United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
October 2008
CONTINGENCY
CONTRACTING
DOD, State, and
USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel
in Iraq and
Afghanistan
GAO-09-19
October 2008
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Highlights
DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
Highlights of GAO-09-19, a report to
congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Found
The Departments of Defense
(DOD) and State and the United
States Agency for International
Development (USAID) have relied
extensively on contractors to carry
out a range of services in Iraq and
Afghanistan. While recognizing the
benefits of using contractors, GAO
and others have noted the
challenges and risks associated
with an increased reliance on
contractors and the ability of
agencies to manage their growing
number of contractors.
For the 18-month period GAO reviewed, DOD, State, and USAID reported
obligating at least $33.9 billion on almost 57,000 contracts for efforts such as
construction, capacity building, security, and a range of support services for
U.S. forces and other government personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. About
three-fourths of the reported obligations were for contracts with performance
in Iraq. Of the total obligations, DOD accounted for almost 90 percent. Most of
the three agencies’ active contracts were awarded during GAO’s review period
and of these, about two-thirds were competed to one extent or another.
However, during its file reviews in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO found that DOD
may have understated the extent to which it competed some contracts.
As directed by the National
Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, GAO analyzed
DOD, State, and USAID data on
contracting activities in Iraq and
Afghanistan for fiscal year 2007 and
the first half of fiscal year 2008
including (1) the number and value
of contracts and the extent they
were awarded competitively;
(2) the number of contractor
personnel, including those
performing security functions; and
(3) the number of contractor
personnel who were killed or
wounded. GAO also reviewed the
status of the three agencies’
memorandum of understanding
(MOU) related to maintaining data
on contracts and contractor
personnel. GAO reviewed selected
contract files and compared
personnel data to other available
sources to assess the reliability of
the data reported by the agencies.
GAO provided a draft of this report
to DOD, State, USAID, and the
Department of Labor for comment.
State and USAID provided technical
comments that were incorporated
where appropriate.
Complete and reliable data were not available for GAO to determine the total
number of contractor personnel who worked on DOD, State, and USAID
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD’s quarterly census, there
were 197,718 contractor personnel working on its contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan as of April 2008. However, DOD did not routinely evaluate the
data for accuracy and the number of local nationals working on contracts may
be underreported. Neither State nor USAID had systems in place during our
review period to track the number of contractor personnel. As a result, they
could not provide complete personnel data. For example, while State and
USAID had information from their contractors on the number of personnel
performing security and demining functions in Afghanistan, they did not have
similar information on personnel performing other functions in Afghanistan.
According to DOD and State officials, information on killed and wounded
contractor personnel was not systematically tracked, which left them unable
to provide reliable or complete data. While USAID could not provide specifics
on its contractor personnel, USAID informed us that 206 individuals working
on its projects, including contractor personnel, had been killed or injured in
Iraq and Afghanistan during GAO’s review period. Data available from Labor
provides insight into the number of contractor personnel killed or injured as a
result of hostile actions, accidents, and other causes while working on U.S.
government contracts. Based on data provided by Labor, there were 455
reports received of contractors killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during the
period of our review and 15,787 reports of injuries. However, there may be
additional contractor deaths or injuries that were not reported to Labor.
In July 2008, the three agencies signed an MOU in which they agreed to use a
DOD database to collect and maintain information on contracts and
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, as
the agencies work together to implement the MOU, the agencies’ ability to
report on the number and value of contracts and the number of contractor
personnel should improve.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on GAO-09-19.
For more information, contact John Hutton at
(202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
1
Scope and Methodology
Summary
4
5
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
12
Appendix II
DOD Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
20
Appendix III
State Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
29
Appendix IV
USAID Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
34
Appendix V
Defense Base Act Cases for Contractor Personnel
Killed or Injured in Iraq and Afghanistan
39
Memorandum of Understanding on Contracting in
Iraq and Afghanistan
41
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
43
Appendix VI
Appendix VII
Tables
Table 1: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008
Table 2: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008
Page i
21
22
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Table 3: DOD’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(excluding task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and
the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Table 4: CENTCOM Quarterly Census of DOD Contractor
Personnel Performing Duties in Iraq and Afghanistan
Table 5: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008
Table 6: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008
Table 7: State’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(excluding task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and
the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Table 8: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008
Table 9: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008
Table 10: USAID’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(excluding task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and
the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Table 11: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq
and Afghanistan by Fiscal Year of Death or Injury, Fiscal
Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
24
25
30
31
32
35
36
37
39
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
October 1, 2008
Congressional Committees
As of July 2008, the Congress has approved a total of about $859 billion for
the military and diplomatic operations launched since 2001 as part of the
Global War on Terror. The majority of this amount has been provided for
Department of Defense (DOD) military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Most of the remaining funds have gone to DOD, Department of State, and
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts to
develop Iraq and Afghanistan’s infrastructure, improve their security
forces, and enhance their capacity to govern.1 DOD, State, and USAID have
relied extensively on contractors to support troops and civilian personnel
and to oversee and carry out reconstruction efforts. Contractors provide a
range of services—including but not limited to—interpretation/translation,
security, weapon systems maintenance, intelligence analysis, facility
operations support, and road construction—that relate to practically every
facet of U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The use of contractors to support U.S. military operations is not new, but
the number of contractors and the work they are performing in Iraq and
Afghanistan represent an increased reliance on contractors to carry out
agency missions. While recognizing the benefits of using contractors—
such as increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs—we and others
have noted the risks associated with the increased reliance on contractors
and the challenges that federal agencies have in managing the growing
1
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimated that about 94 percent of the funds
were for DOD and 6 percent were for foreign aid and embassy operations. CRS also
estimated that about 76 percent of the funds have been for efforts in Iraq and 20 percent for
Afghanistan. CRS, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11, RL33110 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008).
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
number of contractors and overseeing their performance.2 Having reliable
and meaningful data on contractors and the services they provide is
critical for agencies to effectively manage and oversee their contractors.
The Congress has taken a number of actions to increase oversight of
contracts. Among these, section 861 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 20083 required DOD, State, and USAID to sign a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) by July 1, 2008, regarding matters
relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, including maintaining
common databases that will provide the three agencies and the Congress
with information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq or
Afghanistan.
The Act also directs that we annually review DOD, State, and USAID
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan and report on this review each year
through 2010.4 The Act specifies that for each reporting period we provide
2
See GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on
Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, GAO-08-572T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008) and Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to
Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments, GAO-08-568T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008). See also, Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, Contracting in Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR 07-010T (Washington, D.C.:
May 10, 2007) and Department of Defense Inspector General, Challenges Impacting
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom Reported by Major Oversight
Organizations Beginning FY 2003 through FY 2007, D-2008-086 (Arlington, Va.:
July 18, 2008).
3
Pub. L. No. 110-181.
4
Pub. L. No. 110-181, §863. While the mandate and our report address DOD, State, and
USAID contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, other federal agencies such as the Departments
of Agriculture, Justice, and the Treasury have contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan that are not included in the scope of the mandate or our report.
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(1) the total number and value of contracts5 that were active and those that
were awarded6 for performance in Iraq or Afghanistan and the extent to
which those contracts used competitive procedures, (2) the total number
of contractor personnel that worked on those contracts, including those
performing security functions,7 and (3) the number of contractor
personnel killed or wounded. This first report provides the results of our
analyses of agency-reported data for fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008. We are also providing information on the status of the
agencies’ MOU as it relates to maintaining data on contracts and
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.
5
For the purposes of our annual report and the three agencies’ MOU, section 864 of the Act
defines a “contract in Iraq or Afghanistan” as “a contract with the Department of Defense,
the Department of State, or the United States Agency for International Development, a
subcontract at any tier issued under such a contract, or a task order or delivery order at
any tier issued under such a contract (including a contract, subcontract, or task order or
delivery order issued by another Government agency for the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International Development) if the
contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery order involves work performed in Iraq or
Afghanistan for a period longer than 14 days.” The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
defines a subcontract as a contract entered into by a subcontractor to furnish supplies or
services for performance of a prime contract or other subcontracts. The FAR defines a task
order as an order for services placed against an established contract or government
sources. For the purposes of this report, when we use the term contract, we intend it to
refer to a “contract in Iraq or Afghanistan” as defined in the act. However, due to
limitations in how the agencies track their contracts, we included in our analyses contracts
reported to us regardless of whether they had a performance period of more than 14 days.
Also, the agencies were unable to provide data on the number or value of individual
subcontracts.
