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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTVS GOVERNMENT
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for the Cabinet.
March
1933.
SECRET.
Copy No.
35
O.P. (81) 33.
CABINET.
MALAYA.
Memorandum
by the Secretary
of State
for the
Colonies.
I C I R C U L A T E h e r e w i t h the R e p o r t of S i r Samuel Wilson, P e r m a n e n t
U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for the Colonies, on h i s visit to M a l a y a last year.
I propose to p r e s e n t t h i s R e p o r t to P a r l i a m e n t as a C o m m a n d P a p e r about
the m i d d l e of A p r i l . A d v a n c e copies have been sent to S i r Cecil Clementi,
Governor of t h e S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s a n d H i g h Commissioner for the M a l a y
S t a t e s , by m a i l t h i s week in o r d e r t h a t simultaneous publication in t h i s country
a n d i n M a l a y a m a y be effected.
T h e R e p o r t is the sound a n d p r a c t i c a l piece of w o r k which I should have
expected from i t s a u t h o r . I t h i n k the line of policy which he advocates is r i g h t ;
and, unless I find t h a t there are a n y s t r o n g r e a c t i o n s i n M a l a y a which lead me
to reconsider t h i s view, I propose to adopt generally t h e recommendations in
the R e p o r t .
(Initialled)
P . C.-L.
Downing
[8375]
Street,
March 24, 1933.
REPORT
OF
B R I G A D I E R - G E N E R A L SIR S A M U E L
G.C.M.G., K.C.B..K.B.E.,
WILSON,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State
for the Colonies on his
VISIT T O MALAYA
1932
PreeoHtpd by tho Secrolary
March,
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HIS MAJESTVS
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At the Addresses on the J*'ront Cover of this report
REPORT
OF
B R I G A D I E R - G E N E R A L SIR S A M U E L
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E.,
Permanent Under-Secretary of
for the Colonies on his
WILSON,
State
VISIT T O MALAYA
1932
LONDON
P R I N T E D A N D P U B L I S H E D BY H I S M A J E S T Y S S T A T I O N E R Y O F F I C E
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4276
CONTENTS
Page
Letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 25th
February, 1933
3
Chapter.
I.—Constitutional and administrative developments up to the
post-War period
...
...
...
...
...
...
5
II.—Constitutional and administrative developments subsequent
to the War
8
III.—Political aspects of decentralization proposals
...
...
11
IV.— Financial and economic aspects of decentralization proposals
14
V.—Administrative aspects of decentralization proposals
...
19
VI.—Suggested procedure in carrying out the policy recommended
23
VII.—Non-Malay Asiatic Communities
VIII.—Miscellaneous
proposals
...
not affecting
...
...
decentralization
...
in
the Federated Malay States
IX.—Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations
28
33
APPENDICES
Appendix.
I.—Itinerary
II.—General description of Malaya ...
III.—Treaty of Federation, 1895
IV.—Agreements of 1909 and 1927
V.—Summary
of
proposals
of
High
decentralizing departments ...
Map.
Commissioner
26
for
To the E i g h t Honourable
SIR PHILIP CUNLIFFE-LISTER, G . B . E . , M . C . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e C o l o n i e s .
M.P.,
SIR,
I w a s i n s t r u c t e d by y o u to proceed to M a l a y a in t h e a u t u m n of
last y e a r w i t h a v i e w to d i s c u s s i n g w i t h t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ,
the M a l a y R u l e r s , a n d t h e leaders of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , t h e proposals
which h a v e b e e n m a d e to d e c e n t r a l i z e c e r t a i n public s e r v i c e s in
the F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s .
Y o u took t h i s c o u r s e b e c a u s e y o u w i s h e d H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n ­
m e n t t o h a v e t h e fullest i n f o r m a t i o n at first h a n d o n all aspects
of the m a t t e r .
I left L o n d o n o n 2 0 t h October, 1 9 3 2 , a n d , t r a v e l l i n g via
M a r s e i l l e s , r e a c h e d P e n a n g o n 1 0 t h N o v e m b e r , 1 9 3 2 . I n addition
to p a y i n g v i s i t s to P e n a n g , T h e D i n d i n g s , M a l a c c a , a n d S i n g a p o r e ,
I visited d u r i n g m y stay i n M a l a y a t h e f o l l o w i n g M a l a y S t a t e s
in t h e order m e n t i o n e d : — K e d a h , P e r l i s , P e r a k , S e l a n g o r , N e g r i
S e m b i l a n , P a h a n g , a n d J o h o r e ; a n d i n all c a s e s I had t h e
opportunity of d i s c u s s i n g w i t h t h e R u l e r s , a n d i n s o m e c a s e s t h e i r
State C o u n c i l s t o o , s u c h m a t t e r s as t h e y w i s h e d m e to b r i n g to
your n o t i c e .
A t K u a l a L u m p u r and S i n g a p o r e at both of w h i c h
places I s t a y e d for s o m e d a y s I had t h e a d v a n t a g e of b e i n g able
to confer, i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , w i t h t h e
officers of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s a n d S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s
Governments.
A t t h e e n d of a m o n t h ' s stay i n M a l a y a I pro­
c e e d e d , in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h your i n s t r u c t i o n s , t o v i s i t H o n g K o n g
and C e y l o n , e v e n t u a l l y e m b a r k i n g for E n g l a n d at C o l o m b o o n 1 8 t h
J a n u a r y , arriving at M a r s e i l l e s o n 3rd F e b r u a r y and i n L o n d o n o n
4th F e b r u a r y . A full itinerary o f m y tour is g i v e n i n A p p e n d i x I .
A s regards t h e c o n t r o v e r s y d u r i n g r e c e n t y e a r s c o n c e r n i n g t h e
s y s t e m of g o v e r n m e n t i n t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s , I i n t e n d to
confine m y s e l f to g i v i n g a brief s u m m a r y of t h e e v e n t s w h i c h h a v e
led u p to t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t e x i s t s t o - d a y , s i n c e i n m y o p i n i o n
little i s to b e g a i n e d b y r e p e a t i n g t h e a r g u m e n t s w h i c h h a v e b e e n
put forward o n o n e side or the o t h e r .
I propose t o face facts a s t h e y are n o w , and t o s u g g e s t to y o u
w h a t appears to m e a possible s o l u t i o n of t h e d e l i c a t e p r o b l e m of
reconciling t h e natural political a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e R u l e r s w i t h t h e
practical difficulties, e c o n o m i c a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , of d e c e n t r a l i z i n g
a s y s t e m of g o v e r n m e n t in a territory t h e size of M a l a y a .
I w o u l d , h o w e v e r , say i n t h i s introductory n o t e t h a t I t h i n k
t h a t all t h o s e w h o h a v e g i v e n t h e s i t u a t i o n i n M a l a y a serious
t h o u g h t very m u c h regret t h e difficulties t h a t h a v e arisen from t i m e
183S5
A 2
t o t i m e in t h e past t w e n t y years b e t w e e n s u c c e s s i v e H i g h Com­
m i s s i o n e r s and t h e officers h o l d i n g t h e p o s t of K e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l ,
o r Chief S e c r e t a r y , at K u a l a L u m p u r , c u l m i n a t i n g as t h e y did
s o m e years a g o i n the unconcealed friction t h a t e x i s t e d between
t h e holders of t h e s e t w o p o s t s .
S o far as I h a v e b e e n able to
a s c e r t a i n , t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e n created has b e e n to a g r e a t extent
r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e c h a n g e t h a t , I a m told, h a s t a k e n place in the
spirit of co-operation and goodwill t h a t h a d a l w a y s e x i s t e d between
all s e c t i o n s of t h e c o m m u n i t y before t h e n . F u r t h e r , I a m led to
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s a m e situation paved t h e w a y for t h e g r o w t h of the
f e e l i n g of s u s p i c i o n and m i s t r u s t w h i c h appears to e x i s t to-day
b e t w e e n the Colony and the F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s .
I n dealing w i t h t h e different a s p e c t s of t h e decentralization pro­
p o s a l s I h a v e done so i n w h a t appears to m e t o be their order of
i m p o r t a n c e , v i z . , p o l i t i c a l , financial and e c o n o m i c , and administra­
t i v e . I m e n t i o n t h e point b e c a u s e I t h i n k that t h e r e is a tendency
i n M a l a y a to e x a g g e r a t e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e difficulties t h a t may
arise if c h a n g e s a r e m a d e and to forget t h a t in all c a s e s the ad­
m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e e x i s t s for t h e benefit of t h e country and its
people and n o t v i c e versa.
I a m m u c h i n d e b t e d to t h e G o v e r n o r and H i g h Commissioner
for t h e very e x c e l l e n t a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h h e m a d e in order to
e n a b l e m e t o carry o u t m y task.
I a l s o o w e a d e e p debt of
g r a t i t u d e to the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r and E u l e r s a n d all t h o s e who
g a v e us such a w a r m w e l c o m e and e x t e n d e d to u s so m u c h kind
hospitality.
1 have also to t h a n k M r . G e n t of t h e Colonial Office w h o accom­
p a n i e d m e a s m y P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y a n d h a s rendered m e invaluable
assistance.
F i n a l l y I w i s h t o record m y d e e p appreciation of t h e courtesy
of t h e M a l a y a n P r e s s , w h i c h , i n t e r e s t e d as it w a s i n t h e whole
q u e s t i o n of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r s policy,
refrained during m y tour i n t h e c o u n t r y from p u b l i s h i n g a n y con­
troversial m a t t e r o n t h e subject.
S. H .
-25th
February,
1933.
WILSON.
REPORT
C H A P T E R I.*
Constitutional and administrative developments up to the
post-War period.
T h e original T r e a t i e s c o n c l u d e d w i t h t h e R u l e r s of t h e M a l a y
S t a t e s w e r e not i d e n t i c a l i n t e r m s , but e a c h provided for B r i t i s h
protection and for a s s i s t a n c e in a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b y t h e appoint­
m e n t of a B r i t i s h officer b y t h e Governor of t h e S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s
to reside i n e a c h S t a t e . T h e advice of t h a t officer w a s t o be a s k e d
for and octed upon i n all m a t t e r s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e t o u c h i n g M o h a m ­
m e d a n religion and c u s t o m .
T h e first of t h e s e T r e a t i e s w a s t h e T r e a t y of P a n g k o r concluded
w i t h t h e C h i e f s of P e r a k in 1 8 7 4 .
I n t h e fifteen y e a r s w h i c h
followed, B r i t i s h R e s i d e n t s w e r e a l s o a p p o i n t e d i n S e l a n g o r , N e g r i
S e m b i l a n , and P a h a n g .
A t t h a t t i m e t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e
tin-ore resources by f o r e i g n , chiefly C h i n e s e , e n t e r p r i s e w a s l e a d i n g
to a rapid o p e n i n g u p of t h e country : a n d t h e M a l a y R u l e r s and
C h i e f s had n e i t h e r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n nor t h e resources
to e x e r c i s e proper c o n t r o l .
T h e result w a s t h a t t h e B r i t i s h R e s i d e n t s h a d n o option b u t t o
g a t h e r t h e reins of g o v e r n m e n t i n t o t h e i r o w n h a n d s i n s p i t e of
an e x p l i c i t s t a t e m e n t by t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t t h a t t h e i r f u n c t i o n s
were n o t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e . T h i s s t a t e m e n t e x p l a i n e d t h a t a R e s i d e n t
w a s rjlaced i n a N a t i v e S t a t e a s a n a d v i s e r , n o t a s a ruler,
that h i s f u n c t i o n s w e r e t h e g i v i n g of r e s p o n s i b l e a d v i c e , and t h a t
h e w a s n o t to i n t e r f e r e m o r e f r e q u e n t l y or t o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t
than w a s n e c e s s a r y in t h e m i n o r d e t a i l s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
But
it did not take full a c c o u n t of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n e x p e r i e n c e of
t h e M a l a y R u l e r s and t h e l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s at their d i s p o s a l , o r
of t h e fact t h a t at t h e t i m e t h e M a l a y G o v e r n m e n t s m a i n t a i n e d a
precarious e x i s t e n c e a n d w e r e to all i n t e n t s t o t a l l y l a c k i n g i n jjroper
o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t d o e s n o t require a g r e a t s t r e t c h of t h e i m a g i n a ­
tion to u n d e r s t a n d h o w , i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e R e s i d e n t s w e r e
forced to create a n d c o n t r o l t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s y s t e m s i n t h e
S t a t e s and to e x p a n d and adapt t h e m to m e e t t h e n e e d s of a rapidly
developing country.
T h e M a l a y s , w h o s h a r e d i n t h e g r o w i n g prosperity w h i c h r e s u l t e d ,
a c c e p t e d t h e n e w r e g i m e w i t h o u t r e s e n t m e n t , b u t t h e rapidity of
the country's material development outstripped the advancement
in e d u c a t i o n of t h e M a l a y s . T h e result w a s t h a t A s i a t i c s differing
i n r e l i g i o n and c u s t o m s of life from t h e p e o p l e of t h e P e n i n s u l a
were recruited for e m p l o y m e n t i n c o m m e r c e a n d industry and
* A g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of M a l a y a a n d i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s is g i v e n i n
A p p e n d i x II.
m o n o p o l i z e d t h e m o s t prized p o s t s i n t h e s u b o r d i n a t e government
services.
I n 1 8 9 3 t h e M a r q u e s s of E i p o n , t h e n S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for
the C o l o n i e s , s u g g e s t e d federation w h i c h t h e G o v e r n o r welcomed
as likely to l i g h t e n h i s o w n work and to p r o m o t e co-ordination
b e t w e e n t h e four S t a t e s c o n c e r n e d .
I n 1 8 9 5 a draft s c h e m e of federation w a s approved by M r . Joseph
C h a m b e r l a i n , w h o laid d o w n t h a t n o p a i n s s h o u l d be spared to
safeguard the position and d i g n i t y of t h e M a l a y R u l e r s , t h a t they
should t e i n v i t e d to c o n t i n u e to c o - o p e r a t e w i t h t h e i r British
advisers i n p r o m o t i n g t h e a d v a n c e m e n t of their r e s p e c t i v e terri­
tories a n d s u b j e c t s , a n d t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e g i v e n t h e assurance
that s u c h c h a n g e s as w e r e to be m a d e w e r e solely i n t e n d e d to
p r o m o t e s t r e n g t h b y co-operation. F u r t h e r t h e y w e r e t o be assured
t h a t i n b i n d i n g t h e m s e l v e s and their S t a t e s t h e y w o u l d not be
d i m i n i s h i n g i n t h e s l i g h t e s t d e g r e e t h e p o w e r s a n d privileges they
t h e n p o s s e s s e d nor w o u l d t h e y b e curtailing t h e r i g h t of self­
government w h i c h they enjoyed.
I n t h e result t h e T r e a t y of F e d e r a t i o n of 1 8 9 5 , t h e terms of
w h i c h are reproduced in A p p e n d i x I I I , w a s readily s i g n e d by
t h e E u l e r s of t h e four S t a t e s of P e r a k , S e l a n g o r , N e g r i S e m b i l a n .
and P a h a n g .
On a strict interpretation t h e t e r m s of t h e T r e a t y are i n some
r e s p e c t s contradictory. I t m a y h o w e v e r be m a i n t a i n e d : —
(a) T h a t t h e T r e a t y itself c o n v e y e d n o p o w e r of control
to t h e R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l , w h o s e office w a s created under
C l a u s e 4 , n o r did it i n a n y w a y c h a n g e t h e advisory status
of t h e G o v e r n o r s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
(b) T h a t t h e t e r m " F e d e r a t i o n " as applied t o t h e form o f
u n i o n c r e a t e d b y the Treaty- w a s a m i s n o m e r , s i n c e t h e Treaty
d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h any central G o v e r n m e n t , did n o t m a k e any
a t t e m p t at a division of p o w e r s , b u t did o n the contrary pre­
s e r v e all former S t a t e r i g h t s .
7
V a r i o u s and conflicting as are t h e o p i n i o n s w h i c h h a v e been
e x p r e s s e d b y p e r s o n s of k n o w l e d g e and a u t h o r i t y o n t h e precise
i n t e n t i o n s of those w h o drafted t h e T r e a t y , t h e r e c a n be n o doubt
that i t did i n fact effect s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e s .
F o r e x a m p l e previous t o t h e T r e a t y t h e de facto
executive
p o w e r ( m a t t e r s c o n c e r n i n g M o h a m m e d a n r e l i g i o n and M a l a y custom
e x c e p t e d ) h a d b e e n left by t h e R u l e r in e a c h S t a t e to h i s British
R e s i d e n t , w h o c o n s u l t e d t h e R u l e r w h e n e v e r h e t h o u g h t desirable.
T h e c r e a t i o n , a s t h e result of t h e T r e a t y , of a F e d e r a l Secretariat
u n d e r a R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l , w h o s e a d v i c e h a d to be followed in
all m a t t e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , r e m o v e d m a n y of t h e p o w e r s pre­
v i o u s l y e x e r c i s e d b y t h e R e s i d e n t s to a superior authority w h o was
not i n c o n t i n u o u s and personal t o u c h w i t h t h e R u l e r s ; a n d the
s a m e a u t h o r i t y took o v e r c o m p l e t e s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e rapidly ex­
p a n d i n g finances of t h e S t a t e s : a n d t h e unified control which
r e s u l t e d w a s a great s t i m u l u s t o c o m m e r c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e State G o v e r n m e n t s , e v e n if t h e y h a d w i s h e d , w e r e p o w e r l e s s
to check c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n the F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t and to e s c a p e
from the ever e x p a n d i n g a c t i v i t i e s of t h e federal d e p a r t m e n t s .
F r o m t i m e to t i m e t h e r e w e r e isolated protests from i n d i v i d u a l s
against e n c r o a c h m e n t s b y the F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t ; a n d i n 1 9 0 3
the S u l t a n of P e r a k , at a n a n n u a l m e e t i n g of t h e R u l e r s , p l e a d e d
for t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of S t a t e r i g h t s , but on t h e w h o l e there c a n
be little doubt t h a t t h e r e w a s g e n e r a l a c q u i e s c e n c e i n t h e federal
s y s t e m , w h e r e there w a s n o t w h o l e - h e a r t e d approval.
T h e first a t t e m p t to modify t h e s y s t e m w a s m a d e b y Sir J o h n
Anderson in 1 9 0 9 , b e c a u s e at t h a t date h e considered there w a s a
strong feeling o n the part of t h e M a l a y R u l e r s a g a i n s t t h e l o s s of
authority by t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s .
H e d e c i d e d to c u r t a i l t h e
powers of t h e R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l a n d t h e federal m a c h i n e , b y t h e
creation of a F e d e r a l Council w i t h t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r h i m s e l f
as P r e s i d e n t a n d i n c l u d i n g the R u l e r s a n d R e s i d e n t s as m e m b e r s ,
l i e also i n s t i t u t e d c o n f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , t h e
R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l , a n d t h e R e s i d e n t s w i t h a v i e w to k e e p i n g t h e
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r i n direct t o u c h w i t h the v i e w s of t h e R u l e r s .
Finally h e c h a n g e d t h e title of " R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l " to t h a t of
"Chief S e c r e t a r y to G o v e r n m e n t " .
T h e F e d e r a l Council w a s a c c o r d i n g l y c o n s t i t u t e d u n d e r t h e
terms of a n A g r e e m e n t , concluded w i t h t h e four R u l e r s of t h e
Federated S t a t e s in October, 1 9 0 9 . T h e t e r m s of this A g r e e m e n t
are reproduced i n A p p e n d i x I V (i).
T h i s A g r e e m e n t m a y be said to m a r k a definite a t t e m p t t o create
a g e n u i n e federal s y s t e m . L e g a l critics h a v e p o i n t e d out t h e i n ­
consistencies of the a c t u a l . t e r m s of the A g r e e m e n t , b u t , w h a t e v e r
its s h o r t c o m i n g s m a y h a v e b e e n , it did c r e a t e t h e F e d e r a l Council
as the m a i n l e g i s l a t i v e a n d financial a u t h o r i t y for t h e F e d e r a t e d
M a l a y S t a t e s , a n d it d i d a t t e m p t a division of p o w e r s b y allocating
certain q u e s t i o n s to t h e s p h e r e of t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s .
T h e c h a n g e of title of the R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l w a s also effected,
but n o actual s t e p s h a d b e e n t a k e n to restrict h i s p o w e r s before
Sir J o h n A n d e r s o n ' s t e r m as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r c a m e to a n e n d
in 1 9 1 1 : and i t is i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t e i n this c o n n e x i o n , t h a t t h e
first Chief S e c r e t a r y in h i s A n n u a l R e p o r t for 1 9 1 0 r e c o r d e d t h e
c h a n g e i n t i t l e , but at t h e s a m e t i m e o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e duties and
responsibilities of t h e p o s t would r e m a i n t h e s a m e .
The years 1910-13 marked a great expansion in the rubber
plantation i n d u s t r y , h i g h prices i n t h e tin m i n i n g i n d u s t r y , and
p h e n o m e n a l i n c r e a s e s i n G o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e s : and i n t h e g e n e r a l
rush of d e v e l o p m e n t , b r i n g i n g w i t h it i n c r e a s e d p r o s p e r i t y , a n y
discontent w i t h t h e h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d b u r e a u c r a c y at K u a l a
L u m p u r s e e m s to h a v e b e e n f o r g o t t e n .
T h i s period w a s f o l l o w e d by t h e W a r w h e n e v e r y t h i n g w a s s u b ­
ordinated to t h e E m p i r e ' s s t r u g g l e for e x i s t e n c e . D u r i n g t h e s e
critical years t h e M a l a y R u l e r s and t h e i r p e o p l e s w e r e in t h e first
rank in their g e n e r o s i t y and their e a g e r n e s s to h e l p the British
cause.
