The Swedish Model:
What, why and whereto?
Lars Niklasson, Associate Professor
Political Science
Linköping University, Sweden
What is the Swedish Model?
 Collective bargaining since 1938
 Welfare for work (”Arbetslinjen”) since the 1950s (?)
 A welfare state since the 1970s (?)
 A ”high tax equilibrium”: high taxes and high quality (?)
 ”Good government” generates trust in government?
 Reforms since the 1990s
 A new ”supermodel” (The Economist, February 2013)
Topics of the course
 The roots: from the Vikings to the present days
 ---1809-1932-1968-1995
 The effects: quality of life and competitive advantage?
 (Better than the alternatives?)
 The logic: self-supporting trust (”equilibrium”)
 (Only in Sweden?)
 Operations: central/local, fragmented/coordinated
 Whereto? Europeanization, globalization
The ambition of the course
 After completion of the course, the student should…
 …be able to show a fundamental knowledge of the
origins and structure of the Swedish government and
the Swedish social system
 …have the capacity to deal with the many myths
concerning Sweden and Swedish society
1: The roots of the Swedish Model
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Introduction to Statebuilding
Swedish history to 1600
Swedish history 1600-1800
Swedish history 1800-2000
Good government from 1850
The early politics of the WS
Seminar on the literature
Seminar on individual papers
Lars Niklasson
Sofia Gustafsson
Henrik Ågren
Björn Ivarsson Lilieblad
Lars Niklasson
Elin Wihlborg
2: The Swedish Welfare System
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Introduction to politics
Education and training
Governance & privatization
Legitimacy & efficiency
Drivers of change
Seminar on the literature
Seminar on individual papers
Lars Niklasson
Lars Niklasson
Bo Persson
Lars Niklasson
Elin Wihlborg
Course requirements
 Active participation at the seminars
 Questions on the literature will be provided
 Submit and defend a short individual paper
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1,000-1,500 words
A topic related to the course
A question and a short analysis
Only few extra sources (use the literature)
Collaboration is encouraged
High grades for clarity and creativity
The literature
 A history compendium
 Articles by Bo Rothstein et al
 Quality of Government Institute, Gothenburg
 Morel, Palier & Palme 2012: Towards a Social
Investment Welfare State? Ideas, Policies and
Challenges, Bristol: The Policy Press
 Articles from Oxford Handbook on Swedish Politics
(forthcoming)
 Articles on higher education policy
1. Introduction to Statebuilding
 States are different
 Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, German, French, Asian etc.
 Parliaments, governments, bureaucracies etc.
 Comparison helps us understand and see causalitys
 The historical process helps explain present variety
 What was before states?
 Why have they dominated from 1648?
 How were patterns formed?
Sweden and Denmark:
Different paths and outcomes
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Estates (the nobility) vs absolutist kings
Strong peasants or towns (Not West/East)
A military state vs separation
”Corruption” until 1870s vs 1730s
 The legal systems, university education
 Gradual shift from conservatism to corporatism vs radical break
and strong liberalism (by the farmers)
 S: Protectionism, administrative corp., social corp. (statism)
 D: Radical break 1848-49, farmers and towns, little corporatism
 More private providers in the Danish WS, less paternalism
Knudsen & Rothstein 1993:
State-building in Scandinavia
 What are ”western” and ”eastern” patterns?
 How do Sweden and Denmark fit these patterns?
 Sweden’s bureaucracy was more corrupt for a longer time
than Denmark’s; How? Why?
 What were the important steps in Sweden’s ”road to mass
politics”? How did it differ from Denmark’s?
 How did the popular movements differ?
 Can we see differences in the welfare states? (1993)
 (Why is Sweden more similar to Denmark now? A new path?)
Swedish history
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Lecture 2: Swedish history to 1600
Lecture 3: Swedish history 1600-1800
Lecture 4: Swedish history 1800-2000
Based on the compendium
Excursion to western Östergötland
5. The roots of good government
 The puzzle: What causes what?
 A. Economic development, industrialization
 B. ”Good government” without corruption
 C. Welfare policies
 Rothstein et al: the quality of the government is the key
 Corruption is a barrier to welfare and development
 (Co-evolution with early industrialization?)
 How can you go from corruption to non-corruption?
