Wake Forest Debate
Hurwitz
1/53
***Negative***
Wake Forest Debate
Hurwitz
2/53
1nc oceans
Oceans resilient
Kennedy ‘2 (Victor, Environmental science prof, Maryland, Former Director, Cooperative Oxford
Laboratory, PhD, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change,
http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm, 2002)
There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele
(1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical
factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering
them ecologically adaptable . Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their
range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.
Wake Forest Debate
Hurwitz
3/53
2nc no impact
Recent history disproves the impact
Idso 12, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and
Idso, PhD botany – ASU, ‘12 (Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “Two Centuries of Reef Growth in the Southern South China Sea,” CO2 Science
Vol. 15, No. 20, May)
The authors write that "rising atmospheric CO2 and global warming are regarded as fatal threats to coral reefs," noting that "the
IPCC has
reported that by the end of this century, coral reefs will be the first ecological system that will become extinct,"
citing Wilkinson (2004). However, they say "others contend that rising
seawater temperature is conducive to enhanced
coral calcification, and increased calcification will be higher than the decline caused by rising CO2," so that "coral
calcification will increase by about 35% beyond pre-industrial levels by 2100, and no extinction of coral
reefs will occur in the future," citing McNeil et al. (2004). So who's right? What was done In an attempt to shed some light on this
important question, in late May of 2004 and 2007 Shi et al. extracted
core samples of coral skeletons from several
massive live and dead Porites lutea colonies comprising part of the Meiji Reef in the southern South China Sea, after which they analyzed
their skeletal calcification rates by means of X-ray photography, which enabled them to construct a nearly three-century-long
history of coral calcification rate for the period 1716-2005. What was learned The results of the six scientists' efforts are depicted in
the figure below. As best we can determine from the Chinese scientists' graph, over the period of time depicted - when climate
alarmists claim the world warmed at a rate that was unprecedented over the past millennium or two, and when the
atmosphere's CO2 concentration rose to values not seen for millions of years - the two "fatal threats to
coral reefs," even acting together, could not prevent coral calcification rates on Meiji Reef from actually rising by about
11% over the past three centuries. What it means It certainly looks like the infamous IPCC has gotten it all wrong when it comes
to predicting the effects of rising temperature and atmospheric CO2 concentration on coral calcification rates ... because you better believe that
nature's got it right.
Framing issue—gigantic uncertainties in ocean sciences mean default to zero risk
Idso 12, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and
Idso, PhD botany – ASU, ‘12 (Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “The Unsettled Science of Ocean Warming and Acidification,” CO2 Science Vol.
15, No. 19, May)
In an eye-opening "perspective" article published a couple of years ago in the 9 December 2009 issue of the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, three
researchers from the Marine Biogeochemistry Section of the Leibniz
Institute of Marine Sciences in Kiel, Germany, describe their assessment of various possible responses of
the global ocean's seawater carbonate system, plus its physical and biological carbon pumps, to ocean warming and
associated changes in vertical mixing and overturning circulation, as well as the closely-allied phenomena of ocean
acidification and carbonation. All of these phenomena, many of which are nonlinear and extremely
complicated, are interlinked; and Riebesell and his colleagues thus conclude, from their objective review of the
pertinent scientific literature, that the magnitude and even the sign of the global ocean's carbon cycle
feedback to climate change are , in their words, "yet unknown." They note, for example, that "our understanding of
biological responses to ocean change is still in its infancy." With respect to ocean acidification, in
particular, they write that the impact it will have on marine life "is still uncertain," and that the phenomenon itself is but "one
side of the story," the other side being what they call "ocean carbonation," which, as they describe it, "will likely be beneficial
to some groups of photosynthetic organisms." Thus, they write that "our present understanding of biologically
driven feedback mechanisms is still rudimentary," and that with respect to many of their magnitudes, "our understanding is
too immature to even make a guess." What is more, they imply that even what we do think we know could well be wrong,
because, as they elucidate, "our present knowledge of pH/CO2 sensitivities of marine organisms is based almost
entirely on short-term perturbation experiments, neglecting the possibility of evolutionary adaptation."
Wake Forest Debate
Hurwitz
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Wake Forest Debate
Hurwitz
5/53
2nc resiliency
Ocean acidification will be slow and stable, proven by 1000 studies- it improves ocean resiliency
Codling ‘11 [Jo, received a Bachelor of Science first class and won the FH Faulding and the Swan Brewery prizes at the University of
Western Australia. Her major was microbiology, molecular biology. Nova received a Graduate Certificate in Scientific Communication from the
Australian National University in 1989,[4] and she did honours research in 1990, prize-winning science graduate, Jo has has done over 200 radio
interviews, many on the Australian ABC. She was formerly an associate lecturer in Science Communication at the ANU and is based in Perth,
Western Australia, , “Ocean Acidification — a little bit less alkalinity could be a good thing,” Sept. 11, http://joannenova.com.au/2011/09/oceanacidification-a-little-bit-less-alkalinity-could-be-a-good-thing/]
Studies of how marine life copes with less alkaline conditions include many experiments with water at pH values in a range beyond anything that
is likely on planet Earth — they go beyond the bounds of what’s possible. There are estimates that the pH of the ocean has shifted about 0.1 pH
unit in the last 200 years, yet some studies consider the effects of water that is shifted by 2 or even 4 entire pH
units. Four pH units means 10,000 fold change in the concentration of hydrogen ions). That’s a shift so large, it’s not going to
occur in the next few thousand years , even under the worst of the worst case scenarios by the most
sadistic models. Indeed, it’s virtually impossible for CO2 levels to rise high enough to effect that kind
of change , even if we burned every last fossil, every tree, plant microbe, and vaporized life on earth. (Yet
still someone thought it was worth studying what would happen if, hypothetically, that happened. Hmm.)¶ 1103 studies on acidification say
there’s no need to panic¶ CO2 science has an extraordinary data base of 1103 studies of the effects of
“acidification” on marine life. They reason that any change beyond 0.5 pH units is “far far beyond the
realms of reality”
even if you are concerned about coral reefs in the year 2300 (see Tans 2009). Even
the IPCC’s highest
end “scenario A2″ estimate predicts a peak change in the range of 0 .6 units by 2300 .¶ Many of the
headlines forecasting “Death to Reefs” come from studies of ocean water at extreme pH’s that will
never occur globally , and that are beyond even what the IPCC is forecasting. Some headlines come from studies of hydrothermal vents
where CO2 bubbles up from the ocean floor. Not surprisingly they find changes to marine life near the vents, but then, the pH of these areas
ranges right down to 2.8. They are an extreme environment, nothing like what we might expect to convert the worlds oceans too.¶ Marine life,
quite happy about a bit more CO2?¶ Studies of growth, calcification, metabolism, fertility and survival show that,
actually, if things were a little less alkaline, on average, marine life would benefit . There will be winners and
the whole, using those five measures of health, the reefs are more likely to have more life on
and around them, than they are to shrink.¶ Figure 12. Percent change in the five measured life characteristics (calcification,
losers, but on
metabolism, growth, fertility and survival) vs. decline of seawater pH from its present (control treatment) value to ending values extending up to
the beginning pH value of "the warped world of the IPCC" for all individual data points falling within this pH decline range. ¶ How can this be?¶
life evolved under conditions where most of the time the world was warmer and had more
CO2 in the atmosphere than it does today. Second, like life above the water, life-below-water is based on carbon,
and putting more carbon into the water is not necessarily a bad thing. That said, the dots in the graph above represent
study results, and the ones below zero tell us there will be some losers, even though there will be more winners (above zer0).
First, marine
Thirdly, watch out for some of the more devastating headlines which also come from studies where researchers changed the pH by tossing
hydrochloric acid into the tank. Chlorine, as they say, is not the same as the gas nature breathes — CO2. (The strange thing about the studies with
hydrochloric acid, is that it doesn’t seem to be bad as we might have expected– nonetheless, it seems like a dubious practice to use in studying the
health of corals.)¶ The Ocean Acidification Database is housed at CO2 science. ¶ The graph above is just one of many on their results and
conclusions page.¶ The bottom line:¶ Yes, we should watch and monitor the oceans careful. No, there is no chance the Great Barrier
Reef will be gone in the next 100 years: 1103 studies show that if the worlds oceans were slightly less
basic then marine life as a whole will be slightly more likely to grow, survive, and be fertile.
Climate change proves Oceans and marine bioD are resilient – alarmist predictions empirically
denied
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Taylor ‘10 (James M. Taylor is a senior fellow of The Heartland Institute and managing editor of
Environment & Climate News., “Ocean Acidification Scare Pushed at Copenhagen,” Feb 10
http://www.heartland.org/publications/environment%20climate/article/26815/Ocean_Acidification_Scare
_Pushed_at_Copenhagen.html)
With global temperatures continuing their decade-long decline and United Nations-sponsored global warming talks falling apart in
Copenhagen, alarmists at the U.N. talks spent
considerable time claiming carbon dioxide emissions will cause
catastrophic ocean acidification, regardless of whether temperatures rise. The latest scientific data, however,
show no such catastrophe is likely to occur . Food Supply Risk Claimed The United Kingdom’s environment secretary,
Hilary Benn, initiated the Copenhagen ocean scare with a high-profile speech and numerous media interviews claiming ocean acidification
threatens the world’s food supply. “The fact is our seas absorb CO2. They absorb about a quarter of the total that we produce,
but it is making our seas more acidic,” said Benn in his speech. “If this continues as a problem, then it can affect the one billion people who
depend on fish as their principle source of protein, and we have to feed another 2½ to 3 billion people over the next 40 to 50 years.”
Benn’s claim of oceans becoming “more acidic” is misleading, however. Water with a pH of 7.0 is
considered neutral. pH values lower than 7.0 are considered acidic, while those higher than 7.0 are considered
alkaline. The world’s oceans have a pH of 8.1, making them alkaline, not acidic. Increasing carbon
dioxide concentrations would make the oceans less alkaline but not acidic. Since human industrial
activity first began emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere a little more than 200 years ago, the pH of the oceans has
fallen merely 0.1, from 8.2 to 8.1. Following Benn’s December 14 speech and public relations efforts, most of the world’s major
media outlets produced stories claiming ocean acidification is threatening the world’s marine life. An Associated Press headline, for
example, went so far as to call ocean acidification the “evil twin” of climate change. Studies Show CO2 Benefits Numerous recent scientific
studies show higher
carbon dioxide levels in the world’s oceans have the same beneficial effect on
marine life as higher levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide have on terrestrial plant life. In a 2005
study published in the Journal of Geophysical Research, scientists examined trends in
chlorophyll concentrations, critical building blocks in the oceanic food chain. The French and American scientists reported “an
overall increase of the world ocean average chlorophyll concentration by about 22 percent” during the prior two decades of increasing carbon
dioxide concentrations. In a 2006 study published in Global Change Biology, scientists observed higher CO2 levels are correlated with better
growth conditions for oceanic life. The
highest CO2 concentrations produced “higher growth rates and
biomass yields” than the lower CO2 conditions. Higher CO2 levels may well fuel “subsequent
primary production, phytoplankton blooms, and sustaining oceanic food-webs,” the study concluded.
Ocean Life ‘Surprisingly Resilient’ In a 2008 study published in Biogeosciences, scientists subjected marine
organisms to varying concentrations of CO2, including abrupt changes of CO2 concentration.
