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National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction

The Security of National Staff:

Towards Good Practices

A Report for InterAction

Final Document: 27 July 2001

Contents:

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 1

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1

Towards Good Practices: Essential Elements ................................................................ 3

Threats and Concerns: The Vulnerability of National Staff ........................................ 6

Differences in the Treatment of National Staff: Policy and Practice ........................... 9

Salary, Benefits, and Personnel Procedures ................................................................. 13

Appendix One: Who are National Staff? ........................................................................ i

Appendix Two: Summary of Responses and Compendium of ‘Best’ Answers ....... iii

Appendix Three: Agencies That Answered ................................................................. xx

Appendix Four: A UN View on National Staff Security ........................................... xxi

Executive Summary

The research presented in this report concludes that the following steps are critical for aid agencies to enhance the security of their national staff:



The agency formally states its commitment to the security of all staff without differentiation, and backs up its commitment with measurable resources.



National staff fully participate in security management procedures, and in some cases even lead them, from the design of security plans to training, to decision-making on the main issues concerning the security of all staff.



Attention to national staff security is a key element for evaluating the performance of managers and supervisors.



Evacuation should not be the cardinal issue of national staff security: it is not necessarily the best solution in times of crisis, and is often not expected by national staff.



The agency is transparent in its security and personnel procedures, and is clear on its expectations of national staff; this is critical to promoting the security of all staff.



Agency-wide policies lay out the agency’s general security and personnel philosophy, but consistently defer to field-based practices that integrate local realities.

1

Final Document: July 27, 2001


Introduction

National staff security should not be seen as just another headache we have to deal with. Instead they are the prime resource in developing appropriate and effective security strategies for all staff.

Security Consultant at InterAction Forum Workshop (June 2001)

In every extreme situation I have been in during the last three years, it has been the national staff who have given me the best indication of a way forward.

Bob MacPherson, CARE - Assistant Director, Emergency Group (July 2001)

At the Security Seminar for NGO Senior Management hosted by InterAction in

September 2000, CEOs and other attendees expressed concern over the management of the security of national staff, the consensus being that it was generally inadequate. In

March 2001, with OFDA funding, InterAction contracted research into the current practices and policies of its membership on national staff security. As external researchers, we designed a 24-question survey that was distributed to all InterAction members.

1

We received 46 completed questionnaires from 14 agencies; just 33 respondents were international members of staff, 12 were national members (one was unclear). We discouraged agencies from reviewing or consolidating field responses at the HQ level. Based on the results of the survey and responses from queries sent out to non-InterAction members, we conducted a workshop at the InterAction Annual Forum in

Washington DC on June 6. The present report is based on the survey responses, other inquiries made, the workshop and our own experience.

This research is an initial step in a longer-term process to identify a set of good practices for national staff security.

The following report (pp. 2-14) presents an analysis of our findings. We start with a presentation of some first steps towards good practices in national staff security: this is the essence of the report. We then discuss the essential aspects of national staff vulnerability, the differences in how agencies address security issues for national and international staff in policy and practice, and aspects of human resources management and personnel procedures.

Also included is a set of appendices (pp. i-xxi):

a presentation on who national staff are;

a combined summary of questionnaire responses and compendium of ‘best’ answers;

a list of the agencies that answered the survey;

and a cursory view of security from the UN perspective.

1 The 24 questions of the questionnaire are reproduced in Appendix Two.

2



Towards Good Practices: Essential Elements

Good practices should be taken as examples and not as universal, prescriptive measures.

Comment from the audience, InterAction Forum (June 6, 2001)

Good v. Best Practices:

Given the great variety of contexts, programs and cultures that characterize NGO activities, the idea that one could devise and implement a set of ‘best practices’ on anything, let alone on security, is unrealistic. And as this is the first attempt to lay out the policies and practices of InterAction’s members concerning the security of their national staff, it is premature to even lay out ‘good practices.’ We therefore settled from the outset on something more experimental: trying to move ‘towards’ good practices. We identified five fields: elements of policy, threat assessment, preparedness, evacuation, and benefits and personnel procedures. We recognize that the term ‘good’ implies a judgement: what follows is a presentation of our opinions, based on our research, as to what the essential elements of good national staff security practice could be.

Towards Good Practices: Elements of Policy

On the topic of national staff security, as with many other issues that aid agencies have to deal with, policy should not hinder practice. The key lies in a continual refinement of field-based practices – and not in defining a one-size-fits-all policy. Nevertheless, some overall good practices, that fit many different environments, come close to elements of a policy. These policy-level practices include the following:



The agency publicly, formally and repeatedly commits itself to the security of all staff, and backs this commitment up with measurable resources and inputs.



National staff are integral to the formulation, enactment, and review of security plans and structures. National staff should guide, and in some cases even lead, the process, including for the security of international staff.



Staff are hired and promoted based on their qualifications for a position regardless of whether they are national staff or foreign.



A key security consideration in choosing managers is their ability to incorporate many voices when planning and managing agency activities.



The agency is transparent both in its security practices and in its commitments to national staff. Transparency is key to improving the security of all staff, national and international alike.



Agencies evaluate managers and supervisors, inter alia , on the attention and effectiveness they demonstrate in dealing with national staff security.



Agency-wide security policies set broad guidelines and state commitments, but always defer to good practices designed in the field.

3



Towards Good Practices: Threat Assessment

Most agencies understand the need for threat assessments: which military or paramilitary forces operate in the country where they work? What is the level of organized or incidental crime in the local society? What tensions are there in the local community?

But only a few agencies apply threat assessments across the board, looking at the possible detrimental consequences of the many decisions their staff must make. For instance, assessing threat includes exploring the following types of questions:



Does the agency increase the risk to national staff if it provides outstanding services to a discrete group in the local community or not to others?



What is the risk to staff of an ostentatious agency presence, for instance, if the agency purchases a flashy white 30,000-dollar four-by-four?



What are the risks to a national staff person who takes on new responsibilities, or is assigned to a new location?



Are national staff who are sent to another part of the country at risk because they are not local?



Would the agency have an overall lower risk threshold if we employed national staff rather than foreigners?



What risks are national staff disproportionately vulnerable to, and how do programs affect those risks?

While a security coordinator or security focal point may be able to assist decision makers in formulating the necessary questions, the goal is for threat assessment to become a routine portion of all decision-making processes.

Towards Good Practices: Preparedness

The more agencies are willing to consider their national staff and local associates as primary recipients for information and training, the more they will increase the overall security preparedness of their operation. The following are initial steps:



The security orientation of newly hired national staff goes beyond the risks associated with their level of responsibility. Newly hired staff are made aware of the existence of a security plan, and briefed on who the focal point for that plan is and what structures exist to include their voice in the formulation or review of the plan.



Orientation for new staff includes the history, role, mandate and message of the agency. Newly hired staff must be able to go home and explain to family and friends what the agency is all about.

4





National staff should be prioritized over foreign staff for security-related training because they are more attuned to local conditions and because they stay on – this will contribute to improving the security of all staff.



National staff are encouraged to express their concerns, and training providers orient their courses towards these concerns.

 For equipment training, agencies use the ‘stand-in’ method: the primary user of a piece of equipment and their assistant or potential ‘stand-in’ are trained.



Local partners such as NGOs, institutional partners, contractors, local professionals share in the information and in-house security training. This extends the agency’s informal risk assessment network.



All staff are repeatedly told, before and during a crisis, that agency assets and equipment are never worth risking one’s life for.