6
Since the Act did not define what constitutes an “active” contract, we considered a
contract as active if an obligation or deobligation of funds was made on that contract in
fiscal year 2007 and/or the first half of fiscal year 2008. There are other contracts that had
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but had no obligations or
deobligations; these contracts were not included in our analyses. Contracts awarded in
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 are a subset of the active contracts.
7
Section 864 of the Act defines private security functions, in part, as the “guarding of
personnel, facilities or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a
third party” and “any other activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in
the performance of their duties.” This definition applies to contractors under a covered
contract in an area of combat operations. The Act requires us to report “the total number
of contractor personnel, on average, performing security functions.” However, the data
were not sufficiently reliable to calculate the average number of personnel providing
security functions.
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Scope and
Methodology
To address our first objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of active contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 and
the amount of funds obligated on those contracts.8 We also obtained data
on the extent to which contracts were competitively awarded during the
18-month period covered by this review. After taking steps to standardize
the data, such as removing duplicates, we compared the reported data to
selected contract files in the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan to assess
the reliability of what was reported. We determined that the reported
contract data were sufficiently reliable to establish the minimum number
of active and awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the
minimum number of competed contracts, for the period of our review.
To address our second objective, we obtained data from the three
agencies on the number of contractor personnel for the period of our
review and discussed with them how they collected and tracked these
data. To the extent that the agencies were able to provide contractor
personnel data, we compared that data to other sources, such as contract
data and information from contracting officers, to determine data
consistency and reasonableness. We concluded that the personnel data
were underreported. However, we are presenting the reported data along
with their limitations as they establish a minimum number of contractor
personnel and provide insight into the extent to which the agencies had
information on the number of contractor personnel during the period of
our review. Given the limitations we found, the data presented should not
be used to reach conclusions about the total number of contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For our third objective, we requested that agencies provide us with data
on the number of contractor personnel who had been killed or wounded
during the period of our review and we discussed with agency officials
how they collected these data. However, not all of the agencies were able
to provide complete data, but they did provide what data they had
available, which for one agency included data on individuals other than
contractor personnel. We are presenting the agencies’ data as they provide
insight into the extent to which the agencies had information on the
number of personnel killed or wounded. Because of the limitations
8
Amounts obligated in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 were used to
determine value as opposed to a contract’s total estimated cost or price ceiling, for
example, because obligations represent a specified sum of money that will require
government expenditures as opposed to estimates.
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associated with agencies’ data, they should not be used to reach
conclusions about the total number of contractor personnel killed or
wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the shortcomings in the three
agencies’ data, we obtained data from the Department of Labor9 on the
number of Defense Base Act cases for contractor personnel deaths and
injuries that occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period to
provide further insights on contractor casualties.10 To assess the reliability
of Labor’s data, we reviewed existing information about how the data are
collected and cases are processed and interviewed knowledgeable agency
officials. We determined that Labor’s data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report, but the data should not be relied on to determine
the total number of DOD, State, or USAID contractor personnel killed or
wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan.
To provide information on the status of DOD, State, and USAID’s MOU as
it relates to maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan, we obtained and reviewed a copy of the MOU. We also
met with officials from the three agencies to discuss plans for
implementing the MOU.
A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in
appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from March 2008
through August 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the
audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on
our audit objectives.
Summary
DOD, State, and USAID reported that they obligated at least $33.9 billion
during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 on
56,925 contracts with performance in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Almost
three-fourths of the reported obligations were for contracts with
9
The Defense Base Act requires all contractors that enter into contracts with the U.S.
government and their subcontractors to secure workers' compensation insurance for their
employees working overseas, including those who are not U.S. citizens. 42 U.S.C. §§ 165154. The Department of Labor administers the Defense Base Act.
10
Labor initiates a case when it receives a notice of an injury or death. These notices
include reports filed by employers and claims for benefits submitted by injured workers or
by their survivors.
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performance in Iraq, with DOD having significantly more obligations than
the other two agencies combined. The three agencies’ contracts were for
services and supplies related to efforts such as construction and capacity
building, as well as a range of support services for U.S. military forces and
other government personnel. Of the agencies’ active contracts, almost
97 percent were awarded during the 18-month review period. The extent
to which the agencies were required to compete these contracts depended
on where the contract was awarded and performed, its dollar value, and
the contracting method used. For all of the contracts awarded during the
review period, the agencies reported that about two-thirds were competed
to one extent or another. Competitively awarded contracts accounted for
almost 85 percent of the obligations on new awards. The agencies
reported using various competitive procedures, including full and open
competition and simplified acquisition procedures, such as competitions
among prequalified companies. However, DOD may have understated the
extent to which it competed new awards. Of the 85 files we reviewed in
Iraq and Afghanistan, we found 14 instances in which DOD reported that
the contract had not been competitively awarded but the files indicated
that competitive procedures were used to award the contract.
Complete and reliable data were not available for us to determine the total
number of contractor personnel, including those performing security
functions, who worked on DOD, State, and USAID contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008.11
During our review period, DOD initiated systems to track contractor
personnel at the prime and subcontract levels in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to its quarterly census, there were 197,718 contractor personnel
working on DOD contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan as of April 2008.
However, DOD officials explained that data obtained from the census
were not routinely evaluated for accuracy or completeness and there was
reason to believe that the number of local nationals working on contracts
was underreported. Additionally, DOD reported almost 25,000 individuals
working on security contracts, but based on information from DOD and
our analyses, that number also appears to be inaccurate with both
duplicate and missing personnel. Unlike DOD, State and USAID did not
have systems in place during the period we reviewed to track the number
of contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore could not
11
The term contractor personnel, as used throughout this report, refers to individuals,
regardless of nationality, working for a prime contractor or subcontractor at any tier.
Contractor personnel also include individuals who are working under personal services
contracts with a government agency.
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provide complete data on their contractor personnel. However, based on
queries made to their contractors, State reported that 7,192 contractor
personnel were working in Iraq and Afghanistan as of July 2008, while
USAID reported 5,150 contractor personnel as of early 2008. These
numbers understate the number of State and USAID contractor personnel.
For example, State’s numbers for Afghanistan only included personnel
performing security and demining functions. Similarly, USAID’s numbers
for Afghanistan only included personnel performing security functions,
with a USAID official acknowledging that not all contractors had
responded to the request for personnel data. Contractor personnel
performing other functions, such as police training, in Afghanistan were
not included in State or USAID’s numbers.
DOD, State, and USAID were unable to provide complete or specific
information on the number of contractor personnel who had been killed or
wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan during the period of our review. DOD and
State officials told us that information on killed or wounded contractor
personnel was not systematically maintained or tracked in a manner that
would allow the agencies to provide us reliable or complete data. Despite
the lack of systems for tracking such data, DOD and State provided what
information they had available on killed or wounded contractor personnel.
For example, State informed us that based on an inquiry of its contractors,
it was aware of 23 personnel who were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan
during 2007, but it did not have information on the number wounded.
USAID did have a process for tracking contractor personnel who were
killed or wounded. USAID informed us that 105 individuals working on
USAID programs in Iraq and Afghanistan had been killed and
101 individuals had been wounded or injured. However, USAID was
unable to specify how many of these individuals were contractor
personnel as opposed to individuals working on grants or otherwise
working to implement USAID programs. Department of Labor data
provide additional insight into the number of contractor casualties in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Labor maintains data on cases reported to it under the
Defense Base Act for contractor personnel killed or injured while working
on U.S. government contracts overseas, including those in Iraq and
Afghanistan. According to data provided by Labor, there were 455 cases of
contractor personnel killed and 15,787 cases of injuries in Iraq and
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Afghanistan during our review period.12 Deaths or injuries not reported to
Labor would not be included in its data, so according to Labor officials, it
is possible that the actual number of deaths or injuries in Iraq and
Afghanistan is higher than the number of Defense Base Act cases.
DOD, State, and USAID signed a MOU in July 2008, agreeing to use the
Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database13
to collect and maintain information on contracts and contractor personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the Act did not specify a minimum dollar
value threshold above which contracts should appear in the database, the
MOU established a $100,000 threshold. Pursuant to the MOU, DOD is
responsible for maintaining the SPOT database, but it is the responsibility
of each agency to ensure that information is accurately entered into SPOT.
DOD is already using SPOT to track information on some contractor
personnel. State has also started ensuring that its contractors enter data
on their personnel into SPOT and USAID is making plans to do so.
