Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Somalia
Humanitarian Business Case
2013 – 2017
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Contents
Intervention summary ............................................................................................. 5
A.
Context and need for a DFID intervention ....................................................... 7
Why is UK support required? .............................................................................. 7
Policy Context ..................................................................................................... 9
What are we and others doing? .........................................................................10
Why we need to work differently ........................................................................13
B. Impact and Outcome .........................................................................................14
Anticipated Results? ..........................................................................................14
Programme structure .........................................................................................16
Funding ..............................................................................................................16
Monitoring and Evaluation and the Evidence Base ............................................17
Mainstreaming of Cross Cutting Issues .............................................................17
Evidence and Risk .............................................................................................18
Appraisal Case ......................................................................................................19
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic
case? .....................................................................................................................19
The “portfolio” approach ....................................................................................19
THE OPTIONS ......................................................................................................19
Option 1: More of the same (annual funding).....................................................20
Option 2: Multi-year approach............................................................................21
Option 3: Do nothing ..........................................................................................22
Delivery channel options .......................................................................................23
Allocation options ..................................................................................................25
Burden Share ........................................................................................................26
Internal Risk Financing (IRF) .................................................................................26
Results and Impact................................................................................................27
Aid Enablers ..........................................................................................................28
Non-spend results: .............................................................................................28
Innovation ..............................................................................................................29
Refugee Returns ...................................................................................................29
Theory of Change (TOC) .......................................................................................30
Cross Cutting Issues .............................................................................................34
Decision Making ....................................................................................................34
Research, Monitoring and Evaluation ....................................................................34
Risk management .................................................................................................34
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Appraisal Conclusion .........................................................................................35
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option ..............36
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and
environment for each feasible option? ...............................................................36
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option? .................................36
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?.43
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option .........................47
Commercial Case ..................................................................................................48
Financial Case.......................................................................................................56
Management Case ................................................................................................60
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention? .60
How the IRF will work? ......................................................................................65
Cross Cutting issues .............................................................................................65
Working across HMG .........................................................................................65
Conflict sensitivity ..............................................................................................66
Social appraisal .................................................................................................67
Private sector .....................................................................................................68
Gender ...............................................................................................................68
B.
What are the risks and how will these be managed? .....................................69
D.
How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated? ....71
Monitoring implementation and delivery ................................................................72
Monitoring and evaluating outcomes and value for money ...................................74
Humanitarian system reform and performance .....................................................75
Figures
Figure 1 Main droughts and impact from 1987 onwards ........................................ 7
Figure 2 Seasonal Food Security and Nutrition Calendar (FSNAU) 2012-2013 ..... 9
Figure 3 People in need 2003 – 2013 .................................................................... 9
Figure 4 UK and CAP funding 2002-2015 (2013 onwards based on current
projections) ............................................................................................................13
Figure 5 Components of the programme logical framework ..................................61
Figure 6 CHF Process ...........................................................................................63
Tables
Table 1 Critical Success Criteria ...........................................................................19
Table 2 partner / mechanism compared against objectives ..................................24
Table 3 2013/14 Allocation Options.......................................................................25
Table 4 Spending Plan ..........................................................................................26
Table 5 CAP amounts and projected UK share .....................................................26
Table 6 Projected sample outputs 2013/14 (based on £30m) ...............................27
Table 7Scoring the options ....................................................................................35
Table 8 2013/14 Spend options.............................................................................36
Table 9 The Estimated number of Beneficiaries for each Year 1 Option ...............37
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Table 10 Proposed VfM Metrics ............................................................................45
Table 11 Understanding Partner Business Models. ..............................................46
Table 12 Procurement types .................................................................................48
Table 13 Spend projections ...................................................................................48
Table 14RME procurement timeline ......................................................................51
Table 15 MAR assessments..................................................................................54
Table 16 Spending plan 2013-2017 ......................................................................56
Table 17 Programme Timeline ..............................................................................60
Table 18 CHF reform objectives ............................................................................63
Table 19 Risks and mitigating actions ...................................................................69
Table 20 - Monitoring Techniques used in Somalia ...............................................73
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Intervention summary
What support will the UK provide?
DFID Somalia will provide up to £145 million over four years (2013-17). This includes a £40
million Internal Risk Facility able to fund disaster preparedness actions based on early
warning indicators.
Why is UK support required?
What need are we trying to address?
Somalia is one of the poorest and most vulnerable countries on earth, experiencing the
first famine of the 21st century. 20 years of chaos, including drought, conflict and state
failure has left most Somalis highly vulnerable.
Currently, over 1 million Somalis are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance and a
further 1.7 million are just one poor harvest or displacement away from requiring urgent
assistance. An estimated 1.1 million people are internally displaced living in squalid IDP
camps and some 1 million refugees have fled Somalia and are currently unable to return.
Somalia has an unacceptably high level of malnutrition with some 215,000 children acutely
malnourished. Repeated shocks, both natural and man-made have weakened the
population’s traditional coping capacities, the terrorist group Al Shabaab control large parts
of the rural areas and general insecurity makes delivering aid in Somalia extremely difficult.
What will we do to tackle this problem?
DFID Somalia’s humanitarian programme has four principal objectives. Firstly, providing
flexible multi-annual funding for humanitarian programmes specifically targeting the most
vulnerable, including children and IDPs. Secondly, identifying and targeting the chronically
vulnerable with resilience enhancing activities designed to strengthen livelihoods and
restore coping strategies and where possible to assist in the graduation away from
humanitarian aid. Thirdly, influencing and promoting change in the humanitarian system to
ensure better coordination, responsiveness and targeting of aid and finally, developing
new and innovative ways to monitor implementation and outcomes, and building an
evidence base to understand and ensure maximum impact for UK Aid. The programme will
also seek opportunities to harmonise with DFID’s stabilisation and development portfolios,
and where possible work more closely with the emerging government of Somalia.
In addition, an innovative Internal Risk Facility of £10 million per annum is proposed that
will allow the UK to fund activities ahead of a crisis maturing or fund rapid response in the
event of rapid onset disaster.
The programme will be coordinated with other DFID and HMG initiatives to bring stability
and peace to Somalia, thus creating the necessary conditions for refugees and IDPs to
return.
Who will be implementing the support we provide?
The programme will work with key tried and tested partners who have performed well in
the past and with whom DFID has well established relationships. These include a UN
managed Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), UN agencies (FAO, UNICEF, WFP), nongovernmental partners (Action Against Hunger, Save the Children amongst others) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross. Opportunities for new partnerships will emerge
during the competitive selection process for resilience, nutrition and livelihoods
interventions.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
What are the expected results?
What will change as a result of the Somalia Humanitarian Programme?
DFID’s programme will continue to save lives and reduce suffering, but also result in the
reduction of both food insecurity of vulnerable populations, and the impact of conflict and
natural disasters. The details of the different stands of the overall humanitarian programme
will be developed during the inception phase, building on the existing evidence base and
results achieved so far in the current humanitarian programme. The overall results of the
four year programme will be:

Up to 200,000 people per year provided with lifesaving humanitarian assistance
based on need;

300,000 highly marginalised individuals benefitting annually from cash for work and
income generating activities, allowing them to diversify their livelihoods and become
more resilient to future shocks.
The four separate programme outputs will be and headline results include;
Output 1. Quality life-saving humanitarian assistance provided to the right people at scale,
in a timely and cost effective manner, including;

Treatment of between 50,000 and 60,000 malnourished children and women
annually.

Provision of health, shelter and WASH assistance to 10,000 IDP households (60,000
individuals) annually.
Output 2. Improved resilience of vulnerable households, reducing their reliance on extreme
coping mechanisms

12,000 households per year benefiting from resilience projects

Household dietary diversity increased, nutritional status improved.
Output 3. A more efficient humanitarian system, delivering better aid, better coordinated
and delivering more accountable and measurable results

UK influences key stakeholders (Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA) to monitor and
evaluate the overall humanitarian effort.

UK is judged by peers as playing an effective influencing role
Output 4. New evidence and research on the effectiveness of multi- year humanitarian
action is generated, UK aid is well monitored and evaluated.

A real time monitoring system will be developed and on line showing the results of
UK funded projects

Research papers produced demonstrating the advantages and disadvantages of a
multi- year humanitarian approach.
What are the planned outcomes attributable to UK support?
The expected impact of the programme attributable to DFID support will be fewer Somalis in
need of humanitarian assistance, and the outcome will be food insecurity of vulnerable
populations reduced, and the impact of conflict and natural disasters reduced.
How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?
A sizeable research, monitoring and evaluation component is proposed that will help track
results, evaluate impact and research the benefits of multi-year humanitarian funding. The
M+E will use innovative technology including: GIS and mobile phone based technology for
data collection.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
Why is UK support required?
1.
Somalia remains in an extreme humanitarian crisis with over 11 million people in
urgent need of humanitarian assistance and some 1.7 million people on the very edge
of crisis. Of those in crisis the majority are estimated to be living in south and central
Somalia. Somalia’s crisis is also manifested in high levels of displacement. With 1.1
million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Somalia has one of the highest caseloads
in the world2. There are also more than one million Somali refugees living outside the
country3.
2.
The crisis in Somalia is complex and protracted. The chief characteristics of the crisis
include: climate variation; the lack of governance and rule of law leading to
widespread insecurity; the paucity of rural and urban livelihoods opportunities and
market instability. In 2011 climate variation, characterised by regular droughts and
flooding (see figure 1), eroded already weakened coping mechanisms to such an
extent that Somalia experienced the first famine of the 21st century.
Figure 1 Main droughts and impact from 1987 onwards
3.
Non state armed groups, in particular Al Shabaab (AS), continue to exercise control
over large areas of south Somalia. Recent territorial gains by the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Government of Somalia (GoS), Ethiopian and
Kenyan forces has prompted the withdrawal of AS from key strategic locations, such
as Kismayo, Baidoa and Mogadishu. This evolving pattern of military control has yet
to translate into appreciably better humanitarian access.
4.
Though insecurity continues to compromise the collection and accuracy of data,
Somalia has some of the worst humanitarian indicators in the world. Life expectancy
is 51 years – 16 years below the regional average and on a par with Afghanistan and
1
OCHA January Humanitarian Dashboard http://reliefweb.int/map/somalia/somalia-humanitariandashboard-january-2013
2 Officially Somalia has the fifth highest number of IDPs after Colombia, Iraq, Sudan and DRC.
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
3 UNHCR Information Sharing Portal http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At 180/1,000 under-five mortality is the worst
in the world and at 1,200/100,000 maternal mortality rates are second only to CHAD4.
(In 2010 a united Sudan had comparable figures of 103/1,000 and 730/100,000).
Malnutrition remains a huge public health problem, negatively affecting growth,
development and survival of the population. Situational analysis shows a long-term
nutrition crisis characterised by persistently high rates of acute and chronic
malnutrition throughout the country with some variation by zone and livelihood
system. 215,000 or some 20% of all Somali children are acutely malnourished with
four out of five of those affected living in south Somalia. Malnutrition rates are
particularly high amongst specific demographic groupings. For example, Global Acute
Malnutrition (GAM) rates among agro-pastoralist communities in Bay and riverine
communities in Juba remain close to double the 15% emergency threshold.
Mogadishu IDPs are similarly exposed. So, although famine is no longer present in
south Somalia, we must avoid complacency. Malnutrition rates remain among the
worst in the world and there is the potential for them to worsen should inadequate
rainfall during the coming Deyr and Gu rainy seasons compromise household food
security.
5.
Somalia is chronically food insecure: a result of social services ruptured by conflict
and the environmental impact of recurrent drought and flooding. With around 80% of
Somali households relying on natural resource-dependent activities for their
livelihood, there is an overwhelming sensitivity to climate variability. Delayed and/or
reduced rainfall disproportionately impacts agricultural yield and the productivity of
grazing lands on which livestock depend.
6.
Shortfalls in successive rainy seasons 2010-2011 created a drought which in turn led
to the 21 century’s first famine. With drought and famine conditions no longer present
- the result of a steady deyr season rainfall and massive increase in humanitarian
assistance - the current situation is significantly better than it was. Nonetheless the
progress made in ending famine can be quickly reversed. Even a modest reduction in
rainfall will disproportionately impact the lives and wellbeing of the most vulnerable
households and communities. Widespread food security is predicted to follow a
shortfall in rains.
7.
The table below outlines the annual agricultural cycle. Food insecurity is at its highest
during the main lean season (February through June). This period represents the
principal hunger season.
4
World Health Organisation, World Health Statistics 2012
http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2012/en/index.html
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Figure 2 Seasonal Food Security and Nutrition Calendar (FSNAU) 2012-2013
8.
Somalia’s vulnerability to climate variation and insecurity is reflected in agricultural
deficiencies. Even in good years, Somalia is only able to produce 40% of its cereal
requirements and over the past five years, local production has averaged about 30%
of food needs. Agricultural shortages mean that Somalia is heavily reliant on food
imports and humanitarian food aid and even prior to the collapse of central
government in 1991, Somalia was a major recipient of international food aid. Another
factor contributing to Somalia’s persistent food insecurity are constraints surrounding
humanitarian access borne of insecurity. The inability of humanitarian agencies to
deliver much needed food aid and other forms of food assistance has deleteriously
impacted the health and nutritional status of the most vulnerable.
9.
Though Somalia will continue to remain highly susceptible to shocks, the 2011 famine
was far from inevitable5. According to the Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC)
Real Time Evaluation (RTE) famine stemmed from a number of factors, notably the
lack of security in south Somalia but also the failure of the international community to
adequately support early action6.
10. The reinforcement of resilience at a household and community level will be
underpinned by continued humanitarian support. With resilience an increasingly
dominant theme, many donors are expected to transition funding away from
humanitarian budget lines over the coming few years towards stabilisation, early
recovery and development funding. Whilst DFID has championed more resilient
approaches to addressing vulnerability, we remain mindful that over 1 million in
Somalia (see table below) will continue to require humanitarian support until such time
that social protection mechanisms are better equipped to respond to their needs.
Figure 3 People in need 2003 – 2013
Policy Context
11. DFID’s 2011 Humanitarian Policy commits the UK to supporting humanitarian action
on the basis of need and need alone. Of particular relevance to the Somalia context
are the commitments that seek to strengthen anticipation and early action and build
resilience to disasters and conflict.
5
6
One of the principal findings of the IASC Real Time Evaluation, page 8
Ibid, page 8
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
12. In addition to commitments outlined in the Humanitarian Policy, the UK Government
agreed to a set of political undertakings at the February 2012 London Conference on
Somalia. The humanitarian side event at the conference welcomed the reversal of
famine, whilst highlighting the fragility of the humanitarian situation, particularly in
south Somalia. The meeting underscored the importance of humanitarian action
being guided by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and encouraged
efforts to promote a more resilient future for Somali households and communities by
committing to provide multi-year basic services and livelihoods support. With
adequate financial and human resources committed to its humanitarian portfolio DFID
Somalia has been able to maintain an engaged and effective humanitarian function
matching the leadership the UK Government demonstrated in arranging/hosting the
London Conference.
13. The approach presented in this business case is consistent with key themes
articulated in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), notably
anticipation, innovation, leadership and resilience7. In proposing a longer-term funding
timeline this business case is looking to ‘change the funding model’ and increase
‘predictable multi-year funding’. A longer-term approach predicated on the delivery of
an integrated package of assistance to a clearly defined beneficiary caseload aims to
reinforce household and community resilience. The introduction of an Internal Risk
Facility (IRF) that enables the programme to flexibly adjust to emerging needs will
improve early action and ultimately the quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian
response. Equally, the business case’s focus on reform reflects the priority placed on
leadership within the HERR.
14. The appraisal case considers the applicability of approaches detailed in DFID’s
Practice Note on working in Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS), as well as
existing Nutrition and Gender policies.
15. The Somalia Humanitarian programme will contribute to the overall DFID Country
Operational Plan (COP) and specifically the headline result that seeks to assist and
treat acutely malnourished children under-five years of age.
16. In determining geographic and sector priorities this business case will also be guided
by commonly agreed UN-led approaches, including the Consolidated Appeal Process
(CAP), the FAO/UNICEF and WFP Joint Resilience agenda; the Mogadishu IDP TriCluster strategy and Contingency Plans for Newly Recovered Areas and beyond.
What are we and others doing?
17. DFID has a proven track record of responding to humanitarian needs in Somalia.
Over the past 10 years DFID’s annual humanitarian spend has averaged £29 million
however, this figure has risen sharply in times of acute crisis and reached £78 million
in 2011. This translated into a 9.4% share of the 2011 CAP making the UK the
second largest government donor after the US. DFID’s current 2012 £55m
humanitarian commitment amounts to 5.8% of the 2012 CAP.
18. In 2012 UK Aid helped:





Provide food assistance for 1.4 million people;
Treat 160,000 moderately and severely malnourished children;
Treat 1 million people including pregnant women;
Immunise 1.4 million children under five and women of child bearing age;
Provide safe water and improved sanitation or hygiene promotion to 1 million
people;
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/emergency-response-review
7
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017

