Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
1

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Sadly, the prospects for good Venezuela affs are scarce, and solvency advocates are few and far between.
Hopefully this is good for some practice debates on the country, but I wouldn’t recommend making
Venezuela your topic area of choice at the moment.
The Canada oil/tar sands impact can be removed and read as an add-on if you need to shorten the 1AC.
Acronyms:
PVDSA- Petróleos de Venezuela, Venezuela’s biggest oil company. It dominates their oil sector, and is what most authors assume when advocating more funding.
FDI- Foreign Direct Investment
OAS- Organization of American States
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Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Gue 3-21 -13 [Elliott H. Gue, Founder and Chief Analyst at Capitalist Times and Energy & Income
Advisor, “Venezuelan Oil Production: No Overnight Recovery,” https://www.energyandincomeadvisor.com/venezuelan-oil-production-no-overnight-recovery/ ]
Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s former vice president and current acting president, has campaigned as Hugo Chavez’s hand-picked successor and is all but certain to be elected president on April 14. Maduro’s victory would ensure that Chavismo, the socialist ideology that’s dominated
Venezuelan politics since the late 1990s, will continue to hold sway. That being said, economic realities may undermine Maduro’s efforts to maintain many of Chavez’s populist programs:
Venezuela’s economy is in shambles and on the verge of outright collapse
. Since assuming office in 1999, Chavez has steadily increased government expenditures on social programs and subsidies to cultivate support among Venezuela’s poor, with public spending usually spiking in advance of presidential elections. To fund these social programs,
Chavez’s government relied primarily on cash from Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the national oil company. According to the BP’s (LSE:
BP, NYSE: BP) most recent Statistical Review of World Energy, Venezuela’s oil reserves stood at 296.5 billion barrels at the end of 2011–the largest in the world, eclipsing Saudi Arabia’s 265 billion barrels. But unlike Saudi Arabia, heavy oil accounts for much of
Venezuela’s resource wealth. Exploiting these complex deposits requires significant investments in infrastructure and the technical expertise of major international oil companies and services firms
. Industry observers estimate that maintaining production from Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt and other fields would require annual capital expenditures of between USD3 and USD5 billion. But Chavez’s plethora of social programs robbed PDSVA of the necessary capital to fund ongoing development of the nation’s considerable hydrocarbon resources. Under Chavez, the Venezuelan government has always had a vexed relationship with the energy industry. When PDVSA workers went on strike in late 2002, the country endured a severe economic downturn and the unemployment rate skyrocketed to more than 20 percent. The state responded by firing 18,000 PDVSA workers, including many of its most talented and experienced engineers and employees. In 2006 and 2007, Venezuela moved to nationalize exploration and production, seizing assets held by foreign companies such as ExxonMobil Corp (NYSE: XOM) and Italian energy giant Eni (Milan: ENI, NYSE: E). Although Chevron
Corp (NYSE: CVX) and a handful of other oil and gas companies opted to renegotiate their agreements with PDSVA and continue to operate in
Venezuela, the state’s increasingly heavy-handed moves have discouraged foreign investment in the domestic energy industry. Against this backdrop, it’s no surprise that
Venezuela’s oil production has declined steadily
since Chavez became president in 1999. At the same time, Venezuela’s oil consumption has surged to well over 800,000 barrels per day in 2012 from an average of about 560,000 barrels per day in 1998-99. Much of this increase reflects generous subsidies that have limited the domestic price of gasoline to between USD0.04 and
USD0.10 per gallon. To worsen matters, the nation transfers a large portion of its hydrocarbon production to other nations as part of special arrangements that generate minimal cash proceeds. For example, Venezuela sends about 100,000 barrels of oil per day to Cuba in exchange for medical services for Venezuela’s poor. Cuba has even sold discounted heating oil to parts of the US in recent years as part of a public relations ploy–you may recall the television spots featuring Joseph Kennedy that advertised this program. Analysts from Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS) estimate that an astounding 43 percent of Venezuela’s total oil exports aren’t sold at market-based prices. Meanwhile, a fire at one of Venezuela’s largest refineries last year has increased the hydrocarbon-rich nation’s reliance on imported refined products. In fact, US gasoline exports to
Venezuela have jumped from zero in 2008 to 94,000 barrels per day at the end of 2012.Recent developments also suggest that
PDSVA is strapped for cash . Although the government’s nationalization of its oil resources has deterred foreign investment, PDSVA has relied on international oil-field services firms to help the nation exploit its vast resource base
. In a conference call to discuss Schlumberger’s (NYSE: SLB) fourth-quarter results, CEO Paal Kibsgaard noted that PDSVA had delayed payment on some of its bills:
In Venezuela, we have in recent years actively managed our activity levels relative to our receivables balance. During the fourth quarter we saw a significant slowdown in the rates of payment, and we are currently working closely with our customer to resolve the situation. Massive government spending on social programs and yet another currency devaluation–the seventh since Chavez took office–have pushed the inflation rate in Venezuela to 22.8 percent. Meanwhile, mandated price controls on basic goods have resulted in widespread shortages of food and other household necessities. The government has attributed these problems to hoarding by the wealthy and large companies, backing up these claims by televising raids of well-stocked warehouses. These inflammatory actions are unlikely to encourage suppliers to keep the nation stocked with basic goods. Ever since Hugo Chavez announced that doctors had discovered a baseball-sized tumor in his pelvic region, investors have been bullish on
Venezuelan sovereign debt that’s denominated in US dollars. This rally reflects a belief that Chavez’s death would hasten a return to marketfriendly policies that would encourage foreign investment in Venezuela’s floundering energy industry. Over the long run, this investment thesis should pan out. Although Maduro will likely coast in the upcoming presidential election, the country can’t afford to continue Chavez’s magnanimous social programs because PDSVA flagging hydrocarbon output can no longer support these expenditures. However, the national oil company can’t restore production growth overnight; reversing years of neglect will require
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Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative significant foreign investment in exploration and development. The idea that an upsurge in Venezuelan hydrocarbon production in the aftermath of Chavez’s death will depress global oil prices in the near term betrays a lack of familiarity with the recent history of the country’s oil industry
. A more likely outcome:
Murado will continue Chavismo until the situation truly becomes untenable and the requisite foreign investment revitalizes Venezuela’s neglected oil fields
.
Ladislaw and Verrastro 3-6 -13 [Sarah O. Ladislaw, co-Director and senior fellow, Energy and National
Security Program, and Frank A. Verrastro, senior vice president and James R. Schlesinger Chair for
Energy & Geopolitics, CSIS, “Post-Chavez Venezuelan Oil Production,” http://diplomatmagazine.co.uk/local-news/751-post-chavez-venezuelan-oil-production.html]
The winds of change are once again blowing in Venezuela. The recent announcement of Hugo Chavez’s passing has opened up a host of questions about the future leadership of Venezuela and the potential impact this leadership transition could have on Venezuelan oil production and global oil markets.
¶ Venezuela is one of the largest oil and natural gas resource holders in the world. It is among the world’s largest oil producers (13th) and exporters (10th) and has historically been one of the United States’ largest sources of oil imports (4th behind Canada, Saudi
Arabia and Mexico). Ever since the failed coup and the subsequent strike that brought about a short collapse in oil production in 2002, followed by nationalization of the oil sector, onlookers have been waiting for indications that the regime’s approach to energy production would either fail once and for all or that some political change would bring about reform and rejuvenation of the energy sector. A political transition in Venezuela is now upon us but how it evolves could mean a lot for the energy sector and global energy markets.
¶ Despite its enormous oil resources,
Venezuela's oil production (regardless of whose figures you use) has long been in steady decline. In 2011 liquids production was 2.47 million barrels per day (mmbd) , down a million barrels per day since 1999. Some of this is reflects the changing cost and economics of Venezuelan oil production but field decline is significant and expertise and reinvestment are questionable and looking harder to come by. The internal technical and managerial capabilities of state run oil and gas company PDVSA have deteriorated since the 2002 strike and aftermath. Increasingly,
PDVSA relies on contractors, as well as other private company partners, to keep the fields in production but reports state that contractors have not been paid in months and that the political uncertainty in the country has even driven routine decision making to a halt
.
¶ The sustained political uncertainty has also slowed investment; Russian and Indian companies were planning to invest in Venezuela's oil fields but so far have withheld incremental new money. China has not announced a new line of credit
or extensions on its development-linked financing since last April.
¶ At the same time that production is dropping
, highly subsidized domestic consumption of oil is increasing while revenue from exports is also declining
. The United States remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil exports at 950,000 barrels per day in 2011, roughly 40 per cent, plus another 185,000 barrels per day from the Caribbean that was Venezuelan sourced but those volumes area down as U.S. demand has declined and other crudes have become available. Venezuela's next largest export destinations are the Caribbean (31 per cent) and then China (around 10 per cent). Venezuela sells to many of its Caribbean neighbours at below market rates due to extremely preferential financing relationships, including additional heavy subsidies for Cuban exports. All of this culminates in an outlook for continued decline in oil production and a worsening economic outlook for Venezuela during a politically difficult time.
¶
However, conventional wisdom argues that maintaining oil production is in the interest of any regime. Revenue from oil production is such a large part of Venezuela’s government balance sheet that no leadership could survive for long without a sustained cash flow that oil exports bring.
The converse of this argument is that revenues generated by the energy sector are such an important source of power and influence in Venezuela that there is potential for infighting over control of the sector. Moreover, the potential for strikes or instability among groups involved in the sector (some of whom have not been paid) could have additional negative impacts on production.
¶
While oil markets have so far taken the news of Chavez’s demise in stride
(many claim because the news was largely expected, others because the political outcome is still so uncertain) an actual disruption in Venezuelan production could add pressure to an already difficult market outlook
. The last year has produced a number of supply disruptions around the world from OPEC, the Middle East
North Africa region, as well as non-OPEC sources. If the economic outlook continues to improve and yield an increase global energy demand, if
Iran sanctions remain in place, and if Venezuelan production be compromised, then oil prices would experience much more significant upside
pressure from any new disruptions
.
¶ Even under the best of circumstances, reform in the energy sector will take a long time to emerge. The damage that has been done to not only PDVSA but to the institutions of the state and civil society could take years to rehabilitate. A few key reasons for this include: ¶ 1) revenue from the oil and gas sector that is diverted for political purposes and not reinvested in a way that will drive new production will be hard to direct back to useful investment in the sector, ¶ 2) much of the private sector has been driven away from investment in Venezuela and may be reluctant to return
, or for the companies in country to re-invest in the short-term given their experience in the 2000s, ¶ 3) oil field mismanagement and damage may have likely occurred over the last decade and it will take time and investment to revitalize, ¶ 4) many of Venezuela’s core assets are in technologically complex and capital-intensive heavy oil projects that take time and resources to develop and must now be viewed in light of the global array of upstream options that are now on the table for international oil investors as compared to a decade ago, ¶ 5) some of Venezuela’s current commercial relationships on the upstream or export side may have to be revisited in light of a more commercially-based hydrocarbon policy, ¶ 6)
Venezuela’s energy sector is dominated by the state’s decisions and management and it will take time to replace the managerial competency that
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Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative once existed, ¶ 7) highly subsidized oil is a key feature of Venezuelan society and the political will to reform the entire energy sector into one that is more market-based and open to private investment will necessarily have to feed into the domestic demand-side of that equation.
¶ What about
Venezuela’s relationship with the United States? Over the last ten years the sustained trading relationship between the
U nited
S tates and Venezuela has been one of the stabilizing forces in an otherwise contentious and sometimes volatile relationship
. U.S. refineries in the Gulf Coast are specifically designed to process Venezuela’s sour and medium to heavy crude and serves as its natural market. Despite oil production being down, the United States still imports just under a million barrels of crude per day from Venezuela (down from a peak of 1.4 mmbd in 1997) and, as stated earlier, the government of Venezuela is highly dependent on those revenues for their ongoing stability, especially as revenue from other exports and domestic consumption decline. As we look ahead to another period of transition in Venezuela it is important to be mindful of the potential for disruption
and to look for ways to mitigate the impacts of such disruption, but it is equally important to remember the trade ties that bind the two countries for the time being and to find opportunities to drive change in a positive direction
.
¶
Time may be limited in this regard because the U.S. domestic production outlook is changing thanks to tight oil development in the U nited
S tates and the influx of Canadian oil sands
, both of which are giving U.S. refiners more options in terms of the crudes they use and more decisions to make about how they want to configure their refineries going forward.
A future in which Venezuela is no longer as competitive in its natural market in the United States would change the outlook for Venezuelan crude marketing decisions
.
Erwin ’12 [Sandra, editor of National Defense Magazine, “30% Cut in U.S. Oil Imports Would Avert
Future Catastrophe, Study Warns,” 11-1-12, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=577]
Unless the United States curtails its consumption of petroleum, these military greybeards caution, any future crisis that disrupts oil supplies could hamstring the nation’s economy and cause global instability . “ We have seen oil shocks before … But at today’s level of U.S. consumption, a sustained disruption would be devastating
– crippling our very freedom of movement,” said retired Army Gen. Paul Kern, chairman of the military advisory board of CNA Corp., a government-funded think thank. In a report released Nov. 1, a group of 13 generals and admirals are calling for "immediate, swift and aggressive action" over the next decade to reduce U.S. oil consumption by 30 percent. Of nearly 88 million barrels of oil consumed worldwide every day, the United States eats up the biggest share, with 20 million barrels. Slightly more than half of the petroleum the United States consumes comes from foreign countries:
Two-thirds from the Middle East, and the rest from Canada and Mexico. “You could wake up tomorrow morning and hear that the Iranians sense an attack on their nuclear power plants and preemptively take steps to shut off the flow of oil in the Gulf,” retired Marine Corps Gen. James T.
Conway says in a CNA news release. “The U.S. would likely view this as a threat to our economy, and we would take action. And there we are, drawn into it.” Even a small interruption of daily oil supply can have huge ripple effects
, the study contends.
Even though just 2 percent of U.S. oil supplies come from Libya, the military campaign there this summer prompted the U.S. D epartment o f
E nergy to release 30 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve
.
A larger crisis could disrupt the entire fabric of the U.S. economy
, the CNA analysis concludes. If America reduces its current rate of oil consumption by 30 percent and diversifies its fuel sources, the study says, the U.S. economy would be relatively insulated from such upheaval, even in the event of a complete shutdown of a strategic chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz, the international passageway for 33 percent of the world’s seaborne oil shipments. The report, titled, “Ensuring America's Freedom of Movement: A National
Security Imperative to Reduce U.S. Oil Dependence,” was sponsored by the San Francisco-based Energy Foundation, a partnership of major donors interested in solving the world's energy problems.
CNA analyzed the potential economic impact of a future oil disruption
. Under a worst-case scenario 30-day closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the analysis finds that the U.S. would lose
nearly
$75 billion in GDP
. By cutting current levels of U.S. oil dependence by 30 percent, the impact would be nearly zero.
Royal ‘10
(Director of CTR Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration,
Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed.
Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the
global economy are associated with the
rise and fall of a
pre-eminent power and
the often bloody transition
from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher
in a redistribution of
relative power
(see also Gilpin.
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Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing
the risk of miscalculation
(Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power
(Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and
Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal
conflict and external conflict
, particularly during periods of
economic downturn
. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate
external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect
. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and
use of force are
at least indirectly correlated
. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and
Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
Helios Global 4-29 -13 [Research organization based in Washington, DC, “Change in Venezuela Yields
Political and Economic Uncertainty,” http://www.heliosglobalinc.com/world-trends-watch/?p=152 ]
Nicholas Maduro’s narrow electoral triumph over opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski in Venezuela’s April 14 elections to serve out the remainder of the late president Hugo Chavez’s current presidential term signifies a turning point in Venezuelan politics. Maduro’s victory has also reverberated beyond Venezuela’s borders. Due to its role as a major source of oil
, the course of political events in
Venezuela also
has important implications for the world economy
. The death of Hugo Chavez has also raised concerns about the prospects of social, political, and economic stability in Venezuela. The victory of Chavez’s heir apparent – Chavez and his supporters went to great lengths to ensure the survival of the Bolivarian Revolution launched by Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (known by its
Spanish acronym PSUV) – in a politically charged and polarized climate has already resulted in unrest and violence between Maduro’s supporters and his opponents. Venezuela’s increasingly dire economic predicament has further exacerbated tensions across the country.
¶ Despite a contentious bilateral relationship, Venezuela remains the fourth-largest supplier of imported oil to the United States. Given the peculiarities of its oil, namely, the category of relatively low quality heavy crude oil that represents the bulk of its oil capacity, Venezuela relies heavily on U.S. refineries located in the Gulf of Mexico that were designed to refine oil from Venezuela (and Mexico). Roughly forty-percent of Venezuela’s oil exports are delivered to the United States. Consequently, the United States is Venezuela’s top trade partner. This is the case even as U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil have steadily declined in recent years. In 1997, the United States imported about 1.7 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) from
Venezuela. In contrast, only about 1 million bpd of Venezuelan oil makes its way to the United States today. Venezuela also boasts major natural gas reserves, possibly the second-largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere. At the same time,
Venezuela’s oil production capacity continues to deteriorate due to
mismanagement, corruption, and antiquated infrastructure
.
¶ With its emphasis on
South-South cooperation, Latin American integration, and opposition to what it refers to as U.S. imperialism, Venezuela’s foreign policy has largely reflected its Bolivarian Revolutionary principles. Even as it has continued to serve as a major source of crude oil to the United States,
Venezuela has also devoted significant diplomatic and economic resources toward checking U.S. influence in the Americas. Initiatives such as its
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA) have served to expand Venezuela’s influence across the region.
This support has come in the form of diplomatic and, especially, economic assistance to governments led by leftist political parties and movements that are often enmeshed in their own disputes with the United States, including Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Venezuela has also supported a number of militant groups in the region, most notably, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym FARC) in neighboring Colombia. Venezuela has also engaged closely with other left-leaning governments across the region, including
Brazil, a rising regional and geopolitical power in its own right that is slowly emerging as a challenger to the United States.
¶ ¶ Outlook ¶ Chavez’s appointment of Nicolas Maduro, a trusted loyalist, as Vice President was emblematic of efforts by the incumbent regime to ensure ideological and political continuity in any post-Chavez scenario. At the same time, despite its popularity among a sizable segment of the Venezuelan populace, it is unclear whether the PSUV will be able to retain its dominant role in Venezuelan politics without Chavez in the long-term.
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Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Maduro’s narrow victory in this month’s elections – Maduro is reported to have defeated his opponent by less than 2 percent of the total vote – reflects a shift in Venezuelan public sentiment.
¶ The removal of Chavez from the political equation will also have an important geopolitical impact that will be felt beyond Venezuela’s borders. Venezuela remains an important supplier of discounted oil for its regional partners and a source of other vital economic support . On the surface, Maduro’s decision to travel to Cuba for his first foreign trip in late April reflects his determination to continue the populist and activist foreign policy forged by his late predecessor.
Venezuelan largesse in the form of discounted oil and other benefits has helped sustain Cuba’s Communist Party. Yet it appears that Maduro is operating under a weaker popular mandate. This raises important questions about his ability to maintain his late predecessor’s approach to foreign affairs, especially given the presence of an increasingly organized and emboldened opposition.
¶ ¶ Risks ¶ Operating under a weaker popular mandate and in a politically charged and polarized climate raises the specter of widespread disturbances in Venezuela. Capriles announced on
April 25 that his movement plans to boycott an official audit of the election results due to concerns relating to voter registration irregularities. He has also called for a new presidential vote. Capriles and his supporters seem determined to step up pressure on the fledgling Maduro presidency.
¶
Countries that depend on Venezuelan largesse to support their economies through the receipt of subsidized oil and preferential trade access to the Venezuelan market, including Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Bolivia, among others, stand to lose a great deal should Maduro choose to shift Venezuelan foreign policy , however slightly, from the Bolivarian Revolutionary ideals enshrined during Chavez’s rule. Having to contend with their own economic troubles, the loss of subsidized oil or other benefits provided by Venezuela
, for example, can destabilize fragile polities, impoverishing millions in the process. This raises the potential of social, political, and economic instability throughout the region
.
¶ ¶ Opportunities ¶ Despite his declared commitment to toe his predecessor’s ideological line, the gravity of the economic problems affecting Venezuela may force Maduro to depart from some of
Chavez’s policies, especially those governing foreign direct investment (
FDI
) in Venezuela. Maduro may elect to liberalize certain sectors of the Venezuelan economy
and institute other economic reforms in a possible bid to cater to his more moderate opponents, undercutting segments of the opposition and bolstering his own credentials in the process.
Rochlin ‘94 [James Francis, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan U. College, Discovering the
Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America , 130-131]
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important.
Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas.
Perceptions of declining U.S. influence
in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring
in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worstcase scenario, instability created by a regional war
, beginning in Central America and spreading
elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy
Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena
– a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee
Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war
. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
McKenna 4-28 -13 [Barrie, National Business Correspondent for The Globe and Mail, two-time finalist for Canada's National Newspaper Award, “The secret threat to Canada’s oil sands,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/the-secret-threat-to-canadas-oilsands/article11597201/ ]
The bottom line is that
Canada and Venezuela produce the same kind of heavy crude that’s now sought by reengineered U.S. petroleum refineries
along the Gulf of Mexico. So does Mexico.
¶
In recent years, Canada has been winning the competitive battle to feed those refineries. Alberta oil has steadily displaced
Mexican and
Venezuelan crude in the U.S. market
.
¶ But there is no certainty that shift will continue. Indeed, Venezuela and Mexico are showing tentative signs of getting their energy act together.
¶ Canada has benefited from the ineptitude of its energy producing rivals in the hemisphere.
The state-run oil industries in Venezuela
and Mexico are hobbled by inefficiencies, poor tech nology and underinvestment in exploration
. In spite of vast reserves, the two countries are producing less oil now than they did five years ago.
U.S.
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Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative imports of Venezuelan crude
, for example, have dropped to less than a million barrels a day
from 1.7 million barrels a day in 1997. Oil imports from Mexico have shrunk nearly 30 cent since 2006.
¶ New drilling technology and foreign investment cash could change all that.
¶
An often overlooked risk for Canada’s oil patch is the possibility that both these underperforming competitors could start ramping up production and exports again.
That would exacerbate the already-significant price discount on Canadian crude in the U.S. market
. It would also ratchet up pressure on
Canadian producers to access alternative markets in China and India via pipelines to the West Coast.
¶ Politics and economics have held back
Venezuela and Mexico. But the landscape in both countries is shifting.
¶ Hugo Chavez was an unexpected gift to the oil sands. Now that he’s gone, Venezuela has a much greater chance of shedding its image as an unstable and inefficient supplier of oil to the U.S.
¶
Venezuela has proven oil reserves of 211 billion barrels, eclipsing Canada ’s 175 billion barrels, according to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration.
¶ And in Mexico, newly installed President Enrique Pena Nieto is vowing to reform the country’s troubled oil industry and attract private investment, particularly to help develop deep offshore and shale reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. Mexico has nearly 11 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, but roughly twice that including potential unconventional and deepwater sources.
¶ Mexico is unlikely to privatize Petroleos
Mexicanos – the state-owned oil company known as Pemex. But Finance Minister Luis Videgaray acknowledged recently that Mexico can’t do everything itself and there might be opportunities for private investors in unconventional oil and gas projects where “Pemex clearly doesn’t have either the capital or the expertise.” ¶
Venezuela and Mexico have a long way to go to right their energy industries, and some tough political decisions to make.
¶
But if
, and when, they do, Canada could be the biggest loser. More Venezuelan
and
Mexican oil coming into the U.S. would likely lead to an even larger discount on oil sands crude, which is already hampered by high extraction costs and limited pipeline capacity
.
¶ The threat of new and more productive rivals underscores why projects such as the Keystone XL and Northern Gateway pipelines are so vital to Canada. The industry needs access to markets before there is a gusher of rival capacity in the neighbourhood – oil that’s free of the extraction, transportation and environmental challenges of the oil sands.
¶ Mr.
Oliver
denigrates unfriendly and unstable oil regimes.
¶ But he’s
probably quietly hoping that Venezuela remains an
unfriendly and unstable supplier
forever. It’s good for business.
Hansen ’12
[James, directs the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, “Game Over for the
Climate,” May 9, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html?_r=0 ]
GLOBAL warming isn’t a prediction. It is happening
. That is why I was so troubled to read a recent interview with President
Obama in Rolling Stone in which he said
that
Canada would
exploit the oil in its vast tar sands
reserves “regardless of what we do.” ¶
If
Canada proceeds
, and we do nothing, it will be game over for the climate
.
Canada’s tar sands
, deposits of sand saturated with bitumen, contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history
. If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era
, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now
. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk
.
¶ That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things will be bad enough
. Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable.
More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl.
California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels
.
If this sounds apocalyptic, it is
. This is why we need to reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground.
O’Neil 3-6 -13 [Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow of Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations, “New era for US-Venezuela relations?” http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/03/06/new-era-for-u-svenezuela-relations/ ]
8

