Venezuela Oil Neg
Economy Frontline
1NC
1. Economy improving now – new initiatives stimulate the economic flow of currency
Venezuela Analysis – Website dedicated to Venezuelan news originated in Caracas, 7/19/13, New
Foreign Exchange Initiative in Venezuela Hopes to Aid Economy, Venezuela Analysis,
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9868
¶ ¶ The second auction of US dollars under Venezuela's new foreign exchange initiative is a step towards
ensuring the “necessary flow of the economy”, according to President Nicolas Maduro.¶ ¶ The Complimentary System of Foreign
Currency Acquirement (Sicad) held its second auction of US dollars this week, with thousands of individuals and companies
participating.¶ ¶ In total, 1,085 companies and 21,916 individuals made successful bids, according to a statement posted on the Central
Bank of Venezuela's (BCV) website.¶ ¶ US $215.3 million was successfully auctioned; exceeding the initial offer of US$200
million. According to the BCV, this was due to the participation of private sellers.¶ ¶ “The Sicad operation has generated great,
positive expectations,” Maduro stated after bidding ended on Tuesday.¶ ¶ “We are guaranteeing the flow necessary for
the economy, and mechanisms for checks [and balances],” he said.¶ ¶ US$170 was initially on offer to businesses, while
US$30 million was earmarked for individuals. However, following the auction the BCV reported that US$180.5 million had been sold to
businesses, while individual bidders had been allocated US$34.8 million.¶ ¶ On Wednesday, Venezuela's minister of finance Nelson Merentes
told media in Caracas, “we want more companies to sell dollars.”¶ ¶ “There were some problems with the banks, but they have been resolved,”
Merentes stated.¶ ¶ In a statement released last week, the BCV urged banks authorized to process Sicad transactions to make access to the
scheme as easily available as possible, and not turn away customers.¶ ¶ Travelers were also able to participate in the auction. Venezuelans
holding return tickets for international flights between July 11 and September 15 could purchase dollars though Sicad, but with some
restrictions.¶ ¶ Sicad dollars can only be used to cover expenses related to study, healthcare, sports and cultural events, scientific research,
other specific occupational requirements and emergencies.¶ ¶ Automotive and health sector businesses, along with companies registered in
areas of Nueva Esparta and Falcon state were eligible to participate. However, restrictions have also been imposed on the use of dollars by
businesses. In a statement, the BCV announced that buyers would be unable to use Sicad dollars to pay off debts, and barred companies that
were not active in the 2012 fiscal year from bidding. Information from the National Customs and Tax Administration Service (Seniat) was used
to ensure that ineligible businesses didn't participate, according to the BCV.¶ ¶ Businesses could order between US$8000 and just over US$1
million, while individuals could make purchases between US500 and US$2500.¶ ¶ This week's auction was intended by the Venezuelan
government to be the first in a more regular schedule. According to the BCV, auctions will now be held roughly twice a month.¶ ¶ The only
previous Sicad auction was held in March, when US$200 million was sold, mostly to private importers.¶ ¶ Opposition Response¶ ¶ Last week,
former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles criticized Sicad on his internet program at Capriles.tv, describing it as a “new devaluation”.¶ ¶
“US
dollars are in short supply and they are looking for a way to legitimize the parallel exchange rate,
which is over 30 bolivars per US dollar,” Capriles stated.¶ ¶ However, BCV director Armando Leon has hit back at Capriles'
remarks. In an interview with Globovision, Leon emphasized that, “there is no formal or official movement of the exchange rate.”¶ ¶ “The
official exchange rate of 6.30 bolivars [to the US dollar] remains in place,” he stated.¶ ¶ According to Leon, the prices paid for US dollars though
Sicad will not “be made public”.¶ ¶ Leon also stated that the
auction process which started last Friday had progressed
smoothly.¶ ¶ Inflation¶ ¶ Leon likewise responded to criticisms from Capriles of the government's handling of inflation, arguing that price
rises will be “significantly lower” in the second half of the year compared to the last six months.¶ ¶ Between February and May, the monthly
rate of inflation increased from 1.6% to 6.1%, according to the BCV's National Index of Consumer Prices (INPC). The rate of inflation in May was
the highest recorded by the INPC since it was established in 2008. However, in June inflation dropped to 4.7%.¶ ¶ According to Leon, prices
of consumer goods are likely to stabilize over the next few months, though he stated that the BCV has advised
authorities to revise price controls every five or six months.¶ ¶ When Sicad was first announced in March, former minister for finance Jorge
Giordani described it as a public “bidding system”that would ensure “transparency in the process of assigning foreign currency”, and would
operate parallel to the pre-existing Foreign Exchange Administration Commission (Cadivi). Maduro stated the
new system would
help “overcome” the currency black-market.
2. There’s no internal link to solvency in their 1AC that indicates that sanctions on
PDVSA is the reason why their economy is failing or that lifting sanctions would help
the economy
3. China investment solves the status quo
Bloomberg News – March 6, 2013, China Weighs Risks to $50 Billion Investment After Chavez,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/china-weighs-risks-to-50-billion-investment-afterchavez-death.html
Chinese firms are assessing the risk that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s death poses to investments worth at least
$50 billion, after 14 years of closer ties between the two countries.¶ China Development Bank Corp., which has lent Venezuela
more than $40 billion since 2008, has contingency plans in place, Yao Zhongmin, head of the bank’s supervisory board, said in an
interview today. State-owned conglomerate Citic Group Corp. is also weighing the risks, Chairman Chang Zhenming said. State-owned Chinese
firms have won contracts to build railroads, housing and power stations since Chavez took power in 1999 and nationalized more than 1,000
companies or their assets. The terms of some of the deals may face new scrutiny should Venezuela’s opposition wins elections required to be
held within 30 days.¶ “If you do get an opposition candidate that wins there could be more information out there about previous deals that will
be very uncomfortable,” said Matt Ferchen, a scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. “That could be politically
unnerving but also reason for leverage to rework some of the deals.Ӧ Chavez died yesterday at age 58 of cancer. Since he announced his illness
in June 2011, investors have speculated that his departure could pave the way for the opposition to win power and introduce more marketfriendly policies.¶ Dollar Bonds¶ Chavez was a “great friend of China,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said at a briefing today in
Beijing, adding that China’s top leaders sent their condolences over his death. “China cherishes the two countries’ friendship and would like to
work with Venezuela to constantly develop their strategic partnership,” she said.¶ Moody’s Investors Service rates Venezuelan long-term
foreign-currency debt B2, or five levels below investment grade, the same as Honduras and Cambodia.¶
Led by China Development
Bank, the world’s largest policy lender, China has made Venezuela the main focus of its global oil-forloans program, in which loans were repaid with oil shipments. Some of the biggest state-owned companies, including
Citic Group, China Railway Group and Sinohydro Corp. won more than $11 billion in contracts to build and supply equipment for infrastructure,
according to data compiled by Bloomberg.¶ “As
long as Venezuela maintains stable oil exports to China, then the
risks to China’s loans are small,” said Sun Hongbo, an associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies, part of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. “No matter who wins the presidential election, China will continue to be a strategic
partner for Venezuela.”