Towards Good Practices: Evacuation

Evacuation is not the defining feature of national staff security practice, nor should it be considered as such: national staff do not always expect it, it is often not an appropriate solution, and there are real difficulties, financial, legal and logistical, with the evacuation of national staff. The following steps, however, are central:



In the event of a general evacuation, national staff will be returned to their home or point of hire, if the staff member so desires.



In exceptional circumstances – if a national staff member has come under extreme threat due to the his or her activities on behalf of the agency – the agency will make every effort to re-locate or evacuate him or her.



The agency adopts procedures for post-expatriate evacuation salary payment or advances that are clear and understood prior to evacuation.

Towards Good Practices: Benefits and Personnel Procedures



Hiring, promotion, and dismissal procedures are tailored to local realities, i.e., they are not agency-wide, one-size-fits-all procedures.



These procedures are transparent and based on merit. The procedures are understood by national staff and applicants to those positions.



Where local health insurance is non-existent, ineffective or corrupt, the agency crafts a solution that provides their national staff employees protection better than the incountry standard.



The agency adopts measures that bolster the abilities of national staff to enhance their own protection (e.g., such as cash allowances, improved home communications, home guards, etc.).

5



Threats and Concerns: The Vulnerability of National Staff

The day I began working for ARC was both the best and worst day of my life.

National staff member (as relayed by Karen Elshazly, ARC)

Risks to national staff fall broadly under two categories, that are in fact two sides of the same coin: risks associated with their work for the international agency and risks due to their enhanced status, visibility and wealth in their own society.

The Job as Risk:

Working for an international agency exposes national staff members to risks they are unlikely to otherwise face.



Being there: A primary risk is the increased exposure staff take on just from carrying out the duties of their job: doing dangerous things, going places they might otherwise not visit, or engaging with people they might otherwise chose to avoid. This is of particularly true of drivers and interpreters. Agencies often assume that the presence of an expat or the white 4x4 lessens the risk of being targeted, but this is far from universal and may actually work the other way – and national staff often travel alone, anyway.



Guilt by association: Association with the agency and its activities, or with the international community writ large, can again be a source of both risk and protection.

Where an armed force or political authority is opposed to the delivery of assistance or even the presence of foreign agencies, national staff may come under threats that other jobs would not involve. The protection element can stem from an aggressor’s fear of retribution should it attack foreign agencies.



Access to wealth: Being in possession of agency assets – e.g., a four-wheel drive vehicle or computer or communications equipment, or even cash – constitutes an obvious risk, as does receiving a regular and presumably better-than-average salary.



Second-tier status: All staff security is affected by those who formulate and execute security planning. Where this is a foreigner or group of foreigners, evacuation, physical protection, and other forms of protection of those foreigners often takes precedence over that of national staff. National staff are too often dependant for their security on harried, stressed and often ignorant outsiders.



Peer-pressure: National staff may come under considerable pressure from fellow staff members whom he or she might otherwise not be in contact with, to take part in illegal schemes, orient the program in one way or another (geographically, politically), or direct business to a given supplier.

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National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices

7

A Report for InterAction

The Society as Risk:

Threats from within the local society are much more likely to be targeted at the national staff of an international agency than at its foreign staff. This can be due to the impunity that the aggressor feels when threatening a national staff-member, or to the fact that national staff are effective targets because they understand an implied threat more readily than an expatriate is likely to. Such threats can start out as requests for graft or collusion, then build to pressure and lastly threats of violence.



Authorities and security forces: These groups can use their powers of coercion to either enrich themselves and their associates or to get the aid agency to support their political or military stance vis-à-vis their opponents. Foreign staff often are able to gain some measure of understanding of the threats that these authorities pose.



Political hard-liners: In conflict-ridden societies, the most extreme political elements are usually not the governing authorities, but rather hard-line elements that are either part of the authority structure or in opposition to it. Such hard-liners are often wellorganized and see international agencies as both bothersome interlopers or helpless targets ripe for the plucking. Foreign staff are less likely to spend the time to understand the threats that these groups pose.



Local community: As any member of any society, national staff count enemies, rivals or grudge-holders in their circle of acquaintances. However, once a local person’s status has radically changed – i.e., they get a job with an international agency – the threat that their personal enemies pose will increase. A second aspect of the local community that can pose a threat is businessmen who wish to land lucrative contracts with international agencies. Third, organized crime will almost always pressure national staff first before attacking an agency’s assets or taking on international staff.

Lastly, elements of the local community may be unhappy with the agency’s programs for any number of reasons, and are likely to take it out on the part of the agency closest to them – the national staff. Foreign staff rarely get beyond the opinion that the local society is corrupt, dangerous, and impossible to understand.



Beneficiaries: In many instances, recipients of international assistance have some affinity, ethnic or linguistic, with the national staff of the agencies involved.

Individuals within this group that want to gain though the threat of violence or are disgruntled by perceived or actual inadequacies of the aid agency will almost always begin with threats to the national staff.

Length of Service:

There are several levels of correlation between length of service and risk to national staff.

First, the longer staff stay with an agency, the more responsibility they gain and hence the more vulnerable they are to pressure from the local society. Also the longer they stay in a given operation, particularly and emergency operation, the more complacency is likely


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction to set in. (This is true of all staff, foreign and national alike.) Second, the longer staff stay in an agency, the more they tend to gravitate to desk jobs, where the risk is less. The corollary to this is that newer staff, posted to field positions, were more at risk.

Stress and Exhaustion:

National staff are clearly prone to these conditions as well as foreign staff. However, there is considerable debate as to the efficacy and culture appropriateness of what has come to be called the psycho-social field. The UN has made large strides in grappling with the ‘psycho-social’ needs of its staff, however not necessarily in the right direction.

The following quote is from the March-April 2001 issue of Secretariat News :

Survivor’s guilt is a common and predictable response to a critical incident. . .

‘When there is an evacuation and local staff members are left behind, there may be feelings of guilt associated with the experience. . .[we] make them aware that it is a symptom of the trauma itself. . . but generally they go back to functioning normally after a short time.’

It would seem unwise and possibly counterproductive to duplicate in other cultures this

‘Western’ approach to talking through our feelings. All societies have ways of dealing with stress. Identifying them and facilitating their use, rather than imposing our views, seems to make most sense. Until an agency has been able to apply appropriate responses to stress and exhaustion, probably the best we can do is the very common sense suggestion made at the June InterAction Forum Workshop:

National staff get tired too. But we rarely make enough allowance for their timeoff. During and just after a crisis we should insist that they take time away from the job, just as we do for the international staff.

8



Differences in the Treatment of National Staff: Policy and Practice

Our agency’s security policy is less than two pages. . . A typical country’s security plan runs to over 100 pages.

Randy Martin, IRC (InterAction Forum Workshop, June 2001)

Policy v. Practice:

Few organizations specified a difference, within their overall written security policy, between foreign and national staff. Where they did it was generally to express limits on the agency’s commitment to evacuate national staff – agencies rarely, if ever, evacuate national staff alongside their foreign colleagues. In practice, however, there were significant security-related differences: after hours activities (the foreign staff are much more regulated); better access to information from foreign sources such as press and embassies for foreign staff; and better coverage by security procedures (communications, calling tree, home guards) for foreign staff.

The absence of reference to national staff in policy documents seems to be based on two rationales. The first concerns a minority of agencies who do not care to acknowledge that the differences in practice between national and foreign staff security are in fact policy.

They hide behind the ‘one staff, one policy’ approach. The majority of agencies, however, are more honest as to their differences in practice. Not enshrining these differences in a policy document allows field management some leeway to craft local security practices that meet local realities.

