Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network
Evolution
Global Jihadist Database Project
Scott Atran - P.I.
Marc Sageman - P.I.
Justin Magouirk - Principal Case Architect
Ken Ward – Consultant
Dominick’ Wright and Darcy Noricks - Contributors
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Overview
• JI was formed in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar (548)
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (10) after Sungkar split
with the leadership of Darul Islam
• Sungkar and Ba’asyir had been leaders in Darul Islam,
a jihadist movement in Indonesia, since the 1970s
• Sungkar set JI up as a hierarchical organization with
regional heads (mantiqi) reporting to the leader (amir)
• Sungkar (548) was the central figure and the
source of vision, inspiration, and direction for JI
• Sungkar (548) died in 1999 leaving a leadership
void
• Sungkar’s long-time confidant, Ba’asyir (10), was
expected to successfully lead the organization
• Ba’asyir (10) took over as amir, but proved to be
an extremely weak leader
JI Overview (cont.)
• Unlike the centralized Sungkar (548) era, the
organization split into two fractious groups under
Ba’asyir (10)
• Moderate majority wing led by:
• 574, the head of Mantiqi II (Indonesia)
• 234 and 92, heads of Mantiqi III (Philippines)
• 592, head of Mantiqi IV (Australia)
• Radical minority wing led by:
• Hambali (520), the head of Mantiqi I
• Zulkarnaen (244), the head of military affairs for JI
• Ba’asyir (10), who was unwilling to provide the
vision for the organization, initially sided with
Hambali (520)
• Hambali (520) radicalized the organization
through his pursuit of violent activities and his
connections with al Qaeda
JI Overview (cont.)
• Hambali’s militant minority was responsible for
all of JI’s terrorist attacks from 2000-2003
• With Hambali in hiding in Thailand in 2003 (and
later under arrest in August 2003), Noordin Top
(261) took over the informal role of attack leader
for the radical fringe of the organization
• To illustrate the evolution of the network over
time, we will focus on changes in the JI leadership
• At pivotal points in time, we will “drill down” into the
networks of the militant minority, which implemented
all of the attacks
Social Network Graph Background
• Node size is based on individual reputations. Reputations
are based on an algorithm that evaluates:
• Organizational role (Mantiqi leadership, key Afghanistan and
Philippines trainer, bomb expert, pesantren teacher at key JI
school, etc)
• Attack activity (participation and role on JI bombing operations)
• Larger nodes are more central to the JI attack network
• Node color is based on the most important tie group to
which the individual belongs. Tie groups are explained in
the legend for each graph
• Many individuals belong to multiple tie groups (i.e. a jihadist
trained in Afghanistan, attended the JI school Lukmanul Hakiem,
attended the JI school Ngruki, etc)
• In such cases, the individual is assigned the most important tie
group for the entire period (1985 - 2006)
Social Network Graph Background
• Arrests are signified by a box around the node in question
• Depictions of arrests occur in the period following the event
• Deaths are signified by a plus sign (+)
• Depictions of deaths occur in the period following the event
• Tie thickness and color reflect the strength of the tie
between two individuals
• Thin red lines represent acquaintances and in-laws
• Medium blue lines represent friends, non-nuclear relatives, and
individuals that have met on operations
• Thick black lines represent nuclear family members
1985-1989: Leadership Network Evolution
• Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) are leaders in Darul Islam
• Zulkarnaen (244) and 180 attend Sungkar (548) and
Ba’asyir’s (10) flagship madrassah, Pesantren al-Mukmin
(Ngruki) in the 1970s and 1980s respectively
• The Ngruki school is one of the founding pillars of JI
• 180 becomes Sungkar’s (548) driver
• 592 meets Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) in Indonesia
• Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), 574, and Hambali (520)
form an exile community in Malaysia after the two leaders
flee Indonesian authorities in 1985
• 368 meets Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and Mukhlas (26)
in Malaysia
• Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and 574 recruit a first
generation of Afghanistan training volunteers
• The majority of initial connections are formed here - 26, 92, 154,
198, 234, 244, 245, 250, 262, 520
• Afghanistan training is one of the founding pillars of JI
1985-1989: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
1990-1994: Leadership Network Evolution
• JI is formed in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar (548)
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (10) after Sungkar split
with the leadership of Darul Islam
• First documented ties between Hambali (520) and
