In which ways have democratisation processes in Arab Spring
countries served to strengthen the political position of monarchical
Saudi Arabia from 2011 through 2013?
A thesis submitted to the faculty of
humanities of the Utrecht University
by
Victor Meulendijks
As part of the fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of BA
Under the supervision of
M.A. Fumerton and A. Sanchez
01 February 2014
9,765 words
Table of Contents
List of figures
Chapter 1 -
4
Introduction: significance, methodology and context
of the research
1.1
Significance of the study
1.2
Methodology
6
6
1.2.1 Explanation of the theoretical frameworks
7
1.2.2 Outline of searched and used sources
8
1.3
The proposed research thesis and its factors
9
1.4
The broad impact of the Arabian Spring on the Middle East
1.4.1 Impact of the Arab Spring on some of Saudi Arabia's
direct and regional neighbours
11
1.4.2 Impact of the Arab Spring on Saudi Arabia itself
12
Chapter 2 -
How is Saudi Arabia fighting the hegemonic war in
the Middle East?
2.1
14
Use of political tools and military interventions
2.1.1
Gulf Cooperation Council
15
2.1.2
Bahrain
17
2.1.3
Syria and Iran
18
2.1.4
Morocco and Jordan
20
2
2.2
Economical and further financial packages to allies and
potential allies
2.2.1
Egypt
23
2.2.2
Palestine
25
How is Saudi Arabia gaining regional leadership
by reaching out globally?
26
3.1
The extensive economic cooperation with the United States
26
3.2
Increased financial rapprochement from Saudi Arabia
Chapter 3 -
towards China
Chapter 4 -
In what ways has Saudi Arabia set itself up for a
position of either a position of hegemony or
imperialistic overstretch?
28
29
4.1
The regional influence and Cold War prospects
29
4.2
A troublesome international outlook
30
4.3
The conclusion of the status quo
31
4.4
Discussion and concessions
32
Bibliography
33
3
List of Figures:
Figure 1
An overview of the Arab world
5
Figure 2
A map of Saudi Arabia and its surroundings
5
Figure 3
Bahrain's strategic and economic importance mapped out
18
Figure 4
Jordan's strategic positioning could as a buffer for Syria
21
Figure 1: An overview of the Arab World
4
Figure 2: A map of Saudi Arabia and its surroundings
5
1. Introduction: significance, methodology
and context of the research
There are very few moments in our lives
where we have the privilege to witness history taking place.
This is one of those moments. This is one of those times.
- Barack Obama, Remarks by the president on Egypt in 2011
It's just over three years ago since the world was shocked by what seemed to be one of
the first major power shifts in several decades in the country of Tunisia. Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali, then ruling president of Tunisia after his successful coup d'état in 1987, would
not last another month after protests spread from the medium-sized town of Sidi Bouzid
to the rest of the country.
The Tunisian protests would serve as a catalyst for what has now become known as the
Arab Spring - a large scale civilian uprising reaching from Morocco to Iran, so far costing
several heads of state their positions (and in some cases their lives), and rejuvenating the
political landscape in much of the Arab world. As the grounds are still shaking with
protest and change this study will take a closer look at one specific country which could
severely impact the outcome and consequences of the Arab Spring: Saudi Arabia.
1.1
The significance of the study
Although having a culture of understanding and a desire for knowledge are cornerstones
of any scientific enterprise, the topical subject of conflict analysis of the Arab Spring and
its major components bears more importance to any world-wise citizen than most other.
As a part of a globalised whole, with international ties growing ever more important, the
fall-out of a conflict with the magnitude of the Arab Spring becomes relevant for all, for a
triplet of reasons.
First off, Saudi Arabia has become an irreplaceable player in the global trade market. The
trade of goods with the European Union skyrocketed over the last 10 years, with imports
from Saudi Arabia to the EU tripling to over 30 billion dollars annually (87% of which is
in fuels and minerals). 1 The exports to the United States are even higher than that,
1
"European Union, Trade in goods with Saudi Arabia," accessed January 22, 2014,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113442.pdf
6
averaging out at almost 40 billion dollars annually. 2 These figures make the Saudi
Arabian Kingdom the top Middle Eastern trade partner for both regions, and a top ten
economic partner overall of both. 3 4 Furthermore the goods being shipped, fuels and
minerals, are invaluable for everyday life, as oil and other fossil fuels take in a more
important role than ever. Although relatively the exports of both western powerhouses to
Saudi Arabia are lower, respectively at 20 billion and 15 billion per annum, the message
is clear - Saudi Arabia is a very hard to replace trade partner, especially with a possible
alternative being that the hard to come by raw materials would most likely get exported
to 'opponents' of either region.
Secondly, with the money accrued from the flourishing international trade, Saudi Arabia
has more resources than before to start playing an increasing role of importance in the
region. As a longstanding partner of the USA in economical, but more importantly also
political sense, so far there has been a relatively successful cooperation between 'the
West' and the Saudi kingdom. However, with the power structures in its vicinity in
shambles and the US and EU taking opposing standpoints to the Saudi Arabian rulers,
that political collaboration is becoming ever more stressful.
With other potential allies, most notably China, offering equal political support without
the moral demands of the West, a failure to cooperate in these years could create another
dichotomy between East and the West, meaning the handing of the current situation is of
pinnacle importance in deciding the coming years (or potentially even decades) of
international relations.
1.2
Methodology
1.2.1 Explanation of the theoretical frameworks
To be able to perform any comprehensive research at all the study will rely on three
cornerstone theoretical frameworks. Although there were other options, such as perhaps
Collective Action or Agency, the grand scale and large variety of cases discussed in the
study called for a more overarching theory to tie the findings together.
2
"Trade in Goods with Saudi Arabia," accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5170.html.
3
"Trade Balance by Country and Area, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/Press-Release/current_press_release/exh6as.pdf.
4
"Countries and Regions Statistics," accessed January 22, 2014,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/statistics/index_en.htm.
7
The main construction of the study lies, mostly implicitly, in stability theory. Perfected
by John Mearsheimer in 1993, stability theory looks at the possibilities of both bipolar
and multipolar systems and how power is distributed and maintained in either. Applying
this to the case both on a regional and global level gives the study extra insight in how a
new regional (super)power could impact the rest of the world and the status quo of
international relations. In general, the less poles, the more stable the system. To relate to
the case in the study, changing the current 'semi-bipolar' system of EU and US, China and
Russia, and adding a fifth rich, regionally supported Islamic superpower could change the
entire playing field, quite possibly for the worse. 5
Secondly, to define how Saudi Arabia could play itself into a position of a superpower,
the study will draw on a second theoretical concept: hegemony. Closely tied to stability
theory, as oftentimes the 'poles' in the system are hegemons in their respective regions,
this concept will help define and stipulate the goals of Saudi Arabia's international
relations as the country plays its part in the political field during the Arab Spring. This
struggle is called the 'hegemonic war'; a political, military and economic fight to secure
sole rule over a certain region.