A detailed policy may in fact be counterproductive. The respondents to our survey described a wide variety of practices dealing with national staff security. It is this variety that will be of greatest interest to InterAction members (we included some of the more representative and striking examples in the compendium). Here, however, we want to stress the general point of how important it is to have local solutions to local problems.

Few agencies are satisfied with their approach to national staff security, and many may be tempted to tackle or even just mitigate the problem centrally. We believe that dictates from head office that seek to homogenize policies will do little to improve actual practices. Instead agencies should look to the ad-hoc nature of field-based responses to identify both increased security of national staff and increased risks.

2

We do not mean to imply that every field based approach to security will be a good one.

Indeed, many field managers lack the experience or competence to develop appropriate security mechanisms. A main task of HQ is to see that this is taken into account when hiring managers or to provide appropriate training. If this is done, an agency will have made a key step towards establishing the architecture necessary to develop a good security structure.

2 Many people understand ‘ad-hoc’ to mean ‘hasty,’ ‘haphazard’ or ‘ill-thought through.’ We use it here in its true definition, ‘for the case at hand.’

9



Specific Difference: Evacuation

National staff may be evacuated in "only the most exceptional cases in which their security is endangered, or their property is lost or damaged as a direct consequence of their employment by the United Nations organizations."

The UN Field Security Handbook

Overall Policy: Most agencies differentiate between the evacuation of expatriate and national staff. Still, the majority fall into the category of ‘no but’ – the agency generally does not evacuate national staff but exceptions are often made. Exceptions fall into general evacuation and targeted evacuation.



General: A small minority of agencies have carried out general evacuations of national staff where they felt that leaving them behind meant a significant threat to their lives in the past – and say they would again do so again. Most agencies, however, would not carry out general evacuations claiming local border controls, size of families, transport restrictions on transport, and financial expense as the rationale.



Targeted: Many agencies evacuate individuals (and had done so in the past) who have either fallen afoul of local authorities due to their work with the agency or suffered physical injuries that were not treatable locally.

In-Country: Most agencies have some sort of plan for national staff in the case of a serious deterioration in the security situation or an evacuation of international staff, with roughly into three categories: relocation to a safe area, relocation to the staff-member’s address of origin, and no relocation.



Safe Area: Some agencies assist national staff to re-locate away from areas of instability – safer areas within the country and away from their home if necessary.



Home Address: Some agencies feel an obligation to make sure employees were returned to their home if they were working in a different part of the country that became unsafe.



Bye-Bye and Good Luck: A small number of agencies feel their obligation to national staff ends once national staff have finished assisting in the evacuation of the international staff. Many agencies, however, think that national staff have sufficient local savvy and a safety network to survive regardless of what the agency feels or did.

We do not feel that evacuation is the major national staff security issue that agencies must address. Indeed several individual respondents to the survey, mostly national staff, stressed that national staff did not expect to be evacuated. However, evacuation came up in virtually every response to policy vs. practice questions, as well as in conversations. It is a highly emotive issue and on the rare occasions where evacuations take place, they can, if mishandled, dramatically increase risks to all staff and leave lingering resentment in their wake. The key, whatever the policy or practice, is an unambiguous explanation to all staff of the commitments that the agency makes to them.

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National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices

11


Post-Evacuation Threats: There seems to be convergence on the issue of threats to national staff following an evacuation of the expatriates. The most common risk is that resulting from resentment and reprisals linked to the staff member’s affiliation to the agency. Others risks are linked to pressure from outside individuals wanting to gain access to the assets the agency left behind, and the general situation — war, lawlessness, lack on amenities.

Specific Difference: After-Hours Protection

This is a case of balancing protection with intrusiveness: while expatriates often receive more protection — e.g., guarded residences, better communications, transport — they must also accept agency-mandated constraints on their after-hours activities. Many agencies feel they cannot expect local employees to conform to agency security standards outside of working hours. There are also questions surrounding the legality of requiring national staff to do so. But the truth of the matter is that many agencies would be reluctant to fund such a level of protection for national staff.

Specific Difference: Information

Information is a two-way road. Most agencies recognize the local sources of information and knowledge to which national staff have access. Some agencies attempt to actively bring these sources into their threat assessment and security planning processes. Most agencies also note that foreign staff have sources of info such as international media and governments that national staff are not privy to. Some of these agencies attempt to share this with their national staff; others choose not to. Some managers argue that, in some cases, it is best to withhold information from national staff because that knowledge could place them at increased risk; others see this as a patronizing and ultimately self-defeating attempt to control information. In terms of transparency, honesty with national staff as to what the national staff can expect by way of support from their employer in the event of a security incident or crisis is of fundamental importance. And while this is recognized, many agencies seem to feel that they did not yet live up to their own expectations.

Specific Difference: Training

The security orientation of newly hired national staff is generally poor. Many agencies provide none and those that do provide it on a ‘need to know’ basis, i.e., orientation is related to job task and responsibility. As for ongoing training, the trend is clearly towards increased national staff training. This is for both training at the level of staff member’s responsibility and access to security courses that are either run in-house or retained outside.



Security Plan Formulation:

The role of national staff in contributing to the creation of country specific security plans fall into three categories: integration, comments, sign-off.



Integration: A few agencies bring national staff into the process of creating and periodically reviewing their field-based security plans, either because they want national staff participation per se, or because they have national staff in senior positions. A couple of agencies have even decided that national staff should drive the process — again, this is a practice born of locale-specific circumstances, not of policy. Agencies that take this approach find they have improved their assessment of threats, the prevention of incidents, and their response to crises.



Comments: Many agencies present a draft of their security plan to all their staff

(international and national) for comments before finalization. While this may be useful in avoiding or mitigating erroneous assumptions or faulty planning, it is clearly inferior to the integration approach. Staff who are asked only to comment on the thinking of other people, rather than contribute with their own, are more likely to give only a cursory review.



Sign-Off: Some agencies do nothing more than insist that national staff read the plan and sign that they have done so, sometimes as a requirement for employment. It is hard to see how this approach contributes to national staff security. It may actually decrease security of staff as they perceive that the agency is more concerned with procedure than the security of its’ staff, and begin to act accordingly.

12



Salary, Benefits, and Personnel Procedures

Unhappy personnel are not the best of company in security prone situations.

Survey respondent.

Salary and Improved Security:

The beneficial aspects of the salaries that national staff make are clear (the associated hazards are noted above), such as the ability to provide improved security hardware for their homes. Many agencies provide salary advances to national staff in the eventuality of an evacuation, ranging in the survey responses from one to three months of pay. Some agencies provide emergency saving schemes based on national staff salaries. But there is also the fear that handling extra cash and processing the payments in the midst of a crisis is likely to create additional security issues.

Insurance Options:

Agencies seem to provide three types of insurance: none, legal, and ad-hoc.



None: In the survey, many respondents provided no information as to health or life insurance. While we assume that some of these either did not know or did not want to answer, other agencies clearly provide nothing.



Legal Approach: Many agencies claim to meet the needs of the national staff by adhering to the regulations of the countries in which they work, despite the level of care and corruption in the health structures of the country.



Ad-Hoc: A few agencies not only felt their obligation to their staff but also recognize the inadequacy of the local structure. Various responses, tailored to local situations, have been enacted, such as private insurance, in-house insurance funds, total or partial reimbursement-on-receipt systems, and a monthly or annual payment for health care to be spent as the employee sees fit.

Impact of Personnel Procedures on Security:

Fairness and transparency is a key component to security. First, where hiring, dismissal and promotion practices are obscure or prone to cronyism, the security of all staff – and especially the security of internationals – deteriorates. Second, some respondents said that a good understanding of the agency’s history and mission provides for better community acceptance, and therefore increased security. An open environment in which national staff have easy access to management (whether national or expatriate) encourages the flow of security-related information and concerns. In these cases, threat assessment and incident prevention become an everyday part of the working environment of the agency, rather than being relegated to monthly safety meetings or to the security

13


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices coordinator.