al Qaeda core (650)
• 234, 92, and 250 set up a JI training camp in the
Philippines at Zulkarnaen’s (244) request
• Mukhlas (26) founds Lukmanul Hakiem, the most
important JI madrassah in exile in Malaysia, at the
request of Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10)
• Lukmanul Hakiem is one of the founding pillars of JI
• 592 accompanies Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10)
on a recruitment trip to Australia
1990-1994: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
1995-1999: Leadership Network Evolution
• Pesantren Lukmanul Hakiem in Malaysia becomes the center
of radical activity for JI
• Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), Mukhlas (26), 245, 358, Noordin Top
(261), and Hambali (520) live or commute there on a regular basis
• Zulkarnaen (244) and 198 visit often
• JI leadership ties are strengthened
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Sungkar (548) – Amir
Ba’asyir (10) – Deputy Amir
Hambali (520) – Mantiqi I
574 – Mantiqi II
92 – Mantiqi III
592 – Mantiqi IV
Mukhlas (26) – Head of Lukmanul Hakiem, Central Command
Zulkarnaen (244) – Central Command
154, 234, Zulkarnaen (244), 245, 250 – Lead trainers for the
organization
• 368 – Treasurer for Mantiqi I (de facto treasurer for JI)
1995-1999: Leadership Network Evolution
• Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and Zulkarnaen (244)
formalize strong ties with the al Qaeda core (650)
• Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir’s (10) ties are based on a letter from
Sungkar / Ba’asyir to Darul Islam commanders stating that they are
the representatives of Bin Laden in Southeast Asia (August 3, 1998)
• Zulkarnaen’s (244) ties are based on his tenure as lead trainer in
Afghanistan
• Hambali (520) strengthens ties with al Qaeda core (650)
• Hambali (520) brokers a trip to Afghanistan for 368
• 368 outlines one of the Singapore terrorist plots for the al Qaeda core
(650)
• 368 and Hambali (520) strengthen their ties through their
Mantiqi I leadership roles
• 368 acts as a liaison for Hambali for the Singapore cell
• Noordin Top (261) and 358 enter the network
• Sungkar (548) remains the dominant JI figure with
unquestioned authority until his death in 1999
1995-1999: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2000: Leadership Network Evolution
• The death of Sungkar (548) and the weak
leadership of Ba’asyir (10) results in multiple
centers of power within JI
• Hambali (520) rises to prominence based on his ties and
funding with al Qaeda (650)
• Mukhlas (26) becomes prominent as the de facto leader
of Lukmanul Hakiem and as one of the few legitimate
Islamic scholars within JI
• Faiz Bafana (368) rises to prominence as Hambali’s
(520) key aid and treasurer of JI
• First documented ties between Mukhlas (26) and
al Qaeda core (650)
2000: Leadership Network Evolution
• The moderate majority faction of JI leadership
(92, 234, 574, 592) is sidelined by Ba’asyir’s (10)
decision to side with the militants led by Hambali
(520)
• Hambali cultivates the Afghan training and
Lukmanul Hakiem radical networks
• Hambali (520) directs three attacks within six
months in the latter part of 2000
• Philippines Ambassador Residence Bombing in August
2000
• Christmas Eve Bombings in December 2000
• Rizal Day Bombings in December 2000
2000: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2000: Philippines Ambassador Residence
Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
• The Philippines Ambassador Residence (PAR) bombing is
envisioned by Hambali as revenge for the Philippines
government’s decision to overrun the JI / MILF training
camps, Camp Abu Bakar and Camp Hudaibiyah
• The PAR bombing network is cultivated by Hambali (520)
from former Afghan trainees and Lukmanul Hakiem
members
• Funding stems from Hambali’s (520) connection with al
Qaeda (650)
• The PAR bombing is approved by Ba’asyir (10) and
planned by Hambali and his Mantiqi I aids – Mukhlas
(26), 368, and 584
• In what would become a standard operating procedure,
Hambali (520) “borrows” Al-Ghozi (521), a Mantiqi III
member to help lead the bombing
2000: Philippines Ambassador Residence
Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
• Hambali chooses two separate groups to
implement the bombing
• The first group, consisting of 226 and future Bali
bombers 27, 29, 167, 209, 522, constructs and delivers
the bomb and the car that would be used for the
bombing
• 29 buys the explosives from 587, a non-jihadist who was later
arrested after the Bali I bombing
• The second group, consisting of 4, al-Ghozi (521), and
55, detonates the bomb
• The bombing occurs on August 1, 2000, injuring
the ambassador and killing his security guard and
an innocent bystander
2000: Philippines Ambassador Residence
Bombing Network (Militant Minority)
Leadership
Group
Reconnaissance /
Detonator Group
Material Sourcing /
Bomb-making Group
= Lukmanul Group
= Afghan Ties
= Lukmanul
= Misc.
