Efficient Market Hypothesis and Behavioral Finance Where we began and where we are heading Group Member: Savita Krautheim Can we predict risk tolerance from investor behavior? • Black Monday –On Monday October 19th 1987, stock markets around the world crashed, shredding a huge value in a short time. The crash began in Hong Kong, spread to Europe then the United States. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) dropped by 508 points to 1738.74 (22.61)%. Most investors sold their investments because they saw the prices declining as opposed to selling based on information!! Eugene Fama wrote The Efficient Market Hypothesis theory in the 1960’s. Three forms of EMH Weak Form –Stock prices reflect all past information in the prices. Semi-Strong Form-stock prices reflect all past and current publicly available information. Strong Form-stock prices reflect all relevant information, including information that is not disclosed to the pubic i.e. insider information. Is The Market Rational? No, say the experts. But neither are you. -Justin Fox "If the efficient markets hypothesis was a publicly traded security, its price would be enormously volatile.” -Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers (1990) Two types of Investors • Rational Speculators or Arbitrageurs- trade on the basis of information. Greed is Good!–Gordon Gekko • “Be Fearful When Others Are Greedy And Greedy When Others Are Fearful” ——Warren Buffett Noise traders-trade on the basis of imperfect information. Arbitrage is Limited by two types of risk • Fundamental Risk – e.g stocks are selling above expected value of future dividends and arbitrageur is selling them short. The arbitrageur then bares the risk that the realization of dividends-or of the new about dividends-is better than expected, in which case he loses on his trade. • Unpredictability of future resale price- future mispricing is more extreme than when the arbitrage trade is put on, the arbitrageur suffers a loss in his position. Psychology has shown individuals have limited information processing capabilities. exhibit systematic bias in processing information. are prone to making mistakes. often tend to rely on the opinion of others. • Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory, is very important in economics and especially in financial economics. In 2002 Daniel Kahneman shared the Nobel Prize in Economics but unfortunately Amos Tversky had died by that time and did not get his share of the fame. Mental Accounting Group member : Sarah Khosroshahi The Behavioral Shift Conventional finance->rationality (e.g. EMH, expected utility hypothesis) But conventional finance had its problems: • Certainty effect • Isolation effect To watch or not to watch!! Behavioral finance -> acceptance of human irrationality • Using a value function instead of utility function of expected utility theory to factor in human subjectivity Mental Accounting Financial behavior • Reference price ( reflected by transaction value) • Transaction utility • Fungibility • Coding Gains and losses Integration and Stagnation (2) • So investors sometimes consider their portfolio as a whole, and sometimes as a collection of separate components – Integration: evaluating the whole – Stagnation: evaluating the parts • How does the investor choose between the two options? Integration v Stagnation (1) Multiple gain : v(x) +v(Y) >v(x+y) segregation (christmas gifts!) Multiple Loss :v(-X) + v(-Y)<V[-(x+y)] integration why desirable credit cards! Mix gain: v(X) + V(-Y) <V(x-y) integration cancel loss against larger gain : because the loss is more steeper so may v(x) +v(-Y)<0 Mix losses: silver lining principle : keeping in mind separately a small gain and a loss and forget about the sum Khaneman Prospect Theory and Some Financial Applications Describing Decision-Making under Uncertainty Group Member: Rachel Jiang The Value Function (1) Loss/gain perspective • value function defined by deviations from reference point and thus looks at relative changes, not absolute wealth in the final state. Concave/convex value function • Concave for gains • Convex for losses • Steeper for losses than for gains (loss aversion)——Thus whether an investor frames alternatives as gains or losses strongly impacts risk-attitude. The Value Function (2) Probabilities are weighed subjectively, not objectively • Weights measure impact of events on desirability of prospects, not just the perceived likelihood of the event • Lower probability scenarios are overweighted Fourfold pattern of risk attitudes results from overweighing small probabilities and concavity/convexity • • • • Risk aversion for gains of moderate or high probability Risk aversion for losses of low probability Risk seeking for gains of low probability Risk seeking for losses of moderate to high probability Illustrations The Game: A=sure gain of €2400 [E(A)=2400] B=25% chance of gaining € 10000 and 75% chance of nothing [E(B)=2500] C=sure loss of € 7500 [E(C)= -7500] D=75% chance to lose € 10000 and 25% to lose nothing [E(D)= -7500] Prospect Theory in Action (1) Disposition Effect: traders often hold on to their losing investments for too long and “cash in” their winners too early. • Loss aversion: agents become risk-seeking in the face of loss, risk-averse in the face of gain (see time value) • Greater investor appetite for large losers than small ones • Similar reasoning leads to difficulty relinquishing sunk cost and Bowman’s risk-return paradox • Hedonic framing may help avoid the disposition effect • An investor can use his awareness of psychology rules to frame situations in a way that maximizes his decision-making abilities. Prospect Theory in Action (2) Why are portfolios often not well diversified? • Framing leads to 1) separating “downside protection layer” from “upside potential layer” so that their weights diverge 2) ignoring security-returns covariance • Loss aversion leads to 1) focus on loss avoidance rather than benefiting from diversification 2) excess cash holdings to avoid losses due to liquidity problems Other applications include explanations of the equity premium puzzle and the volatility puzzle. References The Value Function (1): The Value Function (2): Han, Bing and Jason Hsu. “Prospect Theory and Its Applications in Finance.” Research Affiliates. (Dec. 2004). <http://www.researchaffiliates.com/ideas/pdf/Prospect_Theory_and_It s_Applications_in_Finance.pdf>. Prospect Theory in Action (1): Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica. Vol. 27, No. 2. (Mar., 1979). p. 263292. Illustrations: Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica. Vol. 27, No. 2. (Mar., 1979). p. 263292. Fiegenbaum, Avi and Howard Thomas. “Attitudes Toward Risk and the Risk-Return Paradox: Prospect Theory Explanations.” The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar. 1988), p. 85-106. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/256499>. Prospect Theory in Action (2): Barberis, Nicholas et al. “Prospect Theory and Asset Prices.” Journal of Economic Literature G12. (Jul. 1999). Han, Bing and Jason Hsu. “Prospect Theory and Its Applications in Finance.” Research Affiliates. (Dec. 2004). <http://www.researchaffiliates.com/ideas/pdf /Prospect_Theory_and_Its_Applications_in_Finance.pdf>. Anchoring and Framing Group Member: Alberto Banchetti Anchoring Cognitive bias that describes the common human tendency to rely too heavily (anchor) on one piece of information while taking decisions Frequently it occurs when: • people are dealing with concepts that are new for them • a single value is taken in consideration in an overestimated way In the Financial World Most of the people take decisions for their investments analyzing specific figures and considering them the leading factors of their choice. In the economic field most of the times the anchor is represented by a precise number, a value or a price. In investments the reference can be: a previous peak stock ( or index ) price, a previous price trend or a previous estimate. • This process can lead to wrong evaluations in predicting the utility of a future outcome. Examples Tendency of investing in the stocks of companies that have fallen perceptibly in a very short amount of time. The investor may be anchored to the idea that the drop in prices is not a relevant message but it’s just a great opportunity to buy the stock at a discount. Tendency of being anchored to the investments that you have done and accepting the possibility to wait for subpar investments for several years looking for the break even point instead of dumping them. The most balanced and correct strategy seems to be the one that avoids the anchoring process and tend to evaluate plenty of perspectives in order to derive the truest picture of the investments landscape. So Why Does Anchoring Still Exist? “Human limits” 1)People usually feel committed to the choice they’ve done so they prefer to rationalize and find good reasons for what is happening instead of changing their belief. 2)People usually balk at the complex cognitive task required to re-analyze and adjust their prior estimate of prospects and risks. Consequences Investors, at least in the first moment, tend to under-react by keeping, more or less, the same behavior that has become demonstrably inadequate. The inner problem is that mind is anchored on a reference that tends to solidify into a tunnel vision and to be blind to signals that may contradict this reference. It neglects facts and ideas that do not confirm this prior, also if often it has no logical and objective bases. FRAMING A selective and excessively narrow way by which a question or a piece of information used to take a decision is described and processed. SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION • According to Taylor and Fiske human beings are by nature “cognitive misers” thus meaning that they prefer to do as little thinking as possible. • Frames provide a quick and simple way to process an information; using these mental filters people manage to make sense easily of the incoming messages coming from the external world. INNER PROBLEMS • The framing bias becomes easily dangerous because it distorts the perception of an issue and the whole decision making process. It gives a selective ( framed ) and simplistic picture of reality that may lead to flawed decisions with unwanted effects. PRACTICAL EXAMPLES 1)Companies usually focus their perception on the immediate future, they are full interested in the short term position and, by doing so, they run the risk of facing difficulties in the long term. 2)Investors usually put overemphasis on the short term risk so they prefer assets with low return ( seen as safer ) even when they save for the long term. REASON OF FRAMING EXISTANCE 1) Outside reason: a representation is deliberately reductive, manipulative and non neutral in order to achieve positive effects on the audience. It can be due to the incompetence of the author ( in this case is done involuntarily ) or it can be launched voluntarily by the informer to manipulate the massage. 2) Inner reason: it can be occasional ( due to lack of attention, tunnel vision but also emotional situations that block analytic mind ) or the result of the habit to look at information from a single angle. In this case the prior beliefs and choice criteria may result too much selective and framed. CONSEQUENCES - Possibility to narrow the situation by focusing only on one aspect. - Possibility to take a narrow approach that lead to different conclusions if the objectives and criteria at stake in the issue change ( an investment decision can be different if the analysis is focused on the loss prospect or on the contrary on the gain prospect ). RESULTS - Thwart the ensuing reasoning, conclusions and decisions in an investment decision making process - Usually creates in the investor’s mind a too favorable or too unfavorable impression and this aspect usually bring to dubious and anomalous practical effects PARTICULARITY There are also some positive effects that can be attributed to the framing process. The most important one is the “wealth frame” for investments decision: it means you have to take on account your present and expected wealth in order to choose the right investment for yourself considering this important “personal” perspective. Overreaction, Overconfidenc e, and the Availability Bias Group Member: Neo Zhou Uncle •Failure •Too sensitive Father •Failure •Too confident OVERREACTION VS OVERCONFIDENCE OVERREACTION ! A study by Behavioral Finance academics 35 Best Performing Stocks •Winners portfolio 35 Worst Performing Stocks •Losers portfolio How did it turn out? …………………………………………………………… Winners Portfolio Losers Portfolio Why does it happen ? ? ? investors in the previous year overreact to news favoring certain stocks and speaking against the value of others This leads to a divergence between the fundamental fair price of these stocks and the market price. the information of this overreaction fades away and the market price of the stock converges back toward the fair price Availability Bias "if you can think of it, it must be important." Try to recall your driving behavior after you heard that there was a car accident happening on your daily way to school/work Value investing Securities shares underpriced Make a gain Stock price converges to the fair price Fundamental analysis Investment in these stocks DOGS OF A DOW Value investing Focus on Fundamental Analysis • • • • • -Company Assets -Financial Statements -Brand Names -Patented Technology -Management Team Fundamental Analysis Includes • • • • • -Earnings per Share -Sales Revenue -Asset Values -Profit Margins -Return on Equity Further Practice Warren Buffett has taken the value investing concept even further with a focus on "finding an outstanding company at a sensible price" rather than generic companies at a bargain price. OVERCONFIDENCE ! People in the market, especially men, have overly optimistic assessments of their own knowledge or control over a situation. MERGER PERSONAL COMPUTER MINI COMPUTER NETWORK STORAGE “Risk management issue should not only be addressed on a corporation’s financial level. Management should also be involved, thus integrating it into a daily management practice.” --Prof. Mantovani How do we avoid overconfidence? We need to recognize that we’re not as smart as we think we are. In fact, the smartest investors (and frankly the smartest financial advisers) are the ones that acknowledge that they’re dumb. A paradigm shift has occurred since the days of rational theories and EMH. In the modern day, theorists recognize the existence and importance of psychological and cognitive factors upon investor decisions. People are not completely rational creatures; there is no true “economic man.” Investors, as humans, are all subject to emotions, biases, and a whole host of mental factors and make decision making a complex but fascinating field of study. THE END