1
INTRODUCTION
The reality of Syrians entering and residing in Jordan as a result of the ongoing Syrian
war carries substantial political weight for the Jordanian state. King Abdullah II has repeatedly
called for a “diplomatic solution to the conflict,”1 affirming Jordan’s neutral position and
choosing to maintain at least the semblance of diplomatic ties with Bashar al-Assad’s
government. Nonetheless, within its borders, Jordan has, until recently, extended a “generous”
hand toward Syrian civilians and fighters opposing al-Assad's government alike.
Outside the diplomatic sphere, similar contradictions appear in the kingdom’s domestic
policies. Since the uprisings in several Arab countries began at the end of 2010, the Jordanian
Parliament has passed a mixture of legislature, some of which has addressed sources of
grievance (corruption and government opaqueness) while others have strengthened measures to
uproot sources of political opposition and contention.2 To be sure, Jordan’s heavy-handed
approach to governance has come to dominate its strategies for controlling emerging Syrian
refugee communities within its borders. State treatment of refugees increasingly reflects Jordan’s
various security concerns, namely the rising risks involved in maintaining open borders and in
providing indiscriminate humanitarian care to Syria’s war victims. This change comes in spite
of, or perhaps even a result of, Jordan’s continued call for foreign assistance (mainly European
non-governmental organizations and US foreign aid) to address the security and humanitarian
crisis on its hands as a result of the nearby Syrian war.
Jalal Al Husseini, “La Jordanie face à la crise syrienne.” In Pas de printemps pour la Syrie, (Paris: La
Découverte, 2013) p.282.
2
Ryan Curtis. “Jordan’s Unfinished Journey: Parliamentary Elections and the State of Reform” Project on
the Middle East Security Brief. March 2013. Online.
1
2
This is not the first time that Jordan’s domestic and foreign policies have been at odds.
Across various regional crises, Jordanian politicians have justified state actions as “neutral
arbitration” between the diplomatic interests of neighboring governments on the one hand and
the humanitarian needs of refugee populations from those countries on the other. The case of
Jordan hosting a large population of Syrian refugees throughout the protracted Syrian war
provides yet another example of the kingdom’s adeptness in navigating these demands and in
aligning them within its own state capacities and interests.
My case study of Syrian refugees demonstrates how urban Syrian communities in Jordan
surmount state-imposed restrictions on their interests and activities by operating through
informal community networks. Through surveying the various activities and informal institutions
that Syrians have established in Jordan over the past two summers, I observed an interesting shift
in their objectives. It is clear that over the four years that Syrian refugees have settled in Jordan,
they have relied on social networks in order to meet the immediate needs of the members of their
communities. However, as Syrian refugees have entered their fifth year of exile due to the
ongoing civil war, Syrians have increasingly come to envision their stay in Jordan as long-term.
Not only is this new reality reflected in the objectives of Syrian informal organizations and larger
NGO’s, but also more distinctly in the Jordanian state’s refugee policies, both toward Syrian
individuals and collectivities. Indeed, the proliferation of concerns stemming from the
degenerating conditions inside Syria and Iraq and, by extension, from hosting Syrian refugees
long-term in Jordan, has forced the Jordanian government to change its position on Syrian affairs
almost across the board. Whereas Jordan’s subtle interest in supporting a moderate Syrian
opposition first guided its treatment of Syrian refugees and political and military representatives,
it is apparent from the changes in its (some codified, some uncodified) policies since mid-2014
3
that Jordan increasingly prioritizes its own security, economy, societal harmony, political
stability, and so on. Jordan’s approach to the prolonged Syrian war follows suit of its neighbors
who have also been deeply impacted by the instability of the war and the refugee crisis. As I
propose, it also reflects the concerns raised by the Global War on Terror and the new face of the
modern, securitized, authoritarian state.
This type of research connects to different genres of social science inquiry.
Understanding my case study as a continuation (in some form) of ongoing discourses in Political
Anthropology and the genre of people’s politics, as I detail in Chapter 2, is important for
identifying where and how my case study contributes to these literatures. Proceeding to Chapter
3, I turn my focus specifically to Jordan, beginning with an outline of Jordanian history since the
establishment of the kingdom in 1946. In order to understand Jordan’s evolving treatment of the
newest wave of refugees in its borders, it is also crucial to understand the context into which
Syrian refugees entered. This chapter should give the reader a sense of Jordan’s susceptibility to
various regional events throughout the decades that have continuously pushed new refugee
populations into the country, each with different consequences on Jordanian identity and country
formation. Chapter 4 then moves into a discussion of the development of Jordan as an
authoritarian state, particularly the rise of its security and intelligence apparatus and its
politically repressive policies. One can use this discussion to situate Jordan’s current political
climate in the unstable era of the (post) “Arab Spring” as another way of understanding the
recent changes in Jordanian policy toward Syrian refugees. This leads into a detailed history of
the conflict under discussion, Syria’s civil war, in Chapter 5. I explain the conflict up to the
present in light of Jordan’s tumultuous history with Syria and the evolution of Jordan’s stance
toward Syrian affairs, particularly its treatment of Syrian refugees, since 2011. With this
4
understanding, I move into the content of my own case study in Chapter 6. Here I describe the
on-the-ground conditions for urban Syrian refugees in Jordan by shining a light on a handful of
community leaders who struggle to pursue their interests while continuously interacting with the
host country, both in collaborative and restrictive ways. I then focus specifically on the recent
shift in codified and uncodified Jordanian policies toward Syrian urban refugee communities and
provide analysis for these shifts. The Conclusion is a continuation of this analysis, tying the
phenomena in Jordan to wider regional changes and to the international move toward state
securitization. However, in order to begin investigating any of these matters, it is of foremost
importance that I first establish my original interest in this topic, my qualifications to conduct
such an investigation, and how I went about studying its many constitutive aspects, as I will
detail in Chapter 1.
CHAPTER 1
Methods and Positionality
An undergraduate student conducting fieldwork in Syrian Refugee Communities
I was an upcoming junior at Swarthmore College, where I study Political Science and
Islamic Studies, the first time I travelled to Jordan. It was the summer of 2013, and I was given a
generous grant to study with the University of Virginia’s Arabic program at Yarmouk University
in the northern city of Irbid. Irbid has one of the highest concentrations of urban Syrian refugees
in Jordan, and I interacted with this reality daily. Syrian children and women lined University
5
Street selling gum, clothing, or simply begging. Locals complained to me about skyrocketing
housing prices and overcrowded schools that resulted from the sudden influx of large numbers of
Syrian refugees in Irbid.
By assisting with Ramadan programs for Jordanian and Syrian children at an Irbid youth
volunteer organization, I came in contact with several Syrian social workers. They work to
facilitate the integration of Syrian refugees who have varying degrees of need when they arrive
in Irbid. I accompanied one social worker on her visit to flats for wounded Free Syrian Army
fighters. Through visits like this, I learned about the social networks that provide assistance and
connect members of Irbid’s Syrian community. For example, I observed that these networks
provide opportunities for financially secure Syrians to assist injured civilians or fleeing refugees
in finding places of treatment and refuge in Jordan.
I presented the interviews I conducted with the founder of one of these housing units to the
Institute for Research and Study of the Arab and Muslim World (l’IREMAM). With their
support and that of the J. Roland Pennock Fellowship in Public Affairs, I returned to Jordan in
the summer of 2014 to study these social networks in depth for my upcoming thesis.
The research design for this project underwent rigorous evaluation by Swarthmore
College’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). The protocol for this research included measures for
protecting the anonymity of all participants and for reducing the risks of coercion or exploitation
in recruiting and in interviewing participants.
I began my fieldwork in the summer of 2014 knowing of only a couple of housing units
in Irbid. However, the social workers and doctors I met during the previous year introduced me
to other Syrians activists in Irbid and other cities who were interested in contributing to my
6
research. My connections to and familiarity with the Syrian communities in different cities grew
throughout these five weeks and facilitated my research.
The case study presented here is the result of fieldwork in cities in north Jordan: Amman,
Irbid, Zarqa, and Ramtha. My fieldwork comprised of visits to various community centers (a
civil registry center and five centers for women and children), four hospitals, two clinics, and
four rehabilitation centers. Among the Syrian individuals that participated in my research were
four heads of clinics, eight doctors, two psychologists, three social workers, four founders of
NGOs, two artists, two actors, a human rights documenter, and a lawyer. They came from
Damascus and its countryside towns (Rif Dimashq) but mainly from the southern city and
countryside of Dera’a. They had varying religious views and levels of personal wealth. Most
came to Jordan after receiving direct or indirect threats from officials of Bashar al-Assad’s
regime, based on their perceived or explicit opposition to that regime. All of those I interviewed
had relatively secure financial situations and were committed in varying degrees to providing
goods or services to struggling Syrians, both in Jordan and in Syria.
On a smaller scale, I conducted interviews with Jordanian ministry officials at the
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor as well as with military officials I met at one of
Jordan’s border centers, the Ruba’ al-Sarhan, also known as the Joint Registration Center (with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Through my visits to their offices and in
my interviews with them, I was able to probe into the logic behind specific policies that they
were willing to discuss. Where my questions were not answered, I was able to discern which
aspects of the state’s policies were politically sensitive, and with further research, why this was
the case.