The ecosystems were “surprisingly resilient” to changes in atmospheric CO2, and “the ecosystem composition,
bacterial and phytoplankton abundances and productivity, grazing rates and total grazer abundance and reproduction were not significantly
affected by CO2-induced effects.” In a 2009 study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, scientists reported, “Sea
star growth and feeding rates increased with water temperature from 5ºC to 21ºC. A doubling of current [CO2] also increased growth rates
both with and without a concurrent temperature increase from 12ºC to 15ºC.” Another False CO2 Scare “ Far
too many
predictions of CO2-induced catastrophes are treated by alarmists as sure to occur, when realworld observations show these doomsday scenarios to be highly unlikely or even virtual
impossibilities ,” said Craig Idso, Ph.D., author of the 2009 book CO2, Global Warming and Coral Reefs. “The phenomenon of CO2induced ocean acidification appears to be no different.
Wake Forest Debate
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1nc disease
No impact
Posner ‘5 (Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the
University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks
and what we can do about them.”
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmske/is_3_11/ai_n29167514/pg_2?tag=content;col1, March 11,
2005)
Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so
of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have
been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has
come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors
germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be
spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus,
wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is
no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would
cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric
times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease),
despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is
improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous
losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.
Wake Forest Debate
Hurwitz
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2nc no impact
Science means extinction is impossible
a.) Any disease that kills its host too fast will die off
UE 07 – understanding evolution, Website on Evolution from UC Berkeley (December, "Evolution from a virus's view,"
http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/news/071201_adenovirus)
Since transmission is a matter of life or death for pathogen lineages, some evolutionary
biologists have focused on this as the key to understanding why some have evolved into killers
and others cause no worse than the sniffles. The idea is that there may be an evolutionary trade-off
between virulence and transmission. Consider a virus that exploits its human host more than
most and so produces more offspring than most. This virus does a lot of damage to the host — in
other words, is highly virulent. From the virus's perspective, this would, at first, seem like a good thing; extra resources mean extra
offspring, which generally means high evolutionary fitness. However, if the viral reproduction completely
incapacitates the host, the whole strategy could backfire: the illness might prevent the host from
going out and coming into contact with new hosts that the virus could jump to. A victim of its
own success, the viral lineage could go extinct and become an evolutionary dead end. This level
of virulence is clearly not a good thing from the virus's perspective.
b.) Natural Immunities
Sowell 01 – Fellow at Hoover Institution (Thomas, March 5, Jewish World Review, “The Dangers of “Equality”,
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell030501.asp)
People have different vulnerabilities and resistances to a variety of diseases. That is why one disease is
unlikely to wipe out the human species, even in one place. An epidemic that sweeps through an area may
leave some people dying like flies while others remain as healthy as horses.
New disease control models allow reducing diseases to extinction and predicting outbreaks allowing
control
Ira 09, American Physical Society, (Schwartz, “Fluctuations in epidemic modeling - disease extinction and control” Physical Society,
2009 APS March Meeting, March 16-20, 2009, abstract #D7.003http: adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2009APS..MAR.D7003S)
The analysis
of infectious disease fluctuations has recently seen an increasing rise in the use of new tools
and models from stochastic dynamics and statistical physics. Examples arise in modeling fluctuations of multistrain diseases, in modeling adaptive social behavior and its impact on disease fluctuations, and in the analysis
of disease extinction in finite population models. Proper stochastic model reduction [1] allows one to predict unobserved
fluctuations from observed data in multi-strain models [2]. Degree alteration and power law behavior is predicted in adaptive network
epidemic models [3,4]. And extinction rates derived from large fluctuation theory exhibit scaling with respect to distance to the
bifurcation point of disease onset with an unusual exponent [5]. In
addition to outbreak prediction, another main
goal of epidemic modeling is one of eliminating the disease to extinction through various control
mechanisms, such as vaccine implementation or quarantine. In this talk, a description will be presented of the
fluctuational behavior of several epidemic models and their extinction rates. A general framework and analysis of the effect of non-
In particular, in it is shown that
even in the presence of a small Poisson distributed vaccination program, there is an exponentially
enhanced rate to disease extinction. These ideas may lead to improved methods of controlling
disease where random vaccinations are prevalent.
Gaussian control actuations which enhance the rate to disease extinction will be described.
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a/t: trade impact
Trade will never collapse
Ikenson, 9 [Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “ A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes
and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651]
Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy
rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the
global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International
Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum
bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would
decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth
experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global
trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's
passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not
that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their
tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But
most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the
impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11
Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not
going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the
events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures
in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that
the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived
as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American
provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice
commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But
even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing
trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and
provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government
initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on it s tariff
schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When
the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3
percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the
Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some
capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on
communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an
import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on
February 27, a new free
trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media
and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around
the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments
remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge
discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in
commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to
accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.
Wake Forest Debate
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1nc food
Food shortages won’t cause war
Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr
professor – MIT
(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the
interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36
Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)
The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or
water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over
food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the
economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows
linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite
natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if
these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most
empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and
greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More
generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has
breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist
scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of
alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars.
The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for
example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP,
2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and
social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has
an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities
at the international level. In the Middle East , presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have
also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be
over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the
sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent
water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by
president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up
by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last
decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the
amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an
important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food
systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus
belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University
of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water
seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the
incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate
(Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than twothirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if
one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument.
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According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized
political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and
approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have
been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by
a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no
direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to
agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the
different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water
rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries
(see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water
needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity
exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards
the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process
of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms
of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much
sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to
occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water
supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate
change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will
precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown,
institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch,
2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall
(2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water
shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern
that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the
connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).
Double bind – either no food scarcity, or there are tons of alt causes
Adeline 13 – food preservation specialist (02/17, “Food Storage: The Solution to Food Shortage,”
http://beforeitsnews.com/survival/2013/02/food-storage-the-solution-to-food-shortage-2462712.html)
We humans need food for proper nutrition. In times of crisis, access to a stable food supply is the key to
continued survival. In the presence of natural disasters, human conflicts, climate change, and
overpopulation , the threat of food shortages and total famine is not as far-fetched as it seems.
Preparing long-term food supplies can buffer the effects of these potential catastrophes. The Anatomy of a
Catastrophe Many people think that food shortages may be a thing of the past. Thanks to the marvels of
modern technology and scientific farming methods, we have a constant and abundant supply of food.
It is difficult to imagine how a food shortage can happen – but it is still a possibility. During ancient
times, humans hunted and gathered for food. Then a revolution occurred and changed the course of
history: we learned how to cultivate the soil, plant crops, and domesticate animals for a stable source of
food. Eventually, modern technology has improved farming and fishing techniques, that food
production has now become large-scale. People now depend on hard-working farmers and fishermen
for their everyday supply of food. But what happens when the harvests are poor? The farmer will keep his
produce to feed his own family first – other people are left without food. Such scenario is still possible
today because there are man-made disasters and natural calamities that threaten the world’s food supply.
For example, a hurricane rages across the country and floods several states. Our access to food is
restricted because travel is nearly impossible. To add to that, business establishments like groceries and
supermarkets are probably closed down due to the flood as well as a power outage. Some might argue that
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Hurwitz
12/53
this is not a real food shortage scenario because the problem is merely logistics: there is food; it is just
that we have no access to it. It is true that natural calamities and wars cause a food shortage only
temporarily. However, recent studies show that at present, we consume more than we produce. The
UN warns that grain reserves are progressively getting lower because of droughts and crop failures in
major food producing countries. The famine in Africa may possibly be felt in other parts of the world.
This is an emergency situation that requires us to prepare beforehand. We must have a supply of food and
water for us to survive.
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2nc no shortage
New tech and adaption solve food shortages
Michaels 11 Patrick Michaels is senior fellow in environmental studies at the CATO Institute. " Global
Warming and Global Food Security," June 30, CATO,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/global-warming-global-food-security
While doing my dissertation I learned a few things about world crops. Serial adoption of new technologies produces a nearly
constant increase in yields. Greater fertilizer application, improved response to fertilizer, better
tractor technology, better tillage practices, old-fashioned genetic selection, and new-fashioned
genetic engineering all conspire to raise yields, year after year.¶ Weather and climate have
something to do with yields, too. Seasonal rainfall can vary a lot from year-to-year. That's
"weather." If dry years become dry decades (that's "climate") farmers will switch from corn to
grain sorghum, or, where possible, wheat. Breeders and scientists will continue to develop more
water-efficient plants and agricultural technologies, such as no-till production.¶ Adaptation even
applies to the home garden. The tomato variety "heat wave" sets fruit at higher temperatures than traditional cultivars.¶ However, Gillis claims that "[t]he rapid
growth in farm output that defined the late 20th century has slowed" because of global warming.¶ His own figures show this is wrong. The increasing trend in
world crop yields from 1960 to 1980 is exactly the same as from 1980 to 2010. And per capita
grain production is rising, not falling.
Innovation solves
Chang 11 – Graduated Cornell Law School (Gordon G., Feb 21, “Global Food Wars”
http://blogs.forbes.com/gordonchang/2011/02/21/global-food-wars/)
In any event, food-price increases have apparently been factors in the unrest now sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. The poor spend up
to half their disposable income on edibles, making rapid food inflation a cause of concern for dictators, strongmen, and assorted autocrats
everywhere. So even if humankind does not go to war over bad harvests, Paskal may be right when she contends that climate
change may end up altering the global map. This
is not the first time in human history that food shortages looked like
they would be the motor of violent geopolitical change. Yet amazing agronomic advances, especially
Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution in the middle of the 20th century, have consistently proved the
pessimists wrong. In these days when capitalism is being blamed for most everything, it’s important to
remember the power of human innovation in free societies—and the efficiency of free markets.
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1nc REMS
Won’t happen – not commercially feasible – their ev is media hype
Gordon 11, Julie, mining and minerals reporter for reuters, “Analysis: Underwater rare earths likely a pipe dream,” July 6 th,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/us-rareearths-underwater-idUSTRE7655M320110706
An underwater bonanza of rare earth deposits discovered by Japanese scientists poses little threat to miners
already developing major rare earth projects on solid ground. Companies such as Molycorp, Lynas and Avalon Rare Metals may rest
assured that developing the offshore bounty could take decades and cost billions, making it little more
than a pipe dream, analysts say. "'Desperado', that's the first word that comes to mind," said Jacob Securities analyst Luisa
Moreno. "It makes for some nice headlines, but I don't think it would really be feasible to do this." The discovery of
the vast deposits, located on the floor of the Pacific Ocean, 3,500 to 6,000 meters (11,500 to 20,000 feet) below sea level, marks the latest bid by
the Japanese to secure their own supply of rare earths, which are critical ingredients in the production of high tech products. Prices for rare earth
metals have skyrocketed over the last year as China, producer of some 97 percent of the global supply, has repeatedly clamped down on exports.