4. No impact to lifting sanctions – largely symbolic anyway
Gupta 11 (Girish - British freelance journalist and reporter for Reuters, TIME, May 26th, “US Hits
Venezuela Oil Giant With Sanctions for Iran Trade,” Minyanville,
http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/articles/venezuela-venezuela-news-petroleos-devenezuela/5/26/2011/id/34789)
The sanctions, however, are largely symbolic as they have no sway over Venezuela’s oil sales to the US
which account for 45% of the Latin American country’s total. There is also no effect on US-based
subsidiary Citgo. “The sanctions mean nothing to us,” a defiant Ramírez added, with Venezuelan president Hugo
Chávez weighing in with the much more grandiose, and typically Simón Bolívar-hailing, “Sanctions against the Fatherland of Bolivia? Imposed by
the Gringo imperialist? Well, welcome Mr Obama, don't forget we are the children of Bolívar!” Analysts
have said that the
sanctions are nothing more than a slap on the wrist. Nomura’s Boris Segura described the act as
“fairly inconsequential.” The United States would be biting the hand that feeds it if it had given the
sanctions any teeth as Venezuela is the fifth largest crude supplier to the US, making up around 10%
of imports. Nearly 30m barrels were sent from Venezuela to the US in February. Citgo’s refineries there
produce 750,000 barrels a day which is just over 4% of the total consumed by the US market.
5. No impact on the economy
Walid Khadduri – MEES Consultant, former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, August 23,
2011, “Walid Khadduri: The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations,” Al
Arabiya News, http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html, Hensel)
What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be
large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the
IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its
findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They Really That Bad?", IMF Working
a comprehensive global dataset […] we find that the impact of
higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically
causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less.” The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from
one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although
higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external
Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using
receipts
[represented in new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words,
the more oil prices increase , benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are
recycled , for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The
researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United
States. However, Rasmussen
and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S.
economy in the previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy,
the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S.
economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy. A 10
percent rise in oil prices before 1984, for instance, used to lower the U.S. GDP by about 0.7 percent over two to three
years, while this figure started shrinking to no more than 0.25 percent after 1984, owing to these accumulated
economic changes. This means that while oil price shocks continue to adversely impact the U.S. economy, the latter has managed,
as a result of the changes that transpired following the first shock in the seventies, to overcome these shocks, and subsequently, the
impact of oil price shocks has become extremely limited compared to previous periods
2NC Ext.
1NC #1 – the buy American dollars initiative that began recently has already boosted
the economy – everyone is participating and the economy is going to get back on track
No econ collapse – Venezuela’s economy growing now
Arsenault 3/13/2013 (Chris – journalist with Al Jazeera English, Venezuela: A tale of two economies,
Aljazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331372515565950.html)
Despite a currency facing further devaluation, soaring inflation, and intense capital flight, Mildred Castellano thinks Venezuela's
economy is doing better than ever. Like millions of working-class voters who have supported the socialist government during the
past four elections, Castellano doesn't care much for traditional economic indicators. "The past 14 years have been unbelievably good for us
poor people," Castellano told Al Jazeera while sitting in her modest Caracas apartment. "Back in 1989, people were rioting and looting because
they were starving. After we elected [deceased president Hugo] Chavez, the economy improved for Venezuelans… now I have
an apartment of my own." It wasn't always this way. Several years ago, Castellano, a community organiser, was living in a shack perched on a
hillside, a common sight around major cities in this oil-rich country. In 2010, torrential rains triggered mudslides, destroying her home. With
help from the government, she was given an apartment in a newly constructed public housing complex. "This horrible thing happened and I was
homeless," she said. "But look where I am now." While Castellano's support for Chavez, and his chosen successor Nicolas Maduro, is common
among the country's poor, many Venezuelans have seen their lives worsen during the transition to "21st century socialism". These should be
boom times, economists say, but shortages of basic goods continue and inflation remains above 15 percent. Oil accounts for more than 90
percent of exports, and prices of the commodity have risen ten-fold, from about $10 to $100 per barrel since the socialist government's first
election victory in 1998. Despite an oil windfall, the government's budget deficit ballooned to 17 percent last year, according to CIA figures,
while public debt reached 49 percent of GDP. "The lack of government discipline is why the deficit is so high," Luis Angarita, professor of
international economics at the Central University of Venezuela, told Al Jazeera. "The government wanted to expand public spending in 2012, an
election year, and this increased the fiscal gap." Social spending isn't merely a tactic for winning elections, government supporters say, and
most indicators of well-being improved significantly during the Chavez era. GDP
per capita rose from $4,132 in 1999, to an
estimated $11,131 in 2012, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while inequality
decreased sharply. And social spending as a percentage of GDP climbed from about 11 percent in 1998
to more than 21 percent in 2011, according to government statistics.
1NC #2 Make them prove that sanctions are uniquely key to reviving the economy –
there’s no evidence in the 1AC that states this
1NC #3 China is specifically investing in Venezuela’s economy using the loans for oil
program – each country has plenty of their respective resource – means that US
engagement isn’t necessary
Even if US influence declines, China will fill in – China and Latin American co-operation
solves.
Xiaoxia, Professor of Economics at Tsinghua University, 2013
(Wang, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,” May 6th,
WorldCrunch, Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-risinginfluence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)
In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isn’t much different from that of
Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesn’t care about local human rights or the state of
democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic
relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of
certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States. ¶ The global financial crisis of
2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and
the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on
"funds-for-assets" transactions with Latin American countries.¶ So
what does China want exactly in entering Latin
American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way
round?¶ Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer.¶ China's involvement in the Latin American
continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China
has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it
brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of
oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as
stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal
immigration and the drug trade on the U.S.¶ For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum
game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin
American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse
influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.
1NC #4 Extend Gupta evidence – star this card – the sanctions don’t even do anything
– they’re only symbolic to the US disapproval of the Iran’s engagement with
Venezuela.