T h e m a n y difficult p r o b l e m s w h i c h arose in t h e F e d e r a t i o n were
ably h a n d l e d by t h e Chief Secretary to G o v e r n m e n t and his
a s s i s t a n t s , and t h e m a n y fresh e x t e n s i o n s of bureaucratic control
went unchallenged.
CHAPTER II.
Constitutional and administrative developments subsequent to
the War.
W h e n Sir L a u r e n c e Gtiillemard took up the duties of H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r in F e b r u a r y , 1 9 2 0 , he found t h a t s o m e of t h e Rulers
of t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s w e r e n o t satisfied w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n and
w e r e a p p r e h e n s i v e t h a t federal e n c r o a c h m e n t m i g h t grow w o r s e .
T h e sequel w a s that t h e w h o l e q u e s t i o n of t h e future of t h e Malay
S t a t e s c a m e u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and in D e c e m b e r , 1 9 2 1 , t h e H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r w a s authorized to m a k e a declaration i n the
F e d e r a l Council to t h e effect that it w a s n o t t h e policy o f H i s
M a j e s t v ' s G o v e r n m e n t t o e x t e n d t h e F e d e r a t i o n to e m b r a c e any
of t h e S t a t e s not a l r e a d y i n c l u d e d , unless at their o w n w i s h , but
to a i m a t friendly co-operation b e t w e e n t h e C o l o n y , t h e F e d e r a t e d
S t a t e s , and the U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s o n all m a t t e r s of c o m m o n
interest.
I n t h e f o l l o w i n g \ ear it w a s a n n o u n c e d in t h e F e d e r a l Council
t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e transfer of p o w e r from t h e F e d e r a l to the
S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s w a s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and t h a t it w a s hoped
to i n c r e a s e t h e p o w e r s and f u n c t i o n s of t h e S t a t e Councils i n some
i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s ; a n d assurances w e r e g i v e n from time t o time
during t h i s period, t h a t i t w a s t h e i n t e n t i o n of H i s M a j e s t y ' ;
G o v e r n m e n t to g i v e effect t o a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .
S l o w progress w a s m a d e , h o w e v e r , i n g i v i n g a n y practical effect
to t h e s e a s s u r a n c e s , a n d t h e first s t e p w h i c h calls for n o t i c e w a s
t h e p a s s i n g of a n e n a c t m e n t i n April, 1 9 2 4 , w h i c h e m p o w e r e d the
Chief Secretary to d i s p e n s e , b y notification in t h e Gazette,
with
t h o s e statutory provisions w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e d t h e approval of the
Chief S e c r e t a r y b e i n g g i v e n before a R e s i d e n t could take action in
certain m a t t e r s .
D u r i n g a v i s i t to E n g l a n d i n A u g u s t , 1 9 2 4 , H i s H i g h n e s s the
S u l t a n of F e r a k took t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to v i s i t M r . J . H . T h o m a s ,
t h e n Secretary of S t a t e for the Colonies, to ask for the restriction
of t h e p o w e r s of t h e federal authority and t h e transfer to t h e State
a u t h o r i t i e s of t h e control o f their d o m e s t i c affairs.
I n 1925,Sir L a u r e n c e Guillemard, the H i g h Commissioner,visited
E n g l a n d a n d discussed the q u e s t i o n w i t h M r . A m e r y , w h o w a s then
Secretary of S t a t e for t h e C o l o n i e s .
A s t h e result of t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s , a n official a n n o u n c e m e n t w a s
m a d e i n t h e M a l a y a n p r e s s to t h e effect t h a t it had been c o m m o n
g r o u n d for years p a s t t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the F e d e r a t e d
M a l a y S t a t e s w a s too h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d a n d t h a t the root of the
r
g
difficulty lay i n t h e great p o w e r s of control w h i c h w e r e v e s t e d i n
the Chief S e c r e t a r y ; a n d it w a s s t a t e d t h a t t h e w h o l e q u e s t i o n w a s
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Sir L a u r e n c e G u i i l e m a r d , w h o returned to M a l a y a towards t h e
end of 1 9 2 5 , e x p l a i n e d i n D e c e m b e r of that y e a r to t h e F e d e r a l
Council t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t w a s c o m m i t t e d t o a policy o f d e c e n ­
u a l i z a t i o n a n d that t h e logical o u t c o m e of t h a t policy w a s t h e
gradual d e v o l u t i o n of t h e p o w e r s of t h e Chief S e c r e t a r y until t h e
office a s t h e n c o n s t i t u t e d practically c e a s e d to e x i s t . T h e H i g h
Commissioner also s u g g e s t e d to t h e F e d e r a l Council t h e possibility
of t h e E u l e r s e l e c t i n g i n d u e course t o w i t h d r a w from m e m b e r ­
ship of t h e C o u n c i l to t h e s e r e n e r a t m o s p h e r e of an U p p e r H o u s e
or periodical D u r b a r ; a n d h e e x p r e s s e d t h e v i e w t h a t it m i g h t be
found t o b e a g o o d t h i n g if o n l y m e m b e r s of t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s w e r e
eligible for a p p o i n t m e n t a s unofficial m e m b e r s of t h e F e d e r a l
Council.
O p p o s i t i o n t o t h e policy o f decentralization c o n c e n t r a t e d o n t h e
proposal t o r e d u c e t h e p o w e r s and s t a t u s of t h e Chief S e c r e t a r y : a n d
the s u b s e q u e n t controversy s h o w e d t h a t t h e E u r o p e a n a n d C h i n e s e
unofficial m e m b e r s of t h e C o u n c i l , a n d practically t h e w h o l e c o m ­
mercial c o m m u n i t y took t h e s a m e v i e w . T h e y a r g u e d t h a t a reduc­
tion of t h e p o w e r s of t h e Chief S e c r e t a r y a s p r o p o s e d w o u l d , t o a
large e x t e n t , r e l e a s e t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s a n d t h e E e s i d e n t s f r o m
the control of t h e F e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y , and w o u l d s h a k e public c o n ­
tidence i n t h e financial stability of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s .
P r o g r e s s t o w a r d s g i v i n g effect to a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w a s
made i n t w o respects before Sir L a u r e n c e G u i l l e m a r d ' s t e r m of
iffice ( w h i c h h a d b e e n e x t e n d e d for o n e year o n a c c o u n t of t h e
proposals) c a m e t o an e n d i n 1 9 2 7 . T h e s e w e r e : —
(a) T h e r e a r r a n g e m e n t i n 1 9 2 7 of t h e various H e a d s of
E x p e n d i t u r e i n t h e A n n u a l E s t i m a t e s in three c a t e g o r i e s a s
follows : —
(i) Federal
Services
t o be provided for i n t h e F e d e r a l
Estimates.
7
(ii)
Reserved
(State)
Services
t o be s h o w n in t h e State
Estimates.
(iii)
Unreserved
Services
to
be
regarded
as
not
yet
finally a l l o c a t e d , a n d to be s u s c e p t i b l e of classification i n
either the Eeserved (State) E s t i m a t e s , or the Federal
E s t i m a t e s a n d to b e s h o w n i n a v o l u m e " U n r e s e r v e d
Services."
(6) T h e conclusion i n 1 9 2 7 of a n e w A g r e e m e n t * w i t h t h e
E u l e r s f o r t h e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e F e d e r a l Council.
By
this reconstitution the Eulers withdrew from active member­
s h i p of t h e Council t h o u g h r e t a i n i n g t h e r i g h t t o b e p r e s e n t
at a n y m e e t i n g if t h e y w i s h e d ; t h e unofficial m e m b e r s h i p
of t h e C o u n c i l w a s e n l a r g e d to give i t a m o r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
c h a r a c t e r a n d i t s l e g i s l a t i v e a n d financial a u t h o r i t y w a s defined.
* F o r t h e t e r m s of t h i s A g r e e m e n t see A p p e n d i x I V (ii).
N o further s t e p s towards g i v i n g effect to a d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n policv
w e r e taken d u r i n g t h e t i m e t h a t Sir H u g h Clifford held t h e post
of Governor and H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , a n d i t w a s n o t u n t i l 1930,
w h e n Sir Cecil C l e m e n t i took u p t h e a p p o i n t m e n t , that t h e ques­
tion of t a k i n g further steps w a s raised.
I n t h i s y e a r ( 1 9 3 0 ) t h e four R u l e r s re-opened t h e q u e s t i o n of
decentralization at t h e A n n u a l D u r b a r , and in the f o l l o w i n g year
the H i g h Commissioner, w h o was h o m e on leave in England,
discussed t h e m a t t e r w i t h L o r d Passfield, w h o w a s t h e n Secretary
of S t a t e for the Colonies.
As t h e result of this d i s c u s s i o n , t h e Secretary of S t a t e w r o t e to the
officer w h o w a s a c t i n g as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r i n f o r m i n g h i m thai
h e agreed w i t h Sir Cecil C l e m e n t f s v i e w s a s to t h e e x i s t i n g Con­
s t i t u t i o n b e i n g capable of i m p r o v e m e n t , a n d added t h a t , as ;i
preliminary m e a s u r e , i t w a s desirable t o e x p l o r e t h e q u e s t i o n o f
h o w far t h e d e f e c t s in the e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e Severn 1
S t a t e s and S e t t l e m e n t s in t h e P e n i n s u l a could b e r e m e d i e d . A t
t h e s a m e t i m e t h e Secretary of S t a t e p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e problem
w a s a large o n e and would require full c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n Malaya
before any definite proposals w e r e s u b m i t t e d t o H i s Majesty's
G o v e r n m e n t for c o n s i d e r a t i o n : a n d h e e x p l a i n e d t h a t h e had
authorized Sir Cecil C l e m e n t i on h i s return to M a l a y a to discuss
his proposals w i t h t h e R u l e r s and t o a s c e r t a i n their v i e w s .
I n A u g u s t of the s a m e y e a r , Sir Cecil C l e m e n t i , after h i s return
to M a l a y a e x p l a i n e d t o the R u l e r s at a D u r b a r h e l d at Sri Menanti
his proposals for g i v i n g effect to a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n : and
he d e a l t w i t h t h e m a t t e r still further i n a n address to t h e Federal
Council o n 1 4 t h N o v e m b e r , 1 9 3 1 , and at a D u r b a r h e l d a t Pekan
in April, 1 9 3 2 .
I t w a s in c o n n e x i o n w i t h t h e s e proposals that I w a s instructed
by t h e Secretary of S t a t e for the C o l o n i e s to visit M a l a y a , a n d they
are c o n s e q u e n t l y fully dealt w i t h i n t h e s u c c e e d i n g c h a p t e r s of this
Report. I w i l l confine m y s e l f t h e r e f o r e , at this s t a g e , to g i v i n g a
brief s u m m a r y of their s c o p e .
T h e proposals a s a d u m b r a t e d by t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r at the
Sri M e n a n t i and P e k a n D u r b a r s provide for : —
(a) T h e transfer t o t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e control
of t h e f o l l o w i n g d e p a r t m e n t s , v i z . , Agricultural, Co-opera­
tive, Educational, Electrical, Forestry, Medical,
Mining.
P u b l i c W o r k s , and V e t e r i n a r y . *
(b) T h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s and an extension
of t h e i r p o w e r s .
(c) T h e abolition of t h e post of Chief S e c r e t a r y as now
constituted.
* T h e D r a i n a g e a n d I r r i g a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t w h i c h i s n o w a separate
d e p a r t m e n t w a s a t t h i s timo i n c l u d e d in t h e P u b l i c W o r k s D e p a r t m e n t . The
P r i s o n s D e p a r t m e n t h a s been s u b s e q u e n t l y a d d e d to t h e list.
(d) T h e control of the R a i l w a y s b y a n e w r a i l w a y board
t o be a p p o i n t e d in addition to the e x i s t i n g A d v i s o r y B o a r d ;
and t h e control of P o s t s , T e l e g r a p h s , a n d T e l e p h o n e s b y a
postal board.
(c) T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of c e r t a i n services s u c h as C u s t o m s and
Surveys on a pan-Malayan basis.
(/) T h e d i s c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e s y s t e m of h a v i n g i n t h e
Colony and t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s separate h e a d s of
certain d e p a r t m e n t s , and t h e c r e a t i o n of a s i n g l e h e a d of each
service for t h e w h o l e of M a l a y a , t h e s e officers b e i n g v e s t e d
w i t h e x e c u t i v e p o w e r s in t h e C o l o n y but o n l y w i t h advisory
p o w e r s in t h e M a l a y S t a t e s .
(a) T h e a b o l i t i o n of t h a t v o l u m e of t h e E s t i m a t e s e n t i t l e d
" U n r e s e r v e d S e r v i c e s " , t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e n u m b e r of v o l u m e s
of E s t i m a t e s i n f u t u r e from s i x to five, t h e services s h o w n at
present u n d e r " U n r e s e r v e d S e r v i c e s " b e i n g s h o w n in e i t h e r
the F e d e r a l v o l u m e or t h e S t a t e v o l u m e s ; those w h o s e final
allocation i s not decided b e i n g m a r k e d w i t h a n o t e to t h a t effect.
T h e a n n o u n c e m e n t of t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r w a s w e l c o m e d
by t h e R u l e r s of t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s , b u t m a n y of t h e p r o p o s a l s ,
and particularly that for t h e abolition of t h e p o s t of Chief S e c r e t a r y ,
were soon the s u b j e c t of public c r i t i c i s m . I n d e e d , v e r y consider­
able opposition h a s been s h o w n b y the b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y as a
w h o l e — E u r o p e a n , C h i n e s e , a n d I n d i a n — t o t h e proposed abolition
of t h e post of Chief S e c r e t a r y .
T h e r e a s o n s for t h i s o p p o s i t i o n
are similar t o t h o s e w h i c h u n d e r l a y the c r i t i c i s m of t h e p r o p o s a l s
made by S i r L a u r e n c e G u i l l e m a r d s o m e s e v e n y e a r s earlier.
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t t h e c r i t i c i s m s of Sir Cecil C l e m e n t i ' s
proposals s h o w a particular a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t w h a t w i l l r e s u l t
is not so m u c h d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s a s
centralization i n S i n g a p o r e .
T h e p o s s i b i l i t y of such a s i t u a t i o n
arising appears to be v i e w e d w i t h d i s m a y by t h e c o m m e r c i a l and
business c o m m u n i t i e s i n t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s , w h o freely
express t h e v i e w t h a t in s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s their i n t e r e s t s w o u l d
lie sacrificed to t h o s e of t h e C o l o n y .
CHAPTER III.
Political aspects of decentralization proposals.
F r o m a p u r e l y e c o n o m i c point of v i e w i t w o u l d n o d o u b t b e ad­
visable i n a c o u n t r y t h e s i z e of M a l a y a to h a v e o n e Central G o v e r n ­
m e n t a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e w h o l e territory.
There i s , h o w e v e r , t h e political a s p e c t of t h e p r o b l e m ; a n d as
pointed o u t in t h e p r e v i o u s C h a p t e r , the c r e a t i o n o u t s i d e t h e t e r m s
of the T r e a t i e s and A g r e e m e n t s o f t h e h i g h l y
centralized
bureaucracy t h a t e x i s t s at K u a l a L u m p u r t o - d a y h a s l e d i n r e c e n t
1S385
A4
y e a r s to a g r o w i n g wish o n the part of the Rulers for a transfer
to t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s of m o r e control of their o w n affairs, ami
for t h e a s s i m i l a t i o n of t h e position of t h e R u l e r s of t h e Federated
S t a t e s t o t h a t of t h e R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s .
Further
t h e r e c a n be little d o u b t t h a t t h e e v e n t s of recent y e a r s h a v e en­
couraged t h e R u l e r s to b e l i e v e that it is the i n t e n t i o n of His
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t to adopt in t h e n e a r future a policy of
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n : a n d t h e adoption of a n y other course n o w would.
I a m afraid, shake to a great e x t e n t t h e confidence of t h e Rulers
i n t h e b o n a fides o f t h e British G o v e r n m e n t . W i t h o u t doubt the
R u l e r s o n e and all e x p e c t
s o m e considerable
m e a s u r e of
decentralization.
M o r e o v e r it s e e m s c l e a r that t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of the position,
a u t h o r i t y , and prestige of the M a l a y R u l e r s m u s t a l w a y s b e a
cardinal point in B r i t i s h policy : and t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t of indirect
rule will probably p r o v e t h e greatest safeguard a g a i n s t t h e politic:;i
s u b m e r s i o n of t h e M a l a y s w h i c h w o u l d result from t h e developmen!
of popular g o v e r n m e n t o n w e s t e r n l i n e s . F o r , in s u c h a govern­
m e n t t h e M a l a y s w o u l d be hopelessly o u t n u m b e r e d b y t h e other
races o w i n g to t h e great influx of i m m i g r a n t s that has t a k e n place
i n t o M a l a y a d u r i n g the last few years.
P o l i t i c a l l y e v e r y t h i n g s e e m s to p o i n t to the desirability of the
R u l e r s and their respective G o v e r n m e n t s b e i n g a l l o w e d to have
control of their o w n d o m e s t i c affairs w i t h o u t interference e x c e p t
in t h o s e c a s e s w h e r e a unified policy i s clearly n e c e s s a r y .
T h a t this should be t h e u l t i m a t e political r e l a t i o n s h i p between
t h e different G o v e r n m e n t s of M a l a y a appears to be t h e H i g h Com­
m i s s i o n e r ' s v i e w , h a v i n g regard to h i s p r o n o u n c e m e n t at t h e Sri
M e n a n t i D u r b a r in A u g u s t , 1 9 3 1 , a n d to the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n pro­
posals t h a t he h a s formulated d u r i n g h i s three y e a r s ' t e n u r e of office
w h i c h are d e s i g n e d t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e position of t h e R u l e r s of the
F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s to t h a t of the R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d States.
S o m e closer a s s i m i l a t i o n is o b v i o u s l y a n essential preliminary to
a n y s c h e m e for the p r o m o t i o n of c o - o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e con­
s t i t u e n t parts of M a l a y a as a w h o l e , and until t h e k n o t n o w tied
s o t i g h t l y in t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s c a n be loosened it w o u l d appear
h o p e l e s s t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s should
c o m e i n t o any form of M a l a y a n T.-eague, o r e v e n a g r e e t o meet
t o g e t h e r periodically t o discuss m a t t e r s of c o m m o n i n t e r e s t . A
possible
explanation
of w h y
the
High
C o m m i s s i o n e r ha;
n o t m a d e a m o r e e x p l i c i t s t a t e m e n t i n regard to h i s proposal?
for d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is firstly the f a c t t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y of State
h a s not y e t approved a d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n policy as a w h o l e , and
s e c o n d l y a r e l u c t a n c e o n t h e part of t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r to
do a n y t h i n g t h a t m i g h t arouse a suspicion in t h e m i n d s of the
R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s t h a t t h e r e w a s an intention of
forcing t h e m a g a i n s t t h e i r will i n t o a n y form of c l o s e r u n i o n .
Any such s u s p i c i o n w o u l d , a s I h a v e p o i n t e d o u t to t h o s e R u l e r s
w h o m I h a v e h a d t h e h o n o u r of m e e t i n g , h a v e b e e n q u i t e u n ­
justified b e c a u s e , as I w a s a u t h o r i z e d to tell T h e n : H i g h n e s s e s t h e
S u l t a n of J o h o r e and t h e R e g e n t of K e d a h , H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n ­
m e n t have n o i n t e n t i o n of r e q u i r i n g t h e R u l e r of a n y U n f e d e r a t e d
S t a t e to e n t e r a g a i n s t his will i n t o any k i n d of M a l a y a n L e a g u e
or U n i o n .
On the other h a n d , and w h i l e t h e r e is n o s u c h i n t e n t i o n o n t h e
part of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , i t is o b v i o u s , a s I h a v e pointed
out t o T h e i r H i g h n e s s e s t h e S u l t a n of J o h o r e a n d t h e R e g e n t of
K e d a h , that there m u s t b e m a n y q u e s t i o n s o n w h i c h joint dis­
cussion could not but be o f a d v a n t a g e to e v e r y c o n s t i t u e n t part of
M a l a y a ; a n d , as I h a v e s u g g e s t e d t o t h e s e R u l e r s , t h i s c a n b e d o n e
without interfering t o a n y great e x t e n t w i t h their n a t u r a l desire
to retain their i n d e p e n d e n c e in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e d o m e s t i c
affairs of their S t a t e s .
H o w e v e r , from m y d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h T h e i r H i g h n e s s e s i t a p p e a r s
to m e that t h e s e t w o R u l e r s w o u l d be v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o c o m m i t
t h e m s e l v e s at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e to a n y c l o s e r co-operation t h a n there
i s to-day w i t h t h e o t h e r G o v e r n m e n t s i n M a l a y a : and f r o m w h a t
T learnt from t h e B r i t i s h A d v i s e r s in K e l a n t a n , T r e n g g a n u , and
P e r l i s , t h e R u l e r s of t h o s e S t a t e s w o u l d take t h e s a m e v i e w .
Everything s e e m s to point to its b e i n g s o m e considerable time
before t h e R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s a r e l i k e l y t o a g r e e t o
do m o r e t h a n t a k e part i n o c c a s i o n a l D u r b a r s , o r C o n f e r e n c e s , for
the discussion o f q u e s t i o n s of i n t e r e s t t o M a l a y a a s a w h o l e : and
I think a l s o t h a t t h e d a y is a l o n g w a y off before it w i l l b e
practicable, or desirable, t o d e c e n t r a l i z e t o s u c h a n e x t e n t i n t h e
F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s as t o put t h e R u l e r s of t h e s e S t a t e s in e x a c t l y t h e
s a m e position a s t h a t in w h i c h t h e R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d
S t a t e s are t o - d a y .