Dysprosium, which is used to make magnets for hybrid cars and smartphones, has soared to $3,600 a kilogram, up from $300 a kg a year ago,
while neodymium, also used in magnets, is hovering at about $450 a kg, up from $45 late last year. Outside China, Japan is the largest consumer
of the group of 17 metals, and the breakneck price jumps have hit it hard. The country's demand for rare earths is expected to shrink by as much
as 30 percent in 2011 as companies cut usage, sources told Reuters. "Obviously they are very frustrated and very desperate for alternatives,"
Moreno said. She noted that the Japanese have been experimenting with rare earth recycling, and are also looking to invest in rare earth
exploration projects around the world. "They want to be independent from China," she said. "These materials are really, really critical for their
economy." PUMP AND SEPARATE With some 80 billion to 100 billion tonnes of contained rare earths, the underwater deposits outlined by
Japan are certainly larger than any deposits found on solid ground -- but the feasibility of harvesting the metals from sea sludge is less clear.
According to Japanese scientists, it is simply a matter of pumping up the material from the ocean floor and using acid to extract the rare earths
from the mud. But analysts aren't so sure. They point out that rare
earths are notoriously tricky to process on a
commercial level, and that development of the deposits, located miles underneath the sea, would be costly. "The technology you
would need, with the pressure and the corrosive factors that are there," said Dahlman Rose analyst Anthony Young. "I
think this one falls into the camp of something that is less likely to ever be developed." Certainly there are mining companies that
see value in the ocean floor. Canada's Nautilus Minerals plans to develop an underwater copper project off the coast of Papua New Guinea, while
the diamond industry has been mining off the Namibian shoreline for years. But with hundreds of companies exploring and developing rare earth
deposits on solid ground, analysts say the value of mining the metals underwater remains unclear. "The cost of undersea mining, necessarily, is
going to be high," said Byron Capital Markets analyst Jon Hykawy. "The value of the mined products must therefore be high." "Rare earths have
become pricier, but they are by no means pushing the levels of the prices of really rare materials such as gold." BETTER BETS Chinese state
media reported on Wednesday that the country is planning to reform its export of rare earths based in part on World Trade Organization rules, a
move that could loosen the supply crunch. Still, analysts say there is a clear need to develop mines outside China, and the top pick for many is
Molycorp, which plans to start up its Mountain Pass mine in California next year, ramping up to output of 40,000 tonnes a year by late 2013.
Rival Lynas, which owns the Mount Weld mine in Australia, plans to start up production by the end of the year, hitting 22,000 tonnes annually in
2013. Junior miners such as Avalon, Rare Element Resources and Great Western Minerals are all clamoring to be next. With global demand at
about 130,000 tonnes in 2010 and expected to grow rapidly over the next five years, Molycorp and Lynas together can produce about a third of
the world's need. If Japan develops the deep sea deposits, which a government source said could come into production within five to 10 years, it
also would be a huge source of supply. "Just one square kilometer (0.4 square mile) of deposits will be able to provide one-fifth of the current
global annual consumption," said Yasuhiro Kato, an associate professor of earth science at the University of Tokyo. Still, rare earth producers and
explorers are not fazed by the possibility of future competition from offshore mines. "It's
ridiculous to think you'd be able to
dig anything up and haul it up from those kinds of depths," said an executive at a Canadian-listed rare earth company,
who declined to speak on the record because of the sensitivity of the issue. "I'll wait for the giant squid and the prehistoric
monsters that will come out of the bottom of the sea first before we see any rare earths."
The environment’s resilient
Easterbrook ‘95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow @ The Fullbright Foundation and Reuters Columnist,
“A Moment on Earth,” p. 25, 1995)
In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the
environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase
of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment
is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment
that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages;
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bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful
than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism
releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic
poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into
plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and
lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets
bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed
these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would
have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human
assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the
magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.
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1nc water wars
No impact to water scarcity
Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT
(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource
scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)
The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates
on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to
conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the
Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and
population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neoMalthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits
are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that
most empirical studies do not support
any
these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically
increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during
the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons
from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist
of
scenarios
have linked the increasing use
of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water
wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and
within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic
and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security
and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.
In the Middle East , presidents, prime
ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the
Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of
transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international
conflicts. The
evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these
declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased
attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that
can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability,
sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None
of the various and extensive databases on the causes of
war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University
of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to
have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to
water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins
At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the
‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate
this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies
signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with
water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water
wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war.
correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict.
There is
however
no
direct
Most specialists now tend to agree that the major
issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005,
Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water
rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other
rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water
needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of
the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have
argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and
relatively water
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Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations,
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the threat of water wars
sense in the light of the recent historical record.
due to increasing scarcity
does not make
much
Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and
appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates
over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate
change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass
migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US
Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that
water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite
growing concern that climate
change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections
is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).
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2nc no war
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2nc no impact
Cooperation is more likely – history is decisively neg – private stewardship solves
Lee 12 (Sylvia Lee leads the water program at the Skoll Global Threats Fund. World Water Day 2013: Water as a Catalyst for Peace, 3/22,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/skollworldforum/2013/03/22/world-water-day-2013-water-as-a-catalyst-for-peace/)
The news is not all dire . Historically, water has acted as a catalyst for peace . In fact, studies by
experts have found that countries are more likely to cooperate over water than to fight over water.
The Indus Water Treaty has withstood the test of two wars between India and Pakistan. During the
Vietnam War, countries in the Mekong River basin still continued technical negotiations. After
independence, nine countries in the Niger River Basin in Africa created a joint river basin authority
to cooperatively manage their joint water resources. In fact, over 3,600 water-related treaties have
been signed in the past 1200 years . The role to promote and improve water cooperation is not only
confined to governments. Skoll Award for Social Entrepreneur, Friends of the Earth Middle
East/Ecopeace, is a unique organization that brings together Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli
environmentalists to promote cooperative efforts to protect the Jordan River Basin and the
Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank. IUCN’s Ecosystems for life project bring together scientists
from India and Bangladesh to do joint research projects across boundaries. The private sector has
been actively engaged in various discussions and joint initiatives such as the CEO Water Mandate,
the Alliance for Water Stewardship, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
to develop a set of guidelines for the private sector to engage in water and define “ good water
stewardship ”. Since water is a common property resource, no one owns the problem and no one
owns the solution. To tackle one of the biggest challenges we face in the 21st century, we need to
continue to find innovative ways to cooperate and work together to provide water security for all.
Empirics prove – 4,500 years and 3,600 treaties later there have been no water wars – even if there
was a war the main factor wouldn’t be water
Doyle 06 – Environmental correspondent, Reuters, (Alister September 17, “Water Wars” loom? But none in past 4,500 years”
http://harowo.com/2006/09/17/water-wars-loom-but-none-in-past-4500-years/) Jacome
With a steady stream of bleak predictions that "water wars" will be fought over dwindling supplies
in the 21st century, battles between two Sumerian city-states 4,500 years ago seem to set a worrying precedent. But the good
news, many experts say, is that the conflict between Lagash and Umma over irrigation rights in what is now Iraq was the
last time two states went to war over water.Down the centuries since then, international rivals
sharing waters such as the Jordan River, the Nile, the Ganges or the Parana have generally favoured cooperation over
conflict. So if history can be trusted, things may stay that way. "The simple explanation is that water is simply
too important to fight over," said Aaron Wolf, a professor at Oregon State University. "Nations often go to the brink of
war over water and then resolve their differences." Since the war between Lagash and Umma,
recorded on a stone carving showing vultures flying off with the heads of defeated Umma warriors,
no wars have been fought and 3,600 international water treaties have been signed, he said. Yet
politicians regularly warn that water shortages caused by surging populations and climate change could trigger
conflicts this century in a world where a billion people in developing countries lack access to clean drinking water."Fierce competition for
fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future," U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in 2001. The English word
"rival" even comes from the Latin "rivalis" meaning "someone sharing a river". Other experts say international "water wars" are
unlikely."I don’t really expect wars over water because … the benefits of collaboration are so great," said
Frank Rijsberman, head of the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). And still others say water might be one factor in future
conflicts. Achim Steiner, executive director of the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), says this is particularly true in border regions where
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countries share rivers."I am not somebody who believes that our third world war will be over water, but I think the potential for conflict
will grow as we are faced with water scarcity," he told Reuters. SCARCITY WORSENS? Rijsberman led a U.N.-backed report in August that
said one in three people lives in a region where water is scarce and that demand could almost double by 2050 — led by farming which absorbs 74
percent of all freshwater used by humans. Planting extra crops to produce biofuels and global warming — which could bring more erosion,
droughts and floods — could add new pressures, the report said. But it added that there was enough water to go around, with better planning. "If
there is a war between two countries the 15th reason could be water but the first 14 reasons will
have absolutely nothing to do with water," said Asit Biswas, head of the Third World Centre for Water Management in Mexico
City. "But if I want to get in the media the easiest thing is to say that a water war is about to break out in the Middle East," he said. "The
last war over water was thousands of years ago."
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a/t: Pakistan collapse
Pakistan won’t collapse
Parvez Jabri is a reporter with Business Recorder, 14 [“Political stability encouraging more investors to
focus on Pakistan,” Jan 4, http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/1-front-top-news/151542-politicalstability-encouraging-more-investors-to-focus-on-pakistan.html]
ISLAMABAD: The investors are heading to Pakistan to benefit from a newly elected businessfriendly government that is rolling out an economic programme to aid the struggling economy, a
Wall Street Journal report said.¶ In its report published on Friday, the American daily said the
benchmark index traded in the financial capital Karachi jumped 49.4 percent last year, ranking as
one of the world's top performers. The market jumped another 2.8 percent Thursday, the first
trading day of 2014.¶ The report said the rally is also part of a broad move by money managers,
willing to take on high risks in frontier markets across the globe on hopes of juicy returns that beat
traditional emerging markets. That bet paid off handsomely in 2013 with countries including
Argentina, Venezuela and Vietnam also scoring big gains although they also have a history of volatile
movements and sudden declines.¶ The report observed that the catalyst in Pakistan was the election in
May of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz led by Nawaz Sharif, a business-friendly politician. It is
the first time in the nation's history an elected government has handed over power to another,
raising expectations for improved political stability.¶ Flows from foreign investors into Pakistan
reached $283 million from the beginning of May, the month of the election, to the end of 2013, according
to the National Clearing Company of Pakistan. Global investors have also snapped up Pakistani
government bonds with yields, which move inversely to prices, falling to 7.54 percent recently from
as high as 11.69 percent in April on the 10-year bond.¶ In a further sign of growing confidence, the
government said last month it is also aiming to sell billions of rupee debt aimed at the Pakistani
diaspora. A spokesman for the finance ministry said there is currently no specific timeframe on the
issuance of the bonds.¶ It said that the optimism stems from the government paying off $5 billion in
debt that was weighing on the energy sector, freeing up funds at fuel importers and power
producers and distributors. The country also agreed to a long-term bailout loan of at least $6.6 billion
from the International Monetary Fund to avoid a potential balance of payments crisis. The government
has in addition announced a far reaching privatization programme which will include the national airline
and electricity producers.¶ The energy move was important given the country is plagued by electricity
shortages, while the oil and gas sector accounts for nearly a third of the benchmark index in Karachi. The
largest company on the index, energy firm Oil and Gas Development Co. rose 43.5 percent last year.¶
"Given that the general impression of the new government has been corporate friendly that is a
very strong factor that made people more optimistic about Pakistan," said Mattias Martinsson, chief
investment officer and partner at fund company Tundra Fonder in Stockholm, which runs a $30 million
Pakistan fund.¶ For all the gains however, the market is small with the market capitalization of the
companies listed in Karachi at around $52 billion, according to securities firm Foundation
Securities research. That compares to neighboring India where the companies on the Bombay Stock
Exchange are valued at around $1.1 trillion.¶ "Pakistan as a market has very many companies that are
trading below their fair value, but as it goes you get distracted by other more important markets,"
said Arnout van Rijn, chief investment officer at Robeco Asia Pacific in Hong Kong, who manages the
$1.2 billion Robeco Asia-Pacific Equities fund.¶ The market has been up since the end of 2008
however, with shares soaring 329 percent to the end of 2013 - despite the country being hit by
terrorism, the economy nose-diving and Karachi suffering law and order situation during that
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period.¶ Some investors say that those companies that survive both a weak economy and regular
violence throughout the country are well run, resilient and especially appealing. Unilever Pakistan
Foods Ltd., a unit of the consumer goods giant, shot up 116 percent last year.¶ "When you have to deal in
this kind of environment, I think you have to be extremely good as management to deal with it and
survive," said Thomas Vester, fund manager at Lloyd George Management, who runs the firm's frontier
market investments, and manages assets worth $656 million as of Oct. 31.¶ And the relative political
stability now is encouraging more investors to focus on the country whose population of around 180
million makes it the sixth most populous country in the world and a potential draw for those betting
on rising incomes and more consumer spending. The market remains cheap even after the strong runup earlier this year - currently trading at over nine times trailing 12 month earnings - a common valuation
measure used by stock analysts.¶ "Pakistan has a fairly diverse economy with a large and young
population that needs to be fed and supplied basic infrastructure such as electricity," said Caglar
Somek, global portfolio manager at Caravel Management in New York, which manages around $650
million.¶ "If you find the companies that supply those basic needs, growing at double digit with high
profitability, you can buy them at valuations that are on average 30 percent to 40 percent cheaper
than their emerging market peers," said Somek.
