Population: the long view
Population workshop, St John’s College, Oxford,
16 – 17 September 2013
Can the ‘West’ survive
demographic
marginalisation?
1 Department
Stuart Basten 1,3
David Coleman 1, 2
of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford
2 St. John’s College, Oxford
3 Nuffield College, Oxford
The Death of the West: an enjoyable
demographic disaster scenario
An extensive literature, mostly US, on an unwelcome geopolitical
revolution:
Europe irretrievably shrinking on the world stage.
Europeans obsessed with welfare, not production (or reproduction).
Too idle and secularised to be bothered to reproduce; prefer pets.
Destined to be crippled by population ageing and decline.
To be displaced by vigorous immigrant, mostly Muslim populations.
Dependent on US for defence, prefer to sit out crises in their wine cellars.
True - the demographic future is not European
(smaller, older)….
Population estimates and projections, selected countries 1950-2050. UN 2008-based medium variant projections
2000
Brazil
China
India
Sub-Saharan Africa
Europe
Northern America
Japan
1800
1600
1400
1200
Estimates
Projections
1000
800
600
400
200
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
0
And the EU only ‘grows’ by adding demographically failing
countries, while the US grows by adding people.
Population projections, Europe, EU27 and United States (millions), 2010 - 2060.
Sources: Eurostat 2010 Convergence projections, United Nations 2012-based World Population Prospects, United
States Census Bureau 2012 National Population projections.
800
700
600
500
400
Europe
EU27
300
USA
200
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
‘Fewer’- Projected population decline, selected European
countries 1960 - 2060
Actual and projected population, 1960 - 2060, selected countries (millions). Source: UN
2013, 2012-based medium variant.
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
Bulgaria
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
‘Older’ - old-age dependency ratios (constant ratio (65+/ 15-64)*100),
selected low-fertility European countries 1960 – 2060.
80
Old-age dependency ratios, selected countries, 1960 - 2060. Source: United
Nations 2013, 2012- based projections, medium variant.
70
Portugal
60
Spain
Italy
50
Greece
Bulgaria
40
30
20
10
0
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
The coming eclipse
Diminution of Europe, and the ‘West’ more
broadly, on the world stage
Demographic ‘decline’ and welfare/ageing burdens
Military security; energy security; geopolitical ‘clout’.
Marginalisation of EU by US
Marginalisation of EU and US by ‘The Rest’
Economic/geopolitical future is Chinese (Jacques 2012).
Or Indian? Latin American? African?
Europe’s demographic challenges – some other
details
Diminished productivity of older workforce (Skirbekk 2008).
Pension costs higher than expected: greater human capital, much longer
lifespans (Ediev 2012, 2013).
Erosion of democracy: reaction to austerity to sustain pensions. (Cincotta 2012)
Immigrant integration: uncertain outcome (Caldwell 2009).
Female educational superiority: lower birth-rate through male marriage
squeeze (van Bavel 2013).
Purely economic challenges: to pensions systems and elderly care.
Not all that bad? an upbeat view of ‘Western’
birth rates.
Upward trend in period fertility, (recession notwithstanding ?)
Recuperation (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012) and intensification (Burkimsher 2013) of fertility.
Robust cohort fertility in NW Europe (Andersson 2009).
Upward projection of cohort fertility (Myrskyla et al. 2012)
Favourable relationship of fertility with female workforce participation, human
capital and – possibly - education, GDP and HDI (Myrskyla et al. 2009)
Positive (though variable) effect of higher education on second birth intensity (Klement
and Puur 2013).
Positive effect of education on projected labour force productivity (Loichinger 2013).
Birth rate increase through differential growth from religious conservatism? (Kaufmann
and Skirbekk 2012).
Population reproduction powerfully augmented by immigration, to replacement
levels and beyond in EU15 (Ediev et al. 2013, Wilson et al. 2013).
Fertility in Europe has not been declining....TFR trends, major
European regions and USA, 1950 – 2010.
TFR trends Major Regions 1950 - 2010
3.5
unweighted means. Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices
CEE unweighted mean
Southern unweighted mean
FSU unweighted mean (excluding Moldova)
Northern Europe
Western Europe
USA
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2010
2007
2004
2001
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1.0
The prospect of population replacement. Sweden, stable
completed family size, women born 1870 – 1967.
Source; Statistics Sweden 2013, p.12.
Possibly an increase? Trends and projections in cohort
fertility, women born 1950 – 1979. (1) .
Shaded area is projected.
Source: Myrskyla, Goldstein and Cheng 2013, Figure 1.
Ageing trend is not forever - projection of Potential Support Ratio, UK
2011 – 2086 on different definitions of aged population.
Source: based on ONS 2010-based Principal Projection.
6.0
Aged Potential Support Ratio
5.5
APSR 20-75 (graduated)
5.0
APSR 20-69
4.5
APSR 15-64
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2086
2081
2076
2071
2066
2061
2056
2051
2046
2041
2036
2031
2026
2021
2016
2011
Broader considerations: advantages from European
demographic and political ‘maturity’?
Low fertility past its worst – prospect of increase, better ageing
outlook?
Gradual acquisition of democratic, non-theocratic political
institutions and consensus, welfare systems, ‘civil society’, trust.
Therefore social resilience (not much in post-Soviet countries).
Demographic and democratic transitions and social, economic
development slow, kept pace with each other.
Relatively stable demographic and political regimes.
Less severe climate change outlook than in ‘global South’?
Who are ‘The Rest’?
BRICs no longer a coherent concept
Russia: demographic (etc.) basket case
South Africa: disappointed expectations
Core members: Brazil, India, China
In the wings: Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia
NE and SE Asia
Gulf states – rentier economies: small, rich, peculiar.
Africa (increasingly an extension of Chinese mineral resources?)
The developing world – some stumbling blocks on
the road to world dominance?
Fertility may fall lower than W. Europe, ageing (eventually)
therefore worse.
Some countries (e.g. China) ‘old before rich’ (Bloom et al. 2011)?
Some (e.g. China, India, Brazil) too big to be ‘rescued by
migration’ from population ageing (Coleman 2009).
3W ‘demographic’ transition might only lead to ‘democratic’
transition via political instability?
Problems of resource adequacy from large size and continued
population growth.
Most severe climate change challenges in ‘global South’?
(e.g Beardson 2013, Littwak 2012, Mirsky 2013, Schumbaugh 2013, mostly concerning
China).
A reversal of fertility patterns already in progress?
Some contrasting total fertility levels. 2011 - 2012
The West
TFR stable or increasing
Developing world
TFR mostly going down.
Some higher TFRs
Some lower / declining TFRs
Ireland
Iceland
New Zealand
France
UK
Sweden
Australia
US
Norway
Finland
Belgium
Netherlands
Lithuania
Denmark
2.05
2.04
2.03
2.00
1.91
1.90
1.89
1.89
1.88
1.83
1.81
1.76
1.76
1.73
Sri Lanka
Turkey
Nicaragua
Karnataka
Vietnam
Chile
Iran
Uzbekistan
Brazil
Lebanon
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Thailand
China
Source: Eurostat, national statistical yearbooks.
2.17
2.13
2.08
2.00
1.89
1.87
1.87
1.86
1.82
1.76
1.70
1.70
1.66
1.55
East Asia
TFR very low, little change
Japan
S. Korea
Taiwan
Singapore
1.39
1.23
1.01
0.78
Some ‘rising’ (and waning) powers. TFR 1990 - 2012
6.00
Bangladesh
5.00
Brazil
Cambodia
China
4.00
India
pTFR
Indonesia
Japan
3.00
Korea, Rep.
Mexico
Myanmar
2.00
Russia
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
1.00
Vietnam
0.00
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Most severe case so far outside China. Trends and projections in
cohort fertility, women born 1950 –1979, East Asia.
Shaded area is projected. Source: Myrskyla, Goldstein and Cheng 2013, Figure 1
UN projections: developing world may face decades of subreplacement fertility (for example, China, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia).
Source: UN 2010 probabilistic projections.
Expert views of low fertility for China, 1990 - 2050
Estimated and projected period TFR in China through 2050: Expert-based projection (main estimate and 80% confidence interval) as
compared with three rounds of UN projections and estimates (From Basten et al. forthcoming)
Might fertility recovery not happen? Emergence of subreplacement fertility ideals.
Desired / ideal family size (almost) always above 2. But
no longer in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China (Basten 2013).
Chinese urban generations free to have two children do
not want two or have two.
Pattern now seen more widely: Thailand 1.85; Urban
India vanguard groups up to 25% desire one-child
family
No stigma of ‘One Child Family’. Has China, and
others, fallen into a ‘low fertility trap’ (Basten, this
workshop).
Why is this happening? some factors
reinforcing low fertility.
‘Culture matters’: authoritarian, familist, low trust (e.g.
Almond and Verba 1963, Landes 1998, Harrison and Huntingdon 2000, Billari 2013).
Incomplete gender revolution of public and private roles
for women.
Obsessive investment in education in East Asia; an extra
burden on women (Lutz, Rios-Neto 2013; Tan, Morgan et al. 2013)
Urbanisation: crowded mega-cities; very small familyunfriendly apartments.
Retreat from marriage, but marriage still key to
reproduction
Ineffective family policies.
Familism against the family: a partly-baked idea:
Familist societies have low fertility when modernising –
dual burden on women (hence low TFR Southern
Europe, ?East Asia).
Many societies outside NW Europe are ‘familist’ in
some sense.
If such societies modernise, fertility falls to a low level.
Slow cultural change prevents rapid recovery.
Long period of damaging population ageing, possibly
eventual decline.
But evidence? Not much so far..
Consequences? developing world ageing can overtake ageing
in NW Europe.
Age Dependency Ratios ((pop 65+ / pop 15-64)*100), selected European and developing
countries 2010 – 2060.
80
Spain
Germany
70
Source: UN 2012, medium variant.
Age dependency ratios, 2010 - 2060, selected developed and developing countries.
Source: UN 2012 medium variant.
China
Iran
60
France
UK
50
Brazil
Sweden
40
Turkey
Mexico
India
30
20
10
0
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
2055
2060
Can developing world economic growth catch up?
Selected developed and developing countries, 2005 and 2050, projected GDP per
capita in PPP terms .
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2013 figure 8. http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world2050/pdf/world2050emergingeconomies.pdf
Old before rich? Which trajectory for the ‘rest’?
Age dependency ratio and per capita GDP (1000$ PPP). Selected European and
(currently) developing countries 2050.
Per capita GDP (1000 US$ PPP) and age-dependency ratio, 2050, selected countries. Sources: World
Bank, UN, Price Waterhouse Coopers
80
Japan
70
Spain
Italy
Population65+ per 100 15-64
60
Korea
Germany
50
France
China
40
Canada
Mexico
Brazil
30
UK
USA
Australia
Turkey Russia
Indonesia
India
20
10
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Per capita GDP, 1000US$ PPP
70
80
90
100
Potential non-demographic difficulties
Serious environmental pollution, especially water.
Centralised economic policy, corruption, low economic
freedom, handicapped economic growth (e.g. energy
in India); lumbering policy change.
Extreme economics (debt, investment, growth)
Wasted ‘demographic dividends’: job-poor growth
Most severe climate change in ‘global South’?
Will China rule the world?
Will India be the next superpower?
Biggest
Population, biggest consumer of resources,
biggest economic surplus and reserves . GDP
one-sixth of US, 90th in world p.c.
Huge economic, social growth 2002 –11:
Projected urban growth 380 million – 600
million 2030, energy demand 3x by 2030.. 80%
of India unbuilt.
Demography
Population ageing problem, solution not in
sight. No ‘rescue’ from migration.
‘Lewis point’ exaggerated.
Population homogeneous, minorities small.
Demography
Environment
Worst global environment. Biggest
greenhouse contributor. Unsafe water, air, food,
medicine. Water shortage in North.
Climate change threats: 150 million people in
LECZ.
Politics
Rigid party control ; Corruption and local
oppression, inequality, environment, eventual
political instability?
Isolated internationally, influence through
money,
Population growth problem. No ageing problem
yet. Uneven regional transition.
Environment
Nearly worst global environment 125th / 132
in 2012 GEP Index
Water insecurity, 4% of world’s fresh water with
17% of population
Resource consumption unsustainable.
Climate change threat: (hotter, wetter).
Politics
Plus: judiciary, press, democracy, civil society,
unity despite diversity
Minus – corruption at all levels, clientism,
subsidised prices, heavy bureaucracy.
‘Permit Raj’ lives; high and growing inequality
Conclusions 1: Reports of the Death of the West
somewhat exaggerated
West’s share of world population, power and wealth must decline.
But demographic outlook more stable and sustainable than
supposed.
Positive outlook does not apply to all European countries, (or East Asia).
Anglosphere and NW Europe in most favourable position.
Sustainable fertility levels re-establishing?
With immigration, population reproduction positive in some countries
Management of ageing slowly developing?
Economic, political maturity? Manageable environment.
Conclusions 2 – ‘The Rest’ have problems but
must not be exaggerated.
Developing world must cope with problems. But few
insurmountable?
Faster transitions from initially higher fertility levels, therefore
faster ageing.
Persistent traditional, authoritarian or ‘familist’ cultures dissonant
with economic growth and with non-family adaptations to
population ageing.
Substantial population growth in environmentally vulnerable
areas.
Less developed politics, worse environment.
Resource problems, exposure to more severe climate change.