Finally the consequences of the hegemonic war are weighed off by using a third and last
theoretical concept, namely that of 'imperialistic overstretch'. As the hegemonic war
intensifies and more resources and strategies are implemented in the pursuit of a position
of power, oftentimes there is the risk of overextending ones metaphorical hand. In the
case of an overstretch one's resources are spread too thinly, causing a backfire leading to
a diminishing role of importance rather than an increasing on.
1.2.2 Outline of searched and used sources
By clearing up the theoretical frameworks that would be included in the study a concise
way of searching sources and information could be set up, which will be outlined in four
different categories.
The initial search for sources was done by consulting Google's Scholar search engine.
Through use of a set of keywords which were systematically specified as the study
advanced. Initially broad topics were addressed such as "Saudi Arabia", "Foreign
Affairs", "International Relations" and "Arab Spring". As the study progressed more
specific terms were added to find studies relating to more specific subjects. Examples of
the added terms are "Counterrevolution", "Arab League", "Gulf Cooperation Council",
"Egypt", et cetera. Further results were then found by using intertextuality, among other
5
Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches
(Oxford: University Press, 2013), 82.
8
things, to be referred from one study to its sources, or from one study to another, leading
to a network of studies regarding Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring in particular.
A second source for studies and papers on the matter is Utrecht University's extensive
OMEGA search platform, which delves into several scholarly databases and countless
journals. Once more the same keywords were used to double-check and review the
sources from Google Scholar, comparing the two results and in that confirming there
were no apparent disparities or false statements.
A third, and perhaps ultimately the most important, source of information would simply
be reviewing newspaper reports, political commentary and articles from all various media
outlets. Although there is a wealth of information to be found in these sources they were
handled with care, reviewing the potential biases and larger debates in which each piece
of news was situated. Eventually a case-by-case evaluation had to be made for each
source, depending on author, publisher, reception and possible appendices.
The fourth and final source of facts and evidence for the thesis were official reports,
highlights, statements and summaries of political council meetings (including the GCC,
the AL and the OIC) as well as official fact sheets and reports from large organisations
(among others the WTO and the UN), and finally reports and statements from political
discourse.
All of the aforementioned sources were reviewed on their individual merits and demerits,
assessed for potential facts and figures, as well as analysed for their potential place within
the theoretical framework.
1.3
The proposed research thesis and its constituent factors
The research question asked in this study is, in its entirety: ' In which ways have
democratisation processes in Arab Spring countries served to strengthen the political
position of monarchical Saudi Arabia from 2011 through 2013?' This complete thesis, as
explained in 1.1, holds broad topical relevance because of the possible influence in other
respective political regions, but some of its factors require additional explanation.
First and foremost, why has Saudi Arabia been picked as the main focus of the study?
The answer to that is two-fold. First and foremost this is simply because of the political
and financial strength of the state, which ranks it as the highest partner of both the EU
and the US hailing from the Middle East. However another reason is the political stability
that the country has maintained despite its deeply troubled surroundings. Other nations
such as Egypt or Syria, which might ultimately become players in the grand political
9
scheme, are as of yet simply too fractured and unpredictable to be scrutinised in the same
way.
Equally because of its political stability Saudi Arabia has exercised far more international
action, both military and economically, giving a clearer picture of its intents, and more
material to study.
Secondly, the concept of 'democratisation processes' has been picked as an illustration of
the succeeded or ongoing revolts and reforms that the Arab Spring induced, overthrowing
rulers in multiple nations across the region. This will be explained in more detail in 1.4.
Finally, the timeframe from 2011 through 2013 has been picked for a few reasons. Most
importantly, it encapsulates the time period in which views on the Arab Spring
phenomenon changed from a fearful, large-scale and democratically oriented revolt, to a
more grim opportunity to build not only democracy but also monarchical alliances.
Equally the proposed timeframe skips the first few months of the Arab Spring, when the
event as such was still very murky and undefined. This has been done specifically do
avoid using misguided or incomplete sources from that specific period, which could
make for an inconsistent start compared to the latter years of the revolts.
Lastly, this timeframe does include the brief period of internal conflict in Saudi Arabia,
which adds valuable information towards the reasoning and resources behind the foreign
relations policy that the monarchy could later focus on.
1.4
The broad impacts of the Arabian Spring on the
Middle East
In order to give a clear overview of the context the study is placed in it is important to
understand the individual cases of the Arab Spring surrounding and influencing Saudi
Arabia. As such the final and most topical part of the introduction will be a concise
characterisation of several countries bordering or influencing Saudi Arabia during the
Arab Spring, as well as a short description of Saudi Arabia's own dealing with its internal
opposition. These impacts are purely those of the Arab Spring itself and act as
background information for the discussed Saudi Arabian actions discussed in later
chapters.
10
1.4.1 Impact on some of Saudi Arabia's direct and regional
neighbours
Discussing matters chronologically (rather than ordered on purely importance for Saudi
Arabia) for clearness, the first nation to be hit by what has now become known as the
Arab Spring was Tunisia. In the country of just over 10 million inhabitants protests,
which at that point was argued to have the best educational system, largest middle class
and most powerful labour movements, revolts broke loose after the self-immolation of
Mohamed Bouazizi. 6 Despite the aforementioned institutions the country suffered large
scale corruption and joblessness, resulting in the first revolution of the Spring. Because it
was the first it was also less organised and lacked support from the military, but still it
managed to see president of 20 years Ben Ali ousted in just 28 days. 7 After open
elections Ben Ali was replaced by Moncef Marzouki and the Islamist Ennahda party, who
remain in office to this day. 8 The short, spontaneous but ultimately effective revolt led to
a wave of new protests in other countries, among which was the already instable Egypt.
Of all of Saudi Arabia's neighbouring countries Egypt used to be the most impactful and
powerful in the political sphere. Not only does the Mediterranean country hold the most
population of any country in the region at approximately 85 million, but it has had a long
standing alliance with the United States, making it one of the most influential nations in
the Middle East. 9 However Egypt had also been in political peril for a number of years
before ultimately real change would be brought through the Arab Spring. As early as
February of 2012, some 10 months before Tunisian protests broke loose, groups of
civilians had been protesting president Hosni Mubarak's rule. 10 The president which had
ruled some three decades by then was facing increasing opposition, which ultimately
climaxed in another wave of protests in early 2011.
As a result of the long opposition to Mubarak he too didn't last long when the Arab
Spring revolts hit, as army had already prepared a plan of action. Furthermore the
disciplined revolution and subsequent discussion about the new political possibilities
spoke to the relative freedom that Egyptians enjoyed under Mubarak, as it showed that
alternatives had already been thought up and discussed beforehand. 11 The army's
intervention would come to an end with the free elections later in 2012, which placed
6
Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," Foreign Affairs May/June (2011): 2.
Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," 3.