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a/t: indopak war
No war – deterrence checks escalation
Ganguly ‘8 (Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair
at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Vol. 33,
No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 45–70, Fall 2008)
As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia.
Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has
argued, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership,
secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an
effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while
containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian
military planners can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open
question. This article’s analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear
deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three
specific forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First,
there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably,
Pakistan’s willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a
nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two
parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle
in India’s internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that
occurred was the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use
in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous
uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized,
trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions
of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did
multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to establish a firm causal connection between the growth of
Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability.
Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope
and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did
exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of
Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they
left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground ªre.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to
avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into
Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in Kashmir in 1965,
within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In
fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts
of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not
especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had
died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain
stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war
with the People’s Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military
was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104
Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small
number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military
remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns
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were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations,
the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian
military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military
context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-confident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially
more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions
about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve
strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the
political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose
to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent
Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993:.
The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble
nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part
of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in infiltrators,
India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That
escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration
of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not
send its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87
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a/t: Africa war
Wars now disprove African escalation
Straus ’13 (Scott Straus, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Wisconsin, African Arguments, part of the Guardian Africa Network, Scott Straus, “Africa is becoming
more peaceful, despite the war in Mali”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/30/africa-peacefulmali-war, January 30, 2013)
Recent events in Mali, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Sudan seem to confirm one of the most durable stereotypes of Africa, namely that the continent is
unstable and uniquely prone to nasty political violence. Writing in Foreign Policy two years ago, New
York Times east Africa correspondent and Pulitzer Prize winner Jeffrey Gettleman espoused this view.
He painted a dismal picture of pointless wars waged by brutes and criminals "spreading across
Africa like a viral pandemic."
Wars won’t be large-scale
Straus ’13 (Scott Straus for African Arguments, part of the Guardian Africa Network, Scott Straus is a
professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, “Africa is becoming
more peaceful, despite the war in Mali”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/30/africa-peacefulmali-war, January 30, 2013)
The bigger point is that we may be witnessing significant shifts in the nature of political violence on
the continent. Wars are on the decline since the 1990s, but the character of warfare is also changing .
Today there are fewer big wars fought for state control in which insurgents maintain substantial
control of territory and put up well-structured armies to fight their counterparts in the state – Mali
not withstanding. Such wars were modal into the 1990s. From southern Africa in Angola, Mozambique,
Namibia, and even Zimbabwe to the long wars in the Horn in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan to the Great
Lakes wars in Rwanda and Uganda, the typical armed conflict in Africa involved two major, territoryholding armies fighting each other for state control. Today's wars typically are smaller . They most
often involve small insurgencies of factionalised rebels on the peripheries of states. Today's wars also
play out differently. They exhibit cross-border dimensions, and rather than drawing funding from big
external states they depend on illicit trade, banditry, and international terrorist networks. Typical of
today's wars are the rebels in Casamance, in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, various armed groups
in Darfur, and the Lord's Resistance Army. The latter typifies an emerging trend of trans-national
insurgents. The LRA moves across multiple states in the Great Lakes region. Northern Mali is another
case in point – prior to seizing control of the north, the Islamists moved across multiple countries in the
Sahel. Once they gained territorial control in 2012, they attracted fighters from Nigeria and across North
Africa. Moreover, these are not non-ideological wars, as Gettleman claims. The jihadis in Mali and
Somalia, the separatists in Casamance, and the rebels in Darfur are certainly fighting for a cause.
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a/t: central asia
No escalation- nations cooperate
Collins and Wohlforth ‘4 (Kathleen, Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and William,
Professor of Government – Dartmouth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations”, Strategic Asia 2003-4:
Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-313, 2004)
Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture
the declared interests of the great powers as well as the best reading of their
objective interests in security and economic growth. Perhaps more importantly, it fails
to explain their actual behavior on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the
Central Asian states themselves. Naturally, there are competitive elements in great
power relations. Each country’s policymaking community has slightly different
preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more
influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with
those preferences. But these clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends
that all the great powers share. To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would
prefer that their own national firms or their own government’s budget be the
beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and
transshipment of the region’s natural resources. But the scale of these rents is
marginal even for Russia’s oil-fueled budget. And for taxable profits to be created, the
projects must make sense economically—something that is determined more by
markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting
metaphor that serves to draw people’s attention to an oft-neglected region. The
problem is the great-game lens can distort realities on the ground, and therefore bias
analysis and policy. For when great powers are locked in a competitive fight, the
issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending
states. Power itself becomes the issue—one that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing
an essential positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will
result in missed opportunities for cooperation that leaves all players—not least the
people who live in the region—poorer and more insecure. While cautious realism
must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable
region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least
conditional and relative optimism . Given the confluence of their chief strategic
interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than
analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress
that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror
attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and
Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the
United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCOCSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate
more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan [The Stans] are clearly on a trajectory that portends
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longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic
security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that
“great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and
destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in
Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’
relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and
domestic stability in Central Asia.
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a/t: Chinese stability
No collapse—the government represses instability
Pei ‘9 (Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Will the Chinese Communist
Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survivethe-crisis, March 12, 2009)
It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed
migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the
world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a
revolutionary scenario
overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the
regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest
may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A
glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified
elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of
abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually
spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress
chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's
Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the
most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of
information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of
dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities.
Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most
experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of
"political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If
worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off
any organized movement against the regime.
China unsustainable- collapse inevitable
Dickson ’12 (Micah Dickson, SeekingAlpha, Investor Trading Online News, “The Cracks In The Great Economic Wall Of China”,
November 27, 2012)
China has just gone through their once in a decade power transition. While
the transition of power has appeared to have
gone smoothly, it does not mean that the challenges facing China have diminished at all. Xi Jinping
and his regime face a host of challenges. These challenges vary from economic to societal in nature.
The current course China is on is utterly unsustainable . The question is, can the new Chinese leadership make the
necessary reforms to keep the country from a political and economic collapse? Investors must consider the size and scope of the challenges facing
China as they make decisions on where to allocate their assets for the coming year. Economic Challenges Any true economic growth is based
upon investors and consumers acting on information. The accuracy of that information can decide if that economic growth is sustainable or not.
Many of the basic economic numbers coming from China have largely been called into question. Li Kepiang, possible future premier of China,
said in 2012 that the GDP figures were "man-made". There has also been documented cases of the growth in many Chinese industries being quite
different from the overall GDP numbers that are reported. Unfortunately, China's
state owned enterprises are becoming a
prime example of the failure of accurate information from China itself. State owned enterprises are
filled with Communist Party leaders who use them to bolster the Party's power. Included in the list of state
owned enterprises are banks that provide loans to businesses. These businesses include other non-financial state owned enterprises. These loans
are given at lower interest rates and in unlimited amounts. This
incestuous relationship gives state owned enterprises
an advantage over other smaller enterprises inside the country. Besides being incredibly corrupt,
this system has led to what has been referred to as "zombie companies". These are companies that
should be going bankrupt because they are unable to repay their debt. The Chinese government is
not allowing these companies to go bankrupt. Instead the state owned banks are being forced to continue to lend money to
the enterprises despite their inability to repay the debt. Matthew Boesler from the Business Insider commented on the effects of these practices in
this way, "This is causing a deterioration in asset quality on banks' balance sheets, and increases the chances that the government will have to bail
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them out down the road".
Some estimate that the debt to equity ratio of many state owned enterprises
exceed 230%. This is a staggering figure. Even with all of these negative developments, the "official" amount of nonperforming loans in the Chinese banking sector is only 0.9%. This obvious contradiction is why so many of the numbers out of China are
deceptions. The banking sector numbers are not the only numbers that are troubling. The
state owned enterprises have been
showing weakness for a while. These enterprises make up 40% to 50% of GDP. From 2001 to 2009, these state owned enterprises
made 5.8 trillion Renminbi (RMB). This would equal $931.1 billion in the United States. Normally, this would be a tale of their success. But if
you remove the government subsidies for that same time period, the real average return on equity for the state owned enterprises would be a
problems are compounded by a growing real estate bubble . Part of China's
growth has come from the government's investment in the building of infrastructure. Robin Banerji and
negative 6.29%. These
Patrick Jackson of the BBC describe the expansion like this, "The country is said to have built the equivalent of Rome every two months in the
past decade". The problem with this rapid expansion is that supply is beginning to overtake demand.
Satellite images are showing entire Chinese cities empty many years after their construction. The World Bank's Holly Krambeck gave a
frightening example of this in the city of Chenggong. She says, "In Chenggong, there are more than 100,000 new apartments with no occupants".
