joint
mag 18
Perspectives on German-African futures
April 2011
Crossing the Line
Migration and Migration Policies
Editors: Alexander Schwartz, Julian Bergmann,
Linda Poppe Editorial Team: K. Asante,
J. Bergmann, M. Gatobu, L. Tsebe,
B. Zasche, L. /Narib
AVAILABLE ONLINE:
www.bpb.de
CONTACT US:
goafrica@bpb.de
]
in this issue
3 Editorial
]
joint
mag 18
Perspectives on German-African futures
4 A History of Immigration and Migration
sustainable
partnerships
Policies in Germany
7 New Regulations for an Old Phenomenon Regional Migration in West Africa
11 Alumni Profile : Chidiogo Akunyili
THE JM TEAM
EDITORS: Alexander Schwartz, Julian Bergmann, Linda Poppe // Editorial Team: K. Asante, J. Bergmann, M. Gatobu, L.
Tsebe, B. Zasche
LAYOUT & DESIGN: Leitago /Narib
PHOTOGRAPHS: Leitago /Narib, Go Africa Go Germany Community, Flickr
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EDITORIAL
]
Dear Reader,
No less than 200 million people around the world, it is safe to estimate,
will decide to or be forced to move to another country during 2011.
As Kristin Heinig explains in her article, after decades of hot tempered
debate, Germany is only just beginnig to accept its role as a country
of immigration. Meanwhile, West Africa has dealt with migration rather
more pragmatically in the past, a stance, which is becoming subject to a
substantial shift, migration-expert Dr. Laurence Marfaing tells us in our
interview. In the Alumni profile, Chidiogo Akunyili reflects on personal
motives for migration.
Best,
Your JointMAG Team
Julian Bergmann, Linda Poppe, and Alexander Schwartz
Editors
CALL
FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
JM 20 - ENERGY
Energy has for a long time been a crucial issue in national and world politics. Not only is it essential for
the growth of economies. Access to and generation of energy fundamentally affect individual living
conditions in an even larger number of aspects. Events like the nuclear crisis in Japan and projects like
Gilgel Gibe III in Ethiopia constantly spark debate about appropriate, fair, and responsible generation
and usage of energy.
Deadline for contributions is June 2nd.
jm 3
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
A History of Immigration and Migration
Policies in Germany
))Kristin Heinig
For a long time, Germany’s society has been shaped
by migratory movements. In the recent past particularly, several larger waves of migrants and refugees reached the country and thus strongly altered
its population structure.
After the end of World War II in 1945, about twelve
million refugees and expellees (“Vertriebene”) from
the former “Ostgebiete” (the eastern territories of
the German Reich, since 1945 part of Poland and
Russia) have been successfully integrated into society – despite all the hardships of the post-war period, caused by twelve years of national-socialist dictatorship and war. Additionally, some three million
citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
had been fleeing to West Germany before the Berlin
Wall was built in 1961. In a country suffering from the
demographic consequences of a destructive war, the
economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s would not
have been possible without those millions of ‘ethnic
Germans’ from Eastern Europe
and the GDR, moving to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
in the aftermath of the war. The
further high labour demand of
the flourishing German industry
could only be met by the temporary recruitment of the so-called
‘guest workers’ (“Gastarbeiter”):
In 1955, Germany signed the first
© Bundesbildstelle
recruitment treaty with Italy, setting the starting point for a development that would shape the country until today.
Treaties with several other Mediterranean countries
followed, among them Spain,Turkey and former Yugoslavia. The ‘principle of rotation’ was meant to ensure
the return of the migrant workers to their respective
home countries after a few years of work.
But even if they did so for the most part, and the
myth of a return to the home countries stayed alive
in the minds of many guest workers as well as German politicians, it soon became apparent that the
temporary migration was swiftly transformed into
a more permanent situation of immigration. When
jm 4
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
the economic crisis reached Germany in 1973, the
influx of foreign workers was immediately stopped by
a ‘recruitment ban’. Ironically, this motivated the remaining guest workers to stay and bring their families,
with family reunification leading to another, though
unintended increase in immigration: In the mid-1970s,
around 4 million foreigners lived in Germany, constituting more than 6 % of the population.
Notwithstanding the virtual presence of millions of
foreigners in the country, German policy makers did
not actively seek to create a consistent policy framework for migrants and to implement policy tools towards immigration and the integration of migrants.
“Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland” (‘Germany is not a country of immigration’) was the incontestable doctrine of large parts of the German population as well as of its politicians. In contrast to the
‘ethnic German’ refugees who arrived in Germany
after WWII, access to political and citizenship rights
and to a secure residence status was highly
restricted for many
foreigners, even if they
had lived in the country for decades. For a
long time, Germany’s
policies towards immigration and citizenship
have been dominated
by an ethnocultural nationalism, apparent for
example in the fact that citizenship could only be inherited by descent. This principle called ius sanguinis
contrasts sharply with the policies of many traditional countries of immigration, where citizenship can be
acquired by birth or duration of residence (ius soli).
This has led to an enduring exclusion of migrants e.g.
from political participation.
When more and more asylum seekers were coming to Germany from the 1980s onwards, the tone
of the public anti-immigration-debate grew harsher:
Xenophobia spread amongst the population, fueled
by parts of the German media and populist politi-
cians, and claims for a more restrictive policy gained
ground. In addition, the dramatic changes in the international political landscape around 1989/90 caused
another unexpected rise in the number of migrants:
After reunification, hundreds of thousands of the socalled “Aussiedler” (ethnic Germans from the former
Eastern Bloc) made use of their right to ‘return’ to
Germany. Moreover, the number of asylum seekers,
now mainly coming from Eastern Europe, rose to
more than 400 000 per year in the early 1990s (in
comparison: in the same time, Great Britain counted
around 30 000 asylum applicants per annum).This development was accompanied by a dramatic increase
in violence against foreigners, arising for example in
Rostock-Lichtenhagen where the neighborhood’s
residents applauded when a xenophobic mob attacked a home for asylum seekers with petrol bombs
and stones. As a result of the ongoing and partly aggressive debate on how to deal with the high number of refugees, the right to asylum, anchored among
the fundamental rights of the German constitution,
was restricted in 1993 by introducing the category
of the so-called ‘safe countries of origin’. According
to this legal provision, people coming from a country
classified as safe can not be granted asylum, irrespective of their individual fate. Since then, the number
of asylum seekers dropped heavily. Today, mainly the
countries at the exterior borders of the European
Union (EU) have to deal with the arrival of refugees
and asylum seekers. Countries like Germany, which
are in a comfortable position in the centre of Europe,
are not particularly willing to assume responsibility.
By the end of the 1990s, the member states of the
EU set the goal of a common asylum and immigration
policy, but the interests of the member countries are
heterogeneous on this topic and therefore, the process of harmonisation is quite slow. Consensus only
© Deutsches Bundesarchiv
jm 5
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
exists over the repression of illegal migration at the
edges of the continent.
Despite all these restrictions, the accumulative effect
of the continuous waves of migrants and refugees has
deeply transformed the German society.Today, nearly
20 % of the population have a ‘migration background’
(“Migrationshintergrund”), a term applied by German
bureaucrats to describe people who migrated to
Germany since 1950 and their descendants. In 2009,
the Federal Statistical Office counted more than 16
million migrants and people who descend from migrants – undeniably, Germany is a multi-ethnic country (although regional disparities are high). But it took
years to adjust the country’s self-image as a non-immigration country to the realities of a cultural pluralist society at least slightly. Nowadays, a partial shift
in the orientation of Germany’s immigration policies
has taken place, in part due to the insight that the
country will otherwise suffer from demographic and
skills shortages. Whilst the introduction of a pointsbased entry system for high-skilled migrants is still
discussed, significant changes have already taken place
in the field of citizenship and integration. Since the
mid-1990s, it came to a gradual liberalisation of the
citizenship law with the introduction of certain elements of a ius soli, making the acquisition of German
citizenship easier. Moreover, steps have been taken to
facilitate the integration of newly arriving migrants,
above all by the indroduction of integration courses which provide a basic knowledge of the German
language, of the country’s legal system and society.
Thirdly, political decision-makers try to tackle problems of discrimination and exclusion, namely by the
introduction of an anti-discrimination law and by the
removal of certain legal disadvantages (e.g. concerning the recognition of foreign associate degrees).
But still, this slight liberalisation is accompanied by
ethnocultural debates on the German “Leitkultur”
(‘guiding culture’), claiming the necessity of a more or
less complete adoption of indigenous German values
by migrants. Discussions on integration stay rather
demanding, and cultural pluralism is not (yet) taken
for granted, especially when it comes to Muslim migrants, whose position is often exploited in populist
debates on the incompatibility of the occidental heritage with non-western migrant cultures. Concerning the social and economic integration, statistically,
people with a ‘migration background’ are generally
situated within a poorer socio-economic position,
mainly caused by lower educational outcomes, lower
incomes and a higher risk of unemployment.
But despite those rather depressing findings of the
population census, there are more and more encouraging examples of migrants and their descendants in
Germany who take over important positions and –
once again – shape the picture of this country. Modern societies are pluralist societies (not only in terms
of migration), and it is our choice whether we face
this diversity with anxiety or open-mindedness. But
in a liberal and democratic society, the discrimination of people on grounds of their social and cultural
background is unacceptable, and it is our responsibility to fight all forms of exclusion and to open up opportunities of participation for all inhabitants without
exception. The outcome of these efforts can only be
positive: Societies do not develop because of unifor-
mity, and we should rather concentrate on chances
and benefits that will evolve from a democratic approach towards diversity.
More information on Germany’s history of migration
and immigration policies, see: Klaus J. Bade (2002)
„Europa in Bewegung“ and other of Bade’s publications,
Ulrich Herbert (2003) “Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland”.
Anglophone experts on this topic are Rogers Brubaker (e.g.“Citizenship and Nationhood in France
and Germany”, 1992) and Simon Green (e.g. “The
Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration
Policy in Contemporary Germany”, 2004).
Kerstin Heinig
Kristin Heinig is an alumni of the 3rd Go Africa… Go
Germany programme. She is currently working as a
project coordinator for civic education and support
of civic commitment in “Saxon Switzerland”, a region
that became known as a stronghold of right-wing extremism in eastern Germany. She has studied cultural
studies, political science and African history in Leipzig
and Paris. During the last years, she worked voluntarily on different projects in the field of migration
and refugees.
© Zeca-schall
jm 6
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
New Regulations for an Old Phenomenon
- Regional Migration in West Africa
Dr. Laurence Marfaing is a research fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area
Studies in Hamburg. She has produced an ample number of publications focussing on migration in West Africa, trans-locality in the Sahara-Sahel region, and the informal sector.
In her most current research project, she investigates the interaction between Chinese
entrepreneurial migrants and local traders in Ghana and Senegal. For a comprehensive
list of research projects and publications, see http://www.giga-hamburg.de/english/
index.php?folder=staff/marfaing&file=marfaing_en.html.
))Laurence Marfaing
))Alexander Schwartz
JointMAG: Dr. Marfaing, your research focus
is on regional migration in West Africa. Information and
scientific studies on this subject seem rather hard to
come by. Why do you think this is?
Laurence Marfaing: This is exactly what
time of productive work to the whole year. The second group are largely professional craftspeople, who
are looking for better job opportunities in other countries. For example, there are a lot of craft professions
in Senegal, but less so in Mauritania. There is a further
group migrating from countries marked by political
instability, which makes it structurally difficult to find
work there – currently one could name Togo, Cameroun or Côte d’Ivoire. The fourth group consists of wellskilled people who go to work in countries, where
there is less access to professional training as is the
case in Mali or Mauritania, where there is an additional
lack of francophone professionals.
I have asked some of my West African colleagues. They
said funds were almost exclusively being granted for
research on illegal migration to Europe. I find this difficult to comprehend, especially as the free movement
of people seems to work rather well in West Africa –
and not only since it was adopted in the ECOWAS protocols. Demand for and supply of labour have always
regulated themselves in this region, which indeed
Most of the migrants intend to commute between
makes work on the subject worthwhile.
their home countries and the countries of residence,
You have just come back from a research project which is mostly also true for African migrants in Euin Senegal – how is the topic addressed there?
rope, if you ask them. Often people migrate without
their families or family members are assigned with
Close to not at all. As immigrants have always establishing trade networks with the countries of oriplayed such a big part in the Senegalese economy, gin. For example, a Ghanaian fisher runs a small fishpeople take it for granted. Politically, it is only just ing business in Mauritania and his wife makes sure the
starting to become an issue.
refrigerated or dried fish arrives at its due destination.
It is a way of organizing business, family reunion at
Could you draw a general picture of regional mithe place of residence is, usually, not a goal in itself,
gration in West Africa?
because the migrants plan to return sooner or later
Regional migration is largely restricted to cer- anyway.
JM:
LM:
JM:
LM:
JM:
tain sections of the population. You can distinguish
You mentioned the ECOWAS policies concernfour groups of migrants: The first are people, who are
ing the Free Movement of People. Does this mean, that
occupied seasonally in their home countries, be it there are no barriers to migration in West Africa at all?
in farming or fishing, who are looking to extend the
jm 7
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
LM: Well, free movement does not necessarily
comprehensive law on migration in 2008, I think.
In Mauritania, it was adopted in June 2010, in Mali,
they are still discussing the bill. As I said, it had not
been much of a topic before.
include the permission to work or permanent establishment. People are officially allowed to move,
but after three months they have to register in order
to get these permissions. In reality, though, there is
Did the West African states have any interests to
no comprehensive monitoring instrument, only the introduce tighter regulation of their own or can you
occasional chicanery by security personnel at the exclusively ascribe the new policies to the EU’s pushborders, so you will not find too many registered ing in that direction?
people. Even on the official, political level this has
I can only really speak for Mali and Mauritanot been much of a topic until very recently.
nia, but I can tell you that these countries feel they
have to perform a balancing act between their own
What has changed?
economic demands and the guidelines for more
In 2006, the EU initiated the Conference on control laid down in Rabat. In these countries, miMigration and Development in Rabat, during which gration is not regarded as a problem, but as an enmany West African states have been declared transit richment – and by this I do not refer to culture or
countries. As such, they are obliged to deter “illegal” humanism. They simply need the work force. The
migrants from crossing their borders and introduce controls have been implemented solely because
better controls concerning the migration flows. In of the needs of Frontex [the EU agency for border
return, they receive logistic and financial support.
security, JM] and the European security discourse
the transit countries have to live up to. This whole
So consistent national strategies of migration discourse and the media-based depiction of poor
control in West Africa have only just come into exis“illegal migrants”, security issues, terrorism and contence in 2006...
cerns about transmission of illnesses, which has
Not even then. Senegal introduced the first come to the fore along with the new regulations,
JM:
LM:
JM:
LM:
JM:
LM:
jm 8
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
has drastically changed the perception of non-nationals in West Africa. Of course, people knew there
were migrants from other countries before, but they
were not regarded as “foreigners”.
Talking about interests, the main beneficiary of the
new laws has been the police, which is now entitled
to carry out more comprehensive controls. As you
can imagine, this is happily being taken as an opportunity to gain some extra money. I am not saying that, before Rabat, migrants had the freedom
to do whatever they wanted. There were laws and
corresponding controls in certain defined fields as
health, business and work permissions and so on.
Also, despite the Free Movement provisions people
were exposed to the occasional chicanery at the
borders. That, however, did not have anything to to
with migration control in general, it was blackmail,
basically. Everyone knew it was random and illegal.
a result, there is an aggravation of the economic and
health situation, which can turn economic migrants
into criminals. The Red Cross is rather lost, too, as
they are advised to attend refugees preferentially
to economic migrants, but were do you make the
distinction?
JM:
Has the change in policies and corresponding
new perception of “foreigners” led to an increase of xenophobia in the affected societies?
LM: As you might know, there was a coup d’état
in Mauritania in 2008. The slogan, which the then
coup leader and later president General Aziz came
up with, was “work for Mauritanians”, not foreigners. This, indeed, was something new, even though
it is difficult to tell, if it was related to the change
in migration policies. It was an obviously populist
speech, as the slogan does not make any sense as
long as there is not enough training and education in Mauritania. The young Mauritanians may be
This changed after the conference in Rabat. Espeslightly better trained than 20 years ago, but it concially in cities like Nouadhibou, which had a large
tinues to be a big problem, so foreigners are very
infrastructure for the departure of migrants until
welcome there, usually. General Aziz has continued
2007/08 when Frontex became more active in that
with these kinds of speeches and policies, though.
area, the police exploited the new legal backing by
tightening controls in neighborhoods with a high
Xenophobia is not a general trend in West African
ratio of foreigners. There were actual raids, where
politics, however. It works quite different for Mali,
police forces threatened inhabitants with arrest befor example, where the government says, if the forcause of illegal immigration in order to press money
eigners do better work than Malians – where is the
from people.
problem? Our people must learn to compete with
The population as well as the local economy in them.
JM:
these areas must be quite unsettled by this...
LM: Indeed. To give you an example: I had a re-
search project in Gao, which is close to the border
between Mali, Algeria, and Libya, on the so called
eastern route of illegal migration to Europe. There, it
has become a big problem that people cannot continue circulating, because they are being detained
at the border. Turns out, the area neither provides
for resources, nor infrastructure to accommodate all
these people. This way, migration becomes a security issue, of course. People do not have the opportunity to earn money, nor are they allowed to move
on, as it is assumed – rightly or not – they might be
illegal migrants on their way to Libya or Morocco. As
jm 9
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
JM: The Malians just accept that?
LM: Well, of course they claim the state does not
protect them, but it does not matter. It is the normal
discourse, which is similar in Senegal, by the way.
For example, the Senegalese ask the government
for help with regard to “unfair trade competition”
by foreigners, but remarkably, only in reference to
the Chinese foreigners. By no means would they ask
for protection from, say, Guineans working in transport. They simply belong there. The “foreigners” are
the Chinese.
JM: What kind of role does ECOWAS play in laying
down migration policies in the member countries?
ple like to think...
JM: So the EU’s worries about so called illegal miLM: This is another balancing act. Basic rule of gration
are largely exaggerated?
ECOWAS is the Free Movement of People and Goods
with the aim of yielding development potentials.
ECOWAS and the member states are dependent on
economic migration. However, as single ECOWAS
and UEMOA member states are (as transit countries)
instructed to tighten controls, there are now controls where there should not be any, from a regional
economic perspective.
LM: Let us say the debate about illegal migra-
tion to Europe is much bigger than its actual subject matter. As you said, overall numbers are hard to
come by, but it is estimated that about 70 per cent
of the migrants intend to stay in the region, only 10
to 15 per cent ever intend to go to Europe. Even less
of them actually try it. People would prefer to stay
From an economic perspective, it is often ar- in West Africa, but European politics seems to need
gued that the countries of origin suffer from the ef- the myth of a threat, in oder to stress issues of sefects of migration, due to brain drain, for example. On curity.
the other hand, remittances from abroad account for
a large share of families’ income. How do you estimate
A bit off-topic, but we cannot really discuss the
the economic effects for those countries?
issue of migration without mentioning the current
developments in North Africa. What kind of effects on
There is a huge scientific discussion about migrant movements will they bring about?
the remittances, but it is hard to tell. What strikes
The implications of the current developme, is the fact, that regional migration, compared
to migration to Europe, has become much more ments will be very interesting. I do not think peoimportant for the West Africans. Until it got so ex- ple have fully realized the extent of these political
tremely hard to get to Europe in 2004/05 and before turnovers with regard to migration. With the regime
the financial crisis, it was considered very attractive changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and – imminently – Libto have family members in Europe. However, peo- ya, Frontex is virtually no more capable of acting
ple have started to realize that a lot of the migrants at the northern African borders. Its efforts can only
in Europe are unemployed, unhappy, and unable concentrate on states like Mauritania now. In North
to send any money. On the other hand, there is Africa, Frontex is powerless, de facto non-existent.
an awareness of the advantages of being able to Even though, Europe is far from facing an “invasion”,
commute between the countries, which most of Gaddafi and others in his position very consciously
the African migrants in Europe cannot, due to high play that card. Due to a lack of support, they threatcosts, lack of documents etc. The families feel, the en with no longer controlling their borders and miremittances from regional migration are more re- grant flows within their countries. Migration – or
liable. Also, the migrants themselves from time to rather Europe’s fear of it – continues to be the pawn
time want to make sure the money they send back of North African state leaders.
to their communities is being invested wisely. Thus,
Dr. Marfaing, thank you very much for this inregional migration is perceived as being more and
terview.
more important, as well as more successful, in the
last couple of years, while the disadvantages of migration to Europe have become clearer: high risk,
unemployment, long absence of family members,
stigmatization of foreigners, loneliness, because
family reunions in Europe are much rarer than peo-
JM:
JM:
LM:
LM:
JM:
jm 10
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
ALUMNIPROFILE
Interview with Chidiogo Akunyili
JM: Please briefly describe yourself for our readers.
CA: My name is Chidiogo and I am from the East
of Nigeria. I have a background in International Relations and Political Science from the University of
Pennsylvania and Sciences Po Paris. I am presently
pursuing a masters degree in International Economics and International Relations at the Johns Hopkins
University. As part of this two-year program I am
currently residing in Bologna, Italy, after which I will
be completing my studies in Washington DC.
in Africa’, I decided to pursue the topic of my senior
thesis research, which was on China-Africa relations.
I thought: What better way to do this than to live
and work in China?
My move to China was thus a practical decision to
understand China, its people and its motivations in
Africa’s development landscape. As part of this plan
I learnt Chinese as well as worked with a Chinese
emerging markets consultancy facilitating Chinese
investments in Africa and in some cases vice versa.
Almost two years into my stay in China, I felt that my
purpose had to a great extent been achieved and
You have already lived in a number of countries that it was time to complete my studies. My interaround the globe. What is it that keeps you moving est in development had been further strengthened
from one place to the next?
in the three years I had been working and as such
it was obvious to me what my focus would be on.
For me it has been a mix of intellectual cu- I got accepted to SAIS Johns Hopkins, where I am
riosity, passion for foreign languages, and a love for currently studying towards my masters. I will, however, be back in Paris this summer interning with the
adventure.
OECD.
JM:
CA:
I moved to the United States because it was the
most feasible option for me, as I had family there. As
What was your biggest challenge when settling
you can imagine, at the young age of sixteen, this
in
to
a
new place?
was considered an important precondition for my
move.
The biggest challenge is always the lanMy move to Paris was to further my studies and my guage barrier, but it is also the biggest motivator.
French in the form of a one-year exchange program. I remember my first day in China when I could not
I had been learning French since my first year in the even say “ni hao” (hello In Chinese) and had to deuniversity, and in addition to my international rela- pend on sign language for several days. However,
tions concentration, Paris and Sciences Po seemed
there is an inexplicable sense of pride and joy one
the obvious choice.
gets when after a few months in a new country,
My move upon graduation to Germany was, how- you sit in social setting, surrounded by new friends,
ever, a mixture of a youthful yearning for adventure, speaking and laughing in a language that was once
especially upon graduation, and the then dream of strange. It makes it all worthwhile.
working with Transparency International which has
its headquarters in Berlin. I ended up working inWhat strikes you as being a common thing
stead for an NGO in Berlin called Institute for Cultur- young people care about in all the places you have
al Diplomacy and upon completion of the program I been - if anything?
was directing at that time called ‘Cultural Diplomacy
JM:
CA:
JM:
jm 11
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
CA: It varies slightly from place to place, but I
would argue that be it in Lagos or Paris or Beijing
even, most young people are concerned with jobs
and security, both financial and otherwise. I was in
China at the time of the financial crises and many
of my friends were extremely frustrated by the fact
that they could not get a job upon graduation and
even when they did, it was often for positions for
which they were overqualified Many of them felt
cheated and frustrated, a sentiment that echoes
also here in Bologna.
JM: What are your plans for the next five years?
CA: This is the million-dollar question. I have
one more year left in my studies, after which I
jm 12
joint mag ] APRIL 2011
would like to work in New York with the UNDP or an
equivalent multilateral for a couple of years. After
this time, I would be interested in relocating, also
possibly with the same organization, back to Africa,
preferably West Africa, working on development
issues. The international and regional knowledge
gained should serve towards my eventual journey
back home. However, as the saying goes, “the bestlaid plans of mice and men often go awry”, and I am
flexible and excited for what the future holds.
joint
mag
Perspectives on German-African futures
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