Plato’s Academy, a
mosaic in the Museo
Nazionale, Naples,
(Photo: Giraudon)
The Statesman, (257A-291C, pp. 294 -335) .
Philosophy 190: Plato
Fall, 2014
Prof. Peter Hadreas
Course website:
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/cour
ses/Plato
Topic of the Statesman:
What is the art of
statesmanship
and how might it be applied
well
Was Napoleon a good statesman?
A good political leader?
Is Barack Obama a good statesman?
A good political leader?
Who Is the Eleatic Visitor’s Interlocutor:
The “Younger” Socrates
The Socrates of Plato’s early and middle dialogues,
as in the Sophist, is silent in the Statesman except for
a few opening remarks. The “younger” Socrates, of
the Statesman, is mentioned once in the Theaetetus
(147D1) as studying mathematics with Theodorus
and Theaetetus. He was likely an early member of
Plato’s Academy. He is mentioned once in Plato’s
Tenth Letter (358E). Aristotle also mentions him once
in the Metaphysics (Meta, B 1036b25) in a way that
suggests he belonged to a group in the Academy that
Aristotle reproaches for their ‘pan-mathematicism.’
Result of Division (Diaeresis) I (p. 308, 267B-C)
VISITOR: Well then; of theoretical knowledge, we had at the
beginning a directive part; and of this, the section we wanted
was by analogy said to be ‘self-directing.’ Then again, rearing
of living creatures, not the smallest classes of self-directing-self
knowledge, was split off from it; then a herd-rearing form
from rearing of living creatures, and from that in turn,
rearing of what goes on foot; and from that, as the relevant
part, was cut off the expertise of rearing the hornless sort. Of
this in turn the part must be woven together as not less than
triple, if one want to bring it together in a single name, calling
it expert knowledge of rearing of non-interbreeding creatures.
The segment from this, a part relating to a two-footed flock,
concerned with rearing of human beings, still left on it own –
this very part is now what we were looking for, the same thing
we call both kingly and statesman like.
End of Diaeresis I (p. 308, 267B-C) Is a Joke 1
The last divisions of the “longer way” of the first Diaeresis
265E-266C hardly can be meant seriously The Stranger says
that the young Socrates and Theaetetus need to divide up –
literally ‘tear open’ -- the nurturing of hornless land-dwelling
herd animals. (There’s a problem with dogs because they travel
in packs when wild, but singly or severally with human beings
when tame.) But especially funny is the comparison of fourfooted animals to the square root of four and two-footed
animals to the square root of two. As Rosen points out this is a
Platonic joke. (Two-footed land animals are ‘irrational’ like √2).
And especially a joke or joke-like is the Visitor calling human
beings “the noblest and laziest race” (266B10-C6) playing on
the word for ‘pig.’
1. Indebted to Stanley Rosen for these observations. See Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s
Statesman: The Web of Politics, (South Bend, IN: St, Augustine’s Press, 2009), pp.
34-35.
End of (Diaeresis) I (p. 308, 267B-C) Is a Joke 1
“The shorter way” (266D-267A) – the last revision in the first
Diaeresis -- also seems to be ironical. The shorter way takes for
granted that human beings are the only two-footed featherless
animals, drops the main condition of the political art as a tender
of human beings and inserts that the political leader holds the
reins of the city. This suggests a comparison between human
beings and horses. So we end up with the conclusion that the
royal and political art is the pastoral science of unmixed
breeders, a herding of two-footed animals.
1. Again adapted from Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics, (South
Bend, IN: St, Augustine’s Press, 2009), pp. 34-35.