700,000 people benefit from humanitarian based livelihood and disaster
preparedness activities.
19. Humanitarian assistance is one pillar of the UK’s strategy for supporting Somalia.
Other assistance is delivered through the development and stabilisation pillars. The
preferred option of multi-year humanitarian support proposed in this business case
will complement these other forms of assistance by promoting greater household and
community security that will, in time and with changes in the broader contextual
environment, reinforce community level resilience and make vulnerable communities
more open to developmental forms of programming.
20. Under the auspices of the British Office for Somalia (BOFS), DFID Somalia will
ensure that humanitarian issues are raised in discussion with the Somali authorities
and that UK diplomatic influence is used to promote protection of civilians and other
humanitarian issues.
21. Over the course of the business case there will be opportunities to harmonise DFID’s
humanitarian, stabilisation and development portfolios. For example, the Joint Health
and Nutrition Programme (JHNP) which is already active in three regions of south
Somalia. The JHNP looks to provide forms of basic service support similar to that
proposed in this business case albeit in complementary geographical areas. The
humanitarian programme aims to provide health and nutritional support in areas of
greatest vulnerability such as Bay, Bakool and the Juba’s all of which are currently
either in conflict or still largely controlled by Al Shabaab. The JHNP will focus on nonAS controlled Border Areas and Mogadishu. With both pillars channelling assistance
through the same clusters and partners, there is an opportunity to transition support
towards longer-term development programming as and when the security situation
permits. Though there is likely to be a highly vulnerable residual caseload requiring
emergency humanitarian assistance, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that
greater security over the course of the four year humanitarian business case will allow
target caseloads to be graduated into the JHNP. In managing their respective
portfolios DFID Somalia’s health and humanitarian teams will look to develop
complementary measurements and indicators for determining success.
22. Similar opportunities for the cross fertilisation/rationalisation of humanitarian and
development activities may arise with DFID Somalia’s community development
programme, in particular the Sustainable Employment and Economic Development
programme (SEED). Working through partners affiliated with the Food Security
Cluster, SEED is supporting a range of initiatives that look to diversify and reinforce
livelihoods and employment opportunities. Conceptually consistent with the
humanitarian approach the difference is largely down to geography with humanitarian
partners delivering activities and services in AS controlled areas. Assuming the
security situation permits, and partner capacity exists, will we look to graduate the
humanitarian caseload into SEED over the course of the humanitarian business case
or upon its end.
23. The UK is better placed than many other donors to deliver a meaningful package of
humanitarian assistance. In the US multi-year support requires Congressional
approval. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) will pursue a multi-year
approach though this will take some years to translate into programmatic action. Also,
reductions made in OFDA global budget8will decrease humanitarian spend in
Somalia9. Anti-terrorism legislation demanded by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) will also continue to constrain US funding, though the legislation was relaxed
8
Forecast to reduce from $1bn in 2011 to $800m in 2012.
current budget for Somalia totals $210m. $150m of this comprises food aid. Though the
overall budget for 2013 is likely to remain static, the proportion of non-food aid is expected to fall.
9OFDA’s
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
in response to pressure brought about by the declaration of famine10. Humanitarian
partners were issued with a special license exempting agency personnel from
prosecution in light of diversion/corruption. This license is expected to be extended
through 2012/2013; however, greater rigour in enacting the legislation may well inhibit
funding levels.
24. Along with the US and UK, the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
has been the other large and consistent humanitarian donor to Somalia over the past
decade. As with OFDA, ECHO funding is tightly regulated with usage limited to a
maximum 12 months and limited scope for extending beyond a 12 month timeframe.
EU funding is also increasingly focused on resilience and, in particular, an approach
that seeks to link relief, rehabilitation and development. Funding for such activities will
increase commensurate with a reduction in humanitarian funding. This can be
illustrated by comparing ECHO’s Somalia budgets 2011 and 2012. At €37m the 2012
is a modest reduction on the €40m allocated in 2011 and a further reduction in the
humanitarian budget is expected in 2013.
25. Non-traditional donors (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, OIC) invested considerable sums
during the famine response and continue to support Somalia. The extent to which
these donors will be involved in the on-going humanitarian effort is unknown. The UK
will continue to engage with these donors investing in humanitarian response and
lobby for greater burden share and aid transparency.
26. The 2013 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) is appealing for $1.3 billion and $3.8bn
over the three years. The amount requested in 2013 represents a slight increase from
the revised 2012 CAP ($1.1bn). Recent Somalia appeals have been relatively well
funded (with the 2011 CAP reaching over 85% coverage), and Somalia appeal shave
traditionally been well supported when compared with other complex emergency
environments11. However, the sheer scale and chronic nature of need in Somalia can
appear daunting and there is a concern that the mobilisation of resources in 2013 will
be challenging (the 2012 CAP is only 58% funded). This reduction is due a number of
factors, including the on-going impact of the global financial crisis and the rise in
development and stabilisation funding for Somalia.
27. Whilst a multi-year humanitarian commitment totalling up to £145 million over four
years (2013-2017) is expected to diminish the UK’s annual share of the burden, the
predictability of financing will enable partner agencies to sharpen assessment and
analytical data and better plan and deliver the allocation of resources. The table below
present’s appeal and coverage data for Somalia over the period 2002-2015. The
average amount committed annually by the UK over the past decade equals £29
million.
10
The relaxation of OFAC precipitated a corresponding increase in humanitarian funding from
$29m in 2010 to $114m in 2011.
11 The past five CAP’s (2007-2011) received an average of 75% coverage
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Figure 4 UK and CAP funding 2002-2015 (2013 onwards based on current projections)
Why we need to work differently
28. Though unreliable, demographic data estimates a caseload of approximately one
million chronically vulnerable people in south Somalia. Whilst this caseload has and
will continue to benefit from short cycle humanitarian assistance (3-12 months), the
erosion of coping mechanisms over two decades of conflict and climate variation,
means that these communities are highly susceptible to the most minor shock or
change in their situation. In a normal season assets can be sufficiently husbanded to
ensure a degree of household subsistence, however, when this delicate equilibrium is
threatened, through a delay or reduction in the rains, the risk of widespread food
insecurity precipitating drought and famine is heightened. The economic appraisal
(FLAG E and F) makes the case for early and predictable finance that will save
money by reducing future humanitarian need. Whilst the figures require more detailed
analysis, the methodology is one which we aim to further develop and build upon
during the course of this business case.
29. In keeping with its mandate, short-cycle humanitarian assistance has proved
successful in keeping people alive. Yet sustainable human security requires a longerterm humanitarian commitment. Whilst one-off support, be it in the form of a four
month cash for work programme, or a six month cash voucher initiative is sufficient to
get people through the worst of a crisis, it is correspondingly insufficient to restore
capacities that have been eroded over decades. A more connected ‘whole of
government’ approach that mutually reinforces the link between humanitarian and
non-humanitarian assistance is therefore required.
30. Though the humanitarian action proposed in this business case will remain impartial
and independent, we cannot dissociate humanitarian assistance from the political and
security environment in which it is delivered. That Somalia is changing needs to be
reflected in our ‘whole of government approach’ and we will consider ways in which
the humanitarian agenda can prudently connect with stabilisation initiatives. This
maybe in the sequencing of assistance in Newly Recovered Areas and/or the
application of the Do No Harm and conflict sensitive approaches to community
engagement.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
31. The UK has been providing humanitarian aid to Somalia for a number of years. This
business case builds on the successes of previous programmes and the strong
performance of a number of our partners. Repeated annual reviews and project
completion reports score a 1 or 2 (the recent 2011 Project Completion Review scored
A++), demonstrating the success of DFID’s humanitarian programme.
The
longstanding relationship developed with a number of key partners such as: ICRC,
UNICEF, FAO, WFP, Action Against Hunger, Save the Children and the Common
Humanitarian Fund (CHF), has enabled DFID to develop its situational understanding
and deliver better aid. This proposed programme aims to build on these relationships
and further develop existing partnerships.
32. This business case seeks to capitalise on progress already achieved in strengthening/
reforming the humanitarian system. A better functioning, more dynamic and intuitive
humanitarian system will be better placed to predict and respond to need and thereby
serve the interests of target communities. DFID humanitarian staff have consistently
engaged with coordination structures in Nairobi and Mogadishu and, where
appropriate, have sought to influence the decision making process. DFID is viewed as
a leading voice in shaping humanitarian policy.
33. The recent Somalia Real Time Evaluation (RTE) applauded the donor community for
responding ‘quickly and generously’ to the revised 2011 CAP. It however noted a lack
of resources to fund early action between August 2010 and June 201112. The RTE
goes on to state that foot-dragging on the part of donors, and the funding shortfall this
created with regard to early action, allowed a containable drought to worsen into
famine. The proposed Internal Risk Facility is designed to address this lack of flexible
funding and provide an innovative solution to dealing with crisis early warning.
B. Impact and Outcome
34. The humanitarian programme proposed in this business case has four principal
objectives. The objectives have been formulated on the basis of UK experience in
delivering humanitarian programmes in Somalia over the past decade and where UK
advantages lie. Whilst each of the objectives are mutually reinforcing, the
humanitarian imperative will continue to take precedent. As such, different weight will
be accorded the first two and third objectives. First and foremost we must continue to
respond to needs as best we are able. The provision of life-saving humanitarian
assistance when complemented with livelihoods and employment opportunities serves
to reinforce household and community resilience. The proposed results and resilience
objectives will be buttressed by reforms that lead to improved humanitarian
performance.
i)
Respond to continued humanitarian needs in a timely manner with quality and
well-targeted assistance;(results)
ii) Build the resilience of Somalia’s chronic caseload of vulnerable
people;(resilience)
iii) Continue to promote change within the humanitarian system to achieve better
outcomes for the people of Somalia;(reform)
iv) Building the evidence base for multi-year predictable humanitarian action.
(Evidence)
Anticipated Results?
35. Building on the existing evidence base and results achieved to date, this proposed
business case will assist between 300,000 and 500,000 people per annum (FLAG J
provides more detail). The impact of humanitarian action proposed in this business
12
IASC Real Time Evaluation of the Somalia Drought Crisis Response, March 2012
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
case will offer more meaningful and predictable support to highly vulnerable
households and communities thereby sustaining them until such time that they are
able to benefit from social protection initiatives.
36. The programme will deliver, as its outcome (based on an investment of between:
£105 to £145 million), reduced food insecurity of vulnerable populations in Somalia,
and quality and timely emergency humanitarian assistance provided to those that
need it. The results that will be achieved are:
 Up to 200,000 people per year provided with life-saving humanitarian
assistance, based on need;
 300,000 highly marginalised individuals benefit from cash for work and
income generating activities, allowing them to diversify their livelihoods.
37. The programme will deliver four outputs and associated headline results:
38. Output 1. Quality life-saving humanitarian assistance, the headline results include:
 Treatment of between 50,000 - 60,000 acutely malnourished children and
women;
 Provision of health, shelter and WASH assistance to 10,000 IDP
households (60,000 individuals).
39. Output 2. Improved Resilience of vulnerable households, reducing their reliance
on extreme coping mechanisms. The results include:
 12,000 households benefiting in 2013 from resilience projects;
 Household Dietary Diversity increased.
40. Output 3. A more efficient humanitarian system, which is better coordinated and
delivering measurable results: The activities under this output are:
 UK influences key stakeholders (Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA etc) to
monitor and evaluate the overall humanitarian effort;
 UK is judged by peers as playing an effective influencing role.
41. Output 4. New evidence and research on the effectiveness of multi-year
humanitarian action. The results include:
 A real-time monitoring system is developed and online showing the results
of UK funded projects;
 Research paper(s) produced that demonstrate the advantages and
disadvantages of a multi-year humanitarian approach.
42. In keeping with the philosophy of providing an integrated multi-annual package of
assistance, the proposed action aims to direct different forms of assistance to a highly
vulnerable caseload of half a million people or some 80,000 households. To protect
household assets and give beneficiary households a real opportunity to elevate their
economic security, the programme will provide assistance to target households each
year over the four year cycle of the business case. One-off assistance is insufficient.
The receipt of predictable, lasting humanitarian assistance will allow the most
vulnerable households to secure productive assets thereby reinforcing household and
community resilience.
43. An innovative Internal Risk Facility (IRF) is proposed that will allow the UK to fund precrisis actions based on early warning indicators. The assumption made is that funding
preparedness and activities early on is more cost effective than more expensive
emergency humanitarian action. This approach to making financial savings is more
detailed in the economic appraisal and economic crisis simulation (FLAG E and F)
15
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
44. UK assistance will be used to improve collective accountability. These reform results
include working to improve the humanitarian community’s ability to report on results
and impact, to assess needs and gaps and develop a more coherent humanitarian
strategy that links the provision of emergency aid to recovery and development.
45. A research component will seek, over four years, to provide a comprehensive
evidence base for the UK humanitarian programme in Somalia. This work will explore
both system wide and DFID specific impact assessment, examine the value for money
of interventions and provide evidence for how the resilience agenda can best be
articulated within and outside DFID.
Programme structure
46. Structurally, the proposed programme will operate in four ways: i) core emergency
funding, ii) resilience programming and iii) early warning action (internal risk facility)
and iv) a research and monitoring and evaluation component. The former will serve as
the aperture for delivering on-going life-saving intervention, specifically food
assistance and nutrition, whilst the second will concentrate on investing in livelihoods,
cash and/or cash for work. The Internal Risk Facility will provide the flexibility to fund
activities based on early warning indicators/triggers. The research and monitoring and
evaluation component will lay the foundations for more robust evidence regarding the
benefits of multi-year humanitarian action.
47. This operational structure recognises the complex and chronic nature of the crisis in
Somalia. As we have seen there is a highly vulnerable caseload of roughly one million
people in south Somalia who will continue to require some form of emergency
humanitarian assistance. This humanitarian assistance is however, insufficient, in and
of itself, to augment depleted coping mechanisms or reinforce household and
community resilience. To secure household and community assets requires a more
comprehensive package of emergency humanitarian assistance that is complemented
by renewed investment in basic services and livelihoods.
48. From a geographical perspective the evidence currently available suggests that
humanitarian needs are greatest in south Somalia. We will therefore look to
disproportionately focus resources on this region. This is not to suggest that needs
don’t exist or won’t emerge elsewhere and the Internal Risk Facility included in this
business case will allow us to flexibly adjust our geographical focus should needs shift.
Funding
49. This Business Case anticipates a gradual decrease in spend from £30 million in FY
2013/14 to £23 million in FY 2016/17, amounting to a total baseline spend of £105
million over the four years. A £10 million per annum Internal Risk Facility (IRF) is
proposed, which if used would bring the total amount of possible spend over four
years to £145 million.
50. The current Country Operational Plan makes provision for £21 million a year for the
next two years. This figure is considerably lower than the £32 million average spend
over the past five years, and insufficient to respond to predictable needs and a
significant (and predictable) spike in need. For this reason we will seek pre-approval to
expand the programme by £9 million in 2013/14 and £6 million in 2014/15. Additional
monies will be drawn from underspends in the Country Office, Divisional or
Humanitarian Reserve budgets. We will seek the necessary permission from the DFID
Finance & Corporate Performance Division (FCPD) permission to extend this business
case beyond the end of the current spending round by two years.
51. The scale and severity of humanitarian needs in Somalia oscillate in line with security
and climate issues. Over the past 10 years UK humanitarian funding has oscillated to
16
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
reflect changing levels of need with an average allocation of £29 million over the past
10 years.
52. Intervention review sheets (IRS) will be used as the basis for funding decisions, and
these will allow for the development of multi-annual strategies. IRS’ were developed
by DFID Somalia to accelerate funding decisions in response to the 2011 famine and
offer a detailed overview of the proposed operation. Logical frameworks that
accompany IRS’ will be consolidated and thereafter assessed against impact and
results on an annual basis. See management case for more detail.
Monitoring and Evaluation and the Evidence Base
53. Remote management methods will continue to be used by partners to implement
projects in Somalia. This makes monitoring and evaluating impact and performance
challenging. Monitoring will continue to be undertaken by partners using a range of
methods. These are expected to include third party monitoring, beneficiary
consultation, use of new technology (satellite imagery) etc. Hitherto, the opportunity for
DFID staff to undertake field visits has been limited though Mogadishu is increasingly
accessible as AMISOM extends its sphere of influence. Movement beyond Mogadishu
is expected to remain severely constrained. The opening in 2013 of a British Embassy
Somalia is expected to shift the centre of gravity to Mogadishu and possible help
facilitate our movement.
54. The DFID humanitarian portfolio will be assessed on an annual basis. Independent
experts will be commissioned to examine partner and overall program performance
and coherence and help determine any changes in direction required.
55. In order to better understand the operating environment and develop our analysis, a
research component will be included to explore impact of a multiyear approach,
especially how the resilience agenda can best be taken forward and inform DFID
policy. Value for money studies will also be included in this work. The research will be
of benefit to DFID and other parts of the humanitarian system, drawing on existing
evidence and evaluations.
Mainstreaming of Cross Cutting Issues
56. The application of a more integrated approach to gender, climate (including the
Strategic Programme Review) and conflict sensitivity are detailed within the appraisal
case. DFID will continue to champion an approach that reinforces the principles of ‘do
no harm’. In newly recovered areas and elsewhere, we will reinforce and apply a
conflict sensitive approach to estimating and responding to needs (see FLAG K).
57. DFID Somalia operates in a conflict-prone environment where its actions and the
actions of its implementing partners will affect that conflict, positively or negatively,
regardless of whether they are ‘about’ conflict. DFID, like others, is a conflict actor
which must take responsibility for the effects of its programmes and internal
processes, as well as guard against the risks that an insecure conflict-affected
environment poses to the organisation and its staff. Conflict sensitivity is defined here
as:

understanding the context in which DFID and its implementing partners operate;

