.pdf.
Secretariat.”
p.
9.
[7] Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-93, “IAEA Has Strengthened its Safeguards and Nuclear Security
Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed,” October 2005.
[8] Alicia de Reynaud, Head of the IAEA’s Safeguards Programme & Resources Office, Presentation to the NGSI
Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for IAEA Safeguards, Brookhaven National Laboratory, October 22-23, 2008.
[9] In September 2003, following 15 years of zero real growth budget, the IAEA General Conference agreed to a onetime increase in the organization’s regular budget that was phased in from 2004-2007. This included a 21.7 percent
increase for safeguards. See “Report to the Board of Governors by the Co-Chairmen of the Informal Open-ended
Working Group on the Programme and Budget for 2004-2005,” GOV/2003/48, July 16, 2003, Annex 1; See also
“IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game,” July 2007, p. 19. In 2009 and 2010, the real increase in the IAEA’s
safeguards budget was approximately 1% each year.
[10] IAEA, International Status and Prospects of Nuclear Power, 2008, p. 32. This IAEA report highlights that “With
the large number of retirements coming at the same time as planned [nuclear power] expansions, having sufficient
human resources with suitable experience … can be a significant challenge.”