The Statesman Diaeresis I is an Example of the
Misapplication the Method of Division in the
Determination of a Type .1
The progress of the first application definition by Division,
Diaeresis I, in the Statesman methodically demonstrates the
misapplication of this manner of analysis. Each forward
division step is revealed to be a step backward; admitted to be a
failure; and, the correction of errors are made through further
errors. The goal of the Method of Division is to uncover a
natural and conceptual order. But this sequence of division
relies on a freakish system of distinctions. Commentators find
fundamental Socratic irony
The Statesman Diaeresis I is an Example of the
Misapplication the Method of Division in the
Determination of a Type1
[from previous slide]
in the Early and Middle Plato Dialogues with little exception
have been able to find irony in the Statesman. Few
commentators allow Plato the same rhetorical complexity in this
later dialogue. One of the few who reads the Statesman giving
Plato the license to irony in the Statesman is Rosen. Rosen
writes about Diaeresis I: “Philosophy is transformed into
technology and the doctrine of Ideas into ideology. Platonism is
then indistinguishable from the late-modern version of the
Enlightenment, according to which humans make themselves.”
1. Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics, (South Bend, IN:
St, Augustine’s Press, 2009), p. 36.
The Incompleteness of Diaeresis I: the Introduction of
the Myth of a Forward and Backward Moving Cosmos
Immediately following his summary of Diaeresis I, the Visitor
says that the previous result of the Method of Division has not
been entirely successful (267C-D). In the case of the non-human
herds there seems to be one art – and type of person – capable
of caring for them. But in the case of human beings there are
numerous types of professionals and producers who nurture
people along with the statesman. There are for example,
merchants, farmers, grain producers, gymnasts and physicians
(2676-268A). In terms of Plato’s previous dialogues and his
later dialogues such as the Timaeus and the Philebus we should
also note that Diaeresis I of the Statesman is directed towards
the human animal. There is an avoidance of any knowledge or
technē that might be concerned with ‘the best’ or the Good. The
dialogue will finally arrive at the ‘Socratic ‘ conclusion. But the
initial investigation of the Visitor seems to methodically avoid it.
The Myth of the Statesman:
A Forward and
Backward-Moving Cosmos
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - I
Introduction
(268E-269C)
The Visitor refers to tales recounted by ancients. He
says many actually took place and will occur again.
(The Statesman myth bears comparison to
Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence of the Same.) The
Visitor mentions the account of the heavenly sign
marked upon the strife between Atreus and
Thyestes. The legend that the Visitor refers to is
about strife between two brothers Atreus and
Thyestes who fight over who should be king. Zeus
settles the dispute in preference of Atreus.
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos –I
Introduction
(268E-269C) [continued]
Zeus then changes the course of the sun and the
Pleiades as a sign of his decision. The Visitor in the
Statesman revises the legend. Instead of changing
the motion of the sun and the Pleiades, The Visitor
has Zeus changing the motion of the entire cosmos,
a motion which perpetually recurs. Hence forward
there is the epoch of the motion of the cosmos as we
know it, followed and preceded by its reversal. This
recurs perpetually. We’ll call the first the forward
epoch and the second the reverse epoch.
Ruins of Mycenae. Thought to be Atreus’ treasure or
perhaps Agamemnon’s tomb.
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - II
Description of Cosmic Motion (269C-270B)
The Visitor refers to the god who guides all. This would suggest
a Demiurge. Neither Zeus the ‘Forward Epoch’ god nor
Cronus the ‘Reverse Epoch’ god will qualify since they operate
within their specific epochs. Some overriding Demiurge guides
the cosmos which is described as possessing a body and being
alive. The Visitor describes the Reverse Epoch in which things
become younger. Humans and animals who are previously dead
are resurrected from the earth at the point of their death and
then they become younger entering into middle age, youth, and
infancy until they become seeds and are sewn in the earth. The
rejuvenation is described as a process of unraveling, so mental
and perceptual processes unravel as well. To the extent there is
any knowledge it is subject to a process of forgetting.