(If you run with appeasement, make sure that you argue that appeasement would still trigger the link
because it’s an act of submission to Venezuela and Iran’s relationship but that this is still a solvency
takeout to the aff)
US-Venezuela oil trade high now and no impact to regime change
Epperson and Domm 3/16/2013 (Sharon – commodity market analyst for CNBC and Patti – CNBC
executive editor for markets and economics, “With Hugo Chavez gone, US oil industry eyes Venezuela,”
The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Latest-NewsWires/2013/0306/With-Hugo-Chavez-gone-US-oil-industry-eyes-Venezuela)
Sira said Venezuela could produce as much as 6 to 9 million barrels of oil a day but now it's probably less than 2.5 million barrels. He said oil
production peaked in the early year at 3.3 million barrels. (Read More: Why Venezuela's World-Beating Oil Reserves Are 'Irrelevant')
Venezuela ranked fourth in oil imports to the U.S. last year at 906,000 barrels per day, according to
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). But crude oil imports from Venezuela have been declining steadily
since 2004, when they peaked at 1.3 million barrels per day. Venezuela's refineries are also in such poor shape that it has to import gasoline and
diesel from the U.S. In December, Venezuela
imported a record 197,000 barrels per day of petroleum
products from the U.S., according to EIA data. In the short-run, oil prices may not be greatly impacted by
regime change in Venezuela since for now the flow of oil from Venezuela to the U.S. and domestic
fuel imports to the South American country are likely to continue current trends, said Houston-based
energy analyst Andy Lipow. "We both need each other."
1NC #5 – Extend Kahdduri – empirical data proves that there’s no impact to oil shocks
because oil prices have a very small effect on the economy due to the diversification
of the US sector – the market has become very flexible
2NC Investment Fails
Be careful if you run this with China DA or any argument that China can fill in
Investment empirically proven to fail – Venezuela is still paying off China’s loans
Christopher Helman - Southwest region correspondent for Forbes and reports on Exxon, Chevron,
Chesapeake and Michael Dell, 3-5-13, Forbes, “What Does Chavez's Death Mean For Venezuelan Oil
Giant Pdvsa?” http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/03/05/what-does-chavez-deathmean-for-venezuelan-oil-giant-pdvsa/
In desperation, earlier this year, Chavez, through Pdvsa, sought to land $6 billion in loans from China
Development Bank ($4 billion) and Chevron ($2 billion). The Chevron cash was supposedly earmarked for the company’s Petroboscan joint
venture. The U.S. oil giant had previously loaned Pdvsa billions.¶ But Chavez’s biggest enabler was China. Beijing over the past decade has
shown a willingness to prop up Chavez –more out of a desire for cheap oil than any kind of socialist objectives (Venezuela could only dream of
having economic planners as competent as China’s). Venezuela
has been repaying China’s $36 billion in loans with oil,
not cash.¶ By last September the financial situation at Pdvsa had gotten so dire that the company was
paying service providers with IOUs.¶ So what’s going to happen to Pdvsa under Chavez’s heir Nicolas Maduro? Probably more of
the same. Maduro last month showed that he is likely to be little more than a chip off of Chavez’s block
when he announced that Pdvsa would “annex” the share of oilfields owned by privately held Suelopetrol.¶ Whatever happens next, we can be
sure that unless Maduro turns out to have the same charisma-driven cult of personality that Chavez managed, Venezuela’s partners, especially
China, will be increasingly unwilling to take the role of “pendejo” (sucker). The oil industry has been waiting patiently for Chavez to die with the
hope that whoever came next would be more interested in building value rather than destroying it.
2NC No Solvency
No impact to lifting PDVSA sanctions – either to the Venezuelan oil industry or to
Venezuela-Iran relations
Petkoff 11 (Teodoro – former Minister of the Venezuelan Central Office of Coordination and Planning,
May 26th, Sanctions against PDVSA, Democracy in America,
http://www.democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Sanctions%20against%20PDVSA.pdf)
In the case of the sanction against PDVSA we face a similar situation. Although in practical terms the penalty is
literally harmless, being that it has no concrete consequences and, in essence, is nothing more than
a mere warning, the State Department spokesman asserted that "in imposing these sanctions we are sending a clear message to companies
around the world, " which se ttles the fact that it is a warning to the whole world that the United States will not hesitate to continue acting,
whenever it pleases, unilaterally, even outside the United Nations, whose resolution opposi ng military intervention in Iraq, for example, was a
huge issue of contempt for the Bush administ ration, or as in the case of the Kyoto protocol, which various U.S. presidents have refused to sign.
Within the framework of multilateralism and debate, any subject - even something that could be regarded as unfair or unjust - is allowed, but such
potent unilateralism is completely unacceptable. We
do not support, in any way, the political alliance that the
national government maintains with Iran, and our rejection of sanctions that ultimately do nothing
does not mean that we in any way endorse the murky relationship between both governments,
which goes well beyond normal diplomatic ties between countries, nor do we ignore the
apprehension that the whole world shares about the possibility of the hyper reactionary Iranian
theocracy acquiring atomic weapons, but is not politically acceptable to validate the hegemonic
policies of a large power, policies to which the U.S. government expects universal compliance. It is even less acceptable when
approaching the situation from the a purely Vene zuelan perspective, where these sanctions are music to the ears of Chavez who will use this
unexpected gift from the American government as an opportunity to repair his already battered inte rnational image and, above all, find refuge in
his ever-profitable patriotic discourse.
Relations Frontline
1NC
1. Maduro refuses to normalize relations with the U.S.
AP 7/20/13 (Associated Press, Venezuela halts normalization talks with US, The Sacramento Bee,
http://www.sacbee.com/2013/07/20/5582836/venezuela-halts-normalization.html)
CARACAS, Venezuela --
Venezuela says it's ending talks with the United States to restore normal relations
because Washington's U.N. ambassador-designate criticized its human rights record. The Foreign Ministry
said in a statement late Friday that Samantha Power's remarks compelled it to halt the process begun in
Guatemala last month by its foreign minister, Elias Jaua, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Power
said in Senate confirmation hearings Wednesday that Venezuela is guilty of a "crackdown on civil
society," along with Cuba, Iran and Russia. Jaua and Kerry had said they would fast-track talks to resume ambassadoriallevel ties absent since 2010. Those prospects dimmed after Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro later offered
asylum to U.S. leaker Edward Snowden. Kerry subsequently called Jaua and threatened unspecified action if Snowden wound
up in Venezuelan hands.
2. Veneuela-Iran relations collapsing now
Lansberg-Rodriguez and Zonis 7/4/13 (Daniel - fellow at The Comparative Constitutions Project
and Marvin - Professor Emeritus at Booth School of Business, “Venezuela and Iran: The End of The
Affair,” Economoniter, http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-ofthe-affair/)
Yet now, given that they never did get around to ending the Empire, does this alliance still have a future? The answer to this
question will be of no small consequence to the world as a whole. It will extend beyond their role as a self-proclaimed rhetorical international
disestablishment: an Axis of Insults. The alliance between these two countries has generated concerns beyond the rhetoric. They have provided
financial benefits to poorer neighbors and generated security risks to a great many others. Some commentators, more than a few of them
Republican congressmen, have publically surmised that Iran might have been using Caracas as a staging ground for terrorist plots throughout
the Western hemisphere, although a State Department report g Latin America’s largely undeveloped uranium reserves, in hopes of advancing
its ambitions towards the status of a nuclear power. What cannot be denied is that there are, at present, released last week would seem to
belie that fact. Others believe that Iran’s true interest’s lies in access in numerous Iranian agents active in Latin America operating at various
official levels. The Iranian security apparatus has been instrumental in teaching Chavista security forces to more efficiently repress dissent
among their own people. (The Venezuelan Jewish community, once among the largest in Latin America, has been a particular target.) So what
happens next? Venezuela’s
new president, Nicolas Maduro, has announced that he will meet soon with
Iran’s new president-elect, Hassan Rowhani. And while neither country has provided any details, if
Rowhani is the moderate he is touted to be, he may well seek better relations with Europe and the
United States, advanced economies capable of engaging with Iran on more than a rhetorical level.