This is becoming the story all over China as new buildings, office spaces, and other projects are lying empty due to the lack of occupants able to
fill these empty structures. These factors should cause investors to be cautious about their positions in China. A
red flag to any
investor should be the inability for Chinese companies to be audited by firms outside of China. If
these large economic challenges are not addressed, China may see anemic economic growth as
Japan did in the 1990s or worse , an economic catastrophe that could rock the world markets as
investors begin to move their capital to other parts of the world. This could be hastened by the growing perception
of many in the United States, China's largest customer, that companies that do business there are hurting American workers. Political
Turmoil China is currently finishing their once in a decade transition of political leadership. This
however has not come without serious hiccups in the road. There is serious tension inside the
Chinese hierarchy which is beginning to reveal itself. As Dean Cheng reported about the 2012 National People's Congress
session, "As this year's session came to a close, outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao warned of the potential for chaos and cited the Cultural Revolution
of 1966-1976". This statement immediately preceded the ousting of Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai from the Communist Party. Bo, his wife,
and many extended family members were also charged with a variety of crimes including corruption, murder, and adultery. His populist tone and
rising star in the Communist Party made him an attractive candidate for higher office and many reports say he was campaigning for a position on
the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. This committee is the most important and power part of the Chinese leadership. Bo's rising star quickly
extinguished after his former police chief tried to defect to the United States. Because of how common corruption is inside the Party, many find it
strange that Bo Xilai was ousted and charged so quickly and publicly. Dean Cheng makes this comment regarding the scandal: "Such major
developments-occurring in the midst of one of China's most public political events-suggest that Chinese politics are in major turmoil." While
the event with Bo Xilai is scandalous, it is an extension of the ongoing concern of many inside the
Party of the increasing corruption and the deterioration of the perceived legitimacy of the Party .
Premier Wen, who is exited his position during this most recent transition has even publicly called for the power of the Communist Party to be
reduced. In the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Premier Wen was quoted as saying: A ruling Party's most important duty is
to follow the constitution and the law, and restrict its activities within the constitution and the law…. This requires changes in the use of the Party
as a substitute for the government and in the phenomenon of over-concentration of power. For this, we need to reform the leadership system of
the Party and the country. But these reforms
will be close to impossible to carry out as the 70 wealthiest
members of the National People's Congress are ten times wealthier than the top 660 government
officials here in the United States. This is due to the fact that state owned enterprises are run by members of
the National People's Congress or by a close relative of those members. Any reforms would mean
these members would have to give up their sources of wealth and power. As we've seen in many cases,
economic troubles can strain political relations even further. If China does not make changes, the
corruption and decadence in the ruling Communist Party could become the scapegoat for any
"hard landing" China experiences. If China experiences a hard landing, it would lead to the second largest economy in the world
falling into political chaos. This would create uncertainty that would trump the uncertainty experienced from the problems in the European
Union. Societal Challenges The
political problems in China are compounded by the fact that there is
growing unrest among the average citizen in China. The largest problem is that of forced evictions
by the Chinese government. After the Financial Crisis of 2008, the Chinese government began implementing an extremely large
stimulus package. The main thrust of the stimulus package is to build up infrastructure across the country. In order to do this, many
Chinese cities are forcibly and violently evicting citizens who live on land that is going to be used
for new government building projects. The stories of these forced evictions have caused outrage
throughout the Chinese population. An example of how outraged many citizens are is the Chinese fishing village of Wukan. The
citizens of the village became fed up with land grabs from the government. In response, they rushed the offices of the local government during a
protest. After the protest, one of the protest leaders died while in custody. This led to the village ousting the Communist Party leadership in the
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village and democratically electing local leaders. While this rebellion is an extreme example, what caused the outrage is still there and is
becoming prevalent among the Chinese people. Land
grabs are not the only problems, income disparity, working
conditions, and many more social ills are beginning to bubble over. In 2010, China experienced
180,000 protests, riots, and mass demonstration. This is staggering . Unfortunately, many of the complaints are too
narrow to begin a nationwide movement that will cause sweeping reforms inside China. That will not last for long. More and more of
the protest leaders admit that the underlying problem with the country is the one party system that
has dominated the government for so long. This growing public anger combined with the political
turmoil inside the country could combine to create a deadly chemical reaction . Conclusion The Chinese
model is quickly becoming a potential Chinese nightmare . While it has created incredible wealth inside China, it
has created a monster that does not seem to be able to make the necessary changes. China has to go back to
the path of reforms that Deng began in 1970s in which their economy becomes freer. Unfortunately, the incredible corruption
that has sprang up from China's economic growth is beginning to insulate itself. Communist Party
leaders have shown hostility toward any change. Investors must consider these factors when looking toward China for the
growth that is missing in the United States. While that growth may be advantageous in the short to medium term, it could be an incredibly risky
bet in the long term. If
China does not address its economic, political, and societal challenges, the Great
Wall that is the rising Chinese economy may have a mighty fall .
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a/t: Mideast stability
No Middle East war
Cook ‘7 (Steven, CFR senior fellow for Mid East Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations
from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of
Pennsylvania, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265, June 28, 2007)
Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing
conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the
entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of
the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the
situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are
heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political
developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their
own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle
Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is
an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most
armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and
capability
thus
Arab
have little
for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis
returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this
possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In
the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700
kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab
leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small
contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab
countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon,
never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil
war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the
current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is
an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through
proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive crossborder incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may
abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The
Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil
wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain
its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.
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1nc leadership
Heg inevitable
Friedman 10 – American political scientist and author. He is the founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and
CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor. He has authored several books (George, “The Next 100 Years” p 13-31)
We are now in an America- centric age. To understand this age, we must understand the United States, not
only because it is so powerful but because its culture will permeate the world and define it.
Just as French culture and British culture were definitive during their times of power, so American culture, as young and
barbaric as it is, will define the way the world thinks and lives. So studying the twenty- first century means studying the United
States. If there were only one argument I could make about the twenty- first century, it would be that the
European Age has ended and that the North American Age has begun, and that North
America will be dominated by the United States for the next hundred years. The events of the
twentyfirst century will pivot around the United States. That doesn’t guarantee that the United States is necessarily a just or
moral regime. It certainly does not mean that America has yet developed a mature civilization. It does mean that in many
ways the history of the United States will be the history of the twenty- first century.
There is a deep- seated belief
in America that the United States is approaching the eve of its destruction. Read letters to the
editor, peruse the Web, and listen to public discourse. Disastrous wars, uncontrolled deficits,
high gasoline prices, shootings at universities, corruption in business and government, and an endless litany
of other shortcomings—all of them quite real—create a sense that the American dream has been shattered and that
America is past its prime. If that doesn’t convince you, listen to Europeans. They will assure you that America’s best day is
behind it. The odd thing is that all of this foreboding was present during the presidency of Richard Nixon, together with many
of the same issues. There is a continual fear that American power and prosperity are illusory, and that disaster is just around
the corner. The sense transcends ideology. Environmentalists and Christian conservatives are both delivering the same
message. Unless we repent of our ways, we will pay the price—and it may be too late already. It’s interesting to note that the
nation that believes in its manifest destiny has not only a sense of impending disaster but a nagging feeling that the country
simply isn’t what it used to be. We have a deep sense of nostalgia for the 1950s as a “simpler” time. This is quite a strange
belief. With the Korean War and McCarthy at one end, Little Rock in the middle, and Sputnik and Berlin at the other end,
and the very real threat of nuclear war throughout, the 1950s was actually a time of intense anxiety and foreboding. A widely
read book published in the 1950s was entitled The Age of Anxiety. In the 1950s, they looked back nostalgically at an earlier
America, just as we look back nostalgically at the 1950s. American culture is the manic combination of exultant hubris and
profound gloom. The net result is a sense of confidence constantly undermined by the fear that we may be drowned by melting
ice caps caused by global warming or smitten dead by a wrathful God for gay marriage, both outcomes being our personal
responsibility. American mood swings make it hard to develop a real sense of the United States at the beginning of the
twentyfirst century. But the fact is that the United States is stunningly powerful. It may be that it is heading for a catastrophe,
is hard to see one when you look at the basic facts. Let’s consider some illuminating
figures. Americans constitute about 4 percent of the world’s population but produce about
26 percent of all goods and services. In 2007 U.S. gross domestic product was about $14
trillion, compared to the world’s GDP of $54 trillion—about 26 percent of the world’s
economic activity takes place in the United States. The next largest economy in the world is
Japan’s, with a GDP of about $4.4 trillion—about a third the size of ours. The American
economy is so huge that it is larger than the economies of the next four countries combined:
but it
Japan, Germany, China, and the United Kingdom. Many people point at the declining auto and steel industries, which a
generation ago were the mainstays of the American economy, as examples of a current deindustrialization of the United States.
Certainly, a lot of industry has moved overseas. That has left the United States with industrial production of only $2.8 trillion
(in 2006): the largest in the world, more than twice the size of the next largest industrial power, Japan, and larger than
Japan’s and China’s industries combined. There is talk of oil shortages, which certainly seem to exist and will undoubtedly
increase. However, it is important to realize that the United States produced 8.3 million barrels of oil every day in 2006.
Compare that with 9.7 million for Russia and 10.7 million for Saudi Arabia. U.S. oil production is 85 percent that of Saudi
Arabia. The United States produces more oil than Iran, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates. Imports of oil into the country
are vast, but given its industrial production, that’s understandable. Comparing natural gas production in 2006, Russia was in
first place with 22.4 trillion cubic feet and the United States was second with 18.7 trillion cubic feet. U.S. natural gas
production is greater than that of the next five producers combined. In other words, although there is great concern that the
United States is wholly dependent on foreign energy, it is actually one of the world’s largest
energy producers. Given the vast size of the American economy, it is interesting to note that the United States is still
underpopulated by global standards. Measured in inhabitants per square kilometer, the world’s average population density is
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49. Japan’s is 338, Germany’s is 230, and America’s is only 31. If we exclude Alaska, which is largely uninhabitable, U.S.
population density rises to 34. Compared to Japan or Germany, or the rest of Europe, the United States is hugely
underpopulated. Even when we simply compare population in proportion to arable land—land that is suitable for
agriculture—America
has five times as much land per person as Asia, almost twice as much as
Europe, and three times as much as the global average. An economy consists of land, labor, and capital. In
the case of the United States, these numbers show that the nation can still grow—it has plenty of room to increase all three.
There are many answers to the question of why the U.S. economy is so powerful, but the
simplest answer is military power. The United States completely dominates a continent that
is invulnerable to invasion and occupation and in which its military overwhelms those of its
neighbors. Virtually every other industrial power in the world has experienced devastating warfare in the twentieth
century. The United States waged war, but America itself never experienced it. Military power and geographical reality created
an economic reality. Other countries have lost time recovering from wars. The United States has not. It has actually grown
because of them. Consider this simple fact that I’ll be returning to many times. The United States Navy controls
all of the oceans of the world. Whether it’s a junk in the South China Sea, a dhow off the African coast, a tanker in
the Persian Gulf, or a cabin cruiser in the Caribbean, every ship in the world moves under the eyes of
American satellites in space and its movement is guaranteed—or denied—at will by the U.S.
Navy. The combined naval force of the rest of the world doesn’t come close to equaling that of the U.S. Navy. This has never
happened before in human history, even with Britain. There have been regionally dominant navies, but never one that was
globally and overwhelmingly dominant. This has meant that the United States could invade other
countries—but never be invaded. It has meant that in the final analysis the United States
controls international trade. It has become the foundation of American security and American wealth. Control of
the seas emerged after World War II, solidified during the final phase of the European Age, and is now the flip side of
American economic power, the basis of its military power. Whatever passing problems exist for the United
States, the most important factor in world affairs is the tremendous imbalance of economic,
military, and political power. Any attempt to forecast the twenty- first century that does not
begin with the recognition of the extraordinary nature of American power is out of touch
with reality. But I am making a broader, more unexpected claim, too: the United States is
only at the beginning of its power. The twenty first century will be the American century.
Competitiveness resilient
Engardio 08 – senior writer for Business Week, (Pete, Is US Innovation Headed Offshore?, 5/7, Business Week)
To those worried about America's ability to compete in the 21st century, the trend is
alarming: Just as key manufacturing industries fled offshore in the 1970s and '80s, U.S.
companies are now shifting more engineering and design work to low-cost nations such as
China, India, and Russia. Surely, innovation itself must follow. Apparently not, according to
a new study published by the National Academies, the Washington organization that
advises the U.S. government on science and technology policy. The 371-page report titled Innovation in
Global Industries argues that, in sectors from software and semiconductors to biotech and logistics,
America's lead in creating new products and services has remained remarkably
resilient over the past decade—even as more research and development by U.S.
companies is done offshore. "This is a good sign," says Georgetown University Associate Strategy Professor Jeffrey T.
Macher, who co-edited the study with David C. Mowery of the University of California at Berkeley. "It means most of the
value added is going to U.S. firms, and they are able to reinvest those profits in
innovation." The report, a collection of papers by leading academics assessing the impact of globalization on inventive activity in
10 industries, won't reassure all skeptics that the globalization of production and R&D is good for the U.S. One drawback is that most
of the conclusions are based on old data: In some cases the most recent numbers are from 2002. Exporting the Benefits? And while the
authors of the report make compelling cases that U.S. companies are doing just fine, thank you, none of the writers addresses today's
burning question: Is American tech supremacy thanks to heavy investments in R&D also benefiting U.S. workers? Or are U.S.
inventions mainly creating jobs overseas? A few years ago, most people took it for granted that what was good for companies was good
for the greater economy. But the flat growth in living standards for most Americans during the last boom has raised doubts over the
benefits of globalization. "Innovation shouldn't be an end in itself for U.S. policy," says trade theorist Ralph E. Gomory, a research
professor at New York University's Stern School of Business. "I think we have to address whether a country can run on innovation. If
you just do R&D to enhance economic activity in other countries, you are getting very little out of it." Gomory, a former top IBM
(IBM) executive, retired in 2007 as president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, which funded the National Academies study. Still,
given all the debate over offshoring, the report's central findings are interesting. The
authors marshal a wealth of
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evidence to show that, thanks to innovation, globalization hasn't eroded U.S. leadership
even in some industries where there has been a substantial offshore shift in engineering
and design. Despite an explosion of outsourcing to India and Ireland, for example,
America's software industry still trumps the rest of the world in exports of packaged
software and services, patent activity, and venture capital investment. The U.S. also
accounts for 90% of chip-design patents—the same level as 1991—although Asian
companies now do most of manufacturing. And when it comes to biotechnology, the U.S.
is way ahead, luring more venture capital than all other countries combined. America First The U.S. even remains a
heavyweight in personal computers, the study says, though China and Taiwan manufacture most of the hardware.
That's because the real innovation and profits still belong to companies like Microsoft (MSFT) and Intel (INTC), makers of the
operating system and central processors, while U.S. brands command 40% of the global market and still define breakthrough design.
35/53
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2nc inevitable
Dominance inevitable
Price 10 – Miller-McCune Magazine,(Tom, 3/13 “U.S. Challenged for High-Tech Global Leadership,” http://www.millermccune.com/science-environment/u-s-challenged-for-high-tech-global-leadership-10818/
Despite negative trends, U.S. R&D continues to lead the world by a large margin. In 2007,
America’s $369 billion R&D spending exceeded all of Asia’s $338 billion and all of the European
Union’s $263 billion. The United States spent more than the next four countries — Japan, China, Germany and
France — combined.
America’s share of all high-tech manufacturing has risen — and it continues to lead the world —
even though the U.S. share of exports has declined. That’s because the United States consumes so
much of its product domestically. The United States makes nearly a third of the world’s high-tech
goods, compared with the European Union’s 25 percent and China’s 14 percent. It’s the world leader in
communications, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and aerospace. It trails only the EU in scientific
instruments and China in computers.
U.S. inventors obtained 81,000 U.S. patents in 2008, more than double Japan’s 35,000 and all of Europe’s 23,000. America’s 49
percent share of those patents dropped from 55 percent in 1995.
U.S. inventors also led in what the report calls “high-value” patents — those that were given protection by the
EU and Japan as well as by the United States. The
U.S. share of 30 percent was down from 34 percent in 1997.
China obtained just about 1 percent of both kinds of patents. But its scientists have become the secondmost-prolific contributors to scholarly journals, another area in which the United States continues to lead the world.
The globalization of science is illustrated by the worldwide growth in many measures of scientific prowess, no matter which countries
dominate, the board said. For example, high-tech exports more than tripled to $2.3 trillion worldwide between 1995 and 2008. The
estimated number of researchers increased to 5.7 million in 2007 from 4 million in 1995. Global R&D expenditures totaled $1.1 trillion
in 2007, up from $525 billion in 1996. Cross-boarder co-authorship also increased from 8 percent of scientific articles published in
1988 to 22 percent in 2007.
Foreign corporations actually invested more in U.S.-based research ($34 billion) in 2006 than U.S.
firms invested overseas $28.5 billion. Both more than doubled since 1995.
Statistics
Galama and Hosek 08 –RAND Corporation, (Titus and James, “U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology,”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG674.sum.pdf)
We find that the
United States continues to lead the world in science and technology. The United
States grew faster in many measures of S&T capability than did Japan and Europe, and developing
nations such as China, India, and South Korea showed rapid growth in S&T output measures, but
they are starting from a small base. These developing nations do not yet account for a large share of world
innovation and scientific output, which continues to be dominated by the United States, Europe, and Japan.
The United States accounts for 40 percent of total world R&D spending and 38 percent of patented
new technology inventions by the industrialized nations of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), employs 37 percent (1.3 million) of OECD researchers (FTE), produces 35 percent, 49 percent,
and 63 percent, respectively, of total world publications, citations, and highly cited publications,
employs 70 percent of the world’s Nobel Prize winners and 66 percent of its most-cited
individuals, and is the home to 75 percent of both the world’s top 20 and top 40 universities and 58
percent of the top 100.
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1nc science diplomacy
Science diplomacy fails
Dickson’ 9 (David, Director of Science Development online, “The limits of science diplomacy”,
http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html)
Using science for diplomatic purposes has obvious attractions and several benefits . But there are
limits to what it can achieve. The scientific community has a deserved reputation for its international
perspective — scientists often ignore national boundaries and interests when it comes to exchanging ideas
or collaborating on global problems. So it is not surprising that science attracts the interest of politicians
keen to open channels of communication with other states. Signing agreements on scientific and
technological cooperation is often the first step for countries wanting to forge closer working
relationships. More significantly, scientists have formed key links behind-the-scenes when more overt
dialogue has been impossible. At the height of the Cold War, for example, scientific organisations
provided a conduit for discussing nuclear weapons control. Only so much science can do Recently, the
Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions
such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities
in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in
Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is
not as straightforward as it seems . Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries
can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly
becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether scientific cooperation
can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the
Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to
support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised
by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even
suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such
a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking. Conflicting ethos Perhaps the
most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed
countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is little to quarrel with in
collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership —
whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for
development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are
prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their
own countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have
been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his
country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet co-dependent The truth is that science and politics
make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether
social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research.
But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or
another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful
purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support.
Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more
humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to
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science diplomacy that ignores the differences — acting for example as if science can substitute
politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa ), is dangerous . The Obama administration's
commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear
weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing.
Alt cause – funding barriers
Redden, 8
[Elizabeth, writer, July 16, 2008, “ Science Knows No Borders. But Funders Do.,” Inside Higher Ed.,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/07/16/science]
James A. Calvin, the interim vice president for research at Texas A&M University, referenced, by way of
example, three different summits that brought together Chinese and U.S. scientists, each conference a
site of vigorous discussion and debate.
And then what?
“Everyone’s excited, but then after three conferences we’re still at the same phase,” Calvin told the
U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Research and Science Education during a hearing
Tuesday on the role of non-governmental organizations and universities in international science and
technology cooperation
What scientists have, Calvin explained, are “the international conferences to make the introductions.
What they don’t have is the mechanism to take the next step.” When pressed by the committee
chairman, Rep. Brian Baird (D-Wash.), to offer an example of what such a mechanism would look like,
Calvin suggested that, in this context, a granting entity jointly funded by the Chinese and U.S.
governments could promote scholarly collaboration (he cautioned, however, that he wouldn’t want to
dilute existing research funds available through the National Science Foundation).
Calvin's suggestion got to the heart of two of the challenges to international scholarly cooperation
highlighted during Tuesday’s hearing: the difficulty of coordinating research when partners have
different governmental agencies to ask of and answer to, and, at least in the U.S. government’s case,
the legal limitations on funding foreign collaborators. (“Although we do agree with the view that U.S.
taxpayer funds should be used primarily to support American science, there are instances, such as in
international science development activities, where we believe this limitation can impede the ability of the
programs to achieve their goals,” said Alan I. Leshner, chief executive officer of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, which publishes Science.) Among the other barriers brought
up were continuing challenges with visas, although, as Representative Baird pointed out, witnesses at a
February subcommittee hearing reported progress on that front.
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2nc no impact
-
Science diplomacy fails
Other issues precede – science doesn’t lead to political collaboration, other issues precede scientific
cooperation – our evidence gives the example of science project in the middle east that no country
has agreed to cooperate on until the Palestine problem is solved, Science and politics are two
different things, so science can’t replace issues where politics is needed first
Empirics prove – politics precede
Dickson, ’10 [David, Direction Science & Development Network , 6/28/10, “Science in diplomacy: ‘On tap but not on top’”,
http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/the-place-of-science-in-diplomacy-%E2%80%9Con-tap-but-not-on-top%E2%80%9D/]
The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely
the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus
on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict.On the first of these, some pointed to
recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good
example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action.But others referred to the
failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on
action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking.It was argued that this failure had been
partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to
collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have.Another
example that received considerable attention wasthe current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAMEin Jordan, a project that is already is
bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine,
as well as both Greece and Turkey).The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its
operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME
will become a
symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant
described as a “beacon of hope” for the region.But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn
out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be
exaggerated.Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over,however open-minded
scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts.Indeed, there was even a
warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit
political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over
another.Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come
over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities.Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a
practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take
into account how advances in science – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – have also led to
new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities.“Science for diplomacy” therefore
ended up with a highly mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic
initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either.
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2nc alt causes
Alt causes make science diplomacy cooperation impossible
Dickson ‘11 (David, Director of Science Development online, “Science diplomacy: easier said than
done”, http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/science-diplomacy-easier-said-than-done/)
But, as rapidly become clear in the opening session of the three-day meeting on science diplomacy being
held at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, putting the principle of such diplomacy into action presents many
practical problems , some of which SciDev.Net aired last week (see Science diplomacy must be more
ambitious). As several participants pointed out, this is particularly the case at a time when science budgets
are under pressure, and scientists are being asked to justify their support from the public purse in terms of
the practical contributions they make to national – rather than international – well-being. The dilemma
was highlighted by the very first speaker at the meeting, Peter Fletcher, chair of panel that seeks to coordinate the international activities of Britain’s research councils. Fletcher outlined the many ways in
which science can be effectively used as a diplomatic tool. He pointed out, for example, that scientific
cooperation offered countries such as Britain an opportunity to establish good relations with the Muslim
world in just the same way that it had helped them build bridges with China in the 1990s. “Science is a
way of building relationships, sometimes even before politicians have agreed to talk.” Fletcher said.
“Researchers are used to working across national boundaries. They understand people who are thinking
about the same things as they are, and are used to working together in ways in which other people are
not.” But he also pointed out that, with the UK having just announced a 25% reduction in its science
budget, governments were increasingly requiring scientists to demonstrate the value of their work for
those who paid for it. “How much are we prepared to commit to solving global challenges for mutual
benefit [in this context]?” he asked. Other challenges were highlighted by Vaughan Turekian, director of
the Center for Science Diplomacy, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS),
Washington DC Turekian pointed out that part of the attraction of using science for diplomatic purposes
was its apolitical nature. In addition, the United States, for example, was well placed to exploit the fact
that its science was held in much higher regard around the world that many of its other activities. He
quoted a recent visit to Syria by a US scientific delegation that had met with President Assad – an
ophthalmologist – as an example of how science diplomacy could help promote political engagement in
situations where official relations were limited. “Science cooperation has provided a wonderful way to
have a dialogue on issues of mutual interest,” Turekian said. But he also pointed to some of the barriers
that prevent science diplomacy from operating effectively, such as asymmetries in scientific
capabilities, economic or security concerns over providing access to certain types of key
technologies, and a general lack of funding. In the discussion that followed, it became clear that these
barriers are likely to become an important focus of attention over the next two days. Several participants,
for example, pointed to the obstacles to international scientific exchange presented by the increasing
restrictions on entrance visas being placed by countries such as the United States. “It becomes so difficult
for someone to get into the US that once they are there, they cannot afford to go home, even for a short
visit, because they have no idea whether they will be able to get back in,” was one typical comment.
Others pointed to the broader issue of an apparent conflict between the supposed goal of science to
promote international interests, and the goal of diplomacy, namely to advance the national interests of the
country that the diplomat is serving. There has been much talk of the need to find a way of achieving a
balance between these two tendencies. Reaching agreement on where that balance should lie is a major
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challenge. Achieving that balance will be even harder. Already it is clear from this meeting that science
diplomacy is easier said than done.
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a/t: korea war
No Korea war – its all posturing and international powers check escalation – history proves
Fisher 13 (Max, the Post's foreign affairs blogger, Before joining the Post, he edited international
coverage for TheAtlantic.com, The Washington Post, “ 3/12, Why North Korea loves to threaten World
War III (but probably won’t follow through)”
But is North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching “all-out war,” a mad dog of East
Asia? Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty,
has also shown itself to be shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own selfpreservation . The regime’s past behavior suggests pretty strongly that these threats are empty .
But they still matter. For years , North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent
readiness, never gone through with it . So why does it keep going through these macabre performances?
We can’t read Kim Jong Eun’s mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North
Korean politics, with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries
(including the United States) to bear the costs of preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war.
Starting World War III or a second Korean War would not serve any of Pyongyang’s interests. Whether
or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North Korea could indeed cause
substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North Korean
military is antiquated and inferior ; it wouldn’t last long against a U.S.-led counterattack. No matter
how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost certainly end
with the regime’s total destruction. Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyang’s interests,
even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the allimportant military, behind the leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps
Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so hostile to its interests. Howard
French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing at
The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Il’s death that Kim had made up for North Korea’s weakness with
canny belligerence: The shtick of apparent madness flowed from his country’s fundamental weakness as
he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and bluff big. Kim adopted a game of brinkmanship
with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames.” And while this may have
sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions : fuel oil deliveries, food aid,
nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones. At the risk of
insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Korea’s provocations as somewhat akin to a child
throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top declarations (“I hate
my sister,” “I’m never going back to school again”) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the
child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, not because you think the threats are real or because
he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop. The big problem here is not that North Korea
will intentionally start World War III or a second Korean War, because it probably won’t. So you can rest
easy about that. The big problem is that North Korea’s threats and provocations, however empty,
significantly raise the risk of an unwanted war. The United States, South Korea and yes Pyongyang’s
all-important ally, China, all have much more to lose in a regional war than does North Korea. It falls to
those countries, then, to keep the Korean peninsula from spiraling out of control . Even if they don’t
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ultimately offer Pyongyang concessions to calm it down, as they have in the past, they’ve still got an
interest in preventing future outbursts. Like parents straining to manage a child’s tantrum, it’s a power
dynamic that oddly favors the weak and misbehaving.
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a/t: Saudi prolif
-
No Saudi prolif
No capabilities
Too controversial and destabilizing
Committed to economic reforms
Official opposition
Lippman ’11 [Thomas, senior adjunct scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. His career in journalism at the
Washington Post included four years as the Washington Post’s Middle East bureau chief, three years as the Post’s oil and energy reporter and a
decade as the newspaper’s national security and diplomatic correspondent, he traveled extensively to Saudi Arabia, 8-5-11, “Saudi Arabia’s
Nuclear Policy,” http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-policy-lippman/]
It is highly unlikely, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is
capable of doing so. King Abdullah’s comments should not be taken as a dispositive statement of considered policy. There are compelling
reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons , even in the unlikely event that Iran
achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom.
Money is not an issue — if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program.
With oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would
be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately
would be more likely to weaken the kingdom than strengthen it. The kingdom has committed itself to an
industrialization and economic development program that depends on open access to global markets and
materials; becoming a nuclear outlaw would be fatal to those plans.
Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s commitments under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States.
Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt
to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a
dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabia’s leaders
know would not be in their country’s best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil. Their
often-stated official position is that the entire Middle East should become an internationally supervised
region free of all weapons of mass destruction.
No Saudi prolif – decades away from even having the capacity
Hoodbhoy 11 –, professor of physics at Quaid-i-Azaam University in Islamabad, interviewed by Jess Hill, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, 7/1/2011
HOODBHOY: Saudi
Arabia doesn't have the technological capacity, and in particular the highly skilled
technicians, engineers and scientists who would be required to start a nuclear program, whether that be nuclearpower generation or making the bomb itself. So, obviously, they would look for expatriates and they would try to get them from all over the
world, they could try and get people from people from ex-Soviet Union countries, you would get Russians, and more than anybody else, they
would try to get Pakistanis, because Pakistan has a fair amount of experience in dealing with nuclear issues. It has a nuclear-power program, but
it's got even more expertise in terms of the bomb. JESS HILL: Now there was a report a few years ago, I think in 2003, that Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan had entered a kind of pact for cheap oil on Pakistan's side and for nuclear weapons to the Saudis. Is there any evidence to
suggest that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan already have an agreement like this? PERVEZ HOODBHOY: None at all. I
don't believe that any kind of formal agreement exists. It may well be that there's a wink and a nod here and there, but that's it.
Now when Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998 it was subject to sanctions and the Saudi help, in terms of the oil given to Pakistan, was key
in helping Pakistan survive those days. Now Saudi Arabia may have hinted at that time that it too would like nuclear weapons but then, given
how closely aligned it is to the United States, I don't think that there was any kind of formal agreement at that time either. JESS HILL: Now you
say that Saudi Arabia may turn to Pakistan for expertise; is there any likelihood that Saudi Arabia could go to Pakistan for a fully
finished nuclear weapon? PERVEZ HOODBHOY: No, that certainly is not the way that they would go about it. JESS HILL:
Now Saudi Arabia's also a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; what legal and political problems would it face if it went ahead with
publicly pursuing a nuclear weapon? PERVEZ HOODBHOY: I don't think the NPT would be any kind of a barrier in terms of getting nuclear
power plants, and once you get nuclear power plants you are well ahead in the quest for the bomb. After all let's remember that Iran, too, is a
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member of the NPT and yet it does seem to be pursuing enrichment and, well, at some point, it may even want reprocessing. JESS HILL: What
do you think is the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will acquire nuclear weapons? PERVEZ HOODBHOY: I
don't see there's any
immediate possibility of Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly not going to be able to buy
them off the shelf from Pakistan or from any other country, however, what it is seeking to put into motion is a
process which at the end of a decade, or maybe two decades, could result in a capacity to make the bomb.
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a/t: china relations
No impact to U.S.-China cooperation
Friedberg ’12 (Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Bucking Beijing,” Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 48-58, September/October 2012)
Recent events have raised serious doubts about both elements of this strategy. Decades of trade and
talk have not hastened China's political liberalization. Indeed, the last few years have been marked by
an intensified crackdown on domestic dissent. At the same time, the much-touted economic
relationship between the two Pacific powers has become a major source of friction. And despite
hopes for enhanced cooperation , Beijing has actually done very little to help Washington solve
pressing international problems, such as North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons or Iran's
attempts to develop them. Finally, far from accepting the status quo, China's leaders have become more
forceful in attempting to control the waters and resources off their country's coasts. As for balancing,
the continued buildup of China's military capabilities, coupled with impending cuts in U.S. defense
spending, suggests that the regional distribution of power is set to shift sharply in Beijing's favor.
WHY WE CAN'T ALL JUST GET ALONG TODAY, CHINA'S ruling elites are both arrogant and
insecure. In their view, continued rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is essential to China's
stability, prosperity, and prestige; it is also, not coincidentally, vital to their own safety and comfort.
Although they have largely accepted some form of capitalism in the economic sphere, they remain
committed to preserving their hold on political power. The CCP'S determination to maintain control
informs the regime's threat perceptions, goals, and policies. Anxious about their legitimacy, China's
rulers are eager to portray themselves as defenders of the national honor. Although they believe China is
on track to become a world power on par with the United States, they remain deeply fearful of
encirclement and ideological subversion. And despite Washington's attempts to reassure them of its
benign intentions, Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States aims to block China's rise
and, ultimately, undermine its one-party system of government.¶ Like the United States, since the end of
the Cold War, China has pursued an essentially constant approach toward its greatest external challenger.
For the most part, Beijing has sought to avoid outright confrontation with the United States while
pursuing economic growth and building up all the elements of its "comprehensive national power," a
Chinese strategic concept that encompasses military strength, technological prowess, and diplomatic
influence. Even as they remain on the defensive, however, Chinese officials have not been content to
remain passive. They have sought incremental advances, slowly expanding China's sphere of influence
and strengthening its position in Asia while working quietly to erode that of the United States. Although
they are careful never to say so directly, they seek to have China displace the United States in the long run
and to restore China to what they regard as its rightful place as the preponderant regional power. Chinese
strategists do not believe that they can achieve this objective quickly or through a frontal assault. Instead,
they seek to reassure their neighbors, relying on the attractive force of China's massive economy to
counter nascent balancing efforts against it. Following the advice of the ancient military strategist Suntzu, Beijing aims to "win without fighting," gradually creating a situation in which overt resistance to its
wishes will appear futile. The failure to date to achieve a genuine entente between the United States
and China is the result not of a lack of effort but of a fundamental divergence of interests. Although
limited cooperation on specific issues might be possible, the ideological gap between the two nations is
simply too great, and the level of trust between them too low, to permit a stable modus vivendi.