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - III
Consequences of Reverse Cosmic Motion (270B – 271C)
Most animals and especially humans cannot sustain the process
of the reversal of becoming younger. The Reverse Epoch begins
when the cosmos has undergone the final period of the
Forward Epoch which was the last stages of destruction an
decay. The cosmic reversal is a kind of purgation – perhaps an
ancient version of modern theories of revolution which
maintain that current civilization must be destroyed – or
largely destroyed -- before a fair and just society may be
inaugurated. Rosen observes that during this period the
Platonic Ideas or Forms must remain particularly in the
background because nothing is keeping “its look,” its eidos or
form since everything in becoming younger is changing and
unravelling.1
1. Quoted from Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics,
(South Bend, IN: St, Augustine’s Press, 2009), p. 49.
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - IV
The Reverse Epoch is Ruled by Cronus (271C – 272B)
Hesiod: Works and Days (109ff.):
“’The deathless ones who dwell upon Olympus first made the
golden race of articulate human beings. These belong to the time
of Kronos, when he was king in heaven. They lived like gods with
a careless spirit, far from pains and misery. Nor did miserable
old age approach them.’ For these residents of the golden age,
death was like a falling asleep. They did no work; all goods were
theirs by nature’s bounty. This race was followed by the silver
race who enjoyed a childhood of one hundred years, followed by
a brief adulthood marked by by crime and an absence of divine
worship. They were destroyed by Zeus. The third race, produced
by Zeus, is that of bronze and consists of warriors. The heroes
make up the fourth race, and we ourselves are the fifth race who
inhabit the age of iron.” 1. As summarized by Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s
Statesman: The Web of Politics, (South Bend, IN: St, Augustine’s Press, 2009),
Homeric
Kings
were
likened to
shepherds
The "Agamemnon" Mask, Gold, from Tomb V at Mycenae,
Sixteenth century BC, National Archeological Museum, Athens.
Agamemnon is referred to repeatedly in the Iliad as “shepherd
of the people.” See Iliad, Book IV, 295, 413.
Cronus & Rhea, Athenian red-figure pelike, circa 5th B.C., M
The Era of Cronos (Statesman 268d–275c)
Lucas Cranach the Elder, The Golden Age
Joachim Wtewael, The Golden Age
Lucas Cranach the Elder, The Silver Age
Virgil Solus, (1514 - 1562)
The Iron Age
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - IV
The Reverse Epoch is Ruled by Cronus (271C – 272B)
The Reverse Epoch, which is ruled by Cronus in Plato’s myth,
has similarities to the Golden Age described by Hesiod, but there
are many differences. Cronus is the shepherd of all humans. The
reference to Cronus as a shepherd is very likely meant to make
puerile conceiving the art of statesmanship as a kind of
shepherding. Animals and humans in the Reverse Epoch and
humans are blissful but also increasingly ignorant. Cronus
shepherds humans. Every herd of animals is shepherded by a
daimon. There is no meat eating, no war, no sedition. People eat
fruit and of course continue to become younger. They have “no
political constitutions, nor acquired wives and children, for all of
them came back to life from the earth, remembering nothing of
the past.” (pp. 314-5, 271E-272A)
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - V
Speculation About The Age of Cronus (272B– 272D)
In this short section, the Visitor says that “if the nurslings of
Cronus” have speech and use it to gather wisdom there lives will
be “far more fortunate than those who live now.” But “if they
spend their time gorging themselves with food and drink and
exchanging stories with each other and and with the animals of
the sort even now are told about them, this too, if I may reveal
how it seems to me, is a matter that is easily judged.” (p. 314,
272D). This would seem to be another Platonic irony, since this
myth is can be thought of as an ‘exchanging of stories.’ Further
Plato is ironically portraying the condition of what it would like
to be utterly controlled by some superior being, even if the being
is benevolent. It’s a Garden of Eden without the Tree of
Knowledge and in Plato’s construct without Eros.