Because SPOT does not currently capture all contract and contractor
personnel data specified in the MOU, DOD officials informed us that they
have planned a number of upgrades over the next several months. These
include adding a field to indicate whether a contractor has been killed or
wounded and linking SPOT to an existing government wide database on
contracts so that data on contract value and competition do not have to be
entered separately into SPOT. According to DOD officials, as the agencies
work together to implement the MOU provisions and upgrades are made
to facilitate SPOT’s use and track required information, such as contractor
casualties, the agencies’ ability to report on the number and value of
contracts and the number of contractor personnel should improve.
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, and Labor for
review and comment. State and USAID provided technical comments,
which we incorporated into this report where appropriate, while DOD and
Labor had no comments.
12
The Act directs that we report on the number of wounded contractor personnel, but it
does not provide a definition of wounded. Defense Base Act cases may be for injuries that
occur while working under a U.S. government contract performed overseas and are not
limited to injuries that are the result of hostile action.
13
SPOT is a Web-based system initially created by DOD to provide greater visibility over
contractors deployed with U.S. forces. In January 2007, DOD designated SPOT as its
central repository for information on deployed contractors.
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Specific information on DOD contracts and contractor personnel can be
found in appendix II, on State contracts and contractor personnel in
appendix III, and on USAID contracts and contractor personnel in
appendix IV, while data from Labor on Defense Base Act claims can be
found in appendix V. Additional information regarding the agencies’ MOU
can be found in appendix VI.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, the Secretary of Labor, and interested
congressional committees. Copies will also be made available to others on
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix VII.
John Hutton
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
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List of Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Howard L. Berman
Chairman
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
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The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
Chairman
The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20081
(Act) directs GAO to review and report on specific elements related to
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State, and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In response to that mandate, we analyzed agency-reported
data for fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 regarding
(1) the number and value of DOD, State, and USAID contracts with work
in Iraq and Afghanistan and the extent to which that work was awarded
competitively, (2) the number of DOD, State, and USAID contractor
personnel, including those performing security functions, that worked on
those contracts, and (3) the number of contractor personnel that were
killed or wounded. We also reviewed the status of the agencies’
memorandum of understanding (MOU) as it relates to maintaining data on
contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan
To address our first objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of active and awarded contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, the
extent to which those contracts were competitively awarded, and the
amount of funds obligated on those contracts during the 18-month period
covered by our review.2 As we explain below, after we assessed the
contract data provided by each agency, we determined the data were
sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and
1
Pub. L. No. 110-181.
2
For the purposes of our annual report, section 864 of the Act defines a “contract in Iraq or
Afghanistan” as “a contract with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or
the United States Agency for International Development, a subcontract at any tier issued
under such a contract, or a task order or delivery order at any tier issued under such a
contract (including a contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery order issued by
another Government agency for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or
the United States Agency for International Development) if the contract, subcontract, or
task order or delivery order involves work performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a period
longer than 14 days.” The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a subcontract as a
contract entered into by a subcontractor to furnish supplies or services for performance of
a prime contract or other subcontracts. The FAR defines a task order as an order for
services placed against an established contract or government sources. For purposes of
this report, when we use the term contract, we intend it to refer to a “contract in Iraq or
Afghanistan” as defined in the Act. However, due to limitations in how the agencies track
their contracts, we included in our analyses contracts reported to us regardless of whether
they had a performance period of more than 14 days.
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
awarded contracts and obligation amounts,3 as well as the minimum
number of competed contracts, for the period of our review. We could not
rely on queries of the Federal Procurement Data System – Next
Generation (FPDS-NG), which is the federal government’s current system
for tracking information on contracting actions, as the primary source of
data for our review. This was the case, in part, because in a prior related
review we found that needed data were not always available from FPDSNG due to the way individual agencies were and were not reporting
individual contract actions.4 We found that this continued to be the case.
For example, individual contract actions by DOD’s Joint Contracting
Command—Iraq/Afghanistan, as well as some USAID actions, were not
entered into FPDS-NG. Also, we and others have reported on limitations
associated with FPDS-NG data.5
As the agencies provided us with their contract data, we took steps to
standardize their data to facilitate our analyses. This included removing
contracts with no obligations or deobligations during our period of
review,6 obligations that occurred outside the period of our review, and
duplicate contract actions. In some cases we excluded values when the
agencies reported the total estimated cost of the contract instead of
obligations to limit overstating the amounts obligated during the period of
3
Amounts obligated in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 were used to
determine contract value as opposed to a contract’s total estimated cost or price ceiling,
for example, because obligations represent a specified sum of money that will require
government expenditures as opposed to estimates.
4
GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,
GAO-07-40 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2006).
5
GAO, Improvements Needed to the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation,
GAO-05-960R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2005) and Acquisition Advisory Panel, Report of
the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the
United States Congress (Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
6
Since the Act did not define what constitutes an “active” contract, we considered a
contract as active if an obligation or deobligation of funds was made on that contract in
fiscal year 2007 and/or the first half of fiscal year 2008. There are other contracts that had
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but had no obligations or
deobligations; such contracts were not included in our analyses.
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
our review.7 Since the agencies used various numbering conventions to
identify contracts, orders, and modifications, we reformatted the data so
we could identify the unique contracts and orders and any associated
modifications. Additionally, we categorized the competition information
reported on contracts awarded during our review period. In many cases,
the agencies simply reported “yes” or “no” as to whether the contract was
competed, but in other cases they reported additional data on the extent of
competition, such as whether full and open competition occurred. If the
agencies reported any type of competition, such as full and open
competition or simplified acquisition procedures as defined in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, we categorized the contract as “competed.”8 We
categorized contracts for which agencies reported that competition did
not occur, such as those reported as sole source contracts, as “not
competed.” We categorized contracts for which the agencies either
provided no competition information or provided information that was not
sufficient to determine whether competition occurred as “not reported.”
In analyzing the reported contract data from the three agencies, we
identified the total number of contracts by counting the unique contracts
that had obligations each fiscal year. Since some contracts had obligations
in both fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, the number of
active contracts for the entire period of our review is lower than the
number of active contracts in fiscal year 2007 plus the number active in
the first half of fiscal year 2008. In counting the number of contracts, we
excluded the base contracts under which task orders were issued. This
was done, in part, because such base contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance of
each task order. All other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and
purchase orders were included in the count along with their associated
7
For some obligations, USAID did not indicate the fiscal year in which the obligation
occurred. In several of those cases, after consulting with USAID officials, we substituted
the contract start date for the obligation date. However, for some of the obligations, we
were unable to determine when they occurred and we, therefore, did not include those
obligations in our totals for either fiscal year 2007 or the first half of fiscal year 2008. Also,
for some of its contracts, the Navy reported the total obligated amount over the life of a
contract rather than the obligations for our review period. In those cases using the contract
numbers provided by the Navy, we replaced the obligation amounts and dates provided
with more detailed information from FPDS-NG.
8
In analyzing the agencies’ data on competition, we did not evaluate the acquisition strategy
used to award the contract actions, whether justifications for issuing awards
noncompetitively were adequate, or whether task orders were within the scope of the
underlying contract.
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
obligations. The agencies were unable to provide data on the number or
value of individual subcontracts and we were therefore unable to report
these totals as required by the Act.
To assess the reliability of the contract data each agency reported, we
matched the data on selected contract actions to information in the
agencies’ contract files. While we identified some discrepancies between
what the agencies reported and what appeared in the files, we determined
that the reported data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes when
presented with the appropriate caveats. The following is a summary of the
review of contract data and files conducted at each agency and our results:
•
DOD—Because DOD’s reported data came from multiple DOD
components, we selected actions for review from the components that
collectively represented 99 percent of the contracts and 98 percent of the
obligations reported to us.9
• For contracts awarded by the Joint Contracting Command—
Iraq/Afghanistan, we limited our random sample to contract actions
with contract files identified as being physically located in Baghdad or
Kabul. During the course of our file review in Baghdad, we learned that
some of the randomly selected actions could not be found or
accounted for, but we were able to review 44 actions. We were also
able to complete our review of 41 randomly selected files in Kabul. For
the 85 actions reviewed, we identified relatively few discrepancies
between the information in the files and the data reported to us, with
the exception of the competition data. As discussed in the report, we
identified cases in which competition was underreported.
• For contracts awarded by the Air Force and Navy, we randomly
selected 30 contract actions for each service and reviewed the
associated files on-line using DOD’s Electronic Document Access
(EDA) system to validate all of the information except that pertaining
to competition. Air Force and Navy officials sent us selected portions
of contract files so we could validate the reported competition
information. We identified some discrepancies pertaining to the
modification number and the obligation amounts but determined that
they were not significant enough to affect our count of contracts and
their associated obligations.