Meanwhile, barring some unforeseen crisis precipitating the collapse of regime in Caracas, the Venezuelan government seems
unlikely to do likewise. Under fire from accusations of having stolen the recent election, Maduro’s domestic legitimacy is predicated
primarily on his having been fingered by Chávez himself as successor, rather than on any personal charisma or qualifications. Under these
circumstances, seeking rapprochement with “The Empire,” so often vilified by his hallowed predecessor, would be a dangerous game. In
geopolitics, much as in interpersonal relationships, countries sometimes outgrow each other. For an
Iran that might finally be coming of age, maintaining close ties with declining, unpopular Venezuela,
would be no great benefit, and might hold back a more fruitful potential dalliance with the West.
3. Solvency takeout – their Griffin evidence indicates that relations will never improve
as long as the US criticizes Venezuela for the drug trade, violation of human rights, and
cooperation with Iran – these are all things the US are doing even now – the plan does
nothing to solve this
4. Multiple alt causes to soft power failure – Gitmo, warming, and the economy
Beinart ’10 [6-21-10, Peter Beinart is an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York and a
senior fellow at the New America Foundation, “How the Financial Crisis Has Undermined U.S. Power”,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1995884,00.html]
The Obama Administration's charm offensive hasn't been a complete failure. Personally, Obama is far more popular overseas than was George
W. Bush, and that popularity has brought the nastiness of adversaries like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into sharper relief. But the very nastiness of
those adversaries means that they don't get rattled by low favorability ratings. What's more, Obama's
efforts to change America's
image have been constrained by his inability to change certain U.S. policies at home. The best way for America
to promote its values is "by living them," declares the National Security Strategy, but when it comes to closing Guantánamo Bay
or dramatically reducing U.S. carbon emissions, Congress has shown little interest in making Washington
a shining city on a hill. These problems, however, pale before the overarching one: despite Obama's personal popularity, American
soft power isn't going up; it's going down. The reason is the financial crisis. America's international allure has
always been based less on the appeal of the man in the Oval Office than on the appeal of the American
political and economic model. Regardless of what foreigners thought of Bill Clinton, in the 1990s America's brand of deregulated
democracy seemed the only true path to prosperity. American economists, investment bankers and political consultants fanned out across the
globe to preach the gospel of free elections and free markets. America represented, in Francis Fukuyama's famous words, "The End of History."
(See pictures of Obama in Russia.) Now it is much less clear that history is marching our way. The
financial crisis has undermined
the prestige of America's economic model at the very moment that China's authoritarian capitalism is
rising. A decade ago, poor governments hungry for trade and aid had no choice but to show up in Washington, where they received lectures
about how to make their economies resemble America's. Now they can get twice the money and half the moralizing in Beijing. From Iran to
Burma to Sudan, the Obama Administration's charm offensive has
been undermined by China's cash offensive.
5. Neg outweighs – there’s literally no terminal impact to any of this advantage – all
they claim is just internal links to iran prolif and soft power
2NC Ext.
1NC #1 – Extend AP evidence – recently Venezuela has already decided to cut off ties
with the US due to disagreements over Snowden and human rights
Maduro uninterested in normalizing relations – Snowden affair and anti-American
policy prove
Diaz 7/5/13 (Emilia - investigative reporting coordinator at the Press and Society Institute of Venezuela
and a professor of journalism at the School of Communication Sciences at Central University of
Venezuela, “Venezuela says it will shelter Snowden,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0705/world/40391772_1_venezuela-maduro-s-simon-bolivar)
Venezuela is the first country to offer sanctuary to Snowden. The 30-year-old computer whiz has reportedly requested
asylum from more than 20 countries — among them Ecuador and Bolivia, allies of Venezuela’s — since he arrived in Moscow. And
Maduro’s offer came just hours after WikiLeaks, the anti-secrecy organization that is helping
Snowden, said the fugitive had applied to six more countries to escape American justice. WikiLeaks would
not identify the countries “due to attempted U.S. interference,” the group said in a Twitter message. A 50-year-old former union
activist with close ties to Cuba, Maduro has been fervently trying to burnish his anti-imperialist
credentials since winning a disputed election April 14 to succeed Chávez. He has talked about
elaborate plans he says were hatched in the United States to poison him and destabilize his
government and has accused the United States of infecting Chávez with cancer. Maduro also has
lashed out at U.S. policy toward Venezuela’s allies, from Cuba to Syria. In his speech, he praised Snowden, asking,
“Who violated international law? “Ask ourselves: Is it a young person who rebelled and said the truth about United States espionage toward
the world, or a government like the one from the United States?” In
his speech Friday and in previous comments,
Maduro has characterized Snowden as a hero who has opened the door to U.S. war plans. Maduro has not
explained the reference, but on Friday, he added that the “United States has launched bombs and armed the
terrorist opposition in Syria against the people of Syria and against the legitimate president, Bashar alAssad.” “Who is the terrorist?” Maduro asked. “Who is the world criminal?” Maduro’s comments have played
well in some countries in Latin America, where there is indignation that Bolivian President Evo Morales’s plane was apparently not allowed to
cross the airspace of some European countries Tuesday because of the belief that Snowden was hiding aboard. Morales, Maduro and several
other leaders said the United States was responsible, a claim American officials neither admitted nor denied.
1NC #2 – Venezuela is not obtaining influence as Iran is which means that iran will
inevitably find another ally to negotiate with – this is the basic theory of geopolitics –
that’s our Lansberg ’13 evidence
1NC #3 – Their own griffin evidence indicates that as long as the United States takes a
dominant policy approach to Venezuela, relations will never improve – the status quo
empirically proves this
1NC #4 – Soft power fails – America can’t influence others if countries see that
America can’t even agree on internal issues such as Guantanamo Bay and carbon
emissions
No impact to soft power – believers exaggerate benefits – hard power is
comparatively more important
Gray 2011 – Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. (Colin S., April, “HARD POWER
AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY.” Published by Strategic Studies
Institute)
Soft power is potentially a dangerous idea not because it is unsound, which it is not, but rather for the faulty inference that
careless or unwary observers draw from it. Such inferences are a challenge to theorists because they are
unable to control the ways in which their ideas will be interpreted and applied in practice by those unwary observers.
Concepts can be tricky. They seem to make sense of what otherwise is intellectually undergoverned space, and thus potentially come
to control pliable minds. Given that men behave as their minds suggest and command, it is easy to understand why Clausewitz identified the
enemy’s will as the target for influence.37
Beliefs about soft power in turn have potentially negative implications
for attitudes toward the hard power of military force and economic muscle. Thus, soft power does not
lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration. What does this mean? To begin with a vital
contrast: whereas military force and economic pressure (negative or positive) can be applied by choice as to
quantity and quality, soft power cannot. (Of course, the enemy/rival too has a vote on the outcome, regardless of the texture of
the power applied.) But hard power allows us to decide how we will play in shaping and modulating the
relevant narrative, even though the course of history must be an interactive one once the engagement is joined. In principle, we can
turn the tap on or off at our discretion. The reality is apt to be somewhat different because, as noted
above, the enemy, contingency, and friction will intervene. But still a noteworthy measure of initiative derives from the
threat and use of military force and economic power. But soft power is very different indeed as an instrument of policy.
In fact, I am tempted to challenge the proposition that soft power can even be regarded as one (or more) among the grand strategic
instruments of policy. The seeming validity and attractiveness of soft power lead to easy exaggeration of its potency. Soft power is admitted by
all to defy metric analysis, but this is not a fatal weakness. Indeed, the
instruments of hard power that do lend themselves
readily to metric assessment can also be unjustifiably seductive. But the metrics of tactical calculation need not be
strategically revealing. It is important to win battles, but victory in war is a considerably different matter than the simple accumulation of
tactical successes. Thus, the burden of proof remains on soft power: (1) What is this concept of soft power? (2) Where does it come from and
who or what controls it? and (3) Prudently assessed and anticipated, what is the quantity and quality of its potential influence? Let us now
consider answers to these questions. 7. Soft
power lends itself too easily to mischaracterization as the (generally
unavailable) alternative to military and economic power. The first of the three questions posed above all but invites a misleading
answer. Nye plausibly offers the co-option of people rather than their coercion as the defining principle of soft power.38 The source of possible
misunderstanding is the fact that merely by conjuring an alternative species of power, an obvious but unjustified sense of equivalence between
the binary elements is produced. Moreover, such an elementary shortlist implies a fitness for comparison, an impression that the two options
are like-for-like in their consequences, though not in their methods. By conceptually corralling a country’s potentially attractive co-optive assets
under the umbrella of soft
power, one is near certain to devalue the significance of an enabling context. Power of all
power to be influential, those who are to
be influenced have a decisive vote. But the effects of contemporary warfare do not allow recipients the luxury of a vote. They are
coerced. On the other hand, the willingness to be coopted by American soft power varies hugely among
recipients. In fact, there are many contexts wherein the total of American soft power would add up in
the negative, not the positive. When soft power capabilities are strong in their values and cultural
trappings, there is always the danger that they will incite resentment, hostility, and a potent “blowback.”
In those cases, American soft power would indeed be strong, but in a counterproductive direction. These
kinds depends upon context for its value, but especially so for the soft variety. For
conclusions imply no criticism of American soft power per se. The problem would lie in the belief that soft power is a reliable instrument of
policy that could complement or in some instances replace military force. 8. Soft power is perilously reliant on the calculations and feelings of
frequently undermotivated foreigners. The second question above asked about the provenance and ownership of soft power. Nye correctly
notes that “soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.” He
proceeds sensibly to contrast the armed forces along with plainly national economic assets with the “soft power resources [that] are separate
from American government and only partly responsive to its purposes.” 39 Nye cites as a prominent example of this disjunction in
responsiveness the fact that “[i]n the Vietnam era . . . American government policy and popular culture worked at cross-purposes.”40 Although
soft power can be employed purposefully as an instrument of national policy, such power is notably unpredictable in its potential influence,
producing net benefit or harm. Bluntly stated, America
is what it is, and there are many in the world who do not like
what it is. The U.S. Government will have the ability to project American values in the hope, if not quite
confident expectation, that “the American way” will be found attractive in alien parts of the world. Our
hopes would seem to be achievement of the following: (1) love and respect of American ideals and artifacts (civilization); (2) love and respect of
America; and (3) willingness to cooperate with American policy today and tomorrow. Admittedly, this agenda is reductionist, but the cause and
desired effects are accurate enough. Culture is as culture does and speaks and produces. The soft power of values culturally expressed that
others might find attractive is always at risk to negation by the evidence of national deeds that appear to contradict our cultural persona.
1NC #5 – The 1AC has no terminal impact which means you should default neg
2NC Relations Bad
Maduro unwilling to negotiate with US – cut off diplomatic talks
Bercovitch 7/21/13 (Sascha – Contributor for Venezuelanalysis.com, With “Zero Tolerance to Gringo
Aggression,” Maduro Cuts Off Venezuela-U.S. Talks, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9872)
The conversations that were started a month and a half ago between Venezuela and the United States
have definitively ended, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced yesterday at an event of the
Strategic Regions of Integral Defense (REDI) in Cojedes state. “My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggression against
Venezuela. I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it be verbal, political, or diplomatic.
Enough is enough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves anymore in Venezuela, ”
he said. The announcement comes after controversial statements from Samantha Powers, President
Barack Obama’s nominee for U.S. envoy to the United Nations, who testified to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on Wednesday that she would fight against what she called a “crackdown on civil society
being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.” In a statement written on Friday that marks
the last communication between the two countries, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua wrote, “The preoccupation expressed by the U.S.
government regarding the supposed repression of civil society in Venezuela is unacceptable and unfounded. To the contrary, Venezuela has
amply demonstrated that it possesses a robust system of constitutional guarantees to preserve the unrestricted practice and the respect of
fundamental human rights, as the UN has recognized on multiple occasions.” Jaua spoke with US Secretary of State John Kerry in a meeting in
Guatemala last month that Kerry described as the “beginning of a good, respectful relationship.” However, relations cooled
after
Bolivian President Evo Morales’ presidential plane was prevented from entering the airspace of four
European countries following false information that U.S. whistleblower Edward Snowden was on board,
and Maduro’s subsequent offer of political asylum to Snowden. “I told Jaua to convey to Kerry [in June] that we are
ready to have relations within the framework of equality and respect,” Maduro said yesterday. “If they respect us, we respect
them. But the time has run out for them to meddle in the internal affairs of our countries and
publically attack us. Their time has run out, in general in Latin America, and in particular with us.” Neither country
has had an ambassador in the other nation since 2010, when late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
refused the entrance of newly-appointed US Ambassador to Venezuela Larry Palmer for “blatantly
disrespectful” remarks, and Venezuelan Ambassador to the US Bernardo Alvarez was expelled from
the country several days later.