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - VI
Rotation from Reverse Epoch to Forward Epoch (272D– 273E)
We recall the cosmos has its own life and unity. Once the
shepherd-like rule of Cronus had brought the earthborn humans
to a fully blissful and peaceful if vegetable-like state “ . . . The
steersman of the universe, let go, -- as it were – of the bar of the
steering oars and retired to his observation post; and as the for
the cosmos, its allotted and innate desire turned it back again in
its opposite direction.” (pp. 314-5; 272E) This produced a great
tremor which in turn brings about another destruction of all sorts
of living things, but in time “. . . It set itself in order, into the
accustomed course that belongs to it, itself taking charge of and
mastering both the things within it and itself.” But the
accustomed order in the long run finally returns again to selfdestruction and the whole process of reversing time and
rejuvenation recycles again, “… rendering it immortal and
ageless.” (p. 315, 273E).
Myth of a Forward and
Backward Moving Cosmos - VII
Point of the Myth (273E-274E)
“We are now at the point that our account has all along been
designed to reach. . . . Everything that has helped to establish
human life has come from these things, once care from the gods,
as has just been said, ceased to be available to human beings, and
they had to live their lives through human resources and take
care for themselves, just like the cosmos as a whole, which we
imitate and follow for all time, now living and growing in this
way, now in the way we did then. As for the matter of our story,
let it now be ended, and we shall put it to use in order to see how
great our mistake was when we gave our account of the expert in
kingship and statesmanship in our preceding argument.”
What the Main Errors of Diaeresis I?
The Younger Socrates asks and the Visitor Responds
(274E-275A, p. 316)
YOUNG SOCRATES: So how do you say we made a mistake and how great
was it?
VISITOR: In one way it was lesser, in another way it was very high-minded,
and much greater and more extensive than the other case.
YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
VISITOR: In that when asked for a king and statesman from the period of the
present mode of rotation and generation we replied with a shepherd from the
opposite period, who cared for the herd that existed then, and at that a god
instead of a mortal – in that way we went very astray. But in that we revealed
him as ruling over the whole city together, without specifying what manner his
does so, in this way, by contrast, what we said was true but incomplete and
unclear, which is why our mistake was lesser than in the respect just
mentioned.”
Preliminary Pass at a Definition of the Statesman
276D-277A, pp. 318-319
VISITOR: First of all, as we are saying we should have altered
the name, aligning it more with caring for things than with
rearing, and then we should have cut this; for it will still offer
cuts of no small size.
YOUNG SOCRATES: When would they be?
VISITOR: I imagine, where we would have divided off the
divine herdsman, on o0ne side, and the human carer on the
other.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Correct.
VISITOR: But again we ought to have cut into two the art of
the carer resulting from this appointment.
YOUNG SOCRATES: By using what distinction?
VISITOR: That between the enforced and the voluntary.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Why so?
Preliminary Pass at a Definition of the Statesman
276D-277A, pp. 318-319 [continued]
VISITOR: I think we made a mistake before in this way too, by behaving
more simple-mindedly than we should have. We put king and tyrant into
the same category, when both they themselves and the manner of their rule
are very unlike one another.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
VISITOR: But now we should set things to rights again, and, as I said,
should we divide the expertise of the human carer into two, by using the
categories of the enforced and the voluntary?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Absolutely
VISITOR: And should we perhaps call tyrannical the expertise that relates
to subjects who are forced, and the herd-keeping that is voluntary and
relates to willing two-footed living things that expertise which belongs to
statesmanship, displaying, in his turn, the person who has expertise and
cares for his subjects in this way as being genuine king and subject?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, visitor, and it’s likely that in this way our
exposition concerning the statesman would reach its completion.
Filling out the Sketch
VISITOR: “ . . . We took upon ourselves an astonishing mass
of material in the story we told, so forcing ourselves to use a
greater part than was necessary; thus we have made our
exposition longer, and have in every way failed to apply a
finish to our story, and our account, just like a portrait, seems
adequate in its superficial outline, but not yet to have received
its proper clarity, as it were with paints and the mixing
together of colors. But it is not painting or any other sort of
manual craft, but speech and discourse, that constitute the
more fitting medium for exhibiting all living things, for those
who are able to follow; for the rest, it will be through manual
crafts.”1
1. It seems then somewhat arrogant of the Visitor proceeds
through the analogy of manual crafts, weaving and clothesmaking.