John Fawcett <johnfawcett2@compuserve.com>

Victor Tanner <vtanner@compuserve.com>

July 27, 2001

14


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices i


Appendix One: Who Are National Staff?

The term ‘national staff’ covers many different situations. These vary in terms of nationality, relationship to the local population or to the beneficiary population, level of responsibility, and so on, and were reflected in the survey responses. The examples come from the questionnaires.



Where National Staff Are From:



Local staff: Staff that are hired locally, i.e., within the area of operations of the program they are associated with. They are often assumed to be more ‘at one’ with the local community because they are part of it. But this can also entail specific risks, for instance in the case of tense or divided communities, or if the local population is itself at risk (e.g., male staff under forty in Chechnya).



National staff: Staff that are citizens of the country of operations. They can sometimes be quite alien to the local community (e.g., Javanese staff in Aceh).



Regional staff: Staff that are hired within the region but are not considered international staff (e.g., Kenyan staff hired for operations in southern Sudan).

 Refugee staff: Staff that are hired to work with a refugee population in a country of asylum, either from within the refugee population itself or from the country of origin

(e.g., Sierra Leonean staff in Guinea).



Levels of Responsibility:

National staff can occupy many different levels of responsibility. Some programs are entirely run by national staff or have national staff in very senior levels, especially in more development-focused agencies. Some of the responding agencies clearly had a policy where a senior position is automatically held by national staff-member. In other programs, national staff make up the bulk of program staff (e.g., project officers, fieldlevel managers) and of professional and non-professional support staff (e.g., accountants, translators, drivers, radio operators, secretaries). But national staff is also made up of less

‘visible’ ancillary staff such as guards, warehouse personnel, cleaning staff, and so on. A few of the agencies that responded to the questionnaire explicitly distinguish between these groups. Most did not.

These varying levels of responsibility carry, not only different levels of risk, but also different levels of commitment on the part of the agency, particularly with regards to evacuation. It appeared that agencies that had national staff in senior positions were likely to have been on the ground longer, and were more deliberate and thoughtful in


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction addressing the security concerns of their national staff.



Third Country Nationals:

So-called third country nationals (staff hired locally who are not citizens of the country at hand) were considered in different ways. Some agencies said that they would treat third country nationals according to their contract (national, international). Most agencies, however, recognized a special responsibility towards third country nationals who could not fend for themselves in difficult situations. This was especially clear for Western staff, even if hired locally and under national staff contracts ii



Appendix Two:

Summary of Questionnaire Responses and

Compendium of ‘Best’ Answers

This appendix aims to give the reader a flavor of the responses we received to the survey.

The summary of responses seeks, question by question, to review the main issues raised.

It is based on 46 different surveys from 14 member agencies and four non-member agencies, covering field offices in 17 countries. Thirty-three surveys were completed by international staff, 12 by national staff (1 was unclear).

Choosing ‘best’ answers is inevitably a subjective exercise. We chose the answers we thought reflected particular thoughtfulness. The main criteria for inclusion were: that the respondent acknowledged that the situation varied from case to case and that local specifics were taken into consideration, or that they reflected some realism and honesty.

1)

Within your agency’s overall security policy is there a differentiation between international and national staff? If yes please specify what are the differences.

Summary of Responses:

This question brought out the two essential differences in the treatment of international and national staff: evacuation (19 responses) and off-the-work-place protection, including after-hours regulations, guards for homes and protection for families (8). Other responses included differences in benefits (5); and better procedures for internationals, such as communications, inclusion in the calling tree, or simply “more attention” (3). One respondent said there was no specific policy for national staff, one said policies were country-specific, three did not know or deferred to HQ; two said there was no “formal policy;” one just answered “no.”

At least nine respondents said there was not difference at all, even though subsequent answers indicated, in eight of these nine cases, that the agency would not consider evacuating national staff, or be reluctant to do so .

‘Best’ Answers:

“While [name of agency] does not yet have a formal policy document, there is a differentiation between intl. & national staff in that 1) national staff would not necessarily participate in an evacuation, and 2) local staff are not held to all the same security rules as intl. staff during off-duty hours.”

“International staff are evacuated and national staff are not.”

“Yes. [Our organization] has three categories of staff: iii



- International;

- National Officer Corps (have much of the same privileges as international staff);

- National Support Staff.”

2) In field based security practices what are the differences between international and national staff?


Again, differences for evacuation (11 responses) and after-hour protection (8) were the most often cited. Other answers included: internationals are subject to curfews (1) and travel restrictions (2); internationals have better benefits (1), better comms (1), and command more attention, in particular from other organizations that might be carrying potential evacuations, e.g., SFOR in Bosnia (2). Six respondents indicated that national staff were more in tune with local norms and customs, and more knowledgeable about the local political and security realities; one of these respondents stressed that this meant that national staff could do things that internationals could not do. Two respondents said that their agency would take whatever measures were necessary to ensure the security of national staff; two indicated that there was no “specific” policy for national staff; one said that security measures were task-specific, not a function of whether the staff member was national or international; and two mentioned the potential legal constraints of implementing after-hours security measures for national staff. Ten respondents said that there were no differences in field-based security practices. Two respondents said they did not know.


“… I do not know if it came out in our written policies or not, but the spirit of our discussions at the time we were working on our policies was that if a person was at risk because of their work with [our agency] we would take whatever measures possible to ensure their safety.”

“In practice, good field managers minimize the differences where they can.

Within [our organization], distinctions are often sharp in theory and manifested, in practice, under “national interest” rationalizations. This means that often, the most intricate planning for worst case scenarios do not involve local staff or experts at all and such plans are classified. It means that local staff are often an afterthought in security measures.” (Governmental agency)

3) Where within the organizational structure does responsibility for national staff security lie?

Summary of Responses: iv


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices v


The majority of respondents (30 responses) indicated that the country director, or equivalent, held primary responsibility for national staff. Some mentioned field coordinators (8), immediate supervisor (1), expatriate supervisor (1), administrative manager (1), staff members in charge of security (often the logistics or communications officers, 3 responses), national staff personnel managers in the field (2), headquarters (4), a “global security” division in HQ (1), and the agency itself (2). Five respondents said they believed it was, inter alia, a matter of personal responsibility. Five respondents said that they did not know or gave no answer.


“First with each individual to be aware of risks and to prepare to cope with security problems, secondly with a designated security officer on site. The country director can also weigh in. HQ has also dictated security measures in the past.”

“We do not differentiate between responsibility for NATIONAL staff security and responsibility for staff security. In the field, the Country Director or senior

[organization] representative in a country is responsible for managing the security of all [our] staff in that country. At the HQ level, the director of emergency operations is the de facto watchdog on security management and preparedness issues within the organization.”

4) Does your agency differentiate, as regards to security, between national staff that are citizens of the country in which you are working and third country nationals locally recruited?


Answers were evenly split between those respondents who said that any non-national staff is an international staff if hired locally (16 responses) and those who said that nonnational staff that were not internationals per se (e.g., ‘regional’ or refugee staff) were treated as national staff (15). Four respondents indicated that it could vary from case to case and depended on the nature of the contract (international or local). One respondent indicated that locally-recruited third-country nationals came after international staff and before national staff (in case of evacuation, for instance). One respondent also pointed out that, in case of an evacuation, it depended on who was in charge: in the central

African country in question, Western embassies take charge of evacuations and they evacuate, in addition to their own nationals, the nationals of other First World countries; but “most of our staff are stuck as they’re from Ethiopia, Colombia, Philippines, Kenya, etc. What do they do? Walk out?”