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
With Chavez’s death, some have hoped for a change in the US-Venezuela relationship
. But just because
Chavez is gone it doesn’t mean the tensions in bilateral relations will ease
. The U.S. is too useful and tempting a foil for papering over internal disagreements in Chavez’s party and for rallying loyal supporters for the upcoming presidential election to expect any abrupt change. Heir apparent and now interim President Nicolas Maduro’s speech right before Chavez’s death shows this. In it he expelled two
U.S. diplomats and even accused the U.S. of causing Chavez’s cancer.
¶ But in the longer term, trade, commercial relations
and personal ties could shift U.S.-Venezuelan relations for the better. First and foremost are the economic ties between the two nations
. Despite the rhetorical animosity of the last decade, trade continued.
The U.S. remains the largest recipient of
Venezuelan oil —some 40 percent percent of Venezuelan oil exports
(and oil makes up over 90 percent of the country’s total exports). In turn, the U.S. has continued to send
machinery and cars, and even increased exports of natural gas and petroleum products
to the South American nation.
¶ The hard currency and goods are vital to the functioning of Venezuela’s economy
, government and society, and may become even more so through the anticipated tough economic times ahead
.
¶ Despite the increased government management of the economy through price controls and the nationalization of hundreds of private companies over the last decade, many well- and lesser-known U.S. companies still work in Venezuela, providing not just goods but ongoing links with the United States. In addition to these commercial links, the more than 200,000 Venezuelans living in the U.S. and the hundreds of thousands more that have ties through family, friends and colleagues, could also bring the two countries together.
¶ Finally, as subsequent
Venezuelan governments look to adjust their economic policies in the coming months and years, the experience of their neighbors provide incentives to forge a more amicable bilateral relationship.
Colombia, Brazil, Peru, along with other Latin American nations, have opened up to the U.S. and the world more broadly in recent years and in the process have benefited tremendously
.
¶ In the last set of hemispheric elections, a “third way” combining open markets, balanced fiscal accounts, and socially inclusive policies—most closely identified with former
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva—became an almost mantra for incumbent and opposition party candidates alike (including
Chavez’s 2012 rival, Henrique Capriles Radonski). These nations and leaders illustrate a real and positive path forward, not just economically but also diplomatically
.
¶ Today
Venezuela faces significant political uncertainty
, as Mr
Maduro works to unite the many factions within Chavez’s party. He does so without Chavez’s charisma nor the deep-seated loyalty he inspired.
The next administration also will confront growing economic and fiscal problems, making governing all the harder in the months to come. Still, in most of Latin America anti-U.S. rhetoric is fading, which suggests it can in Venezuela too
.
Fite ’12
[Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian
Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf
]
Iran’s closest relationship is with Venezuela
. Although both countries have very different ¶ guiding ideologies and political structures, they are bound by a common rejection of US
¶ leadership
in the international system and by their significant petroleum exports, signified by ¶ their dual membership in OPEC.
The State Department has determined Venezuela to be
“not
¶ cooperating fully U nited
S tates antiterrorism efforts” since 2006
. Distinct from the designation ¶ of “state sponsor of terrorism”, this classification nevertheless resulted in an US arms embargo,
¶ which was extended in May 201118 ¶ . In the past decade
Tehran and Caracas have engaged in a
¶ broad spectrum of commitments
ranging from mutual diplomatic support to military exchange. ¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has shown himself to be committed to Iranian sovereignty— ¶ supporting Iran’s nuclear program at the IAEA—and to Iran’s vision of an anti-Western coalition ¶ of developing states.
¶
As long as
Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez — or some successor
with a similar ideology and ¶ hostility to the US— continues to define his role as one of opposition to the US, Washington has little hope of bettering its political position with Caracas or diminishing Iran’s close affiliation
. ¶ That being said, US-Venezuelan commercial ties are strong and provide links between both ¶ countries which help maintain an undercurrent of stability in the relationship. At present, the US ¶ need not be too concerned about this Iran-Venezuelan relationship, despite the threatening ¶ language used by both presidents. Mutual
US-Venezuelan energy dependence
mitigates the possibility of a more serious breach in relations
.
Berman ’12
[Ilan, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense, “Confronting Iran's Latin
9

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
American Ambitions,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2012/12/04/confronting-irans-latinamerican-ambitions/]
Over the past year, policymakers in Washington have woken up to a new threat to U.S. security. Since October of 2011, when law enforcement agencies foiled a plot by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the nation’s capital, U.S. officials have begun to pay attention in earnest to
Iran ’s growing activities and influence in the Western Hemisphere.
¶ What they have found has been deeply worrisome.
The Islamic Republic, it turns out, has made serious inroads into Latin America
since the mid-2000s, beginning with its vibrant strategic partnership with
the regime of
Venezuela n strongman Hugo Chavez. Today,
Iran enjoys warm diplomatic ties
not only to Venezuela
, but to similarly sympathetic governments in Bolivia and Ecuador as well. It has begun to exploit the region’s strategic resource wealth to fuel its nuclear program. And it is building an operational presence
in the region that poses a direct danger to U.S. security
.
¶ Exactly how significant this threat is represents the subject of a new study released in late
November by the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. That report, entitled A Line In The Sand, documents the sinister synergies that have been created in recent years between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and radical regional regimes and actors—from
Venezuela to Mexican drug cartels—on the other. Some of these contacts, the study notes, are financial in nature, as
Iran seeks to leverage Latin America’s permissive political and fiscal environments to skirt sanctions and continue to engage in international commerce amid tightening Western sanctions
. But these contacts could easily become operational as well. The report suggests that “the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack
Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation.” ¶ The U.S. response, meanwhile, is still nascent. To date, only one piece of Congressional legislation—the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012—has seriously taken up the issue of Iran’s penetration of the Americas, and the potentially adverse implications for U.S. security. Fortunately, the Act has found a receptive ear among many in Congress, and is now likely to pass the Senate with only minor modifications during the current lame duck session of Congress. Yet, in and of itself, the Act does not constitute a comprehensive strategy for competing with Iran in the Americas—or for diluting its influence there.
¶ To the contrary,
America’s strategic profile in
Latin America is now poised to constrict precipitously
. As a result of looming defense cuts, and with the specter of additional, and ruinous, “sequester” provisions on the horizon, the Pentagon is now actively planning a more modest global profile. To that end, back in May, General Douglas Fraser, the outgoing head of U.S. Southern Command, the combatant command responsible for the Americas, told lawmakers that it plans to retract to Central America and focus predominantly on the threats posed by the region’s rampant drug and arms trades.
In other words, the U nited
S tates is getting out of the business of competing for strategic influence in Latin
America
, and doing so at precisely the time that Iran is getting serious
about it.
¶
That could end up being
a costly mistake. As the findings of the Homeland Security Committee’s study indicate,
Iran’s presence south of the U.S. border represents more than a mere annoyance. It is
, rather, a potential front for Iranian action against the U nited
S tates—one that could well be activated if and when the current cold war between Iran and the West over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program heats up in earnest.
Washington
needs to be prepared should that happen.
¶ Better yet, it needs to craft a proactive approach to confronting
Iran influence and activity south of our border. That
, after all, is the surest way for us to avoid having to face
Iran and its proxies here at home
.
Kemp and Gay 3-23 -13 [Geoffrey Kemp and John Allen Gay are coauthors of War with Iran: Political,
Military, and Economic Consequences . Kemp is director of the regional security program at the Center for the National Interest and served on the National Security Council during the Reagan administration.
Gay is an assistant editor at The National Interest, “The High Cost of War with Iran,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-high-cost-war-iran-8265]
President Obama stated recently that Iran could develop a nuclear bomb in over a year. As negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program continue to drag on with little sign of a breakthrough, the odds increase that an armed conflict will eventually break out
. The chances are significant that the U nited
S tates would
either start or be sucked into
this war
. What would the consequences be? What are the alternatives? Our new book War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences [4] can serve as a guide to these questions.
¶ The
United States would make destroying Iran’s major nuclear facilities its primary aim, and it would likely be successful within hours of a conflict breaking out. Iran’s known nuclear sites are heavily defended or buried in the earth, but the U.S. arsenal contains aircraft that can penetrate the defenses and munitions that can penetrate the bunkers. Iran probably has other, smaller nuclear sites that are not known. If these are not identified and destroyed, they can serve as the building-blocks of a reconstructed nuclear program—or even enable an attempt at a rapid breakout. Still, there is little doubt that the United States could deal Iran’s nuclear program a massive setback.
¶ This will not be the only front of a war, however.
Iran’s leaders have threatened the West with retaliation too frequently and too publicly to simply ignore an attack. Iran has agents
and allies that may commit
acts of terrorism . Lebanese Hezbollah’s deadly bombing of a bus full of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria and the discovery of a similar plot in Cyprus are examples of this capability. And assassination plots against Israeli diplomats in India, Georgia, Thailand and Kenya, as well as the Saudi ambassador in Washington, show Iranian willingness to commit acts of terrorism as part of its strategy.
¶ Iran also has many small military speedboats, midget submarines and antiship missiles. It may use these to attack American vessels near its shores or to
10

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative disrupt the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. An oil blockade, if successful and sustained, would send shockwaves through the global economy, as roughly a fifth of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the strait.
¶ But Iran’s leaders know that such a severe step would risk a severe response, and it is unlikely that they’d be able to effectively seal Hormuz. Thus, they are more likely to launch a sustained campaign of pinprick harassment—a missile here, a few floating mines there, spread out over hours, days and weeks. When combined with actions by Iranian operatives in neighboring countries and possibly by Iran’s ballistic missile forces, this will create uncertainty for any attacker—too violent to be peace, but not fully war. This state of affairs will put Iran on a more level footing with the United States, and will challenge U.S. policy makers to come up with an appropriate response. A sustained entanglement may result.
¶ The economic impact of this kind of war would be negative. Regardless of how the conflict proceeds, there would be a significant spike in oil prices
; if the war is not swift and decisive, the spike could last
for weeks or months. The impact of this should not be underestimated, especially given the fragility of the global economic recovery
. A $10 increase in the price per barrel of oil would take a billion dollars from American consumers in about five days. War could see oil between $150 and $200 per barrel. High prices would harm most states, although oil exporters outside the Persian Gulf region, like Russia and Venezuela, could see a windfall.
¶ The economic fallout would drive much of the war’s negative political impact. Asian nations
, which are the recipients of much Gulf oil, would be particularly unhappy. Washington’s European allies also would be divided
at best.
Relations with
Russia and China would suffer most. Both states are alarmed by U.S. willingness to use force
to reshape the strategic environment, and a major conflict with Iran could see the two taking steps to
be an effective counterbalance
.
This could include helping Iran rebuild and rearm.
¶ The unprecedented international sanctions regime against Iran would likely fall apart in the wake of a war. Some would loosen sanctions out of frustration with the United States. Some might yield to public pressure over images of Iranian suffering. The war’s oil-price shocks may tempt others to improve relations with oil-producing Iran. The net effect would be a reduction in Iran’s isolation.
¶ A war thus has significant costs and dangers. Yet there is no guarantee that it would solve the Iranian nuclear threat. Iran can always rebuild its nuclear facilities. Being attacked by a superpower might convince Tehran that nuclear weapons aren’t worth the price. Yet it might also reinforce the case for getting a nuclear deterrent to make future attacks less likely
. The strategic problem for the United States after the war would thus be the same as it was before: getting Iran to abandon the threatening elements of its nuclear program.
¶
The United States might not start the war. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been singularly determined to bring the Iran crisis to a swift resolution. The rest of the Israeli security establishment shares many of Netanyahu’s worries. If Israel strikes Iran on its own, and the United
States is drawn in, the U.S.-Israeli relationship will likely suffer. Polls already show fading sympathy for Israel on the American left; an unpopular war could fuel this trend.
¶ As counterintuitive as it may seem, Iran could also start the war. Certain hardline cliques within Iran are willing to engage in provocative actions. If a terror plot like that against the Saudi ambassador to the United States were to succeed, it would likely be seen as a casus belli. Further, Iran’s economic isolation is a source of tension that it could seek to alleviate by provoking instability.
¶
Needless to say, inaction has its own costs. There is not yet any indication that Iran has chosen to build a bomb, but as its nuclear program steadily advances, detecting and stopping a rush to weaponize will become more difficult
.
¶
An Iran with a nuclear weapon will be better-equipped to resist the efforts of the U nited
S tates and
its allies
in the Middle East. There will be fewer options if relations sour. Still, Iran isn’t likely to give atomic weapons to terrorists or launch sudden nuclear attacks—history suggests that even the most radical regimes that get the bomb, like Mao’s China, become very wary of using it. Iran’s leaders may sponsor terror, but they are not out to commit national suicide by provoking nuclear retaliation against their country.
¶ Perhaps the biggest concern with an
Iranian bomb is that it will end the nuclear nonproliferation regime and provoke a cascade of proliferation
, not only in the Middle East but in South and East Asia, including South Korea and Japan. This would be a significant setback for the United States, which has long made nonproliferation a center of its foreign policy.
The risk of a nuclear conflict would increase
.
Monroe 9-12 -12 [Robert, vice admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Nonproliferation requires enforcement,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-nonproliferation-requires-enforcement]
Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world
. For twenty years two irresponsible and belligerent rogue states have been working intensely to develop nuclear weapons production capabilities. The world has protested and wrung its hands. North Korea has now tested primitive weapons, and Iran is close to producing them. When North Korea succeeds in weaponizing its designs, it will sell them to anyone desiring to buy – including terrorists. Neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan will be forced to go nuclear in self-protection.
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons – and its likely willingness to give them to proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela
, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, rush to protect themselves.
With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos, a return from which appears impossible
.
11

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Ayson ‘10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic
Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack
, and especially
an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more
of the states
that possess them.
In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
between the superpowers started by third parties
. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be
definitely ruled out
in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular
, if the act of nuclear terrorism
occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China
, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to
? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
Washington’s early response
to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might
also raise the possibility of an unwanted
(and nuclear aided) confrontation
with Russia and/or
China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s
armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert
. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force
(and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might
grow
, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One farfetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or
China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither
“for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability
12

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Ross ’98 [Douglas, professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canada’s functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, Winter 1998/1999, lexis]
Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat.
Future
American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone
. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone.
Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the U nited
S tates and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD
.
Fillingham 3-10 -13 [Zachary, Managing Editor and Asia Analyst for Geopolitical Monitor, holds an MA in Chinese Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, England and a BA in
International Relations from York University in Toronto, Canada, has studied extensively in China,
“Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/postchavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/ ]
And by all indications,
Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out
for very long
. The country is currently running a deficit of over 20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent. Though it presides over one of the world’s largest oil reserves and is a card-carrying member of OPEC,
Venezuela’s oil yields have been dropping
throughout the Chavez era due to a lack of foreign investment . The same is true of Venezuela’s food industry. A lack of foreign investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavez’s economic policy was a willful ignorance regarding the creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic growth beyond the era of direct government handouts.
Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces , challenges that will preclude the government’s ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad infinitum, a
Maduro government will inevitably be faced with an economic reckoning
of sorts. In the aftermath of this economic reckoning, there will be an opportunity for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and
American foreign policy to make inroads
. Just to recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politicoeconomic crisis that ushers in either a return to credible multi-party democracy or a descent into conspicuous authoritarianism.
¶ But how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations?
¶
Given its precarious economic situation, Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future
. And while some would say that China is best suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the
Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral rights over to foreign companies.
¶ In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese economic influence . Now that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but discredited, and countries like
13

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep US influence at arm’s length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible
. However, authorities in Washington will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in
Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of opportunity presents itself.
Hearn ’12 [Kelly, Washington Post, “Venezuelan oil a risky investment for China,” 3-13-12, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2858282/posts ]
China has poured billions of dollars into Venezuela’s oil sector to expand its claim over the country’s massive oil reserves.
¶
But Beijing is getting relatively little for its investments, and Chinese officials are increasingly frustrated
with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.
¶ [...] ¶ But Tom O’Donnell, an oil analyst who teaches at the New
School University and writes an oil-industry blog, the Global Barrel, said the payoffs of China’s loans amount to a “consolation prize.” ¶ He said
China’s goal is not to get oil for loans, but to have its own national oil companies contract for major oil-production projects in Venezuela’s
Orinoco Tar Sands, the largest single known petroleum reserve in the world, with 513 billion barrels of heavy crude oil.
¶ “The Chinese have not gotten the kind of preferential access they want [to the tar sands], and my sources tell me they are extremely unhappy,” said Mr. O’Donnell.
¶
“Apart from money, there seems to be little that China can offer Venezuela in the oil industry,” he said, adding that a “culture gap will make working with China very difficult for Venezuelan oil people, who were mostly trained in the U.S
.” ¶ Critics of the loans say Mr. Chavez is using the so-called “China fund” as his personal piggy bank.
¶ The
Chinese also seem to be increasingly wary.
Sanchez 3-4 -13 [Fabiola, Associated Press, “Outlook Grim in Venezuela's Essential Oil Industry,” http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/outlook-grim-venezuelas-essential-oil-industry-
19108842?singlePage=true#.UY67xKLktX8
]
The oil flowing from the El Palito refinery sells for more than five times what it cost when President Hugo Chavez took office in 1999. Yet when Chavez died in March he left Venezuela's cash cow, its state-run oil company, in such dire straits that analysts say $100-a-barrel oil may no longer be enough to keep the country afloat barring a complete overhaul of a deteriorating petroleum industry
.
¶
The situation is more urgent than ever
, analysts say. The price of crude has slumped in recent weeks and Chavez's heir, Nicolas
Maduro, appears to have done little to address declining production
, billions in debt and infrastructure deficiencies that have caused major accidents including a blaze that killed at least 42 people at Venezuela's largest refinery last year.
¶ Maduro has retained Chavez's oil minister and the head of state oil company Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A., Rafael Ramirez. And he appears intent on continuing to send cut-rate oil to members of the 18-nation Petrocaribe alliance, for which Venezuela is hosting a summit on Saturday.
¶ Ramirez said Friday that Maduro would use the meeting to propose creating a special economic zone for group members.
¶
PDVSA
, which accounts for 96 percent of the country's export earnings, no longer "generates enough income to cover all its costs and finance its commitments
," said Pedro Luis Rodriguez Sosa, an energy expert at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Administration in Caracas.
¶ He said that "you can see PDVSA is in trouble" at the $100-a-barrel level because of the many millions lost to gasoline subsidies and spending on domestic social spending and PDVSA's use as a "geopolitical tool" to maintain regional alliances.
¶
Venezuela has the world's largest oil reserves but PDVSA's production, earnings and income all appear to be on a downward slide
and its debts to suppliers rose 35 percent. Its debt to the Central Bank of Venezuela reached $26.19 billion last year, a nearly eight-fold increase in two years.
¶ The government makes no apologies. It says it is employing the country's most important natural resource for the good of the people and promises increased production and revenues in the immediate future.
¶
Ramirez said that PDVSA's efforts remained focused on developing the remote Orinoco belt, site of the world's biggest oil reserves, with the aid of oil firms from China, Russia, the U.S., Italy, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan and Spain. Venezuela hopes to lift overall production to some 3.32 million barrels a day, 200,000 more than last year.
¶ "
We're in a process of trying to attract investment in dollars other than ours
," Ramirez said, assuring reporters that PDVSA would work with private investors to not take on more debt to make new investment.
14

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
15

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Garibian 4-23 -13 [Pablo, Reuters, “Venezuela's Maduro sends conciliatory message to U.S.,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/23/us-venezela-usa-idUSBRE93M1J820130423 ]
Venezuelan President Nicolas
Maduro named a new acting head of its U.S. diplomatic mission in Washington on
Tuesday and sent an offer of dialogue after attacking the U nited
S tates for "interference" in a row over his election
.
¶ Disputes between Venezuela and the United States were common during Hugo Chavez's 14-year socialist rule of Venezuela, leaving both nations without ambassadors in each other's capitals.
¶ Maduro, who won an election this month to replace Chavez after his death from cancer, has wavered between reaching out to the U.S. government and condemning its policies in the same uncompromising terms as his predecessor.
¶ In an address on live on TV,
Maduro called for "respect" and "dialogue" while naming
Calixto
Ortega
, an ally and member of Venezuela's delegation to the Latin American parliament, to the post of charge d'affaires in Washington
.
¶
"We want to have the best ties with all the world's governments, and the U.S. government, but on the basis of respect. There can be no threats," said Maduro.
¶ Last week, Maduro blasted the United States for "brutal" and "vulgar" meddling in supporting opposition calls for a vote recount after the April 14 election.
¶ Maduro won the vote by less than 2 percent, leaving opposition leader Henrique Capriles fuming at what he said were thousands of irregularities that skewed the result.
¶ "As we don't have ambassadors, we have for a while been considering naming a new charge d'affaires to our embassy in Washington," Maduro said
.
¶ "I have decided to name Calixto Ortega so that dialogue with U.S. society may increase, with the universities, the academic world, the social and union world, the Afro-American community, the Latino community, Congress, senators, representatives, the economic, trade and energy sectors." ¶ Despite the years of diplomatic spats, oil has continued to flow north unabated.
¶ Venezuela, an OPEC member with the world's largest oil reserves, sends between 900,000 and one million barrels per day to the United States, its biggest export market.
¶ "
We hope one day to have respectful relations with the
U nited
S tates, a dialogue between equals, state-to-state," Maduro said.
"Sooner rather than later, the elites running the
United States will have to realize there is a new, independent, sovereign and dignified Latin America."
Eckert 4-17 -13 [Paul, Reuters, “U.S. holds back recognition for Venezuela's Maduro,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/us-venezuela-usa-kerry-idUSBRE93G0MJ20130417 ]
Maduro
, who accused the United States of giving Chavez the cancer that killed him, echoed his mentor's anti-U.S. rhetoric on the campaign trail and has accused the Obama administration of orchestrating and funding the post-election protests.
¶ But in a hint of change, Bill
Richardson, the former governor of New Mexico, who was in Caracas with the OAS, told The New York Times Maduro had told him he wanted to "regularize the relationship." ¶ Earlier this week, the White House said
Washington wanted to have dialogue with Caracas on issues including
counternarcotics, counterterrorism and the commercial relations
.
¶ Cooperation on these areas suffered during the long tenure of Chavez, who taunted the United States at the United Nations and forged close ties with U.S. foes Cuba, Iran and Syria and with leftist guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.
¶ Ted
Piccone
, deputy director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, said inflation, scarcity of food and other basic goods, corruption and flagging investment could drive Maduro eventually to turn to the U nited
S tates. "
He needs to turn around the really bad economic situation there and can use some help from the
U.S. on that
," said Piccone.
Roberts and Daga 4-15 -13 [James M. Roberts is Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth in the Center for International Trade and Economics and Sergio Daga is Visiting Senior Policy Analyst for
Economic Freedom in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, “Venezuela: U.S. Should Push
President Maduro Toward Economic Freedom,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/venezuela-us-should-push-president-maduro-towardeconomic-freedom ]
Hugo Chavez’s hand-picked successor, former trade union boss Nicolás Maduro, appears to have defeated Governor Henrique Capriles by a narrow margin in a contentious and hard-fought special election on April 14.
Venezuela is in such shambles after 14 years of seat-of-the-pants mismanagement that Maduro —assuming his victory is confirmed— may ultimately be forced to pursue
16

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative more moderate policies and seek help from the U.S. to restore stability
.
¶ The
Obama
Administration and Congress should exploit this opening
by using U.S. leverage to push Venezuela to turn from Chavez’s failed experiment in oil-cursed[1] “21stcentury socialism” toward economic freedom.
Farzad 3-14 -13 [Roben, Businessweek, “After Chávez, What Happens to Venezuela's Oil?” http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-14/after-ch-vez-what-happens-to-venezuelas-oil ]
Investors have been cart-before-horse stoked about Venezuela , and with good reason. There’s lots of upside in an economy that arguably has the world’s largest proven oil reserves and yet has stagnated in the past 14 years. What’s now top-of-mind is how the successor to late president Hugo Chávez stewards state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela SA, whose strategy seems to be to rust while hoping energy prices remain high. Throw in a restive nation of 30 million and a welter of costly social bennies, and this caballero faces tough decisions.
¶
Venezuela is one of the more peculiar players in the Mideast-heavy Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Though it’s OPEC’s fourthbiggest producer, Venezuela has let its output fall by more than a fifth since Chávez came to power, leaving hundreds of billions in revenue on the table during a lengthy period of high crude prices. As promised, the charismatic leader plowed PDVSA’s profits into social welfare projects while starving the enterprise of investment in exploration and production.
¶ The tab left by such profligacy is steep. Morgan Stanley (MS) estimates that 43 percent of 2011 production at debt-laden PDVSA wasn’t even paid for in cash. Per Chávez’s wishes, a good deal of fuel was shipped off on below-market terms to such places as Cuba and Nicaragua (and Boston, even). Making matters worse,
Venezuelan engineers and rig roughnecks have bolted the country in favor of bigger salaries and tamer inflation abroad
.
¶ Venezuela’s 2011 crude production was comparable to what it was churning out in the 1980s, according to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration.
Its investment
in exploration and production may continue that decline if social spending underwritten by PDVSA continues apace
, says the International Energy Agency—a likely outcome if Chávez’s preferred successor, Nicolás Maduro, gets elected.
¶ But, says Kathryn Rooney Vera of Bulltick Capital Markets, “ any change in leadership
, whoever stays in power, will have to be more pragmatic about oil in order to stay in power. He’ll have to
increase revenue, which means open ing up PDVSA to more private investment and joint ventures
. That, or cutting social spending.
It’s the lesser of two evils.”
17