The Paradigm of Weaving in the Statesman
(279B, p. 321)
“VISITOR: So what model, involving the same activities
[pragmateia] as statesmanship, on a very small scale, could one
compare with it, and so discover in a satisfactory way what we
are looking for? By Zeus what do you think? If there isn’t
anything else at and, well, what about weaving? Do you want us
to choose that? Not all of it, if you agree, since perhaps the
weaving of cloth from wool will suffice; maybe it is part of it, if
we choose it, which would provide testimony if we want.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I’ve certainly no objection.
The Paradigm of Weaving in the Statesman
The Visitor does say (285E, p. 329):
“I certainly don’t suppose that anyone with any sense would
want to hunt down the definition of weaving for the sake of
weaving itself.”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
How is Weaving like Statesmanship
(279B, p. 321)
The Visitor says they are both activities or ‘pragmateia’. This
word should be distinguished from knowledge: epistēmē or
gnōstikē. It means diligence in business or in a practice.
Pragmateia as ‘applied study’ is halfway between knowledge
and practice.1
Weaving like good politics provides protection against nature.
Clothes in general are to the body as the polis is to the citizen.
Statesmanship like weaving depends on other arts.
An analogy is drawn between the warp or hard threads and
the spirited or hard-souled citizens and between the woof and
soft threads and then gentle citizens. Various weaves are
various blends of the two types of character.
1. Thanks again to Rosen for this characterization of pragmateia. Rosen, Stanley,
Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics, (South Bend, IN: St, Augustine’s Press, 2009),
p. 101.
Raw wool that has been carded and made into ‘rolags’’
Woman spinning. Detail from an Ancient Greek attic
white-ground oinochoe, ca. 490 BC, from Locri, Italy.
British Museum, London..
‘Weft’ and ‘woof’ are Old English words for ‘woven.’
The Art of Measurement
Its Two Types and the Assessment of
Moral/Aesthetic/Political value
283B-287A, pp. 327-330
The Eleatic Visitor, considering whether he’s been going on too
long, takes up a discussion of two kinds of measurement.
(metrētikē). The first accords with the ordinary concept of
measurement. We measure “number, lengths, depths, breadths
and things in relation to what is opposed to them.” (284E, p. 328).
“what is opposed to them’ implies some standard which is not
being measure, but which is a criterion for the measuring, as a,
inch foot or a mile – millimeter, kilometer -- might be for length,
depth and breadth.
The Art of Measurement:
Its Two Types and the Assessment of
Moral/Aesthetic/Political value
283B-287A, pp. 327-330
[continued from previous slide]
But the second type of measurement is the distinction, with very
significant revision, that will become Aristotle’s notion of virtue
as a mean between an excess and a deficiency. The Visitor
introduces the notion by saying (283E, p. 326): “What about
this: shan’t we also say that there really is such a thing as what
exceeds in due measure [πρὸς τὸ μέτριον, pros to metrion]1, and
everything of that sort, in what we say or what we do? Isn’t it
just in respect that those of us who are bad and those of us who
are good most differ?
YOUNG SOCRATES: It seems so.
1. πρὸς τὸ μέτριον, pros to metrion which Rowe translates as ‘due measure’ is
literally translated as ‘toward the mean.’