understanding the interaction between DFID’s interventions and the context; and

acting upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative
impacts and maximise positive impacts.
58. Amongst other issues the programme will promote inclusion and ensure broad and
meaningful participation; act in a transparent and accountable way; consider the
17
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
timing, sequencing and location of interventions for their potential conflict impact; and
be responsive and flexible to changing requirements.
Evidence and Risk
59. The evidence base for Somalia is generally poor, simply due to a lack of access and
over reliance on few sources. One of the prime sources of information is the UN Food
Security Nutrition and Analysis Unit (FSNAU) that provides regular and informed
updates on the food security situation. There are also a number of individual agency
assessments and broader assessments such as the 2012 UNICEF Multiple Indicator
Cluster Survey (MICS).
60. Delivering humanitarian aid in Somalia is particularly challenging; the level of risk is
high and will remain so for the duration of the programme. The current levels of
conflict and insecurity throughout south Somalia in particular ensure partners are
constantly at risk of being forced to close, intimidated or have supplies stolen. Over
£720,000 UK funding has been written off in the past two financial years due to AS
theft from a number of partners. This amounts to less than 1% of total UK
humanitarian funding over the past two financial years. A rigorous approach to
monitoring is outlined below and risk mitigation strategies will be worked on with a
number of our key partners.
61. In order to mitigate some of the risks, due diligence assessments will be carried out on
all UK funded partners. These assessments will aim to test our partner systems for
remote management. We will also emphasise the need to learn more about what
works and what does not.
62. The DFID Somalia Risk Strategy13 provides the overview of the main risks faced by
the office as a whole and the mitigating measures in place. This humanitarian
programme will play a full and active role in helping shape DFID’s risk management
practices and policy in fragile states.
13
Insert QUEST number
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the
Strategic case?
63. The strategic case has outlined the immense, protracted and on-going humanitarian
needs in Somalia and why a new approach is required. The appraisal case assesses
which mix of delivery channels and interventions will deliver against our three
objectives in an effective, time-sensitive, and efficient manner.
64. The Critical Success Criteria provide the yardstick by which we can measure
outcomes against our objectives: results, resilience, reform and evidence.
Table 1 Critical Success Criteria
Objective 1 – Front line delivery - Results
1.1
Quality humanitarian assistance delivered up to 500,000 of those most
in need per annum (DFID attributable)
1.2
Humanitarian assistance is provided in an effective (high quality, timely
and value for money) and flexible manner, and according to need.
Objective 2 – Progress on Resilience
2.1
A package of assistance is designed and provided to the most
vulnerable to ensure more reliable access to a range of basic services
and/or livelihoods support.
2.2
Projects address the chronic caseload of vulnerable people with
assistance that helps strengthen coping and fewer households resort to
extreme coping measures such as selling assets.
Objective 3 – Humanitarian Reform
3.1
UK influences the humanitarian system to be well coordinated and
proportionate to agreed priorities and assessed need.
3.2
UK influence used to ensure humanitarian aid is more measurable at
output level and collective impact assessments are developed.
Objective 4. Evidence base
4.1
Create a robust evidence base for multi-year humanitarian action,
including how resilience programming provides better value for money.
4.2
Develop a real-time monitoring system for UK funded results
The “portfolio” approach
65. To meet the objectives of this business case it will be necessary to take a “portfolio”
approach” such that we work with a number of partners who have particular expertise
in their areas. First this appraisal will focus on (a) whether to continue with single year
funding or (b) begin multi-year funding or (c) do nothing. It will then move on to
consider delivery channels for the preferred option in more detail.
THE OPTIONS
66. The options are:
1. More of the same (an annual funding cycle)
2. Multi-year humanitarian funding incorporating resilience and improved M&E
3. Do nothing
67. Elaborating options for a humanitarian business case has been made more
complicated by the portfolio nature of the approach and lack of visibility beyond the
first year of needs. Discussions with the previous Secretary of State included an
understanding that a multi-year approach “made sense” and was the likely way
forward to address and embed resilience.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
68. The strategic case proposed three options, but realistically only one option (that of
multi-year assistance) can be chosen. Thus, the approach taken is to assess the
delivery mechanisms by type. This allows for a more detailed look at what benefits,
results and outcomes could be achieved over the four year period. For this reason,
only our preferred “option 2” is fully appraised in this business case.
69. Within our preferred option, three spending options for 2013 (with the same overall
budget) have been appraised. The amounts set out in the business case have been
determined by using a mix of: previous UK humanitarian spend in Somalia, DFID
operational plan estimates, UK burden share and partner absorptive capacity.
Option 1: More of the same (annual funding)
70. The option of an annual programming cycle includes some benefits, but on balance
does not achieve the necessary transformational impact that we envisage from a
multi-year approach, notably delivering resilience benefits.
Results
71. An annual funding cycle will achieve similar emergency results for the UK. This
includes: nutritional, wash, NFI/Shelter and some livelihoods results. However, the
annual approach will not allow for the resilience component to take root and would
weaken DFIDs ability to influence the wider resilience agenda in Somalia. In addition,
this would potentially remove a significant number of beneficiaries per annum from UK
results.
72. Reducing resilience funding could either increase the amount spent on nonsustainable emergency inputs or be removed from the overall amount of the business
case. This has not been quantified in the appraisal as the number of options then
becomes too onerous to deal with.
73. Some of the benefits of an annual approach might include:
a. The ability to allocate funds more flexibly (UK not locked into long term
agreements with partners);
b. The possibility of easily changing partners if performance or needs change;
c. The ability to direct and adapt short term assistance to target areas flexibly.
74. Whether multi-year or annual, many of the delivery channels / partners will be the
same. Some partners such as the ICRC operate on an annual funding basis and the
predictability of funding is less important for them – as the ICRC generally secures
almost total funding. For the rest, the predictability of multi-year funding could play a
critical part in determining innovative implementation options. Our existing partners
have all expressed a keen interest in the possibility of multi-year funding and are
supportive of this approach.
Resilience
75. The key difference will lie in the ability of partners to make year on year gains to
beneficiaries that would not have been possible within an annual funding cycle. With
the risks of annual funding, partners will not invest in resilience nor address the need
to develop a more creative approach to humanitarian aid delivery. This ability to
innovate and break the cycle of humanitarian funding is an assumption which the
multi-year approach will allow us to test.
Reform
76. The reform objectives would largely remain untouched. Although, a pluri-annual
commitment to humanitarian finance would signal a determined approach by the UK in
honouring our commitments made in the HERR and ICAI reviews.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Evidence
77. It would not be possible to build the evidence base without multi-annual funding and
commitments to partners. The evidence component is established to help answer
whether multi-year funding does deliver better value for money in reducing
humanitarian need and vulnerability.
Option 2: Multi-year approach
78. The evidence that multi-year humanitarian finance will lead to better outcomes is not
yet available however, our partners have long been calling for donors to change the
funding cycle, thereby allowing a more innovative approach to humanitarian aid
provision leading to better outcomes for vulnerable families. Ultimately, this approach
is expected to reduce the demand for humanitarian aid, thus leading to longer term
financial savings.
79. Experience tells us that there are a number of advantages (some of which will require
more hard evidence) in having a multi-year approach to humanitarian work. Many of
these will be familiar to development colleagues as multiyear programming is the
norm.
80. Overall some of the assumed advantages of multi-year funding include:
a. Allowing partners to develop interventions that build on gains and bring
beneficiaries further along their development trajectory, thus building
resilience;
b. Stimulating partners to develop longer term planning frameworks leading to
better interventions;
c. Cost savings, as partners are able to better plan procurement, make gains
in transportation (sea versus air) etc.;
d. Better staff retention, as partners will be able to offer longer term stability.
This should result in more skilled and knowledgeable staff managing and
implementing projects;
e. Partners being able to maintain flexibility by responding rapidly to needs as
they change on the ground and scaling up more quickly during spikes in
need;
f.
Reducing transaction costs for DFID and partners in developing new
partnerships every year, allowing more time to be spent monitoring quality
and engaging in policy debates;
g. Providing DFID with greater understanding of the sector and potentially
greater policy leverage;
h. The building of a more comprehensive dialogue with Government of
Somalia and local authorities.
Results
81. The achievement of providing up to 500,000 people per annum with life-saving
interventions, such as: nutrition, shelter, water programmes will remain largely
unchanged compared to annual funding.
82. However, the expectation is that multi-year funding will allow for a more mature
partnership to emerge that allows partners to experiment with alternative and
innovative approaches to the delivery of emergency aid. This could include looking at
the value for money of procurement cycles of certain goods to establishing better
connections with local partners in the assessment and delivery of relief aid. These will
be tested as part of the evaluation and research processes.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Resilience
83. Some of the questions and assumptions made above will be included in the research
and monitoring component of this BC. CHASE work centrally will also help guide and
build the evidence for multi-year humanitarian action.
84. Our assumption is that by providing continued and guaranteed support to vulnerable
families and communities, this will enable people to build sufficient assets and coping
capacity to deal with minor shocks. Currently, what drives many families into
destitution is that with even a minor shock, families resort to extreme coping measures
(often selling productive assets) and taking crippling loans.
Reform
85. By providing multi-year funding, DFID will be in a strong position to influence the
humanitarian donor community to follow suit. It will also demonstrate a strong
commitment to follow through on recommendations from the HERR, Real Time
Evaluation etc.
86. DFID will continue to play an active role in the various coordination forums
(Humanitarian Country Team, informal donors group, clusters etc). The engagement
with key stakeholders, the Humanitarian Coordinator, Agency and NGO heads, donors
such as the EC and US with a sustained commitment to fund humanitarian action will
only act to bolster our standing with partners.
87. A longer term approach to humanitarian funding will also allow DFID to track and
press the humanitarian community to come up with better means of measuring
collective results and impact monitoring.
Evidence
88. Currently, the evidence base to measure multi-year funding against an annual
approach is lacking. Collecting the necessary evidence is part of an organisational
push led by CHASE which has commissioned work in this area. The results of this
work are not yet available to inform this Business Case. The proposed Research and
Monitoring and Evaluation component of this business case aims to build an evidence
base and provide a more comprehensive monitoring package.
Option 3: Do nothing
89. The impact of withdrawal of UK funds from the humanitarian effort in Somalia would
be significant. Not only would our objectives not be met (see below) but significant
reputational risks would arise and other UK funded interventions would potentially
suffer (stabilisation, resilience, social service provision etc).
90. UK political objectives and broader HMG investment strategy in Somalia would also
suffer from a lack of credibility if the UK were to withdraw support at this juncture,
especially given the huge role played by the UK in responding to the 2011 famine.
Objective 1: Results
91. The UK has committed through the Somalia Country Operational Plan (COP) to help
60,000 starving children under-5 benefit from specific acute malnutrition prevention
programmes each year. These results will contribute to DFID global results and
government targets.
92. The UK has provided humanitarian support to Somalia for a number of years helping
over 1 million people in 2011 and 2012. The UK response to the 2011 famine in
Somalia was applauded by many and mentioned by the outgoing SOS as a proud
moment for UK Aid.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
93. UK Humanitarian policy commits the UK to provide aid where needs are greatest. The
withdrawal of UK Aid would impact negatively on the most vulnerable in Somalia who
rely on humanitarian aid.
Objective 2: Resilience
94. The UK has recently been the “resilience” champion, with the previous Secretary of
State leading the way and creating an international Political Champions group bringing
together key governments and multilaterals. It would therefore be inconsistent for the
UK to abandon work linking humanitarian to development by simply withdrawing UK
humanitarian and resilience aid at this point in time.
Objective 3: Reform
95. The argument of whether other donors would increase contributions if the UK were to
reduce or withdraw is tenuous. Few donors have the means to compensate for the
absence of UK Aid and even fewer have the technical expertise in country to press for
systemic reform.
96. The lack of our influencing potential would have significant impact on the collective
efforts underway to improve needs analysis, response quality, monitoring and
reporting and overall coordination. The impact would be felt on both the country and
international stage.
Delivery channel options
97. Option 2 is the preferred option. This provides DFID with the potential to transform
the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and deliver far greater potential
savings in the longer term. Option 2 has been split into three parts, each representing
different funding options in 2013 as the nature of humanitarian need precludes
forecasting further ahead at this stage.
98. A four year time horizon provides us with an opportunity to better develop linkages
with other parts of DFID’s programme, develop a more robust evidence base of
resilience work and value for money and test some assumptions that cost savings will
be made in the longer term by reducing humanitarian demand.
99. Some of the assumed benefits of multi-year funding for certain partners (see table 16)
are to develop innovative interventions that build on gains and bring beneficiaries
further along their development trajectory, thus building resilience; the development of
longer term planning frameworks leading to better interventions; partners able to better
plan procurement; partners being able to maintain flexibility by responding rapidly to
needs as they change on the ground and scaling up more quickly during spikes in
need; building of a more comprehensive dialogue with Government of Somalia and
local authorities.
100. The table below illustrates how only a combination of delivery channels will deliver
against our objectives.
23
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Table 2 partner / mechanism compared against objectives
Objective 1.
Delivery of assistance
(RESULTS)
CHF
ICRC
Medium / High
Objective 2.
Effectiveness of the
overall humanitarian
response (REFORM)
High
Objective 3.
Restoring livelihoods,
promoting resilience
(RESILIENCE)
Medium / Low
Concrete results across
all sectors and locations.
Broad range of partners
(UN, INGO, national
NGO)
maximises
delivery potential in an
ever
changing
and
constricting environment.
CHF and other reform
objectives are mutually
reinforcing.
Leadership,
cluster coordination, GHD,
improved collective M+E
and
humanitarian
financing reform are all
supported.
The CHF contracts a wide range of
partners, including a number of
smaller national NGOs and
supports some livelihoods work,
the mechanism currently provides
only short term (up to 12 months
funding).
Quality
of
delivery
strengthened
through
cluster participation.
High
Low
High
With a rich tradition and
mandate ICRC is at the
vanguard
of
humanitarian delivery in
south Somalia and its
reach exceeds that of
most other actors. The
unique role accorded
ICRC focuses on IHL
and protection as well as
assistance.
In private, ICRC shares
situational analysis and
participates in technical
coordination. It remains
however,
completely
independent of UN led
structures and largely
outside of the reform
agenda.
High
Low
Working through the Somali Red
Crescent Society, ICRC is one of
the largest providers of livelihoods
assistance in south Somalia. ICRC
access is unrivalled and its current
programme of assistance links
food assistance to basic services
and livelihoods support. One of the
central themes of ICRC’s work
focuses on protection and ICRC
will continue to champion respect
for IHL and the protection of
civilians.
Medium to high
Contracting
through
accountable grants is a
tried
and
tested
mechanism for securing
results through INGO
partners.
Evidence
shows that they can
deliver a high level
(quantity and quality) of
assistance.
Direct bilateral support
does not promote the
reform effort. Partners
have less incentive to
participate in coordination
and
joint-working
approaches once funding
is secured.
NGOs/
UN
The
administrative
burden of multiple grants
is relatively high for
DFID.
UN agencies and NGOs are well
placed to provide more resilient
forms of programming that look to
marry humanitarian assistance
with improved access to basic
services and livelihoods support.
As with all actors the ability of UN
agencies and NGOs to maintain
services and programmes remains
contingent on access and the
wider
political
and
security
environment.
101. Given the range of delivery options in Somalia, we argue that the following main
tried and tested partners / mechanisms are used to deliver against our objectives:
 The Common Humanitarian Fund;
 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
 UN agencies;
 NGOs.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
102. It is likely that consortiums of partners will develop over the coming months / years
to leverage additional donor resources and make efficiency gains. We will explore the
options these present when determining our allocations as and when they arise. The
management case sets out in more detail the approach to be taken in selection of
partners.
103. Adopting a multi-year humanitarian approach provides an opportunity to test the
assumption that our partners can alter their approach to aid delivery. This means not
repeating the same project year-in-year-out but rather adopting a new approach
altogether. We will press partners to adopt new approaches that make incremental
gains leading to beneficiaries moving out of extreme vulnerability and no longer
requiring humanitarian assistance.
104. The four year period will permit a well-developed research, monitoring and
evaluation framework to be established that is able to test this theory and new
approach. (see detail at FLAG I)
105. The recently elected Government of Somalia (GoS) is not expected to be a direct
recipient of DFID humanitarian aid. However, considering the desire of the new GoS to
have more say over where aid goes and what it is spent on, the humanitarian
programme will inform the GoS of our humanitarian actions and will look to build links
with the GoS over time. This will include a better understanding of how the GoS
intends to manage and cope with climate related changes and sudden onset shocks
and what role the GoS will take in coordinating aid delivery. A more detailed plan of
engagement will be developed during the lifetime of the business case in collaboration
with other donors and key partners.
Allocation options
106. The table below provides an indication of how funding could be split across the
programme in the financial year 2013/14. The outer years are subject to change
depending on performance assessment and how the need and situation evolve.
Table 3 2013/14 Allocation Options
International Organizations
Pooled funding
Livelihoods (Cash)
NGO resilience
UN Resilience Programme
Nutrition
Aid Enablers
RME
Total
internal risk facility
Total With IRF
Option(A)(£m)
4
10
2
3
3
5
2
1
30
10
40
Option (B)
(£m)
3
8
3
3
6
4
2
1
30
10
40
Spend option A. Emergency focused with less emphasis on resilience
Spend option B. Balanced approach
Spend option C. Resilience focussed
The spending plan over the four years is as follows:
25
Option (C)
(£m)
3
4
2
4
9
5
2
1
30
10
40
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Table 4 Spending Plan
Humanitarian Allocation
Total Programme
Internal Risk Facility
Total With IRF
2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17
£30
£27
£25
£23
£10
£10
£10
£10
£40
£37
£35
£33
Total (£m)
£105
£40
£145
Burden Share
107. Based on a £30 million spend in 2013/14 the UK share of the 2013 appeal would
drop to 3.69%. With a larger contribution of £40 million the share would reach 4.92%.
108. If CAP funding remains relatively constant at around 60% of the appeal14, then the
UK’s proportion of funding received would range from 6% to 8% and if all the
additional IRF funds are programmed then the UK share of CAP funding would rise
from 8.2% to 11.5%. This still represents a significant drop in 2013/14 from the 10.2%
UK share in 2012 and 14.3% in 2011, but we feel is still an acceptable level of burden
share for the UK.
Table 5 CAP amounts and projected UK share15
Year
CAP amount
requested (£)
CAP funds
received @
60%
UK
funding
(£)
UK % of
CAP
appeal
UK funding
with IRF (£)
2013
£812,500,000
£487,500,000
30 m
3.69%
40 m
2014
£768,172,938
£460,903,763
27 m
3.51%
37 m
2015
£507,812,500
£304,687,500
25 m
4.92%
35 m
2016
£480,108,086
£288,064,852
23 m
4.79%
33 m
UK % of
CAP
appeal
(with IRF)
4.92%
UK % of
CAP
funding
UK % of
CAP
funding
(with IRF)
6.15%
8.21%
5.86%
8.03%
6.89%
8.21%
11.49%
6.87%
7.98%
11.46%
4.82%
109. Whilst the reduction in UK Humanitarian Aid will likely be met with considerable
consternation amongst our partners, the rise of other forms of UK development and
stabilisation assistance should offset some of the criticism. In addition, the ability to
offer multi-year humanitarian support will be attractive to many partners.
Internal Risk Financing (IRF)
110. As outlined in the strategic case, Somalia is highly susceptible to shocks (both
climatic and conflict related). The likelihood of rain failure leading to drought and failed
harvest during the implementation period is high (see climate section below). In
addition, the conflict(s) and power struggles will likely continue to play a de-stabilising
role in Somalia during the foreseeable future despite the recent political and military
progress.
111. Whilst it is impossible to predict now what will happen over the four years,
recommendations from ICAI suggest that flexible funding arrangements should be in
place to deal with such challenges. 16
112. Recent research undertaken in Kenya and Ethiopia17suggests that providing
assistance before a crisis reaches maturity is more economical and results in better
14
The amount in 2012 is 57.8% to date. Previous 10 year average is 68%.
The UK burden share is based on funds requested. Often we use the CAP funding to determine
actual burden share. This will be monitoring throughout the lifetime of this programme.
16ICAI recommendation 2: DFID should build on existing good practice to develop, within six
months, a new model for flexibly addressing recurring crises in the Horn of Africa.
15
26
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
outcomes for people than provision of emergency aid. Rapid response humanitarian
aid is often expensive and does not provide the time needed to properly plan and
develop initiatives that build sustainability.
113. Given that the UK humanitarian spend will reduce from £55 in 2012/13 and £78 in
2011/12 to £30 million in 2013/1418, a flexible Internal Risk Facility of £10 million per
annum is proposed. The amount is a proportionate amount that would enable the UK
to plan a significant catalytic role in funding early action. Depending on the severity of
the impending crisis (how alarming the early warnings are), funds from outer years
could be drawn upon. Thus, if a similar scenario to 2010 and 2011 was to materialise,
it is probable that more than £10 million would be required to avert a famine. Thus
funds would be drawn from the £40 million total IRF.
114. Other donors such as the US and the EC are already looking closely at early
warning funding (the US calls this a Crisis Modifier). The UK will coordinate with other
donors in this domain. In particular there is a need to reach agreement on triggers for
early action. This commitment was itself made as a response to one of the ICAI’s
report recommendations.
115.
The management case sets out in more detail how the IRF would work.
Results and Impact
116. Results have been calculated on the basis of a £30 million spend in 2013/14.
Should the crisis modifier be activated – additional results will be achieved but we are
unable to determine these for obvious reasons. For the purposes of monitoring our
interventions, each delivery channel and project will be held to account on the basis of
the estimated numbers of beneficiaries identified at project outset.
117.
The projected results by selected standard indicator are as follows:
Table 6 Projected sample outputs 2013/14 (based on £30m)
2a
2b
Output Indicators
emergency
Balanced
2c
Resilience
# people receiving food
84,372
93,058
62,505
# people provided with Non-food items and / or Shelter
70,743
84,346
59,517
# people receiving agricultural / livelihoods support
208,899
201,178
121,876
# people benefitting from Cash for Work
47,908
49,974
29,147
# people with access to safe water
416,409
375,086
213,768
# people accessing Health services
50,793
64,262
46,898
# children treated SAM/MAM
52,230
60,504
45,852
# Housholds benefitting from a resilience package
8,372
12,559
18,140
118. Behind the above output numbers lies a significant amount of technical detail
regarding how programmes are implemented, the standards that are being applied,
beneficiary targeting etc. FLAG J provides an overview of the packages of assistance
that will be provided and links to the most current standards being applied in Somalia.
Standards are established by Clusters and we expect all our partners to follow these
standards.
17
The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia
June 2012. Courtenay Cabot Venton, Catherine Fitzgibbon, Tenna Shitarek, Lorraine Coulter,
Olivia Dooley
18 The reduction is due to the amount originally projected in the COP (£21 million per annum).
27
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Aid Enablers
119. The aid enablers programme is managed separately as it includes other nonhumanitarian spend. The humanitarian team provides technical input to the above
components. The Aid Enablers programme has been approved Business Case (Quest
No. 3717472) and will operate from 01/11/2011 to 31/12/2014. It is envisaged that this
120. The Aid Enablers component will provide funding for partners that programme will
continue into the new Country Operational Plan. Help improve the overall effort and
humanitarian response. Funding may/will include:
 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA
provides inter alia valuable humanitarian analysis and structures the overall
coordination effort;
 the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) provides excellent
food security & nutrition analysis;
 the NGO Safety Programme (NSP) provides NGO implementing partners
with timely security advice facilitating their access to beneficiary
populations;
 Support to the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) for
security and medical provision;
 UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) provides flights to and around
Somalia ensuring our partners have access to safe and reliable air
transport. (this is not currently part of the portfolio, but may become so in
future).
Non-spend results:
121. In addition to the output based results listed above, UK influence and lobbying will
be used to effect change in a number of strategic priorities:
Humanitarian Leadership
122. Our funding will look to complement what others are doing and support the
strategy put in place by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). This will include in
particular our Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) funding, but also our bilateral
interventions. We will also support the HC in his ability to exercise authority over the
response as a whole and provide strategic leadership.
Improved coordination:
123. As part of the UK’s influencing agenda we will work with the humanitarian
response system as a whole to promote a more joined-up and coordinated approach.
Our investment in the Common Humanitarian Fund helps to promote a wellcoordinated approach as needs/gaps are determined by Cluster coordinators.
124. All of our bilateral investments will be coordinated with the cluster lead agencies
and we will encourage our partners to take an active part in the coordination structures
in place.
Protection of Civilians
125. The UK will play an active role in promoting the protection of vulnerable
populations. This will include lobbying at the UN Security Council and ensuring
protection language is included in AMISOM resolutions. The UK will input into the
Ethiopia and Somalia Monitoring Group reports as necessary.
126. Regionally, the UK will press for Somalia’s neighbours (notably Ethiopia and
Kenya) to incorporate and address protection concerns in their military interventions in
Somalia.
28
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
127. In Somalia the UK will press AMISOM to adopt approaches that are in keeping
with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights law and standards.
Increasingly, access to Somali government and armed forces will allow for the
promotion of a rights based approach and one that’s in keeping with the principles of
IHL.
Gender
128. The situation in Somalia for women and girls is dire. Through our interventions and
in dialogue with the humanitarian community as a whole, the UK will promote
interventions that take into consideration and address the specific needs of women
and girls, such as where water points are located in IDP camps, sanitary facilities that
are secure and gender-sensitive health services that inter alia offer Post Exposure
Prophylaxis19. This work will be mainstreamed across all sectors and will be included
in our monitoring systems to make sure we move from rhetoric to action. We will seek
to incorporate ‘best fit’ practice from our international partners regarding humanitarian
programming for gender equality.
129. Data will be (where possible) disaggregated to monitor closely the impact UK Aid
is having on women and girls. See section in the management case on Gender for
more detail (paragraph 317-320).
Innovation
130. The very nature of a multi-year humanitarian programme seeking to bridge the
humanitarian and resilience divide in Somalia can already be defined as innovative.
The UK will seek to persuade partners to think more creatively about how multi-year
programming can best be used to deliver more sustainable humanitarian outcomes.
When seeking partners for each of the sectors, the key question when proposing
multi-year funding will be: What are you proposing to do differently with multi-year
funding that you would not be able to achieve with annual funding?
131. In addition, the programme will continue to look at the benefits of alternative
means of delivery. This will include cash transfers and Cash for Work where
appropriate. Use of new technology will also be promoted. This will include possible
biometric registration of beneficiaries and use of mobile phone technology to transfer
cash.
132. Innovation will be closely tied to a more comprehensive value for money analysis
that ensures the UK investment delivers the best possible returns.
Refugee Returns
133. This business case does not make a financial provision for the return of Somali
refugees from Kenya or Ethiopia (currently estimated at one million people20). Should
a return start to materialise from either Kenya or Ethiopia, funds currently allocated in
those country programmes could be re-oriented to support return in Somalia. If this
does not prove possible, the £10 million per annum IRF planned for in this business
case could be activated. The use of resources will be contingent on the fact that
returns are voluntary and in keeping with the 1951 Refugee Convention. The UK will
press host countries to abide by applicable refugee legislation.
134. Given the changing political and military context in Somalia, it is possible that the
current Government of Somalia’s desire to see the return of refugees could materialise
19
Post exposure prophylaxis is ideally provided to rape victims within 48-72 hours to prevent the
transmission of HIV.
20 UNOCHA Somalia Dec 2011 Humanitarian Bulletin http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somaliahumanitarian-bulletin-december-2012-issued-4-january-2013
29
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
over the implementation period. In addition, pressure brought about by the Kenyan
authorities to promote refugee return could take place over the course of the coming
few years. The UK will continue to monitor the situation with colleagues from Kenya
and Ethiopia. It is likely that refugee returns will be discussed at the 2013 Somalia
Conference in London.
135. Recent unconfirmed reports of some departures from camps in Kenya could be
linked to the improved situation in Somalia or merely seasonal movement for planting
and harvesting. The UK will continue to monitor the situation closely across the Horn
of Africa.
Theory of Change (TOC)
136. In order to better examine the relationships between inputs to impact across our
four objectives, the theory of change maps out the logic behind the programme
approach and how we envisage multi-year funding having the desired impact of
breaking the cycle of dependency and eventually reducing humanitarian need.
137. The problem the ToC seeks to address is that a chronic caseload of approximately
one Million people exists, who due to repeated shocks and insecurity, are living in
crisis and constantly in need of humanitarian assistance. A further 1.7 million are in
stress (vulnerable to shocks and failing back into crisis).The challenge is to enable a
proportion of these people to graduate out of the need for humanitarian assistance by
improving their resilience to shocks and crises, and to improve the delivery of relevant
humanitarian assistance to those who remain.
138. Over the past 20 years repeated short term humanitarian responses to shocks /
crisis has been the norm. Reliance on such funding is problematic in that a) it hampers
the development of innovative longer-term solutions by donors and partners, b) does
not build resilience c) misses opportunities for institutional learning and collection of
reliable evidence.
139. Continued instability and humanitarian need are likely to remain the norm in
Somalia in the short to medium term as the country struggles to rise out of the current
repeated crises, therefore a more strategic humanitarian approach is required to break
the cycle and gradually reduce the numbers of Somalis needing humanitarian
assistance.
140. The central tenet of the programme is that providing multi-year funding will allow
partners the opportunity to develop innovative projects (doing things differently) and
make gains in reducing the overall caseload of people reliant on humanitarian aid.
Whilst the individual projects will be worked out once the business case is approved,
we anticipate that this type of funding will allow partners to work with vulnerable
households over a longer predictable period, providing a more guaranteed level of
assistance. This will enable households to retain assets, manage debt better and
break the cycle of resorting to extreme coping measures every time a shock comes
along. In addition, the £10 Million IRF (up to £40 Million over 4 years) maintains a
capacity to respond rapidly to unforeseen emergencies and provide early warning
(preparedness) funding, once pre-agreed triggers have been reached. Each multi-year
project will be required to demonstrate the gains possible and how a longer time frame
provides an opportunity to innovate.
141. In terms of value for money, early identification and treatment of acutely
malnourished children prevents them becoming severely malnourished, and is a far
more cost effective treatment option than treating Severe Acute Malnutrition. At the
family level, asset preservation activities can be less than half the cost of providing
food assistance once a crisis has hit. Similarly borehole rehabilitation ahead of time
can be far more cost effective than providing emergency water. Such programmes are
more likely to be feasible and effective and result in improved resilience when planned
30
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
and implemented over a predictable multi year period. Light infrastructure projects
such as borehole rehabilitation also benefit from predictable funding due to the often
long lead time needed to procure and supply materials to Somalia.
142. Key components in the theory of change in the programme are based on the
following assumptions: the detail of which is found in the economic appraisal (FLAG
E).
143. We assume that approximately 1 Million chronically food insecure Somalis
constitute a relatively stable group with long term predictable needs. Due to a lack of
centralised records, poor coverage of government services, and NGO programmes
operating on an annual basis, beneficiaries are not currently monitored as a cohesive
whole. By requiring partners to keep records of beneficiaries, and by independently
evaluating what types of support have a longer term resilience building outcomes,
interventions will be refined over time and targeted more efficiently so as to reduce the
impact of future shocks, and enable people to graduate out of Humanitarian need.
This process will also set benchmarks for future resilience building humanitarian
approaches for other countries in the region.
144. We assume multi-year funding (Output 1 &2) will provide an opportunity for more
innovative solutions to be found, will allow for more timely assistance and cut both the
cost of meeting slow-onset emergency needs (by arriving sooner) and reduce the level
of additional need in the future. Evidence from Ethiopia’s productive safety net
programmes21 suggests a shift to multi-year funding is beneficial in saving lives and
preventing destitution.
145. Evaluations of the 2011 Somali famine22 suggest multi-year funding and better
contingency planning would have reduced delays between funds becoming available,
and the response on the ground, and so would have reduced the impact of the famine.
There is evidence23 that multi-year programming is more cost effective in responding
to chronic crisis than annual funding, and studies show how multi-year funding could
deliver the same results at lower cost.
146. Multi-year contracts will result in NGOs being able to retain staff, avoid costs of
rehiring, and mean the staff are better connected, had detailed contextual knowledge
and are able to implement emergency responses quicker. This will also enable donors
and NGOs to build stronger and more durable relationships with departments of the
Government of Somalia, as and when they emerge.
147. Resilience: The assumption is that only by making multi-year funding available is
making people resilient possible. Greater resilience will cut the level of external
humanitarian assistance needed by communities in the long term. Evidence from
Ethiopia’s safety net programmes show “hungry gaps” reducing by approximately one
third over a five year time frame. Calculations from Kenya and Ethiopia suggest that
funding resilience enhancing activities, such as productive safety net programmes and
drought resistant seed distributions, although costly initially, result in a reduced
humanitarian spend in the longer term, particularly when the development benefits are
factored in. However in Somalia, careful tracking of activities designed to increase
resilience will need to be carried out under the Research, Monitoring and Evaluation
element of the programme and modified accordingly. A dedicated RME function,
funded throughout will be able to build sophisticated and innovative monitoring tools,
21Slim,
Hugo (2012) IASC Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought
Crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya: Synthesis Report, available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RTE_HoA_SynthesisReport_FINAL.pdf
22Wimpenny, J, Anne Bush and Lyndsay Mountford (2012) Value for Money in Humanitarian Aid to Kenya
and Somalia, study commissioned by DFID of Coffey International, page 24.
23
Hale P and Kessler R (2012) Value for money in Humanitarian Response, page 22
31
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
and develop specific resilience indicators to a far greater extent than currently
possible.
148. We also assume there will be a need to draw on the proposed Internal Risk Facility
of £10 million per year (Output 1) which will allow DFID to respond to unforeseen
emergencies, such as flood affected populations, or movements of IDPs due to the
continued conflict and climate change. Long term records show more than four
consecutive good harvests is unusual. The current rainfall predictions for 2013, and
subsequent harvest estimates are good; conversely making it likely a poor harvest will
follow at least once if not twice in the coming four year programme. (See FLAG L for
details of increase in frequency of natural hazards including climate related shocks.)
This funding will be outside the main body of resilience enhancing interventions, but if
an emergency response requires it, could be channelled through existing delivery
mechanisms, and by existing partners, who due to their multi-year engagement with
resilience enhancing work, would be well placed to respond rapidly either by scaling
up existing interventions, such as mobile phone cash transfers, or undertaking more
standard relief activities.
149. Reform: Multi-year funding allows for greater innovation and so reform of the
humanitarian system in Somalia. At the activity level, for example, use of biometrics in
identifying beneficiaries may be trialled (as it is in Kenya) and if successful adopted
more widely. Such approaches are difficult to trial and mainstream in a short funding
cycle due to the set up costs and training required. If successful these would enable
more accurate record keeping and tracking of beneficiaries allowing evidence of
enhanced resilience to be demonstrated. There is a push for multi-year funding across
the sector, with NGOs, the UN (FAO and UNICEF) and ICRC all moving that way. In
addition, closer links between vulnerability / food security indicators with pre agreed
triggers for releasing funds necessitate a year on year approach, and are in the
process of being set up. A longer time frame and the dedicated focus of the RME
function will result in more reliable impact data and an evidence base resulting in
improved leverage and influencing reform with international partners, and with the
Government of Somalia.
150. We also assume that DFID Somalia’s technical advisory and programme
management functions will benefit from multi-year funding by reducing the
considerable time currently taken to work up proposals and contracts and project
completion reports with implementing partners on an annual basis. This will allow
DFID to spend more time building influencing relationships, adding value to
programme design, and ensuring lessons learned are fed back in. The evidence
generated by outputs 1 and 2, measured by output 4, will enable DFID to more
effectively influence the wider humanitarian sector, the major partners operating in
Somalia and the government of Somalia itself, and so deliver effective reform of the
sector.
151. Research, Monitoring and Evaluation (Output 4). We assume the inclusion of a
dedicated RME function, funded throughout the 4 year period, will result in significant
learning, and continued programme refinement, and so greater impact. With the
capacity to monitor all aspects of the portfolio, the RME will move towards a far more
real time “dash board” type of monitoring, which will allow for example the wide and
varied CHF implementation to be followed more effectively, and when necessary feed
into re designing of activities. Increased use of remote sensing, mobile phone
technology and third party monitoring will all be included, as will the development and
use of standardised indicators across the range of interventions. The RME function will
also allow analysis of the impact of mixes of interventions on different groups of
beneficiaries and reduce the risks of exacerbating ethnic / clan tensions.(do no harm)
32
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Problem:
Chronic caseload of 1 Million people
Repeated short-term funding but:
o Current system hampers innovation;
o Programmes do not build resilience;
o M and E does not build understanding
of what would create resilience.