Earliest Bird ’13
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Clarke 3-25 -13 [Kevin, MA in International Studies from DePaul University in Chicago, senior editor for
U.S. Catholic Magazine, “Chavez Death Brings New Chance For U.S.-Venezuela Engagement,” http://americamagazine.org/issue/chavez-death-brings-new-chance-us-venezuela-engagement ]
The passing of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela unleashed an epic outpouring of grief among his supporters in Venezuela, the likes of which may only be eventually paralleled with the passing of another larger-than-life figure in Latin American socialism, Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Matthew
Carnes, S.J., assistant professor of government at Georgetown University, said Chávez will be remembered as a leader who had an “outsized impact in Venezuelan politics.”
¶ Father Carnes said
Chávez’s passing offers an opportunity for the U nited
S tates, politically and economically, to revive its relationship with Venezuela.
Occasionally “capricious and doctrinaire,” Chávez was “someone the
United States had a hard time negotiating with,” according to Father Carnes.
¶ Whether his designated political heir, Vice President Nicholas
Maduro, or an opposition candidate, most likely Henrique Capriles Radonski, governor of the Venezuelan state of Miranda, is elected to replace
Chávez, Father Carnes expects a more pragmatic and less confrontational leadership to emerge. That could mean improved ties not just with Venezuela but throughout the region
, he said, and a possible opening for renewed U.S. investment and partnership with the Venezuelan state oil industry . Despite Chávez’s notorious distaste for U.S. political leaders, under his leadership Venezuela remained one of the largest suppliers of oil to the United States. This is likely to continue.
Gjelten 4-11 -13 [Tom, Peabody Award-winning journalist for NPR, has over two decades of experience in political investigative reporting, “Venezuela's Next Leader Faces Tough Choice On Oil Program,” http://www.npr.org/2013/04/11/176843567/venezuela-s-next-leader-faces-tough-choice-on-oil-program]
Oil production in Venezuela declined sharply
under the Chavez administration, however, largely due to inadequate investment in
the energy infrastructure
, inefficiencies in oil industry management, and the replacement of skilled oil technicians and managers with political loyalists.
¶ PetroCaribe Initiative ¶
The drop in oil production
— more than 7 percent just in the first quarter of
2013 — is severe enough to call into question whether the Chavista oil welfare programs can be sustained.
For the Caribbean and Latin American countries that have been benefiting from the PetroCaribe program, it is a time of great anxiety
.
¶ Chavez saw the energy alliance as a way to free the member states from U.S. energy imperialism.
¶
"There's no one who can slow our ever-faster march toward our great historical goals," he said, defining PetroCaribe as "energy unity." ¶ For poor countries, the PetroCaribe deal was irresistible. Typically, they had to pay cash for only half the oil they received. The rest they got on credit, financed over 25 years at 1 percent. Among those who eagerly signed up for the program was Haiti.
¶ "Any country that would benefit from such a credit would take advantage of it," says René Jean-Jumeau, Haiti's minister of energy. "There's not even a need to justify this. Haiti is a struggling economy, and this is a great advantage for us. We consider it extremely important
." ¶ In the
Dominican Republic, PetroCaribe was key to the country's 2008-2009 financial stabilization program. "By allowing us to defer the oil payments, it was a big, big thing for the government," says Juan Carlos Russo of the Pontificia Universidad Católica in Santo Domingo.
¶ To be sure, there were strings attached: Chavez wanted the PetroCaribe countries to support his ideological crusade against the U.S. Some did so enthusiastically.
Others largely ignored the Chavista rhetoric.
¶ "A lot of these countries looked at this thing in a practical manner," says Jeremy Martin, director of the energy program for the Institute of the Americas at the University of California, San Diego. "They were able to stomach the ideology as long as they could get such a wonderful financial deal." ¶
For countries such as Haiti, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, the cheap oil from Venezuela could not have come at a better time, with energy prices rising and the world economy in crisis.
¶
"Most of these countries have no domestic supplies of oil
and gas," Martin notes. "If they do, it's minimal. These are energy-starved countries. And so they became absolutely addicted [to the PetroCaribe program]."
¶ What Does Venezuela Get?
¶ But whether the deal is good for Venezuela is another question.
¶ "In my economic mind, I would say, 'Why are they willing to sacrifice this much?' " says Russo. The Dominican Republic is repaying its oil debt to Venezuela partly in string beans.
¶ Jorge Piñon, who previously worked in Latin America for the Amoco and Shell companies, notes that all the oil that Venezuela provides on easy credit terms to other countries could have been sold for cash on the global market.
¶ "To Venezuela, from a cash-flow point of view, this represents close to $5 billion a year of revenue that they're missing," Piñon says.
¶ The state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. also donated oil to low-income families in the United States. There were the oil subsidies for Cuba. Plus, there's all the oil that goes for cheap gasoline for Venezuelan drivers.
¶ "In reality, PDVSA makes money from only a small proportion of the oil it produces," says independent energy economist Roger Tissot, who specializes in the Latin American energy market. "Now, can that continue? I don't think so." ¶
Venezuela's problem is that its oil production is declining
, in part because of the lack of reinvestment
and the politicization of
PDVSA operations under the Chavez government. Unless oil prices move sharply higher, the country will face a significant loss of oil revenue.
18

Earliest Bird ’13
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Palacios 4-8 -13 [Luisa Palacios, Head of Latin America Macro and Energy Research, Medley Global
Advisors, “Viewpoints: What Will the Top Challenge Be for the Next Venezuelan Administration?” http://www.as-coa.org/articles/viewpoints-what-will-top-challenge-be-next-venezuelan-administration ]
Venezuela could be facing a much less constructive oil price environment
and this will bring significant challenges for the next president. Given the country’s export and fiscal dependence on oil revenues, the outlook for the oil sector is key to assess
Venezuela’s creditworthiness in the future. And what is required of the next president is a dramatic change in energy policy.
¶ Since 2007 oil exports have fallen by more than 300,000 barrels per day
(b/d) due to a decrease in oil production, an increase in domestic consumption, and declines in refinery output due to lack of maintenance
. If imports are added, the decline in net oil exports has been of the order of 400,000b/d in the past 5 years, and this according to the own numbers of the state oil company, PDVSA. Venezuela is currently a net importer of gasoline, and these imports significantly increased last year with the explosion in the
Amuay refinery in August that has yet to return to pre-crisis levels. This forced Venezuela to import more than 100,000b/d of gasoline in Q4 from the US alone.
¶
A significant improvement in PDVSA’s cash flow situation is required. Some of the recent changes in foreign exchange policy are a step in the right direction, but insufficient. PDVSA needs to refocus itself on its core business of producing oil and allow much more participation by international oil companies in conventional crude production to arrest declines
. An important revision of oil pricing policy will be needed as Venezuela currently realizes international oil prices on less than 60 percent of its oil production. This is because it sells oil products in domestic markets at unbelievably highly subsidized prices, it sells oil to Cuba and other Latin American countries with no immediate cash compensation, and it sells oil to China to pay for debt service at discounted prices.
¶ An opposition government will be more willing and capable to push the necessary policy changes. But despite its ideological rhetoric, even a chavista government will be forced to deal with these challenges
.
Alic 4-21 -13 [Jen, geopolitical analyst, co-founder of ISA Intel in Sarajevo and the former editor-in-chief of ISN Security Watch in Zurich, “Foreign oil and gas companies look to status quo in Venezuela,” http://www.mining.com/web/foreign-oil-and-gas-companies-look-to-status-quo-in-venezuela/]
Now that Nicolas Maduro—the late Hugo Chavez’s choice for successor—has narrowly won Sunday’s presidential elections in Venezuela, oil and gas investors can expect a perpetuation of the status quo
.
¶ In Sunday’s vote, Maduro won with a very narrow 50.7% and a vow to continue with Chavez’s “revolution,” which has seen the oil industry nationalized and the state-run PDVSA oil company funding social programs and voraciously courting China and Russia.
¶ The narrow vote will not be without its challenges. Opposition rival candidate
Henrique Capriles has refused to recognize the results and is demanding a recount, though the electoral commission is standing firm on Maduro’s victory.
¶ For foreign oil and gas companies, we can expect more of the same.
There are no regulatory changes in the works
, and an unattractive windfall tax system announced in January will likely be pushed forward under Maduro.
¶ What Maduro is inheriting, though, is a nightmare situation that will see him stuck between using PDVSA to fund expensive social programs that cost it $44 billion last year alone diverted from oil revenues, and cutting social spending or allowing a rise in the price of fuel that could spark regime-threatening unrest.
¶ If
Maduro feels compelled to reduce fuel subsidies, it could lead to riots as cheap fuel—which cannot be sustained—is one of the most crucial social benefits for Venezuelans, who pay around 6 cents per gallon.
¶ Maduro has inherited a “sinking ship” and does not appear to have the political capital to make any short-term changes in Venezuela’s energy policy, experts at Southern Pulse told Oilprice.com.
¶ “
The main energy issue for Venezuela is that oil production is struggling
, down from a peak of about 3.2 million barrels per day in
1998 to less than 2.8 million bpd now.
One would hope that fixing infrastructure, completing refinery repairs and construction, and investing in exploration and new tech nology would be priorities but Maduro will not have funds to invest
unless he makes controversial cuts to social programs,” according to Southern Pulse, which does not believe that Maduro will attempt to cut fuel subsidies any time soon.
¶ A top priority for Maduro will be boosting refining capacity, says Southern Pulse. Towards this end, Maduro may be willing to negotiate if a partner steps forward to build a new refinery, which is a goal Chavez failed to realize.
¶ “If PDVSA fails to increase production, PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez may be replaced this year. One way for Maduro to keep his presidency afloat is to bring new proven wells online
in the Orinoco Belt; but that will require major investment. PDVSA may need more than a minority-partner
-with-a-service-contract at those fields if they want to start pumping soon.”
19

Earliest Bird ’13
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Kurmanaev 3-7 -13 [Anatoly, economics and political reporter for Bloomberg, “Oil industry hopes 'new day will dawn',” http://www.telegram.com/article/20130307/NEWS/103079862/1237]
The death of
Hugo
Chavez leaves his successor the task of reviving Venezuela's oil fields after the late president's policies of limiting investment
and expelling U.S. drillers reduced production by 13 percent over the past decade. ¶ As
Chavez fought cancer for 21 months,
Venezuela's bureaucracy let the nation's oil infrastructure languish: A critical
$233 billion development of fields, pipelines and refineries fell behind schedule in the country's Orinoco heavy oil belt
, which may hold more crude reserves than Saudi Arabia, according to a U.S. Geological Survey study. ¶ Output at new
Orinoco fields was supposed to reach 195,000 barrels a day by the end of last year. Instead, production is close to a 6,000 barrel-a-day trickle that's costing state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela an estimated $19 million a day in lost revenue, according to data from Venezuelan Oil
Chamber and officials at Russian, Asian, European and U.S. companies partnering with PDVSA. ¶ “Their plans fell very short because of the lack of pipelines,” Thomas O'Donnell, an independent petroleum analyst, said in a March 4 email from Berlin. “The real cost of Venezuela's political crisis was that not much has happened. Everyone at PDVSA was busy with Chavez.” ¶ Output in South America's largest oil exporter declined 13 percent to 2.7 million barrels per day in 2011 from 1999 when Chavez came to power, even as proven reserves almost quadrupled in the period, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. The publication ranks Venezuela's potential at 296.5 billion barrels, the world's largest. ¶
Industry cautious ¶
For Venezuela to regain its peak oil production, the task for Chavez's successor is to jumpstart those stalled projects while shifting toward policies that encourage outside investment
and an inflow of talent into a country drained of both by Chavez's nationalization of the country's oil wealth. ¶ Little change is likely, according to Oswald Clint, an oil and gas analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. in London. “The death of President Chavez increases uncertainty over the political direction of Venezuela in the short term,” he wrote in a note Thursday. “However, we believe the most likely scenario is one where the current environment for international oil companies continues.” ¶ The industry was cautious in its response to how it will proceed in a post-Chavez
Venezuela. ¶ “We'll have to wait for the new head of state to be named and look at the statements he makes about the country's future directions,”
T.K. Ananth Kumar, finance director at Oil India Ltd., a partner with four other foreign companies at the Carabobo-1 block in Orinoco, said in a phone interview Thursday. “Hopefully, things will not turn for the worse.”
¶ BP, Sinopec ¶ BP Plc may look at investing in Venezuela again if the
“right conditions” exist, Chief Executive Officer Bob Dudley said Thursday on CNBC. ¶ Fu Chengyu, chairman of China Petrochemical Corp., said Wednesday in Beijing the company won't be affected by Chavez's death. Sinopec, as the parent company is known, has exploration contracts for the Junin-1 and Junin-8 blocks in Orinoco. ¶ “
What you would hope for is a very different investment environment ,”
Enrique
Sira
, senior director for IHS CERA, an energy consulting company, told reporters
Wednesday at the IHS CERAWeek conference in Houston. Any change will still take years, he said.
Tovar ’12 [Ernesto, El Universal, “Venezuela's oil industry and the challenge of growth,” Oct 7, http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/121007/venezuelas-oil-industry-and-the-challenge-of-growth]
More than ever, Venezuela depends on oil to obtain US dollars. Although Venezuela has large oil reserves
and benefits from currently high oil prices, which are very favorable for the oil industry, the country must develop new areas as well as oil infrastructure, and streamline and expand installed oil capacity
.
¶
Venezuela's current oil output stands at 2.9
million barrels per day ( bpd
), a decline from 3.2 million bpd in 1998.
Higher oil output
, as provided in the
Oil Sowing Plan, is expected to hit 4 million bpd by 2014 and 6 million bpd by 2019. In order to reach this goal, over
USD 270 billion must be invested with participation of the private and public sectors
. ¶
The stagnation of oil production comes in parallel with a downturn in exports caused by a rise in hydrocarbon domestic demand that Venezuelan state-owned company Pdvsa must meet by supplying diesel and fuel to the country's thermoelectric plants
.
Sheperd 3-7 -13 [Benjamin, chief investment strategist of Global Investment Strategist, which examines top-performing investments in Brazil, Russia, India, China, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and other rising economic powers. He’s also chief investment strategist of Benjamin Shepherd’s Wall Street, recognized exchange-traded fund (ETF), mutual fund and stock expert with an extensive background analyzing time-tested funds, “Death and Rebirth in Venezuela,” http://www.investingdaily.com/16287/death-and-rebirth-in-venezuela/]
20

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Venezuelan oil production has stagnated for the past few years, because of a lack of investment
. Moreover, prices were already depressed thanks to the global recession a few years ago. Infrastructure is also severely lacking in the country and little headway has been made on that front, despite the fact that infrastructure investment improves economic efficiency and creates a trickle-down wealth effect
.
Minaya ’12 [Ezequiel, Wall Street Journal, “Deadly Blast in Venezuela Marks Failing Infrastructure,” 8-
28-12, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444506004577617301647879274.html]
A deadly explosion at Venezuela's largest refinery
over the weekend is only the latest sign of crumbling infrastructure in the oil-rich
Andean nation
, putting renewed pressure on President Hugo Chávez as he gears up for a critical reelection battle.
¶ The explosion at Amuay refinery killed nearly 50 people, making it Venezuela's worst industrial accident in decades. The accident came just weeks after the collapse of a key interstate bridge that connects the capital Caracas to Venezuela's eastern states. Officials from the state energy monopoly, Petróleos de Venezuela SA, or PdVSA
, on Tuesday backed off their previous estimate that the refinery would be back in operation early this week —saying that some parts of the plant would restart on Wednesday while others will remain shut for a few days.
¶ Across Venezuela, however, citizens complained about crumbling roadways and periodic power outages, water shortages and food-staple shortfalls in several parts of the fertile, oil- and water-rich country. Flooding from heavy rains and, critics say, inadequate drainage has struck scores of communities in recent weeks.
¶ "They don't bother with upkeep here, that's why the bridge fell, that's why that happened in Amuay; it's the same with the blackouts. It's all the same here," said Ofelia Pereyra, 69 years old, a retired administrator at a construction company.
¶ The timing couldn't be worse for Mr. Chávez, who faces a tough challenge in Oct. 7 elections from an upstart former state governor, Henrique Capriles. Some polls show Mr. Chávez with a big lead; others show a narrowing contest.
¶ Critics contend that the president's populist policies and widespread nationalizations of key industries have led to a dire lack of investment, resulting in the decay of
Venezuela's infrastructure during his 13 years in office.
¶
Despite nearly record high oil prices that have filled the country's coffers, most of the money has gone to welfare programs and costly subsidies of gasoline and basic utility services that keep Mr. Chávez popular among the country's poor, starving investment
, economists say.
21

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
22

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
23

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Mufson 3-6 -13 [Steven, The Washington Post writer since 1989, covers energy and financial issues, has been chief economic policy writer, diplomatic and Beijing correspondent, “Chavez successors likely to continue to use Venezuela’s oil as political tool,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/chavez-successors-likely-to-continue-to-use-oil-aspolitical-tool/2013/03/06/9220bf4a-8656-11e2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_story.html
]
The state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), once regarded as one of the world’s best, has become the government’s ­socialspending arm while investment in oil fields has lagged
. The year before Chavez became president,
Venezuela’s oil production reached 3.5 million barrels a day. Then it slumped so badly that even after a modest recovery, it averaged only 2.5 million barrels a day last year
.
¶ Meanwhile PDVSA, even after purging thousands of experienced engineers and managers during a labor dispute, has grown to about 99,000 employees, according to a report from the Eurasia Group consulting firm. And half of its staggering $36 billion in debt is held by China.
¶ “
PDVSA is a shadow of its former self ,” said David Goldwyn, a consultant and formerly the State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs under Hillary Rodham Clinton.
“The refineries are [in] shambles. Fields are in decline. New investment is stagnant .” ¶ Chavez also raised the state oil company’s share in production projects to 60 percent, and while most companies cut new deals, a couple, including Exxon Mobil, went to court.
¶ Only historically high crude oil prices of about $100 a barrel have saved the country’s economy from ruin. Revenue stayed high even though the heavily subsidized domestic consumption has jumped 39 percent since 2001 and exports dropped by nearly half to 1.7 million barrels a day.
¶ While condemning the United States and wooing countries such as Russia and Iran, Chavez still relied heavily on U.S. Gulf Coast refineries that were among the few capable of handling Venezuela’s thick, low-quality crude oil. About half of Venezuela’s crude ends up in the
United States. But if the Keystone XL pipeline is built, similar-quality crude from Canada’s oil sands could push out Venezuelan petroleum.
24

Earliest Bird ’13
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Sullivan 1-10 -13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf
]
According to the EIA,
Venezuela’s total oil production has been falling in recent years and was estimated at around 2.36
million barrels per day ( mbd
) in 2010
, with crude oil accounting for 2.09 ¶ mbd.
This compares to total oil production of 2.47 mbd in 2009 and 2.64 mbd in 2008. The decline
in production, according to EIA, stems from natural decline at older fields, maintenance issues
, and compliance with OPEC production cuts.115 Total oil production in
2011, however, is ¶ estimated to have increased to 2.47 mbd, with crude oil accounting for 2.24 mbd.
Epperson and Domm 3-6 -13 [Sharon Epperson and Patti Domm, “With Hugo Chavez gone, US oil industry eyes Venezuela,” http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0306/With-
Hugo-Chavez-gone-US-oil-industry-eyes-Venezuela ]
ConocoPhillips CEO Ryan Lance, who spoke Tuesday morning at the Houston energy conference prior to news of Chavez's death, noted how the global energy landscape has changed dramatically.
¶ "The new landscape is like someone picked up the energy world and tilted it," he said, as countries with great demand for energy and those with ample supplies has changed. The U.S. is now exporting more of its natural resources than ever before, he said. Those exports include shipping record supplies of US gasoline to Venezuela. Meanwhile
Venezuela oil exports to the U.S. are on the decline
.
¶ Sira said Venezuela could produce as much as 6 to 9 million barrels of oil a day but now it's probably less than 2.5 million barrels. He said oil production peaked in the early year at 3.3 million barrels. (Read More: Why Venezuela's World-Beating Oil
Reserves Are 'Irrelevant')
Venezuela ranked fourth in oil imports to the U.S. last year
at 906,000 barrels per day, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
But crude oil imports from Venezuela have been declining steadily since 2004, when they peaked at 1.3 million barrels per day
.
25

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Clayton 1-17 -13 [Blake, Fellow for Energy and National Security, Council on Foreign Relations,
“Chavez’s Troubled Legacy for Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2013/01/17/chavezstroubled-legacy-for-venezuelas-oil-industry/ ]
While production has fallen under Chavez, consumption has risen (Figure 3)—up from about 490 thousand barrels per day (kb/d) in 1998 to 850 kb/d today—biting into net exports, which poses a problem for the country’s future fiscal health. Crude exports have collapsed since Chavez took power, down nearly 40 percent to roughly 1.5 mb/d (Figure 4).
Refined product export patterns are looking increasingly shaky
as well. Last September saw a sharp jump in U.S. gasoline and other refined product exports to the South American country, some 196 kb/d, and some industry sources estimate a reliance on net product imports as high as 300 kb/d. The proximate causes of the September jump were accidents at the Amuay and El Palito refineries, which knocked out a substantial portion of the country’s refining capacity. But the more troublesome underlying factor is the slow deterioration of the country’s refining complex and oil-specific technical prowess, causing a string of outages and unplanned stoppages in recent years. Part of what underpins the climb in Venezuela’s consumption is deeply subsidized oil
; drivers there enjoy the cheapest gasoline in the world (Figure 5).
26

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27

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative
Sullivan 1-10 -13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf
]
Despite notable frictions in bilateral relations, Venezuela has continued to be a major supplier of ¶ oil to the United States. On numerous past occasions, however, Chávez threatened to stop selling
¶ oil to the United States, although Venezuelan officials maintained that Venezuela would only stop ¶ sending oil to the United States if attacked by the United States. Because of Chávez’s strong ¶ rhetoric, however, some observers raised questions about the security of Venezuela as a major
¶ supplier of foreign oil
. In June 2006, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) issued a ¶ report, requested by then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, on the ¶ issue of potential Venezuelan oil supply disruption. At the time, the
GAO report concluded that a
¶ sudden loss of
all or most
Venezuelan oil from the world market could raise world prices up to
¶
$11 per barrel and decrease U.S. gross domestic product by about $23 billion
.116
Daly ‘12
[John Daly, CEO of U.S.-Central Asia Biofuels Ltd, Oilprice.com, “If Chavez Dies, What Next for U.S. - Venezuelan Energy Relations?” http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/South-America/If-Chavez-Dies-
What-Next-for-U.S.-Venezuelan-Energy-Relations.html
]
According to the U.S. Energy Administration, of the United States total crude oil imports of 9.033 million barrels per day, despite all the friction with Caracas, Venezuela remains in fourth place at 930,000 bpd.
¶ During last month’s contested U.S. presidential election, Mitt Romney in particular made it a keynote of his policy to bolster U.S. energy independence by deepening relationships with Mexico and Canada along with opening up offshore and federal lands to drilling.
¶ Both candidates overlooked however the importance of Venezuela in the global energy picture.
Venezuela has the largest conventional oil reserves and the second-largest natural gas reserves in the
Western Hemisphere. Two years ago OPEC stated that of the organization’s 81.33 percent of the globe’s known oil reserves Venezuela had 24.8 percent
, exceeding Saudi Arabia with 22.2 percent.
¶ Which means that everyone from Washington to Beijing is scrutinizing what is happening in Venezuela
with the President’s health, and whether one is an optimist or pessimist.
Smith 1-9 -13 [Matt, analyst for Schneider Electric Commodity, “Venezuela's Oil Industry is Likely to
Benefit from Chavez's Death,” http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Venezuelas-Oil-Industry-is-Likelyto-Benefit-from-Chavezs-Death.html]
With the rapid deterioration in the health of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, it seems a pertinent time to look at why Venezuela and
Chavez play such an integral role in the global energy market
.
¶ A glance at a few statistics immediately highlights the importance of the country’s role. It is the largest oil exporter in the Western Hemisphere (and 10th largest in the world), and holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves
at 298 billion barrels. It also has the second largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere (second only to the US). But these rather salubrious details mask a situation which is much less promising than these numbers would lead us to believe. Venezuela is ultimately what is known as a ‘petro-state’. Oil revenues account for 94% of export earnings, 50% of budget revenues, and 30% of GDP. But since 2001, overall oil production has fallen by roughly one-quarter, while oil exports have dropped by almost 50% since 1997. And it is no coincidence that these declines coincide with Hugo Chavez becoming President in 1998.
¶
Although Venezuela nationalized its oil industry in 1976, creating the state-run company Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), Chavez immediately increased state control of the oil industry to gain more control of its coffers (or as Daniel Yergin says in his epic book ‘The Quest’,
PDVSA ‘became the cash box of the state’). This move caused immediate tension between Chavez and PDVSA, and it didn’t take long for this tension to escalate.
28

Earliest Bird ’13
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Hussain 3-6 -13 [Yadullah, editor of Zawya.com, Middle East's largest business and financial newswire and business intelligence platform, Financial Post writer, “Life after Chavez: America’s oil gains could be
Canada’s loss,” http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/06/life-after-chavez-venezuela-u-s-oilindustries-are-naturally-attractive-trading-partners/?__lsa=19e0-14fa]
Despite severe disagreements, the two countries’ oil industries are “naturally attractive oil trading partners” due to their proximity, according to the U.S. Department of Energy.
¶ “
The robust trade in crude oil from Venezuela to the United States is due to the compatibility between the configuration of some U.S. refineries and the quality characteristics of
Venezuelan crude , which is predominately sour and medium or heavy.”
¶
This is a worrying development for Canadian crude producers, which offer similar type of heavy crude to the U.S. Gulf Coast refineries, and may lose out if Venezuela reforms its oil industry
.
¶ Despite shrinking U.S. oil imports, Canada is now it southern neighbour’s largest supplier of crude, accounting for nearly 30% of all U.S. imports last year. Much of these gains were at the expense of heavier crudes from
Venezuela and Mexico.
¶
A long-term reversal in Venezuela oil production could compete with Canada in the
United States and even China and Asian markets
.
29