 Corruption is a stable equilibrium
 Now: one of the least corrupt countries in the world
 Lessons applicable to Russia, Africa etc
Sweden was a thirld world country
 The French ambassador 1771: Two serious problems, love
for democracy and total corruption
 A patrimonial, nepotistic state
 A blurred line between public office and private interest
 Heckscher: Marshy (försumpad) administration
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Hiring not based on merit
Offices were sold to finance retirement
Hold several offices and hire others to do the job
Fees, housing and grain instead of salary
Bribery was a crime only for judges
How can we explain the
transformation?
 How to stop taking bribes?
 More control presumes a benevolent principal
 How to control state leaders?
 Democratic elections, accountability, presumes…
 A social trap, a suboptimal equilibrium (”collective
action theory of corruption”), explains persistence
 ”Big bang” as a way out: impossible?
 An endogenous way out? (Ostrom 1990)
Ostrom’s solution
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Supply of a solution, Comitment, Monitoring
A cooperation game (as overfishing etc)
A high payoff from cooperation
”Another world is possible”
New ideas: Liberalism
Exogenous factors?
Data shows the transformation
 Appeals Court cases on malfeasance peaked twice,
i.e. there was increased attention to the problem
 A new High Court in 1789, by the absolutist king but with
a long-term positive impact
 A need to save money after the wars 1808-09, 1814
 A new political situation after the collapse of the
government 1809. A new constitution and a new king
 A threat to national survival, becoming a small state
 Corruption was mainly in the rural administration
Debates in the Parliament
(the Diet with four estates)
 The separation of public and private money: punishment
for taking private ”loans” 1823
 Several initiatives to outlaw promotion based on fees
(pension system introduced in the 1870s)
 A new tax system and the introduction of salaries
 A Weberian perspective: an impartial bureaucracy was
needed to strengten the legitimacy of the public sector
(not divinity, heritage, tradition etc)
 The bureaucracy as a machine (hierarchy) to handle routine
cases in governments (and companies)
Where did the ideas come from?
 Enlightenment liberalism: meritocracy, impartiality,
professionalism, accountability
 Britain, France, Prussia, Bavaria (Schiller/Beethoven…)
 Stronger from 1830 due to a liberal press and more
liberals in the Parliament/Diet (industrialists)
 Demand for a more representative parliament and a
government that respected the constitution
Bureaucracy and the economy
 From feudal loyalty (back) to Roman legal traditions
 Need for education and good universities
 More rational government: Railway Board 1862,
Telegraph Board 1865, Road and Waterway
Commission 1841
 Feudal guilds abolished 1864: free trade and
commerce
 Industrialization started around 1870
Teorell & Rothstein 2012: Getting to
Sweden: Malfeasance and bureaucratic
reforms 1720-1850
 What are the key elements in a theory inspired by
Ostrom to explain the abolishment of corruption?
 What are the key evidence that Sweden confirms to
Ostrom’s explanation?
 What external (exogenous) factors can have helped
in the transformation of Sweden?
Rothstein 1998: State Building and Capitalism:
The Rise of the Swedish Bureaucracy
 What are the key elements of a bureaucracy
according to Max Weber?
 How did the Swedish civil service differ from the
Weberian model?
 What are the benefits of a bureaucratic government?
 Is the bureaucratic model still appropriate for
governments? How can it be improved?
6. The politics of the early
welfare state
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Popular protest and organized civil society
Free trade vs. protectionism
Democracy for men and women
Saltsjöbaden 1938: corporatism
The dominance of the labor movement 1932-76
ATP as a key event and major conflict
”The solidaristic pay policy” and the booming 1960s
1968 and the 1970s: triumph or hubris?
What is a universal welfare state?
 Benefits for all (universal vs. selective)
 Compare: Bismarckian systems, company-based welfare
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Everyone pays
Creates loyalty, if it works well
The cynical interpretation: a way to buy votes
Does it create social capital or is SC a prerequisite?
Only possible in homogenous societies?
A gradual development, small steps, pragmatism
Rothstein 2008b:
Is the universal welfare state a cause or an
effect of social capital?
 What are universal welfare states?
 What are its electoral and political effects?
 What are the alternative explanations for a relation
between big governments and social capital?
 What evidence points to the welfare state as an
outcome of social capital?
 What evidence points to the welfare state as a
producer of social capital?
Rothstein, Samanni & Teorell 2012:
Explaining the welfare state: Power
resources vs the quality of government
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What is the Power Resource Theory?
What are the problems with PRT?
What is ”bringing the state back in”?
What are the key ideas in the Quality of Government
(QoG) theory?
 What does the empirical evidence show? Are there
any problems with the evidence?