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What China's current leaders ultimately want -- regional hegemony -- is not something their
counterparts in Washington are willing to give. That would run counter to an axiomatic goal of U.S.
grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the domination of either end of the
Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers. The reasons for this goal involve a mix of
strategic, economic, and ideological considerations that will continue to be valid into the
foreseeable future .
Relations are resilient, but the cooperation that their impacts assume is impossible
Harry Harding 11, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of
Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14,
http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html
In my judgment, it is highly unlikely for the relationship between the US and China to be primarily cooperative, at
least in the short to medium term. The differences in values, political systems, interests, levels of development, and
perceptions of the existing international order are simply too great for the two countries to find common
ground on all issues, or even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to
pursue common interests. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis,
a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a
predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately, an essentially confrontational relationship is also unlikely , especially
if one is primarily concerned with the risks of military conflict. The high degree of economic interdependence
between the two countries has already created a relatively resilient relationship. The cost of military conflict,
especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, will be a significant deterrent against military conflict. Equally
important, the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence
by Taiwan – is presently quite low, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.
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1nc STEM
The ocean is BORING! Doesn’t inspire
Carlyle 13, Ryan, BSChE, Subsea Hydraulics Engineer, “Why Don't We Spend More On Exploring The Oceans, Rather Than On Space
Exploration?” January 31st, http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/01/31/why-dont-we-spend-more-on-exploring-the-oceans-rather-than-onspace-exploration/
I’m one hundred and twenty miles offshore in the Gulf of Mexico right now, working on installing seafloor equipment for an oil project. No one
spends more time exploring the deepest oceans than the oil industry. In
the last twenty years, there has been a veritable
explosion of deepwater exploration, with extensive subsea surveys for pipelines and anchors and oil well infrastructure. We have
fantastic subsea robots that let us see and work down to 10,000 ft depth — as well as a host of seismic imaging systems to see below the seafloor,
sonar, Doppler current sensors, monitoring buoys, and so forth. The
equipment to explore the oceans exists today and is
in routine use for energy exploration. For example: So as someone whose job deals with exploring the ocean deeps — see my
answer to Careers: What kinds of problems does a subsea hydraulics engineer solve? — I can tell you that the ocean is excruciatingly
boring . The vast majority of the seafloor once you get >50 miles offshore is barren, featureless
mud. On face, this is pretty similar to the empty expanses of outer space, but in space you can see all the way through the nothing, letting you
identify targets for probes or telescopes. The goals of space exploration are visible from the Earth, so we can
dream and imagine reaching into the heavens. But in the deep oceans, visibility is less than 100 feet
and travel speed is measured in single-digit knots. A simple seafloor survey to run a 100 mile pipeline costs a cool $50
million. The oceans are vast, boring, and difficult/expensive to explore — so why bother? Sure, there are beautiful
and interesting features like geothermal vents and coral reefs. But throughout most of the ocean these are few and far between. This is a pretty
normal view from a subsea robot: Despite the difficulty, there is actually a lot of scientific exploration going on in the oceans. Here’s a pretty
good public website for a science ROV mission offshore Oregon: 2009 Pacific Northwest Expedition To reinforce my point about it being boring,
What IS really
interesting in the deep ocean is the exotic life. You see some crazy animals that are often not well-known to science.
here’s a blog entry from that team where they talk about how boring the sea floor is: 2009 Pacific Northwest Expedition
Something floats by the camera 5000 ft down, and you say “what the hell was that?” and no one knows. Usually it’s just some variety of jellyfish,
but occasionally we find giant* isopods: Unfortunately,
deep-sea creatures rarely survive the trip to surface.
Their bodies are acclimated to the high pressures (hundreds of atmospheres), and the decompression is
usually fatal. Our ability to understand these animals is very limited, and their only connection to the surface
biosphere is through a few food chain connections (like sperm whales) that can survive diving to these depths. We’re fundamentally
quite disconnected from deep ocean life. Also, there is no hope of ever establishing human habitation
more than about 1000 ft deep. The pressures are too great, and no engineering or materials
conceivable today would allow us to build livable-sized spaces on the deep sea floor. The two times humans
have reached the deepest part of the ocean, it required a foot-thick flawless metal sphere with barely enough internal space to sit down. As far as I
can tell, seafloor living is all but impossible — a habitable moon base would be vastly easier to engineer than a seafloor colony. See my answer to
International Space Station: Given the actual space station ISS, would it be cheaper to build the equivalent at 3-4-5 miles deep underwater? Why?
To recap: we
don’t spend more time/money exploring the ocean because it’s expensive, difficult, and
uninspiring. We stare up at the stars and dream of reaching them, but few people look off the side
of a boat and wish they could go down there.
They can’t solve – number of students are irrelevant
a.) Teachers
Galama and Hosek 08 –
Ph.D. and M.Sc. in physics, University of Amsterdam; M.B.A. in business, INSEAD,
Fontainebleau, France and *Ph.D. and M.A. in economics, University of Chicago; B.A. in English, Cornell University (Titus and
James, “U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology”, 2008, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG674.pdf)
With regard to teachers, the line of argument is that there
are too few math and science teachers and that they are not as
well prepared as they should be. In Maryland in 2005, there was apparently “a gap between qualified teachers lost
and qualified teachers gained . . . in sciences like physics and chemistry,” as well as in math (Wedekind, 2006). Many
reports offer accounts of the dwindling pool of teacher talent in math and science—because of, for example,
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higher earnings potential, more attractive compensation systems, and better working conditions in the
private sector (Business Roundtable, 2005; President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2004). The National Academy of
Sciences (2006) report states: “[M]athematics and science teachers are, as a group, largely ill-prepared,” teaching out of field and without full
certification.
b.) China will always win
Attis 07 – (David, Jul 23, 2007, “Higher Education and the Future of U.S. Competitiveness”,
http://www.educause.edu/thetowerandthecloud/PUB7202h)
Yet the
debate in the United States continues to focus on graduating ever greater numbers of
scientists and engineers as the key to increasing U.S. competitiveness. While we must continue to
improve standards and encourage more students to study science and engineering, we need to
acknowledge that we will never win the race to produce the highest test scores or the most
engineers. Simple demographics dictates that we will never outproduce China in engineers. But that
does not mean that America’s innovation capacity is doomed. The best test-takers do not always make the best innovators, and a range
of countries with high test scores—such as Japan, Singapore, Korea, and China—are increasingly worried that their educational
systems stress conformity at the expense of creativity. The challenge is not to train the most scientists and engineers but to train the
scientists and engineers (and artists and anthropologists and managers) who are best able to work within the global innovation system
to create valuable new products and services.
Impact empirically denied
Galama and Hosek 08 – Ph.D. and M.Sc. in physics, University of Amsterdam; M.B.A. in business, INSEAD,
Fontainebleau, France and *Ph.D. and M.A. in economics, University of Chicago; B.A. in English, Cornell University (Titus and
James, “U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology”, 2008, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG674.pdf)
Despite the rhetoric and the intensive action on the Hill, some voices called for restraint. The reports and testimony making a case for
or arguing against an S&T crisis are part of an ongoing policy debate.
One line of counterargument is that such warnings are far from unprecedented and have never resulted in the
crisis anticipated. The author of a Washington Watch article noted that “similar fears of a STEM6
workforce crisis in the 1980s were ultimately unfounded” (Andres, 2006). Neal McCluskey, a policy
analyst from the Cato Institute, noted that similar alarm bells were sounded decades earlier (and in
his view, have had underlying political agendas):
Using the threat of international economic
competition to bolster federal control of education is
nothing new. It happened in 1983, after the federally commissioned report A Nation at Risk admonished that ‘our once
unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, science, and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout
the world,’ as well as the early 1990s, when George Bush the elder called for national academic standards and tests in order to
better compete with Japan. (McCluskey, 2006)
Roger Pielke of the University of Colorado observed that such issues as poor student performance
have an even longer history, with no negative outcomes. Arguments that “certain other countries
produce a greater proportion of scientist and engineering students or that those students fare better
on tests of achievement . . . have been made for almost 50 years,” he stated, “yet over that time
frame the U.S. economy has done quite well” (Pielke, 2006).
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a/t: warming
Warming won’t cause extinction
Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7
(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)
First, climate
change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to
become extinction (though biodiversity
is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical
ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce
land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not
certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely
take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more
rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though
potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we
Even in a worse case scenario , however, global climate change is not the
equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were
sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming.
cannot be sur of its consequences.
The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.
6 degree warming inevitable
AP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24,
http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168
Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if
every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update.
Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global
warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by
2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of
Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care
reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main
cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature
has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because
of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a
United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We
are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s
environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peerreviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by
80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is
still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate
scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international
climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world
temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to
limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peerreviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from
the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago
and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding
up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are
already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic,
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said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and
West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as
fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25
years.
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Space tradeoff link
Sea funding comes from space funding – there’s a direct tradeoff
Mangu-Ward 13, Katherine, managing editor of Reason magazine and a Future Tense fellow at the New America Foundation., “Is the
Ocean the Real Final Frontier?” September 4th,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/09/sea_vs_space_which_is_the_real_final_frontier.html
While many of the technologies for space and sky are the similar, right down to the goofy suits with bubble heads—the main difference is that in
space, you’re looking to keep pressure inside your vehicle and underwater you’re looking to keep pressure out—there’s often a sense that that
sea and space are competitors rather than compadres. They needn’t be, says Guillermo Söhnlein, a man who straddles both realms.
Söhnlein is a serial space entrepreneur and the founder of the Space Angels Network. (Disclosure: My husband’s a member.) The network funds
startups aimed for the stars, but his most recent venture is Blue Marble Exploration, which organizes expeditions in manned submersibles to
exotic underwater locales. (Further disclosure: I have made a very small investment in Blue Marble, but am fiscally neutral in the sea vs. space
fight, since I have a similar amount riding on a space company, Planetary Resources.) As usual, the
fight probably comes down to
money. The typical American believes that NASA is eating up a significant portion of the federal budget (one 2007 poll found that
respondents pinned that figure at one-quarter of the federal budget), but the space agency is actually nibbling at a Jenny Craig–sized portion of
the pie. At about $17 billion, government-funded space exploration accounts for about 0.5 percent of the federal budget. The National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration—NASA’s soggy counterpart—gets much less, a bit more than $5 billion for a portfolio that, as the name
suggests, is more diverse. But the way Söhnlein tells the story, this
zero sum mind-set is the result of a relatively recent
historical quirk: For most of the history of human exploration, private funding was the order of the day. Even some of the most famous
examples of state-backed exploration—Christopher Columbus’ long petitioning of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, for instance, or Sir Edmund
Hillary’s quest to climb to the top of Everest—were actually funded primarily by private investors or nonprofits. But that changed with the Cold
War, when the
race to the moon was fueled by government money and gushers of defense spending
wound up channeled into submarine development and other oceangoing tech. “That does lead to an either/or mentality. That
federal money is taxpayer money which has to be accounted for, and it is a finite pool that you have
to draw from against competing needs , against health care, science, welfare,” says Söhnlein. “In the last 10 to 15 years, we are
seeing a renaissance of private finding of exploration ventures. On the space side we call it New Space, on the ocean side we have similar
ventures.” And the austerity of the current
We’re really returning to the way it always was.”
moment doesn’t hurt. “The private sector is stepping up as public falls down.