Other Group
=
Afghan
Ties
= al Qaeda Core
=
Misc.
Other
+ = Dead
= al Qaeda Core
= Arrest
2000: Christmas Eve Bombings Network
(Militant Minority)
• The Christmas Eve bombings involve perhaps JI’s most
ambitious operational planning. Envisioned by Hambali
(520) and approved by Ba’asyir (10), the bombings were
planned by Hambali and his hand-picked team of jihadists
– Imam Samudra (1), Mukhlas (26), 55, 368, 538, and 584
– Hambali (520), Imam Samudra (1), 55, 336, and 538 are in charge
of the actual bombing teams
• Some bombing teams hit more than one city
• The teams strike 38 churches in 11 cities in Indonesia in an
effort to foment conflict between Christians and Muslims
– Batam, Bekasi, Bandung, Ciamis, Jakarta, Mataram, Medan,
Mojokerto, Pekanbaru, Pematang, and Siantar
• 19 people are killed and 120 injured
• The bombs are crude, often killing the jihadists who try to
detonate them, including Hambali’s friend 538
• Jihadists are spatially positioned in the graphs based on
their bombing teams
2000: Christmas Eve Bombings Network
(Militant Minority)
Pekanbaru
Group
Medan Group
Batam Group
Leadership
Group
Ciamis
Group
Sukabumi
Group
Bandung
Group
Jakarta Group
Mojokerto Group
Mataram Group
= Lukmanul
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= Darul Islam
= GAM
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2000: Rizal Day Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• The Rizal Day bombing is a joint venture between JI and
the MILF
• The origins of the bombing lay with Hambali’s (520)
direction to al-Ghozi (521) to buy explosives from the
MILF. Al-Ghozi approaches his former Philippines training
member, 513 about purchasing explosives
• 513 is willing to help but wants JI to help him implement an attack
in the Philippines as revenge for the Philippines army’s decision to
overrun the MILF militant training camps
• Hambali (520) approves the bombing and provides funding
through 368
• Al-Ghozi (521) and 513 successfully implement five
simultaneous explosions in Manila on December 30, 2000,
the Rizal Day holiday
2000: Rizal Day Bombing Network
Militant Minority
= Lukmanul Group
= Afghanistan Training
2001: Leadership Network Evolution
• 234 takes over the Mantiqi III leadership from 92
• 245, 250, 262 rise to prominence within the JI
leadership structure
• Hambali (520) flees Indonesia after the Christmas
Eve bombings
• Hambali (520) directs church bombings through
Imam Samudra (1) and the Singapore terror plots
through 368 and al-Ghozi (521)
• Ba’asyir (10) approves all of the 2001 plots and
bombings
• The 2001 Singapore terror plots are foiled by
Singapore authorities
2001: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2001: HKBP / Santa Ana Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• The HKBP / Santa Ana church bombings are a
continuation of Hambali’s strategy of bombing
churches to foment conflict between Christians
and Muslims
• Imam Samudra (1) directs a six-person cell that
includes Christmas Eve and PAR bomber, 55
• Funding occurs through 368, the treasurer of
Mantiqi I
• The cell simultaneously hits the Santa Ana
Catholic church and the HKBP Protestant church
on July 22nd
2001: HKBP / Santa Ana Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
= Lukmanul Group
= Afghan Ties
= Ngruki Pesantren
= Misc. Other
= al Qaeda Core
2001: Atrium Mall Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• The Atrium Mall bombing is a continuation of
Hambali’s strategy of fomenting conflict between
Christians and Muslims
• The target is a group of charismatic Christian
worshippers on the upper floor of the Atrium Mall
• Imam Samudra (1) directs a five-person cell. The
cell is the same as the HKBP / Santa Ana
bombings, minus one jihadist, 547
• Funding occurs through 368, the treasurer of
Mantiqi I
• The bomb prematurely explodes, injuring 196
• 196 is immediately captured and his leg amputated
• 55, who took part in the Christmas Eve bombings, PAR
bombing, and the HKBP / Santa Ana Church bombings,
is arrested
2001: Atrium Mall Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
= Lukmanul Group
= Afghan Ties
= Ngruki Pesantren
= Misc. Other
= al Qaeda Core
2002: Leadership Network Evolution
• After the United States attack on Afghanistan,
connections between the al Qaeda core (650) and
Zulkarnaen (244) and Mukhlas (26) are severed
• Hambali (520) continues to work through Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed
• 368, the treasurer for Mantiqi I, is arrested in late
2001 after the Singapore terror plots are foiled
• 358 takes over responsibility for JI finances
• Hambali (520) calls a meeting of his Mantiqi I
followers and redirects their focus to soft targets
• Top (261) is charged with creating a proposal for al Qaeda
funding
• 358 is charged with handling the transfer of funds
• Mukhlas (26) is charged with directing the bombing