The Swedish Model, part 2
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Introduction to politics
Education and training
Governance & privatization
Legitimacy & efficiency
Drivers of change
Seminar on the literature
Seminar on individual papers
Lars Niklasson
Lars Niklasson
Bo Persson
Lars Niklasson
Elin Wihlborg
7. Introduction to the politics
of the welfare state
 1976-82-91-94: Challenges and decentralization
 1995: Membership of the European Union
 Late 90s: Cutbacks to save the welfare state
 Too generous to work?
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2006: Back to ”work for welfare” (Arbetslinjen)
= Reforms to save the welfare state?
Influence from 1997: The European Social Model
Whereto? A Social Investment State?
A new type of welfare state?
(Morel, Palier & Palme, intro)
 1. Social investments in skills and modern needs/risks
(work/family life, change of careers etc.)
 = an Economist’s perspective on welfare: utility rather than
social rights, ”productive social policy”
 = Collective responsibility
 Alva and Gunnar Myrdal: families and women
 (Wanted selective policies)
 2. Keynes: the macro economy, more traditional/male
 3. Neoliberals: rigidities, market distortions, gov’t failure
 Three paradigms (table 1.1) SIWS as a hybrid
A new type of welfare state,
continued
 Critique:
 Less support for passive unemployment with the focus on
”activation”
 Less support to stay outside the labor market
 Bad implementation of policies against exclusion in the Lisbon
strategy
 An instrumental view on women and children (as labor force)
 Divergent views (Nordic vs Anglo-Liberal):
 Esping-Andersen on positive effects of social rights, aim for equality,
combination of investment and protection
 Giddens on moral hazard and duties, beneficial inequalities, support as
springboard, from passive to active measures
Waves of transformation
(Hemerijk 2012)
 1. Keynesianism after WWII (the Depression)
 From charity to right, taming capitalism, class compromise,
embedded liberalism (Bretton Woods)
 2. Neoliberalism after the 70s (Stagflation)
 Monetarism (balanced budgets, low inflation, stable currency),
flexibility, gov’t as problem, selective policies
 OECD Jobs Study 1994: high unemployment in Europe, EMU to
limit politics, social pacts/not cutbacks
 3. Social investment since 90s (the Third Way)
 OECD 1996, EU 1997, Esping-Andersen et al 2002. A balance. The
welfare state can be positive for competitiveness. Structural (not
cyclical) unemployment needs capacitating services
Social investment
(Jenson 2012)
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Beyond neoliberalism: critics on the left and right
Investment (not spending) = future profits
Responsibility mix: market, family, community, state
Universal coverage
Fostering prevention, rights and duties
Governance through networks: communities (?)
(Sweden: Learning accounts, citizen choice?)
Neoliberalism failed: high spending & problems in Europe,
experiments in Asia, revised ideas 1997 (World Bank)
Ageing populations
(Lindh 2012)
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Demographic transition: problem and opportunity
Ageing population effect in 2030-40
National variety, National Transfer Accounts
Transfers over the life cycle: independence, retirement
Life expectancy, fertility rates: dependency rates
Work longer, have more babies: welfare support
Pensions: savings or pay-as-you-go
Parental leave
Consequences for jobs: more services, less goods
Post-crisis policy
(Diamond & Liddle 2012)
 More barriers to European social policy due to
aftershocks of the crisis, especially public finance
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Direct effects: unemployment, austerity
EU divergence
Globalisation winners and losers
Demography
Migration
 The state remains big but changes its role (NPM)
 An opportunity for a European Social Model?
Climate policy
(Sommestad 2012)
 Social policies to support climate policy
 Market-based climate policies: emissions trading
 Income equality leads to better climate (?)
 Public ethos, economic instruments regressive
 Sectoral impact: less agriculture, energy-intensive
industries, more transport
 Need for industrial policy, employment policy, dialogue,
public investments (-- a role for markets, banks?)
 The new economics of sustainable development (Stern)
 Long-term investments in public goods: education etc.
From Lisbon to Europe 2020
(Lundvall & Lorenz 2012)
 The Lisbon Strategy (2000): wide and with a goal:
 ”The most competitive region in the world”
 ”Europe 2020” (2010): narrower, with priorities
 Smart, sustainable, inclusive growth (+targets)
 Continuity with the focused Lisbon Strategy 2005-10
 Still weak implementation (OMC), change of majority, SGP
 European Employment Strategy: quality jobs? Flexicurity?
Less competitiveness with less cohesion?