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Sullivan 1-10 -13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf
]
As noted above,
Venezuela still remains highly dependent on oil, which accounts for some 90%
¶ of its exports
. Because of its substantial oil exports, the country generally runs a positive trade ¶ balance. The country’s trade surplus began to grow significantly as oil prices began to increase in ¶ 2004. Venezuela’s trade surplus grew from $16.7 billion in 2003 to a high of $44 billion in 2008.
¶
The decline in the price of oil beginning in 2009 reduced the country’s exports by about 40%
, ¶ from $95 billion in 2008 to $57 billion in 2009. During the same period, imports declined at a ¶ slower rate so that the trade surplus declined to almost $18 billion
in 2009. Since then, with the ¶ recovery and increase of oil prices, the trade surplus grew to $27 billion in 2010 and $46 billion ¶ in 2011. (See Table 2.)
Kott ’12 [Adam, Associate in Business Consulting - Trade and Risk Management at Sapient Global
Markets, Master of Science in Global Affairs with a dual concentration in Energy & the Environment and
International Business. Prior to this, Mr.
¶
Kott received his Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs from
The
¶
George Washington University, “Assessing Whether Oil Dependency in Venezuela Contributes to
National Instability,” Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 5 Issue 3 2012, pp. 69-86, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=jss ]
This section explores instability in Venezuela within political and economic dimensions. Each example of instability is complemented with a ¶ cause. These causes fall into one of two overarching themes: 1) the role of ¶ Hugo Chavez, and 2) the stagnation of PDVSA. Political and social groups ¶ in Venezuela, along with misguided economic policies, have effectively ¶ "crowded out" democracy and caused instability under Hugo
Chavez. ¶ Additionally, a structurally unsound PDVSA has had damaging impacts
¶ on the Latin American nation.
While many claim that the resource curse
¶ is destabilizing Venezuela
, the resource curse is really a symptom of the ¶ problem rather than the cause.
¶ Economic Instability ¶ In spite of Venezuela's vast oil wealth, the country faces a great deal of ¶ economic instability. The most noticeable and damaging economic malady is inflation. Venezuela has the highest inflation rate in the world, a ¶ staggering
28.9 percent.26 In fact, purchasing power has decreased by 15 ¶ percent since 2003, meaning citizens can now buy 15 percent less than ¶ they could in 1998.27 According to the Index of Economic Freedom: ¶ "Venezuela continues to be mired in a climate of economic ¶ repression.
Severely hampered by state interference, the formal ¶ economy is increasingly stagnant, and informal economic activity ¶ is expanding. Monetary stability is particularly weak, and there ¶ are extensive price controls on almost all goods and services. ¶ Government interference in the financial sector further distorts ¶ price levels and constrains private-sector growth by allocating ¶ credit on non-market terms."28 Another dangerous aspect of the Venezuelan economy is that both domestic and foreign business within the country is increasingly scarce. A World ¶ Bank analysis posits that there are only six countries in the world where it ¶ is worse to do business.29 In fact, Venezuela is ranked one of the top two ¶ worst places in the world to get credit, pay taxes, or receive investor protection.30 Furthermore, many international investors have refrained from
¶ entering the Venezuelan market due to Chavez's unpredictable nature
. ¶ Since his first election in 1999, Chavez has nationalized part or all of the ¶ oil, cement, steel, gold, and rice industries. The result of these nationalizations remains largely a mystery, as the government routinely releases ¶ economic data with little transparency. Overall, the country's economy is ¶ beginning to feel the crunch of economic mismanagement. Since 2007, ¶ direct foreign investment in Venezuela has decreased
from $44 billion to ¶ $37.6 billion, a 14.5 percent drop.31 As Chavez continues to nationalize ¶ industries and the government maintains intrusive policies, foreign
¶ investment in Venezuela will continue to languish
.
¶ While many resource-rich nations have turned to sovereign wealth funds ¶
(SWFs) to help manage their resource rents, Venezuela has largely turned ¶ a blind eye to the economic precaution. SWFs help prevent the local currency from appreciating and act as a "rainy day fund" to help bolster the ¶ economy of a resource-rich country when commodity prices are low. Oil is ¶ responsible for nearly 95 percent of Venezuela's export revenue, which ¶ between 1999 and 2010 totaled over $510 billion. Despite this great number, the country's SWF is valued at less than 1 percent of this total, at a ¶ mere $800 million. This pales in comparison to Norway, who has put ¶ over $560 billion in an SWF fund thanks to nearly $1 trillion worth of ¶ exports over the same time period. According to the
Sovereign Wealth ¶ Fund Institute, Chavez has nearly complete control over his country's ¶ SWF, as he appoints the SWF's leadership and the country's legislature ¶ has "limited involvement with any decision-making regarding the fund, ¶ nor does it have an oversight role."32 Over the last decade, Venezuela has ¶ become a heavily statist regime with severe regulatory restrictions and little history of private sector growth. The petroleum monoculture exacerbated the country's economic woes when facing the 2008 global financial ¶ crisis. As a result of the crisis,
Venezuela witnessed local debts rise, inflation, exchange rate distortions, consumer good shortages, and the flight ¶ of foreign direct investment.33 The Chavez government failed to pass any ¶ serious austerity measures, as spending cuts would adversely impact his ¶ vital support base, the country's lowest classes.
30

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Sullivan 1-10 -13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf
]
With an estimated 211 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (the largest in the hemisphere, up ¶ from previously reported 99 billion in proven reserves),
Venezuela’s major economic sector is
¶ petroleum, which accounts for 90% of exports, more than
30% of its gross domestic product, and
¶ half of the government’s fiscal income
.50 The country is classified by the
World Bank as an upper ¶ middle income developing country because of its relatively high per capita income of $11,820 ¶ (2011).51
¶ Despite
Venezuela’s oil wealth, economic conditions in the country deteriorated in the 1990s. The
¶ percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty (income of less than $2 a day) increased from 32.2% ¶ to 48.5% of the population between 1991 and 2000, while the percentage of the population in ¶ extreme poverty (income of less than $1 a day) increased from 11.8% in 1990 to 23.5% in 2000.52
¶ In 2002-2003, the country’s political instability and polarization between the government of ¶ populist President Hugo Chávez and the political opposition contributed to a poor investment ¶ climate, capital flight, and declines in gross domestic product (GDP). A national strike ¶ orchestrated by the political opposition from late 2002 to early 2003 contributed to a contraction ¶ of the national economy by almost 9% in 2002 and 7.8% in 2003.53
¶ From 2004-2008, however, Venezuela benefitted from the rise in world oil prices that began in ¶ 2004.
Fueled by the windfall from oil price increases, the Venezuelan economy grew by over
¶
18% in 2004 and averaged 8.6% growth annually from
2005 through 2008
(see Figure 2). The ¶ economic boom allowed President Chávez to move ahead with economic goals that fit into his ¶
“Bolivarian revolution.” These included the expansion of a state-led development model,
¶ renegotiation of contracts with large foreign investors
(especially in the petroleum sector) for ¶ majority government control, and the restructuring of operations at the state oil company, ¶ Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). The government also nationalized numerous enterprises, ¶ including telecommunications, electricity, and steel companies, as well as cement, coffee, sugar, ¶ flour, and milk production facilities.
Meacham 4-25 -13 [Carl Meacham is the director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., “The Aftermath of Venezuela’s Election: Headed for a
Default?” http://csis.org/publication/aftermath-venezuelas-election-headed-default]
Q2
: Is Venezuela heading for a possible default?
¶ A2:
As long as Venezuela’s oil keeps flowing, default appears unlikely . However, Venezuela’s economy faces many vulnerabilities that may worsen if President Maduro proves unwilling or unable to fix them.
¶ When looking at the main indicators of historic sovereign defaults in Latin America, the Venezuelan case may be following a similar path. First, Venezuela has kept its currency artificially strong despite the devaluations of the bolivar. In fact, in the black market the bolivar sells at roughly 12 bolivars per dollar, compared to the official rate of 6.3 bolivars per dollar. On top of this, evidence shows that the exchange rate has been artificially manipulated to serve political purposes, which has deteriorated confidence in the currency. It is no coincidence that the bolivar experienced devaluations in 2010 and 2013, but nothing happened in the run-up to the presidential election in 2012.
¶ Second,
Venezuela’s fiscal deficit is cause for alarm. Given the political, social and economic instability, and likely government spending to solidify support for the Maduro administration, it is unlikely to disappear any time soon. Third, the devaluation of the bolivar by nearly one-third of its value increased the debt to GDP ratio to 70 percent, adding up to a total debt of $180 billion dollars. Although this is peanuts compared to the
Greece’s nearly 160 percent ration or even the 100 percent of the United States, it will likely undermine growth prospects. Fourth, despite a government-reported inflation rate of 20 percent by the end of 2012, lower than the nearly 28 percent rate of 2011, it appears unlikely to diminish in the near future. All of these fiscal and monetary conditions combined suggest Venezuela’s risk of default bears watching. However, it is important to wait for economic adjustments, if any, that Maduro may propose to the Congress and whether the opposition will be willing to work with any proposed measures.
¶ It is also important to mention that this is all occurring with serious societal division and political confrontation as a backdrop. There is a chance that Maduro may see not paying his debts as a political move to demonstrate that he is anti-systemic and that he rejects the claims of the international financial system, a la Argentina with its bondholders.
¶ Q3: What are the prospects for the Venezuelan oil exports?
¶ A3: Venezuela recently threatened to cut energy exports to the United States after rising tensions with respect to the electoral results in
Venezuela. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua stated that any sanctions imposed by the United States as a result of the presidential election would be met with punitive oil and trade measures. However, Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the
State Department, denied that the United States is considering any further sanctions to Venezuela than those currently in force regarding the purchase of U.S. arms.
¶ It’s very difficult to imagine Venezuela cutting off oil exports to any nation to force foreign governments to recognize the electoral results, given that oil is the lifeblood of the administration’s domestic and foreign policies
. In addition, if
Minister Jaua’s statement was intended to be a threat to the United States, it is empty at best. The U.S. market is the number one destination of oil exports for Venezuela, with roughly 40 percent of its oil going to the United States. The oil sector accounts for 25 percent of Venezuelan GDP and 80 percent of exports. Any announcements by the Maduro administration that it is considering suspending oil shipments to the United States should be met with considerable skepticism.
¶ But there could be factors within PDVSA that could complicate matters. It is widely known that
Rafael Ramirez, Venezuela’s energy minister, has political ambitions. With Venezuela’s economy spiraling, it is likely that President Maduro will raid PDVSA coffers in the coming months to fund domestic and foreign commitments. President Maduro, who is barely holding on to power, will need to strengthen his base. The promotion and expansion of the Chávez agenda will depend on these funds. Minister Ramirez may go a long to get along; on the other hand, he may see Maduro’s weakness and try to exploit it for his own gain, claiming that Maduro is leaving
Venezuela’s oil industry without funds to run itself.
¶ In sum, trends in Venezuela suggest that while the possibility of default should not be dismissed , it is not likely given Venezuela’s considerable oil resources.
Venezuela’s economic situation remains
31

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative precarious
. More time is needed to gauge how the Maduro administration will handle the Venezuelan economy. Whether the new administration is up to the task remains to be seen.
Kott ’12 [Adam, Associate in Business Consulting - Trade and Risk Management at Sapient Global
Markets, Master of Science in Global Affairs with a dual concentration in Energy & the Environment and
International Business. Prior to this, Mr.
¶
Kott received his Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs from
The
¶
George Washington University, “Assessing Whether Oil Dependency in Venezuela Contributes to
National Instability,” Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 5 Issue 3 2012, pp. 69-86, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=jss ]
The deterioration of PDVSA has played an equally important role in the
¶ instability witnessed today in
Venezuela. The oil company
has experienced a vast "drain brain" and is being forced to spend revenues on social
¶ programs rather than reinvestment into company infrastructure
. These ¶ social programs show some gains, though critics claim that these gains ¶ are merely superficial and fail to address the structural inequalities within ¶ the nation. Unfortunately, PDVSA's rising inefficiency and debt threaten ¶ to permanently cripple Venezuela's oil economy.
Without this commodity, the country has little to fall back on and
what little gains
were made ¶ during the Chavez Administration will become undone
.
32

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33

Earliest Bird ’13
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Hartman ’11 [Ben, staff writer, Jerusalem Post, 'World economy will fall if revolts spread to S. Arabia,'
2-24-11, http://www.jpost.com/Features/InThespotlight/Article.aspx?id=209605]
He noted that “ every single recession since World War I except for one has been preceded by an oil crisis.
When there is an oil crisis, very shortly after, you see a major recession.
The reason that the situation now is so delicate is that we just had a recession.
When you have a recession on top of a recession, it’s like a heart attack on a heart attack – you are too weak, you can’t handle it.” According to Luft, “ if we get another oil shock, it can roll back all of the economic recovery we’ve had. Then you will see millions of people losing their jobs around the world.”
Oil shocks cause economic recessions- empirics prove
Hamilton ’11
[James D. Hamilton, Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego,
“Historical Oil Shocks,” 2-1-11, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/oil_history.pdf]
The correlation between oil shocks and economic recessions appears to be too
¶ strong to be just a coincidence
(Hamilton, 1983a, 1985). And although demand pressure ¶ associated with the later stages of a business cycle expansion seems to have been a ¶ contributing factor in a number of these episodes, statistically one cannot predict the oil ¶ price changes prior to 1973 on the basis of prior developments in the U.S. economy ¶ (Hamilton, 1983a). Moreover, supply disruptions arising from dramatic geopolitical
¶ events are prominent causes of a number of the most important episodes
. Insofar as ¶ events such as the Suez Crisis and first Persian Gulf War were not caused by U.S.
¶ business cycle dynamics, a correlation between these events and subsequent economic downturns should be viewed as causal
. This is not to claim that the oil price increases ¶ themselves were the sole cause of most postwar recessions. Instead the indicated ¶ conclusion is that oil shocks were a contributing factor in
at least some postwar
¶ recessions
.
Oil shocks destroy the economy
Roberts 04
(Paul, Regular Contributor to Harpers and NYT Magazine, “The End of Oil: On The Edge of a Perilous New World”, p. 93-94)
The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising
, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power
as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil "event
" — a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose exchange between the
Russian and Saudi oil ministers — sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global
wealth and power
.
Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and
, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster
— while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery.
So embedded has oil become in today's political and economic spheres that the big industrial governments now watch the oil markets
as closely
as they once watched the spread of communism — and with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today's growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and
stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.
34

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EC ‘09
(Electrification Coalition, ELECTRIFICATION ROADMAP: REVOLUTIONIZING
TRANSPORTATION AND ACHIEVING ENERGY SECURITY, 11, p. 30.)
The importance of oil
in the U.S. economy has given it a place of prominence in foreign and military policy.
In particular, two key issues related to oil affect national security. First, the vulnerability of global oil supply lines and infrastructure has driven the United States to accept the burden of securing the world’s oil supply. Second, the importance of large individual oil producers constrains U.S. foreign policy options when dealing with problems in these nations. A crippling disruption to global oil supplies ranks among the most immediate threats to the United States today. A prolonged interruption
due to war in the Middle East or the closure of a key oil transit route would lead to severe economic dislocation. U.S. leaders have recognized this for decades, and have made it a matter of
stated policy that the United States will protect the free flow of oil with military force. Still, policy alone has consistently fallen short of complete deterrence, and the risk of oil supply interruptions has persisted for nearly 40 years.
To mitigate this risk, U.S. armed forces expend enormous resources protecting chronically vulnerable infrastructure in hostile corners of the globe and patrolling oil transit routes. This engagement benefits all nations, but comes primarily at the expense of the American military and ultimately the American taxpayer. A 2009 study by the RAND
Corporation placed the ongoing cost of this burden at between $67.5 billion and $83 billion annually, plus an additional $8 billion in military operations. 33 In proportional terms, these costs suggest that between 12 and 15 percent of the current defense budget is devoted to guaranteeing the free flow of oil. Foreign policy constraints related to oil dependence are
less quantifiable, but no less damaging. Whether dealing with uranium enrichment in Iran, a hostile regime in
Venezuela, or an increasingly assertive Russia, American diplomacy is distorted by our need to minimize disruptions to the flow of oil. Perhaps more frustrating, the importance of oil to the broader global economy has made it nearly impossible for the United States to build international consensus on a wide range of foreign policy and humanitarian issues.
ZHANG AND SHI 11 - *Yuhan, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, D.C. AND Lin, Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the
Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-aharbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/)
Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances
, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts
.
¶
However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the
behind the
US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid.
¶
As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards
Spain.
By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western
Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law.
¶
Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of
35

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations.
¶
However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines?
Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the
Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way.
¶ Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations.
¶
For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders.
Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy.
¶ Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).
¶
A world without American hegemony is one where
, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.
36

Earliest Bird ’13
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WEISS et al 2009
(Daniel J. Weiss, Senior Fellow and the Director of Climate Strategy at American Progress, Christopher Beddor, National Security
Intern at Center for American Progress, Winny Chen, fellow, Senior Associate, Crimes Against Humanity program, Rudy deLeon, Senior Vice President of National
Security and International Policy at American Progress, Shiyong Park, intern with the National Security team at the Center for American Progress Action Fund,
“Securing America’s Future: Enhancing Our National Security by Reducing Oil Dependence and Environmental Damage,” Center for American Progress, August
2009, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_security.pdf, )
The U nited
S tates will remain vulnerable to volatile oil prices and supply shortages as long as it heavily depends on
other nations for fuel and energy. Its need for steady supplies of oil
means it must adjust its behavior
and strategies in order to maintain relations
with less than-savory regimes including Venezuela, Nigeria, and Russia.
These countries,
as well as smaller nations such as
Angola, will
therefore hold an increasingly disproportional amount of
bilateral and regional power, while the U nited
S tates has diminished leverage and constrained policy options in strategic regions
such as the Middle East and Central Asia.
This trend
will be exacerbated as continued depletion of oil production and exports from friendly regimes forces the U nited
S tates to import more from antagonistic countries
in the future in order to offset the tapering supply. Former military officials are speaking out on this issue. The
CNA Military Advisory Board, a group of distinguished retired military leaders, issued a report in May 2009 arguing that America’s reliance on foreign oil poses a serious threat to U.S. national security. The report, entitled “Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to National Security,” concluded that
“U.S. dependence on oil weakens international leverage, undermines foreign policy objectives, and entangles
America with unstable or hostile regimes.”
37