T i m e and e x p e r i e n c e alone w i l l s h o w t o w h a t e x t e n t it w i l l be
possible t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e t w o s e t s of R u l e r s .
I a m of o p i n i o n , h o w e v e r , t h a t for political r e a s o n s t h e r e i s
e v e r y t h i n g t o b e said for t h e g r a d u a l s u b s t i t u t i o n i n t h e F e d e r a t e d
Malay S t a t e s of a g e n u i n e federal s y s t e m for w h a t t h e H i g h C o m ­
missioner d e s c r i b e s a s t h e " a m a l g a m a t i o n " of t o - d a y , and I a m
of o p i n i o n t h a t , as t h e first s t a g e i n c a r r y i n g o u t s u c h a p o l i c y ,
effect m i g h t be g i v e n to t h e proposals a d u m b r a t e d b y t h e H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r a t t h e Sri M e n a n t i D u r b a r i n A u g u s t , 1 9 3 1 , for
putting t h e A g r i c u l t u r a l , Co-operative, E d u c a t i o n a l , E l e c t r i c a l ,
Forestry, Medical, M i n i n g , Public W o r k s , and Veterinary Depart­
m e n t s u n d e r S t a t e c o n t r o l . * I t is n o t p o s s i b l e at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e
to v i s u a l i z e w h a t c h a n g e s m a y p r o v e desirable in t h e s u b s e q u e n t
* The Prisons D e p a r t m e n t h a s since been added t o t h i s list a n d I see no
objection t o i t s i n c l u s i o n . T h e D r a i n a g e and I r r i g a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t w h i c h
was p a r t of t h e P u b l i c W o r k s D e p a r t m e n t has b e e n s e p a r a t e d f r o m i t .
s t a g e s , but those w h i c h o n e can foresee as likely to be m o s t urgenl
w i l l b e p r i m a r i l y f i n a n c i a l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d t h e y a r e deal?
with in the two following Chapters.
A s a n o t h e r p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t of t h e p r o b l e m of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,
I s h o u l d m e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e C h i n e s e a n d o t h e r
n o n - M a l a y c o m m u n i t i e s s t r o n g l y p r e s s e d t h e i r c l a i m t h a t t h e in­
t e r e s t s of n o n - M a l a y s b o r n i n t h e M a l a y S t a t e s s h o u l d n o t s u f f e r
a s t h e r e s u l t of a n y d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p r o p o s a l s t h a t m a y b e a p p r o v e d .
I d e a l w i t h t h e a n x i e t y s h o w n b y t h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s i n C h a p t e r VII.
It is "lso right to m e n t i o n i n this C h a p t e r t h a t the increase thai
h a s b e e n m a d e r e c e n t l y in t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s
i s likely t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e d e m a n d o n t h e p a r t of t h e R u l e r s a n d
t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s f o r m o r e c o n t r o l i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of
t h e i r o w u affairs.
To summarize, there is a strong case on political grounds for
giving the Rulers of the Federated Malay States control of their
own domestic affairs, and I recommend that as a beginning effect
should be given during the next four years to the scheme proposed
by the High Commissioner at the Sri Menanti Durbar in August,
1931, for putting the Agricultural, Co-operative, Educational, Elec­
trical, Forestry, Medical, Mining, Public Works, and Veterinary
Departments under State Control"-'.
CHAPTER IV.
Financial and economic aspects of decentralization proposals.
T h e g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e t h a t m u s t be a t t a c h e d t o t h e
financial
and
e c o n o m i c a s p e c t s o f a n y s c h e m e of d e v o l u t i o n m a k e s i t d e s i r a b l e
at this stage to consider the m a t t e r from these aspects.
A local c o m m i t t e e w h i c h m e t for t h i s p u r p o s e in 1 9 3 2 expressed
t h e v i e w t h a t , i n n o c i r c u m s t a n c e s s h o u l d a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a ­
tion be allowed to i m p a i r to a n y degree t h e
financial
stability and
c r e d i t of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s a s t h e y e x i s t t o - d a y .
The
c o m m i t t e e e m p h a s i z e d t h e fact t h a t a n y c h a n g e s m a d e in t h e m u t u a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e F e d e r a l a n d S t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s m u s t n o t be
s u c h as to w e a k e n t h a t essential political cohesion a n d joint financial
responsibility o n w h i c h those w h o lent m o n e y to the Federation
in t h e p a s t confidently relied.
T h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s w h o h a v e
i n v e s t e d a l a r g e a m o u n t of c a p i t a l i n s c h e m e s f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
of t h e c o u n t r y a n d i t s r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d a l s o b e b o r n e i n m i n d in
this connexion.
I t s e e m s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e c o u n t r y
c a n p r o c e e d w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o t h e r a i s i n g of l o a n s f r o m o u t s i d e ,
a n d t o u s e t h e w o r d s of t h e local c o m m i t t e e w h i c h c o n s i d e r e d
t h e m a t t e r i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e F e d e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e a b l e " to
* The D r a i n a g e a n d I r r i g a t i o n a n d t h o P r i s o n s D e p a r t m e n t s s h o u l d be
a d d e d t o t h i s list.
enter the m o n e y m a r k e t i n t h e f u t u r e w i t h c r e d e n t i a l s no w h i t
less c o n v i n c i n g t h a n t h o s e i t carried in t h e past " .
F r o m m y d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e R u l e r s , I feel sure t h a t t h e y all
agree w i t h t h e v i e w e x p r e s s e d b y t h e local c o m m i t t e e to t h e effect
that " political d e v o l u t i o n c a n n o t be p u r c h a s e d at t h e p r i c e of
financial d i s s o l u t i o n " .
A t the s a m e t i m e I s u b m i t t h a t a m e a s u r e of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n
could he effected w h i c h , w h i l e g i v i n g t o t h e R u l e r s a n d t h e i r S t a t e
Councils practically a free h a n d i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e i r
o w n affairs, w o u l d at t h e s a m e t i m e safeguard t h e financial c r e d i t
of t h e F e d e r a t i o n b y k e e p i n g t h e g e n e r a l control of finance i n
t h e h a n d s of a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , o n w h i c h t h e R u l e r s w o u l d be
represented.
A g a i n , I v e n t u r e to t h i n k t h a t , apart from t h e q u e s t i o n of c o n ­
fidence,
there w i l l for s o m e t i m e to c o m e b e a n e e d for s o m e
form of central f u n d i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n from w h i c h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
of the w e a k e r a n d l e s s w e a l t h y S t a t e s c a n b e a s s i s t e d , a d e v e l o p ­
n i e n t w h i c h m u s t be regarded as a p o t e n t i a l a s s e t to M a l a y a a s
a whole.
W h e n I e x p r e s s t h e s e v i e w s , I d o n o t m e a n to i m p l y t h a t t h e r e
is not a great d e a l t o b e said for h a n d i n g o v e r t h e control of t h e
" s p e n d i n g d e p a r t m e n t s " to t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s .
It has been
s u g g e s t e d to m e t h a t a good deal of t h e e x t r a v a g a n t e x p e n d i t u r e
in r e c e n t y e a r s h a s b e e n d u e t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h o s e w h o h a v e u r g e d
t h e carrying o u t of c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s h a v e n o t b e e n r e s p o n s i b l e
for finding t h e m o n e y to p a y for t h e m . M o r e o v e r t h e S t a t e authori­
ties w h o are i n c l o s e t o u c h w i t h t h e d e t a i l s of w h a t is b e i n g d o n e
m u s t be in a m u c h b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to see that t h e r e is n o u n n e c e s ­
s a i y e x t r a v a g a n c e t h a n t h e H e a d s of t h e F e d e r a l D e p a r t m e n t s w h o
can o n l y take d e c i s i o n s o n t h e a d v i c e t h e y r e c e i v e from thenS t a t e officers a n d c a n o n l y a t t h e b e s t paj- periodical v i s i t s t o
t h e different S t a t e s .
I n a g e n u i n e federal s y s t e m t h e r e s h o u l d b e a c l e a r d i v i s i o n
of legislative a n d other p o w e r s b e t w e e n the Central G o v e r n m e n t
on the o n e h a n d and t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s o n t h e o t h e r ; b u t ,
if a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is i n t r o d u c e d in t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y
S t a t e s , there w i l l be for s o m e t i m e t o c o m e , and c e r t a i n l y d u r i n g
t h e transitional period, c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s w h i c h a s regards p o l i c y
will h a v e to r e m a i n subject t o a c o m m o n control, but a s r e g a r d s
detailed a d m i n i s t r a t i o n can w i t h c o n v e n i e n c e and e c o n o m y b e
left to t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s . I n t h i s category I w o u l d i n c l u d e
certain m a t t e r s o n w h i c h a u n i f o r m p o l i c y i s of particular i n t e r e s t
to the c o m m e r c i a l c o m m u n i t y , such a s r e g u l a t i o n s for d e a l i n g w i t h
m i n i n g l a n d s , s t a n d a r d of h e a l t h o n e s t a t e s , m e a s u r e s for p r e v e n ­
tion of floods, forest r e s e r v e s , a n d so o n .
I do n o t a n t i c i p a t e a n y practical difficulty i n e n s u r i n g u n i f o r m i t y
of policy o n s u c h q u e s t i o n s a l t h o u g h u n d e r S t a t e c o n t r o l , s i n c e
m y proposal i s t h a t for d e a l i n g w i t h t h e m t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r
should h a v e an A d v i s o r y Council" o n w h i c h t h e S t a t e Govern­
m e n t s will b e r e p r e s e n t e d : and i n a d d i t i o n the Rulers a r e to be
invited to appoint b o t h t h e L e g a l Adviser and the Federal Treasurer
of the F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t to be m e m b e r
of their S t a t e C o u n c i l s , and these t w o officers, together w i t h the
R e s i d e n t in each S t a t e , w i l l be available t o assist t h e R u l e r s and
their S t a t e C o u n c i l s w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n as t o t h e n e c e s s i t y for a
uniform policy.
I a m of o p i n i o n t h a t from the point of v i e w of finance there is
a s t r o n g c a s e for a d o p t i n g a d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n policy w h i c h , while
r e t a i n i n g under a Central G o v e r n m e n t o n w h i c h t h e R u l e r s are
represented the g e n e r a l control of finance and of other m a t t e r s of
c o m m o n i n t e r e s t , w i l l in course of t i m e m a k e the S t a t e Govern­
m e n t s responsible for their o w n d o m e s t i c services.
But t h e q u e s t i o n as to w h e n or h o w effect should be g i v e n to
s u c h a policy is a m a t t e r for serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n , b e c a u s e the
f e e l i n g is w i d e l y p r e v a l e n t in M a l a y a t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t are
m a k i n g too m a n y proposals for c h a n g e s a t t h e s a m e t i m e ; and
t h e r e i s a strong feeling a m o n g s t t h e b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y that,
w i t h t h e s l u m p i n t h e rubber and t i n i n d u s t r i e s , the p r e s e n t is
a n inopportune t i m e to c h o o s e for m a k i n g c h a n g e s in t h e s y s t e m of
g o v e r n m e n t under w h i c h t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s r e a c h e d the
z e n i t h of t h e i r p r o s p e r i t y .
T o t h o s e w h o argue o n t h e s e lines 1
s u g g e s t t h a t it w a s t h e a b n o r m a l d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e tin a n d rubber
industries w h i c h w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e prosperity of r e c e n t years
rather t h a n t h e actual form of g o v e r n m e n t . I agree, h o w e v e r , that
t h e p r e s e n t i s a n u n f o r t u n a t e t i m e to effect any- drastic c h a n g e s .
I s u g g e s t , t h e r e f o r e , that from t h e financial point of v i e w any
c h a n g e s s h o u l d for t h e t i m e being be strictly l i m i t e d to t h o s e which
will t e n d at o n c e t o c h e c k e x t r a v a g a n t e x p e n d i t u r e and strengthea
t h e financial position of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s .
T o w a r d s t h e close of t h e year 1 9 3 6 it may- be p o s s i b l e to reduce
debt charges b y t h e c o n v e r s i o n of t h e 6 per c e n t . S t e r l i n g Loan.
B y t h i s t i m e also t h e financial p o s i t i o n o u g h t , w i t h r i g i d economy,
to h a v e g r e a t l y i m p r o v e d . I n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s I s u b m i t t h a t from
a financial p o i n t of v i e w three to four y e a r s w o u l d appear t o b e a
suitable period to fix for w h a t m i g h t be called t h e first stage of a
decentralization p o l i c y .
T h e proposals a n d c h a n g e s w h i c h I t h i n k m i g h t reasonably be
said to c o m e u n d e r t h e category of t h o s e w h i c h w o u l d h e l p t o check
e x t r a v a g a n t e x p e n d i t u r e are :—
(a) T h e proposals m a d e b y t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r at the
Sri M e n a n t i D u r b a r in A u g u s t , 1 9 3 1 , for p u t t i n g c e r t a i n spend­
i n g d e p a r t m e n t s t under S t a t e c o n t r o l . T h i s c h a n g e h a s already
b e e n s u g g e s t e d as desirable f r o m a political point of v i e w .
* T h i s A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l i s n o t in a n y w a y i n t e n d e d to t a k e t h e place ot
the F e d e r a l C o u n c i l w h i c h w i l l c o n t i n u e to deal w i t h t h o s e matters
which remain federal.
t For l i s t s of D e p a r t m e n t s , v i d e p a g e 10.
(b) T h e proposal of the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r to h a v e o n l y five
v o l u m e s of E s t i m a t e s i n s t e a d of s i x a n d to d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e
v o l u m e of E s t i m a t e s e n t i t l e d " U n r e s e r v e d S e r v i c e s " , t h e
s e r v i c e s n o w s h o w n i n t h a t v o l u m e b e i n g i n c l u d e d in f u t u r e i n
e i t h e r the F e d e r a l v o l u m e or o n e of t h e S t a t e v o l u m e s , w i t h
a n appropriate n o t e c o n c e r n i n g t h o s e a b o u t w h i c h t h e r e m a y
still be s o m e d o u b t a s to t h e i r final allocation.
(c) A c h a n g e from t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m of " S u p p l e m e n t a r y
E s t i m a t e s " : b e c a u s e a l t h o u g h it m a y not directly affect a
policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n t h e r e appear to be s t r o n g g r o u n d s
for drastically r e d u c i n g t h e n u m b e r and a m o u n t of t h e s e
Estimates.
xVs regards ( a ) I r e c o m m e n d t h a t d u r i n g t h e n e x t four y e a r s
revenue should c o n t i n u e to be c o l l e c t e d a n d appropriated by t h e
F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t , and t h a t t h e F e d e r a l Council s h o u l d v o t e a
block g r a n t to e a c h S t a t e to m e e t t h e s u m total of t h e c o s t of t h e
services a d m i n i s t e r e d by the S t a t e . F o r t h e r e a s o n s m e n t i o n e d
above this a r r a n g e m e n t s h o u l d t e n d to e c o n o m y .
As regards (6) about half t h e total e x p e n d i t u r e i n r e c e n t y e a r s
has b e e n for " U n r e s e r v e d S e r v i c e s " a n d to m e e t t h i s n o r e v e n u e
has b e e n set aside i n t h a t particular v o l u m e of t h e E s t i m a t e s .
I n d e e d , o w i n g t o t h e c o m p l i c a t e d m e t h o d of p r e p a r i n g t h e E s t i ­
rnates and t h e elaborate a c c o u n t s t h a t h a v e h a d to b e k e p t b y t h e
T r e a s u r y , it h a s not b e e n possible t o s h o w a n y correlation b e t w e e n
r e v e n u e a n d e x p e n d i t u r e i n t h e E s t i m a t e s i n their p r e s e n t f o r m ,
and I s u g g e s t t h a t t h e y m i g h t w e l l b e m i s l e a d i n g to a n y o n e w i t h o u t
a good deal of i n s i d e k n o w l e d g e .
T h e possible result m a y h a v e b e e n t h a t , w h e n u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,
the E s t i m a t e s h a v e not b e e n s u b j e c t e d to t h e d e g r e e of c r i t i c i s m
that t h e y h a v e d e s e r v e d ; and it h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d to m e t h a t it i s
only such a s t a t e of affairs that c o u l d h a v e m a d e it p o s s i b l e for t h e
e x p e n d i t u r e of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s to h a v e b e e n on s u c h
a n e x t r a v a g a n t scale as it h a s b e e n s i n c e the W a r .
I s u g g e s t t h a t the c h a n g e s proposed by t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r
i n t h e a r r a n g e m e n t of t h e E s t i m a t e s c a n n o t b u t h e l p t o c h e c k
extravagance.
A s r e g a r d s ( c ) , I realize t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of S u p p l e m e n t a r y V o t e s
is n o t directly r e l e v a n t to t h e q u e s t i o n of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .
Since,
h o w e v e r , I h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h e c h a n g e s o u t l i n e d a b o v e p a r t l y for
political r e a s o n s and partly w i t h a v i e w to c h e c k i n g e x t r a v a g a n c e ,
I t h i n k it w e l l t o m e n t i o n t h a t " S u p p l e m e n t a r y V o t e s " s e e m to
h a v e b e e n too freely resorted t o i n t h e p a s t . W i t h g o o d e s t i m a t i n g
few, if i n d e e d a n y , s u c h V o t e s s h o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y .
I s u g g e s t t h a t the s e c o n d stage of financial d e v o l u t i o n ( i . e . , after
the four-year period) m a y w e l l i n c l u d e a r r a n g e m e n t s for t h e col­
lection and appropriation by t h e S t a t e s of certain of t h e r e v e n u e s
w h i c h are n o t required for federal p u r p o s e s , t h e o b j e c t of t h i s
being to m a k e t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s i n c r e a s i n g l y i n d e p e n d e n t
as regards their S t a t e services but a t t h e s a m e t i m e still d e p e n d e n t
;
o n t h e Federal G o v e r n m e n t v o t i n g m o n e y t o balance their budgets,
i f n e c e s s a r y , or to m e e t such special or extraordinary e x p e n d i t u r e as
c a n n o t be m e t from their o w n resources.
T h e s u b s e q u e n t s t a g e s of financial d e v o l u t i o n m i g h t cover the
transfer of other s o u r c e s of r e v e n u e a n d t h e r i g h t to i m p o s e taxa­
t i o n s o as to p u t t h e S t a t e s i n a position t o m e e t all t h e i r expenditure
w i t h o u t s u b v e n t i o n from central resources.
A s regards the final s t a g e s of financial devolution a n d t h e division
of r e v e n u e b e t w e e n Central a n d S t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s , it h a s been sug­
g e s t e d to m e t h a t all r e v e n u e s should he collected b y t h e States
a n d that t h e Central authority should b e financed b y contributions
from the S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s . All p r e c e d e n t s s h o w t h a t t h e better
p l a n and t h e o n e least likely to cause friction is t h e collection and
appropriation of c e r t a i n r e v e n u e s by t h e Central authority.
There
a r e , i n m y o p i n i o n , strong g r o u n d s for d o i n g t h i s i n t h e c a s e of the
F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s a n d fot appropriating t o t h e Central
authority such r e v e n u e s i n this w a y a s will be sufficient (i) for the
service of t h e d e b t , ( i i ) for m e e t i n g t h e recurrent e x p e n s e s of the
Central a u t h o r i t y a n d , (iii) for the b u i l d i n g u p of a n a m p l e reserve
fund.
All t h e above s u g g e s t i o n s are s u b j e c t t o t h e e s s e n t i a l necessity
of n o t a l l o w i n g t h e financial s t a b i l i t y and credit of t h e Federation
to b e impaired i n a n y w a y i n t h e course of decentralization ; and,
i n addition to c e r t a i n safeguards w i t h a v i e w t o effecting this
object, t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r m u s t retain h i s p o w e r t o veto
e x p e n d i t u r e w h i c h h e does n o t a p p r o v e , a n d also t h e p o w e r in
e x c e p t i o n a l c a s e s to i n s i s t o n a S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t p r o v i d i n g for
s u c h services a s h e m a y consider n e c e s s a r y .
T h e normal safeguards m i g h t include :—
(a) T h e a p p o i n t m e n t of t h e F e d e r a l Treasurer t o be a
M e m b e r of e a c h S t a t e Council.
( 6 ) T h e s u b m i s s i o n for t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of t h e H i g h Com­
missioner of S t a t e e s t i m a t e s before t h e y are s u b m i t t e d to State
Councils.
(c) A n i n s t r u c t i o n t o R e s i d e n t s t h a t t h e y a r e t o work i n t h e
closest t o u c h w i t h t h e F e d e r a l T r e a s u r e r ; a n d that a n y case
of d i s a g r e e m e n t m u s t at o n c e b e referred t o t h e H i g h Com­
missioner.
(d) N o S t a t e l o a n to b e raised w i t h o u t t h e s a n c t i o n of t h e
Federal Council.
To summarise, I am of the opinion that there is a strong case on
financial grounds for some measure of decentralization, and I recom­
mend the following proposals:—
(a) During the first stage extending over a period of about
four years, the transfer to State control of certain departments
(already recommended as desirable on political grounds, vide
page 14) ; with a block grant to each State to be voted by the
Federal Council each year to meet the sum total of the cost
of the departments so transferred.
157
(b) During the second stage the collection and appropriation
by the States of certain of the revenues which are not required
for federal purposes with a view to making the State Govern­
ments increasingly independent.
(c) During the final stages the transfer to the States of other
sources of revenue and the right to impose taxation so as to
put the States in a position to meet all their expenditure with­
out subvention from central resources.
((/) During the process of decentralization there will be
certain questions which as regards detailed administration can
with convenience and economy be left to State Governments,
but which as regards policy will have to remain subject to a
a common control. An Advisory Council* under the presidency
of the High Commissioner and on which the State Govern­
ments are represented should be set up to deal with those
questions from the point of view of a common policy.