7
The decision to study Jordanian refugee policies through interviews with members of
urban Syrian refugee communities upholds this research’s main objective—recovering the lost
voices that are not frequently represented in official sources and documents. I began this project
by going through a wide array of press sources (from the Jordanian government and prominent
Arab publications) to understand how different types of coverage portray Jordan’s policies
toward Syrian refugees. I then compared this information to the reports of international nongovernmental organizations that are working with Syrian communities in Jordan. Interviews and
participant observation served to validate or discredit official government statements and the
compiled data presented in the NGO reports I studied. While these methods are not easily
reproducible, speaking with members of communities affected by certain government policies
allows the researcher to measure the extent or reach of related government policies as they are
really enacted on the ground.
The general research protocol went as follows: I visited most of the sites in my fieldwork
more than once, accompanied by an interpreter, a male Jordanian university student with
excellent translating skills. During the first visit, I would introduce myself and explain my
experience working with Syrian communities in Jordan, the motives for my research, and the
nature of the interview. When potential participants responded favorably, the interpreter and I
would read them an oral informed consent agreement3 (approved once again by the IRB). By
seeking oral rather than written consent, I avoided collecting identifying information on
participants. The oral consent form outlined the benefits, risks, confidentiality, and sharing of
results of the research and affirmed the participant’s right to decline participation at any time. If I
obtained oral consent, I scheduled a time to meet the participant. All participants preferred to
3
See Appendix (Figure 4 and 5) for copy of oral consent form used during site visits
8
conduct the interview on the site where they worked, for example, in the offices of their
community centers, hospitals, or clinics. I audio-recorded most of the interviews, but a handful
of times, I simply took notes, per the participant’s request. I did not collect identifiable
information on any participant, however some chose to give me pseudonyms, which I did record.
In order to responsibly conduct my research, I had to exercise discretion and caution in
the spaces I visited and during the interviews I conducted throughout my fieldwork. This is
because Syrian refugee community leaders, despite their relatively stable situation in Jordan
now, are still coming out of the troubling context of recent events in Syria. Even before the
outbreak of civil war in Syria, many considered the country a “police state”, where rumors,
arrests, torture, and killings were the norm. The positions of Syrian community leaders in Jordan
are not altogether secure, given the often arbitrary nature of the enactment of laws in Jordan,
leaving many Syrian refugees feeling susceptible to harsh treatment (like being sent back to
refugee camps, incurring fines, and in extreme cases, deportation). I observed that many shared a
distrust of outsiders (non-Syrian refugees, and also those not from the region). The omnipresence
of the Jordanian mukhabarat (the intelligence apparatus) around the activities of Syrian refugees
only aggravates this distrust.
By extension, earning the trust of participants and gauging how I was perceived, not just
by participants but by all with whom I came in contact during my fieldwork, was also crucial.
My age (an undergraduate student) and my ties to the Syrian community (as a VenezuelanAmerican with no Arab origins) often perplexed participants. However, I was often able to offset
participant’s suspicions about me by emphasizing my interest in acquiring a comprehensive
understanding of the challenges faced by this community, my concern for safely conducting this
research, and for using this research not only for informative but for humanitarian uses (sharing
9
my research at donor events for various Syria-related NGOs) as well. My relative ease in
colloquial Arabic as well as having a local interpreter was undoubtedly an asset in presenting my
research and myself in a positive light.
Similarly, a concern that I faced as an outsider researcher in these communities is that my
presence and work within the communities might affect the dynamics that were in place before I
arrived. These communities are made up of tightly connected individuals who visit, work,
gossip, etc. with each other on almost a daily basis. I was conscious to distribute my time equally
among those I visited and otherwise maintained similarly close and uniformly good relations
with various members of the communities I worked with. In a similar vein, through my
fieldwork I became aware of the concerns that arise from allowing a select number of individuals
to speak on behalf of the different communities. Though time and sensitivity constraints
prevented me from engaging a larger, more representative segment of the different groups of
urban Syrian refugees, I do attempt to flag the various hierarchies and acknowledge the
differences in cultural capital among the individuals I encountered throughout my research.
The context around the Syrian communities I was studying—the suffering stemming
from the violence in Syria and all of its consequences, imbues this research. Hearing the tragic
personal stories of participants and others I encountered during this fieldwork was inevitable.
During my fieldwork visits, I often met people who asked for my assistance—usually
bureaucratic assistance like registering for UNHCR benefits or the tall order of procuring a visa
to Europe. It continues to be difficult to separate these personal interactions from the act of
conducting, recording, and analyzing research. This has undoubtedly fueled the obligation I feel
10
to make this research beneficial to these communities, and to have humanitarian as well as
academic uses.
CHAPTER 2
Situating My Case Study in the Literature
Analyzing the Hashemite Kingdom’s state-down responses to the presence and activities
of its Syrian population certainly falls within the purview of traditional Political Science inquiry.
Strictly applied, however, a traditional Political Science approach would fail to explain the
various ways in which the Jordanian state has responded to the conflict in Syria (and as the rise
of IS in Iraq and Syria) as well as to these conflicts’ many "spillover" consequences. The
analysis of the Jordanian government's responses to Syrian communities should actually begin at
the community level, this being the only way to observe and measure the full extent and nature
of Jordan's policies. In the same vain, focusing only on the state’s use of power ignores a crucial
factor in this equation, namely, Syrian refugees’ ongoing interactions with Jordan's policies and
institutions.
The common exclusion of community-level dynamics when adhering to the dominant
lines of inquiry in the field of Political Science suggests that such phenomena have little political
weight or investigative value. These macropolitical approaches often reduce conceptions of
power to the allocation of scarce resources4 or the ability to assert domination during conflicts of
interest between institutionalized actors.5 However, giving importance to the dynamics that occur
4
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis of politics. New
York: The Free Press. p. 47-48.
5
Lukes, Steven. 2005. Power: a radical view. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p.109.
11
in Jordan’s Syrian communities and in their interactions with the state actually brings Jordan,
these diaspora communities, and the informal networks they operate into an emerging and crucial
discussion of power.
The field of Political Science has evolved through the need for a broader conception of
what constitutes power and how power operates. Within its various sub-disciplines, particularly
political anthropology and comparative politics, the push to study power relations that operate at
all levels of state and society continues to gain traction. Michel Foucault's deconstructivist
approach to the study of power has had a significant influence on anthropologists, sociologists,
historians, and political scientists looking to expand the discourse on power by challenge the
insularity among their various disciplines. Particularly, Foucault's challenge "to look for power
literally everywhere,”6 has prompted ethnographers to track power in "hidden networks that
connect actors through increasingly globalized webs of influence, dependence, and assistance”7
Foucault’s framework on the decentralized and fluid workings of power continue to
influence the study of Anthropology. His work in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 revealed
power’s intimate and in many ways dialectical relationship to resistance, wherein one does not
exist without the other.8 Lila Abu-Lughod, in her close-up study of Bedouin women villagers,
chooses to explore the consequences of a reversal of one of Foucault’s most cited assertions. In
emphasizing that "where there resistance, there is power,"9Abu-Lughod’s work serves to rectify
romanticized notions of resistance and present resistance instead as an important indicator of
6
Jan Kubik, “Ethnography of Politics” in Political Ethnography: what immersion contributes to the study of power
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009) p.44.
7
Kubik, “Ethnography of Politics”, 44
8
Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité Vol. 1 (1976). Tran. Robert Hurley as The History of Sexuality
Volume 1: An Introduction (NY: Pantheon, 1978): pg 95.
9
Lila Abu-Lughod, "The romance of resistance: tracing transformations of power through Bedouin
women," American Ethnologist (1990): 41-55, accessed December 10, 2014. p. 42
12
often “overlooked instances of political phenomena.”10 Highlighting this redefinition of the
concept of "resistance" is not a commentary of the present case study, for I am not concerned
with classifying the actions of Syrian refugee activists within the various forms that resistance
can take. Rather, tracing the changing discourse on power demonstrates the growing trend of
studying everyday and local forms of power in close relation to its resistances. The study of
regular individuals using power in ways that they aren’t supposed to (i.e. participating in
resistance, or pursuing their interests through underground support networks)11 provides political
scientists with new perspectives on the nature and workings of power. Moreover, in this same
seminal piece, Abu-Lughod writes that the "contradictory details" in the "complex workings of
social power" permit the study of how "power relations are historically transformed—especially
with the introduction of forms and techniques of power characteristic of modern states." 12 This
insight has a direct bearing on another aspect of power, the state’s exclusionary practices and
employment of and surveillance methods for purposes of state control. In the current case study,
the Jordanian state controls Syrian communities through its state intelligence apparatus, as I
detail in Chapter 4. The move to study power as a multifaceted object of inquiry has generated
diversity among the case studies that now fall under the scope of Political Science. 13 Their study,
furthermore, requires innovative and diverse investigative methods, as I will now outline.
10
This turn of phrase comes from a discussion with my thesis advisor, Shervin Malekzadeh
Among the many examples of these studies, see:
Nancy Bermeo. 2003. Ordinary people in extraordinary times: the citizenry and the breakdown of democracy.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Also see: Asef Bayat. 2013. Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle East.
12
Abu-Lughod, Romance, 42
13
For example, see: David I. Kertzer, 1988. Ritual, politics, and power. New Haven: Yale University Press:
a discussion on the centrality of tradition and ritual in politics;
For a guide on the necessity of merging political science and anthropology frameworks in studying collective
identities,
11
13
Ethnographic applications to Political Science
Multi-method research responds to Political Science’s incorporation of new objects of
inquiry by applying quantitative and qualitative methods to the comprehensive study of power.