The Art of Measurement
283B-287A, pp. 327-330
[continued from previous slide]
VISITOR: In that case we must lay it down that the great and the small exist
and are objects of judgment in these twin ways. It is not as we said just before,
that we must suppose them to exist only in relation to each other. But rather as
we have just now said, we should speak of their existing in one way in relation
to each other, and in another in relation to what is in due measure. Do we want
to know why?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
VISITOR: If someone will admit will admit the existence of the greater and
everything of the sort in relation to nothing other than the less,1 it will never be
in relation to what is in due measure – you agree?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
1. NOTE: The visitor apparently doesn’t have the vocabulary to speak of parameters
of measurement, such, meters, pounds, degrees of Centigrade, miles per hour, etc. , but
his meaning is clear enough: we measure something by a lesser part of it, a degree
Centigrade is an increment – lesser part – of heat, etc. But ‘due measure’ as in the
sweater or shoe is the right size is something quite different. And Plato’s goal is clearly
not to apply due measure to crafts but to find the due measure between an excess and
and a deficiency in the actions of a statesman.
The Art of Measurement
283B-287A, pp. 327-330
[continued from previous slide]
VISITOR: Well, with this account of things we shall destroy – shan’t we? –
both the various sorts of expertise themselves and their products, and in
particular we shall make the one we are looking for now, statesmanship,
disappear, and the one we said was weaving. For I imagine all sorts of
expertise guard against what is more and less than what is in due measure, not
as something which is not, but as something which is and is troublesome in
relation to what they do. It is by preserving measure in this way that they
produce all the good and fine things they produce.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
VISITOR: If, then, we make the art of statesmanship disappear, our search
after that for the knowledge of kingship will lack any way forward?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very much so.
1. NOTE: Unlike Aristotle, Plato applies the mean, as the ‘due measure,’ not only to
the moral virtues but to acts of human production, to studied skills, to technai in
general.
The Art of Measurement
283B-287A, pp. 325-330
[continued from previous slide]
VISITOR: Is it the case then just as with the sophist we compelled what is not
into being as well as what is, when our argument escaped us down the route,
so now we must compel the more and less, in their turn, to become measurable
not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to the coming into being
of what is due measure? For if this has not been agreed, it is certainly not
possible for either the statesman or anyone else who possesses knowledge of
practical subjects to acquire an undisputed existence.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Then now too we much do as much as we can.
VISITOR: This task, Socrates, is even greater than the former one – and we
remember what the length of that was. Still, it’s very definitely fair to propose
the following hypothesis about the subject in question.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What’s that?
The Art of Measurement
283B-287A, pp. 325-330
[continued from previous slide]
VISITOR: That at some time we shall need what I referred to just now for
the sort of demonstration what would be commensurate with the precise
truth itself. But so far as concerns what is presently being shown, quite
adequately for our immediate purpose, the argument we are using seems
to me to come to our aid in a magnificent fashion. Namely, we should
surely suppose that it is similarly the case that all the various sorts of
expertise exist, and at the same time that greater and less are measured
not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the coming into
being of what is in due measure. For if the latter is the case, then so is the
former, and also if it is the case that the sorts of expertise exist, the other is
the case too. But if one or the other is not the case, then neither of them
will ever be.
YOUNG SOCRATES: This much is right, but what’s the next move after
this?
The Art of Measurement
283B-287A, pp. 325-330
[continued from previous slide]
VISITOR: It’s clear that we should divide the art of
measurement, cutting it in two in just the way we said,
positing as one part of it, all those sorts of expertise that
measure number, lengths, depths, breadths and speeds of
things in relation what is opposed to them, and as the other,
all those that measure in relation to what is due measure,
what is fitting, the right moment, what is as it ought to be –
everything that removes itself from the extremes to the
middle.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Each of the two sections you refer to is
indeed a large one, and very different from the other.
Cut to Final Definition of the Statesman
(304A, p. 248-9) “VISITOR: Well, is seems that in the same
way we have now separated off those things that are different
from the expert knowledge of statesmanship, and those that
are alien and hostile to it, and there remain those that are
precious and related to it. Among those, I think, are
generalship, the art of the judge and that part of rhetoric
which in partnership with kingship persuades people of what
is just and so helps in steering through the business of cities. .