Earliest Bird ’13
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Heinberg ’11 [Richard, Senior Fellow of the Post Carbon Institute, “How Oil Prices Affect the Price of
Food,” December, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/How-Oil-Prices-Affect-The-Price-Of-Food.html]
The connection between food and oil is systemic, and the prices of both food and fuel have risen and fallen more or less in tandem in recent years
(figure 1).
Modern agriculture uses oil products to fuel farm machinery, to transport other inputs to the farm, and to transport farm output to the ultimate consumer
. Oil is often also used as input in agricultural chemicals.
Oil price increases therefore put pressure on all these aspects of commercial food systems
.
¶ Thus there is concern that high and volatile prices of crude oil may cause food prices to continue to increase (Bloomberg,
2011).
¶ Moreover, as oil prices rise, so does demand for biofuels
, which are the only non-fossil liquid fuels able to replace petroleum products in existing combustion engines and motor vehicles.
But biofuels are often made from corn and other agricultural products
.
As demand for these alternative fuels increases, crop prices are forced upwards, making food even less affordable
.
¶
Export-led agricultural strategies also increase the world’s vulnerability to high oil prices
. Most donor agencies have encouraged the less industrialized countries to focus on the production of cash crops at the expense of staples for local consumption. As a result, people in these countries are forced to rely increasingly on imports of often subsidized cereals or those funded by food aid programmes.
However, rising transport costs contribute to rising prices of food imports, making them ever less affordable
. Fuel costs represent as much as 50 to 60 per cent of total ship operating costs.[1] From early 2007 to mid-2008, as fuel prices soared, the cost of shipping food aid climbed by about $50 per ton – a nearly 30 per cent increase, according to the United States Agency for International Development (Garber, 2008). ¶ Meanwhile, many poor farmers who cannot afford machinery, fuels and commercial farm inputs find themselves at a disadvantage in the global food economy
. Compounding this are agricultural policies in industrialized food-exporting countries that subsidize domestic producers and dump surpluses onto developing countries, thus adding to the economic disadvantages of the smallholder farmers in those countries.
As a result, millions of those farmers are being driven out of business annually
, those countries are giving increasing priority to production for export and they are witnessing a burgeoning landless poor urban class (whose immediate ancestors were subsistence farmers) that is chronically malnourished and hungry.
Brown ‘09 [ Lester R, - founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food
Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May]
The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises
in poor countries to cause government collapse.
Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation
One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that civilization
itself could disintegrate
probably seems preposterous.
Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions.
The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies.
Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk.
Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures-forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible.
The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.
As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting foodprice inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos.
Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number
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Venezuela Affirmative of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate.
We have entered a new era in geopolitics.
In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states.
It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.
States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.
Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere.
Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).
Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states
to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals.
If the system for controlling infectious diseases
--such as polio, SARS or avian flu-breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail
, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.
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Charles 4-4 -13 [Jacqueline, Miami Herald's Caribbean correspondent, Pulitzer Prize finalist, two-time
Journalist of the Year by the National Association of Black Journalists, won the Society of Professional
Journalists Delta Sigma Chi Award, “Venezuelan oil program uncertainty fuels Caribbean concern,” http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/04/3323947/venezuelan-oil-program-uncertainty.html]
In the Dominican Republic, discounts on Venezuelan oil imports keep the lights on. In Jamaica, they are helping a limping economy stay afloat, and in Haiti
, a young and inexperienced leadership is using them to achieve quick results
.
¶ But despite financial benefits of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s Petrocaribe oil agreement with cash-strapped Caribbean countries, analysts and critics say inadequate oversight has contributed to a lack of transparency in many of the 17 beneficiary nations.
¶ In almost every case, the program has allowed governments to postpone politically unpopular but critical economic reforms.
And while Petrocaribe debt carries only a 1 percent interest rate, the size of the accumulated debt is raising serious concerns about repayment.
¶
The Petrocaribe program provides crude to the countries but allows a two to three-year grace period. Payments are stretched over 17 to 25 years at 1 percent interest. The intent was designed to allow the countries to plow the savings into programs to develop their economies.
¶ The future of the program has become particularly relevant as Venezuelans prepare to head to the polls on April 14 to elect a new leader. Amid a tough economy, opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles has said he plans to scrap the program. Meanwhile, acting President Nicolás
Maduro might be left with no choice but to scale back
.
¶ But as the election approaches, analysts say now is as good a time as any for Caribbean nations to start weaning themselves off the subsidy.
¶ “Foreign aid is the easiest thing to cut,” said Risa Grais-Targow, a Latin
America analyst with New York-based Eurasia Group, a global political risk firm that predicts a reduction in Petrocaribe for all except Cuba should Maduro win. “Countries have been able to avoid making some necessary adjustments or agreeing to more stringent multilateral loans. I think they are going to be forced to do that.” ¶ Peter Hakim, president emeritus of the Washington-based think tank, the Inter-American Dialogue, said the cuts, “will most likely be very damaging,” especially for the region’s poor who have suffered under rising double import food and fuel bills in recent years.
¶
“It looks pretty grim for the future
,” said
Hakim, a proponent of the aid.
¶
That reality isn’t lost on Caribbean leaders
, who in the months before Chávez’s death from cancer, attended vigils to pray for his health while publicly refusing to entertain notions of what impact his death would have on their finances.
Many have been racking up huge debt since Venezuela began shipping barrels of cheap oil to them in 2005 and they dipped into the savings to fund everything from new roads to social programs to even elections.
¶ But even with its no-strings-attached requirements, the results have been mixed, said analyst Heather Berkman, who tracks Jamaica and the Dominican Republic for the Eurasia Group.
¶ “The most notorious case is the
Dominican Republic, where they have been transferring funds from Petrocaribe to keep their power sector afloat, not making any adjustments,” she said.
¶ The Dominican Republic, Berkman noted, has avoided passing tariffs or cracking down on electricity theft while racking up a $3 billion fuel bill.
¶ Also troubling is Jamaica’s predicament. The heavily indebted nation is using the cheap oil financing to roll over more expensive debt as part of an agreement with the I nternational
M onetary
F und, which is trying to help Jamaica resuscitate its ailing economy
.
¶ Jamaican officials estimate an end to Petrocaribe could cost the country $600 million a year
. Already, the country has amassed about $2.4 billion fuel bill, said Wesley Hughes, the chief executive of the PetroCaribe Development Fund in Jamaica, according to a statement on the government’s website.
Bryan ‘01
[Anthony T, Director of the Caribbean Program, Stephen E. Flynn, Senior Fellow for the
Council on Foreign Relations, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-
Caribbean Cooperation”, October 21, http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism_porous_borders_and
_homeland_ security.html]
Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception
. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital
. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates
in
Trinidad, which host
more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and
40 percent of U.S. imports of
liquefied natural gas (
LNG
), are vulnerable targets
. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the
Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries
.
¶ Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour.
Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port
. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through
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Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders
.
[Amory B. Lovin, Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, and L. Hunter
Lovin, President – National Capitalism and Co-Founder – Rocky Mountain Institute, “Brittle Power:
Energy Strategy for National Security”, 2001, http://verdilivorno.it/doc_gnl/198204_Brittle_Power_intro_GNL_note.pdf]
About nine percent of such a tankerload of
LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes
.
It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hotter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The resulting gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air.
It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend
at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes.4
It might ultimately reach much farther—perhaps six to twelve miles.5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away.6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city,
creating “a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire.”7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker
(one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters)
is
equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs
.
Ochs ’02 [Richard, BS in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University, with honors,
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY ABOLISHED, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html
Of all the weapons of mass destruction,
. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories.
and severely compromise the health of future generations,
stolen or
.
Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over.
. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever.
. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues?
.
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Sullivan 1-10 -13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf
]
Over the past decade, Venezuela has provided Cuba with substantial assistance.
Cuba benefits
¶ from a preferential oil agreement with Venezuela
signed in 2000, which provides Cuba with more ¶ than 90,000 barrels of oil per day. In payment for the oil,
Cuba has provided extensive services to ¶ Venezuela, including thousands of medical personnel and advisers in a number of other areas, ¶ including sports, education, agriculture, communications, and even security programs involving ¶ the military. In addition to the substantial oil provided to Cuba,
Venezuela has made significant
¶ investments in Cuba
. PdVSA Cuba upgrade an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, which was inaugurated ¶ in 2007, and reportedly will help boost refining at the plant from 65,000 barrels per day to ¶ 150,000 barrels per day. It also reportedly will help upgrade another current refinery in Santiago, ¶ and has plans to build a joint oil refinery in Matanzas province. In June
2010, construction of a ¶ joint Cuban-Venezuelan nickel plant began in western Cuba. PdVSA has signed an offshore oil ¶ exploration and production agreement with Cupet, Cuba’s state-oil company (although in early
¶ November 2012, Cuba announced that an oil well drilled offshore Cuba by PdVSA was not ¶ commercially viable).
Because of Venezuela’s oil assistance, the country is very much an
¶ economic lifeline for Cuba. There would be significant economic disruption in Cuba if the flow of Venezuelan oil were curtailed
.
(Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED
STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)
Regardless of the succession
, under the current U.S. policy,
Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans
on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority.
And there are remnants of the dissident community
within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority.
A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for
.
Whether
Raul or another successor
from within the current government can hold power is debatable.
However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies
for an indefinite period, which will only compound the
Cuban situation. When
Cuba finally collapses
if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach.
The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast.
In the midst of this chaos,
During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be
ing
to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.
¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems.
Cuba is along the axis of the drugtrafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact,
Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs
–
7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.
¶
In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can
then
. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies,
that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba,
.
The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas.
A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.
¶
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U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) ¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then?
The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast.
The administration
, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management.
The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the
GWOT will be long and protracted.
These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that
region are potential
for terrorist activity
, so these areas should be secure.
will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore
. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the
Taiwan situation?
Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally,
could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. I n view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out?
The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?
– adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson
(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg.
PUB628.pdf)
President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today
. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism
. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows.
They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure.
These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease
, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy.
At the same time, t hese actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict .62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South
America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.”
Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about
the political conditions necessary to establish
Latin American
socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64
But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states , or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity.
And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity
.65
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Franklin ‘01 [Stephen, Chicago Tribune staff reporter, "Others Have Big Stake In Venezuela," Chicago
Tribune, articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-03-20/news/0103200311_1_venezuela-plan-colombia-antidrug-strategy, accessed 3-29-13, mss]
Diplomats and experts emphasize that Venezuelan instability could be felt far beyond Caracas
' steep hillsides, spreading to its Andean and Caribbean neighbors, and ultimately to the U nited
S tates. The stakes are significant for the United States, which has tried to maintain smooth relations with President Hugo Chavez, an idiosyncratic populist who criticizes America's global domination while eagerly courting investments from U.S. firms. Anti-drug strategy Perhaps most important to the U.S. is the success of its anti-drug strategy in Colombia, Venezuela's neighbor. As U.S. officials point out, Washington has committed to spending more annually on Plan
Colombia than on any other foreign country, except Israel. The goal of Plan Colombia is to help the government of President Andres Pastrana end a protracted 37-year guerrilla war and gain control over the nation's drug-producing areas. Venezuela fits into that strategy, even though Chavez has been a strong critic of Plan Colombia, warning that the fighting in Colombia will spread across the region
. Experts say a weakened Venezuela could create a convenient export base for the drug traffickers
, who operate deep inside
Colombia's jungles and along its borders with Venezuela.
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Manwaring ‘05 [Max Manwaring, Chair of the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and is a
Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian
Socialism, And Asymmetric Warfare,” October, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf]
President
Chávez also understands that the process leading to
¶ state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge
¶ facing the global community today. The argument in general is that ¶ failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability
, ¶ criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism.
These ¶ conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee ¶ flows.
They can host “evil” networks of all kinds
, whether they ¶ involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form ¶ of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these
¶ conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such ¶ as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of
¶ infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn ¶ further human rights violations
, torture, poverty, starvation, disease
, ¶ the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and
¶ body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons
¶ systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and
¶ criminal anarchy
. At the same time, these actions are usually ¶ unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty,
¶ destabilization, and conflict
.62
Miebaka ‘08
[Marshall, activist, former victim of child abuse, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria,
“Child Abuse: Dehumanization of the Human Mind,” http://www.child-abuse-effects.com/child-abusedehumanization-of-the-human-mind.html]
It is imperative to avoid abusing the child as most of the problems of today's world are as a result of child abuse. In recent times when individuals have increased inputs on how well to bring up their children, many are still out there maltreating and abusing their children. Personal observation has brought to fore that if child abuse is not put to a stop, there might never be a better society. I personally became interested about the worrisome attitude of child abuse, because I was abused by various relations when I was a child due to the early demise of my mother
; and to this day I have come to realise the negative effect of such abuses. I am so touched on a daily basis when I see children of 8, 9 and 10 years of age being sent out to sell bottles of kerosene on their head from 6 pm to 11 pm in the night. I have even had cause to interview some of these children. And what do they have to say: that any day they seize to go out to sell kerosene, there won't be food for them that night and the next day. In some cases they are also sanctioned not to come back to the house until the whole of the kerosene on their head is sold. It is more annoying because in some cases these children are brought from their parents in the rural areas to the urban centres with the pretence of offering them better education only to exploit, abuse and dehumanize the true nature of humans in them
. And I tell you what?
These are the tomorrow leaders we are talking about. And what kind of humane leadership is bound to manifest from these children?
I mean, it can't be anything less than the wicked and sit-tight leadership being experienced in this part of the world (Africa).
I am not even surprise that militancy is paramount in the African continent. Parents, relations and even the government have failed these children
. What do expect to get from them as feedbacks? I wish I am opportuned to fashion out an NGO (Non-
Government Organization) to properly embark on against this destructive attitude of child labour and abuse.
Harff-Gur -82 (B. Harff-Gur, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY
FOR GENOCIDE, 1981, p. 40)
One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation, nor is it rooted in any one, ethnocentric view of the world.
Prohibition of genocide and affirmation of its opposite, the value of
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theoretical
and as such should lift it above prevailing ideologies or politics.
Genocide concerns and potentially effects all people
. People make up a legal system, according to Kelsen. Politics is the expression of conflict among competing groups.
Those in power give the political system its character, i.e. the state. The state, according to Kelsen, is nothing but the combined will of all its people. This abstract concept of the state may at first glance appear meaningless, because in reality not all people have an equal voice in the formation of the characteristics of the state. But I am not concerned with the characteristics of the state but rather the essence of the state – the people.
Without a people there would be no state or legal system. With genocide eventually
. Genocide is ultimately a threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are targeted
, as in Nazi Germany. Sometimes a large part of the total population is eradicated, as in contemporary Cambodia. Sometimes people are eliminated regardless of national origin – the Christians in Roman times. Sometimes whole nations vanish – the Amerindian societies after the Spanish conquest. And sometimes religious groups are persecuted – the Mohammedans by the Crusaders. The culprit changes: sometimes it is a specific state, or those in power in a state; occasionally it is the winners vs. the vanquished in international conflicts; and in its crudest form the stronger against the weaker.
Since virtually every social group is a potential victim, genocide is a universal concern
.
Richard Watson, 1977 (professor of philosophy @ Washington University, World Hunger and Moral
Obligation, pg. 122)
The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However,
although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of equity is morally superior to the principle of survival, we can conclude again that food should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race .
Amy Ray, 1997 , (The American University Law Review, February 1997, Lexis)
Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to recon-sider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes
"peace."
n264
When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten,
imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted
, physi-cally tortured, and murdered simply because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence
. n265 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of [*837] human rights is not limited to violations based on gender. n266 Rather, our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned.
Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk fac-tor is being a woman, and to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women.
n267
Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense
, such as in the expression "the war against poverty."
However, the physical violence and sex discrimination perpetrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect
.
Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. n268
The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality."
n269
Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures.
n270
Thus,
when a man wants to
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When a man wants to communicate that a woman is
[*838] his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or prosti-tute her.
The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communi-cate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. n271 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communica-tion among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced.
Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women
. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." n272
Given the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as the impetus of war between nations or groups of people within one nation, we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life."
n273 We could eradicate the traditional public/private dichotomy and define oppression of women in terms traditionally recognized by human rights laws by arguing that women's bodies are the physical territory at issue in a war perpetrated by men against women.
Under this broader definition of "war," any time one group of people systematically uses physical coercion and violence to subordinate another group, that group would be perpetrating a war and could be prosecuted for human rights violations under war crimes statutes.
n274
Such an understanding would enable women to seek the prosecution of any male perpetrator of violence against women, regard-less of [*839] whether that violence occurred inside a bedroom, on the streets of the city, or in a concentra-tion camp in a foreign country.
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Duddy ‘12 [Patrick D. Duddy is a visiting senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, “Political Unrest in Venezuela,” September, http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936 ]
Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation
, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region.
¶ Democracy Promotion:
The U nited
S tates has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere
. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase
Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day.
¶ Regional Cooperation:
The U nited
S tates has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the
Organization of American States (
OAS
), of which it is a core member.
While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate.
A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the U nited
S tates.
How the U nited
S tates manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere
, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with
Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region.
Ribando ’05
[Clare Ribando, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division of the Congressional Research Service, “Organization of American States: A Primer,” May, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22095.pdf
]
Promotion of Democracy. Since 1990, the OAS has taken an active role in
¶ defending threats to democracy in the
Western Hemisphere
. In 1990, the OAS created ¶ the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now part of the Department for ¶
Democratic and Political Affairs, to assist its member states in strengthening democratic ¶ institutions and processes. Between 1994 and 2004, the UPD sent 60 observation missions
¶ throughout the region to ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral processes
. In ¶ 2000, the UPD declared Peru’s presidential election to be illegitimate and sent a HighLevel Mission to Peru led by
Sec. Gaviria to help resolve the country’s democratic crisis.9
¶ In 1991, the OAS adopted resolution 1080, or the “Santiago Commitment,” ¶ instructing the Secretary General to convoke the Permanent Council or the General ¶ Assembly in the event of “a sudden or irregular interruption”of the democratic process
¶ in a member state, and to act to resolve that conflict. In 1992, the OAS ratified the ¶ Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter, becoming the first regional political ¶ organization to allow suspension of a member state in the event that its democratically ¶ elected government is overthrown by force. The OAS has yet to invoke the Washington ¶ Protocol. Before resolution 1080 was superseded in
2001, the OAS limited its use to four ¶ instances in which either a military coup, self-coup by an elected President, or severe ¶ civil-military crisis occurred. Some observers have criticized the OAS’s failure to invoke ¶ resolution 1080 more frequently as in the case of a successful coup against
Jamil Mahuad ¶ in Ecuador in 2000.10 Others have noted that even in cases when the OAS did act under ¶ resolution 1080, such as Paraguay in
1996, its delayed response was of limited ¶ consequence.11 On September 11, 2001, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter ¶
(IADC). The IADC broadens the mandate of resolution 1080 and states that the OAS ¶ will respond to any democratic crisis that involves an
“unconstitutional alteration of the
¶ constitutional regime”of one of its member states.12 Since 2001, the OAS has employed
¶ a combination of technical assistance through the UPD, high-level missions, conflict
¶ resolution techniques, multilateral diplomacy, and, multilateral sanctions, in order to
¶ respond to democratic crises in countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela, and
, more ¶ recently,
Nicaragua
. In April 2002, the IADC was invoked when the OAS condemned ¶ the “alteration of the constitutional order” in Venezuela that temporarily forced President ¶ Chavez from power.13 Although it was utilized in the case of Venezuela, the IADC has ¶ been criticized for being vague in defining what conditions constitute a violation of its ¶ principles. Those conditions need to be clearly defined, former President Jimmy Carter ¶ has said, and automatic responses developed that would help the OAS deal with common ¶ violations of the Charter.14
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Diamond ’95 [Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING
DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html]
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
The very source of life on Earth
, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered
. Most of
these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy
, with its provisions for legality, accountability
, popular sovereignty and openness
. The experience of this century offers important lessons.
Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.
They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders.
Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations
, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build w eapons of m ass d estruction to use on or to threaten one another
. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment.
They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments
.
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[Stephen, environmental journalist, citing leading climate scientists, professional member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, "Climate Change," Inter Press Service, 8-10-11, l/n, accessed 6-
3-12, mss]
"
It's imperative
that we move quickly to alternate forms of energy - and that we leave
the tar sands in the ground," the U.S.'s leading climate scientists urged
President Barack Obama in an open letter Aug. 3. "As scientists... we can say categorically that it's
[the Keystone XL pipeline] not only not in the national interest, it's also not in the planet's best interest."
The letter was signed by 20 world-renowned scientists,
including NASA's James Hansen, Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution, Ralph Keeling of the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography, and George Woodwell, founder of the Woods Hole Research Center. The proposed seven-billion-dollar Keystone
XL pipeline would carry 700,000 to 800,000 barrels of tarry, unrefined oil every day from the northern Alberta tar sands 2,400 kilometres south through the U.S. heartland to refineries in Oklahoma and Texas.
Embedded in
all that bitumen - the tar sands
form of crude oil - will be an estimated 150 million tonnes of carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions every year. That's more CO2 than the annual emissions of 85 percent of the world 's countries
. Oil-rich Norway emits a mere 50 million tonnes. "
That extra carbon
dioxide is going to warm the planet for hundreds and thousands of years
, causing sea level rise, more pronounced droughts and floods," said German climate scientist
Malte
Meinshausen
of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact
Research. Meinshausen was not involved in the letter to Obama.
Emissions attributed to the project are "enormous" and officials must take into account how it will add to climate change, Meinshausen told IPS. President Obama and Canada's Prime Minister Stephen
Harper say they are worried about climate change and have promised to make major CO2 reductions by 2020. Both countries are parties to the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, whose membership unanimously swore to keep the rise in global temperatures to less than two degrees C to avoid dangerous levels of climate change. Any hope of reaching that goal requires Canada, the U.S. and other industrialised nations to cut emissions 25 to 40 percent compared to their 1990 levels by 2020. And because CO2 lasts forever, the ultimate goal has to be net zero carbon emissions. Both the U.S. and Canada have failed to cut their emissions, but at least U.S. emissions have stopped growing. It's not well known, but Canada has become a compulsive overeater of carbon. Its emissions "weight" ballooned from 590 million tonnes in 1990 to 734 million tonnes in 2008, according to U.N. statistics. In the early 1990s, Canada promised to lose weight and even signed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol swearing to the world community that it would be a fit and trim 550 million tonnes by 2010 or 2012 at the latest. Government estimates put
Canada at substantial 710 million tonnes (Mt) in 2010, 28 percent above its target weight. That leaves the country in seventh place amongst the big boys, just behind Germany, a country with more than twice the population. In Copenhagen at the end of 2009, Harper himself promised other global leaders that Canada would do better and trim down to 607 Mt by 2020. However, an official government report called "Canada's
Emissions Trends" quietly released last month projects a continuing carbon binge, piling on the weight to a whopping 775 to 850 Mt by 2020.
Most of that extra carbon lard is from the tar sands. In Bizarro World, everything is the opposite of what it should be: lose weight by eating more, avoid dangerous climate change by guaranteeing it. And so enormous sums of money, including incentives and subsidies from both governments, are being spent to put ever more tar sands' CO2 into the atmosphere. In fact, an incredible 2.077 trillion dollars is expected to be invested expanding and maintaining the tar sands over the next 25 years, according to the Canadian Energy Research Institute. The tar sands are the world's second largest deposit of oil, albeit in the form of tar, with an estimated 300 billion barrels of recoverable oil.
There is so much carbon in the tar sands that if much of it is burned, there is no chance of stabilising the climate , according to Hansen and other climate experts.
Goldenberg 3-8 -13 [Suzanne, US environmental correspondent for The Guardian, has won the prize of
Reporter of the Year from What the Papers Say, the Foreign Press Association, and the London Press
Club, “Academics warn Canada against further tar sands production,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/08/academics-canada-tar-sands-production ]
The Canadian government's promotion of the tar sands industry is setting the world on a course of catastrophic climate change, a group of climate scientists and economists have warned.
¶
In a letter made available to the Guardian, the academics urged Canada's natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, to consider the consequences of his support for expanding Alberta's tar sands production.
¶
Oliver has in recent months emerged as the main proponent for the Keystone XL pipeline in Washington and other capitals. He is due in London this week.
¶
The project would pump crude from the tar sands directly to refineries on the Texas Gulf coast, and so provide a much-needed outlet for Canada's crude.
¶
But the academics warned that unlocking Alberta's tar sands, which are thought to hold some 170bn barrels of
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¶
Production from the tar sands causes higher greenhouse gas emissions than conventional crude oils.
¶
The academics said that expanding the tar sands ran in the face of recommendations from the International Energy Agency and others that two-thirds of the world's fossil fuel reserves should not be commercialised – in order to avoid catastrophic climate change.
[Bill, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, directs the Middlebury
Fellowships in Environmental Journalism, Post Carbon Institute fellow, "Britain's promotion of Canada's tar sands oil is idiotic," Guardian, 11-27-11, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/27/britaincanada-oil-sands-idiotic, accessed 6-3-12, mss]
Here's the essential fact
to bear in mind.
The tar sands
of northern Alberta are the second-largest pool of carbon on earth
, second only to Saudi Arabia. It's burning Saudi Arabia, more than any other single thing, that has raised the temperature of the planet by a degree so far. But when oil was discovered in the Middle East, we knew nothing about climate change – it's not surprising that we started pumping. In the case of Canada, however, we've taken 3%
of the oil from the sands.
We're still at the start
.
If
, knowing what we now know about climate change, we
just keep going
, then we're idiots.
That realisation explains why Americans rose up in remarkable numbers to fight the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. In August
1,253 people were arrested outside the White House during the largest civil disobedience action in a generation. Citizens ringed the president's mansion in a line a mile long and five people deep. A couple of weeks ago, the president announced that he would delay the pipeline for a new environmental review, which would cover not only the route across the country but also climate change, public health, and other issues. That announcement caught industry off guard. Transcanada Pipeline had already mowed the strip they planned to put the pipe on, and had carried vast quantities of steel across the border. They're fighting back with every tool they can find, but for the moment they're delayed and in trouble. It's a win, though like all environmental wins a temporary one. And it's a tribute not only to an organising effort that brought everyone from Nebraska ranchers to Occupy Wall Street protesters together, but also to the slowly dawning realisation that this was a big deal.
As the leading climatologist
James
Hansen puts it, tap heavily into tar sands oil and it's
"essentially game over for the climate".
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– [Adam, Guardian environment deputy editor, "Desmond Tutu tells David Cameron tar sands threaten health of the planet," Guardian, 2-16-12, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/16/desmond-tutu-cameron-tar-sands, accessed 6-3-12, mss]
Eight Nobel laureates
including Archbishop Desmond Tutu have written
to the prime minister to argue that oil derived from
Canadian tar sands " threatens the health of the planet
" and that the UK should support European moves to classify the controversial energy source as highly polluting. A similar letter has been sent this week to the transport minister, Norman Baker, by the shadow transport secretary, Maria Eagle, asking him "to vote in favour of labelling oil from tar sands as highly polluting immediately and in line with the European commission's proposals". Last November, the Guardian revealed that the UK government has been actively supporting Canada's attempts to stop the tar sands oil being designated by Europe as emitting 22% more g reen h ouse g as emissions than that from conventional fuels
. The proposal, the Fuel Quality Directive, could effectively ban tar sands oil from Europe and would set a precedent of officially labelling tar sands oil as dirtier than conventional oil. Baker has defended the UK's stance on the grounds that all different types of crude oil – not just tar sands oil – should be assessed as low, medium and high emissions. "To be clear, we are not delaying action in any way, but are seeking an effective solution to address the carbon emissions from all highly polluting crudes, not simply those from one particular country," he has said. The foreign office has admitted such a system "may take some time" and would effectively kick the proposal into the long grass. But the Nobel Peace
Laureates warn
that " tar sands development is the fastest growing source of
greenhouse gas emissions in Canada, and threatens the health of the planet
. As the tar sands have contributed to rising emissions, Canada recently stepped away from the Kyoto protocol. Europe must not follow in Canada's footsteps." They describe the Fuel Quality Directive as a policy that would "help Europeans make cleaner fuel choices."
In an op-ed last year, Tutu wrote that " oil from the tar sands
of Alberta is the dirtiest in the world".
Writing to Baker, Eagle warned that siding with Canada could threaten
UK jobs in the manufacture and development of low-emission vehicles
, such as electric cars.
"
Experts agree
that oil from tar sands is a 'dirty fuel'
and the EU has every right to identify the environmental impact of oil extracted from tar sands in Canada and elsewhere. The government must act to prevent a further serious blow to the huge opportunities that exist to boost the UK car industry's potential for growth in low-carbon vehicle sector for the sake of dirty jobs in Canada."
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Sullivan 4-9 -13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]
The death of
Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez
on March 5, 2013, after 14 years of ¶ populist rule, has implications
not only for
Venezuela’s political future, but potentially for
¶ the future of
U.S.-Venezuelan relations
. This report provides a brief discussion of those ¶ implications. For additional background on President Chávez’s rule and U.S. policy, see CRS ¶ Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for
Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. ¶ Congress has had a strong interest in Venezuela and U.S. relations with Venezuela under the ¶ Chávez government. Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers has been the deterioration of ¶ human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of ¶ cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s ¶ relations with Cuba and Iran. ¶ The United States traditionally enjoyed close relations with Venezuela, but there has been
¶ considerable friction in relations under
the
Chávez government.
U.S. policymakers have
¶ expressed hope for a new era in
U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era
. While this ¶ might not be possible while Venezuela soon gears up for a presidential campaign, there may be an ¶ opportunity in the aftermath of the election.
Fabian 3-6 -13 [Jordan, Political Editor at Univision Network, “Hugo Chávez Death: Fixing the U.S.-
Venezuela Relationship Won't Be Easy,” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/hugo-chavezdeath-fixing-us-venezuela-relationship-easy/story?id=18668275&singlePage=true#.UZAf3KLktX8]
The death of
Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes
from
Latin America, sparking hope
among U.S. officials that
the ensuing changes could lead to improved relations in the region
. But it won't be easy.
¶ The United States and Venezuela have shared a rancorous relationship since Chávez was first elected in 1998.
Chávez angered multiple U.S. presidents by establishing ties to regimes in countries like Cuba and Iran that are hostile to the United States, and for fomenting anti-U.S. sentiment in other nations in the Western Hemisphere. And the Chávez regime repeatedly accused the U.S. of plotting to overthrow his rulership, fueling distrust between the two countries. Relations have become so frayed that the U.S. and Venezuela have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010.
¶ Those tensions were evident even on Tuesday, the final day of Chávez's life. Venezuela expelled two U.S. embassy officials from the country on allegations they tried to destabilize the country. Upon their ejection, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolás
Maduro even suggested that U.S. interests were behind the cancer that eventually claimed Chávez's life.
¶ But now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with Venezuela . "Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela with an iron hand and his passing has left a political void that we hope will be filled peacefully and through a constitutional and democratic process," Senate Foreign Relation Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) said in a statement. "With free and fair elections, Venezuela can begin to restore its once robust democracy and ensure respect for the human, political and civil rights of its people." ¶ "It is my sincere hope that
Venezuela's leaders will seek to rebuild our once strong friendship based on shared democratic and free enterprise principles," added Sen. Marco
Rubio (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
¶ The path, however, could be difficult.
¶ Venezuelan officials have said a new election will be called within 30 days. That contest will likely pit Maduro against Henrique Capriles Radonski, an opposition leader who touts free market policies and is perceived as friendlier to the U.S. But it's not clear that Capriles will fare better than he did in October, when he was defeated by Chávez.
¶ The former president sparked a passionate and loyal following among Venezuela's poor and lower-classes that's morphed into a strong social movement, known as chavismo. Maduro, who will lead the country on an interim basis and is considered the front runner, has pledged to continue Chávez's work. But experts are divided on whether chavismo can outlive its charismatic namesake.
¶ Some foreign policy observers believe that, even if Maduro wins, ties could improve between the U.S. and Venezuela.
¶ "I think it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former
U.N. ambassador
Bill
Richardson
, who met with
Chávez in 2008, said
on MSNBC. "The opposition candidate Capriles is pro-U.S. The vice president Maduro is not pro-U.S., but is, I think, going to be more pragmatic than Chávez." ¶ Still, the U.S. will have to work to improve its image and standing in
Venezuela
following nearly a decade-and-a-half of anti-U.S. sentiment being imbued into the country's government and political culture.
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DeYoung 3-6 -13 [Karen, Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist, and is the associate editor for The
Washington Post, “U.S. seeks better relations with Venezuela, but says they may not come soon,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/world/37500568_1_vice-president-nicolas-madurovenezuelan-president-hugo-chavez-venezuelan-constitution]
The
Obama administration is treading carefully in response to the death of
Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez
, extending an olive branch while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two countries
.
¶ Chavez played “an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence” could have “outsized implications,” a senior State
Department official said Wednesday.
¶ The official said the administration was anxious to begin “step-by-step” talks about issues of “mutual interest,” including antidrug efforts, counterterrorism and commercial relations. But the upcoming political campaign to elect Chavez’s replacement may not be the best time to initiate a new dialogue, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the State Department at a briefing for reporters.
¶ “We will no doubt continue to hear things about the United States that will not help,” the official said. “It’s very hard for us to know right now whether the current government,” or the one that emerges from the election, “will in fact accelerate or continue or stop the momentum toward a better relationship.”
¶ Just hours before announcing the Venezuelan leader’s death from cancer Tuesday, Vice President Nicolas
Maduro said Venezuela had ordered the expulsion of two military attaches at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, accusing them of trying to provoke dissension in the Venezuelan military.
¶
Maduro also appeared to blame Chavez’s illness on the United States
, saying that “the old enemies of our fatherland looked for a way to harm his health.”
¶ The United States and Venezuela were barely on speaking terms during Chavez’s 14 years in office as Chavez accused Washington of a heavy-handed approach to the hemisphere and forged friendships with Cuba, Iran and others that the
United States views as troublesome.
¶ The administration has denied the Venezuelan charges against the military officials and called the expulsions “outrageous.” The State Department official said the administration was still reviewing whether to respond in kind, adding that “we’re not ruling anything out at this point.”
Levin Institute 3-22 -13 [Levin Graduate Institute of International Relations and Commerce, research institute, “Life after Chavez,” http://www.globalization101.org/life-after-chavez/]
U.S. officials reached out to Maduro over the past year and held three informal meetings with him.
However, soon after Chavez was declared dead, Maduro expelled two American military attaches
, claiming they plotted against the country. Many view Maduro’s move as a way to strengthen his own position in the upcoming elections, rather than a true denunciation of the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship (Neuman and Thompson, 2013).
Analysts do not expect any major breakthroughs in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship in the immediate future
.
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Southern Pulse 2-6 -13 [Southern Pulse is a field-based investigations organization focused on security, politics, energy, and business in Latin America, “Iran: Expanding its Sphere of Influence in Latin
America,” http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/iran-expanding-its-sphere-of-influence-in-latinamerica]
Bottom-line:
Iran is successfully currying favor in an expanded audience in Latin America
, enabling it to develop crucial economic ties and evade the consequences of the embargo.
¶ Background: State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening stateto-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally. ¶ Recognizing Tehran’s growing influence in its “backyard,” President Barack
Obama signed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a “comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners.
¶ The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad has opened six additional embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4 billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011.
Exports from Argentina to Iran, its second-largest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011. ¶
Not surprisingly, one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with
fellow “anti-imperialist” Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters
. ¶ In
November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who later defended Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program.
In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a distance. ¶
In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America
, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the Western
Hemisphere. Chávez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. (See Douglas Farah’s
Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Nov 2012) On 31 January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s
(IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart from such public overtures,
Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region
. ¶ More recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence
: ¶ On 21 January 2013,
German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of
Tahmasb
Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director
. Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German authorities confiscated the check while they investigate.
¶ On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007.
61