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Jürgen Habermas envisions a pursuit of knowledge that
breaks down the rigid walls between academic disciplines. Looking to the field of
psychoanalysis, he warns that the overemphasis on positivistic models can often distance the
analyst and the research object from the knowledge they are seeking. 14 Increasingly, Habermas
felt that qualitative approaches and small-n data were being lost to the focus on empiricism and
universalism. We see reflections of his interdisciplinary vision, deeply imbedded in human
interaction, in the emerging field of Political Ethnography, to which Anthropology and Political
Science lend their distinct methodologies. Ethnographic applications to Political Science,
specifically the emphasis on immersion, close observation, and interpretation, allow for the
intimate study of power structures and power relations. In her article “The Ethnography of
Politics,” Jan Kubik affirms that “by observing people up close, ethnographers can gauge the
‘structural’ limitations actors face, reconstruct the range of strategic choices they have, observe
their actual action, and assess its possibly transformative impact on structure.” 15 She goes on to
say that by tracing the why and how of circumstances and events on the individual-level,
ethnographers elucidate the “mechanisms of change” rather than its simple occurrence. One of
the many benefits of closely monitoring change is the ability to discern the threshold of what
constitutes “the political.” One can then ask under what circumstances an individual begins
see: Abdelal, Rawi. 2009. Measuring identity: a guide for social scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14
Habermas, Jürgen. 1971. Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.
15
Kubik, “Ethnography of Politics”, 33
14
acting in politically relevant ways.16 To this point particularly, Asef Bayat, another scholar
whose work has rightly challenged the boundaries of the political, might add that in the case of
non-institutionalized actors like those in this case study, the political threshold is determined by
what actors "consider as significant in themselves," though they may not necessarily intend "to
undermine political authority” or engage in resistance.17
Additionally, the constant evaluation of methodological approaches that prevails in the
field of Anthropology inspires a similar reflexivity within the field of Political Science. For
example, a researcher is increasingly held accountable for addressing the implications of the
researcher-participant relationship. Assessing one’s positionality when engaging in Political
Science fieldwork is crucial to understanding the information one records and analyzes. Yet
another development is the incorporation of subjective data (interviews, testimonials, etc.) in
Political Science research. Far from being at odds with empiricism, subjectivity in research acts
as a tool for extracting multiple layers of meaning. 18 Additionally, a “semiotic-practice based
approach” urges political scientists to reflect on the consequences of reifying hazily defined
terms and concepts (such as culture or race), thereby promoting a lexicon that more accurately
reflects diverse and nuanced realities. 19
Hence, the interpretive practice of semiotics is a cornerstone of Political Ethnography.
The production and interpretation of meaning is understood today as a key dimension of any
16
Dirks, Nicholas B., Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner. 1994. Culture/power/history: a reader in contemporary
social theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. p.32.
17
Asef Bayat. 1997. Street politics: poor people's movements in Iran. New York: Columbia University Press. p.8.
This is part of his theory on "quiet encroachment."
18
Joel Myron Aronoff and Jan Kubík. 2013. Anthropology & political science: a convergent approach. New York:
Berghahn Books. p.60.
19
Lisa Wedeen “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” The American Political Science
Review (2009): 713-728. p 726.
15
power structure. Lisa Wedeen’s discussion of performativity and the interviewer as an interpreter
is particularly relevant to the case study at hand and its reliance on interviews and testimonials.
On performativity, Wedeen asserts, “selves…do not exist, as if in some authentic mode,
independently of the actions by which they are constituted.”20 From this perspective, the
elements of an interview should be taken seriously for the (beyond literal) meanings that they do
convey, rather than disregarded for their less-than-objective nature. The researcher must consider
even a disingenuous testimonial as an important dimension of a narrative and must likewise
consider the reasons behind the distortion of facts. By extension, my own research asks why
Jordanian state officials’ reported versions of policies differed from those reported by Syrian
refugees in the communities affected by these policies. Understanding these discrepancies leads
to a more complete and nuanced understanding of their community-state dynamics.
Finally, ethnographic methods do not eschew the messy realities that researchers aim to
quantify and qualify. One of ethnography’s principal objectives is to situate the objects of
inquiry (or the human subjects of the study): to study the object of research as well as the
contextual layers in which it developed. When researching with human subjects, the researcher
strives to gain the perspective of the subject. The researcher (“outsider”) approaches full
understanding by inquiring into “the ways in which ‘insiders’ on the whole understand their
existence.”21 Wedeen rejects the notion that conclusions drawn from ethnographic research
20
Lisa Wedeen “Ethnography as Interpretive Enterprise” in Political Ethnography: what immersion contributes to
the study of power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009) p.87.
21
Edward Schatz, “Introduction”, Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, 2003.
p.7.
16
should not leave any loose ends, suggesting that nuanced and incoherent descriptions are often
better at depicting complex realities.22
Despite the reassuring body of literature that has emerged over the past decades that has
strived to incorporate cultural considerations into Political Science methodology, some scholars
remain skeptical of the future of the Political Science. Political scientist Joe Migdal attributes his
pessimism to the “methodological and epistemological rut [the field] has dug for itself in for the
last few decades.”23 Here, Migdal is expressing a commonly shared sense of incompatibility
between the two competing approaches to the study of power and politics: the rational-choice
approach and the more recent incorporation of culture and semiotics. There is little room for
interpretation (the latter’s focus) in the search for normative statements and universalism that
characterize the former.24 In exploring how culture is defined and conceptualized, Wedeen also
identifies the gaps in ontologies between disciplines as an obstacle for converging differing
methodologies.25 Nonetheless, it is precisely these scholars’ emphases on the shortcomings of
prescribed methodologies that provide a way-out of the empirical-interpretive dilemma. As Ian
Shapiro wryly points out in the existing polarization among approaches, if “one’s only tool is a
hammer, everything in sight starts to look like a nail.”26 However, if the greater goal is not
upholding the traditional conventions of one discipline but rather generating knowledge, then
22
Wedeen, “Ethnography as Interpretive”, 89
Joe S. Migdal, “Anthropology and Political Science: Oil and Water?” review of Anthropology and political
science: a convergent approach, by Joel M. Aronoff and Jan Kubik, Israel Studies Review, 29:1 (2014)
142-165.
24
Aronoff and Kubik, Anthropology, 3
25
Wedeen, “Conceptualizing”, 724
26
Ian Shapiro, “Can the rational choice framework cope with culture?” PS: Political Science and Politics, 31:1
(March 1998) 40-42.
23
17
only “problem-oriented research”27 can begin to address the “specific, historically contingent
relations of power”28 that Political Science should undoubtedly aim to study.
The emergence of a literature on people’s politics and community networks
Many of the scholars and researchers championing ethnographic applications in Political
Science have also produced groundbreaking studies on the unconventional workings and sources
of power. An entire literature on (poor) “people’s politics” challenges existing notions of “the
powerless,” in the “Third World” and in rural Appalachia alike.29 Authors of this genre share
similar methodological approaches. Many found that ethnographic methods—collecting
testimonies, observation, and immersion—best suited the study of community-level dynamics.
These studies also share a common interest for society’s marginalized groups and the
mechanisms of power that the marginalized employ to secure their interests, whether these are
survival, stability, access to public goods, or social or religious reform. Through informal social
networks, marginalized communities collectivize, assert, and engage in forms of power that lie
outside of formal institutions. Special attention has been given to communities that engage in
alternative forms of organization and politics in the Middle East, where “informal networks are
an indelible component of the social matrix.”30
Many who have undertaken such studies employ the term informal networks to describe
the familial and professional ties (among other social connections) that link individuals to each
27
Shapiro, “Can the rational”, 42
Wedeen, “Conceptualizing”, 724
29
Gaventa, John. 1980. Power and powerlessness: quiescence and rebellion in an Appalachian valley. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press.
30
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2001. The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and state
power in Jordan. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. p.9
28
18
other but also to those with relative power— often those with resources or influence within or
beyond their immediate communities. What makes these networks informal, as opposed to
formal, is their lack of recognition by the state. Diane Singerman explains that in the case of
sha’bi (popular) communities in Cairo, informal networks are “overlooked or tacitly tolerated.”31
Seemingly hidden from the state, individuals may use their connections to pursue state goods or
benefits, all the while “maintaining anonymity,”32 because they are not directly interacting with
state institutions. Networks remain under-the-radar as long as they do not “become vehicles for
opposition and resistance or merely work against the interests of state policy.”33 What constitutes
a threat to the state often reveals the sensitivities of the state as well as the agenda of a group or
organization.
Because these networks are frequently carved out of community ties, individuals are
often seen as “belonging” to the networks with which they engage (and they may associate with
a variety of networks). Interacting with networks becomes the basis of the individuals’ ability to
maneuver politically and therefore demonstrates his or her social and political adeptness.
Singerman concludes that knowing how and when to maneuver between formal and informal
structures is a “critically important skill.” Indeed, it is a tremendous asset to know how to
“[negotiate] the fine lines between pragmatism, necessity, opportunism, and crime.”34
Quintan Wiktorowicz also highlights the pragmatic decisions involved in navigating
informal versus formal social connections. In the context of contemporary Jordan’s covert
authoritarianism, groups who pose political threats to the regime are suppressed. Wiktorowicz
31
Singerman, Diane. 1995. Avenues of participation: family, politics, and networks in urban quarters of Cairo.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. p.134
32
Singrman, Avenues, 137
33
Singerman, Avenues, 134
34
Singerman, Avenues, 172, 213
19
observes that this leads these groups to altogether reject formal means of organization.