“Almost all third country nationals that are locally recruited are expatriates with the same provisions as all other expatriate staff. There are a few limited instances where third country nationals are hired on local contracts. In these cases the third country national has essentially the same status as a national staff, with some gray areas.”

“There is a clearer line between locals and outsiders at a given site than between nationals and internationals.”

“We have two categories of staff: international and national. A third country national would be recruited under the terms of one of these categories. However, where we would have a national staff member seconded to / on a field trip in another country / location, the organization assumes responsibility to return them to their normal place of work.”

5) Does any one country or program stand out as having a particularly effective national staff security structure? If so, please describe.


The answers to this question are telling: 15 respondents said “no” and a further 15 answered that they had no information, deferred to HQ or marked nothing. In addition, two respondents answered “not yet” and another two said that improvements were needed. An additional three respondents said that other agencies were better prepared.

Among those rare answers that did cite an outstanding set of national security answers,

Afghanistan came up twice, Cambodia twice and Sierra Leone once; factors cited included a team approach, the fact that national staff hold all key positions and are well connected to the local society at all levels, and successful communications with local communities who have a sense of ownership in project at hand.

Two interesting responses stood out. The first comment, made in three responses, was that programs in places with more security problems were generally better equipped in ensuring the security of national staff. The second stated that the only outstanding management of national staff security was by programs that were willing to bend the rules (admittedly, this was from a large, non InterAction-member organization).


“No, in all the countries I have worked I have never seen a really good policy.

The bottom line for the expat security plan is that expats can leave the country if it really hits the fan. This is usually not an option for national staff.”

“Afghanistan – The programme has now been running for over 12 years and

Afghan managers hold all key positions. They are very well connected to the local, village, town, community, provincial and national levels and the vi


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices vii

A Report for InterAction organization has a excellent reputation for neutrality. In a country populated by armed gangs and militia comparatively few incidents have occurred with minimal injuries to both local and international staff. This is due to excellent communications and military style appreciations.

Cambodia – The teams in Cambodia deploy up to 2 days drive from some employees home and live in remote camps for up to 3 weeks at a time. There have been very few security incidents that have resulted in any major problems. The primary reason for this success has been communication and community mobilization combined with a product the benefiting community wants. Prior to a team deploying to a site there are up to 7 liaison visits by senior management international and/or national staff. During these visits it is explained to the target population exactly what is going to happen and why. Local candidates for employment are also identified during these visits and when the team deploy these personnel are rapidly integrated and made to feel part of the team. The teams then live with the community sharing their hardships and providing them with social and economic benefits. This in a sense transfers ownership of the problem to the local community who have a vested interest in insuring nothing untoward happens to the […] national staff.”

6) Are there any advocates within HQ or in the field for increased national staff security? If so, please give name and contact information for interview purposes.


Interestingly, 15 respondents either answered nothing or “N/A”, said that they did not know or referred us to HQ, and a further 10 respondents said that no one in particular was an advocate of national staff security. Six respondents named a specific individual at

HQ, three named someone in the field, seven referred to themselves, three mentioned the agency CEO, and four the head of corporate security or equivalent. Two respondents mentioned country directors (in general), two said the field in general and more said HQ in general. Two responses stressed that national staff security concerns were present at all levels of the agency.


“At all levels within [our organization] the need for the highest levels of national staff security is fully understood and any international manager who failed to make suitable appreciation of any security threat to his command would be unlikely to remain employed for long.”

7) What specific issues concerning the security of national staff are most important to you?



Summary of Answers:

The main concerns reflected the corporate concerns of the agency. The most frequently cited concerns included: whether or not the national staff would be evacuated in case of danger (6 responses); risks emanating from the staff-member’s association with the NGO, either in terms of financial responsibilities or as a result of the agency ‘message’ which might be unpopular with elements in the local society including vendors and local authorities (11); and safety procedures, including security training, mine awareness, good communications, safe vehicles, etc (9). Less frequently cited concerns included: context-specific fears (4), specific fear of expatriate obliviousness to their level of risk

(2); desire for transparency (3), fear of war and displacement (2), post-expat evacuation fears (1), the need to protect expatriates (1), and the need for consistency throughout the organization (1).


“Would we evacuate national staff in the event of a temporary withdrawal from field offices in Kosovo and FYRO Macedonia. Treatment of national staff when they are working in areas where they are the ethnic minority.”

“Male Chechen staff members under 40 run a greater risk of being harassed, injured or killed if they engage in relief operations in Chechnya. Good advance information about risk, detailed advance notice of planned day-light activities and permission for them, overall low profiles (no "firebrands," "mavericks," or hot shots"), respect of local authorities, collaboration with other NGOs and agencies, and improved radio communication are essential mitigating factors.”

“We understand that national staff may face risk due to the fact that they are publicly linked to an international NGO, specially in isolated areas with a high level of conflict. But it is well known that they do not have responsibilities within the organization, and therefore their level of risk is much lower.”

8) What do you think are the key security concerns of the national staff themselves?


Many answers (10) stated the belief that the prime concern of national staff was for the safety of their families. In contrast, in question seven, the families of national staff only came up once as a concern of the respondents, even when they themselves were national staff. Other answers cited job security concerns (4), fear of guilt-by-association with the agency (5), exposure to intra-community tensions (4), crime (4), the obliviousness of international staff to their risks (3), benefits (3), evacuation (3), what happens after the expatriates evacuate (2), the need for information and transparency on the part of the viii


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices ix

A Report for InterAction agency management (2), fear of authorities (2), landmines (2), and seven other responses including “lesser status” and peer-pressure from corrupt fellow employees. One interesting answer by a national staff-member stated the concern of finding nonconflictive solutions to problems (the inherent assumption appearing to be that solutions devised by expatriates were more likely to generate conflict). Another answer was “we have not surveyed them at this time.”


“To not be expected to have to do anything that the expatriate staff would not do themselves.”

“1. Job security, 2. Physical safety – their own and their family; 3. Harassment and discrimination by association.”

“Comparatively high salaries and medical benefits provided by [our organization] to local staff enables the local staff to take care of their health as well as to strengthen their property security measures - using protective devices like install alarm system on the cars, iron bars on the house windows etc.”

9) What is the impact on security of national staff benefits, salaries, and other personnel procedures? Please provide examples of this impact.


The answers to this question were split. A slight plurality (9 responses) said that compensation and benefits that were higher than the prevailing norm in the local society created a risk for national staff; and a further (3) said that good benefits increased staff satisfaction, but did not draw any conclusions in terms of security. On the other hand, (7) claimed that good conditions improved security — expressed in terms of both personal security of the concerned staff-member and the security of other staff, particularly international staff — with two of these stressing that disgruntled staff were a risk to other staff. A number of respondents drew attention to specific benefit-related measures designed to enhance security, such as emergency allowances or advance evacuation severance pay, and two mentioned the constraints of funding for such measures. One respondent stressed the need of transparency and fairness to reduce intra-staff suspicion.

Eleven respondents failed to answer or said that they did not understand the question or saw no connection, six misunderstood the question (describing the impact of security on staff benefits) and five thought that benefits had no impact on security.


“The impact can be very important. Unhappy personnel are not the best of company in security prone situations. They may be prone to shift sides. Unhappy dismissed people, even when they have taken release themselves, may represent a


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction definite risk since they have nothing to lose with [our organization] anymore.”