Input £105-145 Million 2013-2017
OUTPUT 2
Predictable
M-Y funding;
OUTPUT 1
Internal Risk
Facility
introduced;
£10m P.A. for
unforeseen
emergency
response;
Help those
who are most
at risk.
Outcome
Faster
response
time;
More lives
saved.
Builds on
long term
resiliencepro
grams,
OUTPUT 3
DFID
Technical
Advisory and
programme
mgmt. leads
to effective
relations with
partners;
Quality
research
leads to
policy change
Innovative
prog’s build
on gains
made;
Increased
flexibility for
partners;
Better staff
retention by
partners
Outcome
High quality
partnerships
lead to more
innovative
projects;
Outcome
Cost effective
/ VfM
benchmark;
Speed of
response
improves;
Save more
lives;
Partners
moreefficient
IMPACT
Fewer Somalis in need of humanitarian assistance
+
Increased Resilience
33
OUTPUT 4
R,M and E
undertaken;
Detailed
examination
of beneficiary
caseload;
“real time”
evaluation
Incremental
Improvements to
prog’ design
Outcome
Improved
targeting;
Improved
resilience;
Better policy
leverage;
Dialog with
GoS and
capacity
torespondinc
reases
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Cross Cutting Issues
152. Issues of working across HMG, Conflict, social and gender are all covered
in the management case.
Decision Making
153.
Allocations to partners will be made on the basis of:

Value for money – each partner will be required to submit a VFM annex
outlining the costs of inputs, management and operating costs. Guidance for
partners will be further developed to assist in the understanding of what is
required. As per the recommendations of the recently DFID commissioned
evaluation report – a select number of indicators will be used to determine
VFM;

Ability to deliver and absorb funding – partners with a track record of
delivering (existing DFID partners with a proven track record will be afforded
priority);

Burden share – the amount of UK funding as a proportion of appeals or
overall funding;

Risk management – each partner will be subject to a due diligence review.
The review will assess partner systems and overall ability to manage a DFID
contribution in compliance with our rules and regulations and UK law.
154. The humanitarian business model does not lend itself well to competitive selection.
Most partners are engaged in particular sectors and geographical areas and it is most
often not possible to alter them. Some organisations such as ICRC, UNHCR and
UNICEF have specific mandates that are not open for tender.
155. Within the humanitarian market place, there are other donors who also have pet
favourites and preferred thematic and geographic sectors. The UK will coordinate
decision making with other key donors to avoid duplication.
Research, Monitoring and Evaluation
156. The evidence base for humanitarian action in Somalia is weak and needs
improving. A significant component of this business case will be devoted to both
improving the evidence base, improving the monitoring of interventions and better
evaluation of project outcomes and impact.
157. Monitoring of spend and results will be performed annually with a breakpoint at the
end of year 2. Each intervention, where funds are committed multi-year will be subject
to performance benchmarks that will inform whether continued support is justified or
whether projects should be revised or stopped. The estimated budget allocated to this
component is based on previous experience and expense of running evaluations in
Somalia. A more detailed budget will be developed once the business case has been
approved.
158. This process will be led by the DFID Somalia humanitarian team in collaboration
with the Accountability & Results Team (ART) team. Information generated by the
external monitoring will inform this decision making process. FLAG I provides a more
detailed breakdown of questions for research and the expected outputs / outcomes for
the monitoring and evaluation component.
Risk management
159. Somalia is a high risk environment. Delivering aid in south central Somalia is
particularly challenging with very real risks of fraud and diversion. Somalia is also one
34
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
of the world’s most violent and dangerous operating environments for aid workers
(highest aid worker murder rate from 2006-2011)24. It should be remembered that
whilst the UK assumes fiduciary risk, our partners assume both a fiduciary and a real
security risk to the lives of staff.
160. Most partners operate a remote management implementation model and have
done so for a number of years. Whilst a number of techniques for managing projects
in this manner have developed, the reduced visibility and access to project sites is a
critically limiting and complicating factor in the delivery and monitoring of aid. The
monitoring proposed as part of this business case will aim to deliver more robust
oversight of projects and help build a better understanding of what UK funded
interventions are achieving.
161. Despite the challenges present in Somalia, the heightened awareness of risk by
partners has led to the development of a range of risk management tools and
practices. Through the Aid Enablers programme the Risk Management Unit is funded
that provides a database of contractors and NGOs used by agencies. This is to enable
partners to cross check information and not use disreputable companies and
contractors.
162. DFID partners will be thoroughly assessed prior to funding. The DFID Somalia
humanitarian team has already trialled Due Diligence assessments of partnersand
these Due Diligence assessments will take place for all partners. A risk matrix will be
developed that maps out where risks are greatest and strategies for risk alleviation
and mitigation.
163. The proposed risk management summary is attached at FLAG O. This sets out
existing risks and risk mitigation measures. This will be a live document and regularly
reviewed and updated.
Appraisal Conclusion
164. Table 7 below outlines the scoring against the four objectives and criteria set out
earlier in the appraisal case. The scoring is
Table 7 Scoring the options
Weighting
Option 1
Option 2 a
Option 2 b
Option 2 c
Option 3
Obj. 1
30
25
25
25
20
0
Obj.2
30
5
20
25
25
0
Obj. 3
20
15
20
20
20
0
Obj. 4
20
5
20
20
20
0
Total
100
50
85
90
85
0
165. Option 1 is a continuation of what has been done to date and whilst the approach
would continue to deliver results, it would not build on success nor deliver any longer
term cost savings in terms of reducing the humanitarian caseload.
166. Option 2a would provide a more emergency package of aid, but would be lighter
on resilience in the first year.
167. Option 2b, the preferred option provides a balanced approach to funding core lifesaving activities and delivering against resilience benefits in 2013. This option also
scores well against the overall resilience, reform and evidence objectives (as do
options 2a and 2c).
168. Options 2c is weighted towards resilience, but would not address adequately the
urgent humanitarian needs faced by a great many Somalis.
24
Aid Worker Security Report 2012: Humanitarian Outcomes
35
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
169. Option 3(do nothing) does not score well against our criteria and has therefore
been discounted as a viable option.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
170. In the table below the quality of evidence for each option is rated as either: Strong,
Medium or Limited.
Option
1
2
3
Evidence rating
Medium
Medium
n/a
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and
environment for each feasible option?
171. The impact of climate change and environmental risks are extreme in Somalia25.
Climate change is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of natural hazards.
Thus floods and drought may occur more regularly. 26Current climate modelling across
the Horn of Africa estimates that temperatures will rise by 3.2 degrees Celsius
between 2007 and 2080/9027. Rainfall is forecast to increase by 7% with a greater
increase (30-40%) in rainfall variation.
Option
1
2
3
Climate change and environment risks
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
B
B
n/a
Climate change and environment
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
C
B
n/a
172. A more detailed Climate appraisal and Climate and Environment Assurance Note
is at FLAG G.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
173. The option of doing nothing or more of the same has been discounted through the
appraisal in the previous section. The real options are therefore between focusing
more on addressing immediate needs versus efforts to increase the level of resilience.
To this end, feasible spending options are detailed below.
Table 8 2013/14 Spend options.
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
International organization
4
3
3
Pooled funding
10
8
4
Livelihoods (Cash)
2
3
2
NGO resilience
3
3
4
UN Resilience Programme
3
6
9
25
The Maplecroft: Multi-Hazard Country Risk Briefing. 5 December 2012 Risk Index rates Climate
Change Vulnerability as Extreme.
26 Ibid page 1
27Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2007. The fourth Assessment and
Synthesis report – Africa.
36
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Nutrition
5
4
5
Aid Enablers
2
2
2
RME
1
1
1
Total
30
30
30
Internal Risk Facility
10
10
10
Total With IRF
40
40
40
174. These options relate just to the first year of the programme because the reactive
nature of humanitarian assistance is such that the extent, location and complexity of
delivering the assistance will vary from year to year, meaning that it is very hard to be
precise about needs after the first year.
175. All there options include humanitarian and resilience building elements. But option
1 focuses more on meeting immediate needs, whilst option 3 gives more weight to
resilience with option 2 attempting to strike a balance between the two. The
differences are primarily driven by the relative allocations given to the more reactive
Common Humanitarian Fund under option 1 versus the FAO’s resilience programme
under option 3. These allocations are driven by existing operational capabilities of
potential delivery partners, which is affected by the degree of competition – see
paragraph 134. For each option the value of the internal risk facility remains the same
because this is for unexpected shocks, which in the short-term at least, is assumed to
be independent of which activities are supported.
176. The preceding section and the Commercial Case of this business case provides
an institutional assessment of these partners, and will not be repeated here save to
say that these partners are assessed as being able to target the right beneficiaries
using appropriate instruments that support the outcome statement in the Strategic
Case.
177. Through the application of unit costs coupled with assumptions about the types of
assistance supported under each of the 2nd and 3rd tier options, the estimated numbers
of beneficiaries under each option for the first year are reported below. It’s important
to note that a single beneficiary may be in receipt of a range of these activities (e.g.
children treated for acute malnutrition are also likely to be in receipt of health services
and their families may receive either food or cash) meaning that the rows cannot be
summed to give the estimated total number of recipients.
Table 9 The Estimated number of Beneficiaries for each Year 1 Option
Output Indicators
Option 1
Option 2
# people receiving food
Option 3
84,372
93,058
62,505
# people provided with Non-food items and / or
Shelter
# people receiving agricultural / livelihoods
support
70,743
84,346
59,517
208,899
201,178
121,876
# people benefitting from Cash for Work
47,908
49,974
29,147
# people with access to safe water
416,409
375,086
213,768
# people accessing Health services
50,793
64,262
46,898
# children treated SAM/MAM
52,230
60,504
45,852
8,372
12,559
18,140
# Households
package
benefitting
from
a resilience
37
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
178. A conventional cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to assess the best
option because of two main reasons. First, there is a lack of data on characteristics
of supported beneficiaries to be able to sufficiently identify the type and level of
support that they will benefit from, including how such support will result in outcomes
that can be quantified and monetised so as to allow a comparison against costs. And
second, the aggregate outputs, and by extension results, for each option are not
known over the full four years of the programme. This is because, as previously
noted, the reactive nature of humanitarian assistance means that the precise activities
after the first year cannot be known with certainty. Although the latest UNOCHA
Consolidated Appeal (CAP) is for 3 years, and even where potential delivery partners
may end up providing support to a particular community over a number of years, most
do not (currently) have multi-year results frameworks.
179. Cost-effectiveness analysis is possible for some but not all activities and
outputs. Ideally cost-effectiveness would be compared for particular outcomes and
impacts (the ‘effectiveness’ component of the NAO’s 3’E’s28). An example would be
the cost of making a household resilient to local idiosyncratic shocks, so that it is able
to cope with these shocks without receiving assistance from outside its community.
However, the unit costs of outcomes tend to be very location and context-specific.
Even where they exist, their value as a comparator is questionable given how little
control the implementing partner may have over many of the wider factors that
determine the level of support a particular household may need and so the unit costs.
Unit costs are available for some key outputs and for activities, as reported in what
follows.
180. To overcome these limitations this appraisal compares the options in a
sequenced approach. Although this approach is intended to support the identification
of the preferred option amongst the three identified above, it does so by discussing the
merits and evidence of shifting the general focus of efforts, and is therefore set within
the context of a multi-year timeline. As result, its real value is as a framework for
influencing a multi-year approach with partners to achieve the three strategic
objectives discussed in the Strategic Case.
181. This sequenced approach is nested with the wider context of the Somalia
economy. The Economic Annex supports the analysis in the Strategic Case by
discussing the observed year-on-year production and price fluctuations that
contributed to the number of people in need of assistance. It also reports adopted
coping mechanisms which influence the expected benefits of different approaches.
182.



The sequenced approach comprises the following questions:
Top tier: annual vs multi-year vs do nothing
o What will happen if no assistance is provided? Under what conditions is it
credible that DFID will not provide humanitarian assistance? How likely are
these conditions to prevail?
o How likely are the conditions to exist under which multi-year assistance is
more effective than annual? Central to this is the question is the likelihood
that multi-year assistance is more effective at cutting the level of need in
Somalia compared with continuing a succession of annual programmes.
2nd tier: how to support - assessing the range of delivery options
o What do we know about the effectiveness and costs of particular delivery
options?
rd
3 tier: what to support - assessing the balance of objectives within the portfolio
28The
NAO’s 3 ‘Es’ are: Economy, which is whether the right inputs are purchased at the right price;
Efficiency, which is concerned with how and at what cost inputs are brought together to deliver goods and
services (outputs); Effectiveness is concerned with the cost of delivering a particular outcome or impact.
38
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
o
o
Given the primary objective of providing life-saving assistance, how
feasible it is to do this in ways that both cut the need for assistance and/or
provide it more cheaply? Following on, how feasible it is simultaneously to
meet the two objectives of meeting immediate needs while simultaneously
helping build resilience?
How quickly can resilience be built so that the number of chronic and
transitory food insecure is reduced? How quickly could the portfolio be
refocused on resilience away from meeting immediate needs?
183. Not all the answers are primarily economic. And not all questions are amenable to
a definitive answer. However, a key benefit of seeking to answer them is the insights
the analysis provides into the assumptions underpinning each option and so the risks
associated with them.
184.
Top tier: annual vs multi-year vs do nothing.