Moreover, he concludes, the “use of informal social networks are borne from a pragmatic
assessment of the tactical efficacy of formal organizations” and constitute “a strategic choice
informed by the realities of continued state power.”35 Once again, the often anonymous quality
of informal organization can provide politically contentious groups with “underground”
protection from the state, ensuring groups a longer shelf life. Moreover, informal means of
organization often correspond better to the objectives of certain groups, as is the case with the
Salafi organizations in Jordan, who hope to enact religious reform on an individual level. Thus, a
seemingly marginalized group like Jordan’s Salafis actually enacts its own preferences and
secures its interests by choosing to exist informally.
Similar to Wiktorowicz, Asef Bayat contextualizes the dynamics of informal networks as
part of the loose association of social movement organizations. However, these movements are
generally composed of relatively structured collective bodies that pursue social change.36 It is
important to elucidate the differences between collective action and a collective body, especially
since the former explicitly aims for large-scale reform, and the latter is often the result of
haphazard social organization. As Asef Bayat explains through his study of collectives among
Tehran’s poor and disenfranchised, “in place of protest or publicity [the urban poor] move
directly to fulfill their needs by themselves, albeit individually and discretely.” He affirms,
“theirs is a politics not of protest but of redress, and is a struggle for immediate outcomes largely
through individual direct action.”37 From this point of view, marginalized individuals that
engage in civil networks are often more concerned with survival— “looking out for number one”
35
Wiktorowicz, Management, 4
Bayat, Street, 7
37
Bayat, Street, 10
36
20
(themselves or their immediate community)—than contemplating greater social or political
change. Across these examples of studied marginalized communities, the principal reason people
resort to the use of informal civic networks stems primarily from the “lack of an institutional
mechanism” that guarantees access to public goods equally and to all segments of society. 38 As
such, the powerless’ pursuit of resources and their attempts to secure their interests further
highlight their roles as active agents. It is clear that recourse to informal organization is not
simply a political consequence of state neglect, but rather is a widely occurring political
phenomenon wherein the formation of community networks is possible and even necessary.
The presence of civil networks among urban Syrian refugees in Jordan provides an
ongoing example of how communities39 organize and pursue their interests in the absence of a
state. Their case can contribute to the literature on community politics in the Middle East by
demonstrating how informal networks form in the context of stateless, displaced actors,
particularly as a result of civil war. Syrian refugees resort to community networks precisely
because they are new arrivals in a host country and the length of their stay is unknown. As the
newest wave of refugees in Jordan, they also suffer marginalization because they are perceived
as a burden at the national as well as at the community level. Refugees’ understandings of the
host state and their interactions with state institutions and policies are complicated by the fact
that they are not citizens. Likewise, the host state has recourse to state actions that it cannot enact
on its own citizens—in Jordan’s case, repatriation and the forced resettlement of urban refugees
to refugee camps.
38
Bayat, Street, 9
It is important that in anthropological discourses, notions of “community” as a monolithic or homogenous entity
are often complicated by various social factors.
See: Day, Graham. 2006. Community and everyday life. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
39
21
The example of Jordan’s attempts to regulate the workings of Syrian communities and
the movement of Syrian individuals deviates from cases of informal networks already studied
within this literature. Jordan’s Syrian community presence and activities are not “overlooked or
tacitly tolerated by the state,” as Singerman observed in her Egyptian study. 40 Rather, Jordan has
increasingly perceived potential threats to its state interests among its Syrian refugee
communities that stem from the nearby violence in Syria and Iraq as well as complex refugee
politics in Jordan. The Jordanian government has responded to potential risks by resorting to
strong surveillance and regulation of these communities.
The non-institutionalized actors that drive Syrian civil society and activism in Jordan are
not always “subtle, cautious…invisible.”41 The goals of Jordan’s Syrian refugee collectivities are
diverse, spanning from securing basic needs to offering support for Syria’s political and military
opposition groups. These groups do in fact gauge their activities by anticipating Jordan statedown responses, as Wiktorowicz suggests in his study. Jordan’s policies have shifted from
implicit support for the political activities and actions of Syrian civilians and non-civilians to
outright banning, as Jordan has shifted its approach to hosting Syrian refugees over the last four
years. Thus, the priorities of Syrian refugee collectivities often focus on avoiding state
restrictions to securing individual and community interests and needs.
Ethnographic fieldwork methods best capture the local arena of Syrian refugees’
humanitarian and political activity. Therefore, it is through interviews and on-site visits that I am
able to track the landscape of civil society among these communities. I am also able to observe
Jordan’s treatment of refugees as enacted through on-the-ground policies and compare them to
40
41
Singerman, Avenues, 134
Singerman, Avenues, 270
22
official accounts of such policies. Qualitative methods, namely my incorporation of a semioticsbased approach to fieldwork, also capture the symbolic gestures and values embedded in the
Jordanian regime’s practices and rhetoric. The discrepancies between how policies are
formulated and how they are enacted underpin “the skirmishes that take place between the ruler
and ruled” and how they are “represented in the regime’s idealized representation of itself and in
people’s reception it.”42 Through the aggregation and analysis of fieldwork observations, I can
then discern the regime’s logic that drives its evolving policies and its actual treatment of this
refugee community.
Lastly, given the conventions of past studies conducted within the genre of people’s
politics, my case study requires justifying the application of a Political Science framework to the
my fieldwork observations. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the dynamics and
activities of Jordan’s Syrian refugee communities are relevant to the study of power insofar as
they are constituted by political, albeit non-state actors, that increasingly shape Jordanian state
policies. The transformative effects of the recent Syrian refugee population on Jordan’s social
makeup and on Jordanian economic and security interests are at the core of their political
relevancy.
42
Wedeen, “Conceptualizing”, 276
23
CHAPTER 3
Jordanian Identity Consolidation and
Authoritarianism
The recent entrance of Syrian refugees into Jordan’s social fabric carries particular
significance in the context of the multiple and successive waves of refugees that Jordan has
hosted over various decades. So many new influxes into Jordan’s population aggravate an
already sensitive political equilibrium that originally stems from a tenuously forged national
identity. Transjordan, as the country was named upon establishment, was a colonial conception,
like many nation-states in the so-called Near East. Decades after the power and institutional
vacuum left behind the post- Ottoman fall, and nearing the end of British and French mandates in
the region, Britain sought to ensure post-colonial proxy control over the Arabian peninsula.43 In
order to do this, the British collaborated with the Hijazi clan leader, the Amir Abdullah, and
placed his family, the Hashemites44 at the head of Transjordan’s monarchy, establishing the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on March 25, 1946.
Conceiving of Transjordan
In his exploration of Jordanian national identity and culture, Joseph Massad links
Jordan’s tenuous claims to an essential identity to key moments and political decisions in the
kingdom’s history. He claims that the changes brought about by Jordan’s three major physical
43
Anderson, Betty S. 2005. Nationalist voices in Jordan: the street and the state. Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press. p. 10
44
Who possess a great deal of religious legitimacy as the direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad
24
and demographic expansions “transformed [the country] in ways detrimental to its national
identity and culture.45 King Abdullah I’s expansionist policies marked his reign, and his attempts
to impose this will on Syria adversely affected this relationship until his assassination in 1951.46
However, it was the 1948 and 1950 annexations of Central Palestine, not yet named the West
Bank, that tripled the country’s population, forever shifting the dynamics of Jordan’s social,
political and economic sectors.47 Members of Palestine’s middle and upper class were on the
whole more urban, more technically skilled, and more educated than the majority of
Transjordanians.48 These socioeconomic differences undoubtedly caused tensions between statedifferentiated “West” and “East Bankers”. While Jordanization has attempted to define an
identity that is separate and independent from that of Palestine, their histories have been
intimately intertwined from the outset.
Jordanian- Palestinian tensions rise
These tensions surfaced and developed over the decades surrounding Jordan’s major
demographic shifts. The Jordanian Civil War that broke out in September of 1970 (known to
Palestinians as Black September or aylul al-aswad) and lasted for one year “proved crucial for
national redefinition.”49 The struggle between Jordan’s two populations was largely an outburst
of frustration felt among the dispossessed Palestinians living in Jordan’s refugee camps, as well
as the cynicism following the 1967 Arab defeat. This was followed by the rise in power of the
45
Massad, Joseph Andoni. 2001. Colonial effects: the making of national identity in Jordan. New York: Columbia
University Press. p.12
46
Massad, Colonial, 223
47
It is also important to mention the wave of Palestinian refugees post-1967 Arab defeat
48
Massad, Colonial, 234
49
Massad, Colonial, 13
25
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jordan, which challenged the consolidation of
power of the Jordanian monarchy. The latter, in turn, swiftly weakened Palestinian power
structures within its borders.
These events have had a long-lasting effect on Palestinian-Jordanians, who, as Massad
points out, were forced to recognize that “citizenship and nationality were no longer to be
conflated as one.”50 Even today, discrimination against this segment of the population is a
generally institutionalized practice and manifests through “less government representation, less
employment in the public sector, fewer academic opportunities, and less access to public
funds.”51 These are but some of the methods that Jordan employs to reinforce the distinction of
non-Jordanians, and in doing so, upholding the identity of “true” Jordanians. Of course, the
difficulty in sustaining these divides complicates Jordan’s nationalist discourse and its ability to
claim authority over a stable identity. 52
Subsequent waves of refugees in Jordan
The Palestinian example has undeniably shaped Jordan’s wariness of hosting new refugee
populations. However, Jordan’s relative stability when compared to many of its conflict-ridden
neighboring countries has still made it the destination of refugee from the region’s various crises.