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EIA 1-22 -13 [US Energy Information Administration, “Political risks focus attention on supply of
Venezuelan oil to the United States,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9651#]
Although Venezuela remains an important source of crude for the United States, the volume of oil that the
United States imports from Venezuela has declined over the past 15 years in conjunction with a more general decline in Venezuelan oil production
.
¶ U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil have fallen considerably since they peaked on an annual basis at 1.4 million bbl/d in 1997, when Venezuela was the largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States. Preliminary data for
2012 show that U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude averaged 879,000 bbl/d through October, or 5.8% of total U.S. crude oil supply.
U.S. imports of Venezuelan petroleum
products also peaked in 1997, at 379,000 bbl/d, and have
since fallen to as low as
23,000 bbl/d in
October
2012
. Meanwhile, U.S. exports of petroleum products to Venezuela, which heavily subsidizes liquid fuels, surged to an all-time high of 196,000 bbl/d in September 2012 following an explosion at Venezuela's largest oil refinery.
¶ A number of important political developments have occurred in Venezuela since its oil exports to the United States peaked in 1997. President Chávez took office in 1999 and has enacted various policies to increase state control over the oil industry through the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA). A general strike that began in December 2002 initially disrupted two-thirds of Venezuela's 3.0 million bbl/d of production, a level to which Venezuela's production has yet to fully return. EIA estimated that Venezuela produced 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2012, although definitive numbers are unavailable. Adding lease condensate, natural gas liquids, and refinery processing gains, total Venezuelan oil production was approximately 2.5 million bbl/d in 2012.
62

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63

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Levi and Clayton ’12 [Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the
Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol.
54, No. 6, 2012, online]
These questions can be illuminated by looking at history. It is striking, then, that there has been no systematic study of how international oil trade affects international relationships, and vice versa. To carefully investigate potential connections between the two, we brought together a diverse group of scholars, industry veterans, and former policymakers
. We asked twelve of them to prepare short case studies of specific oil trade relationships that we suspected might be illuminating.4 Three contributors
examined links between oil investment and international politics, in order to help distinguish between the influence of cross-border investment and that of international trade. Another three explored trade relationships involving the U nited
S tates, including those with Venezuela
, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, both to shed light on an important player in the international ¶ 2 ¶ system, and to drill down on a set of cases involving at least one robust market economy. The next three looked at trade relationships involving China, including those with Iran, Angola, and Saudi Arabia. Again, part of the goal was to better understand a key consumer (China), and part of it was to delve more generally into how a less market-based economy interacted with others. A final trio of case studies helped us explore other special types of trade relationships: a look at Russia and several former
Soviet states provided a window into what happens when countries don’t have access to international markets; an examination of Brazilian relations with Iraq and several African countries helped us understand how oil and military relations can become entangled; and a study of French oil trade relations with former colonies highlighted the potential role of cultural ties, and simple inertia, in shaping oil-related relations among states.
¶ These twelve cases, along with additional research, made clear that regardless of whether the detailed patterns oil trade
should influence international politics
, there is no question that, in practice, they do. That has wide-ranging consequences for international security.
¶ Lessons wrongly learned ¶ Is it really necessary to look at a dozen cases in order to conclude that oil and international politics are often intertwined? Anyone who lived through the 1973 Arab oil embargo can tell you that they are closely connected. Reams of careful scholarship have shown that natural gas trade and international politics are essentially inseparable
.5
¶ And anyone who has followed fights over
OPEC production quotas or investment regimes in countries like
Russia and
Venezuela knows that international relations and oil go hand in hand
.
¶ Each of these observations, though, stops short of showing that oil trade and international politics influence each other. Oil markets have changed enormously in the nearly four decades since the first Arab oil embargo. Deeper spot markets, cheap international oil shipping, rise of oil trading in futures markets, removal of import quotas, and creation of national strategic petroleum reserves have all make the global market far more robust and integrated than it was when the first oil shock rocked the world. Past performance, in this case, is an unreliable predictor of future results.
¶ Lessons from the global gas trade are difficult to extrapolate for a related set of reasons. While the global oil trade is marked by the presence of large and liquid spot markets that allow all participants to identify consensus prices without resort to political bargaining, spot markets for natural gas are often nonexistent, forcing parties to determine contract terms through painstaking, and politically charged, negotiations. Moreover, while inexpensive arbitrage is possible between most parts of the world oil market, trading natural gas across long distances requires expensive ships and specialized port facilities, all of which means that the oil market is far more flexible than the gas one. Natural gas trading also requires up-front investment in expensive infrastructure that typically exceeds what is needed in the case of oil.
Financing
that infrastructure
usually requires long-term deals between buyers and sellers. Those create lasting relationships that can more easily acquire a political character than the shorter term deals and spot trades that dominate oil
.
¶ What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example, discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy.
In Latin America
, for example, oil is typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 Oil investment decisions can
thus take on a special cast
.
¶ 3 ¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the bilateral relationship with those firms’ home countries.7
¶ Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select their targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at bay.
¶ Decisions about oil production levels can also become entwined in international politics. Oil consumers consistently try to persuade producers to pump more oil and thus lower world prices. In times of market tension, pivotal countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, often come under pressure to dip into their “spare capacity” and put more oil on the market in order to calm prices.8 Political bargaining can also take a front seat in discussions about whether to release emergency oil inventories. The decision in 2011 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) decision to tap strategic stocks came only after senior energy officials visited Riyadh in an attempt to persuade the Kingdom not to undercut the release by slowing production.9
¶ All of this, inevitably, is a matter of international politics and bargaining, rather than pure economics.
¶ But all of this is distinct from questions of who buys oil from whom, and what consequences that has. It is entirely possible for production and investment decisions to be politically charged but for global trade patterns to simultaneously be the province more of pure economics. To understand this
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Venezuela Affirmative critical dimension of international oil politics, we need to examine how specific trade relationships actually work.
¶ Physical Constraints Matter ¶ If globalized and flexible crude markets supposedly divorce oil trade from international politics, then the best place to start is by looking at cases where markets aren’t actually as globalized or flexible as most people assume.
¶ The relationship between Russia and several former Soviet states is one example of an oil trade relationship where geography, and hence politics, looms large.10
¶ Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Belarus are all landlocked. They have little access to imported oil except through Russian pipelines. This lack of ready alternative supplies gives Russia political leverage that it has not been shy about exploiting. Russia halted deliveries to refineries in Belarus on New Year’s Eve in 2009 after a dispute over tariffs; Kyrgyzstan, which imports 70 percent of its oil from Russia, also found itself on the wrong end of a Russian export ban in
April 2010 after it condemned a spike in Moscow’s transit fees. Prices in Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed, precipitating the fall of authoritarian regime of then-president Kurmanbek Bakiev just one week after the ban was imposed.
¶ Pipeline politics can also exert influence much closer to home. The
United States and Canada are each other’s largest trading partners and enjoy an oil trade relationship that is typically open, but that has not always been the case. The United States curtailed imports from Canada in the 1950s to protect its own domestic producers until finally exempting
Canadian crude in 1959. Following the 1973 embargo, the Canadian government experimented with energy nationalism, raising its asking price for oil from U.S. buyers.11 This period appears to have largely passed, but the battle in 2011 ¶ 4 ¶ over the Keystone XL pipeline suggests that domestic politics can still complicate even the most natural trade relationship.
¶ Refinery configurations also add some rigidity to markets. The common description of oil as a fungible good, where supplies can be moved from one market to another with ease, is usually a good approximation to reality, but has important limits. Not all oil is the same. Different sources of crude vary primarily in their so-called gravity, ranging from light to heavy, and in their sulfur content, which ranges from sweet to sour. Each refinery is tuned to accept a particular source of oil and produce a particular slate of high-value products, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Venezuelan crude, for example, is particularly heavy and sour, and refineries in the Gulf of Mexico are specially designed to process it.
Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the U nited
S tates, many U.S. refiners could be left without attractive
alternative sources
. Venezuelan producers, though, might have parallel difficulties finding new customers for their oil.
The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the
U nited
S tates shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis, with similar results
.
Shifter and Roosen 5-1 -13 [Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas,
“What Does the Future Hold for U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3297]
Q:
The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations remains uncertain in the early days of
the Nicolás
Maduro administration. Maduro has voiced a desire for "respectful relations" with the United States, though Washington has still not recognized his government. The United States has denied that it is considering sanctions against Venezuela, and Venezuelan authorities recently arrested a U.S. citizen on accusations of attempting to spark social unrest. The State Department has denied any efforts to destabilize the Venezuelan government. Will U.S.-Venezuela relations be better or worse under Maduro than they were under Hugo Chávez? What do Maduro's cabinet picks portend about the future of bilateral relations? Should businesses be more worried about political risk in Venezuela now than they were when Chávez was alive?
¶ A: Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue: "
The prospects for improved relations between the U nited
S tates and Venezuela under the Maduro administration now appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric directed at Washington has been notably tough and aggressive
, as he seeks to shore up support among the Chavista base.
Arresting a U.S. citizen and accusing him of stirring up trouble in Venezuela is a vintage Chávez tactic, aimed at diverting attention from the country's myriad, fundamental problems. Lacking Chávez's political skills and common touch, Maduro is in a particularly shaky position, compounded by questions of legitimacy following the April 14 elections. To date, personnel picks and policy signals coming out of the administration have been confusing and mixed. Some in Maduro's team are hardliners, while others, such as Calixto Ortega--the recently appointed representative in Washington--are more open and moderate. Ortega, for example, was very active in the so-called Boston Group, an effort that sought to facilitate dialogue between Chavista and opposition lawmakers. As long as Maduro's political standing remains precarious, he will be severely constrained in his ability to pursue closer ties with the United States. There is no appetite or interest in Washington to adopt punitive measures and apply sanctions against Venezuela. In light of Maduro's confrontational rhetoric and actions--and disturbing incidents of violence--no one is calling for a rapprochement. Still, assuming that things begin to settle down, and given that other governments have already recognized Maduro, it would be surprising if Washington didn't eventually come around and deal with the practical reality." ¶ A: Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas: "The U.S. embargo on Cuba has helped the Castro brothers to hide the total failure of their economic system from their citizens and the world. First Chávez, and now Maduro, are the Castros' pupils and are following in their footsteps. They have randomly attacked the United States based on unsubstantiated evidence to justify the collapse of their socialist model. With now-limited resources, members of Maduro's cabinet are beginning to mention efficiency and productivity as the key to solving complex problems, such as the country's electricity failures. Unlike the fundamentalist views of former Finance
Minister Jorge Giordani, Nelson Merentes maintained a positive relationship with the Venezuelan private banking sector during his time as central bank president. This attitude could be expanded to the rest of the economy. The United States has taken the wise step of delaying recognition of the election results until a full satisfactory audit is conducted. However, as the saying goes, countries have no friends, but only interests.
In the case of the U nited
S tates and Venezuela, trade and direct investments will continue to guide the bilateral agenda
. Exchange restrictions and the recent devaluation could affect the long-term outlook of multinational companies toward
Venezuela. In fact, the first-quarter earnings of several large U.S. companies were negatively affected as a result of the February devaluation of the bolivar.
Venezuela is living a defining moment
. The results of the April election suggest that under the guidance of UNASUR partners, public policy could move toward a model closer to that of Brazil."
65

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Sullivan 4-9 -13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]
In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan
¶ relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be
restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral issues
, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and ¶ democracy concerns, but on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters
. ¶ With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th
Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight
on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as ¶ drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.
Cordoba and Munoz 1-11 -13 [Jose and Sara, Wall Street Journal, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend
Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html]
Venezuela and the U.S. are making tentative moves to improve relations
even as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez struggles to recover from an unknown type of cancer at a Cuban hospital.
¶ Officials say the détente began in late November, when Roberta
Jacobson, the U.S.'s top diplomat for Latin America, telephoned Venezuela's Vice President Nicolás Maduro, the Chávez-designated heir. Both sides discussed areas of mutual interest, according to U.S. officials.
¶ "We have for some time made it clear that we were willing and open to trying to improve our ties with Venezuela," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said at a news briefing this week.
¶
Improving relations
between the U.S. and the country with the world's biggest oil reserves could be a long, hard slog . Mr. Chávez has led a motley crew of like-minded Latin American leaders, and has cultivated close ties with U.S. foes like Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
¶
Mr. Chávez famously called President George W. Bush a "devil" on the floor of the United Nations before the assembled leaders in 2006. Two years later, he tossed the U.S. ambassador to Caracas, Patrick Duddy, out of the country.
The embassy has been without a top envoy since Venezuela refused to accept another proposed U.S. envoy in 2010, leading the U.S. to revoke the visa of Venezuela's ambassador in Washington, Bernardo Álvarez.
¶ Mr. Chávez has also gone after President Barack Obama, once calling him an "ignoramus," after Mr. Obama criticized Mr. Chávez's alleged links to Colombian guerrillas.
¶ But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chávez.
¶ For its part, the
U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step.
¶ "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.
¶
Other areas the U.S. would like to see progress on are counterterrorism cooperation and in resolving commercial disputes involving U.S. companies in Venezuela, some of which have been nationalized, and many of which sometimes have difficulty getting dollars from Venezuela's government to pay for needed imports and repatriate profits.
¶ Since the initial contact, Venezuelan diplomats and U.S. officials have continued the dialogue in Washington. But the deterioration of
Mr.
Chávez's health had slowed progress
, U.S. officials say. Few expect
Mr. Chávez to recover from his illness.
¶
Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other
. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric.
¶ But Mr.
Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels
privately, say experts and observers.
¶ "
It will be very slow, very difficult, but
I think
Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit
," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector.
With Venezuela's oil production in decline
, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under
Mr.
Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector
.
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Hongbo 3-12 -13 [Sun, associate professor with the Institute of Latin American Studies under the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, “Chavez legacy will live on in Latin America,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-03/12/content_16300175.htm]
As far as Venezuela-US relations are concerned, the future points to certain possibilities
. The tense relations between Caracas and Washington are likely to ease, even though diplomatic ties between the two countries are yet to normalize. The degree of progress will depend on the diplomatic game the two countries play
and their domestic political demands. But owing to Venezuela's political and economic stability, and oil security, the new government may ease its anti-US stance, drawing a similar response from Washington.
¶
Since oil plays a key role in both countries' economic and political policies, it will help prevent bilateral relations from worsening
. Plus, the US could review its policy toward
Venezuela
with an eye on its overall interest in Latin America. But if for any reason the US bans oil imports from Venezuela, the latter's economy could get into trouble. The US' geopolitical and strategic interests in Latin America, however, demand that Venezuela continue to enjoy its political, economic and social stability.
¶
The security of Venezuela's oil exports and the US' oil imports are
, to a certain degree, interdependent
. Venezuela is still the third largest source of crude oil for the US. The US remains Venezuela's largest trading partner and has invested about $12 billion in Venezuela, while Venezuela has an investment of about $4 billion in the US. The US is also
Venezuela's largest source of trade surplus and has a decisive influence on Venezuela's international balance of payment and foreign exchange reserve accumulation.
67

Earliest Bird ’13
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Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian
Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf
]
Iran’s forays into Latin America
, Africa, and elsewhere are the product of an aggressive
¶ diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions
and more generally ¶ combating the present international order, which Tehran views as hostile to its interests. At ¶ present, Iran’s relationships with individual peripheral powers are not strong enough to achieve
¶ its goals, and thus not of critical concern to the US. The present weakness of Iran’s alliance
¶ network is brought about by divisions within Iran and its targeted partners, but also by sustained ¶ engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds with
¶ peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should
consider the following three broad ¶ strategies: ¶
Engage with peripheral countries
, but do not meddle. Some analysts have criticized the US for ignoring the ¶ periphery (especially Latin America) and thus allowing Iran to gain a foothold. As Iran’s ambitious and ¶ geographically unbounded strategy in seeking partners and “allies” demonstrates, the US cannot afford to ¶ completely ignore any region of the globe. That being said, in countries of
limited strategic interest it is
¶ beneficial to engage
without overreaching, especially when considering that
Iranian commitments have a
¶ tendency to eventually collapse under their own weight
(e.g. Senegal’s Seniran
Auto).
US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with
¶ the IRI
.
Fite ’12
[Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian
Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf
]
In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti-American sentiment
in combination ¶ with economic incentives to draw states into its “post-Western” camp
. Economically ¶ impoverished countries are drawn to
Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and
¶ mutual antipathy towards the US
provides rhetorical packaging for bilateral agreements. In the past decade
Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of the
¶
US like Venezuela
, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, but also to non-aligned states like Argentina ¶ and Brazil. Iran currently maintains 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers in Latin America. In ¶ addition to existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, and Venezuela, in recent ¶ years, Iran has opened embassies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, and ¶ Uruguay.
¶ 2 ¶ The
Islamic Republic’s diplomatic missions have resulted in lively rhetoric and
¶ impressive promises of cooperation, but they have not yet yielded strategic results that have a ¶ significant effect on greater US-Iranian competition.
Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian
Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” March 12, http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-impact-latin-america-africa-andperipheral-states ]
US competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess
, but a game where each side can modify at least some of the rules with each move. It is also a game that has been going on for some three decades. It is clear that it is also a game that is unlikely to be ended by better dialog and mutual understanding, and that Iran’s version of “democracy” is unlikely to change the way it is played in the foreseeable future.
¶ The Burke Chair at CSIS is preparing a detailed analysis of the history and character of this competition as part of a project supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation. This has led to the preparation of a new draft report entitled
Peripheral Competition Involving Latin America and Africa, which is now available on the CSIS web site at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120314_Iran_Chapter_XII_Peripheral_States.pdf
¶ This report shows that
Iran pursues cooperation
with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of the competition between the US and Iran in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic relationships or “partners” who can lessen the blow of international sanctions and generally oppose Western attempts to constrict its ambitions. These peripheral “partners,” located mainly in
Africa and
Latin America
, also serve as alternative markets for Iranian oil,
68

Earliest Bird ’13
Venezuela Affirmative provide diplomatic cover for Iran’s nuclear efforts, and aid Iran’s acquisition of goods proscribed by international sanctions.
¶ Tehran’s strategy pragmatically subordinates concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity to the goal of creating a coalition of
non- or anti-
Western states capable of influencing its competition with the United States
. The states involved are drawn to Iran by both promises of economic help—particularly in the energy sector—and by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose the Western international system.
¶ The Islamic Republic also portrays its present isolation by the US and Europe as a continuation of Western imperialism, and draws on its credentials as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement to elicit support from the disparate states throughout Africa and the Americas that have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading states.
¶ According to Iranian leaders, the IRI’s competition with the US and its allies is not a just a contest between states, but a clash of worldviews. The US represents an exploitative status quo, and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and interests of developing nations. Speaking to an audience in Nigeria in 2010,
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a decisive break with the present Western-dominated system: ¶ We have to develop a proper cooperation among the developing nations in order to wriggle ourselves from the domination of the western powers. And this effort is going on among the independent developing nations today. We have to establish a collective effort with a view to create a new international independent economic system that should be on the basis of justice.
¶ Though many of the countries Iran seeks to cooperate with are militarily and economically weak,
Tehran casts a wide net in trying to build an array of partners to counterbalance what it sees as Western dominance of the global order. Iran seeks to be the hub of a non-Western bloc, and intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world.
¶
US ability to push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network
of such countries is strongest in countries that benefit from US aid, trade
, or that lack a significant basis for ideological disagreement with US practices. While Iran’s overtures to peripheral states have the potential to weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran,
Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory
.
¶
It remains to be seen if Tehran can make good on the development commitments it has made to potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized
beyond a personal relationship between heads of state. Iran’s plan to restructure the international system in opposition to the Western-led model remains the vision of a few fringe governments and does not appear likely to spread.
69