In addition to the foregoing I recommend on general grounds the
following two proposals which are not necessarily connected with
decentralization.
(c) The High Commissioner^ proposal for the abolition of
the volume of Estimates entitled " Unreserved Services."
(/) A change in the present system of Supplementary Esti­
mates with a view to reducing the number and amount of such
Estimates.
CHAPTER V.
Administrative aspects of decentralization proposals.
O n e t h i n g h a s s t o o d out p e r h a p s m o r e t h a n a n y o t h e r in the
controversy t h a t h a s t a k e n place i n r e c e n t y e a r s o v e r t h e proposal
to adopt a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n in t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s ,
and t h a t is t h e s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n to t h e proposed a b o l i t i o n of the
post of Chief S e c r e t a r y .
W i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the b u s i n e s s c o m ­
m u n i t i e s a n d of t h e unofficial m e m b e r s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a large
n u m b e r of officials, t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e post s h o u l d n o t be
abolished u n l e s s i t is i n t e n d e d to s u b s t i t u t e for t h e Chief Secre­
tary s o m e senior officer, n o t n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h t h e s a m e e x t e n s i v e
p o w e r s , w h o will (i) reside at t h e seat of t h e F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t ,
(ii) b e r e s p o n s i b l e for a s s i s t i n g t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r i n co­
o r d i n a t i n g policy o n q u e s t i o n s w h i c h r e m a i n f e d e r a l , and (iii) be
accessible to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e public.
It i s a r g u e d t h a t so l o n g a s t h e r e are c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s w h i c h
n e c e s s i t a t e a unified policy it w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e for t h e H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r to carry o u t t h e w o r k of co-ordination h i m s e l f
w i t h o u t t h e a s s i s t a n c e of s o m e s u c h officer.
On t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e r e are m a n y w h o advocate t h e r e t e n t i o n
of t h e post of Chief S e c r e t a r y o n o t h e r g r o u n d s a n d argue t h a t
it is e s s e n t i a l t o h a v e a senior officer at K u a l a L u m p u r w h o c a n ,
* See f o o t n o t e on p a g e 1 6 .
as it h a s b e e n a c t u a l l y p u t to m e , " fight t h e b a t t l e s of the
F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s a g a i n s t t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r a n d the
Colonial a u t h o r i t i e s at S i n g a p o r e . "
T h e s e people are inclined to
forget that t h e a b o l i t i o n of t h e post as it exists to-day i s a n essential
part of a n y policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , and at t h e s a m e t i m e to
overlook t h e fact t h a t there is n o i n t e n t i o n of d i s p e n s i n g with
t h e a p p o i n t m e n t u n t i l t h e policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n h a s been
carried to such a s t a g e t h a t t h e g r e a t e r part of t h e duties and
p o w e r s of t h e post as i t is to-day will h a v e been transferred.
Only
a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e will s h o w w h e n t h i s s t a t e of affairs is likely to
be r e a c h e d .
A s a n o t h e r a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e a d o p t i o n of a policy of decentrali­
z a t i o n , it h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d to m e that t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s
h a v e not y e t h a d sufficient a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e to justify
a n y considerable d e l e g a t i o n of p o w e r .
I s u g g e s t t h a t , although
t h i s m a y be a reason for the very gradual carrying o u t of a policy
of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , i t is n o t a n a r g u m e n t for rejecting such a policy
altogether.
M o r e o v e r t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l s h a v e r e c e n t l y b e e n con­
siderably s t r e n g t h e n e d by the addition of n e w m e m b e r s i n c l u d i n g
unofficials, and a s I h a v e already m e n t i o n e d it i s t h e i n t e n t i o n
o f t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r t o i n v i t e t h e R u l e r s t o appoint both
t h e L e g a l Adviser a n d t h e F e d e r a l Treasurer of t h e F e d e r a t e d
M a l a y S t a t e s to be unofficial m e m b e r s of their S t a t e C o u n c i l s .
I n any c a s e , t h e g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n of policy m u s t , I s u b m i t be
decided o n broad g r o u n d s of political and e c o n o m i c e x p e d i e n c y and
m u s t not d e p e n d o n the r e t e n t i o n or o t h e r w i s e of s o m e particular
a p p o i n t m e n t i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e or o n t h e efficiency of
a n y particular a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . F o r t h e reasons I h a v e m e n t i o n e d
i n t h e t w o p r e c e d i n g Chapters I a m of opinion that t h e r e are strong
political and e c o n o m i c r e a s o n s for d e c i d i n g to carry o u t n o w a con­
siderable m e a s u r e of devolution in t h e e x i s t i n g s y s t e m of g o v e r n m e n t
i n t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s , a n d as I h a v e s t a t e d , t h e eventual
abolition of t h e post of Chief S e c r e t a r y as it exists to-day m u s t be
a n e s s e n t i a l part of a n y s u c h policy.
T h e proposal referred to in C h a p t e r VI1T* to set u p a Malayan
E s t a b l i s h m e n t Office c a n n o t b e said to be a m e a s u r e of decentraliza­
tion
I t i s , h o w e v e r , a c h a n g e w h i c h c a n n o t b u t d i r e c t l y affect
a n y general r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of s t a f f s ; and I s u g g e s t t h a t , so far as
p o s s i b l e , effect should be g i v e n during t h e initial period to the
proposals of t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r for s e t t i n g up t h i s Office.
I personally a g r e e w i t h t h e v i e w w h i c h i s a l m o s t u n i v e r s a l l y held
in M a l a y a t h a t if a decentralization policy is approved t h e day is u
l o n g w a y off, if it ever arrives, before a n e x e c u t i v e h e a d of what
r e m a i n s of the federal m a c h i n e at K u a l a L u m p u r c a n b e dispensed
w i t h a l t o g e t h e r , and t h a t it w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e for t h e High
C o m m i s s i o n e r to do t h e n e c e s s a r y co-ordination himself.
* V i d e p a g e 30.
I t w a s for t h i s reason t h a t I h a d i n t e n d e d to r e c o m m e n d t h e
substitution of a " F e d e r a l S e c r e t a r y " for t h e e x i s t i n g " Chief
Secretary " in a f e w y e a r s t i m e w h e n , w i t h t h e p r o g r e s s of de­
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e latter a p p o i n t m e n t will pro­
bably h a v e d w i n d l e d t o t h a t of an e x e c u t i v e head of a very m u c h
smaller federal m a c h i n e t h a n t h e o n e that e x i s t s t o - d a y .
Such a
post m i g h t , I t h i n k , be filled by a n officer of l o w e r r a n k and d r a w i n g
considerably less e m o l u m e n t s t h a n t h e e x i s t i n g Chief Secretary.
T h e n o m e n c l a t u r e of " F e d e r a l S e c r e t a r y " w o u l d i n m y v i e w
e m p h a s i z e t h e fact that his d u t i e s , a s c o m p a r e d w i t h t h o s e of t h e
present Chief S e c r e t a r y , w o u l d be strictly confined to d e a l i n g w i t h
m a t t e r s w h i c h still r e m a i n e d federal.
T h e H i g h Commissioner,
w i t h w h o m I discussed t h e m a t t e r before l e a v i n g M a l a y a , would
m u c h prefer, h o w e v e r , that t h e title of t h e post should c o n t i n u e
to be that of Chief S e c r e t a r y , so long as i t is n e c e s s a r y to h a v e
an officer a c t i n g as e x e c u t i v e head of w h a t r e m a i n s of t h e e x i s t i n g
federal m a c h i n e .
I do not a t t a c h great i m p o r t a n c e to t h e title
of t h e post, a n d I a m prepared to a c c e p t t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s
v i e w provided t h a t : —
(a) I t c a n be m a d e clear to t h e R u l e r s t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n s
of t h e post will be strictly confined to that of a n e x e c u t i v e
head of t h e federal m a c h i n e a n d to d e a l i n g w i t h p u r e l y federal
m a t t e r s , and t h a t its i m p o r t a n c e from t h e p o i n t of v i e w of
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , f u n c t i o n s , and e m o l u m e n t s i s very different
from w h a t i t is to-day.
(b) I t is considered fair to ask a n officer to a c c e p t t h e post
w i t h n o c h a n g e i n t h e n o m e n c l a t u r e a n d w i t h a salary w h i c h
will n o t e n a b l e h i m to m a i n t a i n t h e s a m e p o s i t i o n , or e n t e r t a i n
o n the s a m e s c a l e , a s t h e Chief Secretary of t o - d a y .
I a m n o t prepared to say w h e t h e r it will e v e r b e practicable
to d i s p e n s e a l t o g e t h e r w i t h w h a t r e m a i n s of t h e e x i s t i n g federal
m a c h i n e r y a n d its e x e c u t i v e h e a d , as t h i s w i l l d e p e n d o n t h e
s e t t i n g up of s o m e n e w c e n t r a l m a c h i n e r y for d e a l i n g w i t h m a t t e r s
of interest to M a l a y a as a w h o l e a n d t h e a b s o r p t i o n i n t o it of w h a t
then r e m a i n s of the e x i s t i n g federal m a c h i n e r y .
T h e officers of t h e D e p a r t m e n t s w h i c h it i s proposed t o d e c e n t r a l ­
i z e are for t h e m o s t part o p p o s e d to the p r o p o s a l to transfer t h e
control of t h e s e D e p a r t m e n t s t o S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s . T h e y argue : —
(a) T h a t t h e proposals will result i n loss of efficiency o w i n g
to t h e central e x e c u t i v e control b e i n g done a w a y w i t h ; and
t h a t t h e p o w e r s of v i s i t i n g and i n s p e c t i o n w h i c h are to be
r e t a i n e d as o n e of t h e f u n c t i o n s of t h e D e p a r t m e n t a l H e a d
will be a poor s u b s t i t u t e for t h e unrestricted p o w e r t h a t t h e y
h a v e n o w to i s s u e orders t o t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e s .
(b) T h a t difficulties w i l l arise as regards t h e q u e s t i o n of
t h e transfer of officers f r o m o n e S t a t e to a n o t h e r .
(c) T h a t the i n t e r e s t s of t h e officers in t h e D e p a r t m e n t s will
suffer.
(d) T h a t i n t h e c a s e of t h e M e d i c a l Service, i t i s contrary
to all m o d e r n i d e a s to p u t t h e Medical and H e a l t h Services
in a S t a t e u n d e r o n e H e a d .
W h i l e s y m p a t h i z i n g w i t h t h e natural desire of H e a d s of Depart­
m e n t s t o retain their p r e s e n t control over their D e p a r t m e n t s , 1
s u g g e s t t h a t w e m u s t not lose s i g h t of t h e political a s p e c t of the
q u e s t i o n and t h e natural desire of t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s to control
their o w n services.
A l t h o u g h I d o n o t a g r e e that w i t h t h e will to m a k e t h e pro­
p o s e d s y s t e m a s u c c e s s t h e r e n e e d be a n y great loss of efficiency,
1 t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t , e v e n if t h e r e is s o m e such loss of efficiency,
it will be t h e l e s s e r of t w o e v i l s , and I cannot b e l i e v e that in the
e v e n t of this h a p p e n i n g i t will not be possible to find a r e m e d y .
I n t h i s c o n n e x i o n , I w a s i n t e r e s t e d to hear t h e v i e w expressed
t h a t t h e officers of D e p a r t m e n t s h a v e t h e m s e l v e s p a r t l y to b l a m e for
t h e desire o n t h e part of S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s for t h e adoption of a
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p o l i c y , s i n c e in t h e p a s t t h e officers of t h e Depart ­
m e n t s h a v e in t h e i r zeal to carry o u t their duties been a c c u s t o m e d to
v i s i t S t a t e s w i t h o u t i n f o r m i n g t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s , or even
p a y i n g t h e u s u a l c o u r t e s i e s to t h e R u l e r s .
T h e n e e d for w o r k i n g i n t h e c l o s e s t t o u c h w i t h t h e S t a t e Govern­
m e n t s will b e stronger t h a n e v e r i n t h e future b e c a u s e as the
r e s u l t of t h e r e c e n t e n l a r g e m e n t of t h e State C o u n c i l s t h e views
h e l d b y t h e local a u t h o r i t i e s as t o w h a t m a y b e t e r m e d " federal
i n t e r f e r e n c e " w i l l not r e m a i n i n a r t i c u l a t e .
T h e proposals for the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of D e p a r t m e n t s are briefly
described in A p p e n d i x V .
I t will be o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e proposals for t h e future organisation
o f t h e Medical and P u b l i c W o r k s D e p a r t m e n t s differ from those for
the other Departments.
I n t h e Medical a n d P u b l i c W o r k s
D e p a r t m e n t s t h e " D i r e c t o r Adviser " will p o s s e s s executive
a u t h o r i t y i n t h e C o l o n y o n l y , w h e r e a s i t is i n t e n d e d that
t h e H e a d s of t h e o t h e r D e p a r t m e n t s shall be v e s t e d by t h e Ruler
w i t h e x e c u t i v e authority i n e a c h of t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s .
T h e d i s t i n c t i v e t r e a t m e n t of t h e latter group c a n be justified by
r e a s o n s of e c o n o m y a n d practical c o n v e n i e n c e . I n t h e large staffs
of t h e M e d i c a l a n d P u b l i c W o r k s D e p a r t m e n t s there are m a n y
officers a v a i l a b l e w i t h ripe e x p e r i e n c e of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e character
t o qualify t h e m to e x e r c i s e t h e chief e x e c u t i v e control i n t h e several
S t a t e s . I n t h e o t h e r D e p a r t m e n t s i t i s desirable that t h e H e a d
of t h e D e p a r t m e n t h i m s e l f s h o u l d b e vested w i t h t h e chief
executive power.
To summarize, I am of opinion
(a) That the abolition of the post of Chief Secretary as it
exists to-day, with his wide statutory and administrative
powers, i s an essential part of any policy of decentralization.
(b) That there is no strong objection on administrative
grounds to the measures of decentralization which I have re­
commended in the two preceding Chapters, and that the carry­
ing out of these measures will automatically result in relieving
the Chief Secretary of the more important functions of the
post as it exists to-day, thus making it possible to replace him
as head of what remains of the federal machinery by an officer
of considerably less status.
(c) That it is not possible at the present time to say whether
it will ever be practicable to dispense altogether with what re­
mains of the existing federal machinery and its executive head,
because this will depend on the setting up of some new central
machinery for dealing with matters of interest to Malaya as a
whole into which what then remains of the existing machinery
can be absorbed.
(d) That the statutory and administrative powers exercised
by the present Chief Secretary should be transferred to the
Rulers in Council in the case of State matters, and to the High
Commissioner or the appropriate federal officers" in the case
of matters which are to remain federal.
( e ) That so far as possible, effect should be given to the pro­
posal referred to in Chapter V I I I , to set up a Malayan Estab ­
lishment Office.
CHAPTER VI.
Suggested procedure in carrying out the policy recommended.
T h e r e is w i t h o u t d o u b t a s t r o n g f e e l i n g a m o n g s t a large n u m b e r
of the c o m m u n i t y , b o t h official and unofficial, t h a t there h a s i n t h e
last y e a r or t w o b e e n a t e n d e n c y to try to redress too q u i c k l y a n y
previous d e l a y i n i m p l e m e n t i n g p r o m i s e s m a d e to t h e R u l e r s .
D u r i n g m y tour i n Mala3 a it h a s b e e n b r o u g h t h o m e to m e : —
(a) T h a t t h e v i e w i s w i d e l y h e l d t h a t d u e regard h a s n o t
b e e n paid to public o p i n i o n and t h e n e c e s s i t y of k e e p i n g t h o s e
i n t e r e s t e d i n f o r m e d of t h e actual m e a n i n g of t h e c h a n g e s
proposed.
(6) T h a t t h e p r o p o s a l s m a d e u p to d a t e h a v e created a n a t m o ­
sphere of s u s p i c i o n a n d m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n a s to t h e i n t e n t i o n s
of t h e G o v e r n m e n t .
(c) T h a t practically e v e r y o n e w h o m I m e t , officials a n d tin­
officials, and t h e R u l e r s , t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t a r e
t r y i n g t o carry o u t t o o m a n y c h a n g e s at o n c e , and t h a t if a
policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s to b e a d o p t e d it s h o u l d be carried
out v e r y g r a d u a l l y .
(d) T h a t t h e r e i s a strong f e e l i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s c o n ­
c e r n e d are not c o n s u l t e d b y G o v e r n m e n t before d e c i s i o n s a r e
t a k e n a n d t h a t c o n s e q u e n t l y c e r t a i n aspects of t h e q u e s t i o n
are i g n o r e d .
7
* T h e t e r m " f e d e r a l officers " i n c l u d e s t h e officer r e f e r r e d t o i n (6) a t t h e
t o p of t h e p a g e w h o is t o r e p l a c e t h e Chief S e c r e t a r y .
(e) T h a t t h e r e are m a n y w h o feel t h a t o w i n g to t h e slump
i n trade a m o r e i n o p p o r t u n e t i m e t h a n the present could not
h a v e b e e n c h o s e n for p r o p o s i n g c h a n g e s i n t h e s y s t e m of govern­
m e n t t o w h i c h e v e r y o n e is a c c u s t o m e d .
(/) T h a t s o m e people v i e w w i t h s u c h m i s t r u s t w h a t they
call t h e proposals for c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n Singapore' that they
a d v o c a t e t h e creation of t w o s e p a r a t e p o s t s , v i z . , o n e of H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r at K u a l a L u m p u r and a n o t h e r of Governor (or
A d m i n i s t r a t o r ) at S i n g a p o r e .
(g) T h a t there i s a c e r t a i n a m o u n t of feeling over the com­
p a r i s o n s w h i c h h a v e b e e n m a d e b e t w e e n t h e present financial
p o s i t i o n of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s a n d t h a t of the Federated
S t a t e s , and that s u c h c o m p a r i s o n s are regarded as unfair in
v i e w o f t h e benefits w h i c h i t is said the Unfederated States
h a v e received in t h e p a s t at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e F e d e r a t e d States.
I t h i n k i t m o s t e s s e n t i a l therefore, t h a t if a policy of decentrali­
z a t i o n is a p p r o v e d , t h e s t e p s to g i v e effect to it should be carried
o u t very g r a d u a l l y , or a s t h e S u l t a n of S e l a n g o r advocated to m e ,
step by step.
V a r i o u s s u g g e s t i o n s h a v e b e e n m a d e t o m e as to t h e l e n g t h of
period o v e r w h i c h t h e c a r r y i n g out of a p o l i c y of decentralization
s h o u l d be spread, a n d t h e s e h a v e varied from as m u c h as five to
twenty-five years.
E v e r y o n e will I t h i n k agree t h a t , i n c h a n g i n g from a h i g h l y cen­
tralized form of g o v e r n m e n t such as t h a t w h i c h e x i s t s to-day ai
K u a l a L u m p u r , m u c h m u s t d e p e n d o n the e x p e r i e n c e g a i n e d in
t h e a c t u a l w o r k i n g of e a c h c h a n g e , a n d I a m of opinion t h a t it
w o u l d b e u n w i s e to do m o r e at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e than t o s u g g e s t the
c h a n g e s w h i c h m i g h t b e m a d e i n t h e n e x t few years and to visualize
g e n e r a l l y t h e further c h a n g e s t h a t m a y t h e n be found desirable.
I n d e e d I a m of o p i n i o n t h a t i t would b e premature at t h e present
t i m e t o a t t e m p t to d o g m a t i z e a s to :—
(a) T h e e x a c t p o w e r s t h a t can e v e n t u a l l y be transferred to
S t a t e control.
(b) W h e n , and h o w it w i l l be found desirable t o revise the
e x i s t i n g T r e a t i e s and A g r e e m e n t s .
A s s u m i n g that t h e p r o p o s a l s I h a v e m a d e for g i v i n g effect t o a
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p o l i c y are a p p r o v e d , I v i s u a l i z e t h e p o s i t i o n in
t h r e e t o four y e a r s t i m e a s f o l l o w s : —
(a) T h e c o n t r o l of t h e f o l l o w i n g D e p a r t m e n t s , v i z . , Agri­
cultural,
Co-operative,
Educational,
Electrical,
Forestry,
M e d i c a l , M i n i n g , P u b l i c W o r k s , V e t e r i n a r y , P r i s o n s , and
D r a i n a g e and I r r i g a t i o n , w i l l h a v e b e e n h a n d e d o v e r to the
S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s , and t h e e x p e n d i t u r e incurred o n t h e m will
b e m e t b y a b l o c k g r a n t to be v o t e d e a c h year b y t h e Federal
C o u n c i l to m e e t t h e s u m total of t h e e x p e n d i t u r e o n t h e D e ­
p a r t m e n t s so t r a n s f e r r e d .
160
(6) T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r w i l l b e in t h e s a m e p o s i t i o n
vis-a-vis
t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s as regards
t h e transferred D e p a r t m e n t s as h e i s n o w in w i t h t h e G o v e r n ­
m e n t s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s o n similar q u e s t i o n s and w i l l
h i m s e l f deal t h r o u g h a S e c r e t a r y w i t h m a t t e r s affecting t h o s e
D e p a r t m e n t s w i t h the R e s i d e n t i n e a c h State.
(c) A n y m a t t e r s transferred t o S t a t e control s u c h as t h e
standard of h e a l t h o n e s t a t e s w h i c h as r e g a r d s detailed a d m i n i s ­
tration c a n w i t h c o n v e n i e n c e a n d e c o n o m y be left t o S t a t e
G o v e r n m e n t s b u t as regards policy will h a v e to r e m a i n under
a c o m m o n c o n t r o l , will be dealt w i t h from t h e point of v i e w
of a c o m m o n policy by a n " A d v i s o r y Council " presided over
b y t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r and o n w h i c h the S t a t e G o v e r n ­
m e n t s are r e p r e s e n t e d .