ASSERTION: The ‘do nothing’ option is judged neither desirable nor
likely.
185. It’s clear that none of the three objectives (results, reform, resilience) would be met
if DFID were to suspend its humanitarian assistance to Somalia. The UK would not
only suffer reputational risks but the absence of a humanitarian programme would also
risk undermining other DFID programmes.
186. Despite Somalia’s particular problems, the average costs of humanitarian action
would not appear seriously out of line with other African countries. For example, the
cost of providing a SAM case with therapeutic feeding is estimated at US$153 in
Somalia compared with US$136 in DRC and $186-280 in South Sudan29.

ASSERTION TO BE TESTED: the approximately 1 million chronically
food insecure is a relatively stable group whose needs are long-term,
quite predictable and so far better suited to multi-year support.
187. Weak evidence: there is remarkably little information on the average 1
million who are in need of support each year. In particular, it is not known to what
extent this group is dynamic, with households joining and others leaving each year.
The poor coverage of government services and the fact that many humanitarian
agencies operate on an annual basis mean that there are no central records and
beneficiaries are not monitored as a cohesive whole.
188. Recommendation: This implies that, to be effective, multi-year support to target
communities should require implementing partners to keep records to monitor the
households it supports. These data should be complemented with baseline and
independent monitoring as part of an evaluation of what types of support appear to be
most effective in both meeting immediate needs and in either preventing or reducing
the severity of need over time (i.e. in helping households ‘graduate’ from humanitarian
assistance).
 ASSERTION TO BE TESTED: multi-year funding will be more timely than
annual programming and so should be able to cut both the cost of
meeting slow-onset emergency needs and, by arriving sooner, the level
of such additional need.
189. Moderate evidence but strong inference that multi-year funding will
necessarily be more timely without wider reforms to the humanitarian system in
Somalia. There is evidence from Ethiopia in favour of the shift to multi-year funding.
29Figures
from DFID’s economic appraisal of the Sudan Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience
Programme, 2013-2015.
39
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Good preparedness combined with the coverage of systems such as the productive
safety nets programme (PSNP) are credited with having saved lives and prevented
destitution30. There is consensus that the late collective donor response to the 2011
drought allowed it to become a famine. However, although this is taken as evidence
that annual programming in Somalia is not sufficiently timely, it is not in itself a
guarantee that multi-year programming will be more timely.
190. Moderate evidence and strong inference that multi-year funding will be more
cost-effective than annual funding. The Synthesis Report of the Real Time
Evaluation of the 2011 crisis response (drawing on experience from Ethiopia and
Kenya)31 asserts that multi-year programming will be more cost-effective in
responding to chronic crises than annual cycles. A value for money study of
humanitarian assistance DFID commissioned for Somalia32 notes ways in which multiyear funding could deliver the same results at lower cost. Multi-year staff contracts
should not only save recruitment and training costs but also improve efficiency and
effectiveness as a result of international staff having better contextual knowledge and
all staff having better systems knowledge and being able to develop more effective
working relationships. It should also allow economy savings on multi-year facility
leases, forward contracts and vehicle purchases.
191.
Early action should allow the following financial savings:
 Early action which prevents an acutely malnourished child from becoming
severely acutely malnourished cuts the cost of treatment from an average
of US$230 per child to US$10033. Preventing children from becoming
acutely malnourished in the first place may well be even more costeffective but comparable unit cost data are not readily available;
 The IASC Agriculture and Livelihoods cluster in Somalia has estimated that
it costs an average of US$150-240 to provide asset preservation
assistance designed to prevent a household sliding from one Integrated
Phase Classification (IPC – a measure of need) to another34. The average
value of cash support per household of US$190 a year35 and one
somewhat higher unit cost of providing a household with food for 6 months
that meets 70% of calorific requirements at US$44036. Clearly the
preservation assistance and the cash and food cannot necessarily be
directly compared (even if the household does not slide from one IPC to
another it may still need food or cash support), but the shift to the worse
IPC is likely to increase the household’s needs in other areas (malnutrition,
possibly health). Prevention therefore still looks cheaper than dealing with
the consequences even before the suffering and potential long-term
damage to infants associated with the latter is factored into account;
 Rehabilitating boreholes in areas likely to be affected provides safe water
at a lower cost than the emergency response alternatives of either trucking
or providing vouchers. The analysis in the appendix to this annex
30
Slim, Hugo (2012) IASC Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought
Crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya: Synthesis Report, available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RTE_HoA_SynthesisReport_FINAL.pdf
31Slim (2012), para 8.9.
32
Wimpenny, J, Anne Bush and Lyndsay Mountford (2012) Value for Money in Humanitarian Aid to Kenya
and Somalia, study commissioned by DFID of Coffey International, page 24.
33
Coffey. April 2011 – Value for Money in Humanitarian Aid in Kenya and Somalia
34
Ibid.
35
Calculated from the an FAO proposal submitted to DFID-Somalia in 2012.
36
Provided by Concern to DFID-Somalia in response to a request for unit cost data in 2011.
40
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
estimates conservatively that, on a person-year basis, it costs about
US$30 a year to provide a person with 5 litres of emergency water a day
against less than US$10 for sustainable water from a rehabilitated
borehole37.
192. There are likely to be similar gains in other forms of support (such as providing
more initially more costly but more durable shelters than a succession of more flimsy
materials (tarpaulins etc)) but evidence is not readily available on them.
193. DFID-funded work on the potential gains from early action highlighted the
estimated cost savings to Kenya and Ethiopia from early commercial destocking of
excess livestock and early procurement and transportation of aid supplies 38. The
study compared scenarios of early and late humanitarian response to a severe
drought, equivalent to the 2011 Horn of Africa Crisis. It used Household Economy
Analysis to estimate the cost of each scenario by examining the impact of the drought
upon food deficits, livestock losses and national-level indicators for drought impact and
cost. Over a 20 year period, an early response in southern Ethiopia was estimated to
save between $1.6 billion and $3.1 billion compared with later humanitarian
responses. In Wajir, in Kenya, savings from early response, for the same time period,
were estimated at between $250 million and $392 million. Although early response
carries the risk that investment is made without a full-blown crisis developing, the
study’s findings suggested that donors could fund early response twice in Kenya, and
seven times in Ethiopia, before the cost is even equivalent to that of a single late
response39.
194. However, it is possible that the greatest improvements in VfM will come from
the fact that long planning horizons allow different things to be done. The
security situation in Somalia, however, limits the extent to which some potentially costeffective measures can be introduced (such as the stock-piling of food or the drilling of
new boreholes, both of which risk encouraging the conflict which itself is a cause of
humanitarian need).
195. Indeed, this analysis assumes that there are no major unintended
consequences associated with multi-year funding. There are a number of
such risks. The Appraisal Case assessment in favour of annual programming
notes that it allows for maximum flexibility. Another risk is that multi-year
funding fosters complacency among delivery partners40. Finally, there is a risk
that more predictable funding is also at greater risk of predation. The risk of
predation is hard to assess. The other risks can be managed through
programme and contract design and are unlikely to outweigh the greater
potential cost-effectiveness of multi-year programming.
37See
the Appendix to this Appraisal for details and sources of information. Cost estimates draw on the
IASC guidelines for the Somalia WASH Cluster.
38
Cabot Venton, Courtenay, Catherine Fitzgibbon, TennaShitarek, Lorraine Coulter & Olivia Dooley (2012)
The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia, study
commissioned by DFID and available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/Econ-Ear-RecRes-Full-Report%20.pdf.
39
Though interviews conducted in Nairobi in November 2012 as part of this economic appraisal cast doubt
on the extent to which Somali pastoralists need external help in destocking their herds in a timely manner,
implying that the results from this study are not directly applicable to Somalia.
40
See pages 7 and 22 of Hale, Simon & Rachel Kessler (2012) Value for Money in Humanitarian Response –
Review of the DFID Humanitarian Response in Kenya & Somalia, report by Coffey for DFID, final report
dated July 2012.
41
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017

ASSERTION TO BE TESTED. Resilience: multi-year support is necessary
to build resilience, and greater resilience will in turn cut the level of
external humanitarian assistance needed by communities.
196. Strong evidence from Ethiopia that a shift to multi-year funding can help in
building resilience which can cut humanitarian needs. Preliminary analysis41 of
recent evidence from the on-going evaluation of Ethiopia’s productive safety net
programme (PSNP) show that the amount of time between harvests that households
benefiting from the PSNP are without food has been reduced from 3.6 to 2.3 months.
This has taken about 5 years of support. However, a question remains about how
directly replicable this result is – drawn largely from Ethiopian highland farming
communities which benefit from relatively strong local government – to Somalia’s
largely lowland and often pastoralist communities where government is often absent.
197. The DFID-funded study of the economics of early action42 also supports the case
for a shift in the humanitarian programme towards building resilience. The study
suggests that while resilience costs more than early response, building resilience
offers the best value for money compared even with a timely humanitarian response
once its wider development benefits are considered. Every $1 spent on disaster
resilience was found to result in benefits, in the form of reduced humanitarian spend,
avoided losses and development gains, of $2.8 in Ethiopia and $2.9 in Kenya.
However, the study notes that more work is needed on the relative costs and benefits,
particularly in the longer-term, of different interventions in different contexts. Indeed, it
cautions that an intervention that is effective in one context could be ineffective in
another. It will be important that the DFID humanitarian programme’s research and
M&E component tracks the success or otherwise of resilience building measures in
Somalia.

ASSERTION TO BE TESTED. Reform: multi-year support allows for
greater innovation and so reform of the humanitarian system in Somalia.
198. Strong assertion and moderate evidence that supporting multi-year
programmes will foster humanitarian reform. This is not primarily an economic
issue. The adoption of the multi-year PSNP in Ethiopia has transformed the
humanitarian sector in a country which, like Somalia, was dependent for decades on
annual humanitarian appeals. In Somalia many of the more reform-minded agencies
are also either already exploring with or pushing for multi-year programming (ICRC,
UNICEF on nutrition, FAO on resilient livelihoods). The IASC Real Time Evaluation
recommended a shift to multi-year programming. While it is not certain that a shift to
multi-year programming will by itself enable DFID to foster reform, it is clear that the
chances of reform are far greater than if DFID sticks with annual programming.
199. 2nd tier: How to support: What do we know about the effectiveness and costs
of particular delivery options?
This section does not repeat the institutional analyses of the potential partners to
be funded under the programme included in the Appraisal and Commercial Cases
in the main Business Case. It draws on but does not repeat the assessment of
cost drivers in the Commercial Case.
DFID will continue to press delivery partners for information on the VfM they offer.
Large programmes amenable to cost-benefit analyses should be required to
provide them.
41Berhane, Guush, John Hoddinott, Neha Kumar &AlemayehuSeyoumTaffesse (2011)
The impact of
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets and Household Asset Building Programme: 2006-2010, IDS Sussex.
42Cabot Venton et al (2012).
42
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
200. 3rd tier: What to support: assessing the balance of objectives within the
portfolio.
Given the primary objective of providing life-saving assistance, how feasible
it is to do this in ways that both cut the need for assistance and/or provide it
more cheaply. That is, how feasible are the other two objectives of both
meeting immediate needs while simultaneously helping build resilience?
Moderate evidence that resilience can be built and humanitarian needs
reduced. As noted earlier, the best regional evidence on building resilience
comes from Ethiopia.
There will not always be a financial trade-off between meeting immediate need
and supporting resilience. There are cases of where resilience can be supported
through the provision of immediate support. An example is the education provided
to mothers brining their infants in for therapeutic feeding. If water needs can be
anticipated then it may be possible to meet immediate needs in a sustainable and
ultimately cheaper way (such as by rehabilitating a borehole) rather than by
trucking the water or providing vouchers.
How quickly can resilience be built and so the number of chronic and
transitory food insecure reduced? How quickly could the portfolio be
refocused on resilience?
Weak evidence on the speed with which resilience can be built in Somalia
largely because there is so little experience of this. Evidence has already been
presented from Ethiopia’s PSNP, which suggests that food insecurity has been cut
by about one-third over 5 years, though it is not clear just how this reduction in the
months of food insecurity translates into greater resilience. Although an evaluation
of the use of cash transfers in Somalia reports favourably on progress to date 43,
this only covers a few months during the 2011 famine and it is too soon to draw
lessons for its impact on resilience.
201. On the balance of evidence, Option 2 is the preferred option. Whilst our
assertions that resilience building has to be a key part of any support provided is
based on solid reasoning, there is lack of sufficient evidence that it will deliver
sufficient savings quickly enough so that it doesn’t disproportionately affect the primary
objective of providing Humanitarian support. To address this evidence gap, the
insights gained from the economic appraisal has been used to produce a set of
recommendations to frame multi-year agreements with delivery partners, and to
influence the relative distribution of resources.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the
intervention?
202. Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness are all affected by the economic and
security situation in Somalia.
203. Transportation cost is a key driver of delivery costs. Somalia’s long coast line is
conducive to the transportation of goods over long distances by water; typically a more
cost effective option than equivalent transportation by land. But the security situation
constrains the operating capacity of ports such as that in Mogadishu compared to
Berberra in Somaliland (North West) and Boosasso in Puntland (North East). The poor
state of the road network also acts as an inhibitor to the efficient distribution of goods;
43
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG): Final Monitoring Report of the Somalia Cash and Voucher
Transfer Programme. HPG September 2012
43
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
both from domestic production sites as well as the distribution of imports from the main
ports. According to the Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme (2008),
only about 15% of primary roads and about 10% of secondary and rural roads were in
good condition in 2006.
204. Poor transportation networks are compounded by the local security situation as
well as local monopolies of transport corridors (e.g. transport has to be negotiated
locally with supply controlled by a single clan). Together these factors reduce access
to certain markets and increase delivery costs.
205. Meeting food needs is a good example of how issues around access influence the
instrument of support. Domestic markets are an important means of meeting food
needs that complement own production, but local production is volatile, resulting in
volatile prices (see Economic Annex for more detail). An alternative to the use of
domestic markets (which encompasses both domestically produced as well as
imported food sold by local sellers) to supply demand is for food to be procured
internationally by respective agencies and provided to beneficiaries in-kind. However,
volatility in food prices is also observed on international markets (although to a lesser
degree than in Somalia given international supply chains). Bulk purchasing when
prices are depressed is one possible strategy, but food procured this way to meet
recurring need will incur transportation (both to and within Somalia) and storage costs.
With direct access to beneficiaries far from guaranteed, there is a real risk that
internationally procured food simply never reaches its targeted beneficiary.
Alternatively, cash transfers through the Halawa system, for example, can be used by
beneficiaries to purchase food locally, overcoming the need to transport cash and food
over long distances.
206. Identifying Value for Money metrics and embedding them in the Monitoring and
Evaluation Framework is important, but given the range of activities, chosen metrics
should be those that offer most insight and are likely to influence decisions the most. It
is not feasible to report value for money indicators for all the interventions that will be
supported. The focus is therefore on programmes and sectors that dominate the
humanitarian and resilience components of the intervention. Drawing upon the
information reported in Flag J alongside the analysis on the spending components of
the CHF (see economic annex, VfM metrics for activities/outputs report in Table 10
below will be developed) – in some instances the metrics will have to be refined further
to be more specific. The resilience proposals are at best placeholders - developing
resilience VfM measures beyond simple input costs will be a challenge and it may be
possible to learn from other countries.
44
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Table 10 Proposed VfM Metrics
Humanitarian
Sector
Intervention
Nutrition

Treatment of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM)

Treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM)

Food ration providing 2,100 kilocal / day / person

Cash Transfers
vouchers

Seeds and tools: Provision of high yield seeds and
agricultural tools

Access to clean water:
Food
Water and
Sanitation
Support to
Internally
Displace
Persons
(IDPs)
(conditional
&
unconditional)
and
o
Providing temporary water via either water trucking or
vouchers
o
Providing sustainable water via

rehabilitating boreholes

drilling boreholes

Improved sanitation through the provision of latrines

Hygiene promotion: Training and disease information

Provision of shelter (e.g. Tarpaulin / plastic sheeting /
traditional home construction elements (mainly Puntland
and Somaliland)

Provision of non-food items (e.g. provision of cooking sets
/ Hygiene, sanitation kits / water storage / blankets /
sleeping mat etc.
See minimum Somalia cluster
standards)
Resilience
Sector
Intervention
Strengthen
productive
sectors

Cash for Work – building basic infrastructure (irrigation
canals, silos, feeder roads etc)
Promote
safety nets /
social
protection.

Provision of predictable and continuous support to rebuild
assets and provide basic needs. TBC but likely to be in
the form of cash and/or asset transfers
45
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
207. Deriving an Effectiveness vfm metric will be particularly challenging for a number
of reasons. First, it requires clear evidence that the intervention has the desired
outcome which, in some instances because of the nature of the intervention, is only
expected to be realised/known after several years. And second, the security situation
in Somalia may prohibit a robust assessment of whether the intervention had the
desired outcome/impact. For these reasons, in some instances the focus of efforts
may be directed more on the Economy and Efficiency angles.
208. The narrative behind each metric will be just as important, if not more so, than the
metric itself. For example, differences in quality and characteristics of outputs should
be captured in as much detail as possible so as to address frequently raised concerns
that single output metrics are not terribly useful, especially for comparative purposes, if
it is not clear what underpins them. Particularly pertinent are characteristics that
influence recurrent/maintenance costs. Expected life-span is one such consideration.
Since VfM is about maximising the return of our financial support, knowing the factors
that determine the cost of delivering a given output alongside the factors that
determine the outcome/impact is necessary if improvements are to be sought to
achieve better value for money. Since averages can mask significant variation
between beneficiaries and locations, it will be important to capture the distribution in
value for any given metric.
209. Working with implementation partners to develop their VfM narratives is
imperative. All of the proposed implementation partners are supportive of efforts to get
better at linking costs to results and increasing the return for every pound of
expenditure. DFID Somalia/Kenya have already started engaging with such partners,
including asking for vfm annexes to be included as part of the 2011 responses. Coffey
(2012) were commissioned to review these annexes with the following objectives:
assess partner responses to DFID’s VfM agenda; assess how VfM indicators influence
decision making; and make recommendations to support VfM decision making. The
review confirmed that partners generally welcomed DFID’s efforts to reduce costs, but
most felt that the exercise was time-consuming with little to gain and often requiring ad
hoc estimates outside the scope of partner systems. This will have to be addressed
because DFID reporting of VfM indicators will have to rely on delivery partners
generating the necessary information, and is probably best done through a continuous
programme of engagement which will support not only partners, but also DFID’s own
understanding and capability to assess value for money of partner business models.
The set of questions below can help inform the development of a framework for such
engagement.
Table 11 Understanding Partner Business Models.
Understanding Partners’ Business Models
Understanding
Costs




Understanding
Benefits

What is procured
How is it procured
o Domestic vs. international
o Tendering process
What does it cost
Understanding fixed, variable, semivariable costs

What are the outputs/activities
delivered
o How are beneficiaries
targeted

46





Recurrent vs. one-off costs and
financial sustainability issues
Understanding economies of scale
Can inputs be easily substituted
Are markets competitive
Staff/skill set
How are sustainability issues
considered
Examples of innovative
approaches
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
o
Understanding
Results


Understanding
Risks


Trade-off between short
and long-term goals
Does a Results Framework
exists
Are there input, output, outcome
indicators