 No understanding of the learning economy (or EMU)
 A transnational welfare state needed = European identity
A new economic model
(Morel, Palier & Palme, conclusion)
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A paradigm in search of a new economic model
Modernising ideas
Capacitating policies: education, family, employment
Weak implementation:
 Increase in expenditure, not investments
 Protection and promotion: the Nordics (NL, UK)
 Activation = third way = ”too close to neoliberalism”
 The analysis: disincentives, lack of flexibility
 The solution: working poor. (Conservation?) Skills are needed.
A new economic model, contd.
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With high skill jobs, more difficult to employ migrants
New national accounts? Investments vs consumption
Political triggers: competition for the female vote
Against neoliberalism (– a new coalition of socialists
and conservatives? mercantilism, competitiveness)
 Germany not a viable alternative (?)
 Gradual change may lead to paradigmatic change
Morel, Palier & Palme 2012:
Towards a social investment welfare
state? Ideas, policies and challenges
 1. What are the differences between Giddens and EspingAndersen on Social Investment policies?
 2. What are the three waves reactions against?
 3. What are the differences between investments and savings?
 10. In what sense is demography an opportunity?
 11. Is the crisis an opportunity for a European Social Model?
 12. What is the link between social and climate policies?
 13. What is missing in Europe 2020?
 14. What kind of coalition(-s) would support a European Social
Model based on the idea of social investments?
8. Case study:
Education and training
 Two parts:
 Primary, secondary, tertiary education
 Skills development and training for adults
 Structures, actors, processes, achievements
 Challenges
 European comparisons (Morel, Palier & Palme 2012)
Education policy
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Pre-school, primary school 1-9, secondary 10-12
National curricula, framework legislation and control
Local and private implementation
A strong focus on results since 2006: more uniform
A debate on segregation, vocational programs
Higher education
 Xx universities (PhD-granting)
 Yy colleges (limited PhD-granting)
 Several private, two independent
 Also some vocational tertiary education (YH)
 Student loans to study in Sweden and abroad
 Quasi-market since 1993:
 Formula funding, deregulation, quality control
 Fees for non-EES students (except exchange)
 What drives innovation in higher education?
 Competition and/or top-down inititives?
Labor market policy: training
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Active labor market policy, ALMP = training programs
A national policy: people need to move to the jobs
Formerly regional and corporatist, now centralized
Performance targets lead to creaming
Exclusion: difficult to help clients with many needs
Local collaboration or competition?
Training programs by local and regional gov’ts too
”One door in”, joined-up government bottom-up:
 Infotek = guidance, Lärcentrum = co-location
Consistent? Efficient?
 The policies overlap in adult education
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Are the systems integrated?
Do they promote equality (of opportunity/outcomes)?
Do they support individual development?
Do they support economic growth?
Next lecture on governance and privatization
Good for the citizens?
 More integrated public services?
 More adaptable services?
 Not good at solving complex problems, or these
problems are now more visible?
 Fighting exclusion
 Support for economic growth (better skills
development? A strong business climate?)
 Accountability?
OECD comparisons
(Nikolai 2012)
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Compensatory policies: unemployment, old age
Investment policies: ALMP, family, education
Spending convergence over time
Spending in cash or in kind (services)
Expansion of old age insurance and family benefits
ALMP: more activation, less spending
Four clusters (low/high) Figure 4.3-4.6
Increased spending but less on education
Convergence on Scandinavia or the UK?
Employment policies
(de la Porte & Jacobsson 2012)
 The European Employment Strategy, EES 1997
 After EMU, to develop skills, part of the Lisbon Strategy
 Synergies of economic, labor market and social policies
 Targets the continental and Mediterranean countries
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Soft policy, OMC: increased employment due to EES?
Policy frame: problem, goal, benchmarks, instruments
Contradicts the economic policy frame (EMU)
Flexi+curity, employability, a role for social partners
EES has become a reference point, but little change
Employment policies, contd
 The Nordic countries: big fit
 Less quality in activation, structural issues not reformed
 The English-speaking countries: fit
 UK: Domestically driven reforms, Ireland: ESF
 The Continental countries: misfit
 More activation, ”Modèle danois”, Hartz reforms
 The Mediterranean countries: misfit
 More flexibility, less security (opposite of social investment)
 The East European countries: low spending
 Activation and flexibility, weak social partners
Work-family policies
(Morgan 2012)
 Female employment, gender equality, child care
 Pioneers: France, Norway, Sweden
 Path-shifters: Germany, Netherlands, UK
 Slow-movers: Austria, Italy, Spain
 Political forces: new ideas? Barriers?