For example, Jordan has received successive waves of Iraqi refugees in the past two-and-a-half
decades, beginning with the First Gulf War, proceeding to the 2003 United States invasion of
50
Massad, Colonial, 222
Massad, Colonial, 14
52
Massad, Colonial, 15
51
26
Iraq, and finally, due to the violence and instability caused by the Islamic State’s takeover of
Iraqi cities and villages. Jordan currently houses over 58,000 Iraqi refugees.53
Iraqis are often remembered in Jordan for their economic contribution to the country.
While many who came in fact had very few resources54, the influx of Iraqis with material capital,
particularly in Amman, generated “unsurpassed investment and increased consumption levels,”
as Jordanian economist, Yusuf Mansour examines.55 Iraqi refugees also differed from other
refugee populations in that they lived almost exclusively in urban areas, as no refugee camps
were built to accommodate them (with the exception of Ruwaishid Camp, close to the Iraqi
border, that housed Palestinian refugees from Iraq).56
Multiple parallels exist between Jordan’s treatment of Iraqi refugees, particularly those
that came after 2003, and its policies toward Syrian refugees over the past four years. In regards
to their entrance into the work force, Iraqi refugees were largely denied work permits. Despite
this, many found work doing menial jobs typically reserved for immigrant (largely Egyptian)
workers. This is now the case with Syrian refugees, many of whom possess technical skills, and
fill in the jobs looked down upon by Jordanians because of the stigma in Jordanian society that is
associated with handiwork. Both populations have faced deportation back to their countries for
being caught working illegally. Other conditions have also indicated their less-than-warm
welcome in Jordan, for example, the lower wages reserved first for Iraqi and now for Syrian
53
UNHCR country operations profile: Jordan (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486566.html)- It is likely that there
are many more unregistered Iraqi refugees today.
54
Frelick, Bill. 2006. Silent treatment: fleeing Iraq, surviving in Jordan. New York: Human Rights Watch.
55
Yusuf Mansur. “The cost of refugees,” The Jordan Times, (04 Feb. 2013): accessed February 2015.
56
Frelick, Bill, Silent, 65
27
medical workers (which will be explained in more detail in Chapter 6) as well as Jordan’s
contradictory policies on refugee children’s access to its public schools.57
Fossilized prejudices and new attitudes toward refugees
Meanwhile, the complex politics surrounding Palestinians, particularly Israel’s decadeslong push to convert Jordan into the new Palestinian homeland at Jordan’s refusal, has created an
increasingly hostile atmosphere for future Palestinians entering Jordan. This is crucial context for
understanding the situation of Palestinian refugees attempting to enter Jordan after fleeing the
violence in Syria (referred to as PRS). Most have been rejected at the border, while the few that
have entered are currently held at the Cyber City camp, essentially a holding facility for PRS. As
the Prime Minister, Abdullah Ensour has publicly stated, “Jordan has made a clear and explicit
sovereign decision not to allow the crossing to Jordan by our Palestinian brothers who hold
Syrian documents.”58 As Susan Akram, a specialist in Middle Eastern refugee policies explains,
Palestinians are coming into an area with “fixed attitudes” and “pre-existing policies fossilized
against them.”59
The historic presence of various refugee communities from Jordan’s neighboring
countries is an ongoing reminder that the conflicts that push these new populations into Jordan
are rarely temporary. A Jordanian diplomat recently phrased it quite frankly: “The problem with
Jordan is that refugees do tend to stay.”60 Studying Jordan’s history of refugees provides
57
Frelick, Bill, Silent, 55 and 58
Tamer al-Samadi. “Jordanian PM: We Can't Accept Palestinian Refugees From Syria,” Al-Monitor. Transl. by
Rani Geha. Originally published in Al-Hayat. (January 2013): accessed January 2013.
59
Katy Montoya, Skype interview with Susan Akram, February 20, 2015
60
Ian Black. “Patient Running out in Jordan after Influx of Syrian Refugees” The Guardian, (December 1, 2014):
accessed December 1, 2014.
58
28
important context for the current state of Syrian refugees in Jordan by allowing one to trace how
Jordanian policies toward refugees evolve, particularly under the influence of bigger political
forces. Currently, this is the devolving political and humanitarian state present in Syria and Iraq.
The Authoritarian Jordanian Regime
The logic and the policies of Jordan’s authoritarian regime establish the boundaries
within which Syrian refugee communities operate. Thus, the context of authoritarian regimes in
general, and Jordan’s sociopolitical context in particular, are a crucial part of studying how
informal networks operate in Jordan’s Syrian communities. Jordan’s authoritarian approach to
domestic control originates in the long-standing rift between the monarchy’s secular political
vision, despite its history of conservatism61 and that of its largely Sunni Muslim constituents.
The monarchy’s chosen tactic for addressing this rift has been to stifle dissent through opaque
government structures and repressive policies.
The formation of an authoritarian state
Jordan’s post-colonial ties, for example, have long-been a source of contention between
the government and Jordanians. Since its inception, Jordan has relied on Western powers for
various forms of support. An early example of this tension manifested in 1956, when the British
general “Glubb Pasha,” who had led and trained Jordan’s Arab Legion for decades, was forced
out of the country.62 Popular anticolonial sentiment in Jordan posed a real threat to Jordan’s
Western, Anglophone allies. In 1957, the United States and Britain’s staged a palace coup to
61
62
See Ch. 5
Morris, Benny. Road to Jerusalem : Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews. London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2002.
29
uproot the movement. The intolerance for government dissent that followed this moment in
history is still reflected in the repressive policies that characterize Jordan’s authoritarian
government today.63
The United States has since filled Britain’s former influential role over Jordan, in the
form of financial and military support and political leverage over Jordanian domestic and foreign
policies. Among Jordan’s most controversial decisions was its 1994 peace treaty with Israel and
subsequent attempts to “normalize” relations, namely through economic cooperation with its
western neighbor.64 This has spurred a great deal of opposition in Jordanian civil society that the
government has in turn attempted to silence through its “crackdown” on various antinormalization unions.65 Equally unpopular with the Jordanian public was the government’s
decision to support the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, a stance that Jordanians attribute in
large part to undue American political influence over the monarchy and the latter’s deviation
from traditional and particularly Islamic values.66
Such policies have only widened the rift between Jordan’s growing Islamist movements
and the secular regime. Despite the fact that the government has thwarted many of these groups’
attempts to publicly organize, Islamists in their various forms still constitute the strongest
opposition to the Hashemite monarchy. The largest of these groups, Jordan’s Muslim
Brotherhood, is a complex exception to this, as it has upheld its support for the regime. The
63
Massad, Colonial, 13
Joshua Mitnick. “Twenty Years of Jordan, Israel Peace: Palestine Still a Deal Breaker,” WSJ, Oct. 2014. Online.
65
Russell E. Lucas. “Jordan: The Death of Normalization with Israel,” Middle East Journal. Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter,
2004), pp. 93-111
66
Adely, Fida J. 2012. Gendered paradoxes: educating Jordanian women in nation, faith, and progress.
64
30
monarchy benefits from its presence, which lends an image of plurality to Jordanian politics.
Given the larger Muslim Brotherhood organization’s rocky relationship to various governments
in the region (particularly Egypt and Syria), within Jordan, the group has a widespread societal
presence. Although its calls for political reform often clash with the monarchy’s secular vision,
the Brotherhood’s political wing, the Islamic Action Front, occupied a significant number of
seats in Parliament between 1989 and 2010 (until it decided to boycott parliamentary elections)
and its charity branches continue to operate openly in Jordanian society.67 Meanwhile Salafis and
Salafi-jihadists, whose objectives do not offer an immediate benefit to the government, have in
essence been pushed underground (though Salafi figures are gaining a presence in Jordanian
media outlets).68 These groups must resort to informal networks in order to achieve their societal
goals of Islamic revival.
It was through his study of Salafi underground movements that Wiktorowicz uncovered
the larger mechanisms propelling the Hashemite monarchy’s “survival imperative.”69 It is a
system characterized by state surveillance, enacted through the military and state police and
primarily through the General Intelligence Directorate, commonly known as the mukhabarat.70
The state intelligence apparatus has only been able to gain such efficacy through its creation of
and operation through a pervasive system encountered in any and all daily affairs, resembling the
design of Jeremy Bentham’s model panopticon. The regime’s goal, according to Wiktorowicz, is
67
Katy Montoya, Interviews with ex-Islamic Action Front members in Irbid Jordan, July-August 2014.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2001. The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and state
power in Jordan. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
69
Wiktorowicz, Management, 11
70
Curtis Ryan. “Security dilemmas and the ‘security state’ question in Jordan,” “The Arab Thermidor: The
Resurgence of the Security State” London School of Economics and Political Science Middle East Centre,
October 10, 2014.