Are there Value for Money Metrics
Is there a Monitoring &
Evaluation Strategy
What are the main risks
How are risks managed and
mitigated
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
210. The current pattern of humanitarian response is not sustainable. The shortterm annual humanitarian response has proved successful in keeping people alive but
does so in ways which tend to undermine communities’ coping mechanisms. It
typically arrives too late, after many households have been forced to adopt survival
strategies – such as selling off livestock and other assets, cutting down on meals –
which, among other things, leads to malnutrition in children and undermine the
livelihoods of the parents. This leaves the households – and the communities they
comprise – less able to cope with future shocks and so more dependent on
humanitarian assistance. A consequence of 20 years of annual programmes is the
growing number of chronically food insecure households and of people in need of
short-term humanitarian assistance.
211. DFID’s humanitarian programme therefore seeks not just to meet immediate
needs but to do so in different ways in order to help cut the level of need. The
challenge for humanitarian assistance in Somalia is how simultaneously both to relieve
immediate suffering while helping households and their communities build resilience to
shocks. Given available resources and the level of immediate need in Somalia this will
entail working differently in order to ensure immediate needs do not go unmet.
Immediate needs have therefore to be met more cost-effectively while at the same time
the way assistance is provided has to change in ways that help reduce levels of need
over time.
212. Providing more timely assistance in response to shocks should both cuts the
number in need of assistance and the cost of that assistance. Assistance which
arrives before households adopt destructive survival strategies should in principle save
money (if for example it saves children becoming acutely malnourished or prevents
those who are from becoming severely acutely malnourished).
47
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Commercial Case
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
213. The proposed approach requires a portfolio of interventions, delivered by a
number of specialised and experienced agencies.
Indirect Spend
214.
To maximise value for money, the programme adopts a mix of delivery channels:
(i)
A Letter of Arrangement(LoA) with UNDP for the CHF;
(ii)
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UN Agencies such as FAO,
UNICEF, WFP and international organisations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
(iii)
Accountable grants (AGs) to International NGOs.
(iv)
Direct contracting through a framework provider for the RME.
Table 12 Procurement types
Intervention
Procurement type
Procurement Method
CHF/ ICRC
Indirect
A Letter of Arrangement (LoA) with CHF and an
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with
ICRC
Livelihoods,
Nutrition,
Resilience
Indirect
An MoU with UN or Accountable grant (AG)
Research,
Monitoring and
Evaluation (RME)
Direct
Contract through existing framework provider
(GEFA)
Internal Risk
Facility (IRF)
Indirect
Depending on the selected delivery channel this
could be one or a mix of LoA, MoU or AG.
Table 7: Approach and procurement methods
215. The table below provides a projection of how spend maybreak down over the
implementation period. Given the lack of visibility and flexible approach required,
amounts will vary during the implementation period.44
Table 13 Spend projections
Partner Type
£m
%
International Organizations
£10
9.5%
Pooled funding
£26
24.8%
given the incertitude surrounding the outer year spend – this is very much an estimate and
does not include the IRF with could add £40 million during the implementation period to any
number of delivery channels.
44NB:
48
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
UN
£43
41%
NGO
£22
21%
Direct procurement (RME)
£4
3.8%
£105m
100%
Total
Table 8: Spend projection by delivery channel
Direct Spend
216. The RME component (£4 million) will be procured directly using the existing Global
Evaluation Framework Agreement (GEFA), with DFID procurement supervising a
limited tender. The contract will be managed by DFID Somalia and include an annual
review and break point after the second year.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial
advantage for DFID?
217. Humanitarian aid is delivered by partners that have distinct mandates, specialised
technical expertise, diverse donor support and often operate in geographical areas
where they have a history. A competitive market approach to aid delivery amongst
partners is therefore hard to undertake as partners cannot be easily replaced or move
from one locality to another.
218. The UK will use a competitive approach to determine the most cost effective and
efficient delivery partner. This will take the form of a limited call for proposals in our
chosen thematic areas. It is anticipated that this will stimulate the formulation of
consortia of bidders and will help lower costs. This process will help DFID achieve
value for money and test the market.
219. It is anticipated that this process will start once this business case is approved.
The call for proposals will better define how partners will adopt new or different
approaches in tackling problems over the medium term rather than in an annual
manner.
220. Our multilateral partners such as specialised UN agencies (UNICEF, FAO) and
organisations like the International Committee of the Red Cross operate within the
parameters of mandates conferred upon them by states. These organisations do not
respond to calls for proposals and competitive approaches. The UK funds UN and
ICRC appeals and our investment allows us to influence strategic direction.
221. For the RME, the GEFA has been established specifically to ensure the provision
of efficient and effective services for the design and implementation of evaluations
across DFID. PrG will run a mini competition based on the RME terms of reference to
identify suppliers with a proven competitive track record. Companies will need to
demonstrate extensive experience and knowledge in managing and undertaking
research, monitoring and carrying out evaluations in complex environments.
222. When using a framework agreement, the programme will benefit from prenegotiated economies of scale on fee rates and administration, and the ability to
rapidly mobilise Technical Assistance. The framework arrangements allow for
member firms to submit alternative CVs and fee rates, thereby driving down costs
through internal competition. The contract will be results based. The objectives are
set out in the RME Terms of Reference at FLAG I.
223. Should the need to undertake a process outside of the GEFA be necessary, the
Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) procedures will be adhered to.
49
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
224. For any ad-hoc local contracts during the programme, DFID Somalia will directly
negotiate fee rates and request consultants provide references on past payments to
justify quoted fee rates. All procedures will comply with DFID internal procurement
rules and regulations.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
225. For our indirect bilateral spend, it is anticipated that take up will be high. Somalia
has attracted a large number of partner NGOs and many have been active for a
number of years. Most of our NGO and UN partners have been requesting multi-year
funding for some time, therefore the possibility of this type of funding will no doubt be
attractive.
226. The GEFA is well resourced with 27 pre-qualified suppliers to undertake the
detailed implementation of the RME. The market is competitive and it is expected that
there will be extensive interest amongst those within the framework. Given the nature
and scope of the RME it is unlikely that local Somali companies would have the
necessary experience (as detailed in the ToRs) to bid for this work. It is expected that
the winning bidder will work in collaboration with local Somali consultants / companies.
227. The gradual improvement in security in some parts of Somalia is attracting
consultancy firms to open up offices in Somalia. We expect these firms to bid for work
in Somalia over the period and meet DFID’s duty of care restrictions thus improving
our choice of suppliers. This is expected to increase competition and drive down costs
in the longer term.
228. Currently, our local consultants are broadly similar to the UN and INGOs rates.
However, we will closely monitor fees rates of local consultants to ensure that the
entry of these new and bigger firms do not make their rates considerably more
expensive barring inflation and costs of security.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and
how will we measure and improve this?
229.
The key cost drivers are:
 Security: Somalia is an extremely insecure environment and the threat level against aid
workers is very high. The costs of maintaining staff in Mogadishu and elsewhere in
Somalia is high. Evacuation of staff is a real possibility in conflict affected areas.
Additional costs are incurred when this happens (salaries, rent and utilities). This
increases the ratio of administrative to implementation costs. To minimise both financial
and physical risks to the DFID programme, partners’ advisors will work with project staff
in conducting regular security assessments.
 Multiple offices: currently most partners have two bases, one in Nairobi and one in
Mogadishu. Many staff posts are doubled with equivalent functions in both Kenya and
Somalia.
 Transport: the cost of moving around Somalia and getting to Somalia is high. There
are few options for flights to Somalia – with UNHAS and the European Commission
being used by many partners. An UNHAS return flight from Nairobi to Mogadishu costs
around £600. Costs of transport around Somalia are also high with few commercial
companies prepared to deliver goods to some of the conflict affected areas.
 Experience: currently few experienced Somali consultants are able to provide the
quality of services we would expect. The main costs involved will be fees, travel,
subsistence and profit margin. The experience required will be demonstrated in the
quality of work provided and the utility of that work for DFID and the broader
humanitarian community.
50
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
 Inflation. Due to the absence of a strong regulatory framework and financial institutions
in Somalia, the local currency fluctuates in value, with no checks or balances on
inflation. This has an indirect influence on project costs as although most partners use
the dollar as the currency of transaction, vendors, contractors and partners still use the
local currency, building in a percentage to cushion them against the devaluation of their
own currency in their estimates.
 Increasing presence in Somalia – DFID’s Duty of Care restrictions are expected to
ease in the near future as security and access improves in Somalia and the UK
government opens offices in Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Consultancy firms will be
expected to include security costs for operating in Somalia in their bids. This increased
presence comes with extra costs such as security, flights and accommodation to be
charged to the programme.
 Fraud, diversion and Corruption: whilst this has not been explicitly calculated, it is
assumed that the cost of insurance for goods and staff will be high in Somalia.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
230. Direct procurement will take place through the DFID General Evaluation
Framework Agreement (GEFA). Draft terms of reference (FLAG I) will be further
refined and developed by DFID Somalia once the business case is approved. The
indicative timeframe for contract award is as follows:
Table 14RME procurement timeline
Activity
Date
1
Business Case Approval
April 2013
2
Procurement plan agreed with PRG
May 2013
3
ToRs revised and completed
May 2013
4
Mini competition held
June 2013
5
Bids submitted and evaluated
July 2013
6
Post tender clarification
August 2013
7
Contract awarded
August 2013
Table 9. Procurement timeframe for the RME
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the
intervention?
231. Contract and supplier performance will be managed by the DFID Somalia
Humanitarian team, with oversight by the DFID Somalia Contracts Officer and the
DFID Kenya and Somalia Accountability and Results Team (ART).
232. The above group will form a peer group and develop a robust monitoring
framework for the RME. The winning bidder will be held to account by the submission
of an inception report, regular progress reports and through regular meetings with the
DFID oversight team. DFID will maintain a high level of control over the quality of the
51
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
work provided and will challenge and take necessary corrective measures should the
quality of work not be up to standard.
233. Payments will be made in arrears once budgets and expenditure has been
approved by the DFID Humanitarian team and DFID finance section.
Indirect Procurement
A.
Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one
for this intervention, with this development partner?
234. DFID Somalia already has a proven track record of achieving results in Somalia.
This business case builds on the knowledge, experience and success garnered over
the years. The HERR and ICAI report make the case for flexible approaches in
responding to humanitarian needs effectively. The mix of different implementation
methods proposed in this business case spreads risk, whilst delivering significant
results for the UK.
235. Only a limited number of Accountable Grants and MOUs will be entered into to
ensure a manageable administrative burden for DFID Somalia. The appropriate
balance will be determined between the Somalia humanitarian team and DFID Head
of Office. The mix of delivery channels proposed are designed to provide the right
balance between unearmarked multilateral funding (CHF, ICRC) and bilateral
controlled expenditure (NGOs and some UN agencies). Regardless of the delivery
channel or contractual modality, the focus will be on delivering results.
236. There is good evidence that our existing partners have the technical and
commercial capacity to deliver quality aid representing value for money. The UK will
engage with all partners to monitor spend, results and performance and use our
influence to drive forward improved procurement practices and management. This will
be done through a detailed analysis of reports and our monitoring and evaluation
procedures. In addition, the recent Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) review provides a
comprehensive overview of partner performance that will be used in the decision
making process.
Letter of Arrangement with the CHF
237. A Letter of Arrangement setting out regular, predictable disbursements to the CHF
is in line with DFID’s commitment in response to the Humanitarian Emergency
Response Review to increase the predictability of our funding and to continue funding
to Pooled Funds45.
238. The CHF distributes resources to a wide range of UN agencies and national and
international NGOs, based on needs assessments. This ensures gaps at the field level
are better identified, improves coordination between implementing bodies, and
ensures funding is channelled to organisations best able to respond.
Annual Appeals- MOUs and Accountable Grants
i)
Memorandum of Understanding with ICRC
239. ICRC refuses to access funding from the CHF for reasons of mandate and
principle46. However, supporting ICRC is an important part of meeting our
humanitarian commitments in Somalia (it is projected that ICRC will deliver some 11%
of our COP results in 2013). ICRC responds to the needs of conflict victims, often
aggravated by natural disasters. It provides emergency assistance, long-term support
for community self-reliance, promotes and monitors international humanitarian law and
45
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review: UK Government Response, 17
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/red-cross-crescent-movement/fundamental-principles-movement-1986-1031.htm
46
52
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
visits detainees, and partnering with ICRC will help to build synergies between
humanitarian assistance and development.
ii) Memorandum of Understanding with the UN (FAO/UNICEF/WFP)
240. These agencies are mandated to provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia and
have strong experience in Somalia. They are all existing DFID partners and offer
good value for money and provide aid of a high technical quality.
241. We propose to respond to their appeals and request additional information as
necessary. MoUs will stipulate results to be achieved and the reporting requirements.
Multi-year commitments will be made for the resilience component of the programme,
enabling a more engaged presence of DFID in the programme and the ability to better
assess project impact and learn lessons.
242. Our MoUs with UN agencies will specify reporting requirements and projected
results to be procured with UK funds. UK presence at the Humanitarian Country Team
will also provide an additional layer of accountability of the key decision makers,
including the Humanitarian Coordinator.
Accountable Grants and MOUs with other bilateral partners
243. The proposed portfolio includes a manageable number of Accountable Grants with
International NGOs. This builds into the programme the ability to buy results not
prioritised by the CHF, and to fund vital partners who are unable to access CHF
resources.
244. The bilateral portion also gives scope to invest in innovative approaches to
humanitarian aid, an area prioritised by the HERR. Support through Accountable
Grants is a tried and tested mechanism for securing results through International NGO
partners. The HERR recommends that we continue to provide support for NGOs in a
way that does not undermine donor coordination or NGOs ability to deliver at scale.
Accountable Grants (AGs)offer the flexibility and predictability to support the vital work
of organisations. Predictable and flexible funding through AGs and MOUs allows
NGOs and UN specialist agencies to deliver projects in a way that is suitable for
addressing chronic needs and building community resilience where state systems
remain lacking.
245. Accountable grants to NGOs will be paid quarterly and preferably in arrears.
Should partners demonstrate the clear need for advanced payments; this will be
considered on a case-by-case basis with FCPD.
B. Value for money through procurement
246. The proposed humanitarian programme does not involve DFID procuring any
goods directly. DFID will procure research, monitoring and evaluation expertise to
undertake the RME component of the programme and this will be done by a limited
tender through the GEFA.
247. UK contribution to partners provides DFID with the leverage to effect changes in
approach and management systems of our partners. All funding is conditional upon
performance, and upon progress against pre-agreed output and outcome indicators.
Should our regular reviews (including formal Annual Reviews) of our partners find that
performance is inadequate or progress too slow, we will reserve the right to shift or
withdraw funding. DFID will examine budget lines across partners to ensure
consistency and request justification for any variance.
248. We will enter into a genuine partnership with our partners to jointly establish the
criteria to determine value for money. This shall form one of the approaches the RME
will test.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
249. The planned monitoring &evaluation programme will inform and monitor results
delivery that allows us calculate VfM. The programme will also provide better
evidence of work achieved and inform cancellation of projects that do not provide VfM.
250. We will carry out a procurement assessment on all our implementing partners as
part of a wider due diligence assessment to ensure we partner with agencies that
have robust procurement practices and well integrated value for money procedures.
Constant monitoring of procurement processes as part of quarterly reporting by all
partners will be carried out.
251. Monitoring of budgets and forecasts provided by the partners will be done on a
continuous basis by the DFID Somalia Humanitarian team. Financial and programme
management will be through quarterly partner meetings where achievements,
challenges and best practice will be shared to promote VfM.
Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)
252. The CHF managed by OCHA, does not directly procure goods and services, but
administers grants to a range of NGOs and UN agencies.
253. Of the UN agencies which regularly receive CHF funding, the Multilateral Aid
Review assigned the following value for money categories and assessment of
procurement policy:
MAR assessment of VfM in procurement by partner organisation
Table 15 MAR assessments
Overall VfM
Comments
Category
ICRC
Very Good
There is good evidence that VfM considerations are taken
into account in ICRC programming
UNICEF
Very Good
Provides services which drive down procurement costs
across the UN system
OCHA
Adequate
Although cost control has been an issue for OCHA in the
last few years, it has only just begun to seriously consider
issues such as VfM.
WFP
Good
Drives cost control with delivery partners; and seeks value
for money through local procurement and cost-effective
interventions.
FAO
Poor
Though cost control systems are in place, management
must introduce a culture of value-for-money so that staff
strive for cost effectiveness and deliver results. The FAO
in Somalia also includes the Food Security and Nutrition
Analysis Unit, a valuable instrument in providing almost all
the data required to guide the response. DFID will
nevertheless place attention on VfM with FAO when taking
forward any spending.
Table 10: Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) assessment of VfM in procurement by partner
organisation
Appeals
254. ICRC was scored in DFID’s Multilateral Aid Review as representing very good
value for money for UK Aid. It demonstrates satisfactory value for money through
procurement. Procurement is part centralised and part decentralised to the country
54
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
level. However, the headquarters has direct control over local procurement, enforces
very tight guidelines and follows a rigorous tendering process47.
255. The MAR country studies found good evidence of attention to cost control by ICRC
in the countries visited. ICRC procurement procedures and policies ensure:

Ethical procurement

Market consultation

Decisions are made in a transparent way and at appropriate levels. Decisionmaking points are also used to verify compliance with logistical procedures;

Regular audits of procedures.
256.
ICRC has recently further improved its management of cost, quality and efficiency:

90% of ICRC’s drug supplier base internationally is now audited and certified by a
team of professional pharmacists;

From August 2011, a procurement professional has been appointed to HQ to
improve ICRC’s procurement practices.
47ICRC’s
Logistics Field Manual includes comprehensive guidance and policy on Purchasing (Chapter 4) and order
Management (Chapter 3). ICRC also has an institution wide framework for dealing with fraud (see ICRC’s ‘Fraud Policy and
Code of Conduct’).
55
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure
accurate forecasting?
257. The proposed programme runs from financial year 2013/14 to 2016/17, complying
with FCPD guidance (approval will be sought from the Treasury following Ministerial
approval of the business case). The programme will contribute to the overall DFID
Somalia Country Operational Plan (COP). The existing provision in the COP is for £21
million in the remaining years 2013/14 and 2014/15. The reason for the additional
provision is outlined in the strategic and appraisal case. Once approved, the shortfall
of £9 million in 2013/14 and £6 million in 2014/15 will be requested from Africa
Directorate.
258. The basic spending plan is £105 million for four years. In addition, an Internal Risk
Facility of £40 million (£10 million per annum) is proposed, bringing the total possible
value of the programme to £145 million over four years.
259. Payments will be made to annual appeals of our multilateral partners and the
Common Humanitarian Fund in an annual or bi-annual instalment. We will work
closely with our NGO partners to determine a realistic disbursement schedule. We will
review plans during our weekly team meetings to avoid any slippage and spending
risks. We commit to less than 5% variance from year-on-year plans.
260. The table below reflects provisional funding allocations to partners; actual sums
will be decided based on need and performance assessments. We have allocated up
to £4 million to be used for the research, monitoring and evaluation (RME) of the
programme.
Table 16 Spending plan 2013-2017
International Organizations
Pooled Funding
Livelihoods (Cash & Cash for
Work)
NGO resilience
UN Resilience Programme
Nutrition
Aid Enablers
Research, M&E
Total
Internal Risk Facility (IRF)
Total With IRF
2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17
3
3
2
2
8
7
6
5
3
3
6
4
2
1
30
10
40
2
3
6
3
2
1
27
10
37
2
3
6
3
2
1
25
10
35
2
3
6
2
2
1
23
10
33
Total
(£
million)
10
26
9
12
24
12
8
4
105
40
145
Table 11: estimated spread of funding across partners and delivery mechanisms.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
56
Annual or
Multi
year (MY)
Annual
Annual
MY
MY
MY
MY
MY
MY
Annual
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
261. The bulk of funding for this programme will be from DFID Somalia’s programme
budget. As mentioned above, for 2013/14 and 2014/15 additional resources from
Africa division will be sought. For 2015/16 and 2016/17 the amounts will be included
in the new Country Operational Plan for Somalia.
262. The IRF will draw on divisional underspends, the humanitarian reserve and/or
other sources of funding available. It is clear the IRF will only make commitments with
funds that have been clearly identified.
263. Front Line Delivery (FLD) funds will be used for DFID Somalia team costs. The
team is already in place and the necessary admin funding is already secured as part
of the COP. No additional admin funding is currently envisaged.
C. How will funds be paid out?
264.
The programme will have four main arrangements:
 An Administrative Arrangement with UNDP for the Common Humanitarian Fund.
Funds will be provided in one tranche early in the year.
 MoUs with UN Agencies and ICRC with a mix of annual and bi-annual
disbursements. To be determined on the basis of amount and administrative
burden for DFID.
 Accountable Grant Agreements with a limited number of NGO partners whose
disbursements will be made quarterly in arrears48, with a schedule agreed in
advance. IN the event of unforeseen rapid-onset needs, funding may need to be
provided in advance and be flexible.
 A contract with a consultancy firm to implement the RME component of the
programme.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
265. Delivering humanitarian aid in a fragile and conflict affected context such as
Somalia inevitably carries a certain degree of risk. UK Ministers have agreed that
some level of risk is acceptable in order to meet the pressing humanitarian needs.
DFID will take all steps necessary to reduce risk. The UK has a zero tolerance policy
on fraud. UK Counter Fraud / Bribery legislation will be made known to all our
partners.
266. By working with tried and tested partners and with regular, detailed scrutiny of their
audit processes and scrutiny of financial statements, DFID will work with partner
organisations to strengthen financial management capacity where needed. Continued
disbursement of funds will be contingent upon adequate financial management
mechanisms. Pre-approval Due Diligence checks will carried out on partners in-line
with DFID guidance in this area.
267. Where fraud is detected we will work with partners to attempt recovery of UK
assets / funds. The Counter Fraud Unit (CFU) will be immediately notified of any
incidents of fraud and DFID Somalia will assist in the conduct of any necessary
48
The aim is for payment in arrears. However, we are aware that on a case-by-case basis partners
may provide sufficient justification for advance payments. These will be considered by the DFID on
individual merit.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
investigations. DFID Somalia has already a track record of engagement with CFU on
a number of fraud related cases.
268. We plan to conduct capacity and risk assessment of NGO partners to ensure that
they have the capacity to implement projects and have basic accountability
mechanisms in place to manage project funds. Partners will include audit in the project
work plans to assess their systems and financial management which will inform
decisions on continued future funding. Random evaluations or ad hoc visits will also
be incorporated in the M&E plan in order to improve DFID’s ability to detect and
mitigate financial mismanagement in the programme.
269. DFID has conducted fiduciary risk assessments of UN agencies including
UNICEF, WFP and WHO, and found significant fiduciary risks associated with all of
them. UNICEF and WHO have strong central audit arrangements, and are taking
steps to improve financial management, but challenges remain. With all partners DFID
is actively seeking to improve financial management procedures and funding will be
made conditional on minimum financial management conditions being met.
270. The recent 2012 Internal Audit report (Moderate rating) noted that “Risk
management, governance and control systems are adequate and found to be
operating effectively except in some areas where some weaknesses have been
identified which could impair the achievement of objectives.”49Managing fiduciary risk
is a priority for DFID Somalia and will remain so for the duration of this programme.
271.
DFID will put in place robust oversight and audit mechanisms to mitigate risks:

Pre-award Due Diligence Checks;

Requesting and interrogating full financial statements from all partners at each
annual review;