Earliest Bird ’13
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Stubits ‘09 [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin
¶
American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A
¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from
The American
¶
University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin
¶
America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the
Wilson Center,
¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate
¶
Executive
Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners
¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America:
Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]
Douglas Farah, president of IBI Consultants and a Senior Fellow ¶ at the International Assessment and Strategy Center asserts that
Iran’s
¶ broadening presence in Latin America is promoted by the unwavering
¶ relationship between
Hugo
Chávez and
Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad , necessitated by Iran’s search for international political support, and fortified
¶ by anti-imperialist attitudes toward the United States.
As the dominant
¶ oil provider in the region, Venezuela connects Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, to Iran and facilitates their collaboration
. Moreover,
Iran’s diplomatic expansion into countries such as
¶
Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia reflect Ahmadinejad’s intentions to
¶ bolster political support amid international condemnation and sanctions
¶ in forums such as the Security Council and European Union . Farah clarifies that Iran’s relationship with Latin America is primarily political, not
¶ economic, given that most Latin American trade with the United States ¶ vastly outweighs commerce with Iran. Finally, mutual antagonism toward the United States unites Iran and some Latin American countries. ¶ The existence of a common enemy and the recognition that the United
¶ States has largely excluded Latin America from its post 9/11 agenda has ¶ forged their partnership and has created an opening for Iran to fill.
McCaul ’12
[Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for
Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-
12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf]
The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its
¶ growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela
. Ideologically speaking, both
¶ regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United
¶
States
.44 Economically speaking, the two countries have partnered
together in an attempt to ¶ survive and thrive despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its ¶ financial and trade systems.45
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Venezuela Affirmative
Gratius and Fürtig ’09 [Susanne Gratius, Senior researcher, Peace, Security & Human Rights
Programme, FRIDE, Henner Fürtig, Reseacher, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, ““Iran and
Venezuela: Bilateral alliance and global power projections,” online]
Both Iran and Venezuela are rentier states that use oil revenue as an instrument to gain political influence and to contain their enemies’ breadth of influence
. Combined, they represent 8 ¶ percent of global oil production.
Their recent bilateral partnership is based on the political
¶ affinities between
Presidents
Chávez and Ahmedinejad, who consider themselves as part of an alliance of energy-rich “rogue states” against the U nited
S tates.
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Giles ‘11 [Gregory, Assistant Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation and
Manager of its Weapons Proliferation Analysis Division, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from
Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” May, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/book/chapter5.pdf]
By definition, the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the
¶ failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy
— the deterrence of
¶ proliferation. Both the Obama administration and its predecessor publicly ¶ committed the United States to keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear ¶ weapons. So in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front
¶ that U.S. credibility – a key component of deterrence – had suffered a
¶ serious blow
, one that will generally make it harder subsequently to deter ¶ various threats from the Islamic Republic.
¶
Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined
¶ here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order
¶ than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency,
¶ clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of
¶ weapons of mass destruction
(
WMD
) to others.
At the end of this ¶ spectrum is the potential for direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian
¶ nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation
.
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Fleischman ’09 [Luis Fleischman is an adjunct professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida
Atlantic University, and an advisor to the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security
Policy in Washington, D.C., “The Nuclearization of Latin America?” inFocus Quarterly, Volume 3,
Number 4, Winter 2009, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1528/nuclearization-of-latin-america ]
Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez has an iron grip on his country, and has attempted aggressively to expand his reach into neighboring Latin
American nations. His open hostility toward Colombia and other Western allies has sparked an arms race in a region known for internal instability, but that rarely engages in hostilities between nations. Now, as Chavez cultivates a strong alliance with
the Islamic
Republic of
Iran
, which continues to inch closer to achieving a nuclear weapon, analysts are wondering: could there be a nuclear arms race in Latin America?
¶ Latin America in Context ¶ While Latin America has been a breeding ground of tumult in the last century, most of it was the result of internal strife and inner social and political conflict. Conflicts between Latin American nations have been rare. Exceptions include the war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, tensions between Chile and Argentina in 1978, and fighting between
Peru and Ecuador in 1995. These minor conflicts aside, Latin America has avoided regional conflict primarily because the larger powers—Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico—do not claim hegemony over their neighbors.
¶ The Rise of Chavez ¶ With the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, however, regional tensions are bubbling
to the surface. Since 1999, Chavez has been gradually undermining his country's democratic system by imposing various constitutional "reforms" that wrest control of the legislative branch, the courts, and the electoral council. Moreover, he has moved to pass educational laws aimed at indoctrinating students with Chavez's own "Bolivarian doctrine." Chavez, who has used the instruments of government to harass unions and human rights advocates, and to inhibit free speech and voting rights, is fast converting Venezuela into a totalitarian state under his absolute control.
¶ Chavez is now working to increase his power beyond Venezuela. In 2007, he presented a road map detailing his goal of consolidating his leadership over other countries willing to accept his social and political recipe in the "South American community." Indeed, Chavez seeks a hegemonic block of countries in Latin America under his control that could challenge the United States, a country Chavez rejects as imperialist and standing in the way of true 21st century, revolutionary socialism.
¶ To this end, Chavez leverages his country's multi-billion dollar oil revenue to interfere in other countries' affairs. He mostly supports and funds Latin American electoral candidates that share radical socialist views. This strategy has been a successful one for Chavez in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Dependent upon
Chavez's oil-based largesse, the leaders of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua adopted Chavez's ideology, and have sought to implement measures aimed at exercising tighter control over their populations.
¶ The summer 2009 crisis in Honduras, for example, was the direct result of meddling by Chavez. The Venezuelan strongman succeeded in influencing President Mel Zelaya to seek an indefinite term in office. This would have provided Zelaya with virtually unlimited power, and in the process strengthened Chavez's bid for regional hegemony.
¶ In the countries where his favorite candidates have not been successful, Chavez aggressively tries to influence the opposition. To this end, Chavez funded several violent rebellions in Peru, as well as Colombia, a country he views as a U.S. proxy and an archenemy of his revolution. Indeed, Chavez established a strong alliance with the Colombian guerillas known as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even facilitated the activities of the
Colombian drug cartels by allowing Venezuelan territory to be used by these groups. In addition to these destabilizing activities, Chavez also frequently speaks publicly about the possibility of war against Colombia, and tells his military to prepare for such an occurrence.
¶ The Arming of
Venezuela ¶ Currently, the Venezuelan army is no match for the Colombian army, which is far superior in numbers and training. Indeed,
Venezuela would likely lose a number of battles against other Latin American armies. For this reason, Venezuela recently secured a $2.2 billion line of credit from Russia for new arms purchases. According to their agreement, Venezuela will buy 92 T-72 battle tanks, Smerch rocket artillery systems, and the Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile system. In recent years, Venezuela has also acquired two-dozen Su-30MK2 fighter jets and received a license to manufacture AK-103 assault rifles.
¶ The arming of Venezuela has not gone unnoticed. Analysts of Latin American affairs are now increasingly wary of Chavez's build-up, particularly in light of the Venezuelan leader's close relationship with Iran, a budding nuclear power. Indeed, it would come as no surprise if Chavez sought a nuclear weapon. After all, he is a leader who seeks broader power in the region.
¶
Does Chavez Want Nukes?
¶
Latin America is today a nuclear free zone
. In 1967, 24 Latin American countries signed a multilateral agreement banning the manufacture, acquisition, testing, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons in Latin America (The Treaty of
Tlatelolco). The need for the treaty became clear after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
¶ For a while, Brazil and Argentina maintained an ambiguous posture towards the treaty; they supported the ban on weapons, but sought to enhance their civilian nuclear programs. Since 1990, however, both countries have become parties to a non-proliferation treaty and pledged full commitment to a nuclear weapons free zone. Both countries have allowed mutual nuclear inspections. Observers have even highlighted the Brazil-Argentina nuclear agreement as an ideal model to be applied worldwide, particularly for India and Pakistan.
¶ In 2005, Chavez announced his desire to develop a civil nuclear program. He reportedly raised the possibility of gaining assistance from Argentina and Brazil, since both nations still maintained facilities. When Chavez further called for cooperation between these countries and Iran, both governments quietly refused.
¶ Venezuela and Iran ¶ During the visit of
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to Caracas in March 2005, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement of commercial and technological cooperation. Chavez took the opportunity to publicly defend Iran's right to produce atomic energy, and continue research in the area of nuclear development. Chavez soon issued several other statements to this effect, thereby becoming one of the most outspoken supporters of the Iranian nuclear program.
¶ In March 2006, the two countries established a $200 million development fund and signed bilateral deals to build homes and exploit petroleum. Venezuelan opposition groups soon warned that the deal also might have involved the transfer of uranium from Iran to
Venezuela. Israel's external security apparatus, the Mossad, then provided the exact locations of uranium production in Venezuela. The existence of Venezuelan facilities soon was corroborated by a Venezuelan nuclear expert, an Israeli official, and in September 2009, the Venezuelan minister of mining, Rodolfo Sanz.
¶ Chavez, for his part, seems content to publicize the existence of a Venezuelan nuclear program. He declared that
Venezuela and Iran are working to build a nuclear village in Venezuela
, which "will serve peaceful purposes."
Subsequent reports indicate that the two countries are cooperating in matters related to uranium extraction
. Former
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Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roger Noriega also suggests that
Venezuela could become home to an
Iranian nuclear arsenal
. Indeed, Iran and Venezuela signed an agreement on military-related matters in November 2008, but the content of the agreement remains largely unknown.
¶ No Nukes… Yet ¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons is a reasonable next step for Chavez. A nuclear weapon could provide him with the respect, fear, and deterrence he seeks to carry out his imperial aspirations. Indeed, the bomb could be a short cut to earning the respect of political foes and wielding enough power to intimidate regional or world players
.
¶ Perhaps with this in mind, Venezuela signed an agreement with Russia in September 2008 to build a nuclear power plant. The Russian company in charge of the project would be Atomstroyexport, the same firm assisting Iran with its Bushehr nuclear plant.
¶ Still, it must be stated clearly that there is no credible evidence to indicate that Venezuela has even the most basic infrastructure needed for a nuclear program. As one senior advisor to Brazil's foreign ministry stated in 2005, "Venezuela cannot fulfill these [nuclear] ambitions since it has no nuclear infrastructure and no nuclear engineer." This still holds true today.
¶
The fear of a nuclear Venezuela is based almost entirely on the close and continuing relationship between Venezuela and Iran
. Venezuela provides assistance to Iran in skirting financial sanctions. For example, Chavez has agreed to sell refined petroleum to Iran to help the Mullahs offset the potential damage of Western sanctions against its oil supply chain. Chavez also supports Iran through diplomatic rants against Israel and the
United States, and serves as Iran's top source of rhetorical support in Latin America.
¶ Iran is appreciative of Chavez, who has yet to cash in on the good will he has created. The fear is that the Venezuelan leader might ask his friends in Tehran to not just help him create a nuclear program, but rather to simply supply him with weapons.
¶ The Threat in Perspective ¶ The White House, to date, is less threatened by Venezuela. Dan Restrepo,
Senior Director for Latin America at the National Security Council, stated in a recent interview with El Nuevo Herald that he does not see
Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security, stating that the days of the "hot and cold war" are over. Similarly, the Organization of
American States (OAS) has largely ignored Chavez's bellicose public statements and foreign policies.
¶ Iran, one could argue further, does not yet have an operational nuclear weapons program. If Western diplomacy and sanctions are effective, Tehran will not be able to provide Chavez with the weapons he seeks.
¶
If
, however,
Western efforts fail
, and Iran becomes a nuclear power,
Venezuela can serve as both a source of instability in Latin America, and a strategic threat to the U nited
S tates, with nuclear weapons in
America's back yard
. As such, as the Iranian crisis reaches it peak, the activities of Hugo Chavez must be monitored closely.
Monroe 9-12 -12 [Robert, vice admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Nonproliferation requires enforcement,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-nonproliferation-requires-enforcement]
Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world
. For twenty years two irresponsible and belligerent rogue states have been working intensely to develop nuclear weapons production capabilities. The world has protested and wrung its hands. North Korea has now tested primitive weapons, and Iran is close to producing them. When North Korea succeeds in weaponizing its designs, it will sell them to anyone desiring to buy – including terrorists. Neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan will be forced to go nuclear in self-protection.
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons – and its likely willingness to give them to proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela
, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, rush to protect themselves.
With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos, a return from which appears impossible
.
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Stubits ‘09 [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin
¶
American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A
¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from
The American
¶
University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin
¶
America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the
Wilson Center,
¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate
¶
Executive
Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners
¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America:
Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]
Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region and in the United States as to what role supportive countries like
¶
Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear
¶ tech nologies. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has expressed concern saying, “ We are very worried
and I can’t refrain from saying so, ¶ that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood
. This is very serious, ¶ very worrying,”19 and with seemingly good reason. In September 2009, ¶ “Iran said it test-fired short-range missiles, just days after it confirmed ¶ it is building a second uranium-enrichment facility.”20 Rodolfo Sanz,
¶ Venezuela’s minister of basic industries and mining has indicated that ¶
Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium ,” and while he
¶ rejects allegations that Venezuela is supplying Iran’s nuclear program, ¶ he did confirm that “Iran is helping us with geophysical aerial probes
¶ and geochemical analyses.”21 In September 2009,
Chávez announced an
¶ agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran
.22
¶ Asked if Washington is worried,
Thomas Shannon, then the top ¶ State Department official for Latin America, responded, “
What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links
¶ to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in
Buenos Aires ,”
¶ concluding, “Past is prologue.”23 As far back as November 2007, the ¶ United States House of Representatives passed a resolution “expressing ¶ concern about threats to the U.S. by deepening economic and security ¶ ties between Iran and like-minded regimes in the
Western Hemisphere, ¶ including Venezuela.” The resolution had its base in “evidence that ¶ Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization, raises millions from counterfeit products produced in the tri-border region of ¶ Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and growing efforts backed by Iran to ¶ foment anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.”24 It is therefore no surprise that in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Chávez
¶ government of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah ¶ facilitators and fundraisers.” 25 In a hearing before the
Senate Armed ¶ Services Committee, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, then Commander ¶ of the U.S. Southern Command, testified that “We have seen… an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian government in this region.” He continued, “ That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of
¶ terrorism, and
Hezbollah .”26 It is relevant to note that at the printing of ¶ this publication, there is global controversy over Ahmadinejad’s nomination of
Ahmad Vahidi as the minister of defense for Iran. Vahidi is one ¶ of five Iranian officials wanted by Interpol to face charges in Argentina ¶ for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.27 Without providing any specifics, Stavridis also ¶ testified, “We have been seeing in Colombia a direct connection between Hezbollah activity and narco-trafficking activity.”28 In October
¶ 2008, following a two-year investigation, 36 suspects were arrested in ¶ Colombia on charges related to cocaine smuggling and money laundering.
Gladys Sanchez, the lead investigator for the case said, “The profits ¶ from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah. This is an example ¶ of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists.” 29
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McCaul ’12 [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for
Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-
12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf]
Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States
. The Congressional ¶ Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 ¶ homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States.
Of growing concern and potentially a
¶ more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of
Middle East terrorist
¶ organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western
Hemisphere, to
¶ exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected
. This second edition ¶ emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing
¶ presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths ¶ into the United States.
¶ During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for ¶ violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim ¶ extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to ¶ special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were ¶ radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al ¶ Awlaki, killed in
2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists ¶ around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army
Major Nidal Hassan, the accused ¶ Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of ¶ Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In ¶ several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United ¶ States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist ¶ arm of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the ¶ United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. ¶ In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on ¶ Osama bin
Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use
¶ operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to ¶ conduct terror operations.3
¶ The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al ¶ Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who ¶ then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law.
Of equal concern is the ¶ possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil ¶ into a weapon of mass destruction.
¶ Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program
, and the uncertainty of whether Israel ¶ might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran
¶ or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation
. ¶ Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has ¶ a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. ¶ As this report explains, the United States tightened ¶ security at airports and land ports of entry in the ¶ wake of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, ¶ but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link ¶ in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down ¶ this path of least resistance, and with them the ¶ terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The ¶ federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the ¶ dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to ¶ enter.
¶ One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 ¶ terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda ¶ before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial ¶ challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the ¶ Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war.
Now we are
¶ faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between
¶
Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations
. Similar to the Cuban ¶ missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the ¶ imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to ¶ present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our ¶ Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America.
Ayson ‘10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic
Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack
, and especially
an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more
of the states
that possess them.
In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
between the superpowers
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. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be
definitely ruled out
in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular
, if the act of nuclear terrorism
occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China
, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to
? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
Washington’s early response
to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might
also raise the possibility of an unwanted
(and nuclear aided) confrontation
with Russia and/or
China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s
armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert
. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force
(and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might
grow
, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One farfetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or
China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither
“for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability
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Fugitt ’12 [Kristina Michele Fugitt, School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy
¶
Norwich
University, “The Export of Iran’s Nuclear Program to Latin America: Implications for United States
Security,” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Fugitt%20Iran%20LA.pdf]
The disgust of the United States of America, shared by
Chavez and Ahmadinejad
, fuel ¶ their relationship. The two leaders have historically done what they can to be in an “indirect
¶ conflict” with us
. Now they are supporting each other as members of an “international outsider’s
¶ club.” Ahmadinejad’s last visit to Caracas resulted in playfully delivered threats from both he ¶ and Chavez. In this case, the United States waited for a problem to erupt before taking heed. ¶ Now that the leaders are using playful gestures, and applying indirect threats, the U.S. has started ¶ to wonder if Iran is exporting their nuclear program to South America. Regrettably,
Venezuela
¶ is in close proximity to our shores which poses a new threat
. ¶ The history between Iran and Venezuela is quite strong and has been so for many ¶ decades. The beginning of this alliance started when they founded the Organization of ¶ Petroleum Exporting Countries
(Opec) “to ensure themselves better terms from foreign oil ¶ companies.” Venezuela has enjoyed several benefits from this relationship with the promise of ¶ many more. It was reported in 2008 that the two nations have signed a variety of agreements in ¶ agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela, and the ¶ manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. Iran and Venezuela also reported in April ¶ 2009 that a there was a new development bank for “economic projects in both countries, with ¶ each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital (Sullivan, 2010).”
¶ More problematic for the United States is that the two countries began international
¶ flights connecting Iran and Syria with Caracas. Immigration concerns have surfaced in light of
¶
9/11 with many documented cases of terrorists gaining entry into the Americas with fake
¶ passports, visas, and other “allegedly official” documents. Now that there are flights leaving
¶ directly from “hot-spots” in the
Middle East and going to Venezuela, there are more “lesscomplicated” ways for terrorists to gain access to the U.S
.
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Harper ’12 [Liz Harper, Master’s Degree in Latin American Studies, Political Economy from the
University of California, Los Angeles, Senior Editor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hoover Institution Media fellow at Stanford University, “Venezuela “Not Cooperating” on Antiterrorism Efforts,” August 2, http://americasquarterly.org/venezuela-not-cooperating-on-antiterrorism-efforts]
Ambassador Daniel
Benjamin , the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, released the Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 this week and cited Venezuela as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts
” for the sixth consecutive year. The report is the U.S.’s annual evaluation of terrorism activities in countries around the world.
¶ This year’s report highlighted Iran’s increasing influence and activities in the hemisphere: “The most disturbing manifestation of this was the Iranian plot against the Saudi Ambassador to the
United States; the plot involved enlisting criminal elements from a transnational criminal organization [the Mexican Zeta cartel] to assassinate the
Saudi Ambassador by bombing a restaurant in Washington DC.” Disturbing indeed.
¶ Benjamin, speaking at a press briefing, flagged increasing concern for “Iran’s support for terrorism and Hezbollah’s activities” worldwide. Hezbollah is the Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militant group designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.
¶ “They’ve both stepped up their level of terrorist plotting over the past year and are engaging in their most active and aggressive campaigns since the 1990s,” Benjamin told reporters.
¶ Amid this most “aggressive” campaign, the report finds,
Hezbollah sympathizers and supporters are also reportedly engaged in fundraising and support activity in Venezuela. All the while, Venezuela and Iran continue to strengthen their alliance through “economic, financial, and diplomatic cooperation […] as well as limited military related agreements.”
¶ In May 2011, the U.S. levied sanctions against Venezuela’s national oil company for violating the Iran Sanctions Act, and then reimposed sanctions against the Venezuela Military Industries Company for violating the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-Proliferation Act. ¶
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’ coziness with dictators goes beyond Iran. He provides both material and moral support to Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad, who currently may be responsible for the deaths of 20,000 people. Then there’s that storied “bromance” between Chávez and the Castro brothers, who continue to rule the Cuban island with an iron fist. ¶ Beyond the rogue relations, the report mentions that a number of
Venezuelans, including senior officials, have been designated for their connections to terrorist organizations, like Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
(Basque Homeland and Freedom—ETA) separatist group and Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia—FARC) guerrilla organization, and various drug cartels. ¶ For example, in September 2011, the U.S. designated four senior
Venezuelan officials—including Defense Minister Henry Rangel—as “acting for or on behalf of the [FARC], in direct support of the group's narcotics and arms trafficking activities.”
¶ How does this all add up?
Venezuela is a country that provides support to foreign terrorist organizations
; it violates non-proliferation agreements; its senior officials are designated drug traffickers; it actively fosters relations with other state sponsors of terrorism (e.g., Iran, Syria and Cuba); it sneers at international norms such as freedom of the press and hemispheric institutions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. ¶ The sum of these parts equals that Venezuela isn’t just “not cooperating” on antiterrorism, but it is active in supporting terrorism.
It is a player in worldwide terrorism . Beyond this State Department report there have been many other, more chilling examples of Venezuela’s nefarious activities—some potentially posing harm to U.S. interests. This prompts the next logical question: Why isn’t Venezuela designated as a state sponsor of terrorism? ¶ Otherwise, how many more years will the U.S. chide Venezuela for failing to cooperate on antiterrorism
efforts? Perhaps it is waiting for some cataclysmic event, like a deadly attack by terrorists trained in Venezuela, to rationalize such a bold move. ¶ There’s also the thinking that if the U.S. waits long enough, an ill
Chávez
—whose disease remains shrouded in secrecy— may perish, and that his death may usher in friendly relations again between Venezuela and the U.S.
But this approach relies too heavily on a naïve hope that the U.S. can just bide its time for the Chávez regime’s inevitable collapse. Because what would happen next?
Ayson ‘10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic
Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack
, and especially
an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more
of the states
that possess them.
In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
between the superpowers started by third parties
. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as
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Venezuela Affirmative the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be
definitely ruled out
in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular
, if the act of nuclear terrorism
occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China
, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to
? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
Washington’s early response
to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might
also raise the possibility of an unwanted
(and nuclear aided) confrontation
with Russia and/or
China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s
armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert
. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force
(and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might
grow
, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One farfetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or
China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither
“for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability
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Noriega ’12 [Roger, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has served as a U.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western Hemisphere Affairs “Latin America is crucial to US competitiveness,” http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness/]
A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success
and security. However, the US economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, the
United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing
.
¶ The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.
¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement
, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership
.
¶ Expanding
Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration ¶
An aggressive
trade promotion and foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives
.
¶ Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall.
Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle class.
And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business.
¶ Already the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil
, onethird of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies.
Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.
¶
The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities
.
Green ‘09
[Michael J., Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Asia Times Online, 3.26.9, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/KC26Dk01.html AD 6/30/09]
Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts
at the World Bank and the US Central Intelligence
Agency are just beginning to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year
. For the most part, the focus has been on fragile states such as some in Eastern
Europe
. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on great powers. It is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict
. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London
Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting.
There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face
. A disillusioned rising power? Four areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so far the current financial crisis has not changed Asia's fundamental strategic picture. China is not replacing the US as regional hegemon, since the leadership in Beijing is too nervous about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it internationally. Predictions that the US will be brought to its knees because China is the leading holder of US debt often miss key points. China's currency controls and full employment/export-oriented growth strategy give Beijing few choices other than buying US
Treasury bills or harming its own economy. Rather than creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the Chinese
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Venezuela Affirmative economy to generate greater long-term consumer demand at home, Chinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status quo (though Beijing deserves credit for short-term efforts to stimulate economic growth). The greater danger with China is not an eclipsing of US leadership, but instead the kind of shift in strategic orientation that happened to Japan after the Great Depression. Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before 1932 and sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard.
The worldwide depression and protectionism of the 1930s devastated the newly exposed Japanese economy and contributed directly to militaristic and autarkic policies in Asia as the Japanese people reacted against what counted for globalization at the time. China today is similarly converging with the global economy
, and many experts believe China needs at least 8% annual growth to sustain social stability. Realistic growth predictions for 2009 are closer to
5%. Veteran China hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the Lunar New Year holiday last month to find factories closed and jobs gone. There were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and Chinese leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen next year either. However, the economic slowdown has only just begun and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in China between the ruling communist party and the 1.3 billion Chinese who have come to see
President Hu Jintao's call for "harmonious society" as inextricably linked to his promise of "peaceful development". If the Japanese example is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a dangerous path from economic nationalism to strategic revisionism in
China too. Dangerous states
It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North
Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state
. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy.
It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy . So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system.
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Orhangazi ‘11 [Özgür, Assistant Professor of Economics at the Roosevelt University Chicago, Ph.D. from the University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Contours of Alternative Policy Making in Venezuela,”
November 2011, Political Economy Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts Amherst, http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251-300/WP275.pdf]
Given the dominant role of the oil production in the economy, it is not ¶ surprising to see that the first large-scale changes took place in this area.
The fact ¶ that in
Venezuela
the state has
historically been at the center of appropriating and
¶ distributing the oil rent to the rest of the society, had created the conditions for
¶ inherently more interventionist policies and political institutions
(Grinberg 2010). ¶ While domestically increasing state control over oil industry, internationally the ¶ government set itself out to strengthen OPEC in an effort to increase oil prices. ¶ Increased OPEC coordination and adhering to the production quotas, that were ¶ previously not followed by the PDVSA in an attempt to target market share rather ¶ than price, contributed to the increase in the price of oil
(Lander 2008: 13). ¶ In 2001, oil royalties were increased from 16.6 percent to 30 percent. This was a ¶ significant increase given that most foreign oil companies had previously negotiated ¶ rates much lower than the 16.6 percent. Especially following the failed April 2002 ¶ coup and the 2002-2003 shutdown of the oil industry, PDVSA continuously ¶ increased its control in the oil sector. In 2005 private companies with operating ¶ agreements with the PDVSA were transformed into joint ventures, where the ¶ PDVSA would have a majority stake, with the exception of Exxon Mobile who ¶ refused to participate in this transformation and whose fields were as a result entirely ¶ taken over by the
PDVSA (Wilpert 2007: 96). In 2007, the Orinoco Belt joint ¶ ventures were turned into PDVSA controlled projects and in May 2009, PDVSA ¶ further integrated subcontracting companies into its body in an effort to strengthen ¶ state control in the oil industry.
¶ Increased control over the oil industry resulted in a greater share of the oil ¶ wealth flowing into the coffers of the PDVSA. The new hydrocarbons law aimed to ¶ use the income derived from oil to fund social projects in health and education and ¶ to allocate part of the income to a macroeconomic stabilization fund.
The ¶ redistribution of this wealth to the poorest sections of the society was a priority for ¶ the Venezuelan government, given the widespread poverty and immense ¶ inequalities. This redistribution took the form of various extensive social programs, ¶ called missions, in health, education, provision of basic consumption goods and so [7] ¶ on. These
social programs were directly funded by the PDVSA’s oil revenues in
¶ order to bypass the state bureaucracy as the government considered the state to have
¶ inefficient administrative capabilities
which could not be reformed quickly whereas it ¶ deemed these social programs urgent. ¶ By
2009, there were 25 different missions operating, among which health, ¶ education and food missions occupied a large place. Mision Barrio
Adentro, which ¶ began in April 2003, brought 20,000 Cuban doctors to around 1,600 medical offices ¶ scattered around in poor neighborhoods to make essential health services accessible ¶ to everyone. Over time, this program expanded to bring more advanced health
¶ services and train Venezuelan doctors to replace the Cuban doctors.7
¶
Education
¶ missions included preschool
(Mision Simoncito), literacy
(Mision Robinson 1), primary ¶ education (Mision Robinson 2), secondary education (Mision Ribas), higher education ¶ (Mision Sucre), and vocational training and job creation programs (Mision Vuelvan ¶ Caras).
Other examples
of these social programs included programs for peasant
¶ welfare
(Mision Zamora), mining communities (Mision Piar), indigenous populations ¶ (Mision Guacaipuro), and food distribution
(Mision Mercal). Mercal, one of the most ¶ ambitious of these programs, is a state-run food distribution network. It is estimated ¶ that 40-47 percent of the population buy food through it at prices that are on ¶ average 41-44 percent lower than market prices (Datanilisis 2006). According to the ¶ National Statistics Institute’s numbers, households that buy at least one item from ¶ Mercal constituted 54.21 percent of total households. A large number of programs ¶ were also run to provide infrastructure services such as water distribution, ¶ electrification, transportation, housing and so on. The combination of all these ¶ missions
was to become the
‘Christ’ mission whose central aim was defined as
¶ eradicating poverty
by 2012.8
¶
These social programs contributed to declining poverty rates, increased literacy
¶ and schooling, improved health indicators
and so on. In addition to these, oil ¶ revenues have been used in many different areas, including supporting industrial ¶ initiatives, sponsoring the formation of cooperatives and financing the ¶ nationalizations. Part of the oil rent was distributed to other countries in various forms, including donations, lending and selling of oil with advantageous financing ¶ terms. For example, through PetroCaribe, a 14-country energy agreement launched ¶ in 2005, “Venezuela provides $9.7 billion worth of oil to member-states, of which ¶ $3.7 billion is financed over 25 years at 1% interest. This guarantees supply for ¶ countries with small economies” (PDVSA 2010).9
Richard Watson, 1977 (professor of philosophy @ Washington University, World Hunger and Moral
Obligation, pg. 122)
The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However,
although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that people’s interest in preserving the human species is
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Venezuela Affirmative based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of equity is morally superior to the principle of survival, we can conclude again that food should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race .
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Daly ‘12 [John Daly, CEO of U.S.-Central Asia Biofuels Ltd, Oilprice.com, “If Chavez Dies, What Next for U.S. - Venezuelan Energy Relations?” http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/South-America/If-Chavez-Dies-
What-Next-for-U.S.-Venezuelan-Energy-Relations.html
]
So, if illness does sideline President Chavez, what might happen?
¶ First, given the enormity of the nation’s energy reserves, it is most unlikely that foreign countries, starting with the U.S. will sit on their hands, but instead begin to manoeuvre behind the scenes to find and promote a pliable candidate and administration willing to work with them. As
Maduro
is largely unknown, in the event of Chavez being incapacitated, it is likely that he will come under enormous foreign pressure
, little of which is likely to be made public.
¶ Washington’s wish list would include two primary elements – an end to Venezuelan radical rhetoric and ties to such states as Cuba and Iran, and increased U.S. access to those oil reserves. In May 2011 the U.S. imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PVDSA), and the country’s fiscal crown jewel. President Chavez has used PVDSA as a cash cow for his social reform plans
- between
2004 and 2010 PDVSA contributed $61.4 billion to social development funds. According to PDVSA figures, Venezuela currently has 77.5 billion barrels of oil reserves, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. PDVSA has a production capacity, including its strategic associations and operating agreements, of 4 million barrels per day, the highest production capacity in the Western Hemisphere.
¶ But it is President Chavez’s nationalist approach to the country’s energy assets that is likely to be the first target of foreign governments in a post-Chavez Venezuela. In February 2007 President Chavez announced a new decree to nationalize the last remaining oil production sites that were under foreign majority company control, to take effect on 1
May, allowing the foreign companies to negotiate the nationalization terms
. Under the new regulations, the earlier joint ventures, involving ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Statoil, ConocoPhillips and BP, were transformed to give PDVSA a minimum 60 percent stake. The process completed a government initiative begun in 2005, when the Chavez administration transformed earlier “operating agreements” in Venezuela’s older oil fields into joint ventures with a wide variety of foreign companies. Thirty out of 32 such operating agreements were transformed, with only two being challenged in court. Most foreign companies accepted the new arrangements, including Chevron, Statoil, Total and BP, but America’s ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused. It therefore seems likely that a new Maduro administration would hear about compensation issues during any first meeting with the U.S. ambassador
.
¶
Given relative inefficiency and capital starved nature of PDVSA for major expansion projects, calls to loosen up the country’s energy sector may be hard for Maduro to resist
.
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Kurmanaev and Bierman 1-25 -13 [Anatoly Kurmanaev and Stephen Bierman, Bloomberg, “Chavez
Cancer Freezes Venezuela’s Overseas Oil Funding,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-
25/chavez-s-cancer-freezes-oil-funding-from-russia-to-india-energy.html
]
Venezuela’s $100 billion oil industry is seeing the first drop in funding in five years from some of its closest partners
, as concern mounts President Hugo Chavez’s battle with cancer is creating a political vacuum, people familiar with the matter said.
¶
The government, which for a decade has disclosed credit lines from China
when they’re signed, has announced none since April
, according to a report released Jan. 13 by the National Autonomous University of Mexico, known as
UNAM. Russian and Indian companies are withholding planned investments in Venezuelan oilfields, according to eight oil company executives and consultants who declined to be identified because they weren’t authorized to talk about the matter publicly.The cooling by governments allied to Chavez in his 14th year in office contrasts with growing interest among private investors. They’ve driven up bonds of Petroleos de
Venezuela SA, the state oil producer known as PDVSA, to a record this month on bets Chavez’s successor will reduce state control of the economy.
Delays in funding threaten the ability of South America’s largest oil producer to reverse declining output.
“Given the precarious political situation in Venezuela, these countries are not increasing their lending ,” Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue think tank, said by phone from
Washington. “It’s a wait-and-see mentality.”
Kurmanaev and Bierman 1-25 -13 [Anatoly Kurmanaev and Stephen Bierman, Bloomberg, “Chavez
Cancer Freezes Venezuela’s Overseas Oil Funding,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-
25/chavez-s-cancer-freezes-oil-funding-from-russia-to-india-energy.html
]
China and Venezuela signed an average of 29 commercial agreements at each annual ministerial meeting held since 2001, a survey of Venezuelan government statements shows.
Ramirez returned from Beijing in early December without announcing any new funding deals for the first time since 2008.
¶
“The meeting did not go well for the Venezuelans ,” Thomas O’Donnell, a petroleum analyst affiliated with U.S.’ New School University, said by telephone from Berlin Jan.
12. “ The Chinese have grown frustrated with the chaos surrounding Chavez .”
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Gresser 3-15 -13 [Ed Gresser directs Progressive Economy, a trade and global-economy research programme, at GlobalWorks Foundation in Washington, DC., “Lopsided Sino-US ties,” http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-
1.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2013/May/opinion_May29.xml&section=opinion]
But the view from the top is more troubling. From this vantage point, the relationship’s troubles are multiplying, as longestablished disputes over economics and security merge with one another
.
¶ So far, it hasn’t happened. When the US
Trade Representative published its lists on May 1st, it opted not to give China the Priority Foreign Country title. The decision puts China on notice that the most significant action is not far away.
¶ Tackling a problem directly can, of course, be helpful. Sometimes simple acknowledgement can settle it or at least reduce its severity. For example, congressional complaints and drafting bills may well have forced US executive-branch and Chinese government attention to currency policy. China’s currency rate did rise by about 30 per cent, and for the time being, Chinese surpluses have narrowed and American deficits declined. Likewise, public warnings may suggest to those responsible for cyberespionage that their actions carry a cost.
¶ In a larger sense, though, the controversy over cyber-espionage suggests somber trends at the top of government. These are described in 2012 in Addressing Strategic Distrust, a Brookings Institution dialogue written jointly by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi. The long-time eminences of Sino-American relations observe that despite 60 official “dialogues,” elaborate economic workprograms, regular presidential summits and consultations, the central feature of the official US -China relations is “that strategic distrust is growing on both sides and that this perception can, if it festers, create a self-fulfilling prophecy of overall mutual antagonism .” ¶ If scholars like Lieberthal and Wang are correct, the cyber-spying clash can be seen as a problem in a long succession of mileposts in the relationship’s long-term deterioration, and if the Mandiant report is correct, one that fuses security-based concerns about Chinese military policy with business-community anger over intellectual property
.
Tania ’12
[Maxime, Master of Science (M.Sc.), International Relations and Affairs from the University of Amsterdam, master’s thesis on China’s energy security in Venezuelan politics, “China’s energy security
¶ strategy towards Venezuela,” July 1, http://epa.iias.asia/files/Maxime%20Tania%20-
%20Chinas%20energy%20security%20strategy%20towards%20Venezuela%20-
%20Transnationalization%20and%20the%20geopolitical%20impact%20of%20the%20Sino-
Venezuelan%20relationship.pdf]
However, it seems that
China is conducting either a defensive oil diplomacy strategy of coping
¶ with the U.S. and would prefer to avoid confrontations . First of all, this is due to the fact that China’s
¶ domestic energy consumption is still formed primarily for its demand for coal. In recent years, China ¶ showed initiatives to reduce the usage of coal and increase the consumption of oil and gas. China has a ¶ domestic oil production, certainly not enough to absorb its oil demand, but this nevertheless means that ¶ China is not very dependent on its oil imports, due to its strategy of diversifying its supplies and suppliers ¶ of oil which reduces its oil dependence. As China has been rising rapidly over the last decades, oil has ¶ become an important component to empower its economy, but its oil diplomacy towards the oil-producing ¶ countries should not be valued as aggressive or threatening. This is due to the fact that
China and the U.S.
¶ focus on different sources of supply to import their oil. The U.S.’ main oil imports sources are Canada and
¶
Mexico as they are located much closer with less risks involved. As China is concerned about its energy
106
¶ security and finds ways to diversify its supplies, China obtains its oil imports from, among others, the
¶
Persian Gulf and Middle Eastern countries
. China is aware of the entanglement in these highly geopolitical ¶ areas, and the fierce competition for oil with other consuming countries. This is the reason why China aims ¶ to diversify its oil supplies allowing not to be heavily depending on oil imports from these areas. Therefore, ¶ China seeks bilateral oil trade with different parts of the world such as with
Venezuela. Certainly, the U.S. ¶ also imports oil from Arab OPEC countries, but this includes a quite modest share of its total oil import. ¶ And so in this case, China is not really contravening the U.S. in its ability to import oil from that region, ¶ nor is it really affecting the U.S. in Latin
America as it concerns oil business. In short, according to both ¶ China and the U.S.’ oil diplomacy towards other nations, they both have different focus and suppliers. The ¶ two countries are both oil-importing countries and will benefit both from limited power for oil-producing ¶ countries (and thus OPEC), and share the goal of keeping international oil prices low. In this light, the U.S. and China are likely to cooperate on energy issues rather than to compete ¶ with and hinder each other. An oil crisis for one country, often affects other countries in a wider context. ¶
However, the fact that China is a rising super power is more of a challenge to the U.S.’ global position. The
¶ expansion of political relations between China and controversial regimes in the world can cause a threat to ¶ the U.S.’ national security. The situation around Iran might cause friction between China and the U.S., as ¶ Iran is China’s second largest source of imported oil and the U.S. has been boycotting Iran to some
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Venezuela Affirmative extent. ¶ Another important fact is that China has a limited naval capability. China’s attempt of safeguarding and/or ¶ disrupting sea-lanes, primarily in the Persian Gulf, would at first mean strong counter-moves by other ¶ countries and, second, could be very counterproductive. In fact,
China is likely to fall back on U.S.
¶ protection to guarantee the security of its sea-lanes for oil
(Hongyi,
2007: 531). And thus,
China would
¶ clearly prefer to avoid confrontation around oil issues with the U.S., and instead focus most of its efforts in
¶ securing its oil routes to find alternative links over land through pipelines and railways
.
Bader ’11
(Jeffrey A. Bader 11, visiting scholar at the China Center at Brookings, “U.S.-China Senior Dialogue: Maintaining the Balance”,
May 6, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0506_strategic_economic_dialogue_bader.aspx
The S&ED comes at a time when
U.S.-China relations are in fundamentally sound condition
.
President
Hu
Jintao’s visit
to the United States was generally assessed as
setting a realistic
tone and achieving successes in a relationship that will always be marked by frictions
. President Obama, who will be involved in the S&ED, has put a high priority on U.S.-
China relations, and the two sides have cooperated
, within limits, on major security issues
, including Iran, Korea, Sudan,
Libya, and nuclear security. From the U.S. perspective, it will certainly not hurt that the meeting comes only a week after the successful raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden, which sends a message of U.S. strength and credibility in a relationship where those qualities are always the subject of Chinese scrutiny.
The U nited
S tates and China have developed reasonable expectations about both the possibilities and limits of cooperation
, which will reduce the chances of future miscalculation
. All of these subjects, plus broader developments in the Middle East, will be on the agenda of the S&ED.
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Businessweek 5-8 -13 [“Cyberattacks a growing irritant in US-China ties,” http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-05-08/cyberattacks-a-growing-irritant-in-us-china-ties]
Signs are growing that the sustained surge in cyberattacks emanating from China is imperiling its relations with the
U.S., lending urgency to fledgling efforts by both governments to engage on the issue
.
¶ The Pentagon this week said China appeared to be cyberspying against the U.S. government, the first time it has made such an assertion in its annual report on Chinese military power. A bill introduced in the Senate on Tuesday would require the president to block imports of products using stolen U.S. technology or made by companies implicated in computer theft.
¶
Washington's sudden focus on Chinese hacking comes after rising complaints from U.S. businesses about theft of trade secrets
. Amid growing evidence that the People's Liberation Army and other state-backed groups are behind the infiltrations, Beijing's statements that the cyberhacking allegations are groundless -- repeated anew
Wednesday by the Chinese Defense Ministry -- are being broadly dismissed.
¶ "
Hacking has become a significant sore spot in the U.S.-China relationship," said
Abe
Denmark
, senior director of the National Bureau of Asian Research, an independent U.S.based think tank. "
It encompasses security, trade and intellectual property rights, and has become an issue of strategic significance to Washington
."
Twining 5-3 -13 [Dan, Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a thinktank and foundation based in Washington, DC, where he leads a 15-member team working on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West, “The dangerous domestic politics of U.S.-China relations,” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/03/the_dangerous_domestic_politics_of_us_china_relatio ns]
Over the past six months,
China and the United States have experienced political transitions that allow the leaders of both countries to focus on bilateral relations free from the pressures of domestic political campaigns
. With political maneuvering among China's elites for spots on the Standing Committee of the Politburo finally over, the country's leaders can return to the business of governing the world's largest population. In the United States, President Obama's reelection has been accompanied by the appointment of a new team of foreign policy managers.
But rather than freeing up Washington and
Beijing to cooperate more fulsomely, the domestic political frictions produced by the bilateral relationship are, like the structural tensions between the established power and its rising challenger, intensifying
.
¶ On the one hand, changes in President Obama's second-term cabinet mean that
U.S.-China relations are being handled by a more dovish set of managers
than those who drove the first-term "rebalance" towards Asia.
Ironically, this kind of shift traditionally has led to more discord in U.S.-China relations than when American leaders were clear and consistent
in their policies toward China -- hence Mao Zedong's famous assertion to President Nixon that "I like rightists" and the stability of
U.S.-China relations over the course of the George W. Bush administration.
¶ For instance, Secretary of State John Kerry indicated in his Senate confirmation hearing that he was not convinced of the need for the "increased military ramp-up" in Asia. Chinese observers reportedly believed that this signaled a diminishment of the U.S. commitment to the "pivot," which in their view ended when Hillary Clinton left Foggy Bottom.
Kerry took his first foreign trip to the Middle East and seems to be spending most of his time trying to put in place a more credible strategy on
Syria to replace the malign neglect that has characterized administration policy to date. Meanwhile,
China is stepping up military coercion of neighbors who are U.S. friends and allies, most recently India
.
¶ Meanwhile, Leon Panetta, who had warned apocalyptically of the impact of sequester-related defense cuts on military readiness, has been replaced as secretary of defense by Chuck
Hagel, who has maintained that the armed forces can absorb cuts of this magnitude. His comments have raised doubts about whether the United
States will be able to resource its military rebalance from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon is widely perceived to be more concerned with the politics of American foreign policy -- namely watching the president's back at home -
- than with any grand strategic design abroad.
¶ More broadly, however, American hopes that "engagement" of China through trade and membership in international institutions would turn it into a status quo power have faded.
A new consensus has emerged among experts
, officials, and many business executives that this is a fundamentally competitive relationship, encompassing everything from mercantilist Chinese trade practices to daily cyberattacks to China's buildup of offensive military power designed to target unique American vulnerabilities
. Expectations that China would liberalize politically as a natural outgrowth of its economic success have given way to an understanding that China today is in many ways more politically repressive than it was in the 1980s -- even if Chinese people enjoy greater economic freedom than before.
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– Vice President of Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (Chen, 01/05, “China-US Relations in 2012: Caution
Ahead,” http://chinausfocus.com/slider/no-reason-for-chagrin-over-china-us-relations-but-cautious-management-needed-in-2012/)
The year of
2011 brought
many unexpected, globally altering events. This year, non-stop crises and sea changes in the international arena; chaos and revolution in the Middle East
and West Africa; catastrophic Tsunami and nuclear-leak crisis in Fukushima; paralysis of leadership of EU confronting the evolving debt predicament in Euro-Zone; and the sudden death of Kim Jong-il and its unpredictable repercussions on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia were just a few of the tumultuous events that led global economic and political instability this year. Bilateral relations between China and the US
, in contrast have been
relatively stable, and increasingly positive.
Three driving forces have contributed to the improvement in US-China relations in 2011: mutual commitment, multi-function mechanisms, and increasing interdependence. Beijing and Washington both stressed their commitment to building a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit following a rocky year of bilateral relations in 2010.
Both sides have stressed that
the relations hip between China and the United States should be cooperative
and mutually beneficial rather than zerosum, and that the two sides should stand together in the face of difficulty
and carry out cooperation on an equal footing. The mutual commitment between China and the US has been bolstered by an increasing number of bilateral mechanisms with policy communication, coordination, and implementation functions (“C2I”). 2011 has seen of the growth of “C2I” mechanisms intensify. with a number of new initiatives, including High-level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges, the US-China Governors Forum, and the Strategic Security
Dialogue and Asia-Pacific Affairs Consultation under the framework of Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). While the former two initiatives have either reflected thriving interaction in cross-cultural domains or tapped the huge potential of sub-national cooperation across the
Pacific, the latter two mechanisms have greatly upgraded capacity to address difficult and sensitive military and security issues in bilateral relations n and build confidence in US-China relations. The
60 plus bilateral mechanisms, plus frequent
exchanges of informal visits
and workshops between senior officials have built an impressive level of institutionalization in US-
China
bilateral relations that has enhanced the predictability
of relations between the two countries and
helped consolidate the foundation of
the relations.
The substance of the bilateral relationship, in essence, is not to follow the two presidents’ agreements in words, but to follow the roadmap in action, and those bilateral mechanisms have built significant capacity to do this. Thirdly and perhaps most fundamentally, the growing interdependence
across the Pacific and emerging agenda of global governance has served as the
“ballast” in
the bilateral relations hip. Despite numerous trade disputes between the two countries, economic interdependence has been steadily enhanced, manifested either by the hike of bilateral trade and investment volume, symbiotic financial relations, or the economic restructuring now underway in both countries. This interdependence has transcended economics, and is growing increasingly comprehensive in nature.
Lavin 11
– Undersecretary for International Trade of the the United States Department of Commerce (Franklin, 06/28, “Consequential China:
U.S.–China Relations in a Time of Transition,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/consequential-china-us-china-relations-in-atime-of-transition)
There are a ny number of
differences, challenges, and even friction points in the bilateral relations
, but I want to underscore my optimism because the policy emphasis is such that it requires that most of our time be spent discussing the problems or challenges. However, before I get to that, I want to talk a bit about what is working. For example, it is interesting to me that both China and the U.S. have a nationalinterest-focused foreign policy. Neither country, I think, subscribes to a philosophy that threatens the other. Neither country, as they say in China, tries to put sand in the other’s rice bowl. So I think there is a reasonably positive functional relationship between the two countries. From a U.S. point of view, if we look over the modern era, since the Nixon-to-China moment, we have
about four decades of relations, across eight presidents, both
political parties, a range of philosophies, different challenges, and different times.
But, there is a high degree of continuity in that relationship and I think there are two pillars that allow for that continuity. One is the pillar of engagement that, regardless of
the issue or the challenge, we were not going to break off
or try to diminish relations but always try to
find a way to improve them.
The second pillar is respect for China’s one-China policy, that we would not seek to undermine that, although we certainly have interests vis à vis Taiwan. But we never tried to directly do something to diminish the one-China policy.
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Wall Street Journal 5-8 -13 [“Colombia Says March Exports Fell 20% From Year Earlier,” http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130508-718544.html?mod=googlenews_wsj]
Colombia's exports plunged in March from a year earlier, extending a trend of declines in overseas sales that is affecting economic growth
.
¶ DANE, the government's statistics agency, said Wednesday that exports fell 20% in
March
and stood at $4.56 billion.
¶ The decline, DANE said, was mainly the result of a 23% drop in sales of fuels and mining-related products.
Manufactured exports fell 12.6%.
¶ Many exporters have said the persistent strength of the Colombian peso against the dollar is hurting their ability to compete overseas.
¶
This is the fifth straight month that exports declined, as the Colombian economy likely suffered a slowdown in the first quarter. The Colombian economy slowed to a 4% expansion in
2012 after growing 6.6% in the previous year
.
The Heritage Foundation ’12 [“2012 Index of Economic Freedom,” http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2012/countries/colombia.pdf]
The Colombian economy has shown
a moderate degree of ¶ resilience in the face of a challenging economic environment,
¶ and reform efforts have continued in many of the four pillars
¶ of economic freedom. The overall regulatory framework has
¶ become more efficient, and business procedures have been
¶ streamlined. Policies that support open markets and a strong
¶ private sector are being implemented
, enhancing flows of ¶ investment and the vitality of entrepreneurship.
Government
¶ spending has been expanding in recent years
.
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The Economist ’09 [“No recession here,” 10-15-09, http://www.economist.com/node/14644366]
WHEN the figures are finally tallied,
Colombia may prove to have weathered the world recession better than any other of the larger Latin American countries. After a slight contraction at the end of 2008, the economy has been growing modestly this year
. This resilience stems from continued foreign investment, an increase in government spending on public works and easier money: since December the central bank has cut interest rates by six percentage points, to 4%, a steeper drop than anywhere in the region outside Chile
.
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Mutaner et al ’12 [Carles Muntaner is Professor of Nursing, Public Health and Psychiatry at the
University of Toronto, María Páez Victor is a Venezuelan sociologist, specializing in health and medicine, Joan Benach is a professor of Public Health at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, “The
Achievements of Hugo Chavez: An Update on the Social Determinants of Health in Venezuela,” 12-20-
12, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/7568 ]
One of the main factors for the popularity of
the
Chávez
Government and its landslide victory in this re-election results of
October 2012, is the reduction of poverty, made possible because the government took back control of the national petroleum company PDVSA, and has used the abundant oil revenues
, not for benefit of a small class of renters as previous governments had done, but to build needed infrastructure and invest in the social services that
Venezuelans so sorely needed
. During the last ten years, the government has increased social spending by 60.6%, a total of $772 billion [i]. Poverty is not defined solely by lack of income nor is health defined as the lack of illness. Both are correlated and both are multifactorial, that is, determined by a series of social processes. To make a more objective assessment of the real progress achieved by the Bolivarian
Revolution in Venezuela during the last 13 years it is essential to review some of the key available data on the social determinants of health and poverty: education, inequality, jobs and income, health care, food security and social support and services.
¶ With regard to these social determinants of health indicators, Venezuela is now the country in the region with the lowest inequality level (measured by the Gini Coefficient) having reduced inequality by 54%, poverty by 44%. Poverty has been reduced from 70.8% (1996) to 21% (2010). And extreme poverty reduced from 40%
(1996) to a very low level of 7.3%
(2010). About
20 million people have benefited from antipoverty programs , called “Misiones” (Up to now, 2.1 million elderly people have received old-age pensions – that is 66% of the population while only 387,000 received pensions before the current government.
99