“It can be a double edged sword, employment provides economic stability and lack of dependence but can also cause jealousy and resentment leading to an

10) Do you provide health or life insurance for national staff? If so; how is it paid for? What is the coverage rate? increase in the threat. As with all of the above these factors have to be considered and included in the threat assessment, appreciation.”


Twenty-six answers came from agencies that provide health insurance (external premium system, self-sustaining internal ‘pool,’ cost reimbursement, etc.). Thirteen came from agencies providing life insurance (with a further two providing “death benefit” or bereavement pay in societies where this would be accepted), and seven from agencies providing some form of workman’s comp. In two instances in the same country program there appeared to be confusion as (national) field staff reported no health insurance when country program management indicated the contrary. Some anomalies appeared: in the case of one agency known as a leading advocate on youth and the elderly, staff under 18 and over 57 were barred from health and life insurance benefits; and a Uganda-based agency declines insurance for long-term and terminal diseases. Three agencies provide monetary benefits rather than insurance, and three other respondents claimed that the insurance offered was undermined by corruption and poor level of services. Three respondents said that conditions varied country by country (although that seemed to be implied in many more responses as agencies seek to conform to local legislation and customs). One interesting answer claimed that the level of benefits depended on the

“advocacy of the country director.” Six agencies said they provided nothing, and a further two were reviewing their policies.

An illustration of a situation-dependent approach to benefits came from one questionnaire filled out by the human resources division at an agency HQ: “a summary of what various country programs offer in terms of benefits shows that some offer life insurance and no health insurance, others offer health and no life, some offer both and some offer neither.”


“National staff have opted to receive a monthly stipend (15 USD) in lieu of health insurance.”

11) Do national staff have input into a security strategy or plan? If so; how is this done? What types of input do they provide?

Summary of Responses: x


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices xi


Answers to this question echoed on one hand the understanding that agencies have of the value of national staff to their program and specifically to the security of their internationals, and on the other the lack of real involvement of national staff in the design of security plans. (15) respondents reported that national staff were asked to provide advice on local issues, (6) said that national staff were asked to provide comments on already-devised security plans, (4) respondents stated that senior national staff gave input, (4) respondents mentioned local staff committees, (2) said that national staff provided input at the local level only, and (1) said that the policy was to defer to the field.

(3) said that national staff were in charge of security planning, including for internationals, (4) reported that national staff participated as equals. (1) described the difficulties of unrealistic national staff requests. (1) said they were studying the issue.

(5) respondents declined to answer.


“National staff do have input into the security plan. They all had the opportunity to review and comment on the draft policies and procedures. Key staff participated in all discussions during the development of the policies and procedures. They represented other staff in doing so.”

“All staff have input into the security strategy and plan. The manager drawing up plans will consult widely with the team. The emphasis is on security planning as a team process, not simply on the end product (the physical document). The methodology varies - some areas have undertaken this as a workshop process, or as a consultation process. National staff (along with other staff) provide inputs into the context, threat and risk analysis, the development of appropriate strategy and the resulting standard operating procedures/security guidelines. National staff may be managing security, depending on their post/role.”

“Yes, they have had input, but their requests are unrealistic (4-5 months salary upon closure, air evacuation for all local staff and dependents, etc).”

12) What is the security orientation process for newly hired national staff?


Few agencies seemed to go beyond brief reviews of security, often as part of the overall briefing for newly hired staff, (12 responses), vehicular security (4), radio and communications (4) and the message of the agency (only 1). (7) respondents said that new staff were asked to review security documents, (4) said that the briefing depended on the responsibilities of the new staff-member, (3) said that the security brief was the responsibility of the supervisor or of the security coordinator or other designated official,

(2) said that their agency relied on third party briefings (OLS, mine awareness). (2) respondents described their practices as poor (“weak” and “erratic”), (1) said that nothing was formalized, (1) said that it was locally driven, and (1) said there was no security


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction orientation.


“Varies from country to country. Orientation of national staff is weak in general.

Very few national staff – particularly at base levels – have a satisfactory understanding of the history and mission of their employer. This weakens our acceptance in the community and thus our security.”

“In theory, security is part of the orientation for all new staff, national and international. In practice, only international staff members get a good grounding in security. This is mainly due to the fact that national staff members are usually from the location where they work and are keenly aware of the security situation.”

“They are made aware of the organizations responsibility to them. They are made aware of the security practices in situ in the field/ programmed area.”

13) What type of security training is the national staff eligible for?


(11) respondents said the training was driven by the responsibilities of the staff member or the nature of the program. (8) respondents said that national staff enjoyed the same opportunities as international staff. (6) mentioned in-house security training, while (4) referred to RedR. (8) mentioned specific training (communications, mine awareness, safe driving). (2) respondent mentioned OLS and SFOR training (in south Sudan and Bosnia respectively), and (2) cited insufficient funding. (4) respondents either did not answer or said none.


“There are no limitations, other than the usual limitations that would apply to any training opportunity. The persons supervisor needs to approve, it needs to be relevant to the persons work and in the interest of [our agency] for the person to attend a training. They need to see that their work responsibilities are covered if they will miss work. Each staff can use up to approximately $200 per year for training, professional development, books, tapes, etc. with the approval of their supervisor.”

“Well, we’re getting there. Next month [a training organization] will have a security training in Nairobi. I’ve asked each country to put someone forward.

Who comes is a kind of reflection of the management style in that country.

Somalia have already nominated a local. He will spend the next 3 months reviewing our security plans, training others etc. after the course. Burundi and

Eritrea will send expats, no doubt. Sudan will decide not to come. Kenya is run xii


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction by locals, more or less, so we’ll send one of them. Grants will pay of course, HQ will not. (an old gripe).”

14) Are national staff users of communications networks that require training? E.g. satphones, radios. Are all staff (national and international) trained in their use?


(11) respondents simply answered yes to the above questions; (14) respondents said that staff members who need to use communications are trained for it; and a further (6) said that all staff who needed to use the radio (HF, VHF) were trained in that. (3) respondents said that better training was needed, (2) said that NS were allowed to use all comms except satphones. (3) said that local staff did not use comms and (8) answered N/A or do not know.


“In general, all expatriates are trained in the use of radio and satphones, largely because these systems extend into staff housing and vehicles used during off-hours.

Work-time use of communications equipment is based upon job responsibilities, not national origin. Drivers, for example, will be trained to use codan radios. Guards may have VHF radio access. Radio operators are typically national staff. Training is based on need not nationality.

15) What, if any, is the connection between length of service of national staff members with the agency and the risks to their safety and security?


(13) respondents saw no connection, and (10) said that they did not know. Among those who thought that longer service led to a greater risk for national staff, (6) mentioned identification with an unpopular message, (3) mentioned greater responsibility within the agency, (2) mentioned that greater length of service was likely to lead to better salaries, and (4) mentioned complacency. (2) respondents said that it really depended on the situation, and (2) said that new hires were more likely to be assigned risky jobs.


“Uncertain. Probably higher risk for new staff hired into high risk environments.

Management-level national staff working in prolonged and politically-charged settings may accrue a level of added risk if their work is prominent in the community.”

“Generalising - staff who have been with the organisation for a long time, may be xiii


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction closely identified (externally) with the organisation, and this profile may attract certain risks. Other connections may be; seniority rather than length of service; type of job such as, finance and logistics staff or field staff who have (or are perceived to have) decision making authority over programme resources; staff with representation responsibilities.”

“That is context based. If an agency is perceived as external to the community, interfering with local customs, as being neocolonial and/or upsetting local power relations, it is assumed that the longer national staff are associated with the agency the more at-risk they would be. However, if the agency is positively perceived then the national staff would be more protected.”