2002: Leadership Network Evolution
• Because much of the Mantiqi I leadership structure is
dispersed and in hiding after the 2000 bombings, the
Mantiqi I leader, Mukhlas (26), turns to the Mantiqi II
administrative structure for help
• Mukhlas (26) works through the militant Zulkarnaen (244),
rather than the Mantiqi II moderate leadership led by 574
• 574 quits his Mantiqi II leadership post in protest of
Ba’asyir’s (10) weak leadership
• 262 takes over the Mantiqi II leadership
• 198 ascends to the post of caretaker amir when
Ba’asyir (10) is arrested after the Bali I bombing
2002: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2002 Bali Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• The Bali I bombing is the culmination of a series of
events
• Death of JI’s founder, Abdullah Sungkar
• Weak leadership of Ba’asyir (10)
• Establishment of Lukmanul Hakiem as the center of JI
radicalism in Malaysia
• Rise of the militant minority within the ranks of JI
• Hambali (520) orders the bombing from Thailand,
dispatching his small group of radical followers to
carry out his orders
• The director of the operation, Mukhlas (26) bypasses
the moderate Mantiqi II leadership and plans the
bombing through the Central Command Military
Affairs chief, Zulkarnaen (244)
2002 Bali Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• Mukhlas (26) chooses Imam Samudra (1), one
of the most violent and radical members of JI,
to carry out the bombing
• Samudra recruits the most radical JI members,
the majority of which have already taken part
in previous bombings – 27, 29, 127, 167, 202,
209, 249, 265, 522
• Samudra is also cultivating a small group of
Darul Islam members as potential suicide
bombers, including the eventual suicide
bomber, 524
2002 Bali Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• In mid-August, Zulkarnaen (244), Mukhlas (26), and
Imam Samudra (1) convene a meeting at 81’s house
that is attended by the majority of the bombing
participants
• The plans for the Bali bombing are announced and roles are
delegated
• 27, 167, 202, 265, 522 mix and build the bomb with
the guidance of Azhari Husin (249)
• 127 handles all logistical issues
• Samudra (1) is only able to convince one of his DI
protégées, 524, to become a suicide bomber
• 522 is forced to recruit one of his own protégées, 588,
to be the second suicide bomber
2002 Bali Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• On October 12th, 524 and 588 detonate the bombs at
Paddy’s Bar and Sari Club, killing 202 people and
injuring another 209
• The Bali bombing is implemented by a militant
minority of JI, with no input from the majority of the
organization, including high-level leadership
• In the October Markaziyah (Central Command) meeting
shortly after the Bali bombing, there is no discussion of the
bombing
• 234, head of Mantiqi III, asked Zulkarnaen (244) at this
meeting who had carried out the bombing. He is told that it
is “none of his business”
2002 Bali Bombing Network
Serang Group
+
= Serang Group
= Lukmanul Group
= Afghan Ties
= Ngruki Ties
= Misc. Other
= al Qaeda Core
= Dead
= Arrest
2003: Leadership Network Evolution
• The first round of Bali I bombing arrests weaken the
leadership structure
• Ba’asyir (10), Mukhlas (26), and 358 are arrested in late 2002
• 245 and 250 are promoted to the JI Central Command
• In his final act, Hambali (520) arranges for al Qaeda funding
of the Marriott bombing
• Because Hambali (520) is on-the-run (and eventually
captured), Noordin Top (261) gains stature within the
organization as a developing strategist
• There is no longer coordination from JI leadership for attacks
• 262 plans an attack on the Bank Central Asia Plot in Jakarta (foiled by
police) at the same time that Top (261) plans the Marriott bombing
• Zulkarnaen (244) and 92 create a JI special forces group
• The two do not get along (Zulkarnaen is from the militant group and 92
is from the moderate group of JI)
• 180 takes over the leadership of Mantiqi I
• 198 continues his role as caretaker Amir
2003: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2003 Marriott Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• Hambali is still in hiding in Thailand during the initial
preparations for the bombing, but remains in communication
with JI’s chief bomb-maker, Azhari (249)
– Hambali promises to send money for the operation, eventually using
his brother (66) to funnel money from al Qaeda (650)
• Noordin Top (261) serves as the chief strategist and Azhari
(249) serves as the field commander for the bombing
– This would be the first of three partnerships between Azhari (249) and
Top (261)
• The bombing starts in earnest when 200 contacts Noordin
Top (261) about leftover explosives from the Christmas Eve
bombing
– Top has 129 and 200 coordinate a group of JI members to move the