9
We did not attempt to validate the contract data reported by DOD’s Business
Transformation Agency, Counterintelligence Field Activity, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial Agency, Special
Operations Command, or Transportation Command as their contracts represented a small
portion of DOD’s total number of contracts and obligations.
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
•
•
For contracts awarded by the Army, we reviewed 30 randomly selected
contract actions in EDA and reviewed the associated on-line
documentation. We identified minor discrepancies between the
information in EDA and the information reported to us. However, we
did not separately assess the Army’s reported competition information.
For contracts awarded by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), we
took a different approach due to how DLA reported its data to us. We
assessed the reliability of DLA's data by reviewing information about
its data systems and interviewing an agency official knowledgeable
about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
for our purposes.
On the basis of our comparison of the reported data to the information
contained in DOD’s files, we determined that the DOD-reported data were
sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the minimum
number of competed contracts.
•
State—We reviewed files for 30 randomly selected contract actions
performed by State’s Office of Acquisition Management. This office
performed 20 percent of the contract actions and 80 percent of the
obligations reported to us. We identified very few discrepancies between
what was reported and what appeared in the files. As a result, we
determined that State’s reported data were sufficiently reliable to
determine the minimum number of active and awarded contracts and
obligation amounts, as well as the minimum number of competed
contracts.
•
USAID—For contracts awarded in Iraq, we compared 36 randomly
selected contract actions to information in files located at the USAID
mission in Baghdad. We identified very few discrepancies between what
was reported to us and what was in the files. For contracts awarded in
Afghanistan, we compared 56 randomly selected contract actions to
information in the files located at the USAID mission in Kabul. In
reviewing those files, we determined that 6 were outside the scope of our
review. For the remaining 50 actions, we identified very few discrepancies.
Based on our comparison of the reported data to the information
contained in USAID’s files, we determined that USAID’s reported data
were sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the minimum
number of competed contracts.
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Contractor Personnel
in Iraq and
Afghanistan
To address our second objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of U.S. nationals, third country nationals, and local
nationals working on contracts with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan
during the period of our review.10 These data included individuals reported
to be performing security functions.11 DOD provided us with data from the
U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) quarterly census and the
Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) databases.
We also reviewed relevant DOD orders and guidance related to the census
and SPOT. As we discuss in the report, State and USAID officials told us
they did not have data systems to track the number of personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan during our review period. However, they provided us with
data available from periodic inquiries they had sent to their contractors.
To the extent the agencies were able to provide contractor personnel data
for the period of our review,12 we compared that data to other sources,
such as contract data and information from contracting offices, to
determine data consistency and reasonableness. All three agencies
reported more active contracts than they provided personnel data for,
which led us to conclude that the personnel data were underreported. We
also identified discrepancies between the agencies’ reported data and the
data available from other sources. Furthermore, we discussed with agency
officials the limitations and challenges they experienced in obtaining
information on the number of contractor personnel, particularly for the
period of our review. We are presenting the reported data along with their
limitations as they establish a minimum number of contractor personnel
and provide insight into the extent to which the agencies had information
on the number of contractor personnel during the period of our review.
Given the limitations we found, the data presented should not be used to
reach conclusions about the total number of contractor personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan during our review period.
10
Third country nationals are individuals who are neither U.S., Iraq, nor Afghanistan
nationals. Local nationals, also referred to as host country nationals, are Iraqis or Afghanis
who are working on contracts in their respective countries.
11
Section 864 of the Act defines private security functions as the “guarding of personnel,
facilities, or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a third party”
and “any other activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in performance
of their duties.” This definition applies to contractors under a covered contract in an area
of combat operations.
12
The term contractor personnel, as used throughout this report, refers to individuals,
regardless of nationality, working for a prime contractor or subcontractor at any tier, as
well as individuals working under personal services contracts with a government agency.
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Killed or Wounded
Contractor Personnel
To address our third objective, we requested data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded during
the period of our review. After informing us they did not have a reliable
system for tracking contractor casualties, DOD officials directed us to use
the Department of Labor’s data on Defense Base Act (DBA) cases to
determine the number of killed or wounded contractor personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In addition, some DOD components provided us with
data they had available on killed or wounded contractor personnel, but we
could not independently verify the data they provided. Similarly, State
officials told us they did not have a data system to track contractor
personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during the period of
our review, but they provided what information they had available based
on contractor reports. USAID provided us with information on deaths and
injuries it had compiled from its implementing partners, including
contractors, in Iraq and Afghanistan but did not distinguish between
contractor personnel and others. While we did not establish the reliability
of the numbers provided to us by the agencies, we are nevertheless
providing them as they provide insight into the extent to which the
agencies had oversight of the number of personnel killed or wounded
during the period of our review. Because of the limitations associated with
the agencies’ data, they should not be used to reach conclusions about the
total number of DOD, State, or USAID contractor personnel killed or
wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We also obtained data from Labor on cases reported to it for contractor
injuries or deaths that occurred in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year
2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008. Labor provided us with data on
cases as of August 7, 2008, for injuries and deaths that occurred during the
period of our review.13 We assessed the reliability of Labor’s data by
reviewing existing information about the data and interviewing agency
officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for providing insight into the number of contractor
casualties when presented with the appropriate caveats. In tracking DBA
cases, Labor officials told us they do not collect information on the agency
or contract that claimants worked under and, therefore, could not identify
which injuries or deaths were sustained by contractor personnel working
on DOD, State, and USAID contracts. As a result, the data presented are
for contractor personnel, regardless of nationality, working under all U.S.
13
According to Labor officials, they typically report data on when the cases are filed instead
of when the incident that caused the death or injury occurred.
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
government agencies’ contracts—not just DOD, State, or USAID contracts.
Labor officials also explained that they do not track how deaths or injuries
occurred, so it is not possible to determine whether a death or injury was
the result of hostile actions, accidents, or natural and other causes. Labor’s
data, therefore, should not be relied on to determine the total number of
DOD, State, or USAID contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq or
Afghanistan.
Memorandum of
Understanding
To provide information on the status of DOD, State, and USAID’s MOU as
it relates to maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan, we obtained and reviewed a copy of the MOU. We also
met with senior DOD, State, and USAID officials to discuss plans for
implementing the MOU and making changes to the SPOT database.
Additionally, we talked with officials from all three agencies regarding the
use of SPOT and how they are or are not currently tracking the
information that will eventually be captured in SPOT.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 through August
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit
objectives.
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Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
This appendix provides information on the Department of Defense’s
(DOD) contracts, contractor personnel, and contractor personnel killed or
wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half
of fiscal year 2008. The first section of this appendix presents our analyses
of DOD-reported data on the number and value of contracts and the extent
to which these contracts were competed. In the second and third sections,
we present DOD-provided information on contractor personnel and the
number of killed or wounded contractor personnel, as well as some of the
limitations associated with that information.
DOD Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan
DOD reported at least $30.3 billion in obligations on 55,603 contracts
active in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008.1 As shown in table 1, there were nearly twice as many
contracts with performance in Iraq as in Afghanistan, and more than four
times more obligations on contracts performed in Iraq as in Afghanistan.
Some DOD contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan also
included work outside those two countries. For example, the Navy
reported multiple contracts with work in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United
States. Similarly, the Air Force reported that a number of its contracts
included performance in both Iraq and Kuwait. However, in such cases, it
was not possible based on the data reported to us to determine what
portion of the obligated amount was for work in Iraq or Afghanistan. As a
result, we counted contracts with performance in multiple countries and
their associated obligations with the Iraq contracts if DOD identified the
place of performance as including Iraq, but not Afghanistan. Similarly, we
counted contracts and their associated obligations with the Afghanistan
contracts if the place of performance included Afghanistan, but not Iraq.
For contracts with performance in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as
contracts where DOD indicated that performance was in Iraq or
Afghanistan but did not specify which country, we counted the contracts
and their associated obligations as “other.”
1
In counting the number of contracts, we excluded the base contracts under which task
orders were issued. This was done, in part, because the base contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each
task order. All other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and purchase orders are
included in the count along with their associated obligations. The count and obligations
also do not include small dollar purchases (below $3,000) made by DOD field ordering
officers as information on these purchases, while maintained in log books, has not been
tracked in DOD’s contracting systems.
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Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Table 1: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2008
Fiscal year 2007
Afghanistan
Iraq
First half of fiscal year 2008
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of
fiscal year 2008
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
12,743
$3,192.2
6,543
$1,903.6
18,889a
$5,095.7
$8,541.5
36,485
a
$22,723.7
a
$2,483.2
$30,302.6
24,667
$14,182.2
12,553
Other
149
$1,621.7
123
$861.5
229
Total
37,559
$18,996.0
19,219
$11,306.6
55,603a
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
a
Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008. As a result,
the total number of active contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the number
that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total
obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
DOD’s contracts, which were awarded by contract offices in the United
States and abroad, were for a variety of goods and services including
maintenance of DOD facilities, reconstruction, security, and supplies.