68
31
to create a “system of control based upon predictability and visibility.”71 As experienced by the
average citizen, the constant uncertainty as to whether or not one is being monitored reflects in
fundamentally different, often more conformist human behavior. Journalist and state-surveillance
opponent, Glenn Greenwald asserts that this uncertainty has become the “ultimate enforcer of
obedience and compliance,” and when enacted on a mass scale, effectively creates social
control.72
A sophisticated state intelligence apparatus brings Jordan into a classification of modern
states characterized by these new methods of social control.73 Through their enactment in Middle
Eastern society since the late eighteenth century, new forms of social control have intended for
fundamental societal change. This modernization project has played an important role throughout
the region’s colonial history, and its continuation today reveals the extent of post-colonial effects
on Jordan, among other Middle Eastern states. In Colonising Egypt, for example, Timothy
Mitchell demonstrates that Egyptian government’s adoption of French-inspired ideas of social
control has from the outset reflected a greater desire to westernize Egyptian society. In no way
can the original conception of the panopticon be divorced from its colonial context, as its model
was “devised on Europe’s colonial frontier with the Ottoman Empire… built for the most part
not in northern Europe, but in places like colonial India.”74
Through social control, regimes such as Jordan’s also envision new forms of social
relations within their borders. Jordanian state surveillance targets both individual citizens and
71
Wiktorowicz, Management, 37
Glenn Greenwald, “Why Privacy Matters” TED Talks, Oct. 2014.
73
Michel Foucault. 1995. Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. New York: Vintage Books.
74
Timothy Mitchell. Colonising Egypt, Berkeley, CA, USA: University of California Press, 1991. Web. p.54
See also: Martha Kaplan. 1995. “Panopticon in Poona: An Essay on Foucault and Colonialism,” Cultural
Anthropology,” 10: 185–98.
72
32
larger societal collectives, and shapes how these interact with the Jordanian state. Rather than
outright prohibiting the formation of a civil society, the Jordanian state currently enacts a
rewards system, privileging groups that demonstrate support for the government by granting
them state approval and public visibility— what Wiktorowicz calls the right to exist formally.75
Meanwhile, individuals and collectivities that pose any threat to government policies or regime
legitimacy face continuous state repression. This forces these entities to exist and operate
through informal means and spaces. In the context of an authoritarian regime, the choice to
operate informally may benefit certain organized groups by increasing their chances of
survival.76 That understood, for marginalized segments of the population, including refugees,
“informality” is often simply an “alternative to the constraints of formal structures,” as Asef
Bayat argues.”77 In the case of disenfranchised Syrian refugees in Jordan whose presence and
activities are closely monitored, having recourse to community ties helps ensure that their
everyday as well as their political goals are met.
Responding to the “Arab Spring”: loosening and restricting freedoms
Since the beginning of the “Arab Spring,” (the same four-year time frame addressed in
this case study) Jordan has enacted various inter-governmental and state-down policy changes.
Seeking to avoid the public unrest that has unfolded in nearby countries, the monarchy passed
both “reformist and security legislation.”78 These have addressed the issue of transparency in its
electoral process and of corruption within its intelligence services. Beginning in 2011, Jordan
also began to allow a certain margin of free public expression, one example being the gatherings
75
Wiktorowicz, Management, 150
Wiktorowicz, Management, 4
77
Bayat, Street, 11
78
Ryan Curtis. “Jordan’s Unfinished Journey: Parliamentary Elections and the State of Reform” Project on the
Middle East Security Brief. March 2013. Online.
76
33
of protesters that congregate in front of al-Husseini mosque in downtown Amman, after aljuma’at prayers (every Friday).
Alternatively, other pieces of legislation have spurred controversy over the regime’s
increasingly heavy-handed approaches to state security. For example, in August of 2014, the
monarchy issued a new decree that transfers the power to appoint military and security officials
to the king.79 Earlier that year, the government also passed new legislation on terrorism that not
only broadened the term to include “disturbing [Jordan’s] relations to a foreign state,” but also
created stricter punitive measures for those labeled terrorists.80 The government’s prioritization
of the national security has thus reversed much of its earlier loosening of restrictions and largely
undermined its attempts to reform its more authoritarian practices.
During this politically sensitive time, Jordan continues to closely regulate collectivities of
various groups that might emit critical or dissident messages, whether in the media or in
community spaces. These factors81 provide important context for the political landscape in which
Syrian civil society has formed, operating both formally and informally in Jordan over the last
four years. An understanding of these dynamics moreover allows for further examination of
Jordan’s heightening wariness of and evolving response to Syrian refugee communities and their
activities.
79
Areej Abuqudairi, “Jordan King given further executive powers,” Al Jazeera (Aug. 30, 2014): accessed
September 1, 2014.
80
“Jordan: Terrorist Amendments Threaten Rights,” Human Rights Watch (May 18, 2014): accessed May 18, 2014.
81
along with other considerations discussed in Chapter 6
34
CHAPTER 4
Conflict Context
During a recent lecture for Swarthmore College’s Political Science department, a
professor presented her research on how ethnic identity and diplomatic relations between
countries emitting and receiving refugees influence the recipient countries’ response to the
refugee population, both at the borders and within its borders. Based on the findings from her
research in Egypt, Kenya, and Turkey, she proposed that under two conditions, the refugee
population typically receives better treatment from the recipient country government: 1) if both
countries in question have poor diplomatic relations and 2) if the entering refugee population is
35
ethnically similar to or will improve the demographics of the recipient country.82 Gathering from
this emerging research, the extent of Syria and Jordan relation and where this relation stands now
may provide important considerations for understanding Jordan’s evolving response to its Syrian
refugee communities.
History of Syria- Jordan relations
Jordan’s formal and informal position toward al-Assad’s regime during Syria’s civil war
is only the latest development in a long history of rocky relations between these neighboring
countries. The legacy of tension between the two countries began between the fathers of the
current country leaders (King Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad). Thus, the current Syrian war marks
the first major diplomatic event between Syria and Jordan since King Abdullah II and Bashar alAssad came to power at the beginning of the century (1999 and 2000, respectively).
Jordan and Syria’s long-standing differences go back to the staunch ideological stances
Arab leaders assumed as national identities during the power play of the Arab Cold War in the
1950s through the 1960s.83 Both Syria and Jordan came from the two opposed camps: the former
belonging to the revolutionary Soviet allies and the other exemplifying a conservative, anticommunist monarchy and ally of western powers.84 Important historical events like Jordan’s
general abstention from the Yom Kippur War and its decision to make peace with Israel twentyone years later, meanwhile Syria maintained hostile relations with Israel, further highlighted
82
83
84
Lamis Abdelaaty Lecture, Swarthmore College, Nov. 21, 2014
Henry Laurens, Paix et guerre au Moyen-Orient, l'Orient arabe et le monde de 1948 à nos jours. (Paris: Armand
Colin, 2005).
Curtis R. Ryan, “The Odd Couple: Ending The Jordanian-Syrian "Cold War," Middle East Journal, (2006) 33-56,
accessed 10 January 2015.
36
these differences.85 During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Syria solidified its alliance with Iran,
while Jordan supported Saddam Hussein’s government.
King Hussein of Jordan and president Hafiz al-Assad of Syria also assumed more
aggressive roles in one another’s domestic conflicts. When the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) assumed too great of sovereignty within Jordan’s borders and Jordan’s civil
war ensued in September of 1970, Syrian military forces intervened in Jordan in defense of the
PLO forces.86 After Hafiz al-Assad’s crackdown on Syrian Islamists began in the early 1980s,
the Jordanian government covertly permitted Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood to train and organize
“operations against Syria” from inside its borders.87 Their relations improved toward the second
half of the decade, during which time King Hussein put an end to the Jordanian Brotherhood’s
attacks on the Syrian regime.
Personal animosity and the constant power play between Jordan’s monarchy and Syria’s
Ba’athist regime characterized these countries’ relations until the end of the century. However,
after the deaths of King Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad, the transitions of power to their sons, King
Abdullah II and Bashar al-Assad, allowed for a shift in relations.88 In the last fifteen years, these
leaders have taken similar stances on various regional issues, particularly supporting Palestine’s
resistance against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and against Israeli operations on the
Gaza Strip (though Syria’s position toward Israel has always been harsher). Jordan and Syria
have also expanded opportunities for trade and other forms of economic cooperation, most
85
Laurens, Paix, 380
Curtis, Odd Couple, 36
87
Wiktorowicz, Management, 98
88
Curtis, Odd Couple, 46
86
37
notably, Syria’s agreement to alleviate some of Jordan’s water insecurity concerns.89 The similar
demographic makeup and widely shared cultural and familial ties (for example, in the Hauran
region that geographically links them) between Syria and Jordan underlie the current ties
between their populations and by extension, their governments.
In light of Jordan and Syria’s history of covert interventions in the other’s conflicts, it is
easy to see parallels having taken place in the recent past during Syria’s war. Throughout the
first three years after the outbreak of war in Syria, Jordan generously welcomed refugees (many
of whom opposed the Assad government) and allowed for the movement of members of Syria’s
moderate political and military opposition across its border. However, Jordan’s actions toward
Syria have changed at various points during the Syrian war, making it difficult to discern the
latest status of their diplomatic relations.
Dera’a, the Cradle of the Revolution
The steady devolution of what was once enshrined as Syria’s revolution has inevitably
pushed large flows of Syrians into Jordan’s refugee camps and urban areas. I have gathered
various testimonials of those present during the March 2011 protests in Dera’a and soon after in
Damascus, Aleppo, and other important urban centers. These first-hand accounts support the
dominant narrative that recounts the police and military brutality that suppressed originally
peaceful protests.
One first-hand account in particular, provided by a former Dera’a English schoolteacher
and activist now living and supporting injured Syrians in Jordan, repeated what he had recounted
for the media outlets CNN and BBC in 2011. He described the origins of Dera’a’s protests as a
89
“Jordan Asks Syria for 15 Million Cubic Meters of Water,” Associate Press. 4 July, 2006.