. .”
[continued]
Cut to Final Definition of the Statesman
continued from previous slide]
(305A, p. 351) “VISITOR: If then one looks at all the sorts of
expert knowledge that have been discussed, it must be
observed that none of them has been declared to be
statesmanship. For which is really kingship must not itself
perform practical tasks, but control them with the capacity to
perform them, because it knows when it is the right time to
begin and set in motion the most important things in cities,
and when it is the wrong time, and the others must do what
has been prescribed for them.”
Niccolò Machiavelli
{1469 –1527)
Niccolò Machiavelli
{1469 –1527)
Niccolò Machiavelli and the problem
of the traditional moral virtues if
practiced by a political leader.
The Prince
From Chapter XV
“Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things
concerning a prince, and discussing those which
are real, I say that all men when they are spoken
of, and chiefly princes for being more highly
placed, are remarkable for some of those qualities
which bring them either blame or praise;
and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, . .
one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one
compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate
and cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another
haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another
cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous;
one religious, another unbelieving, and the like.”
The Prince
From Chapter XV [continued]
“And I know that every one will confess that it
would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit
all the above qualities that are considered good;
but because they can neither be entirely possessed
nor observed, for human conditions do not permit
it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent
that he may know how to avoid the reproach of
those vices which would lose him his state; and
also to keep himself, if it be possible, from those
which would not lose him it; but this not being
possible, he may with less hesitation abandon
himself to them.”
The Prince
From Chapter XVI — Concerning Liberality And
Meanness – selection
“Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among
men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no
attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus
inclined will consume in such acts all his property,
and will be compelled in the end if he wish to
maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people,
and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This will
soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he
will be little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having
offended many and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first
trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the first danger;
recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he
runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.”
The Prince
From Chapter XVI — Concerning Liberality And
Meanness – selection [continued]
“Either you are a prince in fact, or in a way to
become one. In the first case this liberality is
dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be
considered liberal; and Caesar was one of those
who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome;
but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not
moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his
government. . . . And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as
liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to
do so, and so become either poor or despised, or else, in
avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince should
guard himself, above all things, against being despised and
hated; and liberality leads you to both. “
The Prince
Chapter XVII — Concerning Cruelty And Clemency,
And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared -selections
“Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects
united and loyal, ought not to mind the
reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful
than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from
which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole
people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the
individual only. . . . And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince1
to avoid the imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of
dangers.” [Emphasis added]
1. Many commentators have argued that with The Prince Machiavelli
addresses a state in a highly weakened an corrupt state that needs
extraordinary methods to restore itself. Consider: "In fact, when there is
combined under the same constitution a prince, a nobility, and the power
of the people, then these three powers will watch and keep each other
reciprocally in check." Book I, Chapter II, Discourses on Livy.
The Prince
Chapter XVII — Concerning Cruelty And Clemency,
And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared -selections
“Upon this a question arises: whether it be
better to be loved than feared or feared
loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both,
but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is
much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either
must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in
general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false,
cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours
entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, and
children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but
when it approaches they turn against you.
The Prince
Chapter XVII — Concerning Cruelty And Clemency,
And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared -selections
And that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has
neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships
that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or
nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not
secured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men
have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who
is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which,
owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity
for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of
punishment which never fails.
The Prince
Chapter XVII — Concerning Cruelty And Clemency,
And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared -selections
Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that,
if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can
endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will
always be as long as he abstains from the property of his
citizens and subjects and from their women. But when it is
necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he
must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but
above all things he must keep his hands off the property of
others, because men more quickly forget the death of their
father than the loss of their patrimony.
The Prince
Chapter XVII — Concerning Cruelty And Clemency,
And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared -selections
Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never
wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will
always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but
reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to
find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and
has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite
necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for
without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to
its duties.