 Electoral strategies (Sweden and Norway)
 The representation of women in politics
 General conservatism in the slow-moving countries
Active labor market policy
(Bonoli 2012)
 Ambiguous concept. Four (six) types (table 7.1):
 Investment in human capital? (or incentives to work?)
 Pro-market orientation? (or temporary jobs?)
 Spending profiles in six countries (figure 7.1)
 General decline 1995-2005, except the UK
 Reduction of ”job creation”, increase of ”employment
assistance”, decline of ”training”
 Spending levels: Nordic, Continental, UK
 From education (60s), via occupation (70s) to re-entry
(90s). Laggards become leaders: Denmark, UK.
More and better jobs?
(Nelson & Stephens 2012)
 Investment policies are related to knowledge-intensive services and discretionary learning employment
 Problems: overeducation? Inhibiting business
investment? Relevant adjustment of content?
 But: markets aren’t perfect, education is undersupplied
(?), a need to recruit internationally
 Data: (1) 1972-99, (2) cross-sectional correlations
 USA at top and bottom
 Investments lead to employment and quality jobs
The globalizing learning economy
(Lundvall & Lorenz 2012)
 A need for organizational learning and networking
 Discretionary learning = more autonomy than in ”lean
production” (But: standardized processes!)
 North vs south
 High skill jobs less exposed to foreign competition
 Flexicurity makes it easy for firms to upgrade and makes
individuals less risk-averse
 Vocational training and informal learning
 Equality, openness and trust
 Learning by doing and by interaction with customers etc.
 Social investments on an international scale for migrants?
Morel, Palier & Palme 2012: Towards a
social investment welfare state?
 4. What spending patterns can we see over time?
 5. Which groups of countries have increased the
policies of activation?
 6. What are the political drivers and barriers for and
against equal rights for women?
 7. How did the laggards become leaders in ALMP?
 8. How can social investments lead to better jobs?
 9. What are the pros and cons of flexicurity?
Niklasson 1996:
”Quasi-markets in higher education –
A comparative analysis”
 1. What is the difference between ”market by design”
and ”market by interaction”?
 2. In what sense did the regulation of the universities
converge on a common model?
 3. In what sense did Sweden and the UK move in
opposite directions?
9. Multi-level governance,
networking and privatization
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The operations ”behind the scenes”
National, regional and local programs
Collaboration in networks
Private providers
Agencies for control and evaluation
Multi-level governance
 Marks & Hooghe (1995): MLG 1 and 2
 Traditional relationship (MLG 1):
 Framework laws and control by the national gov’t
 Funding and operations by regional and local governments
 Separated roles (schools, health care)
 New relation (MLG 2)
 Actors at different levels overlap
 Shared clients (”exclusion”)
 Similar instruments (training, subsidies for firms)
Networking
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MLG 2 = collaboration = networking in projects
Often informal, social skills are needed
Different from Weberian bureaucracy (hierarchy)
Leadership through vision and persuasion
Common goals, common strategies
Territorial integration means greater variety, less control
from the center (performance targets?)
 Functional integration means specialization (silos), works
best when problems are NOT shared
An example: Fas 3
 ”Phase 3”: the furthest away from regular jobs
 Unemployed, on sick-leave or on general welfare
 Agencies and local gov’ts collaborate in projects
 Often co-funded by the EU (ESF, ERDF)
 Returning clients count as new clients in the statistics
 = targets are met, problems remain unsolved
 Gaming, creaming etc.
 Local initiatives to collaborate on a holistic view
Privatization
 Public funding, private provision:
 Client choice: schools, health care
 Procurement: garbage collection for a local gov’t
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Private funding, public provision: Fees
Pro: competition, greater variety (?), empowerment
Con: segregation, bancruptcy, difficult for planners
Quality/costs? Innovativeness? Legal rights?
Cities vs rural areas
More central control
 Many agencies for control and evaluation
 More performance targets by the central gov’t
 The center regains control?
Oxford handbook on Swedish Politics
(2014): Regional and local gov’ts
 Niklasson: Challenges and reforms
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Consolidation 1970 to provide welfare services
Decentralization after 1976 for local adjustments
Regionalization and collaboration 90s (EU?) weak center
Now centralization? Cutbacks top-down = fairness?
 Montin: Overview of local and regional governments
 Feltenius: Multi-level governance
 (Lidström: International comparisons)
Oxford handbook on Swedish Politics
(2014): Regional and local gov’ts
 Niklasson: What are the main waves of reform? Why
did they take this shape?
 Montin: How much autonomy do local governments
in Sweden have? Is Sweden a federal country?
Why/why not?
 Feltenius: How has multi-level governance changed
over time?
 Lidström: What are the unique characteristics of local
government in the Nordic/Scandinavian countries?
10. Legitimacy and efficiency
 Economists ask for efficiency – what is it?
 Productivity: do things efficently
 Effectiveness: do the right things
 More central control? More power to clients?
Competition? Incentives?
 (Individual services vs solving complex problems)
 Sociologists ask for legitimacy
 Organize services to maximize trust?
 Public ethos to avoid corruption
Efficiency-losses
due to organization
 Complex problems are adressed in many pieces
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Exclusion, economic growth etc.
Collaboration is a pragmatic solution
Reorganization, mergers (Norway)
Vouchers, learning accounts etc. (supported by
Parliament but never implemented)
 Efficiency-losses by decentralization – or efficiency
gains?
 Difficult to evaluate, redirect or terminate programs
Efficiency-losses
in the chain of command
 Voters elect the parliament, which selects the
government, which controls agency heads, who
control staff, who run programs to influence citizens
 Who controls whom? Only in one direction?
 Principals can’t control agents
 Information asymmetries, lack of effort
 Cooperation in a situation of Prisoners’ Dilemma
 The long-term win-win solution
Game-like regulation:
An attempt to promote cooperation
 Swedish higher education 1993: a new kind of game?
 The Minister of Education vs the Rector (vice
chancellor): trust or attempt to control/shirking?
 Minister-Rector-Dean-Dept chair-Teacher-Student
 Late 80s: a need for transparency and long-term
perspectives (lobbying, detailed regulation)
 Framework legislation, funding formula (input and
output), quality control, decentralization, competition
Did it work?
 The policies were introduced at a time of expansion,
i.e. everyone was a winner overall
 A later minister reclaimed surpluses, eroded trust
 Funding eroded with more detailed regulation, more
performance targets, more quality control
 More central control, less innovation at the bottom?
 Or: teachers and students live by traditional norms?
Legitimacy as a guiding principle
 Legitimacy of input vs output
 Adjustment to particular situations by professionals
 ”The black hole of democracy”: too many details
 Five models: theoretical legitimacy? Practice? Motive for choice?
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Legal-bureaucratic: impartial = predictable but rigid
Professional: evidence-based, very engaged in each client
Corporatist: decisions by affected groups
Pseudo-market: competition = balance of power
Lottery: can be better than the alternatives
(Local politicians: hostages?)
 What are the effects of collaboration and privatization?
Niklasson 1996: ”Game-like regulation of the
universities – will the new regulatory framework for higher education in Sweden work?”
 How can the ”game” played by the Minister of
Education and each Rector/Vice-Chancellor help us
understand the regulation of the universities (and
other agencies)?
 What are the limitations of the model?
Rothstein 2008a:
”Political legitimacy and the welfare
state: Five basic models”
 What are the pros and cons of each model, in terms
of making the public trust the public sector?
 What type of empirical evidence is provided in the
article?
11. The drivers of change: Welfare
policies in new institutional framing
 How can we understand the ongoing politics?
 ”The three new institutionalisms”
 Rationality, legitimacy and paths
 Actors
 Politicians, bureaucrats, epistemic communities
 Situations
 Many interrelated games
 Ideas
Hall & Taylor 1996: ”Political science
and the three new institutionalisms”
 What is an ”institution” in Rational Choice
Institutionallism?
 What is it in Historical Institutionalism?
 What is it in Sociological Institutionalism?
 To what extent are the three models compatible?
Contradictory?
Dahlström 2009:
”The bureaucratic politics of welfare
state crisis: Sweden in the 1990s”
 In what way did civil servants influence the outcomes
of the bargaining during the crisis of 1992-3?
(Morel, Palier & Palme 2012)
 Why are Active Labour Market Policy and ”the Social
investment welfare state” popular in the EU?
 Is it the best set of ideas?
 How strong are competing ideas?
 Is it a useful set of ideas for the EU?
 Is it evidence of a new path? Or continuity?
 How important are ”the rules of the game”?
(Niklasson 2014)
 How can we explain the shifts from centralization to
decentralization and back?
 How much can be explained by ”necessity”?
 Is Sweden following trends? Give some examples
 Who are the conflicting actors in the article?
 What other conflicts may there be, which can explain
the outcomes?
Conclusions about
the Swedish Model?
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What?
A high-tax equilibrium with a capacity to reform itself
Why?
A workable model, based on traditions
Whereto?
A northern European model?