These goods and services were obtained using different contracting
methods. The majority of DOD contracts were purchase orders,2 but
purchase orders represented a relatively small amount of the reported
obligations. In contrast, DOD reported relatively few active task orders,
but nearly 70 percent of DOD’s obligations were for task orders. These
included orders against DOD logistic support contracts, such as the
Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract that
provides food service, housing, and other services for U.S. military
personnel in southwest and central Asia. The Army obligated more than $6
billion for a single LOGCAP task order during the period of our review.
While we were mandated to identify the total number and value of all DOD
contracts, which is defined to mean prime contracts, task orders, and
subcontracts at any tier, DOD was unable to provide data on the number
of subcontracts or information on the value of individual subcontracts
with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the period of our review,
2
Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (part 2.101), a purchase order is an offer by the
government to buy supplies or services, including construction and research and
development, upon specified terms and conditions, using simplified acquisition procedures.
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Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
DOD officials informed us that they did not track or maintain data on the
extent to which DOD contractors subcontracted portions of their work.
Furthermore, there was no requirement to do so. Although the number and
value of individual subcontracts cannot be determined from the data DOD
reported, the value of the subcontracted work is captured within the
amounts DOD obligated to its prime contractors.
Of the DOD contracts that were active in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, almost all of them
were awarded during that 18-month period (see table 2). These newly
awarded contracts accounted for approximately 60 percent of DOD’s
obligated funds. DOD’s remaining obligations were made on contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2006 or earlier.
Table 2: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan,
Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Fiscal year 2007
Afghanistan
Iraq
Other
Total
First half of fiscal year 2008
Number of
new awards
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
new awards
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
12,335
$1,946.9a
6,091
$820.4
23,559
$8,417.4
a
11,675
$3,257.9
113
$1,072.0a
69
$123.2
36,007
a
17,835
$4,201.5
$11,436.2
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
a
In addition to the obligations in fiscal year 2007, DOD obligated $2,474.8 million in the first half of
fiscal year 2008 on contracts that were awarded in fiscal year 2007.
The extent to which DOD was required to compete a contract depended
on where and for what purpose the contract is awarded and performed, its
dollar value, and the contracting method used. The level of competition
required for contracts (other than task orders) was determined based on
dollar thresholds established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
For contracts valued in excess of $1 million to be used in support of a
contingency operation and to be awarded and performed outside the
United States,3 DOD was required to conduct full and open competition.4
3
Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition threshold. The threshold is
lower for contracts awarded and performed in the United States, which were not in the
scope of our review.
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Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
FAR policy called for the use of simplified acquisition procedures, such as
standing price quotations and source lists, below that threshold.5 For
contracts valued below $25,000 to be used in support of a contingency
operation and to be awarded and performed outside the United States,6 the
FAR provided that award may be made without soliciting competitive
quotations if the price was determined to be reasonable.7 Pursuant to the
FAR,8 statutory and regulatory competition requirements did not apply to
the process of issuing task orders. However, where there were multiple
awardees under the underlying indefinite delivery contract, the FAR
required the contracting officer to provide each awardee a fair opportunity
to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000.9
Of the DOD contracts awarded in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal
year 2008, about two-thirds were competed to one extent or another. DOD
reported that of the 12,978 task orders issued, almost 95 percent were
issued competitively, which accounted for about 91 percent of obligations
on new task orders. For all other contracting methods, DOD reported
using competitive procedures about 57 percent of the time (see table 3).
These competitively awarded contracts (excluding task orders) accounted
for almost 78 percent of the obligations for new contract awards.
However, for the majority of the newly awarded contracts, DOD simply
indicated whether or not competition occurred without further specifying
the competitive procedures used. This is partially due to the fact that,
according to DOD contracting officials in Iraq and Afghanistan, the system
used to track contracts only allows them to select yes or no to indicate
competition.
4
Section 6.101 of the FAR implements the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
requirement for contracting officers to provide for full and open competition in awarding
government contracts. The FAR also implements exceptions to CICA that permit
contracting without providing for full and open competition where an appropriate
justification supports the use of such authority. FAR 6.302.
5
FAR 13.003 (a) and Subpart 13.1.
6
Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the micro-purchase threshold. The threshold is lower for
contracts awarded and performed in the United States, which were not in the scope of our
review.
7
FAR 13.201 (g) and 13.202 (a).
8
FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(ii).
9
FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(i).
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Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Table 3: DOD’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (excluding task
orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Number of
contracts
Percentage of
contracts
Obligation
amount Percentage of
(in millions)
obligations
Competed
23,478
57.3
$5,909.1
77.6
Not competed
15,474
37.8
$1,501.2
19.7
2,002
4.9
$203.1
2.7
Not reported
Total
40,954
$7,613.3
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
During the course of our file reviews in Iraq and Afghanistan, we found
evidence that, in some cases, DOD underreported the number of contracts
it had competitively awarded. Of the 85 files we reviewed, we found
14 instances in which DOD reported that the contract had not been
competitively awarded but the files indicated that competitive procedures
were used to award the contract. For example, for one contract that DOD
reported as not being competitively awarded, the file indicated that a
solicitation had been sent to multiple Afghani firms to compete for the
contract. DOD contracting officials attributed this underreporting to
multiple factors, including the lack of clear guidance on how to report
limited competition awards in their contracting system. Also, some DOD
contracting officials may have identified these competitively awarded
contracts as not competed because they were low value contracts for
which competition was not required.
DOD Contractor Personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan
In June 2007, DOD’s Central Command (CENTCOM) issued orders to
initiate a quarterly census of contractor personnel within its Area of
Responsibility, which includes Iraq and Afghanistan.10 This was done to
provide CENTCOM commanders with greater visibility over deployed
contractors and assist them in planning for protection, medical, and other
support for contractors. At the end of each quarter, DOD components are
to provide CENTCOM with contractor personnel information on active
service and construction contracts that have a period of performance
10
CENTCOM is one of DOD’s six geographic combatant commands. It is responsible for
overseeing U.S. military operations that take place in 27 nations located in the Horn of
Africa, the Arabian Gulf region, and Central Asia.
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Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
greater than 45 days. Information to be provided for each contract
includes services being provided by the contractor (such as security,
training, and transportation) and the numbers of U.S. citizens, third
country nationals, and local nationals employed on the contract at all tiers.
DOD officials informed us that data from the quarterly census represented
the best and most complete data available on DOD contractor personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan for the period of our review. As shown in table 4,
DOD reported that as of April 2008, 197,718 contractor personnel worked
on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.11
Table 4: CENTCOM Quarterly Census of DOD Contractor Personnel Performing
Duties in Iraq and Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Iraq
Total
As of November 2007
29,473
154,825
184,298
As of January 2008
36,520
163,591
200,111
As of April 2008
48,340
149,378
197,718
Source: CENTCOM census.
The census relies on contractor firms to self-report their personnel data.
According to DOD officials, when they receive the data they review it to
ensure that there are no obvious errors, but they do not routinely evaluate
the accuracy or completeness of the reported data. A senior DOD policy
official explained that conducting such an evaluation would be extremely
labor and time intensive. Additionally, DOD contracting officials in Iraq
and Afghanistan informed us that they have a limited ability to assess the
reported data, in part, because security concerns hinder their ability to
make on-site assessments. They told us they had reason to believe the data
on local nationals were more likely to be incomplete because the number
of local nationals working on contracts tends to fluctuate daily and local
firms do not always keep precise track of the number of individuals
working on their projects. In contrast, they explained that the number of
U.S. citizen and third country national contractor personnel was likely to
be more accurate as there tend to be fewer turnovers, which allows the
firms to more easily track those employees.
11
Per CENTCOM guidance, this number includes personnel working at the prime contract
level and subcontract levels.
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Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
CENTCOM initiated the census as an interim measure for obtaining data
on contractor personnel until DOD’s Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) was fully implemented. SPOT is a Web-based
system that facilitates the monitoring and control of contractor personnel
movement throughout a contingency area. SPOT enables the validation of
contractor personnel associated with specific contracts and subcontracts
by users of the system. In January 2007, SPOT was designated as DOD’s
primary system for collecting data on contractor personnel, regardless of
nationality, for contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces. The
requirement to enter data into SPOT excluded personnel hired under
contracts less than $25,000 and for which the period of performance was
less than 30 days. Under the phased implementation of SPOT, contractor
firms were to enter personnel data for contracts performed in Iraq and
Afghanistan by
•
•
•
November 1, 2007, for DOD security and translator/linguist service
contracts;
March 15, 2008, for DOD-funded construction, as well as external and
system support contracts; and
May 1, 2008, for other DOD-funded contracts.