2NC Soft Power Bad
No impact - Soft power is useless
Fan 7 (Ying, Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, “Soft power: Power of attraction or
confusion?”, November 14)
Despite its popularity, the
concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is at best loose and
vague. Because of such confusion it is not surprising that the concept has been misunderstood, misused and trivialised (Joffe, 2006a ).
Criticisms of soft power centre mainly around three aspects: definition, sources and limitations. There may be little or no
relationship between the ubiquity of American culture and its actual influence. Hundreds of millions of people
around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with
America ( Joffe, 2006b ). To Purdy (2001) soft power is not a new reality, but rather a new word for the most efficient form of power. There
are limits to what soft power could achieve. In a context dominated by hard power considerations,
soft power is meaningless (Blechman, 2004 ). The dark side of soft power is largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either
hard or soft, may not be a good thing. In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but
resistance. Likewise, big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage (Joffe, 2006b ).
Nye’s version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic and unrealistic. Human
feelings are complicated and quite often ambivalent, that is, love and hate co-exist at the same time. Even
within the same group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others. By the same
token, soft power can also rest on fear (Cheow, 2002 ) or on both affection and fear, depending on the context. Much of China’s soft power in
south-east Asia testifies to this. Another example is provided by the mixed perception of the United States in China: people generally admire
American technological superiority and super brands but detest its policies on Taiwan.
Empirics prove soft power fails
Greenwald 10 (Abe, associate editor of COMMENTARY, “The Soft-Power Fallacy”,
July/August, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/the-soft-power-fallacy15466?page=2)
Like Francis Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History,” soft-power theory was a creative and appealing attempt to make sense of America’s global
purpose. Unlike Fukuyama’s theory, however, which the new global order seemed to support for nearly a decade, Nye’s
was
basicallyrefuted by world events in its very first year. In the summer of 1990, a massive contingent ofSaddam
Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait and effectively annexed it as a province of Iraq. Although months earlier Nye
had asserted that “geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important,” the fact is that Saddam invaded Kuwait
because of its geographic proximity, insubstantial military, and plentiful oil reserves. Despite Nye’s claim that “the definition of power is losing
its emphasis on military force,”
months of concerted international pressure, including the passage of a UN
resolution, failed to persuade Saddam to withdraw. In the end, only overwhelming American military power succeeded in
liberating Kuwait. The American show of force also succeeded in establishing the U.S. as the single, unrivaled post–Cold War superpower.
Following
the First Gulf War, the 1990s saw brutal acts of aggression in the Balkans: the Bosnian War in 1992
These raged on despite international negotiations and were quelled
only after America took the lead in military actions. It is also worth noting that attempts to internationalize these efforts
and the Kosovo conflicts beginning in 1998.
made them more costly in time, effectiveness, and manpower than if the U.S. had acted unilaterally. Additionally, the 1990s left little mystery
as to how cataclysmic events unfold when the U.S. declines to apply traditional tools of power overseas. In April 1994, Hutu rebels
began the indiscriminate killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. As the violence escalated, the United Nations’s peacekeeping forces
stood down so as not to violate a UN mandate prohibiting intervention in a country’s internal politics. Washington followed suit,
refusing even to consider deploying forces to East-Central Africa. By the time the killing was done, in
July of the same year, Hutus had slaughtered between half a million and 1 million Tutsis. And in the 1990s,
Japan’s economy went into its long stall, making the Japanese model of a scaled down military seem rather less relevant. All this is to say that
during the presidency of Bill Clinton, Nye’s
“intangible forms of power” proved to hold little sway in matters of
statecraft, whilemodes of traditional power remained as criticalas ever in coercing other nations and
affirming America’s role as chief protector of the global order. If the Clinton years posed a challenge for the efficacy of
soft power, the post-9/11 age has exposed Nye’s explication of the theory as something akin to academic eccentricity. In his book, Nye
mentioned “current issues of transnational interdependence” requiring “collective action and international cooperation.” Among these were
“ecological changes (acid rain and global warming), health epidemics such as AIDS, illicit trade in drugs, and terrorism.” Surely a paradigm that
places terrorism last on a list of national threats starting with acid rain is due for revision. For what stronger negation of the soft-power thesis
could one imagine than a strike against America largely inspired by what Nye considered a great “soft power resource”: namely, “American
values of democracy and human rights”? Yet Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, had in fact weighed in unequivocally on the
matter of Western democracy: “Whoever claims to be a ‘democratic-Muslim,’ or a Muslim who calls for democracy, is like one who says about
himself ‘I am a Jewish Muslim,’ or ‘I am a Christian Muslim’—the one worse than the other. He is an apostate infidel.” With a detestable kind of
clarity, Zawahiri’s pronouncement revealed the hollowness at the heart of the soft-power theory. Soft power is a fine policy complement in
dealing with parties that approve of American ideals and American dominion. But applied to those that do not, soft
power’s attributes
become their opposites. For enemies of the United States, the export of American culture is a
provocation, not an invitation; self-conscious “example-setting” in areas like nonproliferation is an
indication of weakness, not leadership; deference to international bodies is a path to exercising a veto
over American action, not a means of forging multilateral cooperation.
2NC Heg Turn
Turn – US hegemony creates backlash and forces Venezuela and Iran to ally with one
another and form deterrence policies
Mallett-Outtrim 7/21/13 (Ryan - Australian activist and independent journalist, “The Myth And
Reality Of Venezuela-Iran Ties – Analysis,” Eurasia Review and Analysis,
http://www.eurasiareview.com/21072013-the-myth-and-reality-of-venezuela-iran-ties-analysis/)
Focusing on the Iran-Venezuela
relationship as a defensive initiative does not give an accurate impression of the whole
story, but is, nonetheless, the most controversial aspect of the relationship. Yet this relationship as an aspect of defence policy is not only
reasonable, but almost inevitable given Washington’s handling of the two countries in recent years. As
Michael Corcoran rightly pointed out in February, despite being lumped in the same basket by much of the Western media, internally the
governments of Iran and Venezuela couldn’t be more different. As Corcoran argues: “Venezuela has internationally recognized elections and
works to empower the working class and the poor. Chávez’s opponents in Venezuela are free to broadcast their discontent and do. Venezuela
may in fact be the only nation where the media could publicly call for a coup of an elected leader, as some Venezuelan media outlets did in
2002, and remain on the air. Certainly, such activities would not be permitted in the United States. In contrast, Iran, an Islamist state, jails
dissidents, executes gays, and is ruled with absolute power by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “Yet for the U.S. media, Iran and the
left-leaning Latin American governments are all of a piece. This assumption undergirds the demonization of the “pink tide” leaders as
dangerous pawns in Iran’s supposed efforts to build nuclear weapons—efforts that are unconfirmed by U.S. intelligence agencies or the
International Atomic Energy Agency.” I couldn’t put it better myself. Nonetheless, the disdain with which Washington has treated both
countries over the last decade has led them to take a number of similar actions in the international theatre.