16) Do you extend any security practices to other national partners, such as NGOs, sub-contractors, or professional interlocutors (teachers, community leaders)?


Most respondents (22) indicated that their agency provided no or no formal security training for partner organizations. (7) respondents said that they did work with partner organizations, often because of institutional links (national red cross chapters, church partners, contractors, national partners), and a further (3) said that there was no policy to do so but they did so in practice. (6) said they share information and in-house training with other organizations. (1) agency said they also worked with beneficiaries. (2) responded with an emphatic yes because of the nature of their work (mine awareness, human rights). (1) respondent cited lack of funding.


“Yes. Security may be discussed with beneficiaries as well, as an integral part of project implementation.”

“Not as a matter of policy, though there may be instances in practice.”

17)

During ‘normal’ operations do national staff face different types of threats than do international staff?


Many respondents (14) said that national staff were not more at risk than internationals during ‘normal’ times. But the majority of respondents nevertheless indicated that national staff thought the contrary. The most frequently cited threats included greater vulnerability to petty crime (7), official harassment (6) and pressure from vendors and bribery (3). Other interesting answers mentioned greater contact with disgruntled beneficiaries, pressures from kin, and the fact that the national staff were ‘on the front line’ for threats such as riots and banditry. xiv


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices xv



“Some national staff may be questioned more frequently than expatriate staff because they belong to an ethnic group that is engaged in hostilities with local authorities.”

“Yes. In some cases worse off with Clan affiliation, ethnic hatred or whatever

(Bosnia, Burundi, Rwanda, etc.). In some cases they are safer, attract less attention, can talk their way out of a bad situation, etc.”

“Yes. Currently, Pristina, Kosovo rivals New York or L.A. for Saturday night killings. Crime in a development or post-war environment can be startling to the expats that live in its midst and don’t realize it is happening because expats are not harmed. Also, as stated before, national staff are often the front-lines of our work. They usually encounter the bad stuff first, whether that is mines, gun fire, threats or robberies. They are often seen as a more acceptable target, as INGOs rarely trade info on security incidents to national staff and these incidents are often explained away (cultural differences, mafia, angry neighbor, etc.).”

18) What threats do they face after an evacuation of international staff?


There was significant convergence on the issue of threats to national staff following an evacuation of the expatriates. The most oft-cited answer was risk as a result of affiliation with the agency and reprisals (15). The next most common answers were risk as a result of pressure from people wanting to access the agency assets left behind (10), and the general situation — war, lawlessness, lack on amenities (6). A high number of respondents (15) declined to answer the question, citing lack of knowledge, lack of applicability (no evacuations to date) or the fact that the factors change in every situation.

(1) answer cited diminished international attention once the internationals were gone, and another lone respondent asserted, based on experience, that the evacuation of the expatriates would have no impact on the national staff.


“Depends. In Somalia, after an evacuation, the locals just keep it running, with no added risk. In Kosovo our locals went “underground” and just survived, or went and joined the KLA. I can’t think of other places we evacuated from.”

“The biggest threats after an evacuation would stem from those wanting access to the organizational assets – if the staff were still in proximity to these assets. The other main threat is just being caught and harmed in whatever fighting or insecurity is taking place – but if not directly in contact with the organization or


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction its assets – no higher danger than other local citizens – which can be great. An exception would be when the insecurity came from those opposed to [our] programs and then they might target the local staff.”

19) Do you have a national staff evacuation or re-location policy? If yes please append or outline main components.


The responses indicated the fundamental unease with the concept of national staff evacuation as a majority (20) answered no, and a further (4) gave no answer. However, of these responses, (8) were in fact “no but” responses, indicating that should the situation really warranted evacuation. (8) respondents said they would evacuate nonlocal national staff, (6) said they would consider relocation to safe havens or across a border, and (4) said that they would do it if a staff-member was threatened. (3) responded yes without specifying. A few interesting answers: (1) respondent said that rules would have to be bent and that he would do that. Another said the agency could only facilitate (for instance by allowing national staff to join an evacuation convoy in their own vehicles), and (2) more said that the staff-member could be evacuated, but not the families.


“Yes, national staff are taken back to the areas where they were hired if different from areas of assignment. The problem is, [our agency] is not responsible for family members (in some cases, small family may be considered).”

“Yes. If necessary, we will evacuate national staff who have been posted to the site from another location. I am not sure our policy states this, but we would facilitate departure of any staff who are seriously at risk especially if that risk is because of their work with us.”

“None other than the eligibility of national officer corps [distinct from national officer corps] for evacuation along with international staff if they so desire.”

20) Does your agency often evacuate national staff? If so is it due to a specific threat to an individual? . . .or as part of a wider evacuation? What is the criteria or reason for evacuating national staff?


Again, the answers showed agency reluctance about national staff evacuation: (20) straight “no” answers, (2) “not often”, (2) “don’t know”, (1) “not out of the country”, one

“if possible”, and (5) blank responses. Nevertheless, (13) respondents said that their xvi


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices xvii

A Report for InterAction agency would consider evacuation on a case-by-case basis in a life-threatening situation, including (4) who mentioned a general threat to the population and (5) who cited the case of threats to an individual staff member.


“We have done both, I believe. Criteria: Evacuation would have to be safer than staying put. Are there other better options to evacuation. Posting by the agency of staff to a location away from their home base. I think we would have to look at various resource requirements for large-scale evacuations. Are we prepared to deal with the protection issues?”

“Yes in some situations we do and it is always in situations when there is a general threat to the population. There have been a few instances where a staffer has been threatened individually but this is not the norm. Keep in mind that the evacuation could be 12km on the outskirts of town or 1/3 km across the river. The most common criteria is the fear of the national staff member and their certainty or belief that they will be killed.”

“Did not have to do this in the past. But in addition to the general evacuation provided to NOCs we are open to reviewing the cases of national support staff

[different from national management staff] on a case-by-case basis.”

21) What are the expectations of national staff during a crisis? i.e. reporting for duty, extra hours, extra responsibilities.


The majority of respondents (24) said they expected national staff to take on additional duties in time of crisis. (4) emphasized that they did not expect national staff to put themselves at risk, including if that meant interrupting activities that were important to beneficiaries. (4) respondents said they expected national staff to look after their safety and that of their families before becoming part of the ‘crisis team.’ (3) respondents said they would (should) defer to the judgement of the national staff themselves, and (1) said that it depended on circumstances. (8) respondents either did not answer, or wrote N/A or said no formal policy was in place.


“Again this is very situational. Staff will generally be told to care for themselves and their families first and the office only after they are certain of their safety. The national staff are given funds for continued office ops, two months salary, all equipment and vehicles and one is appointed in charge with full authority to direct program and operations and to be a point of communications [for our organization] outside. The equipment] is dispersed among staff and they regularly


National Staff Security: Towards Good Practices A Report for InterAction communicate with one another several times daily.”

“This would have a widely varied response – what we are striving for is for national staff to be able to focus on themselves and their families and not risk their well being to protect assets or work. However if the program was just on alert and not suspended or evacuated – local staff would be expected to come to work as long as the international staff continue to work – but any exceptions would certainly be considered on a case by case basis.”

“Depends on the nature of the crisis. Reporting for duty as long as this can be done without exposing yourself (as national staff member) or others (national or international colleagues) to undue security risks. Extra hours and extra responsibilities (sometimes down to earth: taking over for colleagues who could not make it to the duty station, but sometimes very important such as negotiating at higher level than usually would be accessed by the particular employee) are generally part of the package in a crisis. It should, however, always be balanced against the additional security risk that an exhausted employee may represent.