8
"Tunisia's Islamist Ennahda party wins historic poll," BBC News, October 27, 2011, accessed January 10,
2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15487647.
9
"CIA World Fact Book," accessed January 10, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/eg.html.
10
"Egypt profile," BBC News, January 14, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13315719.
11
Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," Foreign Affairs May/June (2011): 4.
7
11
Mohammed Morsi in office. 12 As a part of the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the longest
standing political parties in Egypt, even under Mubarak, Morsi could not stem the
protests either. With a controversial constitution proposal and weak economic regulation
the Brotherhood lasted less than a year before once more the military intervened amid
massive protests in the latter half of 2013. Ever since Egypt has been in political limbo,
awaiting not only new elections, but also a reforming of its political landscape.
Another country which has seen its revolts have an undetermined outcome as of yet is
Syria. Described by the UN as "as the worst humanitarian disaster since Rwanda in
1994", Syria is one of the extremes that show just how violent and indeterminate the
Arab Spring was in several countries. 13 With several local powers such as Iran and Saudi
Arabia intermingling in the fighting, as well as the superpowers of the world putting on
ever more pressure, it seems clear that everyone is trying to get their foot in the door on
having a say what happens after the Spring Revolution. 14
Finally, several Gulf States also saw their own internal upheaval. Closer to home, from
Saudi Arabia's perspective, these small rentier states, providing almost all necessities for
their native citizens through the state, were the most unlikely targets for protest, as rich
people simply seldom take to the streets. 15 Still, most Arab monarchies dealt with
protests during the large-scale Arab Spring movement, mainly during the first wave of
the Arab Spring in 2011. Among those hit were Bahrain and Oman, but through quick
acting both in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and through the national rulers
themselves, the protests were limited to several months of peaceful opposition. 16
What these short characterisations show is that the Arab Spring was far from a uniform
movement, with each country dealing with entirely different phenomena, ranging from
uncoordinated, largely peaceful protests, to nigh-on military coups and full-blown civil
war. And as such each specific case of upheaval requires a different political response.
1.4.2 Impact of the Arab Spring on Saudi Arabia itself
Saudi Arabia wasn't exempt of the Arab Spring movement and had to deal with its own
internal opposition, but they were mainly small and scattered throughout the country. As
early as January of 2011, only a few months after protests broke out in Tunisia, small
12
"Egypt profile," BBC News, January 14, 2014, accessed January 15, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-13315719.
13
Steven Heydemann, "Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 24 (2013): 60.
14
Heydemann, "Syria and Authoritarianism," 64-66.
15
Zoltan Barany, The Arab Spring in the Kingdoms (Doha: ACRPS, 2012), 11.
16
Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, Repercussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States (Doha: ACRPS, 2012),
10-11.
12
riots broke out in the peripheral cities of Jizan and Jiddah (refer to figure 2 for the exact
locations), which were quickly struck down by Saudi police. 17 Smaller unrest spread
across the country but they were largely unsuccessful. It wasn't until January of 2012 that
a small group of protesters showed up in the capital of Riyadh, and in front of ministry
buildings in Ta'if and Tabuk. 18
Although protests were small scale and not directly threatening the government did
respond in several ways, firstly to prevent the situation of getting out of hand and
secondly to pave the way for their more important interest: foreign relations. It started by
implementing legal actions to outlaw many forms of protests including sit-ins and
marches, and enforcing these law every time a protest popped up. 19
However, more importantly than the legal actions, the Saudi king Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Al Saud also released a massive financial package of an estimated $130 billion to stem
the protests. Spread across seven different fields, offering 500,00 additional housing
units, 60,000 new jobs, two months of additional salary for all state employees, one
month of salary for all jobless and a minimum wage, the financial grants almost
immediately stopped the uprising. 20 In doing so Saudi Arabia did not only secure and
maintain its resource-wealthy East, far from the capital city Riyadh but nonetheless the
most important in terms of raw resources, but it also allowed the Royal family to focus on
their foreign interests. 21
17
Mike Giglio, "Saudi Arabia's "Day of Rage": The Next Uprising," The Daily Beast, March 10, 2011.
accessed January 15, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/10/saudi-arabias-day-of-rage-thenext-uprising.html.
18
"Saudi unemployed graduates protest to demand jobs," Reuters, April 10 2011, accessed January 15,
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-saudi-protests-idUSTRE73914E20110410.
19
"Saudi Arabia says won't tolerate protests," Reuters, March 5, 2011, accessed January 15, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/us-saudi-protests-idUSTRE72419N20110305.
20
Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, Repercussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States (Doha: ACRPS, 2012), 16.
21
"Saudi Arabia says won't tolerate protests," Reuters, March 5, 2011, accessed January 15, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/us-saudi-protests-idUSTRE72419N20110305.
13
2. How is Saudi Arabia fighting
hegemonic war in the Middle East?
the
The great turning points in world history have been provided
by these hegemonic struggles among political rivals;
these periodic conflicts have reordered the international system
and propelled history in new and unchartered directions.
They resolve the question of which state will govern the system,
as well as what ideas and values will predominate,
thereby determining the ethos of successive ages
- Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics 1983
Now that the background information has been determined the importance of
understanding the hegemonic war that is ongoing in the Middle East becomes
exceedingly clear. With multiple countries in shambles and the Arab Spring stretching
some three years across, with no real end in sight just yet, we change our focus to the
country that is seeking to establish its hegemonic status. Saudi Arabia dealt with its
internal unrest swiftly and effectively, and has since broadened its horizons to impact the
outcome of the protests in other countries too.
Before pointing out and analyzing exactly what kind of support was given and to whom,
it has to be mentioned that Saudi Arabia holds an extraordinarily pragmatic view on its
foreign relations. F.G. Gause III, professor of political science at the University of
Vermont, illustrated that in his article Is Saudi Arabia Really Counterrevolutionary? by
pointing out some of the reasoning behind the Saudi's foreign policies:
"It supports its fellow monarchs both out of concern for its own domestic regime
security, ideological solidarity, and balance of power politics. It might not like
democracy much, and certainly not at home, but that does not mean it will oppose
all democratic movements. [...] When leaders, even leaders with whom it has had
decent relations in the past, no longer can get the job done, the Saudis will help
usher them out the door.
14
They will deal with their successors in a pragmatic way (as the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces in Egypt, the deposers of Saudi ally Hosni Mubarak, quickly
realized)." 22
2.1
Use of political tools and military interventions
Despite their immense material wealth the Saudi's prefer to use its political prowess and
military might to maintain its most important foreign relations, as we will see in several
cases. First and foremost it possesses important seats in the largest Arabic and Gulf
councils, oftentimes actively playing a part in the building of a strongest whole and being
a frontrunner on the discussion.
2.1.1 The Gulf Cooperation Council
The GCC is Saudi Arabia's most important platform of cooperation with other states.
Comprised of six Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) the council is intended to be both an economic and political
union of the otherwise relatively small but extremely wealthy monarchies.
Although the six individual states had already been seeking to strengthen their bonds the
Arab Spring accelerated this process, leading to a set of diplomatic decisions being made
to increase internal support, and thus strengthening the monarchies altogether.
Firstly the council, which had been working on a combined counter-terrorist effort, saw
the importance of speeding up and passing legislation to hinder protests from
overthrowing any member of the cooperation. As such in December of 2010, as soon as
protests broke out and spread from Tunisia, the council organised a meeting which would
establish both a counter-terrorism intelligence centre, as well as the necessarily
legislature to act upon the gathered intelligence. 23
22
F. Gregory Gause III, "Is Saudi Arabia really counter-revolutionary?" Foreign Policy, August 9, 2011,
accessed January 10, 2014,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/09/is_saudi_arabia_really_counter_revolutionary.
23
"GCC Summit ends: Urges establishment of World Counter-terrorism Centre," Emirates 24/7, December
10, 2010, accessed January 15, 2014, http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/gcc-summit-endsurges-establishment-of-world-counter-terrorism-centre-2010-12-07-1.326200.
15
This would pave the way for an intervention in Bahrain in 2011, despite American advice
against it, from the GCC's joint forces, as protests started to threaten key financial and
political structures of the small island monarchy. 24
The sent help was swift and successful, leading to yet more integration of both security
and military in the next GCC council meeting, the 32nd since the inception of the
council, held in Riyadh in December of 2011. In this meeting the council once more
strengthened its military ties - moving away from its earlier counter-terrorist demeanour
and instead replacing it with "Development of defence and security cooperation to ensure
quickly and effectively and in a collective and unified manner confronting any danger or
emergency." 25 Furthermore the cooperation in intelligence gathering and processing was
intensified in the same meeting.
However that's not where the council would stop at increasing the mutual agreement to
decisive action. One year later, in the now calmed down capitol of Bahrain, the 33rd
meeting would see more military cooperation still. In this council meeting the members
endorsed the creation of a unified military command to coordinate and lead not only the
dedicated, but also the additionally assigned ground, naval and air forces. 26 The
justifications for using the forces were defined as follows:
"The Supreme Council also approved the security agreement of the GCC
countries, [...]stressing the importance of intensifying cooperation in particular
with respect to the exchange of information among security agencies in the
Member States. The Supreme Council asserted the firm positions of Member
States to renounce terrorism and extremism in all its forms and manifestations,
whatever the motives and justifications, and whatever its source." 27
The changes made in the GCC over the last few years clearly enforced its collective
possibilities to act against further protests and deal with possible uprisings, with
everything including military interventions being collectively agreed upon. As such the
GCC has been of pinnacle importance for Saudi Arabia's close regional safety, both as a
nation, and as a cluster of power in military cooperation and raw resources.
24
"Gulf states send forces to Bahrain follow protests," BBC News, March 14, 2011, accessed January 17,
2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12729786.
25
"32nd GCC Summit Final Statement and Riyadh Declaration," December 21, 2011, accessed January 5,
2014, http://susris.com/2011/12/21/32nd-gcc-summit-final-statement-and-riyadh-declaration/.
26
"33rd GCC Supreme Council, the Sakhir Summit, Concludes," December 25, 2012, accessed January 5,
2014, http://susris.com/2012/12/25/33rd-gcc-supreme-council-the-sakhir-summit-concludes/.
27
"33rd GCC Supreme Council, the Sakhir Summit, Concludes," December 25, 2012, accessed January 5,
2014, http://susris.com/2012/12/25/33rd-gcc-supreme-council-the-sakhir-summit-concludes/.
16
2.1.2 Bahrain
The little island monarchy of Bahrain would be the first battleground on which the GCC
could showcase its newfound coercive power. The island, which houses just over one
million inhabitants, has only recently been declared a kingdom in 2002. 28 Since, it has
been argued to have seen more protest than the other GCC states.
Although initially the small archipelago would seem mostly of practical interest for the
Saudi Arabians - an intervention done mostly to send a message so to speak - there were
other, more significant economic and political reasons for Saudi Arabia's handling of the
Bahrain situation.
Initially the small island is simply close to the Saudi mainland, and as such it could be an
easy catalyst for internal conflict in the Saudi Arabian cities, especially since both the
majority of the people in Bahrain and in the east of Saudi Arabia are Shiite. 29 As such, in
the interest of Saudi Arabia's own stability, breaking the status quo in Bahrain was not a
risk the Saudi's wanted to take.
Furthermore Bahrain is an important financial hub for the GCC and for Saudi Arabia
itself, as the small island is the normal go-to route for oil transports from eastern Saudi
Arabian oil wells and refineries across the world. This is helped by the fact that the
American fifth fleet is based in Bahrain, protecting transport through the Persian Gulf.
Because of these capabilities that Bahrain possesses too, Saudi Arabia has invested many
billions of dollars in major infrastructural projects, including causeways, refineries and
Bahrain's general financial structures. 30
And as such, because of Bahrain's financial importance and Shiite identity (which
automatically links it more to Iran than Saudi Arabia) there was good reason from the
Saudi's point of view to militarily intervene in 2011, before the status quo could be
drastically altered from what it was. In doing so equally the Saudi's answered one critical
question: would it be willing to intervene in neighbouring GCC countries? The simple
answer is yes - almost all GCC countries hold financial, religious and tactical importance
to the Saudi cause, and will almost certainly be defended when their monarchies are
28
"CIA World Fact Book," accessed January 17, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/eg.html.
29
Robert F. Worth, "Unrest Encircles Saudis, Stoking Sense of Unease," The New York Times, February 19,
2011, accessed January 17, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/world/middleeast/20saudi.html?_r=0.
30
Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "Politics, Economics and Saudi Military Intervention in Bahrain," Journal of
Contemporary Asia 43 (2013): 370-371.
17
challenged, making sure that the main source of income, as well as the most direct allies
and buffers remain intact. 31
Figure 3: Bahrain's strategic and economic importance mapped out
2.1.3 Syria and Iran
Showing willingness to intervene in the local vicinity is however just one step in the way
of achieving regional hegemony. The next step is to start challenging the one true arch
nemesis the Saudi rulers have had in the past decades: Iran.
The Iraq and Afghanistan interventions by the United States ultimately served to
strengthen Iran, which saw its largest threats (in Saddam Hussein to the West and the
Taliban to the North) eliminated from the playing field. 32 Although Iran itself remained
31
Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "Politics, Economics and Saudi Military Intervention in Bahrain," Journal of
Contemporary Asia 43 (2013): 376-377.
32
Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "Politics, Economics and Saudi Military Intervention in Bahrain," Journal of
Contemporary Asia 43 (2013): 366.
18
largely untouched by the Arab Spring revolutions its one true ally in the region, namely
Syria, suffered the most catastrophic outcome so far.
As a result Saudi Arabia focused its attention to weakening its greatest regional opponent
by proxy - attempting to take away the only significant ally Iran had left in the Middle
East by using the Arab Spring against the ruling Baath party and President Assad.
Saudi Arabian officials have used several political tools to make life hard on the ruling
elites of Syria, starting with the seemingly mild "Abdullah Statement". In this address the
King of Saudi Arabia expressed a clear disapproval of the Assad regime, which was
harsher than it seems considering it made Saudi Arabia the first Arab state to do so. 33
The statement made by the King also cleared the way for other Arab States to start
showing their discontent by withdrawing ambassadors and urging the UN to take serious
measures against the humanitarian disaster that was unfolding, showing Saudi Arabia's
influence as well as the combined opposition across the Arab States. 34
The Saudi's went further than constantly condemning the Syrian regime's massacres
though, as it also started a war-by-proxy. Although the Saudi regime attempted to
pressure the United Nations and the United States into intervention, it ultimately couldn't
find the support to directly force the outcome in Saudi favour through those avenues. 35
As a result the Saudi politicians tried to force a resolution through the Arab League,
managing to seize cooperation with the Syrian bank and forcing further economic
sanctions, but once again the plan for an international peacekeeping force stranded
because no permission was ultimately given for such an intervention. 36
Ultimately the Saudi's then decided to take matters in their own hands. Throughout 2012
the Saudi's gave 'covert' support, starting with humanitarian aid to refugees but quickly
adding military supplies so that the refugees "could be protected". It equally helped Saudi
33
Institute of Developing Economies, "Saudi Arabian Diplomacy during the Syrian Humanitarian Crisis,"
accessed January 25, 2014,
http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Seisaku/pdf/201307_mide_13.pdf, 2.
34
Institute of Developing Economies, "Saudi Arabian Diplomacy during the Syrian Humanitarian Crisis,"
accessed January 25, 2014,
http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Seisaku/pdf/201307_mide_13.pdf, 7.
35
"Saudi Arabia pushes UN resolution on Syria abuse," Al Jazeera, October 31, 2013, accessed January 20,
2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/10/saudi-pushes-un-resolution-syria-abuse20131030221732574344.html.
36
Institute of Developing Economies, "Saudi Arabian Diplomacy during the Syrian Humanitarian Crisis,"
accessed January 25, 2014,
http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Seisaku/pdf/201307_mide_13.pdf, 13-14.
19
citizens raise some $140 million in support to the rebels, money which had no restraints
on what it could be spent on. 37
Although no direct forces have been sent to Syria it is clear that Saudi Arabia is actively
trying to take down Syria's ruling government in a bid to severely weaken the position of
Iran, the one nation that, to this point, remains largely untouchable for Saudi Arabia.
Despite covert arms aid, public international pressure on the Syrian government and
limited, so far denied Saudi native fighters, the battle is as of yet undecided, but the
intentions are clear. 38
The threat of Iran is furthermore being expressively addressed by Saudi Arabia in recent
years by stepping up international rhetoric against the secluded and sanctioned nation. On
several occasions Saudi Arabia granted promises that, if sanctions were to be tightened
on Iran's oil exports, it would guarantee an increase in exports from their reserves to
maintain the world economy. Furthermore Saudi Arabia declared, in a closed meeting,
that a nuclear option for Iran would force the Saudi's themselves to explore nuclear
facilities too. In short, Saudi Arabia has been actively looking for international support to
further limit Iran's capabilities, as well as providing political and military threats if such
demands are not met. 39
2.1.4 Morocco and Jordan
A surprising act of political intervention though was the Saudi-led invitation of GCC
membership extended to both Jordan and Morocco. When word came out of the
invitation the GCC had been a closed community for some three decades already, and
had never shown much genuine interest in expanding that number. 40
The invitation to Jordan can be most easily explained in terms of geopolitical and military
reasoning. The small monarchy, laid right between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
troubled region of Syria, had its own Arab Spring revolts, but didn't see major political
change as a result. This is in part because of Jordan's well prepared intelligence and army
37
Institute of Developing Economies, "Saudi Arabian Diplomacy during the Syrian Humanitarian Crisis,"
accessed January 25, 2014,
http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Seisaku/pdf/201307_mide_13.pdf, 15 -18.
38
Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Insight: Saudi Arabia boosts Salafist rivals to al Qaeda in Syria," Reuters, October
1, 2013, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/01/us-syria-crisis-jihadistsinsight-idUSBRE9900RO20131001.
39
Yoel Guzansky, "Saudi Activism in a Changing Middle East" Strategic Assessment 14 (2011): 67.
40
Suleiman al-Khalidi, "Analysis - Arab dynasties lure Jordan, Morocco into anti-Iran bloc," Reuters, May
13, 2011, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/13/gulf-allianceidAFLDE74A0HM20110513.
20
forces. On several occasions in fact Jordan had already cooperated with the GCC
countries, training their militaries and intelligence officers. 41
The strong military that Jordan possesses however added one more factor to the Saudi
equation - namely that it was a necessary buffer for the unrest brewing in Syria. By
joining the GCC and as such joining the military cooperation of the council it could be
guaranteed that violence would not spread nearer to Saudi mainland. 42
Figure 4: Jordan's strategic positioning could as a buffer for Syria
Important other considerations for the invitation were both diplomatic and economic. By
maintaining the Kingdom that existed in Jordan the GCC, and by extension Saudi Arabia,
kept the Muslim Brotherhood in check in the region. With Syria quite possibly falling in
the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Egypt already electing a government led by
the Brotherhood, the Islamist political movement could start forming a powerhouse of
countries. Although eventually this threat would decrease, this political reason was more
important than just monarchical solidarity when the invitation was sent to Jordan in 2011.
41
Yoel Guzansky, "Saudi Activism in a Changing Middle East" Strategic Assessment 14 (2011): 60-61.
Neil Patrick, Saudi Arabia and Jordan: Friends in Adversity (London: LSE, 2013),
11-15.
42
21
43
Lastly the people of Jordan are generally well educated and could assist the GCC in its
technological advancements and infrastructural challenges, both issues which now
require more international help and investments. 44
The case of Morocco seemed rather out of place, considering its distant geographic
position in relation to the other GCC countries, but exactly that factor could make it into
a valuable international ally for the Saudi's. By increasing the number of GCC states from
six to eight first and foremost Saudi Arabia could start pushing its influence more in all
the regional political associations - the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic
Conference, the United Nations and even the African Union. 45 46
Equally Morocco's cooperation could prove invaluable for the GCC's military aspirations
such as interventions and counter-terrorism. With a standing army of some 180,000 the
Moroccan army equals that of all six current GCC members combined, and its influence
in the Western Sahara region would extend the GCC's reach tremendously in its fight
against what it deems terrorist organisations. 47
As of yet the invitations are still under revision, with neither country yet joining the
council, but the option has already improved international relations between the GCC and
the two new possible recruits, increasing the possibility of a GCC partnership and
ultimately GCC and Saudi influence both in the regional political co-operations and
international political organizations.
2.2
Economical and further financial packages to allies and
potential allies
Saudi Arabia's intent to strengthen its regional ties doesn't stop at its political and military
influence. As shown in their internal conflict resolving, the Kingdom has vast monetary
reserves to use and 'buy' allegiance of those in need of money. First and foremost Saudi
Arabia strengthens itself and its closest allies through the economic collaboration in the
GCC. Talks of a monetary union have been ongoing and mutual investments continue to
43
Neil Patrick, Saudi Arabia and Jordan: Friends in Adversity (London: LSE, 2013), 10.
Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont, "Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council,"
Foreign Policy Winter (2012): 91.
45
"Jordan Joining the GCC: strategic regional realignment," accessed January 25, 2014,
http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/0e0a49b6-9826-413e-8101-6a3701813d81.pdf.
46
Andrea F. Gastaldo, "The Gulf Cooperation Council's new members" (MA thesis, US Command and
General College, 2012) 15.
47
Andrea F. Gastaldo, "The Gulf Cooperation Council's new members" (MA thesis, US Command and
General College, 2012) 67.
44
22
strengthen the six nations, on all fronts ranging from infrastructure to military and non-oil
produces. 48
However the reserves amassed by Saudi Arabia have also been used on occasion to
support the economies of trembling states far outside the GCC's legislature. Saudi Arabia
used financial these incentives to support potential allies on a number of occasions, the
largest two of which will be highlighted.
2.2.1 Egypt
Apart from the collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the focus on its
Iranian nemesis the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia holds their alliance with Egypt in high
regard. As the largest nation of the region by virtue of its population, Egypt has long been
one of the most influential countries in the Arab spectrum. Its longstanding partnership
with the United States and adept military forces further increase Egypt's political
importance in the Arab region.49 From an economic standpoint Egypt also holds one of
the most valuable assets in sea trade - the Suez canal. 50
As such a partnership between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two close neighbours and
powerhouses in the region, could prove invaluable in terms of the collective strength of
the two parties. Therefore it comes as no surprise that, long before Egypt saw the brunt of
its Arab Spring revolution, Saudi Arabia had openly expressed support for sitting
president Mubarak in the decades leading up to the 2011 protests. 51
The years of cooperation and combined coordination led Saudi Arabia to invest large
sums in Egypt, in both infrastructure and tourism, supporting Egypt in its struggle to keep
its finances balanced.52 Because of these longstanding investments the mutual ties
between Egypt and the Saudis remained an important issue, even as the power balance in
48
"GCC Monetary Union Agreement," accessed January 27, 2014, http://sites.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/indexeng.php?action=ShowOne&BID=321.
49
"How New is Egypt's New Foreign Policy?" June 8, 2011, accessed January 20, 2014,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-new-is-egypt-s--new--foreign-policy-.
50
Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, "The economics of the Arab Spring," World Development 45 (2013):
299.
51
"Egypt protests draw mixed reaction in region," CNN, January 29, 2011, accessed January 15, 2014,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/01/29/egypt.middle.east.reaction/index.html?_s=PM:WORL
D.
52
"How New is Egypt's New Foreign Policy?" June 8, 2011, accessed January 20, 2014,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-new-is-egypt-s--new--foreign-policy-.
23
Egypt started to shift - with some $12 billion in outstanding investments and 700,000
Saudis living in Egypt at the time the Arab Spring hit. 53
Ultimately though Saudi Arabia's pragmatism showed most evidently when dealing with
Egypt in the wake of the Arab Spring protests. After Mubarak was removed from power
the very first visit of the newly elected President Morsi was to none other than Saudi
Arabia, and the Kingdom instantly granted $1 billion in cash to keep Egypt's economy
afloat, an amount which was set to increase throughout 2012. To quote Saudi Foreign
Ministry official Rayed Krimly:
"We deal with Egypt as a state and with the institutions of Egypt, not its internal
politics, so it doesn’t affect us. [...] The meeting reinforced the strong and solid
relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as the importance of each
country to the other one. [...] Saudi Arabia is now Egypt’s most important source
of critical financial support. And we will continue to support Egypt. Egypt is
important.” 54
Egypt, which in 2012 was in desperate need of some $9 billion overall to prevent an
economic crisis from occurring, was in this way also prevented from seeking
rapprochement to Iran, which saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a chance to renew
Egyptian ties. 55
As the political situation in Egypt remained unstable Saudi Arabia kept being one of the
single largest benefactors of the otherwise structurally faltering Egyptian economy.
While Morsi was in charge loans and gifts to Egypt were increased by Saudi Arabia, and
after the military removed Morsi from power this money stream was entirely sustained.
Egypt's interim president Mansour received $4 billion in 2013 and continues to be
practically completely reliant on Saudi Arabia and the GCC for support to keep the
country economically viable - let alone recover from the depths it has plunged in. 56 As a
result not only does Saudi Arabia have Egypt's allegiance, it might ultimately also have a
say in the reforms that happen while the political environment stabilizes, firstly because
the current governing body seems unable to resolve the lacklustre economy, and secondly
53
"After the Arab Spring: Power shift in the Middle East?" 4 March 2012, accessed 30 January, 2014,
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43461/.
54
David D. Kirkpatrick, "In Simply Meeting, Egyptian and Saudi Leaders Open New Era," The New York
Times, July 12, 2012, accessed January 28, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/middleeast/in-simply-meeting-egyptian-and-saudi-leadersopen-new-era.html.
55
Yoel Guzansky, "Saudi Activism in a Changing Middle East" Strategic Assessment 14 (2011): 63.
56
Patrick Werr, "UAE offers Egypt $3 billion support, Saudis $5 billion," Reuters, July 9, 2013, accessed
January 10, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-egypt-protests-loanidUSBRE9680H020130709.
24
because the current Egyptian supervisors, who currently maintain power, are unlikely to
dismantle themselves and make room for change.
2.2.2 Palestine
Another area in which Saudi Arabia is doing its best to deter Iranian influence is the state
of Palestine. With the political spectrum divided into two major parties, Fatah and
Hamas, Palestine finds itself being the geopolitical arena of one of the many struggles
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Being cut off from most 'first-world' aid after ruling
party Hamas was designated as a terrorist organisation, Palestine's largest party has been
dependant on the support of Iranian benefactors to stay the largest. 57
However, the Syrian conflict has had Iran preoccupied, and in 2012 it became clear the
ties between Hamas and Iran had been gradually worsening as a result. 58 In the same
period Saudi Arabia stepped up its support to the faction it had been supplying to counter
the Iranian influence in Palestine. Halfway through 2012, and at the start of 2013 Saudi
Arabia granted an overt $200 million to Palestine's government, continuing to be a
steadfast benefactor of many years while Iran's influence was faltering. 59
Although the support is ongoing Hamas' allegiance to Iran and its international standing
make it unlikely that the several hundred million dollar injections by Saudi Arabia will
completely erase Iran's influence in Palestine as of yet, but it seems probable that without
the donations Iran would have a much greater influence.
57
"Hamas 2012 budget mainly "foreign aid" from Iran," World Tribune, January 5, 2010, accessed January
27, 2014, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_hamas0005_01_05.asp.
58
"Hamas says its Iran ties worsen over Syrian civil war," Reuters, June 19, 2013, accessed January 27,
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-syria-crisis-hamas-idUSBRE95I0W220130619.
59
"Saudis will give $100 million to Palestinians," Reuters, January 16, 2013, accessed January 28, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/16/us-palestinians-saudi-idUSBRE90F1B020130116.
25
3. How is Saudi Arabia gaining regional
leadership by reaching out globally?
In the Middle East today there are too many people
consumed by political dreams and too few interested in practical plans.
That is why, to paraphrase Winston Churchill's line about the Balkans,
the region produces more history than it consumes.
- Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad 2003
Although Saudi Arabia is continually bolstering its network of allies and partners in the
Middle East through political, military, monetary and economic means, the Kingdom has
also had to worry about its standing with the largest international powerhouses: the
United States and China. As major trade partners the US has been of pinnacle importance
for the Saudi cause, providing both a market for Saudi Arabia's oil, as well as all the
military goods the Saudi's could hope for.
However, since the Arab Spring started both countries have been divided over support
and aid to nations, with the Americans sometimes opting to go against the Kingdom's
wishes. As a result the partnership has become more troublesome than before.
3.1 The extensive economic cooperation with the United
States
For six decades Saudi Arabia and the United States fostered a mutually beneficial
partnership leading up to the Arab Spring turmoil. As the main producer of crude oil
Saudi Arabia held invaluable worth for the ever increasing energy demand of the United
States. Equally the United States could provide security for Saudi Arabia in a region
which had been unstable.
The partnership however endured some apparent chills as the Arab Spring led both
parties to support different sides on some occasions. Most notably the situation in Egypt
led to Saudi dislike after the United States openly backed the opposition of Mubarak, a
long time ally of Saudi Arabia and one of the most influential figures in Middle Eastern
26
politics at that point. 60 Equally both parties found each other on opposite sides of the
same conflict in the cases of Bahrain, Libya and more importantly Syria and Iran.
The latter two, Syria and Iran, have been the main source of trouble between the U.S. and
Riyadh. The opposition between the two parties led to some heated rhetoric from Saudi
Arabia's side, warning for "a shift away from the United States" because of Washington's
"failure to take action against Assad and its policies on Iran". 61 Moreover, to make a
statement, Saudi Arabia ended up denying a seat in the U.N. Security Council, after
being voted into the council in 2013. By denying the seat Saudi Arabia distanced itself
further from the public frontlines of the Arab Spring policy making, which could
positively influence its international appearance and make it easier for the Kingdom to
manoeuvre itself.
All the upheaval caused by Saudi Arabia can be interpreted two ways. Either Saudi
Arabia is fearful that, if it were to absolutely need U.S. help, it could fall in the same
category as Egypt and be abandoned, or Saudi Arabia is trying to forcefully change the
relationship it has with the United States. 62 What exactly the new relations would look
like is uncertain, but at the very least it seems Riyadh is looking for more loyalty from
Washington.
Despite these factors of insecurity it seems clear that a break between the United States
and Saudi Arabia is very unlikely. Since 2010 the trade balance Saudi Arabia and the
U.S. share has risen drastically, clocking in at over $70 billion in 2012. 63 Equally the
trade of military supplies to Saudi Arabia has swelled, resulting in a record $29,4 billion
in sales in 2012. 64
Ultimately both sides require the basic needs they provide each other. The United States
cannot do without its largest supplier from the Middle East, or its basic need to access the
region through its many bases in Saudi Arabia. 65 Equally, without backing from the
United States, Riyadh loses not only its most important military trade partner but also its
biggest ally in the battle against Iran and the umbrella security the U.S. has been offering.
60
F. Gregory Gause III, "Is Saudi Arabia really counter-revolutionary?" Foreign Policy, August 9, 2011,
accessed January 10, 2014,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/09/is_saudi_arabia_really_counter_revolutionary.
61
Michelle Nichols, "Saudi rejects U.N. Security Council seat, opening way to Jordan," Reuters, November
12, 2013, accessed January 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-un-saudi-jordanidUSBRE9AB14720131112.
62
Yoel Guzansky, "Saudi Activism in a Changing Middle East" Strategic Assessment 14 (2011): 67-69.
63
"Trade in Goods with Saudi Arabia," accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5170.html.
64
Jim Wolf, "U.S. expects record $60 billion in arms sales in 2012," Reuters, June 21, 2012, accessed
January 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/21/us-arms-usa-recordidUSBRE85K1CU20120621.
65
Yoel Guzansky, "Saudi Activism in a Changing Middle East" Strategic Assessment 14 (2011): 68.
27
3.1.2 Increased financial
towards China
rapprochement
from
Saudi
Arabia
However, Saudi Arabia intends to keep its options open in case it has to rely on other
sources of income and support in the coming years, and as a result has looked to the East
to expand its network of contacts and trade partners.
The most important potential new trade partner and ally of Saudi Arabia could become
China. The People's Republic has had a growing energy demand, causing it to look to the
Middle East for its oil imports. In 2013 30% of China's oil imports hailed from either Iran
or Saudi Arabia, a percentage that's been growing steadily over the last years. 66
What's equally important is the growing displeasure with the United States as an ally, not
just in the Saudi Royal family, but also among the Saudi population. China offers a
partnership which comes without civilian criticism or judgment for lack of democracy. 67
As a result Saudi Arabian trade with China skyrocketed over the last few years, now
making China Riyadh's largest import partner and, more importantly, Riyadh's second
largest export partner. 68 Meanwhile Saudi Arabia has become China's main source of oil.
69
In response Saudi Arabia has increased its oil reserve and oil production, accounting
for China's potential increase in oil consumption in the coming years.
All in all this shows a clear intention from Saudi Arabia to spread its chances and keep
other large allies nearby. However, China's stance towards Iran, as well as its potential
own interest in political gain in the Middle East make it a peculiar partner for Saudi
Arabia, and not one that necessarily can provide the umbrella of protection or the
political guarantees that the United States has providing.
66
Margaret Dunsmore, Chinese involvement in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
(Washington: RLC, 2013) 3.
67
Margaret Dunsmore, Chinese involvement in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
(Washington: RLC, 2013) 4.
68
"CIA World Fact Book," accessed January 10, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/.
69
Margaret Dunsmore, Chinese involvement in the Middle East: Implications for the United States
(Washington: RLC, 2013) 16.
28
4. In what ways has Saudi Arabia set itself
up for a position of either a position of
hegemony or imperialistic overstretch?
Look back over the past,
with its changing empires that rose and fell,
and you can foresee the future, too.
- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations
The last three years have been turbulent for Saudi Arabia, and a state of equilibrium is
still far from being reached. Many of the moves made in the Middle East retain an
unstable footing as of yet, with protests ongoing and alliances rocking down to their very
cores. However, there are conclusions significant to be drawn from the moves made up
until this point.
4.1
The regional influence and Cold War prospects
The aim Saudi Arabia had in their involvement in the Arab Spring outcome was two-fold.
First and foremost they were provided a great chance to improve on their own security
and influence sphere. They managed to secure both. By increasing the decisiveness with
which Riyadh and other states could militarily act in the GCC, mainly through loosening
protest and anti-terror laws, and emplacing legislature to allow interventions if necessary,
Saudi Arabia is virtually guaranteed internal and close regional stability. Furthermore, by
strengthening ties to a host of buffer states which equally hold large regional political
relevance, Saudi Arabia has managed to form a power bloc of nations around it to protect
it from public uprising and other potential aggression.
Adding to its security dimension, by gaining close ties to Egypt, Morocco and most
importantly Jordan, Saudi Arabia now has a host of new allies which not only house
exceptionally strong armies for the region, but which also will support Riyadh in its own
endeavour for a stronger military.
29
Secondly it has managed to gain allegiance from these nations, who are bound to Saudi
Arabia either through monetary support or political security, to form a political
powerhouse of nations in multiple large political organizations, among which are the
United Nations, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the African
Union. By increasing this influence sphere Saudi Arabian interests are now more
powerful than they were before.
The prospects of this situation changing, for example by Jordan and Morocco declining a
GCC seat, or Egypt falling into the hands of Iran, seem rather unlikely. Jordan and
Morocco have strong security forces, but their demand for energy sources and finances
will inevitably keep them close to Saudi Arabia. Egypt seems even more of a sealed case,
with its economy shattered and just Saudi Arabia's investments remaining to keep it
afloat. Inevitably whoever rises to power will need to either concede to the U.S. and the
IMF or Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh being the more likely option because of its history of
investments and generosity.
However there is also a drawback to the gains Saudi Arabia has made in its regional
arena. As of yet its rivalry with Iran has only flared up, not died down because of the
increased power of Riyadh. With Iran actively supporting the government troops in Syria,
one of the last few remaining allies of Tehran (but unmistakably a powerful one itself),
the Syrian civil war has become a war-by-proxy for Saudi Arabia to eliminate one of the
final supporters of its arch nemesis.
The proxy war in Syria however has had more drawbacks than just financial costs. With
Iran being challenged more seriously than ever it has stepped up rhetoric against Saudi
Arabia and exacerbated the dichotomy between the two nations. Iran itself as a result has
also actively been looking to gain involvement in several regions in the Middle East,
including Egypt and Jordan.
An outcome between the two regional powerhouses that remained largely untouched by
the Arab Spring revolts, Iran and Saudi Arabia, is currently uncertain, but the results of
the Syrian civil war could very well ultimately decide between a Saudi victory or a
possible Middle Eastern Cold War. Especially considering Riyadh's statement that it
would itself seek a nuclear option if Iran would not be further sanctioned.
4.2
A troublesome international outlook
Internationally Saudi Arabia has yet greater challenges to face. Although it has secured
more power in the large political institutions these can largely be nullified on major
matters through vetoes. In the mean time its partner of 80 years, the United States, has
seemed reluctant to side with Riyadh on many major matters in the Arab Spring.
30
Divisions in decisions on Egypt, Bahrain and Syria have chilled the cooperation between
the two trade partners and made Saudi Arabia's rulers cautious.
That said though, the basic necessities for either party currently outweigh the option of
breaking ties. With Saudi Arabia looking to keep improving its military, and the U.S. in
need of a base from which they can operate in the Middle East, the core of the
cooperation remains firmly intact.
Still, Riyadh is keeping an open mind and continuing to look for other trade partners. In
its search it has found China willing to greatly increase the trade balance with Saudi
Arabia, becoming a greater importer of crude oil than the U.S., with plans to increase that
amount yet more. Furthermore China has more credit with the Saudi population, adding
to the fact that China will make deals with Riyadh without passing judgment.
It has to be said though that this partnership brings its own limitations, for example
China's lenient stance towards Iran. If Riyadh is ultimately looking for a hegemony then
China will most likely not be of much help, if any help at all for that goal, considering its
open stance on the Middle East.
4.3
The conclusion of the status quo
Saudi Arabia has managed to severely strengthen its position within the Middle Eastern
area. Among its international advantages gained are allies which can provide excellent
military support and training, allies which hold strategic strongholds such as the Suez
canal or buffer zones, allies which improve Riyadh's say in multiple major political
organizations and neighbours which greatly limit Iran's possible expansion room.
However, the most decisive areas of the hegemony are yet to be determined. Egypt is
current too unstable to completely guarantee a favourable outcome for Riyadh (despite
the outlook being positive), and the Syrian battle with Iran is far from being resolved.
Were these two nations to fall in Saudi Arabia's direction, it will greatly limit Iran's
influence and almost certainly set Saudi Arabia up for a position of near-hegemony.
However, in acting upon its current situation and the options that lie ahead, Saudi Arabia
has much work to do towards its connections with the world's other powerhouses. With
the United States and China being the closest partners to this point Riyadh has no
guarantee either party will support its cause or oppose it. If Saudi Arabia is to become a
true regional superpower it will, at least for the first few years, need the support of either
one of the existing powerhouses in achieving that position - as it currently cannot yet
complete politically, yet.
31
4.4
Discussion and concessions
Although the study of contemporary issues is necessary, especially within conflict
studies, this specific study does have several noteworthy limitations because of the young
age of the conflict it discusses. Most importantly, with the conflict on-going and the most
important factors on which it relies undetermined, this study should be read in its timely
context. At any given moment, as soon as years or months, the situation in which Saudi
Arabia finds itself can drastically alter, thus changing the ultimate conclusion of the study
It's timely fashion also ties in with the age of the Saudi King and the implications a
possible change in ruler. Although he is over 90 years old the King has been one of the
most import factors in deciding the path which Saudi Arabia takes, and his popularity
among both his peers and his people have made a lot possible. Replace him with one of
the current Princes and the political landscape might drastically alter, and with that also
the international relations that Saudi Arabia has with many of its allies.
Finally, the nature of the studies currently available is both a blessing and a curse. Since
the Arab Spring broke the subject has mainly been studied by Middle Eastern institutions,
which offers the insight of the local scholars, but also lacks tends to lack some of the
objectivity and depth that the prestigious western universities usually bring.
As a result the findings are subject to change over time, due to the conflict moving
forward, the rule of Saudi Arabia most likely changing sometime soon and more western
research on the matter.
32
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