If a global hegemon
treats two countries similarly, then it shouldn’t be a mystery when they both respond in similar
ways. It really shouldn’t have come as a surprise to anyone to see both Iran and Venezuela pursuing
policies of deterrence throughout the last decade. Since the U.S. backed the 2002 coup against
Chávez, Venezuela has developed a multifaceted deterrence strategy primarily reliant on developing regional
alliances (the drive to modernise the Venezuelan military is supplementary at best). As was blatantly obvious to most observers of this year’s
Organization of American States (OAS) summit, this strategy has been nothing short of a spectacular success. From issues ranging from counternarcotics to free trade, the U.S. and Canada were looking pretty lonely. However, Iran’s attempts to integrate into the international community
have failed, largely due to U.S.-Israeli efforts. Hence, while Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro enjoys strong support from most of Latin
America (for proof, look no further than his tour of the Southern Cone, which VA covered here and here), Iran is encircled by U.S.-aligned
regimes in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.
Moreover, contrary to Noriega’s fear mongering, as Bloomberg recently reported, even the State Department has conceded that “Iranian
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning”. In such a context, if
Iran is developing nuclear weapons (which
there is scant evidence of) then it’s largely the result of U.S. policy. If the country’s atomic energy program really is
peaceful, then the Iranian leadership is in desperate need of some kind of effective deterrence model;
especially when Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be under the impression that Iran’s leaders are plotting a second holocaust. The supreme
leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei only needs to look next door to Iraq to see what happens when
U.S/Israeli hawks come knocking and you don’t have any WMD’s. Indeed, if Saddam Hussein actually had WMD’s,
the likelihood that even the hawks would have risked their deployment with an invasion is remote. So, while there are still plenty
in Washington who are eager to beat the drums of war, in reality both Venezuela and Iran are
pursuing defensive policies in the face of very real U.S. aggression. For Iran, Washington’s aggression manifests
mostly in its policy of encirclement, and the ever tightening economic sanctions, which have put millions of lives at risk. These are
supplemented by Israeli aggression, most notably in the form of Mossad support of groups like the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, which has
carried out a number of terrorist attacks on Iranian soil.
2NC No Improve Relations
Efforts at improving relations have been destroyed by talks of regime transformation
and Edward Snowden’s asylum
William Neuman – writer for New York Times, 7/20/13, New York Times, Venezuela Stops Efforts to
Improve U.S. Relations, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-effortsto-improve-us-relations.html?_r=0
CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts
to improve relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for United Nations
ambassador.CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts to
improve relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for United
Nations
ambassador. The nominee, Samantha Power, speaking before a Senate committee on Wednesday, said part of her role as
ambassador would be to challenge a “crackdown on civil society” in several countries, including Venezuela. President
Nicolás Maduro had already lashed out on Thursday at Ms. Power for her remarks, and late on Friday the Foreign Ministry said it was
terminating efforts to improve relations with the United States.¶ Those efforts had inched forward just last month after Secretary of State John
Kerry publicly shook hands with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elías Jaua, during an international meeting in Guatemala — one of the
highest-level meetings between officials of the two countries in years.¶ Venezuela “will never accept interference of any kind in its internal
affairs,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement, adding that it “considered terminated the process begun in the conversations in Guatemala
that had as their goal the regularization of our diplomatic relations.Ӧ Relations with Venezuela have long been troubled, although the country
has remained a major supplier of oil to the United States. Under the previous president, Hugo Chávez, a longtime nemesis of the United States,
relations were bumpy, especially after the Bush administration tacitly supported a coup that briefly ousted him. ¶ Mr. Maduro, Mr. Chávez’s
handpicked successor, has given mixed messages about relations with the United States.¶ In March, when
Mr. Maduro was vice
president, he kicked out two American military attachés, accusing them of seeking to undermine the
government. After he was elected in April, he ordered the arrest of an American documentary filmmaker
whom officials accused of trying to start a civil war. The filmmaker, Tim Tracy, was later expelled from the country.¶ And
in recent days, in a sharp escalation of the war of words with Washington, Mr. Maduro has said he would give asylum
to Edward J. Snowden, the former American intelligence contractor who leaked secrets about American intelligence programs and is
staying at a Moscow airport.¶ The United States and Venezuela have not had ambassadors in each other’s capitals since 2008, when Mr. Chávez
expelled the American envoy, accusing the United States of backing a group of military officers he said were plotting against him. The United
States responded at the time by expelling Venezuela’s ambassador.¶ In the Guatemala meeting, Mr. Kerry said he hoped the two countries
could rapidly move toward exchanging ambassadors again. But those talks never had time to gain traction. On July 12, Mr. Kerry telephoned
Mr. Jaua to express concern over the asylum offer to Mr. Snowden.¶ This is not the first time that Venezuela has backed off the idea of
renewed relations with the United States. The two countries quietly began talks late last year aimed at improving relations, although those
ground to a halt after the health of Mr. Chávez, who had cancer, deteriorated in December.¶ After Mr. Chávez’s death in March, a State
Department official said the United States hoped that the election to replace him would meet democratic standards — prompting Mr. Jaua to
angrily announce that Venezuela was halting the talks between the two countries. Venezuelan officials have repeatedly said relations with the
United States should be conducted on a basis of respect.
2NC Not Narco-State
Venezuela’s narcotic problem is exaggerated by right-wing hacks
Mallett-Outtrim 7/21/13 (Ryan - Australian activist and independent journalist, “The Myth And
Reality Of Venezuela-Iran Ties – Analysis,” Eurasia Review and Analysis,
http://www.eurasiareview.com/21072013-the-myth-and-reality-of-venezuela-iran-ties-analysis/)
Two events that defy hawk logic have taken place in the same month. First, on the 5th of June United States secretary of state John Kerry met
with Venezuela's foreign minister, Elias Jaua, and stated that he had agreed to pursue a more “positive relationship” with Venezuela. Then, just
weeks later, Iranians voted in a president who has openly argued against nuclear proliferation. What happened? Iran
and Venezuela's
amiable relationship of the last decade was supposed to be the sum of all fears for Washington. Two
“tyrants”, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chavez, were accused of co-sponsoring all sorts of
wild, fantastical plots by Washington's warmongers. But was the Iran-Venezuela relationship ever about crushing the
“free world” by assembling an unholy alliance of druglords, Islamists and socialists, or is there a slightly saner explanation? It
was just in March that Roger Noriega delivered his red blooded testimony before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs that alleged that Latin American drug traffickers, Hezbollah,
Venezuela and Iran have all united in some kind of convoluted plot that involves waging
“asymmetrical warfare against U.S. security, interests and allies close to the homeland”. Along with
stating that “Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semitic allies hold important senior positions in the Venezuelan government”, Noriega
also argued that Margarita Island is basically one big Hezbollah training camp (could put a slight dent in the government's ambitions to develop
the tourism sector) and that senior “chavista officials engage routinely in lucrative schemes involving Hezbollah front companies, Colombian
terrorist groups, narcotraffickers, Venezuelan financial institutions and even powerful state-run entities”. In short a unified front of Arabs,
Iranians, terrorism, drugs and state run enterprises united against Washington. Noriega
is far from a lone voice warning
against this rainbow of conservative fears. Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council
Ilan Berman has also warned that a myriad of recent events ranging from toilet paper shortages in
Venezuela to the Colombian peace process are all possibly playing into the hands of a shadowy
“network enabling Iran to carry out attacks in the region”. Last year, an opinion piece in the Miami Herald penetrated
to the core of this existential threat to the U.S.: the “most remarkable and dangerous foreign policy initiative of the [former] Chávez regime”, its
positive relationship with Iran. The article continues by arguing that the threat of Iran and Venezuela cooperating to “smuggle a nuclear weapon
into the U.S...should not be dismissed lightly”. The relationship between Caracas and Iran was a key consideration when lawmakers passed the
Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (CIWHA), which aims to “address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity” in the
region. Since CIWHA was passed, Venezuela's state arms manufacturer has been targeted by U.S. sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and
Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). Perhaps the events of June will make some of the fear brigade rethink the Iran-Venezuela relationship.
After all, the
relationship between the two countries isn't quite as sinister as the likes of Noriega make
it out to be. No, Iran and Venezuela are not cooperating to nuke Miami, and PDVSA might not
actually be a Hezbollah front. The reality of the relationship is just as interesting, but it just doesn't read like an Ian Fleming novel.
Politics Links
Sanctions Popular
Republican support for PDVSA sanctions
Quinn and Daniel 11 (Andrew – foreign correspondent, Reuters, and Frank Jack – journalist, May
24th, “U.S. sanctions Venezuelan oil giant for Iran trade,”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/us-iran-usa-sanctions-idUSTRE74N47R20110524)
The United States hit Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA with sanctions on Tuesday in a more aggressive bid to
starve Iran of fuel, prompting fury and warnings from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's government. The sanctions are largely
symbolic, since they do not limit the company's sale of oil to the United States and other global
markets, or the activities of its U.S.-based CITGO subsidiary. Venezuela's response was inevitably noisy: Chavez's oil
minister made a thinly-veiled warning against oil shipments, but numerous past threats have never become reality. The measures appeared to
be the least severe of a range of options available to Washington and bar PDVSA from access to U.S. government contracts and export
financing. They
come after months of pressure from conservatives in Congress to take action against
Chavez for his support of Iran. "By imposing these sanctions we're sending a clear message to companies around the world: those
who continue to irresponsibly support Iran's energy sector or help facilitate Iran's efforts to evade U.S. sanctions will face significant
consequences," said Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.
Republicans strongly support oil sanctions in Venezuela
Ray Walser 5-31-11 Ph.D. is a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/31/sanctions-on-venezuela%E2%80%99s-oil-company-just-a-start/
With considerable prodding from Congress—especially from the new Republican majority in the House—the
Obama Administration and Department of State announced on May 24 that it is placing Venezuela’s
national oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) on its list of companies sanctioned for their work in
helping expand Iran’s petroleum and gasoline production.¶ The action followed PDVSA’s sale of $50 million in petroleum
products in late 2010. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, moreover, has not backed down on his promise to supply Iran with 20,000 barrels of
gasoline per day.¶ The new sanctions prohibit PDVSA from competing for U.S. government procurement contracts, from securing financing
from the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., and from obtaining U.S. export licenses. These sanctions do not apply to PDVSA subsidiaries and do
not prohibit the export of crude oil to the United States. The sanctions will not at present interfere with the operations of Venezuelan-owned
refineries and CITIGO distribution or with import of Venezuelan crude oil.¶
The measured has long been urged by
Republicans in both houses of Congress, including by the chairman of the House’s Western Hemisphere
subcommittee Connie Mack (R–FL).¶ “It is imperative,” writes former Bush Administration official Jose Cardenas, “that U.S.
investigators continue to strip away the layers of the Venezuelan-Iranian axis to examine what other forms of criminality are taking place, such
as money laundering and Venezuelan-Hezbollah complicity in drug trafficking, in addition to Venezuelan-Iran military cooperation. (Germany’s
Die Welt reported this month that Iran is planning to build medium-range missile bases in Venezuela, astride Panama Canal shipping lanes.)Ӧ
The Chavez regime predictably accused the U.S. of responding to the prohibited sales in “imperial
fashion” and warned that it will consider reducing exports to the U.S., an action that might easily do
more damage to the Venezuela’s battered economy than to the U.S. Chavez nonetheless will attempt to
use the U.S. measures to whip up anti-American sentiment in advance of next year’s presidential
elections.¶ The latest action is a long-overdue first step toward recognizing that the Chavez challenge
presents a long-term threat to U.S. security in Latin America.
Iran Unpopular
Congressional opposition to Venezuela because of ties to Iran
Bowman, 12 (2/16/2012, Michael, “U.S. Congress Warns Venezuela over Ties with Iran,”
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=72042&pageid=17&pagename=News)
U.S. senators are warning Latin American nations against deepening financial and military ties with
Iran, pledging heightened U.S. vigilance of Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere. The Senate's Foreign Relations Subcommittee took a
close look on February 16 at Tehran’s dealings with Latin America. Iran’s increasingly isolated regime retains friends in Latin
America, most notably Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.¶ U.S. Democratic Senator Robert Menendez had a
stern message for the region. “Unfortunately, there are some countries in this hemisphere that, for political or financial gain, have
courted Iranian overtures. They proceed at their own risk: the risk of sanctions from the United States, and the risk of abetting a
terrorist state,” he said.¶ Republican Senator Marco Rubio echoed that message. “The leaders of these [Latin
American] countries are playing with fire,” Rubio said.¶ Researcher Douglas Farah said Iran's intentions in Latin America are
twofold. “To develop the capacity and capability to wreak havoc in Latin America and possibly the U.S. homeland, if the Iranian leadership views
this as necessary to the survival of its nuclear program, and to develop and expand the ability to blunt international sanctions that are crippling
the regime’s economic life,” Farah said.¶ Of particular concern: Iran’s quest for raw nuclear materials and what U.S. National Intelligence
Director James Clapper recently described as Iran’s increasing willingness to mount attacks on U.S. soil.
China Relation Links
US oil investment fuels Chinese tensions
Michael Levi and Blake Clayton, Michael Levi is the Michael A. Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior
Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate
Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National
Security at the CFR, 2012 The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence, Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, online]
What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production is
often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example, discriminates between domestic and
foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from
telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. In
Latin America, for example, oil is
typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional
reactions.6 Oil investment decisions can thus take on a special cast.¶ 3¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases
where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for
example, all appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on
the bilateral relationship with those firms’ home countries.7¶ Chinese
oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select their targets
for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking
a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital.
Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities in
places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at bay.