bombing materials including 54, 127, 151, 166, 173, 530
2003 Marriott Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• In May 2003, 200 robs a bank in Medan to help fund
the bombing
• The Marriott bombing differs slightly from previous
bombings in that there is a wave of arrests before the
bombing actually takes place
– 127, 129, 166, 200 are all arrested from late April to
August 2003
• 245 and 250, both members of the JI Central
Command, meet with the core bombers before and
after the bombing
• The bombing occurs on August 5, killing 12 people
and injuring 150
• 324, the suicide bomber, dies during the operation
2003 Marriott Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
Bomb Material
Movers
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= Misc Other
= al Qaeda Core
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2004: Leadership Network Evolution
• Hambali (520) is arrested in August 2003,
terminating all known links with the al Qaeda core
• 234 is arrested in 2003 and jailed for 10 months
• Upon release in 2004 he repudiates JI and loses all
contacts
• 92 is arrested in 2003 in the wake of the police
crack down on the JI special forces unit
• 198, the caretaker emir, is arrested in 2003 for his
role in hiding Bali bombers after the operation
• Noordin Top (261) takes over the informal role of
attack leader for the radical wing of JI
• With the help of Azhari Husin, Top (261) directs the
bombing of the Australian Embassy
2004: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• The Australian Embassy is the first JI bombing led
entirely by Top (261), without funding from
Hambali (520)
• Azhari (249) again serves as the second-incommand
– This is the second of three bombings that Top (261) and
Azhari (249) lead
• The Australian Embassy bombing involves an
extensive network of jihadists that are not part of
JI
– This results from Top’s (261) direct appeals to Ring
Banten and Kompak, two jihadist organizations in
Indonesia
2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• The Australian Embassy network results from
several key introductions across multiple different
groups
– 243, an instructor at the radical, madrassah-style
university an-Nur, introduces his students 117, 183, 203
to Noordin Top (261)
– 203 then introduces Top to 99
• Top recruits 99 to the network
• 99 immediately sets up a training camp to train the bombers
that would take part in the operation
– Top has his assistant 117 meet with 204, the assistant of
Kompak leader 9, to obtain explosives for the operation
• 9 agrees and Top (261) has a source of explosive materials
– 250, the Central Command member who had met with
Azhari (249) and Top (261) before and after the
Marriott bombing, and the Mantiqi I leader, 180,
provide explosives
2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
• The Australian Embassy operation suffers a series
of arrests before the bombing is ever implemented
– 117, 175, 180, 183, 203, 206, 243 are arrested between
June and August 2004
• The Australian Embassy bombing occurs on
September 9, killing 11 and wounding
approximately 140 people
– 577, the suicide bomber, dies in the operation
2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network
(Militant Minority)
Ring Banten Group
An-Nur Group
Kompak Group
Accommodations
Group
Core Bombing Group
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= an-Nur Group
= Ring Banten Group
= Kompak Group
= Afghan Ties
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2005: Leadership Network Evolution
• 154 is arrested in June 2004
• 180 is arrested in June 2004 in the wave of
Australian Embassy bombing arrests
• 358 is released from Malaysian detention
• No resumption of ties as he is monitored by Malaysian authorities
and barred from contact with former jihadists
• 198 is released from jail and reconnects with former
contacts
• 198 does not ascend to his former position of caretaker emir
• Top (261) continues his role as the attack leader for the
militant minority of JI
• Top (261) and Azhari successfully direct their third bombing
together – the 2005 Bali II bombings
• Azhari Husin is killed in a police raids following the bombing in late
2005
2005: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest
2006: Leadership Network Evolution
• Ba’asyir (10) is released from prison and resumes
his prior contacts
• 368 is released from Malaysian detention
– No resumption of ties as he is monitored by Malaysian
authorities and barred from contact with former
jihadists
• There are rumors that 245 has taken over as Amir,
although this has not been substantiated
• 245 and 250 are clearly the link between the JI
Central Command and Noordin Top’s (261) attack
networks
2006: Leadership Network Evolution
= Lukmanul Group
= Ngruki Ties
= Afghan Ties
= al Qaeda Core
= Misc Other
+ = Dead
= Arrest