Working with partners to strengthen financial management systems and
conducting thorough oversight of finances;

Formalise the spot checks system.
272.
We will also work with other donors to:

Investigate the possibility of community monitoring of projects

Consider putting in place community level monitoring, where beneficiaries are able
to rate and report on the goods and services they receive. This will function as an
additional check that resources are reaching the poorest.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
273. Partners will be required to report on their expenditure and results achieved at
least quarterly, based on the funding agreements. For UN agencies, our agreed
reporting arrangements will be the basis for reporting timeframes. With all partners,
informal discussions will be held at least quarterly to determine project progress. The
level of detail of information required from partners will be proportionate, realistic and
obtainable.
Audit Department Audit report - DFID Somalia (DFIDS) Ref 062/2012/001 – DFID
Somalia Report issued: Friday 19th October 2012
49Internal
58
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
274. All expenditure will be summarised in an annual information note to ministers, and
annual reviews of each partnership will include scrutinising financial reports.Each
funding commitment will contain an exit strategy which makes continued funding
contingent on delivery of results, and adequate financial management mechanisms.
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs)
275. DFID will require partners to produce a comprehensive financial and results
statement annually/semi-annually depending on the funding agreement. Annual
reviews will give the opportunity to programme managers to fully interrogate spending,
and to demand further information on any areas of concern.
Accountable Grant Agreements
276. Each partner organisation will be required to provide full financial and results
statements at least quarterly. Any underspend will be considered and deducted from
subsequent disbursement requests.
Contracts
277. Consultancy firms will be bound by output based contracts which will help to
ensure that they deliver value for money and the intended results for the evaluation
assignment. Payments will be pegged to delivery of agreed results.
Exit Strategy
278. This business case argues for continued UK investment in humanitarian
assistance for Somalia whilst needs exist and the government is unable to respond.
279. The new Government of Somalia wants to take a more active involvement in the
oversight of international assistance and this is to be encouraged. However, the ability
for the current GoS to deliver goods and services to many areas throughout Somalia
remains extremely limited. The UK will explore during the lifetime of this programme
the possibility of developing better links with the GoS in basic service delivery and
capacity building. This could include working with the Disaster Management Agency
on early warning systems and how to better understand and coordinate response to
early warning. The coordination with the GoS will be done with other UN and donor
counterparts.
280. Given the vulnerability and needs of the population in coping with both conflict and
climate related hazards, the continued provision of external humanitarian aid remains
a necessity.
281. When and where opportunities arise to hand over humanitarian projects to
development counterparts in DFID these will be explored. This is already the case with
the health programme where a coordinated approach is taking place.
282. It is unlikely that humanitarian needs will recede by such an extent during the
implementation period that humanitarian needs will no longer be required. We
envisage a continued investment in Somalia over the coming years.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the
intervention?
283. The programme will be managed by the DFID Somalia Humanitarian Team
comprising an A2 Humanitarian Team Leader, an A2L Humanitarian Adviser, a B1
Programme manager, a B2 Programme officer and a C1 project assistant.
284. The humanitarian team is currently located within the community development and
humanitarian pillar of DFID Somalia.
285. A progressive move to Mogadishu is envisaged for DFID Somalia. The move will
be progressive and depend on a continuing improvement in security and the ability to
operate from Mogadishu. Most partners are in the process of moving to Mogadishu.
286. The actual configuration, timing and cost of a move for DFID have yet to be fully
calculated. However, the likelihood is that during the implementation of this
programme, part of the DFID Somalia humanitarian team will be located in the new
British Embassy in Mogadishu. The transition and move to Mogadishu will incur
additional costs, notably in staffing, transport and security. These will be addressed
within the overall DFID Somalia framework and are not factored into this business
case.
Table 17 Programme Timeline
Activity
Timing
Inception
First 3 months
phase
Limited tender
and contracting
Within 6
months
Fiduciary risk
assessment
and Due
Diligence
checks
Resilience
strategy
developed
Within 9
months
Information
note to
Ministers
Mid-point
programme
review
Annual
2013
April/May
2015
Purpose
To determine the scope of the
programme, revise the logical
framework, review and contract
the RME component and decide
on the limited tendering process
for the interventions.
Complete a limited tender for the
main elements of the programme
(based on the findings of the
inception review).
To assess fiduciary risk of our
programme, including
recommendations to mitigate
this.
Resources
DFID Somalia
Humanitarian Team.
To plan how to link all our
humanitarian and development
programmes to build disaster
resilience in Somalia.
Report to ministers on results
achieved
Internal – all DFID
Somalia advisers and
Pillar Leads
Assess progress on results,
reform and resilience, progress
on fiduciary risk
recommendations and key
challenges
External consultant
60
DFID Somalia
Humanitarian Team.
Private Company /
External consultant
Internal – Humanitarian
Adviser
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
CHF Advisory
Board
Annual reviews
Six per year
Select projects, introduce and
track reform objectives
Annual
Track progress against partner
specific and master log frames to
derive project score – includes
possible field visits, meetings
with partners and document
review.
Table 12: Summary of Management Activities
Internal – Humanitarian
adviser
Internal – Humanitarian
adviser, Programme
Management Team
287. The programme will be managed as a whole with a single logframe as the primary
management tool. Individual logical frameworks for each partner will feed into the
overall logical framework (see diagram below). The programme logframe will be
reviewed annually and a Project Completion Report produced at programme end.
288. The overall logical framework will track progress against measurable indicators
which will indicate progress of the programme as a whole. It is anticipated that the
logical framework will be regularly updated with input from the RME component.
289. All projects and partners put forward for funding will have an Internal Review Sheet
completed by the humanitarian team. Depending on delegated authority the IRSwill be
submitted to either the Head or Deputy Head of DFID Somalia.
Country operational plan targets
Programme log frame targets
CHF log frame targets
Bilateral 3 logframe targets
ICRC log frame targets
Bilateral 2 logframe targets
Bilateral 1 logframe targets
Figure 5 Components of the programme logical framework
290. The DFID humanitarian programme team will hold annual meetings with each
partner and desk reviews (and where possible field trips) in order to track progress
against each logical framework. This will feed into a single Annual Review (AR) of the
programme. It is anticipated that the RME component will feed into this process.
291.
The annual review of the programme will consist of two parts:
 A high level meeting to assess progress in the humanitarian situation and system
in country. This meeting will comprise the Head of OCHA (possibly the
Humanitarian Coordinator), the Head of the OCHA Funding Unit and UN/NGO
heads. This meeting will assess progress against log frame indicators, both in the
humanitarian situation in Somalia and in the humanitarian system. We will address
the timeliness and quality of response, as well as numbers of beneficiaries, we will
61
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
explore overall funding levels, blockages in the system and leadership and staffing
issues.
 Individual assessments of projects against logical frameworks. This assessment
will use data gathered from documentation and dialogue with partners to assess
progress against indicators. The programme team or RME will conduct field visits
where possible.
292. Up to £4 million in programme costs will be dedicated to research, monitoring and
evaluation activities over the life of the programme. This is part of a wider strategy
which will involve working with partners to strengthen their monitoring and evaluation
systems. We will support them to improve the quality of data, and use evidence from
findings from the research component to decide where to allocate resources, and how
to achieve results more effectively and improve performance. This expenditure will
enable us to ensure sustainability of our investments, and will thereby achieve value
for money, as well as looking for efficiencies from new and different ways to deliver
humanitarian assistance.
293. All agreements will contain an exit clause allowing a termination of the agreement
should partners consistently fail to deliver results or should their financial management
significantly worsen.
294. DFID has committed to embed disaster resilience in all of its programmes by 2015,
and this has significant implications for our work in the humanitarian sector in Somalia.
It is anticipated that the DFID resilience strategy will be finalised in 2013. This will be
used to shape and orient interventions funded under the resilience window of this
programme.
Common Humanitarian Fund
295. DFID is one of the main donors to the CHF. As such DFID will continue to exert
influence over the fund management and strategic orientation. DFID is present on the
Board and this provides leverage to influence strategy. The CHF produces a large
volume of detailed management information covering results, finances and challenges
which we will review and comment upon as necessary.
296. The process by which a tranche of funding is prepared and assigned by the CHF is
as follows:
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Step 1: Standard Allocation
Document
HC publishes Standard
Allocation Document with
funding envelopes to launch
process
Step 2: Project Prioritization
Clusters invite organizations
with CAP projects to submit
CHF proposals
Document based on CAP,
FSNAU with inputs from IASC,
ICWG and review by Board
Cluster Review Committees
prioritize
proposals
and
submit them via OCHA to the
HC
Step 3: Review and Approval
OCHA conducts formal review
of proposals submitted by
Clusters
HC reviews proposals
recommended by clusters and
OCHA and makes final
decision
Figure 6 CHF Process
297. The CHF’s allocation system is needs-driven, based on the most accurate
information possible from partners on the ground. The system is therefore highly
sensitive to the changing needs of beneficiaries and is designed to respond to
changes in geographical or thematic need.
298. Our agreement with the CHF will make clear that funding is contingent upon
progress against certain reform objectives. The key objectives for the life of the
programme are detailed in the table below.
299. Efforts to improve the CHF will be linked in to central DFID work on improving the
performance of Common Humanitarian Funds. Below are the priority areas which we
will continue to make progress on from the inception of the programme, along with
milestones to track progress.
Table 18 CHF reform objectives
Objective
Monitoring and evaluation
improved
UN OCHA CHF Unit fully and
adequately staffed
Distinguish between
structural and short-term
need. Contribute to building
resilience.
Unit costs measurable and
declining
Multi-sector funding available
for addressing chronic need
Objective(s)
 Develop and introduce a robust M&E system that captures output and
outcome level information from all projects.
 The CHF Unit to be fit for purpose and able to manage the fund in an
efficient and cost-effective manner.
 2013 CAP distinguishes acute from chronic need
 CHF allocations from 2013 systematically distinguish between acute
and chronic responses
 Interventions best suited to acute need confined to geographical areas
where acute need identified in 2013 CAP and CHF allocation
 Contribution to a system-wide resilience strategy by X? 2013.
 Multi-year, multi-sectoral funding window put in place by 2013 appeal,
to enable funding to longer term projects which address chronic need.
 Total area of humanitarian operations declines over programme
duration (assumption: total acute need declines and development
interventions become predominant in areas of chronic need)
 2013 CHF annual report contains information on unit costs of
interventions
 By 2015 CHF annual report shows overall decline in unit cost of
interventions
 Donors propose an earmarked multi-sectoral, multi-year funding
envelope in March 2013 Board Meeting
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Minimum climate and
environment standards
considered in project
selection
 Envelope is in place by 2014 first allocation.
 2014 CHF Annual report contains an analysis of climate and
environment impact
 One CAP during the programme period takes climate change as its
theme, distilling data and thinking in the system on this key issue.
 Build consensus over the programme period for including a climate
marker in the project selection process, similar to the current gender
marker system.
ICRC and UN Agencies
300. The humanitarian team will consider each annual appeal and put a funding
proposal to the Head of Office who will approve the disbursement. Continued funding
to each of these partners is contingent upon DFID’s assessment of their performance
through annual reviews.
301. Our reform objectives for each partner organisation will reflect global Multilateral
Aid Review objectives where these exist.
302. The DFID programme team will conduct an annual stock take of each partnership,
which will feed into the overall programme review. This will involve obtaining results,
financial and management information from partners, and then meeting with key
contacts to interrogate their assessment of progress against log frame targets. Each
partnership will also be thoroughly and independently reviewed in the mid-term review
of the humanitarian programme.
303. We will work with ICRC and UN agencies to track improvement of their
management of climate and environment issues at the country level to mainstream
these into its policy and operations.
Bilateral
304. The process by which a new accountable grant or MOU will be agreed will be the
submission of a proposal from a partner, along with a short intervention summary
written by the Humanitarian Team, based on the full business case model but limited
to two A4 pages, covering the reason for the appeal, projected results and supporting
evidence. This will be approved by the Head of Office in consultation with a board
consisting of the humanitarian team and Deputy Head of Office. Funding will proceed
on the basis of this approval.
305. The DFID programme team will conduct reviews of each partnership which will
feed into the overall annual reviews of the programme. These will be conducted by
requesting financial, results and other management information from partners, and
then evaluating their progress against log frame targets. Any underspend or results
shortfall will be reflected in the next disbursement, and may lead to a termination of
the funding agreement. Bilateral partnerships will also be included in the mid term
review of the programme.
306. We will work with our bilateral partners to improve their management of climate
and environment issues at the country level to mainstream these into its policy and
operations.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
How the IRF will work?
307. Warning signs can come from any number of partners and sources. These can be
partners in the field as well as scientific climate related monitoring centres. Thus early
warning tracking will take place year round. However the main points during the year
will be the FSNAU post Deyr and post Gu harvest reports produced in Feb/March and
in Sep/Oct respectively and the UN CAP mid-year review produced in June/July.
These points represent opportune points during the year when a decision can be
taken regarding use of the IRF funds. Discussions will also be held with key partners,
FAO, OCHA, UNICEF and key NGO partners to cross check our analysis with theirs.
308. The DFID Somalia Humanitarian Adviser will review, at these three points during
the year, the evidence and data and assess the need for additional resources.
Recommendations for additional spend will then be made to the DFID Somalia Head
of Office via a submission. This will in turn be communicated to the Africa Regional
Director for approval, once funds have been identified. Additional IRF funds will be
added to the UK’s overall Somalia Humanitarian portfolio. Projects funded under the
IRF will be managed by the DFID Somalia Humanitarian Team as per normal
procedures. Expected results will be added to the logical framework and results
framework.
309. Triggers for early action will be agreed with other donors mainly the US and EC
(as per the ICAI recommendations) to ensure appropriate burden share. It is
anticipated that the early warning triggers will include a look at both the prognosis /
need, but also, in time, the most appropriate type of action / response required.
310. Any additional resources will be coordinated with other mechanisms and donors
also engaged in early response. This includes: the Central Emergency Revolving
Fund (CERF), the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), US and ECHO, all with early
action funding available or actively seeking to develop a facility.
311. The amount suggested at the outset of this business case is £10 million per
annum. This would provide an additional 27% of the overall DFID Somalia
Humanitarian budget. Whilst this may seem a sizeable increase, when set against the
impact on our overall burden share in the CAP this increases the UK share of the CAP
need to less than 5% (see section below on burden share).
Cross Cutting issues
Working across HMG
312. The Humanitarian team will work closely with the FCO and others to increase
understanding and awareness of humanitarian issues. This will be undertaken through
regular exchanges with British Office for Somalia staff.
With colleagues implementing the development programme in Somalia, the
Humanitarian Team will coordinate project activities and seek where possible to
reduce and withdraw from humanitarian funding in order to favour longer term
development.
313. The challenge will be to wean partners off humanitarian funding, in favour of longer
term more developmental funding. This will take time and over the four year
implementation period we aim to build the evidence base necessary to determine that
this is feasible.
314. The humanitarian programme will work with stabilisation colleagues to ensure a
coordinated approach.
65
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Conflict sensitivity
315. The risks of projects in Somalia unintentionally contributing to conflict and
instability are significant. Without a well-developed understanding of the drivers of
conflict (clan, political, military, economic)it is possible the aid can fall into the wrong
hands and generate conflict. There is currently little solid evidence of the importance
humanitarian aid flows have in the current economic climate. Working with others we
will seek to improve the evidence base in this area. In particular we will test whether
different intervention types provide varying levels of risk in driving conflict (i.e. does
treating children for malnutrition provide the same risk as provision of cash or cash for
work?).
316. All our partners have a “do no harm” approach built into their operational rhetoric,
however, the ability to demonstrate what this actually entails is often found wanting.
This is not neglect, but rather the pressures of delivery in a harsh operating
environment where the primacy, certainly in recent years, has been to deliver
assistance.
317. A four year time horizon provides us with an opportunity to make progress in better
understanding the linkages between the provision of humanitarian aid and the drivers
of conflict. This will be achieved by ensuring that projects we fund bilaterally include a
robust conflict analysis and we are able to monitor and collate information in a more
systematic manner. Our partners have all been operating in Somalia for many years,
and have well developed connections with communities and stakeholders and have a
developed understanding of community / village dynamics.
318. Poverty and scarcity do not cause war, political violence, or extremism, but can
make a society more susceptible to certain kinds of armed conflict, especially
communal clashes over resources. About half of Somalia’s population is pastoral, and
though this group has well-developed mechanisms for negotiating access to pasture,
wells, and markets, growing pressure – from rangeland degradation, enclosures by
private interests, restricted mobility due to armed conflict, and recurring drought – are
pushing some pastoralists into destitution and generating conditions of desperation
that can fuel fights over access to resources50.
319. Any programming introducing the provision of improved access to resources for
one group will have an impact on another, for example, the proliferation of water
sources has changed the movement patterns of nomads. With the availability of the
permanent water resources, nomads feel detached from the constant mobility and
tend to be concentrated around few water points where grazing land seems to be
abundant. The most common mode of sedentarisation involves the creation of clusters
of huts and rural villages that spring around water points. An inherent motive of
sedentarisation is to increase the control over common grazing lands with the aim to
extend a clan’s territory (degaan), often leading to competing land claims. Secondly,
the uncontrolled proliferation of water sources and subsequent sedentarisation puts
sustained pressure on the environment. The permanent nature of the sedentary
settlements spreading all over pastureland, even in places far-off from water points,
denies the environment seasonal rest that are necessary for recovery. This increases
land degradation and the potentiality of conflict over dwindling resources. Frequent
droughts, increasing enclosures of diminishing grazing resources and the
multiplication of settlements also restricts the mobility of pastoralists. Additionally, in
some areas sedentarisation and farming tendencies. Roaming pastoralists are denied
50
(Menkhaus, Ken, unpublished UN paper, October 2012)
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
the open-access to pastures they enjoyed in earlier days. In search for new grazing
areas, nomads now risk armed conflict with other groups.51
320. To minimise these risks, the humanitarian programme is developing a conflict
sensitivity framework which will firstly require implementing partners to conduct a
conflict analysis of the areas they will work in. The partners will then have to assess
whether their interventions will create or exacerbate any local tensions against a range
of criteria; if so, mitigating actions will be put in place to reduce this risk as far as
possible.
321. The UK will work with key partners and donors from the Humanitarian Country
Team (HCT) to ensure a harmonised approach is taken when dealing with the
information and evidence provided by partners. In situations where it would appear
that aid provision is indeed contributing to unacceptable levels of risk (including risk of
conflict), then agreement (at the HCT) on appropriate actions with key stakeholders
will be required/attempted. In some circumstances this may include the temporary or
permanent withdrawal of UK assistance in a particular area.
322. In order to develop a more formal approach capturing the understanding partners
have, a conflict appraisal matrix will be completed by all partners funded under this
business case. See FLAG K for more detail.
323.
The “good enough” appraisal will include a mapping of:
-
Partners and principle sub-contractors (e.g. clan dynamics, specific interest
groups)
-
Stakeholder analysis (including gatekeepers)
-
Agency staffing and recruitment policy / practice
-
Geographical targeting
-
Economic appraisal
-
Communication with beneficiary and non-beneficiary communities;
324. The suggested approach will attempt to draw on existing best practice and aim for
minimum standards as outlined by the Humanitarian Practice Network report “Applying
Conflict Sensitivity in emergency response”52.
Social appraisal
325. The Somali people have withstood two decades of almost total anarchy and cope
with regular bouts of drought, flooding and almost constant violent conflict. This has
only been possible with developed coping mechanisms.
326. The Somalis are divided between nomadic and pastoralist groups. With the bulk of
the farmers in between the Shabelle and Juba rivers. The nomadic lifestyle has
brought with it fierce self-reliance and autonomy. Traditional customs and life styles
dominate much of the rural areas. The urban population is developing with less
attachment to traditions, but still form a relatively small number. The majority of the
population are moderate Sunni Muslim. The traditional trading ties (e.g. for livestock)
have been in Arabia.
51(No
more ‘Grass grown by the Speak’, Addressing Land-based Conflicts in Somaliland, Academy
for Peace and Development. 2007. inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/apd2008lbc.pdf)
52
Humanitarian Practice Network - Applying conflict sensitivity in emergency response: Current
practice and ways forward. Number 70, October 2011.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
327. The Clan is the primary form of association for Somalis. There are four main Clans
each with many sub-clans. Allegiance and support to ones Clan is primordial and
trumps national identity. The Clan provides an intricate support network for
communities and acts as an informal social security network. The ability of people to
borrow funds / goods from each other during times of crisis is often critical for families
to cope and survive. This system works well when shocks are limited and at the
household level. When an entire villages / areas are affected (such as the drought in
2011) then coping within the Clan structure is no longer possible (needs outstrip
supply). This support network is lost when people are displaced. This loss of
connectivity to Clan members increases vulnerability and takes time to be restored.
IDP camps and communities provide good examples of this.
328. Elders play a key role in the communal decision making process. Projects need to
be agreed by elders and without their approval, projects will simply not be allowed to
go ahead or will be spoiled.
329. The humanitarian programme will work with community structures where possible
and where it makes sense. For example this can be in creating village water
committees or determining beneficiary lists with appropriate authorities. The need to
properly communicate decision making and advocate humanitarian principles and
rationale to communities is also key. Partners are already well aware of the need to
engage with local structures in order to operate. In urban areas, partners will
coordinate with local authorities and seek to understand the social dynamics in their
areas of operation.
Private sector
330. The private sector plays an important part in Somali life and the Somalis are astute
business people. The humanitarian programme will seek to use where possible the
business acumen of people to make efficiency gains and support local entrepreneurs.
331. The cash based programming is largely done through a system of money vendors
(the Hawala). These operate much like a bank and are able to send funds from one
part of the country to another. They are the main conduit for remittances for example.
332. The cash programme will continue to use the Hawala system, but will also look to
diversify into the telecoms market. The use of mobile phone technology for the
transfer of funds has been recently piloted and early signs are that this has been
successful.
333. Local procurement of goods including food, shelter, water will also be promoted
(where it makes sense and achieves value for money). Transportation is another
sector that the private sector plays a large part in. By introducing competitive
processes, we aim to drive down costs.
Gender
334. Somalia is one of the worst places in the world to be a woman. The rates of abuse
are high. UNICEF recently assessed that 6,500 women were sexually abused in the
first six months of 2012 and 98% of women and girls suffer from Female Genital
Mutilation (FGM).
335. Sexual violence is most prevalent in IDP communities with over 60% of reported
violence coming from IDPs. Most of these cases involve rape (51%) and often gang
rape. The perpetrators are mainly men in uniform and women report often being the
victims of violence when collecting water or other resources.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
336. The response to such widespread abuse is multifaceted. Humanitarian action can
do little to address the societal and cultural issues of SGBV and FGM. However,
humanitarian action can assist in dealing with the consequences of sexual violence
and mainstream the protection of women and girls throughout all interventions.
337.
The UK will:
-
Introduce a gender marker approach to project appraisals;
-
Ensure partners integrate gender concerns throughout their programs (each
proposal will include a specific section on how the program addresses the specific
concerns and capacities of women and girls);
-
Expect partners to demonstrate gender expertise in their programming teams and
to have applied a gender analysis to needs assessments;
-
Ensure that partners have appropriate policies on sexual exploitation and abuse;
-
Look to improve program targeting – so that the most vulnerable (including female
headed households and vulnerable children) are accorded priorities;
-
Support partners’ efforts to obtain appropriate gender advisory support where
needed;
-
Mainstream protection of women in projects (water projects to look carefully at
where water collection points are positioned, providing gender separated and
lockable latrines etc.).
-
Adapt projects (where possible) to address the specific needs of female and male
victims of sexual violence;
-
Ensure partners provide sex and age disaggregated data;
-
Carefully monitor projects to ensure gender considerations are actually being
implemented;
-
Include gendered indicators in monitoring and evaluation frameworks for
humanitarian assistance
-
Evaluate the extent to which gender sensitive programming has had a positive
effect on women and girls as well as men and boys (third party monitoring and
beneficiary feedback mechanisms).
-
Continue to lobby other partners to ensure gender considerations are taken
seriously;
B. What are the risks and how will these be managed?
338. Each project will have a risk framework developed and monitored. Overall, the
management of the programme will mitigate the major risks identified as detailed in
FLAG O.
Table 19 Risks and mitigating actions
Risk
Increase in
conflict and
insecurity limits
humanitarian
access
Mitigating actions
Delivering humanitarian aid in Somalia is particularly
challenging; the level of risk is high and we estimate will
remain this way for the duration of the programme. Localised
violence in the southern regions of Somalia is significant but is
managed by the capacity of our partners, and by maintaining a
spread of delivery channels. Humanitarian actors are set up
to operate flexibly and in insecure environments. Funding
through each of the delivery channels is, in fact, a strategy for
managing the risk and diminishing the potential consequences
especially for populations in southern Somalia.
69
Residual risk
High
Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Weak UN
leadership
The DFID Somalia humanitarian advisor will work closely with
OCHA, and the Humanitarian Coordinator and offer technical
assistance where necessary (a DFID secondment may be
considered).DFID will monitor leadership and management of
the OCHA and the CHF carefully. Where necessary, use of
UK MIS New York and Geneva will be sought to press for
changes in the UN in Somalia. DFID CHASE will also be used
to lobby where and when necessary.
Moderate
Poor cluster
performance
Cluster performance in Somalia is variable. DFID will use its
influence on the Board, technical review and strategic
committee of the CHF Somalia to influence clusters, and
ensure project proposals are focussed, realistic and respond
to priority needs. The Food Security cluster received DFID
funding in 2012 and this will be closely monitored, and support
for improved cluster leadership and increased capacity
considered. DFID’s position on the Humanitarian Country
team and through the Informal Donor Group will also
contribute to pushing for improved coordination.
Moderate
Low quality
Consolidated
Appeal Process
(CAP)
The quality of the CAP remains dependent on the quality of
UN leadership, staffing capacity in OCHA and their ability to
generate high level participation. We will use our engagement
with humanitarian actors throughout the programme period to
encourage good succession planning, and our influence in the
system to stress the importance of quality UN leadership in
Somalia.
Low
Programme
substitutes for
state functions
and Somalia
Government
does not
engage.
Projects have
an adverse
effect on
Climate and
Environment
The Government of Somalia’s capacity to engage on
humanitarian issues is almost non-existent. The UK will
increasingly seek to dialogue (in collaboration with UN and
other donor partners) with government actors and state bodies
on humanitarian, resilience and disaster preparedness issues.
Moderate
We will use our influence in the humanitarian system, and with
individual partners, to promote the mainstreaming of climate
sensitive approaches. We will push for a climate-focussed
CAP during the life of the programme, and for the inclusion of
a Climate marker in project selection. The Humanitarian
Resilience strategy explicitly seeks to address Climate related
hazards and reduce their impact where possible.
Low
Climate change
increases
humanitarian
need
We will use our influence in the system to integrateadaptive
resilience in programming as a way to confront climate and
environment risks, promote dialogue between development,
humanitarian and environmental practitioners, and to reduce
community vulnerability to climate and environment shocks.
The development of DFID’s resilience strategy in 2013 will
identify concrete actions we can take to mitigate this risk.
Moderate
Humanitarian
intervention
worsens
conflict or
promotes rentseeking
Improve the evidence base. Ask partners to complete the
proposed Conflict Appraisal matrix. Promote neutral,
principled humanitarian assistance. Ensure CHF Advisory
Board considers conflict risks implicit in interventions. Ensure
do no harm principles are at the heart of our partner planning
processes and applied during implementation.
Moderate
DFID
Effective management of the portfolio, influencing of the
Low
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
management of
the programme
is insufficient to
deliver results.
humanitarian system and delivery of key results, will be
dependent on DFID Somalia maintaining an adequately
resourced and skilled team. DFID Somalia will conduct a
review of programme management and staffing on the
humanitarian team at each twelve month point, to ensure
adequate resources in place to deliver results.
Monitoring and
evaluation
inadequate
The RME component will provide the necessary resources
and opportunity to address M&E weaknesses noted in the
past.
Low
Fiduciary risk
Working with partners in a challenging delivery environment
entails a degree of fiduciary risk. See fiduciary risk section
above for detailed mitigation plans.
Moderate/ high
Table 14: Programme risks and mitigating actions
339. The above risk matrix will be revised quarterly and adjusted accordingly. This will
be a living document.
340. DFID acknowledges that Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) represent a relatively
higher level of fiduciary risk53, but that the associated efficiencies and ability to deliver
at scale justify using these mechanisms. Monitoring the performance of the CHF and
management of this risk will be part of the role of the DFID Humanitarian Adviser, as
part of the CHF Board. As a mechanism which is dependent on the interaction of UN
led structures, it is somewhat vulnerable to poor human resource practice in the UN,
especially at senior levels, including the HC and senior staff in OCHA and the MDTF
Unit at UNDP. As a mitigation strategy it is essential that DFID and the rest of the
CHF Advisory board pay close attention to potential weaknesses in staffing levels and
act accordingly.
341. ICRC presents a moderate risk delivery channel. The organisation is highly
regarded and highly professional with an excellent track record. They are also highly
independent, making their operations resilient to all but the most extreme external
factors. Somalia’s operating environment does present challenges which would place
ICRC at a moderate risk level.
342. Bilateral funding arrangements represent a high risk delivery channel.
Bilateral partners are not dependent on the functioning of the UN system
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
n/a
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
343. A four year implementation timeframe provides the UK with a real opportunity to
better assess the impact of our interventions. The RME component valued at some
£4 million or 3.8% of the overall programme, signals a real intent to build the evidence
base for our decision making and both monitor and evaluate the programme to a
higher standard than has been possible in the past.
344. The RME component will provide an impartial and external overview of programme
performance. The RME will be responsible for designing a robust monitoring system
capable of capturing results accurately. The RME will also develop systems to verify
outputs have been delivered (including looking at systems such as: third party
monitoring, remote sensing and beneficiary feedback loops etc.) Evaluation questions
53
See, for example, MDFT Office Fiduciary Risk Assessment, May 2010, DFID.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
will be further designed during the inception phase, but is expected to examine how
multiyear UK aid has helped deliver lifesaving humanitarian assistance and build
household and community resilience.
345. One of the key challenges in Somalia is the quality, availability and reliability of
data to support any assessment of results or performance. We will prioritise
strengthening the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data collection, analysis
and findings, and the use of this information for decision-making. The main
opportunities that we will focus on are:

The opportunity to compare and contrast different delivery approaches (within a
multiyear context and between emergency and resilience programing);

The opportunity to develop more systematic and robust monitoring and evaluation of
cluster performance by areas rather than projects and to support OCHA in moving
to a stronger emphasis on reporting results, particularly at outcome level, and
working with beneficiaries to improve accountability for response;

Capitalising on links with the wider resilience-building agenda that is being
considered in DFID Somalia. We will concentrate our inputs and work with partners
on measuring sustainable outcomes, assessing how effectively interventions reduce
risk and vulnerability and increase capacities, and developing ways to evaluate how
we target and reach chronically vulnerable populations in insecure environments;

Taking advantage of opportunities to join up monitoring and evaluation of
humanitarian programming in Somalia with wider DFID initiatives on UN reform
(e.g. support CHASE work on influencing OCHA reform and performance; MAR
follow-up country validations; CHASE delivery of the strategy for Promoting
Innovation and Evidence-Based Approaches to Building Resilience and Responding
to Humanitarian Crises).

We will also contribute to learning and knowledge sharing at an institutional level by
building evidence about what works, e.g. challenges to scaling up the use of cash
transfers and understanding whether and how they influence food security and
nutrition outcomes in Somalia, understanding other forms of social protection and
more broadly addressing constraints to conducting evaluations in an environment in
which security, humanitarian access, capacity, institutional governance deficits and
resourcing are all major challenges.
346. We will ensure that each of the delivery channels has adequately staffed and
resourced M&E systems that report on results, identify what works or does not work,
and why, and feed findings back into humanitarian and development programme
planning and practice. The RME component will develop a detailed M&E plan within 3
months of being awarded the contract.
Monitoring implementation and delivery
347. Each project will be monitored using a number of tools. The mix of tools used will
depend on the type of activity implemented. For example, satellite imagery is useful for
infrastructure works whilst beneficiary call centres are useful for cash programmes.
Sometimes three or more tools are required for any given intervention.
348. Each partner is expected to monitor their project / programme. DFID will work with
partners to develop robust oversight of projects and, where possible, cross check
information to ensure rigour is applied to monitoring systems. On occasion DFID will
reserve the right to contract external support to directly monitor projects on the ground,
but more often will use external support to monitor the partner monitoring systems.
349. The table below outlines the main techniques used, their advantages and
disadvantages and relative cost.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Table 20 - Monitoring Techniques used in Somalia
Monitoring
Technique
Objectives
Strengths
Weaknesses/ Limitations
Approx cost (£)
Field visits
Direct observation of
project achievements
More control on
implementation by
witnessing first hand
Field monitors do not have
access to all areas – slow to
implement; clan interests.
£1250
3rd party
monitoring
Indirect verification of
implementation status
when access is not
possible
Direct visual control of
project implementation.
£3750
Focus group
interview /
Individual
interview
Interaction with field
staff; perception of
project by
beneficiaries and
stakeholders.
Immediate feedback
Better understanding of
issues and needs.
Geodata
collection
(GPS)
To locate activities
and achievements of a
project
Ability to accurately map
where projects are
implemented.
Expensive
Level of confidence in
results. Cross verification of
information in insecure
areas.
Time consuming
Group discussion limited to
general issues no sensitive
ones
Difficult to get representative
sample of participants.
Translators needed.
Lack of capacity of staff to
use the GPS
Photo with or
without GPS
data
To illustrate activities
and achievements of a
project before and
after interventions
Use of photos, taken
before, during and after
implementation
Need to verify images are
real and not doctored and
relate to the project in
question.
Remote
Sensing
(Areal
Photography)
Arial images of
infrastructure
rehabilitation
Accuracy.
Not available for all areas,
only certain projects
(infrastructure) are possible.
TBD
Call center
Remote Call
Monitoring
Direct beneficiary
contact
Cheap. Real-time
monitoring. Good to get
direct beneficiary
feedback.
Quality and accuracy of
information. Limited sample
size. Technical issues to call
Somalia. Phone coverage
might be limited in certain
areas. Reliability of
answers.
75p per call
SMS data
collection,
survey
Direct beneficiary
contact.
Cost effective. Real-time
monitoring.
As above. In addition
beneficiaries must be
literate.
cost of SMS,
Radio
broadcasts
Creates awareness of
the project and
ensures objectives are
in-line with community
expectations
Can easily and speedily
reach a large number of
beneficiaries
Difficult to target messages
to specific communities /
project sites
TBD
£100 GPS
£200 per camera
350. Monitoring projects in Somalia (especially the conflict affected south) is hard. The
table outlines some of the techniques currently used in Somalia. The RME component
of this programme will aim to use, where appropriate a combination of monitoring tools
to triangulate information.
351. DFID will explore with other humanitarian donors whether a common monitoring
service can be developed that would help drive down cost and make more sense.
DFID is in discussion with the other main donors (EU, US, Canada, AusAid) to
undertake a feasibility study.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
CHF implementation
352. We will work with our partners and OCHA to address acknowledged gaps in M&E
staffing, funding and systems that are widely acknowledged to affect donor confidence
in CHF, and limit the use of critical M&E information for determining funding
allocations and other key matters such as improving project design and performance,
in Somalia and elsewhere. We will support them in putting systematic and rigorous
systems in place quickly, to monitor whether projects were implemented as planned
and paying attention to considerations of cost, timing and outputs achieved. Risk
mitigation will form a key part of monitoring, closely linked to audits to follow on from
the fiduciary risk assessment in 2013 and will support continued management of the
fiduciary and corruption risks. Other priority areas that we will support the CHF
partners and OCHA to monitor and evaluate during implementation are the explicit
links between humanitarian programming and resilience building at community level,
and the quality of the interventions, judged in part by seeking and using beneficiary
views and feedback on the timeliness, relevance, appropriateness and effectiveness
of interventions.
Bilateral and appeals programmes implementation
353. We will work with our partners to ensure that they have comprehensive, costed
and adequately resourced M&E plans linked to logical frameworks in project
proposals, and will support them to deliver the right level of evaluative information at
agreed times to judge the results and to assess the quality and performance of the
assistance given. These detailed M&E plans should cover the areas outlined above
and be designed and delivered to a similar standard. The DFID Accountability &
Results Team (ART) will also be consulted as part of project review.
Monitoring and evaluating outcomes and value for money
Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)
Strengthening cluster monitoring and evaluation of outcomes
354. We will identify actions to strengthen cluster coordination and delivery of outcome
level monitoring, and ensure systems are put in place to track outcomes, including
third party monitoring where appropriate. Progress with outcome monitoring will be
reviewed at Board level against milestones and through evaluation reports. We will
work with the Board to focus assessment of impact on areas or types of intervention
rather than projects, and seek more rigorous and comparative analysis. As DFID
Somalia develops a resilience strategy across all programmes, we will work with
OCHA/ CHF Advisory Board to adjust funding streams and lengths to integrate
resilience approaches into CAP operational procedures, and to measure outcomes
among vulnerable populations (reducing risk, reducing vulnerability, increasing
capacities and coping strategies and improving recovery rates). We will liaise with
CHASE on areas where evidence and analysis overlap with DFID’s interest in reform
and in better co-ordination and leadership in OCHA to avoid duplication of effort and
data collection.
Bilateral and appeals programmes
355. We will fund separately one or two in-depth evaluation studies of programmes we
are supporting through bilateral funding arrangements. The evaluation(s) purpose and
objectives will be linked to the resilience agenda and will be developed as part of our
resilience strategy, looking closely at outcomes for vulnerable populations. Criteria for
selecting a programme will be developed and could include choosing a spatial area or
group, sector, partner or type of intervention, and we will commission the strongest
impact evaluation design that is feasible given data and operating constraints.
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
Value for money evaluations
356. DFID has opted to support 3 different delivery approaches: the CHF, appeals and
bilateral relationships where we fund agencies directly. In Somalia, due to conflict,
insecurity, lack of a properly functioning central governance structures among other
factors, there are long standing and intractable problems with fiduciary risk and
corruption that warrant close attention in evaluation. In addition, DFID has recently
placed a strong emphasis upon value for money in our assessment of multilateral
partners and when making decisions about where to invest limited resources.
357. We should be vigilant and very well informed about which delivery mechanisms
prove to be more or less cost-effective so we can use this to assess value for money
during the next phase of programme design and strategic and operational planning in
2014/2015. It is important to compare and contrast the results, delivery mechanisms
and costs of these approaches to provide scope for learning and for performance
improvements. DFID will fund two evaluations to develop suitable metrics to compare
and contrast the results and operating models of the different delivery channels being
supported, and work with partners to commission them and receive the findings. They
will be conducted in late 2014 and again in early 2016, and where there is overlap with
the MAR country validations, Somalia will liaise on areas requiring the same or similar
evidence and analysis to avoid duplication of effort and data collection.
Humanitarian system reform and performance
358. DFID will continue to dedicate humanitarian advisory time to influence the key
organs of humanitarian coordination and decision making in Somalia.
The
improvements required by the overall humanitarian system include:

Better coordination and leadership;

Delivery focus (results and outcomes);

Improved needs assessment and gap analysis;

Harmonised approach to risk management;

Agreed triggers for early action in response to early warning signals.
359. DFID will work closely with a range of stakeholders (the Humanitarian Coordinator,
OCHA, UN agencies and Cluster Leads, NGOs both international and national) to
build consensus and drive changes within the humanitarian response architecture.
360. DFID will attend key meetings (Humanitarian Country Team, CHF Board, Informal
Donor Group, ad hoc meetings with the NGO consortium) as opportunities to press for
more accountability and change where necessary.
OCHA CHF Secretariat
361. We will invest in evaluating the performance of the OCHA and CHF Secretariat
function as this is critical to more efficient, effective, better co-ordinated and better-led
humanitarian assistance in Somalia. We will look closely at certain areas where
weaknesses have been previously identified in evaluations of common funds, (OCHA
CHF Evaluation, April 2011). These include:
 The level to which results are being evaluated (beyond outputs to
outcomes);
 The quality and scope of monitoring data collection and analysis by
implementing partners and by clusters;
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Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 - 2017
 Quality and scope of evaluations, by implementing partners and by
clusters;
 How monitoring and evaluation findings and data are used for decision
making, e.g. project selection and funding allocations, project adjustments,
CHF guidelines or procedures, OCHA level reporting etc.;
 Resourcing of CHF Secretariat e.g. staff time allocated to M&E by
implementing partners, by cluster leads and by OCHA/HC senior
management teams. Of particular importance is the adequacy of funding
for M&E and whether actual levels have proved to be sufficient to meet
requirements and to improve accountability to beneficiaries and other key
stakeholders.
362. Our first task will be to work with our CHF partners and the CHF Secretariat to
agree a common results framework, an M&E strategy and plans that will be
implemented by the M&E Unit, and to agree how they will be resourced and delivered
at cluster and project levels. This will be done during by participating in the CHF
Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group (DFID is already the donor representative
on the group) and will be closely linked to the global M&E Framework for CHFs. This
will also involve liaison with CHASE and others, e.g. DFID Sudan and DRC.
363. We will review the M&E Unit’s performance in 2014, including in a mid-term
evaluation (see below) to examine how far progress with cluster and project M&E has
been made, what changes have occurred as a result, and at what cost?
Resourcing partner M&E activities
364. All NGO partners will be expected to provide a detailed monitoring and evaluation
plan for their projects. The quality of the M&E plans will be one of the elements used
to decide funding. It will be expected that partners incorporate M&E costs into their
budgets.
365. The CHF and ICRC have M&E systems in place. For the CHF, DFID is on the
board and has input into the management of the fund. DFID is also on the CHF
Monitoring Working Group to help policy development in this area. ICRC is less open
to publicly sharing their M&Eresults. However, DFID has a good working relationship
with ICRC and will discuss M&E as part of the regular dialogue that takes place.
366. UN agencies include M&E costs in their operational plans and DFID will engage
UN partners to better understand their M&E systems.
Summary of resourcing requirements
367. 3.8% of the total programme budget (£4m) is earmarked to directly support
monitoring and evaluation activities. This expenditure will be subject to annual review
and a peer group established to oversee the performance of the contract will
determine on-going expenditure. This sum does not take into account the amount
spent by partners on monitoring and evaluation.
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