The Prince
Chapter XVII — Concerning Cruelty And Clemency,
And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared -selections
....
“Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to
the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will
and fearing according to that of the prince, a wise prince
should establish himself on that which is in his own control
and not in that of others; he must endeavour only to avoid
hatred, as is noted.”
The Prince
Chapter XVIII(*) — Concerning The Way In Which
Princes Should Keep Faith
(*) "The present chapter has given greater offence than any
other portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il
Principe," p. 297.
. . . Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith
when such observance may be turned against him, and when
the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men
were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because
they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not
bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting
to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance.
Of this endless modern examples could be given, showing how
many treaties and engagements have been made void and of
no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has
known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.
The Prince
Chapter XVIII(*) — Concerning The Way In Which
Princes Should Keep Faith
(*) "The present chapter has given greater offence than any
other portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il
Principe," p. 297.
. . . But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this
characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler;
and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities,
that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will
allow himself to be deceived.
Alexander never did what he said,
Cesare never said what he did.
(Italian Proverb.)
The Prince
Chapter XVIII(*) — Concerning The Way In Which
Princes Should Keep Faith
(*) "The present chapter has given greater offence than any
other portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il
Principe," p. 297.
Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good
qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear
to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have
them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to
appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful,
humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so
framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able
and know how to change to the opposite.
The Prince
Chapter XVIII(*) — Concerning The Way In Which
Princes Should Keep Faith
(*) "The present chapter has given greater offence than any
other portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il
Principe," p. 297.
“And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a
new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are
esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to
act contrary to fidelity,(*) friendship, humanity, and religion.
Therefore it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn
itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force
it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he
can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set
about it.”
The Prince
Chapter XIX — That One Should Avoid Being Despised
And Hated
“Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is
made above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the
others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the
prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to
avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible;
and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled
his part, and he need not fear any danger in other
reproaches.”
The Prince
Chapter XIX — That One Should Avoid Being Despised
And Hated
“It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be
rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of
his subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when
neither their property nor their honor is touched, the majority
of men live content, and he has only to contend with the
ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.”
The Prince
Chapter XIX — That One Should Avoid Being Despised
And Hated
“It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,
effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a
prince should guard himself as from a rock; and he should
endeavour to show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity,
and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his subjects let
him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain
himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to
deceive him or to get round him.”
Slide #4; portrait of
Napoleon,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon#mediaviewer/File:JacquesLouis_David_-_The_Emperor_Napoleon_in_His_Study_at_the_Tuileries__Google_Art_Project.jpg
Slide #5, photograph of Barack Obama:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama#mediaviewer/File:President_Barack_
Obama.jpg
Slide #7: schema of first two diaereses in Plato’s Statesman:
http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/data/13030/gn/ft2199n7gn/figures/ft219
9n7gn_00009.gif
Slide #16: photograph of ruins of Mycenae: http://www.greekmythsgreekmythology.com/the-royal-house-of-the-atreids-in-mycenae/
slide #20: photograph of gold mask of Agamemnon:
http://www.artchive.com/artchive/G/greek/agamemnon.jpg.html
Slide #21: Vase painting portraying Cronus: http://www.johnuebersax.com/plato/myths/statesman.htm
Slide #22: Cranach painting: Golden Age of Man: http://creativityandhealingkalina.blogspot.com/2012/06/golden-age-ages-of-man-in-mythology-and.html
Slide #25, etching fy Virgil Solis of the Iron Age:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Virgil_Solis_-_Iron_Age.jpg
Slide # 34, photograph of carded wool made into a ‘rolag’ and ready for spinning:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carding#mediaviewer/File:Rolag.jpg
Slide #35, woman spinning and drawn on 5th century B. C. vase:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hand_spinning#mediaviewer/File:Woman_spinning_
BM_VaseD13.jpg
Slide #37, and following, portrait of Machiavelli:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli