p. 13 The Second Red Scare
Factors that Led to the Second Red Scare

The “loss” of China

Stalemate in Korea
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USSR developed an atomic bomb

Concern about international events. There was a belief in a Communist conspiracy behind the civil wars
in Europe and Asia - (monolithic communism - all communism came from one source: the USSR) which led
to a belief that there were communist conspirators and spies in the US State Department, the US military,
and other institutions in American society. US Government officials did not believe the civil wars were
caused by internal problems. They did not believe the USSR was capable of developing an atomic weapon
and other advanced technologies without the help of traitors inside the US. The US looked for someone to
blame.

Events in American Domestic Politics: Much of the anticommunist furor emerged out of the Republican
Party’s search for an issue with which to attack the Democrats, and out of the Democrat’s efforts to stifle
that issue
o Loyalty Oaths - Under pressure from Republican critics a Loyalty Review Board was established to
investigate the background of more than 3 million federal employees. Thousands of officials and
civil service employees either resigned or lost their jobs in a probe that went on for 4 years.
o McCarran Internal Security Act (1950) - Passed over Truman’s veto and made it unlawful to
advocate or support the establishment of a totalitarian government, restricted the employment
and travel of those joining Communist-front organizations, and authorized the creation of
detention camps for subversion.
o HUAC (House on Un-American Activities) - established by the House of Representatives in 1939 to
seek out Nazis. It was reactivated in 1947 to find Communists. The committee not only
investigated government officials but also looked for Communist influence in such organizations as
the Boy Scouts and in the Hollywood film industry. The first place the Republican Congress looked
for subversion was in the movie industry, arguing that communists had infiltrated Hollywood and
had tainted America with propaganda. Actors, directors, and writers (some of them former
communist) were called before the committee to testify. When some of them (the Hollywood Ten)
refused to answer questions about their own political beliefs and those of their colleagues, they
were jailed for contempt of Congress. Others were barred from employment in the industry when
Hollywood, attempting to protect its public image, adopted a blacklist of those of “suspicious
loyalty.” The ACLU and other opponents argued that the First Amendment protected the freeexpression of unpopular political views and membership in political groups, such as the Communist
party.
Whittaker Chambers, a confessed Communist, became a star witness for HUAC in 1948. His testimony, along
with the investigative work of Richard Nixon, a young Congressman from California, led to the trial of Alger
Hiss. Hiss was a prominent official in the State Department who had assisted FDR at the Yalta Conference.
Chambers claimed that Hiss had passed classified State Department documents through him to the USSR in
1937 and 1938. When Hiss sued him for slander, Chambers produced microfilms of the documents (called the
“pumpkin papers” because Chambers had kept them hidden in a pumpkin in his garden). Hiss could not be
tried for espionage because of the statute of limitations. However, because of Nixon’s passion and efforts,
Hiss was convicted of perjury and served several years in prison. Hiss was not the only damaged goods.
Suspicion was cast upon a generation of liberal Democrats and made it possible for many Americans to believe
that communists had actually infiltrated the government.
When the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb in 1949, many Americans were convinced that spies had
helped them to steal the technology from the US. Klaus Fuchs, a British scientist who had worked on the
Manhattan Project, admitted giving A-bomb secrets to the Russians. An FBI investigation traced another spy
ring to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in New York whom the government claimed had been the masterminds of
the conspiracy. Both were members of the Communist Party. The case against them in large part hinged on
testimony by Ethel’s brother, David Greenglass, a machinist who had worked on the Manhattan Project.
Greenglass admitted to channeling secret information to the USSR through other agents (including Fuchs). His
sister and brother-in-law had, he claimed planned and orchestrated the espionage. The Rosenbergs were
convicted of treason and executed in 1953 after 2 years of appeals and protests by sympathizers. Both
proclaimed their innocence to the end. In 1997, the National Security Agency released the Venona Papers.
This was a secret effort by the US to gather and decode messages sent in the 1940s by Soviet military
intelligence agents. The Venona Papers revealed the identities of several Americans who had spied for the
USSR, including Julius Rosenberg. While the content of Julius’ atomic espionage was not as vital as alleged at
the time of his espionage activities, in other fields it was extensive. The information Julius Rosenberg passed
to the Soviets concerned the proximity fuse (a device that is designed to detonate an explosive device
automatically when the distance to target becomes smaller than a predetermined value or when the target
passes through a given plane - it is one of the most important technological innovations of WW II), design and
production information on the Lockheed P-80 jet fighter, and thousands of classified reports from Emerson
Radio. The papers also show that Ethel Rosenberg was probably no more than an accomplice, if that. The
Venona Papers showed that some Soviet agents had in fact penetrated American government, science, and
industry, including Julius Rosenberg during the Cold War. However, historians disagree as to the accuracy and
significance of the papers. Of the 349 names listed in the papers, readers are left with the implication - unfair
and unproven - that every name on the list was involved in espionage. Some historians believe that a great
deal of the so-called espionage that went on was nothing more than “exchanges of information among people
of good will” and that “most of these exchanges were innocent and were within the law.” Some historians
believe that “there are too many gaps in the record to use the papers with complete confidence.”