38
reaction to the arrest, detention, and torture of fifteen youngsters who, inspired by the Tunisian
government’s resignation after months of popular protest, graffitied, “The people want the
regime to fall” (a-sha’ab yureed isqat a-nitham) on the walls of a school. They belonged to some
of Dera’a’s largest families, who demanded their release.90 The local security forces refused to
release them, and news of the officers’ disrespectful responses spread across Dera’a and the
surrounding towns. On March 18, 2011, Dera’a activists organized the first protest in front of
Dera’a City’s al-Omari mosque, on which security forces opened fire. The proceeding days were
characterized by an escalation of aggressive tactics on the part of the protesters, followed by
increasing violence and cruel repression enacted by local and national security forces, including
the storming of Dera’a’s mosques where doctors were treating injured protesters.91
Various personal narratives I recorded recount the beginnings of a civil security force, the
predecessor to the Free Syrian Army, to protect protesters against the local and national security
forces during Dera’a’s ongoing manifestations.92 Various testimonials also tell of the defections
of ex-regime intelligence and military officials that led to the formation of the Free Syrian Army
in July of 2011.93 This was Syria’s main military opposition force before the entrance of a
multitude of armed, primarily extremist ideological groups, the strongest now being the Islamic
State and Jabhat an-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria). These groups have largely
overshadowed the FSA in organization and military prowess. In most of Syria, affiliation with
the FSA has come to denote a loose association of moderate, largely secular “rebel” fighters.
90
Hugh Macleod, “Inside Deraa: The story of this ancient town is the story of the Syrian Uprising: state brutality,
funerals, and growing fury,” Al Jazeera (April 19 2011): accessed July 2013.
91
Montoya, Interview with Hamed al-Nabulsi, Irbid, Jordan, August 2013.
92
Montoya, Interview with “Muhammad,” (engineering student from Aleppo, joined Dera’a’s volunteer civilian
force in March 2011) in Irbid, Jordan. July 2014.
93
See announcement of Formation of FSA on July 29, 2011 at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZcCbIPM37w
39
Their strongest presence is in Syria’s southern region, particularly Dera’a, where they and the
Syrian regime are currently vying for control.94
Most importantly, many of these testimonials recount the ongoing onslaught by regime
forces in civilian areas in Dera’a City and the Dera’a and Damascene countryside (for example,
the besieged towns of Muadamiya a-Shaam, al-Ghouta, and Darayya), by means of tanks, barrel
bombs dropped from airplanes, snipers, and landmines. Syrians who have left their homes for
Jordan have frequently explained that their decision to flee Syria preempted or came as a result
of these attacks. In other cases, the civilian victims of these attacks were escorted by the Free
Syrian Army and then by Jordanian border security to Jordanian public and private hospitals
where they received life-saving medical treatment. 95
Jordan Accommodates a New Refugee Population
Jordanian policies toward entering and residing Syrians have evolved along with the
almost four-year conflict. Jordanian border security has, from the beginning, played a generous
role in facilitating border crossings, ending the long, dangerous journeys of fleeing Syrians.
Various Jordanian officials in my interviews emphasized the extent of humanitarian care that
Jordan provides entering Syrians, in partnership with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), from the border onward. Unlike nearby Lebanon, the Jordanian government has
worked with the UNHCR to open al-Za’tari96 and al-Azraq refugee camps. Other camps include
Cyber City, a holding facility for “illegal” Palestinian refugees from Syria (often referred to as
PRS) and the Emirati (UAE-funded) camp.
94
See Appendix
See Appendix
96
See Appendix
95
40
Keeping a close count of registered Syrian refugees is difficult. Many Syrians enter
Jordan illegally by bypassing official checkpoints. Increasingly, this is due to intensifying battles
over border crossings between Jabhat an-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army, and al-Assad’s forces,
and Jordan’s subsequent closing of bordering crossings.97 Meanwhile, about a hundred thousand
Syrians who once resided in Jordan’s refugee camps have voluntarily returned to Syria. Many
have also escaped the camps for Jordan’s cities and rural areas in order to seek better conditions
and work opportunities.98 Thus, roughly twenty percent of Syrians in Jordan face poor camp
conditions.99 Overcrowding and poor sanitation prevail, especially in al-Za’tari and Cyber City
camps, despite the efforts of camp officials.
Meanwhile, eighty percent of Syrians now live outside Jordan’s refugee camps and
struggle to obtain necessary goods and services. With the help of UN-subsidies, Jordan kept its
public hospitals open to Syrian refugees for over three years, allowing refugees to access free
healthcare. State officials abruptly announced the termination of these services in late November
2014, citing the heavy debts Jordan has accrued through extending free healthcare to Syrian
refugees.100 Education is also difficult to access for young Syrian refugees. Often, this is due to
difficult home situations, but also due to the challenges in accommodating high numbers of
school-aged Syrians in Jordanian classrooms. Most Syrians struggle to survive off of meager
food vouchers and many refuse to rely on aid organizations. While Jordanian work permits are
97
Al-Abed, Tareq. “Who Controls Syrian Border Crossings?” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East.”
N.p., 17 July 2014. Web.
98
Tilley, Tom. “Refugees Catch Bus Hell to Escape Harsh Conditions of Camp.” ABC News. N.p. 5 Nov. 2014.
Web.
99
Akram, Susan M. and Boston University Law Students. Protecting Syrian Refugee: Laws, Policies, and Global
Responsibility Sharing. Publication. P.p.: Boston U Law School, 2014. Print.
100
Sherlock, Ruth. “Jordan Repeals Free Medical Aid for Syrian Refugees.” The Telegraph. Telegraph Media
Group,
28 Nov. 2014. Web.
41
costly and rarely distributed, refugees risk punishment from Jordanian authorities by taking
informal and black market jobs. Indeed, conditions for Syrians in Jordan have only become more
difficult.
CHAPTER 5
A Survey of Syrian Social Networks in
Jordan
Now in Chapter 6, I move from the general conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan to the first
part of my case study: an exposé on the providers of goods and services within urban Syrian
refugee communities in Jordan, and how their organizations form part of a transnational web of
Syrian community activists.101 These activists’ humanitarian work is political insofar as it
overlaps with transnational networks that provide support for Syria’s political and military
opposition groups (predominantly the heterogeneous Free Syrian Army of Syria’s southern
region). In this context, the lines between civilian and non-civilian and humanitarian versus
political become blurred. Therefore, I outline not only the humanitarian but also the political and
military forms of support that take place within these communities, both among Syrian refugees
and between different members of Syrian refugee communities and Jordan’s military and
government representatives.
101
Based on my interviews with Syrian refugee community leaders in North Jordan in the summer of 2013 and
2014 (see Chapter 1 for an explanation of my methodology)
42
Choosing to operate through informal networks
In Jordan, Syrian refugees are confronted with a wide array of restrictions to pursuing
and securing a “dignified life.”102 While much of their powerlessness stems from the devastating
consequences of civil war, another important dimension is determined by the policies of the
Jordanian state. My case study suggests that Syrian refugees, on the whole, are learning the rules
of their host country in order to overcome the state-imposed obstacles to securing their needs.
Like Tehran’s urban poor in Asef Bayat’s Street Politics, Syrian refugees have not
“unconditionally accepted the limits imposed by the state,” and moreover, they “are actively
challenging the boundaries of the political.”103
In his study of Islamist organizations in Jordan, Quintan Wiktorowicz concludes that the
Jordanian state exercises authoritarian control over civil society formation and practices. 104 As
discussed already in Chapter 4, Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, the mukhabarat, are a
major force in regulating the content and activities of political parties, charities, and cultural
organizations. While this holds true for Jordanian organizations, I discovered through my survey
of civil society formation in Syrian refugee communities that among this population, Jordan is
only selectively regulatory. That is to say that the state allows some organizations and groups to
operate freely while others are closely monitored or banned altogether. An exploration of what is
permitted and under what circumstances helps reveal the logic that steers Jordan’s refugee
policy, and by extension, its political position toward the Syrian war.
102
Bayat, Asef. 1997. Street politics: poor people's movements in Iran. New York: Columbia University Press. p.
13
103
104
Bayat, Street Politics, 43
Wiktorowicz, Management, 37
43
Having recourse to informal networks in Jordan’s Syrian community allows refugees to obtain
necessary goods and services that are otherwise inaccessible to them. Urban Syrian communities
are made up of refugees from all socioeconomic backgrounds, living outside of the refugee
camps. Most Syrian refugees began their stay in Jordan in a refugee camp, however as permitted
by Jordanian policy, many found Jordanian hosts to bail them out or simply forged the kafalah
(bailout)105. The host must agree to bear financial responsibility for those taken out of the camps
to Jordan’s urban centers or villages. Urban Syrian communities thus are comprised of Syrians
who have left the refugee camps as well as refugees who arrive directly from Syria. Less
common but still present are Syrians who have come from other parts of the Middle East
(particularly the Gulf states), Europe, and the United States, often to provide support to these
communities. Thus, among this diverse group of Syrians are “haves” and “have-nots”, the
undoubtedly marginalized and the better integrated. Community dynamics are determined, in
large part, by the divide between those who are able to provide resources and services (these are
usually well-off or very wealthy Syrians from Syria and abroad) and those who seek these out.
Within this context, Syrian communities have increasingly collectivized. Some provide
humanitarian aid to civilians while others search for ways to support Syria’s political and armed
opposition. Divisions between civilian and non-civilian circles are hazy and often overlap.