When there is the slightest possibility for rest it should be taken. Exhausted persons are a security risk for themselves and others.”

22) What are the commitments to national staff during a crisis? i.e. home guards? hostage negotiations? ransom payments?


(11) respondents said there was no formal policy or that their agencies would do what it could, (2) said that this was to be determined in the near future, and (2) said nothing. Of those who said they would do something, the main point of consensus was that no ransom would be paid, (11) respondents specified this (although one said that ransom was

“unlikely” but would not rule it out). Others said they might provide home guards (8) or negotiation services (7), or relocate the staff (6), or leave enough money (2); some ruled explicitly out home guards or negotiation. A large number (8) did not answer.


“No formal commitments, done on a case by case basis. We do not pay ransom payments.”

23) What do you think is the relationship between national and international staff security?

Summary of Responses: xviii



Many respondents (16) stated the obvious — with varying degrees of thoughtfulness — that is that one affects the other and vice-versa. (5) respondents stressed the need for

“fairness,” “trust,” “mutuality,” and “information.” (5) respondents acknowledged the linkages but stressed that national staff faces different realities, “the main one being that

[national staff] do not have a big embassy shouting about their safety and a big plane to take them away if it gets really messy.” (3) placed less emphasis on the different realities, saying that there was no difference between international and national staff except where evacuation was concerned, while a further (4) said the risks were similar or the same. (1) said the difference was “night and day,” and (1) said that the difference could be reduced through training. (7) respondents declined to answer or said that they did not know.


“Full, 100%, totally interdependent. The better national staff security the better international staff security. The better and the more fair (this is very important, more important than paying high salaries etc. is the way in which your employees perceive your organization as a fair, unprejudiced, honest and straightforward organization) the overall organizational arrangements for national staff the better the international staff security can be guaranteed. Many other factors play a role, like treatment of people at the personal level etc. It goes too far to deal with this exhaustively, but one of our security crises was exacerbated by weak personal relations of the expat involved and local staff (and wider, local people, organizations and authorities).”

“Observation of the policies laid down for all, as one staff action affects everybody regardless of national or international.”

“Also, national staff are at times prone to go along and not question the suggestions or perceived directives of international staff even if these may contradict security guidelines or norms. This is partly due to their perception of inter-national staff as temporary guests and of a strong and often prevailing sense of hospitality and partly due to the esteem with which international staff may be regarded and taboos against questioning authority. [Our agency] has tried to safeguard against this tendency through increased ownership through [national staff managers]. Yet this is a real concern that is outside of the organization per se.”

24) Do you have current or former national staff at HQ that we could talk with? If so please provide names and contacts.

Summary of answers:

(17) respondents answered “no” or N/A, (13) gave no answer, (6) deferred to HQ; (10) listed specific names. xix



Appendix Three: Agencies that Answered

Name of Agency

1.

AirServ

2.

American Red Cross

3.

American Red Cross

4.

American Red Cross

5.

American Refugee Committee

6.


7.


8.


9.

CARE

10.

Catholic Relief Services

11.

Church World Service

12.

Church World Service

13.

Concern Worldwide

14.

Halo Trust

15.

International Medical Corps

16.

International Relief and Development

17.

International Rescue Committee

18.


19.


20.


21.


22.


23.


24.


25.


26.


27.


28.


29.


30.


31.


32.


33.


34.


Location of Respondent

HQ

HQ

HQ

HQ

HQ

USA

Ethiopia

Cambodia

HQ

Turkey

Bosnia

HQ

Liberia

Uganda/Sudan

HQ (human resources)

East Africa

Indonesia

Azerbaijan

Bosnia (Banja Luka)

Bosnia (Bihac)

Bosnia (Gorazde #1)

Bosnia (Gorazde #2)

Bosnia (Mostar)

Chechnya

Croatia

Georgia (#1)

Georgia (#2)

Georgia (#3)

HQ

Kosovo

Indonesia (#1)

Indonesia (#2)

Liberia

Sudan

35.


36.

Mercy Corps

37.

Mercy Corps

38.

Mercy Corps

39.

Mercy Corps

40.

Mercy Corps

41.

Oxfam GB

Tanzania

HQ (emergency team, #1)

HQ (emergency team, #2)

HQ (human resources)

Indonesia

Kosovo

HQ

42.

Pathfinder

43.

Peace Brigades

44.

Relief International HQ

45.

USAID/BHR/Office of Transition Initiatives former country director

46.

World Vision

HQ

Colombia

HQ

InterAction?

46 questionnaires returned

14 InterAction members responded (approx. 8 percent of membership)

17 countries covered

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y xx



Appendix Four: A UN View on National Staff Security

*

* This is not an official UN view but instead the consultants’ interpretation based on telephone interviews and e-mail correspondence with security point persons from different UN agencies.

Differentiation: There is a clear differentiation between international and national staff in terms of entitlements. Staff on international mission are given far better provisions.

When the UN moves people from their home country they are entitled to the immunity and privileges of the UN. National staff are not.

Concerns: Household security is by far the most important security issue to national staff. Due to their job with the UN they are upwardly mobile and affluent in their society. This has made them more vulnerable. The UN tries to work closely with them to address their concerns and create a security network. In high risk areas such as Sierra

Leone the UN instituted a calling tree for national staff linked with the international staff and a mobile patrol team that would respond to both international and national staff distress.

Input: The UN normally does a four-day in-country security course, of which one day is for the national staff. The course attempts to draw from them their security needs and get their views of how to handle it. According to interviewees, national staff are often not much interested in this issue (it’s a lot of work learning radio procedure, etc.) In highrisk areas such as Sierra Leone, however, they are very interested. Or for instance in

Khartoum, there is modest interest in security training, while in Southern Sudan staff are both concerned by security issues and interested in them.

Evacuation/Re-Location: The Office of the SG must approve evacuations of national staff. It is a very rare occurrence. Rwanda, where the UN lost so many staff, remains a shocking memory in all agencies, but it was largely an isolated occurrence. The UN have lost staff in other places, recently and notably West Timor, but there are 70,000 staff worldwide; evacuation is a marginal issue to the vast majority of them. The UN have developed a proposed policy for re-location in country: a safe haven is identified incountry where national staff can move to and hopefully continue to work. In Sierra

Leone, the UN provided an allowance to staff (to be paid back interest-free) to help them arrange to move their families if they wished.

The UN are currently doing a significant review of the UN Security Handbook and will hopefully have it approved in the fall General Assembly and ready for publication by Jan

2002. It will have a detailed section on national staff.

xxi


to the PDF file.

The Security of National Staff:

Towards Good Practices

A Report for InterAction

Contents:

Executive Summary

Introduction

Towards Good Practices: Essential Elements

Threats and Concerns: The Vulnerability of National Staff

Differences in the Treatment of National Staff: Policy and Practice

Salary, Benefits, and Personnel Procedures

Appendix One: Who Are National Staff?

Appendix Two:

Summary of Questionnaire Responses and

Compendium of ‘Best’ Answers

Appendix Three: Agencies that Answered

Appendix Four: A UN View on National Staff Security

Related documents

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Support

to the PDF file.

The Security of National Staff:

Towards Good Practices

A Report for InterAction

Contents:

Executive Summary

Introduction

Towards Good Practices: Essential Elements

Threats and Concerns: The Vulnerability of National Staff

Differences in the Treatment of National Staff: Policy and Practice

Salary, Benefits, and Personnel Procedures

Appendix One: Who Are National Staff?

Appendix Two:

Summary of Questionnaire Responses and

Compendium of ‘Best’ Answers

Appendix Three: Agencies that Answered

Appendix Four: A UN View on National Staff Security

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