(d) T h e statutory and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r s e x e r c i s e d by t h e
p r e s e n t Chief S e c r e t a r y will h a v e b e e n transferred to t h e R u l e r s
i n Council in t h e case of State m a t t e r s , and to t h e H i g h C o m ­
m i s s i o n e r or appropriate federal officers ( i n c l u d i n g t h e officer
w h o has by t h e n replaced t h e p r e s e n t Chief S e c r e t a r y ) in the
case of m a t t e r s w h i c h are to r e m a i n federal.
(e) T h e officer w h o h a s replaced t h e Chief S e c r e t a r y w i l l be
t h e e x e c u t i v e h e a d of the Federal G o v e r n m e n t b u t h i s f u n c t i o n s ,
d u t i e s , a n d p o w e r s w i l l be reduced to d e a l i n g w i t h s u c h m a t t e r s
as it is d e c i d e d m u s t r e m a i n federal.
(/) T h e r e - a r r a n g e m e n t of t h e E s t i m a t e s will h a v e t a k e n
place. T h e v o l u m e n o w e n t i t l e d " U n r e s e r v e d S e r v i c e s " will
h a v e disappeared and there will b e five i n s t e a d of s i x v o l u m e s
of E s t i m a t e s .
(g) A
(h) A
mentary
amounts
M a l a y a n E s t a b l i s h m e n t Office will h a v e b e e n set u p .
c h a n g e will h a v e b e e n m a d e i n t h e s y s t e m of S u p p l e ­
E s t i m a t e s w i t h a v i e w t o r e d u c i n g t h e n u m b e r and
of s u c h E s t i m a t e s .
A n y c h a n g e s w h i c h are not directly c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e transfer
of t h e control of t h e D e p a r t m e n t s w h o s e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is n o w
r e c o m m e n d e d s h o u l d be deferred for t h e t i m e b e i n g , a n d I s u g g e s t
that t h i s rule s h o u l d also apply to a n y c h a n g e s w h i c h m i g h t a p p e a r
to t h e R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s as a n a t t e m p t to b r i n g
t h e m i n t o a n y f o r m of closer u n i o n , b e c a u s e I h a v e already called
a t t e n t i o n to the fact that s o m e of t h e m m a d e it quite clear t o m e
that t h e y w o u l d n o t look w i t h f a v o u r at the p r e s e n t t i m e o n a n y
m o v e in this direction. I c a n n o t b u t f e e l , h o w e v e r , t h a t in course
of t i m e and w h e n t h e s e R u l e r s f u l l y realize that there is n o in­
t e n t i o n of p r e s s i n g t h e m to agree t o a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e , t h e y
will be the first t o r e c o g n i z e t h e g r e a t a d v a n t a g e s that will a c c r u e
to their S t a t e s , a n d t o M a l a y a as a w h o l e , b y t h e creation of suit­
a b l e m a c h i n e r y for discussion of, a n d , if agreed, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
of m a t t e r s of c o m m o n interest.
S o far as it is possible n o w to v i s u a l i z e g e n e r a l l y t h e c h a n g e s
s u b s e q u e n t to t h e first period of t h r e e t o four y e a r s they might
include : —
(a) A s s u g g e s t e d i n C h a p t e r I V , t h e c o l l e c t i o n and appro­
priation by t h e S t a t e s of certain of t h e r e v e n u e s w h i c h are not
required for federal purposes w i t h a v i e w to m a k i n g them
increasingly independent.
(b) T h e transfer to the S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s of o t h e r sources of
r e v e n u e a n d t h e r i g h t to i m p o s e t a x a t i o n so as to p u t t h e m in a
p o s i t i o n t o m e e t all their e x p e n d i t u r e w i t h o u t s u b v e n t i o n from
central r e s o u r c e s , l e a v i n g t h e C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y t o collect and
appropriate such r e v e n u e s as w i l l b e sufficient for (i) t h e service
of t h e d e b t , (ii) m e e t i n g recurrent e x p e n s e s for federal pur­
p o s e s a n d , (iii) b u i l d i n g up a n a m p l e reserve f u n d .
(c) T h e u l t i m a t e abolition of t h e e x i s t i n g federal machinery
a n d its e x e c u t i v e h e a d . T h i s h o w e v e r d e p e n d s o n t h e setting
u p of s o m e n e w central m a c h i n e r y for d e a l i n g w i t h m a t t e r s of
c o m m o n i n t e r e s t to M a l a y a as a w h o l e and t h e absorption into
it of w h a t t h e n r e m a i n s of the e x i s t i n g federal m a c h i n e r y .
CHAPTER VII.
Non-Malay Asiatic Communities.
I t h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d t o m e t h a t t h e future t r e a t m e n t of the
people of n o n - M a l a y origin h a s n o direct b e a r i n g o n the question
of t h e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n proposals.
T h i s m a y be t r u e to a certain
e x t e n t , but, w h i l e I w a s i n M a l a y a , I h a v e h a d t h e opportunity
of m e e t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e c o m m u n i t i e s c o n c e r n e d and they
h a v e left m e u n d e r n o illusion as to t h e a n x i e t y w h i c h t h e y feel.
T h i s a n x i e t y , as I h a v e p o i n t e d o u t i n Chapter I I I , m u s t be
regarded as o n e of t h e political a s p e c t s of t h e proposals t o transfer
considerable p o w e r s from t h e F e d e r a l t o t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s .
T h e p o p u l a t i o n of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s is c o m p r i s e d of:—
Per
Malays
( i n c l u d i n g all i n d i g e n o u s
P e n i n s u l a a n d Archipelago)
...
Chinese
...
...
...
...
Indians
...
...
...
...
Others
p e o p l e s of
...
...
...
...
...
...
the
...
....
...
cent.
34.7
41.&
22.2
1.6
It will be seen, therefore, that t h e Chinese and Indians
t h e m a j o r part of t h e p o p u l a t i o n .
form
A c c o r d i n g , h o w e v e r , t o t h e C e n s u s R e p o r t , t h e n u m b e r of the
C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h h a s b e e n for a l o n g t i m e i n t h e country
is relatively very s m a l l a n d t h e n u m b e r of t h o s e w h o w e r e born
t h e r e and e x p e c t to e n d t h e i r d a y s t h e r e i s s m a l l e r still.
The
R e p o r t also s t a t e s t h a t t h e s a m e is true of t h e I n d i a n i m m i g r a n t ,
s o t h a t t h e n u m b e r of n o n - M a l a y s wHo h a v e adopted M a l a y a as
their h o m e i s only a very small proportion of t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n
of t h e territory, and the i n c r e a s e t h a t is t a k i n g place i n t h i s n u m b e r
i s hardly appreciable.
That t h e people who c o m e under this
category form only a small proportion of t h e total p o p u l a t i o n m u s t
not, h o w e v e r , be a l l o w e d t o affect t h e w a y in w h i c h t h e y are
treated; and i n d e e d , w h e n I h a v e e x p l a i n e d i n detail t h e c a u s e
of their a n x i e t y , I think it will b e a g r e e d that t h e smaller their
numbers the more e a s y will it b e t o e n s u r e that t h e y r e c e i v e fair
play.
T h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n born i n M a l a y a t h e m s e l v e s , or w h o s e
children h a v e been born t h e r e , call a t t e n t i o n to t h e fact t h a t t h e y
have acquired great i n t e r e s t s i n t h e l a n d of their a d o p t i o n and h a v e
contributed i n n o s m a l l d e g r e e to i t s prosperous d e v e l o p m e n t .
They
state that i n a g r e a t m a n y cases t h o s e concerned h a v e n e v e r s e e n
the land of t h e i r origin and t h e y c l a i m that their children and their
cliildren's children should h a v e fair t r e a t m e n t .
T h a t t h e a n x i e t y of t h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s h a s i n c r e a s e d of l a t e
appears to b e d u e t o :—
(a) T h e cry of M a l a y a for t h e M a l a y s w h i c h h a s r e c e n t l y
been h e a r d m u c h m o r e t h a n in previous y e a r s .
(6) T h e proposals e x p o u n d e d b y t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r a t
Sri M e n a u t i for transferring considerable p o w e r s to t h e S t a t e
G o v e r n m e n t s , and t h e fear t h a t t h e reduction of t h e p o w e r s
of the Chief S e c r e t a r y w i l l e x p o s e t h e m to d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , s i n c e
they a p p e a r t o regard this officer a s their p r o t e c t o r a g a i n s t
a n y unfair t r e a t m e n t b y the S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s .
(c) T h e fact t h a t t h e p r o g r e s s of e d u c a t i o n a m o n g s t t h e
M a l a y s h a s r e s u l t e d in m o r e a p p o i n t m e n t s i n t h e G o v e r n m e n t
services b e i n g g i v e n to M a l a y s t h a n p r e v i o u s l y .
(d) T h e fact t h a t t h e a l i e n a t i o n of so m u c h land in r e c e n t
years for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e rubber and other i n d u s t r i e s
has led to a l o n g e r v i e w b e i n g t a k e n of t h e l a n d n e e d s of t h e
M a l a y s : and a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y g r e a t e r use of t h e G o v e r n m e n t s
p o w e r s under t h e M a l a y L a n d s R e s e r v a t i o n E n a c t m e n t .
B e c a u s e of the f a c t s m e n t i o n e d i n (c) and (d) a b o v e , t h e n o n Malay c o m m u n i t i e s are i n c l i n e d to t h e v i e w t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t
have adopted a n e w p o l i c y . T h i s is n o t so, s i n c e for s o m e y e a r s
past t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h e
claims of t h e M a l a y s to p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t i n t h e m a t t e r of
a p p o i n t m e n t s in t h e P u b l i c S e r v i c e and to t h e reservation of
suitable a n d sufficient land for t h e i r n e e d s . I n d e e d s o m e of t h e
n o n - M a l a y g e n t l e m e n w h o m I m e t w e n t so far as e x p r e s s i n g t h e
v i e w t h a t t h i s w a s in their o p i n i o n n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e i n t h e
territories of t h e M a l a y R u l e r s ; b u t w h a t t h e y appear t o object to
is d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h e preferential
t r e a t m e n t to i m m i g r a n t M a l a y s from t h e D u t c h A r c h i p e l a g o w h o
are D u t c h subjects.
S o m e of t h e m w o u l d , I t h i n k , w i l l i n g l y
support a policy o f fair c h a n c e .
T h e n o n - M a l a y s w h o h a v e m a d e M a l a y a the c o u n t r y of their
a d o p t i o n , form a loyal section of t h e c o m m u n i t y a n d i t h a s been
the policy of t h e G o v e r n m e n t to accord full r e c o g n i t i o n t o their
s t a t u s a s B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s (in t h e c a s e of t h o s e born in t h e Colony i
and B r i t i s h p r o t e c t e d persons (in t h e case of t h o s e born in the
Malay States).
N o o n e will d e n y t h e i m p o r t a n t part that the n o n - M a l a y s who
h a v e m a d e M a l a y a t h e i r h o m e h a v e played in i t s development,
and t h e s h a r e t h e y are d e s t i n e d t o take in h e l p i n g its future
progress, and 1 think that for this reason alone t h e y are entitled
to a n a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s will not be a l l o w e d to suffer
as t h e result of effect being g i v e n t o a policy of decentralization.
M o r e o v e r , s u b j e c t to t h e policy of preferential e m p l o y m e n t of
qualified M a l a y s in t h e G o v e r n m e n t S e r v i c e s , and t h e reservation
of sufficient l a n d s for M a l a y n e e d s , I t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e persons
born i n t h e M a l a y S t a t e s of n o n - M a l a y p a r e n t s ( a l t h o u g h only
B r i t i s h protected persons) s h o u l d b e treated in t h o s e S t a t e s in
exactly the s a m e w a y as p e r s o n s born in t h e Colony of non-Malay
parents ( w h o are 73ritish subjects) a n d should h a v e t h e s a m e pro­
fessional and b u s i n e s s o p p o r t u n i t i e s a s E u r o p e a n B r i t i s h subjects.
I should record that s o m e of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e nonM a l a y c o m m u n i t i e s w h o m I m e t raised q u e s t i o n s in connexion
w i t h e d u c a t i o n a l facilities, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the C o u n c i l s and in
o t h e r p u b l i c b o d i e s , t h e restriction of alien i m m i g r a t i o n and so on.
I had t o e x p l a i n that t h e s e w e r e m a t t e r s n o t d i r e c t l y relevant to
t h e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n proposals, b u t that I w o u l d b r i n g their
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to t h e notice of t h e G o v e r n o r and H i g h Commis­
sioner, w h i c h I s u b s e q u e n t l y did.
CHAPTER VHI.
Miscellaneous proposals not affecting decentralization in the
Federated Malay States.
I propose t o deal briefly i n this C h a p t e r w i t h c e r t a i n proposals
w h i c h , t h o u g h n o t affecting a p o l i c y of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n in the
F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s , h a v e i n e v i t a b l y b e c o m e a s s o c i a t e d with
the proposals m a d e b y t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r at t h e S r i Menanti
D u r b a r * a n d in s o m e i n s t a n c e s w e r e i n fact i n c l u d e d in his
a n n o u n c e m e n t o n that o c c a s i o n .
Railways; Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones.
B o t h of t h e s e D e p a r t m e n t s are a t p r e s e n t f e d e r a l ; a n d at the
Sri M e n a n t i D u r b a r t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r e x p l a i n e d h i s pro­
posals for p u t t i n g t h e m u n d e r a s i n g l e central m a n a g e m e n t on
w h i c h e a c h of t h e G o v e r n m e n t s i n t e r e s t e d w o u l d be r e p r e s e n t e d .
* H o l d i n A u g u s t , 1931.
(i)
Railways.
T h e r a i l w a y s t h r o u g h o u t t h e P e n i n s u l a are o w n e d b y t h e
F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t e x c e p t i n t h e c a s e of J o h o r e ,
w h e r e , under a revised A g r e e m e n t o n l y c o n c l u d e d v e r y r e c e n t l y ,
the G o v e r n m e n t of J o h o r e h a s u n d e r t a k e n t o l e a s e t h e r a i l w a y
through t h e S t a t e t o t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t a t a
peppercorn rent. I n r e t u r n J o h o r e is t o b e e n t i t l e d t o a share i n
any r a i l w a y profits w i t h o u t a n y o b l i g a t i o n to c o n t r i b u t e t o w a r d s
any losses t h a t m a y be i n c u r r e d .
T h e s c h e m e e x p l a i n e d by t h e
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r at S r i M e n a n t i c o n t e m p l a t e s :—
(a) T h e control of t h e r a i l w a y s b y a n E x e c u t i v e B o a r d ,
w h i c h i s t o b e created i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e e x i s t i n g Advisory
B o a r d , in order t o g i v e a share i n t h e control of policy to
t h e Colony and to e a c h of t h e S t a t e s served by t h e r a i l w a y s .
of
in
in
in
by
(6) T h e a c c e p t a n c e by t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e Colony and
the U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s c o n c e r n e d of a portion of t h e liability
respect of t h e capital c o s t of the r a i l w a y s . T h i s i s t o be done
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e a d v a n t a g e s t h a t h a v e accrued t o t h e m
the past from t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of t h e railway
the Federated Malay States.
T h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s R a i l w a y , in c o m m o n w i t h m a n y
other r a i l w a y s t h r o u g h o u t t h e world, n o l o n g e r s h o w s a sufficient
profit to provide for a r e t u r n o n t h e capital i n v e s t e d ; and it appears
to m e m o r e t h a n q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n y
condition s u c h as that m e n t i o n e d in (b) a b o v e i s likely t o prove
acceptable to t h e G o v e r n m e n t s c o n c e r n e d .
(ii)
Posts,
Telegraphs,
and
T h e proposals for t h e r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n of
telegraphs, a n d t e l e p h o n e s c o n t e m p l a t e : —
Telephones.
t h e service of
posts,
(a) T h e creation of a P o s t a l U n i o n for t h e C o l o n y , t h e
F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s a n d a n y of the U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s w h i c h m a y
elect to c o m e i n t o t h e U n i o n .
(6) T h e control of t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e U n i o n b y a B o a r d
under t h e C h a i r m a n s h i p of a D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l of P o s t s and
T e l e g r a p h s and i n c l u d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Colony and
each of t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g S t a t e s t o g e t h e r w i t h official a n d u n ­
official m e m b e r s t o be n o m i n a t e d by t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r .
(c) T h e i s s u e by e a c h of t h e G o v e r n m e n t s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e
U n i o n of i t s o w n d i s t i n c t i v e p o s t a g e s t a m p , subject t o t h e
R e g u l a t i o n s of t h e " U n i v e r s a l P o s t a l U n i o n of t h e W o r l d "
w h i c h require, inter alia, t h e design of all s t a m p s of a n y postal
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o bear a n i n d i c a t i o n , as far as p o s s i b l e i n
R o m a n c h a r a c t e r s , of t h e c o u n t r y of o r i g i n , w h i c h i n t h i s c a s e
would be " M A L A Y A . "
(d) L e g a l i z i n g t h e use of the s t a m p s of the different G o v e r n ­
m e n t s b e l o n g i n g to t h e M a l a y a n P o s t a l U n i o n t h r o u g h o u t the
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e areas of t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g S t a t e s ; the r e v e n u e and
e x p e n d i t u r e b e i n g apportioned b e t w e e n t h e G o v e r n m e n t s con
cerned o n an agreed b a s i s .
B e f o r e I left M a l a y a I w a s led t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s i n t e n d e d to
form a Postal U n i o n comprising the Colony and the Federated
S t a t e s w i t h o u t delay a n d that t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e partieipa­
t i o n o f t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s w a s n o t to be allowed to
d e l a y the formation of t h e U n i o n .
I suggest that this i s wise,
a n d I feel sure t h a t , w h e n t h e P u l e r s of t h e s e S t a t e s r e a l i z e that
t h e c r e a t i o n of a P o s t a l U n i o n for M a l a y a , as a w h o l e , cannot
b u t be the m o s t e c o n o m i c a l a n d efficient m e t h o d o f o r g a n i z i n g this
public s e r v i c e , they w i l l d e c i d e to c o - o p e r a t e .
Customs.
T h e four S t a t e s c o m p r i s i n g t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s form
a C u s t o m s U n i o n a n d t h e C u s t o m s D e p a r t m e n t i s a federal u n i t ;
a n d there i s n o i n t e n t i o n of a n y m e a s u r e of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n within
the federation.
B o t h t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s h a v e , as
t h e r e s u l t of t h e O t t a w a C o n f e r e n c e , g r a n t e d c e r t a i n additional
preferences on British goods.
T i i e C o l o n y h a s a l w a y s adhered t o a policy of free trade, but
h a s n e v e r t h e l e s s i m p o s e d a f e w d u t i e s m o s t of w h i c h g i v e preference
to B r i t i s h g o o d s . T h e r e i s a s t r o n g body of o p i n i o n w h i c h i s appre­
h e n s i v e t h a t s o m e c h a n g e m a y b e m a d e w h i c h t h e y a r g u e would
b e disastrous t o t h e C o l o n y .
T h e m a t t e r i s a very complicated
o n e , a n d I h a v e assured t h o s e c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e y n e e d not be
afraid of a n y c h a n g e b e i n g approved u n l e s s the Secretary of State
i s quite satisfied t h a t it w i l l not b e to t h e serious d e t r i m e n t of the
i n t e r e s t s of t h e C o l o n y .
T h e tariffs i n t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s are n o t u n i f o r m and a
C u s t o m s U n i o n for t h e wdiole of M a l a y a c o u l d o n l y be agreed after
considerable negotiations w i t h these States.
T h e possibility of f o r m i n g a w i d e r C u s t o m s U n i o n t h a n exists
t o - d a y is still u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n b y t h e local a u t h o r i t i e s .
O n e c o m m i t t e e h a s already reported o n c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of the
q u e s t i o n , t h e report of a s e c o n d c o m m i t t e e i s a w a i t e d , a n d a third
c o m m i t t e e h a s just b e e n a p p o i n t e d t o consider q u e s t i o n s relevant
t o t h e trade of t h e C o l o n y . I t w o u l d n o t be practicable or desirable
t o offer a n o p i n i o n o n t h e m a t t e r until t h e facts are a v a i l a b l e .
Malayan
Establishment
Office.
T h e p r e s e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e M a l a y a n S e r v i c e s i s inherited
f r o m t h e d a y s of separate and d i s t i n c t s e r v i c e s for t h e Colony
o n the o n e hand and the Federated States o n the other.
The
Unfederated S t a t e s h a v e n e v e r , e x c e p t i n r e s p e c t of c e r t a i n
isolated a p p o i n t m e n t s , d e v e l o p e d E u r o p e a n services of their o w n
and their E u r o p e a n staff h a s b e e n s e c o n d e d from t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of t h e S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s , or from t h e joint F e d e r a l E s t a b l i s h m e n t .
T h i s s y s t e m w h i c h a l l o w s of o n e m e m b e r of a M a l a y a n S e r v i c e
being on o n e e s t a b l i s h m e n t and a n o t h e r o n a s e p a r a t e e s t a b l i s h ­
m e n t , h a s not c o n d u c e d t o efficient a n d s m o o t h w o r k i n g or t o
contentment within the services.
T h e r e appear to be strong g r o u n d s i n the i n t e r e s t s of efficiency
and s m o o t h w o r k i n g for a d o p t i n g a s c h e m e w h i c h will p u t all
European officers in t h e s a m e p o s i t i o n , and bring t h e F e d e r a t e d
S t a t e s , t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s , and the Colony i n t o l i n e as r e g a r d s
the supply of E u r o p e a n officers; and t h e r e b y e l i m i n a t e t h e a n o m a l i e s
attendant o n the present s y s t e m of s e c o n d i n g .
I t i s proposed :—
(a) T o c r e a t e a s i n g l e Malay an e s t a b l i s h m e n t o n w h i c h all
European p e r s o n n e l will b e borne.
(b) T o s e t up a M a l a y a n E s t a b l i s h m e n t Office in c h a r g e
of an E s t a b l i s h m e n t Officer w h o w i l l work u n d e r t h e direction
of a n E s t a b l i s h m e n t B o a r d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e i n t e r e s t s of
the C o l o n y , t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s , a n d t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s .
(c) T o a r r a n g e if possible for a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e
Colony, the Federated States, and the Unfederated States
under w h i c h all a g r e e to e m p l o y a specified n u m b e r of officers
in each of t h e M a l a y a n S e r v i c e s a n d jointly a n d severally to
accept liability for r e c r u i t m e n t c h a r g e s , s a l a r i e s , p e n s i o n s ,
passage a n d leave e x p e n s e s , e t c . , a n d for t h e cost of t h e
E s t a b l i s h m e n t Office.
r
I t i s obvious t h a t a large a m o u n t o f d e t a i l e d n e g o t i a t i o n s will
be necessary b e t w e e n t h e different A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s before such
an Office a s that proposed c a n b e s e t u p , and I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e
proposals are n o w under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Reorganization of the Supreme Courts of the Colony and
the Federated Malay States.
T h e S u p r e m e Court of t h e C o l o n y i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y Ordinance­
and e x e r c i s e s w i t h i n t h e Colony jurisdiction a n d a u t h o r i t y t o an
e x t e n t similar t o t h a t o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s H i g h Court of J u s t i c e in
England.
A s t h e Court of A p p e a l i t also h a s appellate jurisdic­
tion.
T h e S u p r e m e Court of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s is c o n s t i t u t e d
b y a Courts E n a c t m e n t of t h e F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t u r e a n d c o m p r i s e s
t h e Court of A p p e a l and J u d g e s ' Courts.
T h e r e is at p r e s e n t a J u d g e r e s i d e n t i n e a c h of t h e F e d e r a t e d
S t a t e s e x c e p t P a h a n g , w h e r e A s s i z e s are h e l d from t i m e t o t i m e .
U n d e r a Colonial Ordinance t h e J u d g e s of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y
S t a t e s are, subject to t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e n e c e s s a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l
qualifications, J u d g e s ex officio of the S u p r e m e Court of t h e Colony,.
and under a F e d e r a l E n a c t m e n t t h e P u i s n e J u d g e s of t h e Colony,
b u t n o t t h e Chief J u s t i c e , are S u p e r n u m e r a r y J u d g e s of the
Federated Malay States.
T h e G o v e r n o r a n d H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r h a s p r o p o s e d that the
s e p a r a t e e n t i t y of t h e several F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d be recog­
n i z e d by c o n s t i t u t i n g a H i g h Court of J u s t i c e for e a c h S t a t e to
t a k e t h e p l a c e of t h e p r e s e n t J u d g e s ' Courts.
H e further pro­
p o s e s t h a t in order to p r o m o t e c o - o p e r a t i o n and t h e fullest use of
t h e available judicial s t r e n g t h a s i n g l e S u p r e m e Court of Malaya
s h o u l d be c r e a t e d h a v i n g jurisdiction over t h e C o l o n y and the
F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s w i t h a s i n g l e Chief J u s t i c e at its head.
T h i s S u p r e m e Court w o u l d c o m p r i s e a H i g h Court of J u s t i c e in
t h e Colony ( r e p l a c i n g t h e p r e s e n t S u p r e m e Court i n i t s original
jurisdiction), t h e S t a t e H i g h C o u r t s , a n d a Court of A p p e a l having
jurisdiction t o hear a p p e a l s from all t h e H i g h Courts.
If t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s w e r e to e l e c t to u s e t h e services oi
t h e Court of A p p e a l its jurisdiction could b e e x t e n d e d accordingly.
I t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y i n t h i s R e p o r t t o g i v e m o r e t h a n the above
brief o u t l i n e of t h e s c h e m e w h i c h is u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
I found t h a t t h e r e w a s an i m p o r t a n t conflict of o p i n i o n i n the
F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s a s to t h e desirability of c r e a t i n g a single
S u p r e m e Court w i t h o n e Chief J u s t i c e for b o t h t h e Colony and
t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s , and I p r o m i s e d to b r i n g to the notice
of t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s m a d e t o m e by the
B a r C o m m i t t e e of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s .
B o t h political
a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o b j e c t i o n s h a v e b e e n urged a g a i n s t t h e proposal
a n d t h e s e w i l l c e r t a i n l y require t h e f u l l e s t e x a m i n a t i o n before any
c h a n g e is a p p r o v e d .
I a m a w a r e , h o w e v e r , of n o s u c h s u b s t a n t i a l o b j e c t i o n s to the
Chief J u s t i c e of t h e C o l o n y b e i n g e m p o w e r e d t o sit a s a Judge
i n t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s ; a n d , a t t h e t i m e w h e n I left
M a l a y a , t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r c o n t e m p l a t e d g e t t i n g t h e conseni
of t h e R u l e r s to t h e n e c e s s a r y a m e n d m e n t of t h e F e d e r a l E n a c t ­
m e n t t o p e r m i t of t h i s , a n d h a d decided to leave for further con­
sideration t h e larger s c h e m e w h i c h h a s n o direct b e a r i n g o n the
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n proposals proper.
Secretariat for Chinese Affairs.
F o r t h e l a s t t w e l v e y e a r s t h e r e h a v e b e e n t w o s e p a r a t e appoiut­
m e n t s of " S e c r e t a r y for C h i n e s e Affairs " — o n e i n t h e Colony and
one in the Federated Malay States.
W i t h a v i e w to e n s u r i n g a u n i f o r m policy t h r o u g h o u t Malaya
in relation t o C h i n e s e i m m i g r a t i o n a n d t h e control of Chinese
a l i e n s , t h e G o v e r n o r and H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r h a s proposed the
creation of a s i n g l e a p p o i n t m e n t of " S e c r e t a r y for C h i n e s e Affairs "
i n s t e a d of t h e t w o e x i s t i n g a p p o i n t m e n t s . U p to d a t e the Secre­
taries h a v e n o t e x e r c i s e d a n y direct a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e Protectors
of C h i n e s e i n t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s , b u t f r o m t i m e t o t i m e the
a c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e Secretary at S i n g a p o r e h a s b e e n s o u g h t by
the S t a t e authorities w h e n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s h a v e a r i s e n , b e c a u s e
the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r o n behalf of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t
is responsible for t h e u l t i m a t e control of C h i n e s e policy t h r o u g h o u t
Malaya.
T h e n e w proposal c o n t e m p l a t e s a c h a n g e , therefore, in so far as
it provides for p u t t i n g t h e " Secretary for C h i n e s e Affairs " i n
the s a m e position as t h e e x i s t i n g " Controller of L a b o u r " * and
m a k i n g h i m t h e e x e c u t i v e officer responsible to t h e H i g h C o m m i s ­
sioner for t h e control of t h e P r o t e c t o r s o f C h i n e s e t h r o u g h o u t
Malaya.
I t h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t the proposed p a n - M a l a y a n S e c r e t a r y
lor C h i n e s e Affairs s h o u l d reside at S i n g a p o r e , s i n c e it is t h e chief
point of C h i n e s e i m m i g r a t i o n and t h e c h i e f c e n t r e of C h i n e s e
activity i n M a l a y a . I understand t h a t t h i s s u g g e s t i o n h a s led t o
criticisms by the a u t h o r i t i e s in t h e M a l a y S t a t e s w h o , a s already
indicated in t h i s R e p o r t , are g e n e r a l l y a p p r e h e n s i v e of a n y e l e m e n t
of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e control from S i n g a p o r e , since i t i s c o n t e n d e d
by t h e m t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of t h e M a l a y S t a t e s are n o t t h e s a m e
as t h o s e of t h e C o l o n y . A g a i n t h e r e is a further r e a s o n , v i z . , t h e
fear of t h e s t r o n g influence t h a t t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y at Singa­
pore m a y e x e r c i s e .
I s u g g e s t that t h e s e a p p r e h e n s i o n s are at least e x a g g e r a t e d and I
h a v e n o fears t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e M a l a y S t a t e s w o u l d b e over­
looked if t h e proposed o r g a n i s a t i o n is a d o p t e d .
T h e question is
o n e , h o w e v e r , on w h i c h all t h e authorities concerned will h a v e t o
be c o n s u l t e d , and I c a n n o t b u t feel t h a t w h e n e a c h G o v e r n m e n t h a s
b e e n s h o w n t h a t t h e proposed s c h e m e m a k e s full provision f o r
t h e consideration of t h e i r o w n particular v i e w s t h e r e o u g h t to b e
n o difficulty i n g e t t i n g t h e m to acquiesce^in i t s adoption.
C H A P T E R IX.
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.
CONCLUSIONS.
(i) F r o m the purely e c o n o m i c p o i n t of v i e w , it w o u l d n o d o u b t
be advisable in a c o u n t r y the s i z e of M a l a y a t o h a v e a s i n g l e
G o v e r n m e n t a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e w h o l e territory.
* T h e d u t i e s of t h e " C o n t r o l l e r of L a b o u r ", w h o is of p a n - M a l a y a n s t a t u s ,
are m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e control of I n d i a n i m m i g r a t i o n a n d of t h e t e r m s
a n d c o n d i t i o n s of e m p l o y m e n t of I n d i a n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e P e n i n s u l a : and i n
c a r r y i n g o u t t h e s e d u t i e s he ants as t h e c h i e f a d v i s e r a n d a g e n t of t h e
Governor and H i g h Commissioner in dealing w i t h various political questions
w h i c h a r i s e f r o m t h e p r e s e n c e of such a l a r g e I n d i a n c o m m u n i t y i n M a l a y a .
As t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of t h e I n d i a n labour e m p l o y e d i n M a l a y a i s w o r k i n g i n
t h e F e d e r a t e d Malay S t a t e s , t h e Controller of L a b o u r r e s i d e s a t t h e F e d e r a l
Headquarters at Kuala Lumpur.
(ii) T h e r e i s , h o w e v e r , a political aspect of t h e p r o b l e m , and
there can be n o q u e s t i o n that the e v e n t s of r e c e n t y e a r s h a v e en­
couraged t h e MrJay E u l e r s to b e l i e v e t h a t i t is the i n t e n t i o n of
H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t to arrange for a transfer to the State
G o v e r n m e n t s of m o r e control of t h e i r o w n affairs.
(iii) T h e c r e a t i o n of a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d bureaucracy at Kuala
L u m p u r h a s b e e n u n d o u b t e d l y o n e of the m a i n c a u s e s of t h e request
o n the part of t h e M a l a y E u l e r s for d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .
(iv) T h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e p o s i t i o n , a u t h o r i t y , and prestige
of the M a l a y E u l e r s m u s t a l w a y s b e a cardinal p o i n t i n British
p o l i c y , and t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t of i n d i r e c t rule will probably prove
t h e g r e a t e s t s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t t h e political s u b m e r s i o n of t h e Malays
w h i c h w o u l d result from t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of popular g o v e r n m e n t on
western lines.
(v) P r o m a political a n d financial p o i n t of v i e w , there i s a strong
c a s e for a d o p t i n g a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and for gradually­
s u b s t i t u t i n g i n t h e F e d e r a t e d Malay- S t a t e s a g e n u i n e federal system
for w h a t h a s b e e n described by t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r a s the
" amalgamation " that exists to-day.
(vi) T h e r e i s no s t r o n g objection on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g r o u n d s to
a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .
(vii) T h e closer a s s i m d a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e E u l e r s of the
F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s to t h a t of t h e E u l e r s of t h e Unfederated
M a l a y S t a t e s i s o b v i o u s l y an e s s e n t i a l p r e l i m i n a r y to a n y scheme
for p r o m o t i n g c o - o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o n s t i t u e n t parts of Malaya
a s a w h o l e o n m a t t e r s of c o m m o n i n t e r e s t .
(viii) A l t h o u g h , a s I p o i n t e d o u t to t h e E u l e r s of J o h o r e and
K e d a h , there i s no i n t e n t i o n of r e q u i r i n g a n y U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e to
e n t e r a g a i n s t i t s w i l l i n t o a s c h e m e of closer u n i o n , t h e E u l e r s of
t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s appear n e r v o u s t h a t s o m e policy of this
k i n d i s i n c o n t e m p l a t i o n , a n d it i s e v i d e n t t h a t t h e y w o u l d be re­
l u c t a n t at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e to agree t o a n y closer form of co-operation
t h a n t h e r e is t o - d a y .
A t the s a m e t i m e I t h i n k t h e E n l e r s would all
agree t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e m a n y q u e s t i o n s o n w h i c h joint discussion
could n o t b u t b e of a d v a n t a g e to e v e r y c o n s t i t u e n t part of M a l a y a .
(ix) T i m e a n d e x p e r i e n c e alone w i l l s h o w (a) to w h a t e x t e n t it
w i l l b e p o s s i b l e to a s s i m i l a t e t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e t w o s e t s of E u l e r s .
a n d (b) w h e t h e r s o m e sy-stem of periodical D u r b a r s for discussing
q u e s t i o n s of c o m m o n i n t e r e s t can b e arranged.
(x) T h e non-Malay
A s i a t i c c o m m u n i t i e s feel
considerable
a n x i e t y a s to t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e i r i n t e r e s t s m a y b e affected by
t h e a d o p t i o n of a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i i o n .
(xi) T h e r e c e n t a d d i t i o n to t h e S t a t e Councils in t h e Federated
M a l a y S t a t e s o f unofficial m e m b e r s i s likely t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e desire
of the S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s for m o r e control of their o w n affairs.
(xii) A n y c h a n g e s m a d e i n t h e m u t u a l relationship of t h e Federal
a n d S t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s m u s t n o t be s u c h as to w e a k e n t h a t essential
political a s s o c i a t i o n and joint financial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n w h i c h the
prosperity of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s h a s b e e n built u p , and
there can b e n o q u e s t i o n of p u r c h a s i n g political d e v o l u t i o n at t h e
price of financial dissolution. T h e g e n e r a l control of finance m u s t
r e m a i n , t h e r e f o r e , i n the h a n d s of a central a u t h o r i t y , o n which
the Kulers are r e p r e s e n t e d .
(xiii) F r o m t h e point of v i e w of c h e c k i n g e x t r a v a g a n t e x p e n d i ­
turc, there s e e m s to be m u c h to be said for h a n d i n g over t h e
control of t h e " s p e n d i n g d e p a r t m e n t s " t o t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s .
(xiv) I t i s argued that the S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s h a v e not y e t had
sufficient a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e to justify a n y considerable
delegation of p o w e r s . T h o u g h this m a y be a reason for proceed­
ing slowly, it does n o t appear to b e a strong a r g u m e n t for not
adopting a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n at all.
( x v ) I t i s argued that the transfer to S t a t e control of certain
services w i l l result in loss of efficiency and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e difficul­
ties in d e a l i n g w i t h the p e r s o n n e l of t h e d e p a r t m e n t s affected.
W i t h the w i l l to m a k e t h e n e w s y s t e m a s u c c e s s , there n e e d not be
a n y great loss of efficiency. I f there is it can probably be reme­
died, and i n a n y c a s e , e v e r y t h i n g p o i n t s to its b e i n g t h e lesser of
t w o evils.
(xvi) T h e abolition of the post of Chief S e c r e t a r y , as it e x i s t s to­
day, m u s t be a n essential part of any policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,
since there can be n o place i n a n y such s c h e m e for a n officer at
the head of t h e Central G o v e r n m e n t h o l d i n g s u c h w i d e statutory
and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r s as t h i s officer does to-day.
(xvii) T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t i e s and of
the unofficial m e m b e r s are s t r o n g l y opposed to t h e abolition of t h e
post of Chief S e c r e t a r y , but I think t h a t t h e y , t o g e t h e r w i t h a
large n u m b e r of officials w h o l i k e w i s e fear its a b o l i t i o n , w o u l d not
feel as s t r o n g l y as t h e y do a b o u t t h e m a t t e r if it w e r e t h e i n t e n ­
tion to s u b s t i t u t e i n t h e place of t h e Chief Secretary a n officer of
reduced s t a t u s w h o could act as t h e e x e c u t i v e h e a d of w h a t r e m a i n s
of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e r y for d e a l i n g w i t h federal affairs.
(xviii) S o l o n g as there are certain q u e s t i o n s w h i c h h a v e to b e
dealt w i t h by t h e federal m a c h i n e r y , it s e e m s l i k e l y t h a t i t will b e
necessary to h a v e an e x e c u t i v e head of w h a t r e m a i n s of that
m a c h i n e , a n d I agree w i t h t h o s e w h o t a k e the v i e w t h a t it w o u l d
be i m p o s s i b l e for t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r to do t h e n e c e s s a r y c o ­
ordination h i m s e l f .
(xix) T h e v i e w i s p r e v a l e n t a m o n g s t m e m b e r s of t h e b u s i n e s s
communities in the Federated Malay States that, o w i n g to the
clash of i n t e r e s t s b e t w e e n t h o s e S t a t e s and t h e Colony, the i m ­
portance of h a v i n g a senior officer at K u a l a L u m p u r w h o will be
available t o look after t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s
cannot b e o v e r e s t i m a t e d .
(xx) T h e v i e w i s w i d e l y h e l d t h a t d u e regard h a s not b e e n
paid to t h e n e c e s s i t y of e d u c a t i n g public o p i n i o n as t o w h a t t h e
proposed c h a n g e s a c t u a l l y m e a n , w i t h t h e result t h a t a n a t m o s p h e r e
of s u s p i c i o n and m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n as to t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e
G o v e r n m e n t h a s b e e n c r e a t e d . T h e R u l e r s , Officials, and un­
officials a l m o s t w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e Govern­
m e n t h a v e b e e n p r o p o s i n g t o o m a n y c h a n g e s at o n c e , and t h a t ii
a p o l i c y of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s to be a d o p t e d i t s h o u l d be carried out
very g r a d u a l l y , s t e p b y s t e p .
( x x i ) T h e r e i s a s t r o n g f e e l i n g that t h e i n t e r e s t s concerned are
not c o n s u l t e d b y G o v e r n m e n t before d e c i s i o n s are t a k e n , and that
c o n s e q u e n t l y certain a s p e c t s of t h e q u e s t i o n are ignored.
( x x i i ) T h e v i e w is w i d e l y h e l d t h a t o w i n g to t h e s l u m p in trade
and t h e u r g e n t n e c e s s i t y for c o n s i d e r i n g r e t r e n c h m e n t t h e time
is a n i n o p p o r t u n e o n e for c a r r y i n g o u t a n y m a t e r i a l c h a n g e s in tin­
s y s t e m of g o v e r n m e n t to w h i c h e v e r y o n e i s a c c u s t o m e d .
( x x i i i ) S o m e p e o p l e v i e w w i t h s u c h m i s t r u s t w h a t they call pro­
posals for c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n S i n g a p o r e , t h a t t h e y advocate the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t w o separate p o s t s , o n e of H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r at
K u a l a L u m p u r , and a n o t h e r of G o v e r n o r (or Administrator) at
Singapore.
( x x i v ) A c e r t a i n a m o u n t of f e e l i n g is s h o w n about t h e com­
p a r i s o n s w h i c h h a v e been m a d e b e t w e e n t h e financial p o s i t i o n to­
d a y o f t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s a n d that of t h e F e d e r a t e d States.
S u c h c o m p a r i s o n s are regarded as unfair i n v i e w of the benefits
w h i c h it i s said t h a t t h e U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s h a v e received in the
past a t t h e e x j i e n s e of t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s .
( x x v ) T i m e and e x p e r i e n c e a l o n e will s h o w t o w h a t e x t e n t de­
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n can b e carried a n d t o w h a t e x t e n t it will be
p r a c t i c a b l e t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e R u l e r s of the
F e d e r a t e d a n d U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s ; and it w o u l d b e u n w i s e at the
p r e s e n t t i m e t o a t t e m p t t o d o g m a t i z e as t o w h a t c a n be d o n e after
t h e first period of four y e a r s .
( x x v i ) A s i n t h e c a s e of all b u r e a u c r a c i e s , there h a s been a
t e n d e n c y for t h a t at K u a l a L u m p u r to g e t m o r e p o w e r i n t o its
h a n d s y e a r b y y e a r , a n d for t h e n u m b e r of e x p e r t s to g r o w and
grow.
( x x v i i ) If t h e proposals for d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n are approved a greater
proportion of t h e t i m e and a t t e n t i o n of t h e Governor and H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r is likely t o b e t a k e n u p w i t h m a t t e r s c o n c e r n i n g the
M a l a y S t a t e s , a n d i t w i l l p r o b a b l y b e n e c e s s a r y for h i m t o spend
m o r e t i m e i n those S t a t e s t h a n h a s b e e n t h e c u s t o m i n t h e past.
( x x v i i i ) V a r i o u s v i e w s are held a s t o t h e l e n g t h of period over
w h i c h t h e c a r r y i n g out of a policy of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n should be
s p r e a d , a n d t h e s e vary from as m u c h as five t o t w e n t y - f i v e years.
( x x i x ) I t is not n e c e s s a r y or desirable t o consider t h e revision of
the. T r e a t i e s and A g r e e m e n t s until e x p e r i e n c e h a s s h o w n w h a t are
t o b e t h e e v e n t u a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e and Federal
a u t h o r i t i e s . T h i s i s n o t likely t o be for s o m e considerable t i m e .
( x x x ) T o o great i m p o r t a n c e should n o t b e a t t a c h e d t o uniformity
in d e t a i l s and n o u n d u e pressure s h o u l d b e b r o u g h t to b e a r o n the
R u l e r s of t h e U n f e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s t o conform t o w h a t is
b e i n g d o n e e l s e w h e r e u n l e s s as regards e s s e n t i a l m a t t e r s .
(xxxi) I n c h a n g i n g from a h i g h l y centralized f o r m of G o v e r n ­
n i e n t , such as t h a t w h i c h e x i s t s to-day at K u a l a L u m p u r , it is o n l y
t h e e x p e r i e n c e g a i n e d in t h e actual w o r k i n g of e a c h c h a n g e w h i c h
will s h o w at w h a t p a c e t h e p r o c e s s should proceed.
(xxxii) A period of about four y e a r s s e e m s a r e a s o n a b l e o n e to
allow for r e a r r a n g i n g t h e financial r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e F e d e r a l and
State G o v e r n m e n t s on a satisfactory b a s i s , and also for s t r e n g t h e n ­
ing generally t h e financial position of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s ;
and t h e first s t a g e of decentralization m i g h t with a d v a n t a g e corre­
spond with t h i s period.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
I am of opinion:—
(a) That a definite policy of decentralization should be
adopted forthwith.
(6) That the changes involved by the adoption of such a
policy should be carried out very gradually.
(c) That the first stage of such a policy should cover a
period of about four years, corresponding with the time re­
quired for rearranging the financial relationship of the Federal
and State Governments on a more satisfactory basis than it is
to-day and for strengthening generally the financial position of
the Federated Malay States.
(d) That during the first stage the decentralization measures
should be strictly limited to the following : ­
(i) The transfer to State control of the following De­
partments, namely—Agricultural, Co-operative, Educa­
tional, Electrical, Forestry, Mining, Medical, Public
Works, Veterinary, Prisons, and Drainage and Drrigation ;
with a block grant to each State to be voted by the Federal
Council each year to meet the sum total of the cost of the
Departments so transferred.
(ii) The setting up of an " Advisory Council " pre­
sided over by the H i g h Commissioner and including re­
presentatives of the State Governments, to deal from the
point of view of a common policy with questions which as
regards detailed administration can for convenience and
economy be left to the State Governments, but as regards
policy will have to remain under a common control.
(iii) The transfer of the statutory and administrative
powers exercised by the present Chief Secretary to the
Rulers in Council in respect of those matters which are
transferred to State control, and to the High Commis­
sioner or appropriate Federal Officers (including the officer
who is to replace the present Chief Secretary) in respect
of those matters which are to remain federal.
(e) That during the first stage of decentralization effect
should also be given to the following proposals, which are not,
however, directly connected with decentralization:­
(i) The abolition of the volume of Estimates entitled
" Unreserved Services " .
(ii) The setting up of a Malayan Establishment Office.
(Hi) A change in the system of Supplementary Esti­
mates with a view to reducing the number and amounts
of such Estimates.
(/) That it would be unwise to try to lay down precisely
what further changes can be made in the direction of decen­
tralization subsequent to the first stage referred to above (since
this must depend on experience) but that they might in­
clude:—
(i) During the second stage the collection and appropria­
tion by the States of certain of the revenues which are not
required for federal purposes, with a view to making the
State Governments increasingly independent. .
(ii) During the final stages the transfer to the States
of other sources of revenue, and the right to impose taxa­
tion so as to put them in a position to meet all their,
expenditure without subvention from central resources,
leaving the central authority to collect and appropriate such
revenues as will be sufficient for the service of the debt;
meeting the recurrent expenses of the central authority;
and building up an ample reserve fund.
(iii) Ultimately the abolition of what remains of the
existing federal machinery and of its executive head.
This, however, depends on the setting up of some new
central machinery for dealing with matters of interest to
Malaya as a whole and the absorption into it of what then
remains of the existing federal machinery.
(g) That the question of the revision of the treaties and agree­
ments with the Malay States is not urgent and should be re­
garded as a matter for the future.
39
APPENDIX I.
Itinerary.
1932.
October 20th
21st
November 10th-13th . . .
13th-15th . . .
16th-19th . . .
19th
Left London.
Embarked in S.S. lianpura a t Marseilles.
A t Penang.
I n Kcdah with a v i s i t t o Perlis on t h e 14th.
I n Perak.
Visited
t h e Dindings
and
embarked
in
the
S.Y. Scabelle II sailing from L u m u t in t h e evening.
20th
Disembarked at P o r t Swettenliam.
20th-21st . . . A t Klang and K u a l a Lumpur (Sclangor).
21st-23rd . . . I n Ncgri Sembilan.
23rd-29th . . . A t Kuala Lumpur. (Selangor).
29th-30th . . . Spent night a t Erasers Hill.
30th-Dcc. 1 s t I n Pahang.
December lst^3rd
A t Kuala Lumpur. (Selangor).
D a y at Malacca, a n d entrained in tho evening.
3rd
D a y a t Johore Bahru and drove t o Singapore in t h e
4th
evening.
5th-10th . . . A t Singapore.
10th
Embarked in S.S. SancJii for Hong Kong.
15th-21st . . . A t Hong Kong.
21st
Embarked in S.S. Sarpcdon for Colombo.
25th-28th . . . I n port a t Singapore.
29th
I n port a t Port Swettenham.
30th
I n port a t Penang.
1933.
J a n u a r y 3rd
3rd-7th
8th-12th ...
12th-17th ...
17th-lSth ...
ISth
February 3rd ...
4th
Disembarked a t Colombo.
A t Colombo.
A t Xuwara Eliya.
A t K a n d y with a visit t o Anuradhapura on t h e 14th/15th.
A t Colombo.
Embarked in S.S. Strathaird for Marseilles.
Disembarked Marseilles.
Arrived i n London.
APPENDIX II.
General description of Malaya.
T h e group of t e r r i t o r i e s w h i c h has come to be k n o w n as M a l a y a corn­
prises (a) t h e t h r e e S e t t l e m e n t s of P e n a n g , Malacca, a n d S i n g a p o r e , which,
w i t h t h e S e t t l e m e n t of L a b u a n off t h e coast of B o r n e o , c o n s t i t u t e t h e
Colony of t h e S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s ; (h) n i n e M a l a y S t a t e s , e a c h w i t h i t s
M a l a y R u l e r , a n d e a c h in t r e a t y r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y by
v i r t u e of which t h e i r S t a t e s are placed u n d e r British protection.
Of these nine S t a t e s four c a m e u n d e r B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n i n t h e course of
t h e years 1S74-18S9, v i z . , P e r a k , S e l a n g o r , N e g r i S e m b i l a n , a n d P a h a n g .
T h e y subsequently i n 1895 c o n c l u d e d a n A g r e e m e n t c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e i r
c o u n t r i e s i n t o a F e d e r a t i o n t o be a d m i n i s t e r e d u n d e r t h e a d v i c e of t h e
B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t . These f o u r S t a t e s a r e k n o w n as t h o F e d e r a t e d M a l a y
T h e five S t a t e s w h i c h are n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n are
States.
K e d a h , K e l a n t a n , T r e n g g a n u , P e r l i s , a n d Johore.
Tiie first four, w h i c h
167
lie between t h e F c d o r a t c d M a l a y S t a t e s a n d S i a m , c a m e definitely under
B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n in 1909 when S i a m transferred to Great B r i t a i n her
r i g h t s o v e r t h o s e t e r r i t o r i e s . Tho fifth, J o h o r e , in t h e s o u t h of the Malay
P e n i n s u l a , had hy a T r e a t y of 1885 confided t h e control of its foreign
affairs t o t h e c a r o of G r e a t B r i t a i n , b u t i t w a s n o t u n t i l 1914 t h a t a n
A g r e e m e n t w a s concluded (with t h e S u l t a n , u n d e r w h i c h a B r i t i s h officer
w a s a p p o i n t e d a s General Adviser with a u t h o r i t y s i m i l a r in e x t e n t to that
possessed by the B r i t i s h Advisors i n tho o t h e r U n f e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s .
The t o t a l a r e a of t h e M a l a y P e n i n s u l a is a p p r o x i m a t e l y 60,000 square
m i l e s of w h i c h t h e Colony of t h o S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s a c c o u n t s for n o t more
t h a n 1,144 square miles, b u t t o t h e t o t a l P e n i n s u l a
population of
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4,350,000 t h e C o l o n y c o n t r i b u t e s 1,100,000 and in t h e two
g r e a t ports of S i n g a p o r e a n d P e n a n g lie tho main c h a n n e l s of international
t r a d e and c o m m u n i c a t i o n , not o n l y w i t h t h o P e n i n s u l a b u t also between
Europe and the Par East.
Of the total p o p u l a t i o n of M a l a y a the M a l a y s ( i n c l u d i n g for this purpose
all i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s of t h e Mala,v P e n i n s u l a and A r c h i p e l a g o ) a r e by n
small m a r g i n t h e l a r g e s t e l e m e n t n u m b e r i n g 1,902,000 o r 45 per c e n t .
T h e C h i n e s e n u m b e r over 1,700,000 or 39 per c e n t .
They constitute
n e a r l y GO per c e n t , of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of t h o Colony of tho S t r a i t s Settle­
m e n t s , a n d t h e y form t h o m o s t n u m e r o u s race in t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s of
P e r a k , S e l a n g o r , and N e g r i S e m b i l a n as well as in t h e U n f e d e r a t e d State
o f Joliore. I n t h e o t h e r S t a t e s t h e y form a n u m e r i c a l l y far loss important
e l e m e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n and fall t o a m i n i m u m of 5 p e r c e n t , in Kelantan.
The I n d i a n s i n M a l a y a n u m b e r 624,000 or over 14 p e r c e n t , of t h o total
p o p u l a t i o n , a n d are c o n c e n t r a t e d chiefly in t h e F e d e r a t e d S t a t e s of Perak,
S e l a n g o r , a n d N e g r i S e m b i l a n , a n d i n t h e S e t t l e m e n t s of Singapore anil
P o n a n g , a n d in t h e S t a t e of J o h o r e .
I n g e n e r a l , i t is t r u e t o say t h a t t h e bulk of t h e C h i n e s e and Indians,
l i k e t h e E u r o p e a n s , go t o M a l a y n o t t o m a k e it t h e i r h o m e , b u t in the
hope of m a k i n g a l i v i n g a n d possibly a m a s s i n g w e a l t h with which to return
t o their n a t i v e l a n d s .
Tho m a i n o c c u p a t i o n of the m a j o r i t y of t h e p o p u l a t i o n is agriculture.
I n the R e p o r t o f t h e 1931 c e n s u s i t w a s e s t i m a t e d t h a t probably one-fifth
of the w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n w a s e n g a g e d i n rice c u l t i v a t i o n .
T h e rublier
c u l t i v a t i o n i n d u s t r y w a s e s t i m a t e d t o occupy probably o n e - t h i r d of the
w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n , while t i n m i n i n g , which is from the economic point
of view t h e o t h e r most i m p o r t a n t p r o d u c i n g i n d u s t r y , e m p l o y e d n o more
than 4 per cent.
APPENDIX
III.
Treaty of Federation, 1895.
A g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h o Governor of t h e S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s , a c t i n g on
behalf of t h e G o v e r n m e n t of H e r M a j e s t y t h e -Queen, E m p r e s s of India,
a n d the R u l e r s of t h e following Afalay S t a t e s : — t h a t is t o say, Perak.
S e l a n g o r , P a h a n g , and t h e N e g r i S e m b i l a n .
(1) I n confirmation of v a r i o u s p r e v i o u s A g r e e m e n t s , the S u l t a n of
P e r a k , t h e S u l t a n of S e l a n g o r , t h e S u l t a n of P a h a n g , and t h e Chiefs
of t h e S t a t e s which form t h e t e r r i t o r y known a s t h e N e g r i Sembilan.
hereby s e v e r a l l y place t h e m s e l v e s a n d t h e i r S t a t e s u n d e r the protection
of t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t .
(2) T h e abo%'e-named R u l e r s a n d Chiefs of t h e r e s p e c t i v e States
h e r e b y a g r e e t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r c o u n t r i e s a F e d e r a t i o n , to be known
as t h e P r o t e c t e d M a l a y S t a t e s , t o be a d m i n i s t e r e d u n d e r the advice
of t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t .
(3) I t is t o bo u n d e r s t o o d t h a t the ai r a n g o m e n t hereby a g r e e d upon
does n o t imply t h a t a n y o n e R u l e r or Chief shall exercise a n y power
o r a u t h o r i t y in r e s p e c t of a n y S t a t e o t h e r t h a n t h a t which he now
possesses in t h e S t a t e of which ho is the r e c o g n i z e d Ruler or Chief.
(4) T h e a b o v e - n a m e d R u l e r s agreo to a c c e p t a British Officer, to be
s t y l e d the R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l , as tho a g e n t a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e
B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t u n d e r the Governor of tho S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s .
T h e y u n d e r t a k e t o p r o v i d e hirn with s u i t a b l e a c c o m m o d a t i o n , w i t h
such s a l a r y as is d e t e r m i n e d by H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , and to
follow his advico in a l l m a t t e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n other t h a n those
t o u c h i n g t h o M o h a m m a d a n religion. T h e a p p o i n t m e n t of t h o R e s i d e n t General will n o t affect the obligations of the M a l a y R u l e r s t o w a r d s
the B r i t i s h R e s i d e n t s now e x i s t i n g o r t o bo hereafter a p p o i n t e d to
offices in t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d P r o t e c t e d S t a t e s .
(5) T h e a b o v e - n a m e d Rulers also agree t o g i v e t o those S t a t e s in t h o
F e d e r a t i o n w h i c h require i t s u c h a s s i s t a n c e in m e n , m o n e y o r o t h e r
respects as tho B r i t i s h Government, t h r o u g h its duly a p p o i n t e d officers,
may a d v i s e ; a n d t h e y f u r t h e r u n d e r t a k e , should war break o u t b e t w e e n
H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t and t h a t of a n y other Power, t o s e n d , on
tho r e q u i s i t i o n of t h o Governor, a body of armed a n d e q u i p p e d
I n d i a n troops for s e r v i c e in t h e S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s .
N o t h i n g in t h i s A g r e e m e n t is i n t e n d e d t o curtail any of the powers
or a u t h o r i t y now h e l d by a n y of t h e above-named R u l e r s i n their respec­
tive S t a t e s , nor d o e s i t a l t e r t h e r e l a t i o n s now e x i s t i n g b e t w e e n any of
the S t a t e s n a m e d a n d t h o B r i t i s h E m p i r e .
The above A g r e e m e n t was signed and sealed by the u n d e r - m e n t i o n e d Rulers
and Chiefs of t h e v a r i o u s S t a t e s in J u l y , 1 8 9 5 : —
His
His
His
His
Tho
The
The
The
The
H i g h n e s s t h o S u l t a n of P e r a k .
H i g h n e s s tho S u l t a n of S e l a n g o r .
H i g h n e s s t h e S u l t a n of P a h a n g .
H i g h n e s s t h e Y a m T u a n Besar of S r i M e n a n t i .
D a t o ' B a n d a r of S u n g e i Ujong.
D a t e ' of J o h o l .
D a t o ' of J e l e b u .
D a t o ' of R e m b a u .
T u n g k u D e w a of T a m p i n .
APPENDIX
IV.
Agreements of 1909 and 1927.
(i) A G R E E M E N T
FOlR. T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N
COUNCIL, 1909.
OF A
FEDERAL
AGREEMENT b e t w e e n t h e H i g h Commissioner of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s
a c t i n g on behalf of t h e G o v e r n m e n t of H i s M a j e s t y T h e K i n g , E m p e r o r
of I n d i a , a n d t h e R u l e r s of the F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s of Porak,
Selangor, P a h a n g , a n d N e g r i S e m b i l a n .
W h e r e a s by t h e T r e a t y e n t e r e d into i n J u l y , 1895, known a s t h e T r e a t y
of F e d e r a t i o n t h e a b o v e - n a m e d R u l e r s a g r e e d to c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r countries
a F e d e r a t i o n t o be k n o w n as t h e P r o t e c t e d M a l a y S t a t e s to be administered
u n d e r t h e advice of t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t , and whereas t h e above-named
F e d e r a t i o n w a s d u l y c o n s t i t u t e d a s provided i n the above-named T r e a t y , a n d
whereas t h e a b o v e - n a m e d Rulers, further d e s i r e t h a t means should be provided
for t h e joint a r r a n g e m e n t of all m a t t e r s of common interest t o t h e F e d o r a ­
t i o n or affecting m o r e t h a n one S t a t e a n d for the proper e n a c t m e n t of all
s i n t e n d e d to h a v e force t h r o u g h o u t t h o F e d e r a t i o n
S t a t e , i t is h e r e b y a g r e e d : —
or in more than
(1) T h a t on and after a d a t o t o be fixed by H i s M a j e s t y a Council
shall be e s t a b l i s h e d to bo k n o w n as tho F e d e r a l Council of tho Federated
Malay States.
(2) I n t h o
Council: —
first
instance
tho
following
shall
be
members
of
tho
Tho Hij-h C o m m i s s i o n e r .
Tho R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l .
T h e S u l t a n of P e r a k .
T h e S u l t a n of S e l a n g o r .
T h e S u l t a n of P a h a n g .
T h e Y a m T u a n of N e g r i S e m b i l a n a s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h o Undang
of t h e N e g r i S o m b i l a n .
T h e l t e s i d e n t of P e r a k .
T h e R e s i d e n t of S e l a n g o r .
Tho R e s i d e n t of P a h a n g .
T h e R e s i d e n t of N e g r i S e n i b i l a n .
F o u r unollicial m e m b e r s t o bo n o m i n a t e d b y t h e H i g h Com­
m i s s i o n e r w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l of H i s M a j e s t y .
T h e absenco of a n y m e m b e r shall n o t i n v a l i d a t e a n y proceedings of
t h o Council a t which ho h a s n o t been p r e s e n t .
(3) If hereafter i t should i n the o p i n i o n of the H i g h Commissioner be
desirable t o a d d to t h e C o u n c i l o n e or more of t h e h e a d s of t h e various
public d e p a r t m e n t s , he m a y do so s u b j e c t t o t h e approval of H i s
M a j e s t y , and may i n such case a n d subject t o t h e like consent also
n o m i n a t e n o t more t h a n o n e a d d i t i o n a l unofficial member for every
official m e m b e r so added to t h e C o u n c i l .
(4) A h e a d of a d e p a r t m e n t w h o i s n o m i n a t e d t o t h e Council shall
hold office s o l o n g a s t h e H i g h Commissioner t h i n k s
fit.
Unofficial
members shall hold office for t h r e e y e a r s .
(5) T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r shall be P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council and
i n h i s a b s e n c e t h e R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l shall be P r e s i d e n t .
(5A) T h e L e g a l A d v i s e r of the G o v e r n m e n t may a t t e n d a n y s i t t i n g
of t h o C o u n c i l and assist in t h e discussion of a n y l e g a l q u e s t i o n s which
m a y arise in the course of i t s p r o c e e d i n g s b u t shall not be e n t i t l e d to
a v o t e ; a n d a n y h e a d of a p u b l i c d e p a r t m e n t m a y s i m i l a r l y a t t e n d anil
a s s i s t i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of a n y m a t t e r affecting h i s d e p a r t m e n t b u t shall
n o t be e n t i t l e d t o a vote.
(6) If a n y of t h e R u l e r s a b o v e - n a m e d is u n a b l e t o be p r e s e n t h e may
n o m i n a t e o n e of t h e m e m b e r s of his S t a t e Council t o r e p r e s e n t him.
I n t h e c a s e of N e g r i S e m b i l a n , t h e n o m i n a t i o n shall be b y t h e U n d a n g .
(7) T h e Council shall m e e t at l e a s t once i n every y e a r at a place t o
be a p p o i n t e d from t i m e t o t i m e by t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r .
(8) U n l e s s the P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council shall c e r t i f y i n w r i t i n g t h a t
i t is a m a t t e r of u r g e n c y e v e r y law proposed to b e e n a c t e d by tlio
Council s h a l l be published in t h e G o v e r n m e n t Gazette a t least one
m o n t h b e f o r e b e i n g s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Council.
(9) L a w s p a s s e d or w h i c h m a y h e r e a f t e r be passed by t h e S t a t e
Councils s h a l l c o n t i n u e to h a v e f u l l force a n d effect i n t h e S t a t e except
i n so far as t h e y m a y be r e p u g n a n t to the p r o v i s i o n s of any law passed
by t h e F e d e r a l Council, a n d q u e s t i o n s c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e Mohammedan
R e l i g i o n , M o s q u e s , P o l i t i c a l P e n s i o n s , N a t i v e C h i e f s and P e n g h u l u s
a n d a n y o t h e r q u e s t i o n s w h i c h in t h e o p i n i o n of t h e H i g h Commissioner
atfect t h e r i g h t s a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s of any of tho a b o v e - n a m e d Rulers or
w h i c h for o t h e r reasons h e c o n s i d e r s s h o u l d p r o p e r l y be d e a l t w i t h only
by t h e S t a t e Councils shall b e e x c l u s i v e l y reserved t o t h e S t a t e Councils.
(10) The D r a f t E s t i m a t e s of R e v e n u e a n d E x p e n d i t u r e of each S t a t o
shall bo considered b y t h e F e d e r a l Council, b u t shall i m m e d i a t e l y o n
publication be c o m m u n i c a t e d to t h e S t a t e Councils.
(11) N o t h i n g in t h i s A g r e e m e n t is i n t e n d e d t o curtail a n y of tho
p o w e r s or a u t h o r i t y n o w held by a n y of t h e a b o v e - n a m e d R u l e r s in
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e S t a t e s , nor does i t a l t e r t h e r e l a t i o n s n o w e x i s t i n g
b e t w e e n a n y of t h e S t a t e s n a m e d a n d the B r i t i s h E m p i r o as c s t a b ­
lished by p r e v i o u s T r e a t i e s .
The a b o v e A g r e e m e n t w a s signed a n d s e a l e d by h i s Excellency S i r J o h n
Anderson, G . C . M . G . , H i g h Commissioner for t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s ,
on the t w e n t i e t h d a y of October, 1909, h a v i n g been s i g n e d and sealed before
t h a t d a t e by t h e u n d e r - m e n t i o n e d R u l e r s a n d Chiefs of tho F e d e r a t e d M a l a y
-States : —
H i s H i g h n e s s t h o S u l t a n of P e r a k .
H i s H i g h n e s s t h e S u l t a n of S e l a n g o r .
H i s H i g h n e s s the R e g e n t of P a h a n g .
H i s H i g h n e s s t h o Y a n g - d i - P e r t u a n B e s a r of N e g r i S e m b i l a n .
T h e D a t o ' K l a n a P e t r a of S u n g e i TJjong.
T h e D a t o ' of J o h o l .
T h e D a t o ' of J e l e b u .
T h e D a t o ' of R e m b a u .
T h e T u n g k u D e w a of T a m p i n .
( i i ) — A G R E E M E N T F O R T H E R E - C O N S T I T U T I O N OF T H E F E D E R A L
C O U N C I L , 1927.
A g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h o H i g h Commissioner for t h e M a l a y S t a t e s , a c t i n g
on behalf of t h e G o v e r n m e n t of H i s M a j e s t y t h e K i n g , E m p e r o r of I n d i a ,
and t h e R u l e r s of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s of P e r a k , Selangor, N e g r i
S e m b i l a n , and P a h a u g .
Whereas an A g r e e m e n t w a s e n t e r e d i n t o b e t w e e n t h e H i g h Commissioner
for t h e M a l a y S t a t e s , a c t i n g on behalf of t h e G o v e r n m e n t of H i s M a j e s t y
t h o K i n g , E m p e r o r of I n d i a , and t h e R u l e r s of t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s
of P e r a k , S e l a n g o r , N e g r i S e m b i l a n a n d P a h a n g , and e x e c u t e d by t h e
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r on t h e 20th d a y of October, 1909, h a v i n g been e x e c u t e d
before t h a t d a t e by t h e said R u l e r s , w h e r e b y it w a s agreed t h a t a Council
should be e s t a b l i s h e d t o be k n o w n as t h e F e d e r a l Council of t h e F e d e r a t e d
Malay S t a t e s :
And w h e r e a s t h e F e d e r a l Council was d u l y established a c c o r d i n g l y :
And w h e r e a s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e s a i d Council was v a r i e d b y t w o
supplemental Agreements entered into between tho same
parties
and
e x e c u t e d by t h e H i g h Commissioner o n t h e 7 t h d a y of N o v e m b e r , 1912,
and t h e 9 t h d a y of J u l y , 1924, respectively, h a v i n g in e a c h case been e x e c u t e d
by t h e R u l e r s before t h e s a i d d a t e :
A n d w h e r e a s t h e p a r t i e s to t h e h e r e i n b e f o r e r e c i t e d A g r e e m e n t s desire t o
r e - c o n s t i t u t e t h e F e d e r a l C o u n c i l a n d t o define m o r e clearly i t s powers and
duties: —
I t i s hereby a g r e e d by a n d b e t w e e n t h e said p a r t i e s as f o l l o w s : —
(1) F r o m t h e d a t e of t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h i s A g r e e m e n t t h e follow­
i n g shall be m e m b e r s of t h e F e d e r a l C o u n c i l : —
T h e H i g h Commissioner.
T h e Chief S e c r e t a r y t o G o v e r n m e n t .
T h e R e s i d e n t of P e r a k .
T h e R e s i d e n t of S e l a n g o r .
T h e R e s i d e n t of N e g r i S e m b i l a n .
T h e R e s i d e n t of P a h a n g .
The Legal Adviser.
T h e F i n a n c i a l Adviser.
Tho P r i n c i p a l M e d i c a l Officer.
T h e Controller of L a b o u r .
T h e D i r e c t o r of P u b l i c W o r k s .
T h e D i r e c t o r of E d u c a t i o n .
One oilier official to bo n o m i n a t e d by t h e H i g h Commissioner.
E l e v e n unofficial members to be n o m i n a t e d by the H i g h Commis­
sioner w i t h t h o approval of H i s Majesty.
A t least four of sucli
unofficial members shall, if possible, be M a l a y , selected one from
each of t h e S t a t e s .
(2) If any unofficial member shall d i e or become incapable of
d i s c h a r g i n g h i s f u n c t i o n s as a member of t h e Council or be su-,­
p e n d e d or removed from his s e a t in the Council or bo absent from
t h o F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s or resign by w r i t i n g u n d e r his hanil
tho H i g h Commissioner m a y p r o v i s i o n a l l y n o m i n a t e a fit person to
be t e m p o r a r i l y a member of t h e Council, provided t h a t every such
n o m i n a t i o n shall cease to have effect if and when tho same be dis­
allowed, by H i s M a j e s t y or o n the t e r m i n a t i o n of
a n y such
i n c a p a c i t y , s u s p e n s i o n or absence as is hereinbefore referred to.
A n y provisional n o m i n a t i o n m a y be a t any t i m e revoked by the
H i g h Commissioner.
(3) If hereafter i t should in t h e o p i n i o n of tho H i g h Commis­
sioner be desirable to add t o t h o Council o n e or more heads of
p u b l i c d e p a r t m e n t s o r o n e or more unofficial members he may do so
subject t o t h e a p p r o v a l of H i s M a j e s t y and t o t h e preservation of
a n official majority on tho Council.
(4) T h o official n o m i n a t e d by the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r under
A r t i e l o 1 of t h i s A g r e e m e n t a n d a n y head of a d e p a r t m e n t nominated
t o t h e Council u n d e r t h e p r e c e d i n g Article shall hold office so long
as t h e H i g h Commissioner shall t h i n k fit, and a n unofficial member
shall hold office for tho t e r m n o t e x c e e d i n g t h r e e years for which
he w a s n o m i n a t e d .
(5) T h e H i g h Commissioner shall be P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council
and i n his absence t h e Chief S e c r e t a r y shall be P r e s i d e n t . I n the
caso of a n e q u a l i t y of votes t h e P r e s i d e n t shall h a v e a n additional
or c a s t i n g v o t e .
(6) T h e Council shall n o t be disqualified from t h e transaction of
business on a c c o u n t of a n y v a c a n c i e s a m o n g t h e members thereof;
b u t t h e Council shall n o t be c o m p e t e n t t o a c t i n any case unless
( i n c l u d i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t ) t h e r e be p r e s e n t a t a n d t h r o u g h o u t the
m e e t i n g of t h e Council t h r e e members a t the least.
(7) S u i t a b l e a c c o m m o d a t i o n shall bo provided a t every m e e t i n g of
t h e Council for a n y of t h e R u l e r s w h o m a y h a v e signified their
i n t e n t i o n of being p r e s e n t .
(S) T h e Council m a y pass S t a n d i n g Orders for t h e regulation of
i t s p r o c e e d i n g s , and m a y w h e n it t h i n k s fit s u s p e n d s u c h Standing
Orders.
(9) T h e Council shall m e e t a t least once in e v e r y y e a r a t a place
t o be a p p o i n t e d from t i m e t o t i m e by t h e H i g h Commissioner.
(10) The Council shall pass all l a w s i n t e n d e d t o h a v e force through­
o u t t h e F e d e r a t i o n . L a w s passed by t h e Council shall be enacted
in t h e following w o r d s : " I t is hereby e n a c t e d by the Rulers of
the F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s b y and w i t h t h e advice a n d consent
of t h e F e d e r a l C o u n c i l , " a n d s h a l l bo signed by each of the Rulers
before c o m i n g i n t o force, p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e Y a n g di T u a n Besar of
t h e N e g r i S e m b i l a n shall s i g n o n behalf of t h e TJndang of t h e Negri
Sombilan.
(11) A n y law passed o r w h i c h may h e r e a f t e r b e passed by a State
Council shall c o n t i n u e t o h a v e full force and effect i n such State
excep, , in so far as i t m a y be r e p u g n a n t to t h e provisions of any
law p a s s e d by t h e F e d e r a l Council.
(12) E s t i m a t e s of r e v e n u e shall be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Council and
all e x p e n d i t u r e shall be s a n c t i o n e d by t h e Council b y resolution
or s u p p l y b i l l ; provided t h a t t h e Council may by resolution allocate
to e a c h S t a t e e v e r y y e a r a l u m p sum t o be e x p e n d e d w i t h o u t further
1
reference to the Council on such services a s tho Council m a y from
time to time determine.
(13) S u b j e c t t o t h o provisions of A r t i c l e 12 questions c o n n e c t e d
w i t h the M o h a m m e d a n R e l i g i o n , M o s q u e s , P o l i t i c a l pensions, N a t i v e
Chiefs and P c n g h u l u s a n d a n y o t h e r q u e s t i o n s which i n tho o p i n i o n
of the H i g h Commissioner affect t h e r i g h t s and p r e r o g a t i v e s of a n y
of the R u l e r s or w h i c h for other reasons ho considers should properly
be d e a l t w i t h o n l y by the S t a t e Councils shall bo e x c l u s i v e l y reserved
t o the S t a t e Councils.
(14) N o t h i n g in t h i s A g r e e m e n t shall affect t h e v a l i d i t y of a n y
a c t done or law passed by t h e F e d e r a l Council as c o n s t i t u t e d before
tho e x e c u t i o n of t h i s A g r e e m e n t .
(15) N o t h i n g in t h i s A g r e e m e n t is i n t e n d e d to curtail a n y of tho
powers or a u t h o r i t y now held by a n y of t h e Rulers in their respec­
t i v e S t a t e s , nor d o e s it a l t e r t h e r e l a t i o n s n o w e x i s t i n g b e t w e e n a n y
of t h e S t a t e s n a m e d and t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e as established by p r e ­
vious Treaties.
I n w i t n e s s whereof t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o h a v e signed t h e p r e s e n t
A g r e e m e n t and h a v e affixed their P u b l i c S e a l s t h e r e t o .
D o n e a t K u a l a L u m p u r , t h e 2 1 t h d a y of April, 1027:—­
( H e r o follow t h e s i g n a t u r e s a n d seals of
H i s E x c e l l e n c y S i r L a u r e n c e N u n n s Guillcmard, G . C . M . G . .
K.C.B.
H i s H i g h n e s s P a d u k a Sri S u l t a n I s k a n d a r S h a h , K . C . M . G . ,
K . C . V . O . , ibni I d r i s , S u l t a n of P o r a k .
H i s H i g h n e s s Ala'iddin Suleiman Shah, K.C.M.G.,
ibni
A l m e r h u m R a j a M u d a M u s a , S u l t a n of Selangor.
H i s H i g h n e s s M u h u m m a d , K . C . M . G . , K . C . V . O . , ibni Aimer­
h u m Y a m T u a n A n t a h , Y a n g d i p e r Tuan B e s a r of N e g r i
Sembilan.
His
Highness Almoktasim
Billah
Al S u l t a n
Abdullah,
K . C . M . G . , ibni A l m e r h u m Al S u l t a n A h m a d , S u l t a n of P a h a n g .
M a m o r b i n inchc K a s s i m , C . B . E . , D a t o h K l a n a P e t r a of
Sungei Ujong.
K a m a t bin L e m a n , D a t o h P e n g h u l u of J o h o l .
Abdullah bin P a n g l i m a M u d a , D a t o h P e n g h u l u of J e l e b u .
A b d u l l a h bin H a j i D e h a n , D a t o h P e n g h u l u of R a m b a u .
T e n g k u M o h a m e d b i n T a n g k u D e w a , T e n g k u B e s a r of
Tampin).
APPENDIX V.
Summary of Proposals" of High Commissioner for Decentralizing
Departments.
(i) Agriculture,
Drainage a7id Irrigation,
Education,
Electricity,
Forestry,
Mining, Prisons, and
Veterinary.
The a r r a n g e m e n t t h a t is proposed for d e c e n t r a l i z i n g t h e above D e p a r t ­
ments is d e s i g n e d to m e e t t h o case of t h o s e D e p a r t m e n t s of w h i c h t h e senior
officer s t a t i o n e d i n each S t a t e is of c o m p a r a t i v e l y junior rank. U n d e r t h i s
arrangement
(a) T h e H e a d of t h e D e p a r t m e n t is t o be s t y l e d " A d v i s e r . "
* The proposals e x p l a i n e d in t h i s A p p e n d i x differ in some r e s p e c t s from
those a d u m b r a t e d by t h o H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r a t t h e Sri M e n a n t i D u r b a r in
1 9 3 1 ; o.g., t h e D r a i n a g e a n d I r r i g a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t a t t h a t t i m e w a s p a r t
of t h e P u b l i c W o r k s D e p a r t m e n t a n d t h e P r i s o n s D e p a r t m e n t w a s n o t
mentioned.
(b) Tho A d v i s c r ' s powers a s a federal officer i n respect of the various
S t a t e s aro t o be advisory and inspectoral only, his e x e c u t i v e powers
being confined t o federal p r o p e r t y a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s .
(c) Tho A d v i s e r is to have e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y in the v a r i o u s S t a t e , ,
b u t t o d o r i v e i t from e a c h S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t a n d n o t from t h o Fedora!
G o v e r n m e n t as a t p r e s e n t ; the a u t h o r i t y being vested i n t h o Adviser
personally by w r i t t e n w a r r a n t from e a c h S t a t o G o v e r n m e n t under t h e
hand of the R u l e r in Council.
(d) Tho word " D e p u t y " is t o bo placed before the titlo of tho senior
officers of theso D e p a r t m e n t s s t a t i o n e d i n e a c h S t a t e i n c a s e s whore the
e x i s t i n g t i t l o d e n o t e s i n d e p e n d e n t charge, s o as to m a k e i t clear t h a t
the Adviser is himself t h e chief o x e c u t i v e officer.
(c) Tho A d v i s e r as t h e chief e x e c u t i v e officer is t o be responsible to
t h e S t a t e a n d n o t to t h e F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t for all e x e c u t i v e action
t a k e n by h i s D e p a r t m e n t in t h e S t a t e .
(/) T h e A d v i s e r (in his federal advisory c a p a c i t y ) is to r e t a i n the right
to i n i t i a t e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h both t h o F e d e r a l and S t a t o Govern­
nients o n a n y m a t t e r s affecting the a c t i v i t i e s o r policy of h i s D e p a r t ­
mont.
(ff) A s A d v i s e r s t h e H e a d s of t h e s e D e p a r t m e n t s a r e to r e t a i n all tin'
p o w e r s of v i s i t i n g and inspection w i t h i n t h o F e d e r a t e d M a l a y States
t h a t t h e y now possess. T h e c o n s e n t of e a c h S t a t o G o v e r n m e n t t o such
v i s i t s w i l l be g e n e r a l , a n d all t h a t a v i s i t i n g H e a d n e e d d o is to apprise
t h e S t a t e S e c r e t a r i a t s i n good t i m e of s u c h v i s i t s . T h e A d v i s e r will take
p a i n s t o m a k o t h o personal a c q u a i n t a n c e of e a c h R u l e r .
(ii) Public
The a r r a n g e m e n t
f r o m t h a t proposed
cludo tho retention
b y t h e H e a d of t h e
Works
and
Medical.
for the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of these t w o D e p a r t m e n t s differs
for tho other D e p a r t m e n t s in s o far as i t d o c s n o t in­
of e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s i n t h e F e d e r a t e d M a l a y States
D e p a r t m e n t . T h e proposals provide for:—­
(a) T h e a b o l i t i o n of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p o s t s of D i r e c t o r of P u b l i c Works,
a n d P r i n c i p a l M e d i c a l Officer, F e d e r a t e d M a l a y S t a t e s .
(!)) T h e c r e a t i o n of t h e a p p o i n t m e n t s of " D i r e c t o r of P u b l i c Works.
S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s , a n d A d v i s e r on P u b l i c W o r k s , M a l a y S t a t e s , " and
" D i r e c t o r of M e d i c a l a n d H e a l t h S e r v i c e s , S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s , and
A d v i s e r on M e d i c a l a n d H e a l t h S e r v i c e s , M a l a y S t a t e s . "
The head­
q u a r t e r s of t h e s e officers will be a t S i n g a p o r e .
T h e d u t i e s of e a c h of t h e " D i r e c t o r - A d v i s e r s " i n so far a s concerns t h e
M a l a y S t a t e s will be a m o n g s t other t h i n g s t o s u p e r v i s e E u r o p e a n personnel,
t o effect t h e t r a n s f e r of officers a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the administrations
c o n c e r n e d , t o p a y p e r i o d i c v i s i t s of i n s p e c t i o n t o e a c h S t a t e a n d report t h e
r e s u l t to t h e G o v e r n m e n t c o n c e r n e d , t o g i v e advice on a n y m a t t e r referred
t o h i m by t h e H e a d of h i s D e p a r t m e n t i n a S t a t e or by a S t a t e Government
a n d k e e p t h e S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s concerned i n f o r m e d of a n y i n t e r e s t i n g de­
v e l o p m e n t s in o t h e r S t a t e s , to compile a m a n u a l of i n s t r u c t i o n s on purely
p r o f e s s i o n a l or t e c h n i c a l (as d i s t i n c t from a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ) m a t t e r s , and to
e n s u r e t h e proper a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of joint i n s t i t u t i o n s .
(1S3S5-2)
Wt. 25355-2935
1625 3/33
P. St.
G.3
EMPIRE
MARKETING
PUBLICATIONS.
BOARD
N o t e on tho work of tho Board and Statement of Besearch and other
Grants approved bv tho Secretary of State from J u l y , 1020, to
March, 1032. Cmd. 4121.
9d. (10d.).
F l i n t Supplies hi 1930. (E.M.B. 38.)
Is. ( I s . 3d.).
Changes in t h e Demand for Butter. (E.M.B. 39.)
Is. ( I s . Id.).
Boport on D e v e l o p m e n t of Agriculture i n tho Bahamas. (E.M.B. 40.)
Is. ( I s . 2d.).
A Preliminary R e p o r t o n an investigation into t h e Control of
W e s t I n d i a n Insect P e s t s . ( E . M . B . 4 2 0
R e c e n t Advances i n Pasture Management. (E.M.B. 43.)
Is. ( I s . 2d.).
Dairy Research. (E.M.B. 44.)
Is. ( I s . 2d.).
Transport a n d Storage of Bananas -with special reference to Chilling.
(E.M.B.45.)
Is. ( I s . 2d.).
British E m p i r e Hardwoods from the point of view of Turnery.
2s. (2s. 2d.).
Wool Quality : A S t u d y of tho Influence of various contributory factors,
their significance and the technique o f their measurement. Cloth.
£ 1 Is. (£1 I s . 9d.).
Australian a n d N e w Zealand Fruit Shipments. Report of a n investiga­
tion into tho deterioration in transit of Imported Australian and
N e w Zealand Fruit, 1927-30. ( E . M . B . 40.)
Is. ( I s . 2d.).
Banana Breeding at the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture.
(E.M.B. 47.)
Is. ( I s . 2d.).
Imperial S u g a r Cane Research Conference, 1931. Report of Proceedings.
2 s . 6d. (2s. l i d . ) .
Further Changes i n the Demand for Butter, July, 1928, a n d July, 1931.
Report of a n Investigation into tho Retail Marketing of Butter in
Nottingham. ( E . M . B . 4S.)
Is. ( I s . Id.).
Fruit Supplies in 1931. (E.M.B. 49.)
.
Is. (Is. 3d.).
The D e m a n d for H o n e y . (E.M.B. 50.)
Is. (Is. 2d.).
Milk Price Margins.
A Report on the Differences between Producers'
Prices, Wholesale Prices and R e t a i l Prices of Liquid Milk in certain
Large Cities in Different Countries. (E.M.B. 51.)
Is. (Is. 2d.).
Dairy Produce Supplies in 1931. (E.M.B. 52.)
Is. (Is. 3d.).
Empire Marketing Board. May, 1931, t o May, 1932. (E.M.B. 53.) Is. (Is. 3d.).
Survey of Vegetable Oilseeds and Oils.
Vol. I.
Oil P a l m Products.
(E.M.B. 54.)
Is. (Is. 4d.).
Canned and Dried Fruit Supplies in 1931. (E.M.B. 55.)
Is. ( I s . 3d.).
The D e m a n d for Canned Vegetables. (E.M.B. 56.)
Is. (Is. Id.).
Wool Survey. A Summarv of Production and Trade in t h e Empire and
Foreign Countries. (E.M.B. 57.)
2s. (2s. 6d.).
Cattle Breeding in Jamaioa and Trinidad. (E.M.B. 58.)
Is. (Is. 2d.).
The Storage of Tropically-grown T o m a t o e s . (E.M.B. 59.)
Is. (Is. 2d.).
Control of W a s t a g e i n Bananas, w i t h special reference t o Time and
Temperature Factors.
( E . M . B . 60.)
All prices are net.
Those in parentheses
1*. (la. 4d.).
include
Postage.
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AT THE ADDRESSES ON THE FRONT COVER OE THIS REPORT
REPORT
OF
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR SAMUEL WILSON,
G.GM.G.,K.C.B.,K.B.E.,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State
for the Colonkd on his
VISIT T O MALAYA
1932
LONDON
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