According to the SPOT data provided by DOD, there were 24,499
individuals working on contracts identified as providing security services
in Iraq and Afghanistan as of July 2008. However, according to a senior
DOD official familiar with the data, this number could include personnel
performing functions other than armed security, such as information
technology security. Also, in providing us with the data, DOD informed us
that the number of individuals identified on these security contracts in
SPOT may be inflated by up to 19 percent due to duplicative reporting,
particularly for local and third country nationals.12 However, in our
analyses of the SPOT data, we found instances in which contractor
personnel performing security services appeared to be underreported.
Specifically, we identified 47 contracts categorized by CENTCOM as
security contracts that did not appear in SPOT but were listed in the
census as having at least 5,924 personnel during the second quarter of
fiscal year 2008.
12
DOD also informed us that for all contractor personnel, not just those performing security
functions, numbers in SPOT may be inflated by up to 7 percent.
Page 26
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Killed or Wounded DOD
Contractor Personnel
Senior DOD officials informed us that the department does not track the
number of contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded. As a
result, the department was unable to provide us with comprehensive data
on the number of contractor personnel who were killed or wounded in
Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year
2008. DOD directed us to the Department of Labor’s data on cases filed
under the Defense Base Act to obtain data on contractor casualties (see
app. V for data on these cases, which include deaths and injuries sustained
by DOD and other contractor personnel).
For most of the period of our review, DOD did not have a requirement to
track the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded. In January
2008, DOD issued a revised instruction13 directing DOD components to
submit casualty reports on all DOD contractor personnel outside the
continental United States who are injured, missing, or killed as the result
of hostile or nonhostile action or while accompanying armed forces in the
field.14 Information from the casualty report is to be entered into DOD’s
Defense Casualty Information Processing System. Additionally, in
November 2007, DOD’s Joint Staff updated its personnel manual to require
the combatant commands to submit casualty reports for overseas
contractor personnel who are declared dead, whereabouts unknown,
missing, ill, or injured.15 Information from these reports is to be entered
into the Joint Personnel Status Report. However, according to DOD
officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff,
the requirements in the instruction and manual are being phased in and
neither the casualty system nor the personnel reports currently contain
useful information for determining the overall number of DOD contractor
personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, neither
the quarterly census nor the current version of SPOT has a field for
recording information on killed or wounded contractor personnel.
13
Department of Defense Instruction 1300.18, Department of Defense Personnel Casualty
Matters, Policies, and Procedures, § 6.1.1 (Jan. 8, 2008). This instruction replaced the
December 2000 version, which did not address contractor casualties.
14
At their own discretion, the services and DOD components may also submit casualty
reports for DOD contractor personnel on travel status.
15
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.13B, Joint Reporting Structure Personnel Manual, Enclosure D, para. 10.r (Nov. 1, 2007). This manual replaced the
February 2005 version, which did not address contractor casualties.
Page 27
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Despite the lack of departmentwide data on the number of contractor
personnel killed or wounded, some DOD components provided us with
limited information. According to data provided by the Defense Logistics
Agency, 147 of its contractor personnel were killed, wounded, or missing
in Iraq and Afghanistan during the period of our review. However, the
Defense Logistics Agency noted that these data are based on
correspondence from the contractors and it does not maintain a database
on killed or wounded contractor personnel. Similarly, the Navy informed
us that based on inquiries to its contractors, none of its contractor
personnel had been killed or wounded. The Defense Intelligence Agency
also informed us that none of its contractor personnel had been killed or
wounded.
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
This appendix provides information on the State’s contracts, contractor
personnel, and contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008.
The first section of this appendix presents our analyses of State-reported
data on the number and value of contracts and the extent to which those
contracts were competed. In the second and third sections, we present
State-provided information on contractor personnel and the number of
killed or wounded contractor personnel, as well as some of the limitations
associated with that information.
State Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan
State reported at least $1.9 billion in obligations on 1,046 contracts with
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008.1 As shown in table 5, approximately 60 percent of
both the contracts and their associated obligations were for performance
in Iraq. While most of the remaining contracts and obligations were for
performance in Afghanistan, State also reported three contracts that had
performance in multiple countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan.
State’s contracts, which were primarily awarded by its headquarters
contracting office and posts in Iraq and Afghanistan, were for a variety of
goods and services, such as construction and poppy eradication. To obtain
these goods and services, State used different contracting methods. Most
of State’s active contracts—nearly 80 percent—were purchase orders. In
contrast, task orders accounted for 85 percent of State’s obligations during
our review period. Most notably, State obligated over $500 million for a
single task order, which accounted for more than one-quarter of its
obligations.
1
In counting the number of contracts, we excluded the base contracts under which task
orders were issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each task order.
All other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and purchase orders are included in the
count along with their associated obligations.
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Table 5: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2008
Fiscal year 2007
First half of fiscal year 2008
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of
fiscal year 2008
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
active
contracts
Afghanistan
319
$562.5
111
$215.0
422b
$777.4
Iraq
452
$986.3
191
$148.1
621b
$1,134.4
2
$1.7
2
$1.0
3b
$2.7
$364.1
b
$1,914.5
Othera
Total
773
$1,550.4
304
1,046
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
a
“Other” includes contracts that State reported as having performance in multiple countries, including
Iraq and/or Afghanistan.
b
Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008. As a result,
the total number of active contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the number
that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total
obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
While we were mandated to identify the total number and value of all State
contracts, which is defined to mean prime contracts, task orders, and
subcontracts at any tier, State was unable to provide data on the number
of subcontracts or information on the value of individual subcontracts
with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the period of our review,
State officials informed us that they did not track or maintain data on the
extent to which State contractors subcontracted portions of their work.
Furthermore, there was no requirement to do so. Although the number and
value of individual subcontracts cannot be determined from the data State
reported, the value of the subcontracted work is captured within the
amounts State obligated to its prime contractors.
Of the State contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, most were awarded in
that 18-month period (see table 6). However, these newly awarded
contracts accounted for a small percentage of State’s obligations. Of the
newly awarded contracts, 75 percent had obligations of less than $25,000
during our 18 month review period. Obligations on contracts awarded in
fiscal year 2006 or earlier accounted for more than 82 percent of State’s
obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008.
Page 30
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Table 6: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan,
Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Fiscal year 2007
Number of
new awards
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
new awards
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
299
$53.6b
101
$1.9
419
b
153
$21.6
Afghanistan
Iraq
Other
First half of fiscal year 2008
a
Total
$223.5
0
b
$0.0
1
$0.2
718
$277.1b
255
$23.7
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
a
“Other” includes contracts that State reported as having performance in multiple countries, including
Iraq and/or Afghanistan.
b
In addition to the obligations in fiscal year 2007, State obligated $31.3 million in the first half of fiscal
year 2008 on contracts that were awarded in fiscal year 2007.
The extent to which State was required to compete a contract depended
on where and for what purpose the contract was awarded and performed,
its dollar value, and the contracting method used. The level of competition
required for contracts (other than task orders) was determined based on
dollar thresholds established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
For contracts valued in excess of $1 million to be used in support of a
contingency operation and to be awarded and performed outside the
United States,2 State was required to conduct full and open competition.3
FAR policy called for the use of simplified acquisition procedures, such as
standing price quotations and source lists, below that threshold.4 For
contracts valued below $25,000 to be used in support of a contingency
operation and to be awarded and performed outside the United States,5 the
2
Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition threshold. The threshold is
lower for contracts awarded and performed in the United States, which were not in the
scope of our review.
3
Section 6.101 of the FAR implements the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
requirement for contracting officers to provide for full and open competition in awarding
government contracts. The FAR also implements exceptions to CICA that permit
contracting without providing for full and open competition where an appropriate
justification supports the use of such authority. FAR 6.302.
4
FAR 13.003 (a) and Subpart 13.1.
5
Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the micro-purchase threshold. The threshold is lower for
contracts awarded and performed in the United States, which were not in the scope of our
review.
Page 31
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
FAR provided that award may be made without soliciting competitive
quotations if the price was determined to be reasonable.6 Pursuant to the
FAR,7 statutory and regulatory competition requirements did not apply to
the process of issuing task orders. However, where there were multiple
awardees under the underlying indefinite delivery contract, the FAR
required the contracting officer to provide each awardee a fair opportunity
to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000.8
Of the State contracts awarded in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008, almost 61 percent were competed to one extent or
another. State reported that of the 110 task orders issued, 24 percent were
done so competitively. However, State did not report the extent of
competition for almost 52 percent of the orders issued during our review
period, which accounted for nearly 80 percent of its obligations on new
task orders. For all other contracting methods, State reported using
competitive procedures about two-thirds of the time (see table 7). For the
569 new contracts (excluding task orders) that State reported as
competed, the department generally reported using full and open
competition. However, for 5 percent of its contracts, State either did not
provide competition information or the information provided was not
sufficient to determine whether competition occurred.
Table 7: State’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (excluding task
orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Number of
contracts
Percentage of
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Percentage of
obligations
Competed
569
65.6
$61.1
55.7
Not competed
252
29.1
$39.4
35.9
46
5.3
$9.3
8.4
Not reported
Total
867
$109.7
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
6
FAR 13.201 (g) and 13.202 (a).
7
FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(ii).
8
FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(i).
Page 32
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
State Contractor Personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan
During fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, State did not
have a centralized system for tracking the number of contractor personnel.
As a result, State was unable to provide us with comprehensive data on
contractor personnel, including those performing security functions, in
Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. However, in response to
our request for data, State provided limited personnel data it had received
through inquiries made to its contractors. State reported that as of July
2008, 6,341 contractor personnel were working in Iraq and an additional
851 were working in Afghanistan. State’s contractor personnel are likely
understated. According to the information provided by State, these
contractor personnel were working on approximately 40 contracts in Iraq
and 3 in Afghanistan, which is considerably less than the number of active
contracts State reported to us. Of the contractor personnel State reported
to be working in Iraq, 73 percent were reported to be performing security
functions. However, of the contractor personnel in Afghanistan, 650 were
reported to be performing security functions while the remainder was
supporting demining efforts, which means that contractor personnel
performing other services in Afghanistan, such as construction and
translation, were not reported to us. We previously reported that for one
contract in Afghanistan, there were 540 contractor personnel training and
mentoring the Afghan national police as of April 2008—these personnel
were not included in the numbers State reported to us.9
Killed or Wounded State
Contractor Personnel
For the period of our review, State did not have a system to track the
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan.
State officials noted that they were not required to track such information,
but they were able to provide partial data on the number of contractor
personnel who had been killed or wounded. They indicated that the
information provided to us was the best available. In 2007, State sent an
inquiry to its contractors to obtain information on contractor deaths. In
response, State’s contractors reported that during fiscal year 2007,
23 contractor personnel had been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of these,
19 were reported to have been killed in Iraq. State officials explained that
they did not verify the information provided by contractors. Additionally,
they explained that they have not requested information on the number of
contractor deaths or the number of contractor personnel wounded in
fiscal year 2008.
9
GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure
Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security
Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).
Page 33
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
This appendix provides information on United States Agency for
International Development’s (USAID) contracts, contractor personnel, and
contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008. The first section of
this appendix presents our analyses of USAID-reported data on the
number and value of contracts and the extent to which those contracts
were competed. In the second and third sections, we present USAIDprovided information on contractor personnel and the number killed or
wounded, as well as some of the limitations associated with that
information.
USAID Contracts in Iraq
and Afghanistan
USAID reported at least $1.7 billion in obligations on 276 contracts active
in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal
year 2008.1 As shown in table 8, the number of contracts and obligations
were relatively equal for both Iraq and Afghanistan over the 18-month
period of our review. These contracts, which were primarily awarded by
USAID contract offices overseas, were for a range of goods and services,
such as building roads and supporting local governance programs. These
also include contracts for individuals to work as personal services
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 Eighty-three percent of USAID’s
active contracts were stand-alone contracts, which made up
approximately 43 percent of USAID’s obligations. In comparison, task
orders made up 12 percent of USAID’s active contracts but accounted for
45 percent of its obligations.
1
In counting the number of contracts, we excluded the base contracts under which task
orders were issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each task order.
All other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and purchase orders are included in the
count along with their associated obligations.
2
USAID is authorized under §636 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Pub. L. No. 87-195)
to contract for personal services. The FAR (Part 2.101) defines personal services contracts
as contracts that, by their express terms or as administered, make the contractor personnel
appear to be, in effect, government employees.
Page 34
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Table 8: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2008
Fiscal year 2007
First half of fiscal year 2008
Fiscal year 2007 and first half
of fiscal year 2008
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number of
active
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Afghanistan
99
$427.5
82
$529.8
154a
$957.3
Iraq
91
$767.4
35
$43.5
122a
$810.9
$573.3
a
$1,768.1
Total
190
$1,194.8
117
276
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
a
Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008. As a result,
the total number of active contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the number
that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total
obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
While we were mandated to identify the total number and value of all
USAID contracts, which is defined to mean prime contracts, task orders,
and subcontracts at any tier, USAID was unable to provide data on the
number of subcontracts or information on the value of individual
subcontracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. USAID officials,
who noted that there was no requirement to do so, explained that they did
not track or centrally maintain data on the extent to which USAID
contractors subcontracted portions of their work. However, they noted
that some individual contract files contain information on subcontracts
but that information is not readily available. Although the number and
value of individual subcontracts cannot be determined from the data
USAID reported, the value of the subcontracted work is captured within
the amounts USAID obligated to its prime contractors.
Of the USAID contracts that were active in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, two-thirds were
awarded during that 18-month period (see table 9). However, the majority
of USAID’s obligations were made on contracts awarded in fiscal year
2006 or earlier. In fiscal year 2007, newly awarded contracts accounted for
one-quarter of the obligations, while newly awarded contracts accounted
for only 17 percent of the obligations in the first half of fiscal year 2008.
Page 35
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Table 9: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan,
Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Fiscal year 2007
First half of fiscal year 2008
Number
of new
awards
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Number
of new
awards
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
66
$70.9a
46
$56.8
43
a
21
$38.1
a
67
$94.8
Afghanistan
Iraq
Total
109
$227.0
$297.9
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
a
In addition to the obligations in fiscal year 2007, USAID obligated $100.2 million in the first half of
fiscal year 2008 on contracts that were awarded in fiscal year 2007.
The extent to which USAID was required to compete a contract depended
on where and for what purpose the contract is awarded and performed, its
dollar value, and the contracting method used. The level of competition
required for contracts (other than task orders) was determined based on
dollar thresholds established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
For contracts valued in excess of $1 million to be used in support of a
contingency operation and to be awarded and performed outside the
United States,3 USAID was required to conduct full and open competition.4
FAR policy called for the use of simplified acquisition procedures, such as
standing price quotations and source lists, below that threshold.5 For
contracts valued below $25,000 to be used in support of a contingency
operation and to be awarded and performed outside the United States,6 the
FAR provided that award may be made without soliciting competitive
3
Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition threshold. The threshold is
lower for contracts awarded and performed in the United States, which were not in the
scope of our review.
4
Section 6.101 of the FAR implements the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
requirement for contracting officers to provide for full and open competition in awarding
government contracts. The FAR also implements exceptions to CICA that permit
contracting without providing for full and open competition where an appropriate
justification supports the use of such authority. FAR 6.302.
5
FAR 13.003 (a) and Subpart 13.1.
6
Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the micro-purchase threshold. The threshold is lower for
contracts awarded and performed in the United States, which were not in the scope of our
review.
Page 36
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
quotations if the price was determined to be reasonable.7 Pursuant to the
FAR,8 statutory and regulatory competition requirements did not apply to
the process of issuing task orders. However, where there were multiple
awardees under the underlying indefinite delivery contract, the FAR
required the contracting officer to provide each awardee a fair opportunity
to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000.9
Of the USAID contracts awarded in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008, almost 97 percent were competed to one extent or
another. USAID reported that it competitively issued all six of its task
orders with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For all other contracting
methods, USAID reported using competitive procedures 97 percent of the
time (see table 10). For the new 175 contracts (excluding task orders) that
USAID reported as competed, 12 were reported as awarded under full and
open competition and 2 were awarded under simplified acquisition
procedures. For the rest of the competed contracts, USAID only indicated
that the contracts were competed without indicating the extent.
Table 10: USAID’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (excluding task
orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008
Number of
contracts
Percentage of
contracts
Obligation
amount
(in millions)
Percentage of
obligations
175
96.7
$474.4
99.5
6
3.2
$2.6
0.5
Competed
Not competed
Total
181
$476.9
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
USAID Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan
During fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, USAID did not
have a centralized system for tracking the number of contractor personnel.
However, USAID officials explained they had made efforts to collect data
on contractor personnel performing security functions in Iraq and
Afghanistan. USAID made periodic inquiries of its contractors to obtain
personnel information. As a result, USAID was able to provide us with
some data on the number of security contractors but could only provide
7
FAR 13.201 (g) and 13.202 (a).
8
FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(ii).
9
FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(i).
Page 37
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan
limited data on personnel performing other functions. USAID reported
that, as of February 2008, 1,975 contractor personnel worked on contracts
in Iraq and 840 of those individuals performed security functions. For
Afghanistan, USAID reported that as of April 2008 there were
3,175 contractor personnel, all of whom performed security functions.
USAID contractor personnel data are likely underreported as they reflect
contractor personnel working on 50 contracts, which is less than the
276 active contracts USAID reported to us. Also, USAID officials identified
a number of limitations associated with the data provided to us. According
to a senior USAID official in Afghanistan, not all of the contractor firms
responded to USAID’s request for data on contractor personnel and no
effort was made to verify the information that was reported. Nevertheless,
he explained that these data were the best available. Similarly, USAID
officials in Iraq told us they were unable to verify the completeness or
accuracy of the number reported to us.
Killed or Wounded USAID
Contractor Personnel
For the period of our review, USAID relied on reports from its
implementing partners, which include contractors, to maintain a count of
the number of individuals that had been killed or wounded while working
on USAID programs. In providing us with the information from those
reports, USAID was unable to specify how many of these individuals were
contractor personnel as opposed to individuals working on grants or
otherwise working to implement USAID programs. USAID informed us
that in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, 22 individuals
had been killed in Iraq and 83 had been killed in Afghanistan. An additional
18 individuals were reported wounded in Iraq and 83 were reported
injured or disabled in Afghanistan. In providing the information on
individuals killed or injured in Afghanistan, USAID noted that several
deaths and injuries were the result of traffic accidents.
Page 38
GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix V: Defense Base Act Cases for
Contractor Personnel Killed or Injured in
Iraq and Afghanistan
Appendix V: Defense Base Act Cases for
Contractor Personnel Killed or Injured in Iraq
and Afghanistan
The Congress enacted the Defense Base Act (DBA) in 1941 to provide
workers’ compensation protection to employees of government
contractors working at U.S. defense bases overseas. Subsequent
amendments to DBA extended coverage to other classes of government
contractor employees. The insurance required under DBA provides
employees with uniform levels of disability and medical benefits or—in
the event of death—provides benefits to eligible dependents. Contractors,
including subcontractors, are required to provide DBA insurance to all of
their employees regardless of nationality, working outside the United
States on U.S. military bases or under a contract with the U.S. government
for public works or for national defense. The Department of Labor
administers DBA and, as such, maintains data on the number of deaths and
injuries reported to it.1
According to Labor, there were 16,242 cases for deaths or injuries that
occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008 (see table 11). Of these, 455 were deaths and 15,787 were
injuries. The majority of the injuries reported involved incidents that did
not result in contractor personnel missing work. Nearly 85 percent of the
cases were for deaths or injuries that occurred in Iraq.
Table 11: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan
by Fiscal Year of Death or Injury, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2008
Afghanistan
Iraq
Fiscal year
2007
First half fiscal
year 2008
Fiscal year
2007
First half fiscal
year 2008
Deaths
40
12
337
66
Injuries
1,962
567
9,148
4,110
Source: GAO analysis of Labor data.
Note: Cases may be for contractor personnel who are under contract with U.S. government agencies
other than DOD, State, and USAID.
DBA cases are likely to represent the minimum number of contractor
deaths and injuries that occurred during our review period. Labor officials
told us that a DBA case record is created in their database once they are
notified of a contractor death or injury. However, they informed us that
1
Labor initiates a case when it receives a notice of a death or injury. Notices include reports
filed by employers and claims for benefits submitted by injured workers or by their
survivors.
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix V: Defense Base Act Cases for
Contractor Personnel Killed or Injured in
Iraq and Afghanistan
there may be contractor deaths or injuries that are not reported and, as a
result, do not appear in Labor’s data. They stated it is more likely that
injuries to local and third country nationals, particularly those working on
subcontracts, are underreported. They noted that there have been a
number of efforts to help ensure that all contractor personnel, regardless
of nationality, are aware of their rights under DBA and are encouraged to
claim benefits as appropriate.
In tracking DBA deaths and injuries, Labor does not collect information on
the agency or contract that the contractor personnel worked under and
therefore could not identify which claims were made by contractor
personnel working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts. Labor also does
not maintain data on how deaths and injuries occurred, so it is not
possible to determine whether a death or injury was the result of hostile
actions, accidents, or natural and other causes. Such information can only
be obtained by reviewing individual case files.
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix VI: Memorandum of Understanding
on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Appendix VI: Memorandum of Understanding
on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Act) directed
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to sign a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan.1 The law specified a number of matters to be covered in the
MOU, including the identification of each agency’s roles and
responsibilities for matters relating to contracting in Iraq or Afghanistan,
responsibility for establishing procedures for the movement of contractor
personnel in the two countries, and identifying common databases that
will serve as repositories of information on contracts and contractor
personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. After negotiations between the
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State, and USAID were
completed, the final signature was added to the MOU on July 10, 2008. No
later than 120 days after signing the MOU, the three agencies are required
to issue policies or guidance and develop regulations, as necessary, to
implement the MOU at their respective agencies.
In the MOU provisions regarding the identification of common databases
for contracts and contractor personnel, the three agencies agreed that
DOD’s Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)
database will be the system of record for the contract and contractor
personnel information required by section 861. The MOU specified that
SPOT will include information on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan with
performance periods of more than 14 days or valued at more than $100,000
and their associated personnel, as appropriate. While the Act specified the
14 days or more threshold, it did not specify a minimum dollar value
threshold regarding which contracts should appear in the database.
According to the MOU, DOD is responsible for all maintenance and
upgrades to SPOT, which it originally designed and used. Each agency will
be responsible for ensuring that data elements related to contractor
personnel, such as the number of personnel employed on contracts in Iraq
or Afghanistan, are entered into the system and for requiring its
contractors to input that information accurately. Other data elements that
are related to the contract, such as the value of the contract and whether it
was awarded competitively, will be pulled into SPOT from the Federal
Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which is the
federal government’s current system for tracking information on
contracting actions.
1
Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861.
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix VI: Memorandum of Understanding
on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
The three agencies are at various stages in implementing and using SPOT.
DOD has been using SPOT since early 2007 to track its contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has drafted new instructions that
detail the requirements for the expanded use of SPOT by contractors to
conform with the Act and MOU. DOD officials explained that as is
currently the case, contractors will be required to enter information on
their contractor personnel into SPOT once the DOD contracting officer
enters the contract number into the system. In terms of ensuring that
contract information is pulled into SPOT, information on individual
contracts awarded by DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan are not currently
entered into FPDS-NG. However, DOD officials told us that there are plans
underway to ensure that information on these contracts is entered into
FPDS-NG so their information can be pulled into SPOT. State officials told
us that they have been using SPOT on a limited basis as part of a pilot
program, but they expect information on State’s contracts and contractors
to be entered into SPOT by early November 2008. USAID and its
contractors have not started using SPOT. According to USAID officials,
they are currently working to educate contractors on the use of SPOT.
USAID is initially focusing on contractors that have large security
subcontracts and will then focus on all other contractors with security
subcontracts. While USAID officials were uncertain as to when its
contractors will start entering data into SPOT, they stated that they fully
expect to comply with the provisions of the MOU.
DOD has already begun taking actions to have SPOT ready to fulfill the
MOU. Plans have been developed to add new fields to SPOT, specifically
to record information on contractor personnel who have been killed or
wounded. According to DOD officials, as the agencies work together to
implement the provisions of the MOU and upgrades are made to SPOT to
facilitate its use and track required information, such as contractor
casualties, the ability of the agencies to report on the number and value of
contracts, as well as on the number of contractor personnel, will improve.
Similarly, State officials indicated that having a centralized system for
tracking contractor personnel will be beneficial as it will reduce concerns
about limited visibility over contractors and allow the department to more
readily respond to requests for contract and contractor personnel
information.
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
John Hutton (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant Director;
Jessica M. Berkholtz; E. Brandon Booth; Brendan S. Culley; Art James, Jr.;
Lisa A. McMillen; Jean McSween, and Karen Thornton made key
contributions to this report.
(120724)
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GAO-09-19 Contingency Contracting
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