Enabling Information Confidentiality in Publish

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Enabling Information Confidentiality in
Publish/Subscribe Overlay Services
Hui Zhang Haifeng Chen Guofei Jiang
Xiaoqiao Meng
Kenji Yoshihira
NEC Labs America
Abhishek Sharma
University of Southern California
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Outline
 Problem statement
 Information confidentiality in pub/sub overlay services
 Information foiling
 Mechanism description
 Performance metrics
 Fake message generation schemes
 Evaluation
 Conclusions & future work
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Publish/Subscribe overlay services
Subscription
Publisher X
Event
Subscriber A
Broker network
Subscriber B
Publisher Y
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Information confidentiality in pub/sub services
 Publish/subscribe decouples publishers and subscribes.
 Events are characterized into classes, without knowledge of what (if
any) subscribers there may be.
 Subscribers express interest in one or more classes, and only receive
messages that are of interest, without knowledge of what (if any)
publishers there are.
 New confidentiality problems in this content-based routing
process
 Can the broker network perform content-based routing without the
publishers trusting the broker network with the event content?
 Information confidentiality
 Can subscribers obtain dynamic data without revealing their
subscription functions (content) to the publishers or broker network?
 Subscription confidentiality
 Can publishers control which subscribers may receive particular
events?
 Publication confidentiality
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Problem definition
 Formulation of pub/sub confidentiality as a
communication problem.
 Upon an event e, the broker determines if each subscription s
in the active subscription set matches the event based on a
function f(e; s), but without learning the information contained
in e and s.
 Threat model: a broker is assumed to be computationally
bounded and exhibits a semi-honest behavior.
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Information foiling – the mechanism
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Information foiling – the mechanism
1. Subscriber: for each active subscription, generates ks foiling
subscriptions, and send them in a random order to the broker
which store them all as active subscriptions.
2. Publisher: for each event, generates kp foiling events, and send
them in a random order to the broker.
3. Broker: upon each arriving event e, decides the subset of the
active subscription set and send one notification for each
matched subscription.
4. (optional) Subscriber: upon a notification associated with one
authentic subscription, sends a confirmation request to the
publisher.
5. (optional) Publisher: upon a confirmation request, sends a reply
to the subscriber upon the authenticity of the related event.
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Information foiling – performance metrics
 Assume the attacker has a function F : f{e, Ee} -> G,
that takes the composite message set {e, Ee} as input
and outputs a message set G  {e, Ee} consisting of
messages that the attacker perceives as useful.
 Metric 1: indistinguishability
 defined as
, where I(e, G) = 1 if e 2 G; 0 otherwise.
 Metric 2: truth deviation
 dened as
, where D(e, g) is the difference
between the values of messages e and g.
 Metric 3: communication overhead
 it depends not only on the information foiling mechanism but
also on the actual data distributions of the authentic events
and subscriptions.
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Fake message generation – a probabilistic model
 Consider an event message m with L attributes.
 Let the value Vi for attribute Ai in m be a random variable taking
values in V according to a probability mass function pVi .
 Let Vm = (V1, V2, …, VL), represent m, i.e., a vector of random
variables associated with message taking values in VL.
 Each of the K foiling messages generated by the information
foiling scheme for m can be thought of as a random variable
vector taking values in VL.
 We discussed three scenarios where different fake message
generation schemes are designed with the performance
requirements defined on the 3 metrics.
 The scenarios are differentiated based on the foiler/attacker’s
knowledge on the pmf for Vm:
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Evaluation - methodology
 Pub/sub service: stock quoting
 Stock price volatility is a random walk with variance a normal
distribution [Black-Scholes model]
 Fake message generation:
 Sit = St + ni , where Sit is the i-th fake message for the authentic
stock price information St, and ni is white Gaussian noise.
 Attacker’s strategy:
 Uniform Sampling: The attacker picks each of the K+1 messages as
the correct message with the same probability.
 Extended Kalman Filter : Use an extended Kalman filter to generate
estimates
, and then picks the observed message j which is
 data trace:
 finance.yahoo.com
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Evaluation results - 1
 The curve labeled
“Sig. Events” shows
the probability of
correct guess by
the attacker when
the stock price
changes by a large
amount.
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Evaluation results - 2
 A value of
“Factor-10”
means the
variance of the
noise was 10
times the variance
of stock price.
 higher variance
for the added
noise achieves
a higher truth
deviation.
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Conclusion and Future Work
 We propose a security mechanism called “information foiling” to
address new confidentiality problems arising in pub/sub overlay
services.
 Information foiling extends Rivest’s ”Chaffing and Winnowing” idea.
 Our scheme is complementary to the traditional cryptography-based
security schemes and offers probabilistic guarantees on information
confidentiality.
 Many interesting open problems for future work.
 The need for a stronger guiding theory to better understand
 An analytic study on the fundamental trade-off between the fake
message number, indistinguishability, and truth deviation is
important.
 Investigating the interaction between a foiler and an attacker in
game theory.
 The designs of optimal FMG schemes for other interesting and
important application scenarios are needed.
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Thank you!
Questions?
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