In my interviews with Syrian founders of community centers, rehabilitation centers,
human rights documenters, groups of doctors, FSA leaders, and FSA supporters, I observed the
pragmatic decisions that groups make in order to ensure their chances of existing and operating
in Jordan. They both anticipate and react to the decisions of Jordanian state institutions. This is
reflected in their decision to operate formally, through registration and compliance, or
105
Dennis Ardis, “Syrians, Fraud, and Forgery in Jordan” ARDD-Legal Aid Firm: Syrian. 2013-14. pg. 8.
44
informally, without government recognition or support.106
In Irbid, the only surviving Syrian family support center (as of July 2014) has taken pains
to abide by strict regulation requirements. The founder (a former activist from Dera’a) not only
sought the assistance of a European NGO partner, but also created two paid positions for
Jordanian workers, a heavy burden for a struggling non-profit, in order to justify its right to
operate in Jordan. “If I didn’t do this, the authorities would close me down immediately,” she
explained, referring to Jordan’s Ministry of Social Development. Institutionalization may bring
peace of mind, but it does not guarantee government support or the ability to attract international
aid.
In response, the activists and humanitarians who run these centers have come to rely on a
transnational web of Syrians that links wealthy financial donors living abroad (often in Gulf
countries) to victims of the Syrian war. Connections are predominantly forged through personal
ties and through social media networks. Syrian organizations and centers often serve as liaisons,
mobilizing their social media networks to advertise pressing cases of those in their communities,
for example, announcing cases of dire injuries, destitution, and even those unjustly imprisoned in
Syria, to activists and potential donors both within and outside their direct communities.
Two humanitarian groups, Li-Ajlik Ya Souriya (For You, Syria) and Fareeq Molham
(Molham Group), help to mobilize the various forms of support in Jordan, Syria, and abroad. The
latter group was started in 2012 by a group of students from Philadelphia University in Amman,
and is now comprised of forty students in Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. They began by
asking their families in Canada, Sweden, and elsewhere to donate funds and created a Facebook
106
Wiktorowicz, The Management, 17
45
page where those in their communities could specify their needs, particularly those in need of
help financing their housing, electricity, and refrigerators. Today, Fariq Molham’s initiatives are
vast. In Jordan, they sponsors eighty Syrian families in the larger Amman area, hold community
events for children and families, and send donations to Syrians in refugee camps and those living
in impoverished villages in Jordan. Inside Syria, their networks of activists smuggle food,
clothing, and money transfers to besieged areas. “We are like worker bees,” joked to me one of
the group’s founders, Zaid Sukkar.107 His organization even opened and operated a bakery in the
eastern Syrian city of Deir Zor.108 In Turkey and Lebanon, Molham Group has various initiatives
to finance surgeries for the injured and to improve refugee camp conditions.
Many Syrians and non-Syrians who are looking to provide financial or material support
to those afflicted by the Syrian war also go in search of opportunities to donate. This was the
case for a rehabilitation center in the northern city of Irbid. Mahmoud, a Syrian citizen living in
Kuwait, works with a successful, humanitarian-driven group of Kuwaiti investors. With their
support, he initially brought medicine and monetary donations during his visits to Jordan in
2011. He is the friend of Faris (pseudonym), a Jordanian man with well-established ties to the
Syrian refugee community. Significantly, he also has the credentials of having worked for the
Jordanian security services for over thirty years. Mahmoud offered Faris the opportunity and the
funds to open a rehabilitation clinic in Irbid for injured Syrian men in 2013. Faris was able to cut
through the bureaucratic red tape normally involved in registering and opening such a space.
This live-in center now provides comprehensive health care and living needs to approximately
fifteen young men, many of whom acquired their injuries during their service with the FSA,
107
108
Montoya, Interview with founder of Molham Group, Amman, Jordan, August 6, 2014.
Presumably, this has closed since the Islamic State’s takeover of the city
46
combatting regime forces.
Faris’ case elucidates a great deal about the unspoken, informal, but understood nature of
how Syrian refugee affairs are treated in Jordan. His strong connections to Jordan’s security
forces since his retirement from those services five years ago grant him much more freedom in
providing humanitarian services to Syrians than what most Syrian activists pursuing similar
objectives are permitted. For example, by assuming full responsibility for his live-in center for
Syrians, he is able to employ a fully Syrian staff.
Moreover, with his wasta (a colloquial term referring to social connections within one’s
community and with government officials), Faris is well-equipped for dealing with the constant
inspections and regulations of the Ministry of Health and Jordanian intelligence. During their
regular visits, representatives of both institutions seem most concerned with keeping track of the
identities and specifically the affiliations of the clinic’s patients, Faris told me. While affiliation
with the Free Syrian Army is clearly an acceptable status (they are considered a moderate group
and are allowed to stay in Faris’ housing unit), housing anyone associated with Jabhat an-Nusra,
the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, would constitute a red flag for Jordan’s regulatory institutions,
who would likely deport JN-affiliated individuals and cause future trouble for (if they did not
automatically close) the humanitarian center.109 Aside from requesting lists of his patients, the
institutional treatment of Faris’ activities are rather lenient. He conveyed this when he recounted
to me, “Just yesterday a man from security came here, sat, had tea, and left.”110 He says that it is
all about “keeping a good reputation,” in which case the security forces “leave you alone”. From
my observations of other activists’ attempts to do similar work, it is clear that these
109
As for the Islamic State, their members have not succeeded in entering Jordan, though many Jordanians do fight
in their ranks and there are pockets of support for IS in marginalized pockets of Jordan.
110
Montoya, Interview with Faris (pseudonym), Jordanian humanitarian in Irbid, Jordan, August 15, 2014.
47
circumstances are unique to Faris and his privileged status vis-à-vis Jordan’s governmental
institutions.
I observed similar government intervention in the case of Syrian refugee activist in Irbid
who established a sort of civil registry office in his living room, reprinting legal documents for
Syrians who left paperwork behind or whose documents have expired. Syrians from various
communities in North Jordan come to Irbid seeking his services. For over a year, this activist has
also assembled teams of Syrian activists to document human rights violations and civilian deaths
wherever they occur in Syria. Volunteers in his office use testimonies and different methods of
verification to create reports with titles like, “Violence Against Girls and Women in Dera’a” and
“Attacks on Field Hospitals in Aleppo.”
The founder claims that when his documents first began surfacing, their facts
contradicted information published by the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). He relates this to the
Jordanian mukhabarat’s attempts to shut down his center—that is, until Jordanian authorities
assessed the quality of his work. He provides legal documents in the hopes that they will be
recognized by the Jordanian government and by international organizations alike (and that Syrian
refugees will be able to obtain aid and refugee status by using them). Meanwhile, his human
rights work ties his center to political leaders, various armed opposition groups, journalists,
activists, arms-traffickers, and local coordinating committees in Syria and neighboring countries.
The capacity to get quantifiable evidence on events in Syria from Jordan is a testament to the
organization and coherence of the transnational networks that bind the larger Syrian community.
Extending support to non-civilians
Informal networks that include non-civilians, particularly those that connect Syrian
48
refugee communities to armed opposition groups in Syria, work in fairly similar ways. As
Syrians collectivize to address civilian needs, it is not uncommon for them to engage with
Syrians who have political and military affiliations. During my own experiences visiting
ostensibly civilian Syrian community centers, I encountered individuals who play more direct
roles in the Syrian opposition on a regular basis: field doctors from battle sites in Dera’a, leaders
of different divisions of South Syria’s Free Syrian Army, political activists and dissidents, and
arms collectors. They often share familial or hometown ties to Syrian community leaders in
northern Jordan and use the resources made available by community networks to collect funds
and supplies, relocate their families to Jordan, spread news, and discuss opposition strategies. As
more Syrians flee to Jordan, the dynamics of civilian versus non-civilian become increasingly
complex.
Political sympathies and affiliations among Syrian refugees in Jordan
As of the summer of 2014, the majority of Syrian refugees in north Jordan sided with the
Syrian opposition to Al-Assad’s government. Most come from Dera’a and Damascus’
countryside, a region which has been largely divided between FSA-controlled and regime-held
areas. Many have faced the dire consequences of regime-attacks on civilian areas and the intense
back-and-forth between the regime and the FSA. However, it is important to distinguish armed
opposition from Syria’s formal political opposition, represented by the Syrian National Coalition
(SNC) and other related bodies. During the summer of 2014, the Syrian refugees I encountered
in my fieldwork overwhelmingly sided with the FSA forces while almost never identifying with
the public political figures of the SNC, who are thought to prioritize unavailing diplomacy and
49
negotiations over the real needs of the greater Syrian community.111
The relative ease with which Syrians in Jordan connect with and support members of
Syria’s opposition occurs in the context of implicitly partisan (non-neutral) practices. It is
relatively well known that the Syrian-Jordanian borders are spaces of cooperation between the
Jordanian military and the FSA. My interviews with leaders of South Syria’s Military Council
(of the FSA), as well as various media sources, have confirmed that implicit agreements between
these military groups permit the free movement of FSA leaders across the border. Moreover, at
one of the last border crossings to remain open at Ruwaishid, Jordanian intelligence and military
actively facilitate the transport of arms, food, and medical supplies across the border into Syria
as well as the entrance of refugees into Jordan.112
Circles of Syrian doctors working in Jordan
Syrian doctors are among the few groups of Syrians who have persisted in their attempts
to continue to practice their professions in Jordan. As explained in Chapter 5, until December
2014, Syrian refugees predominantly accessed healthcare through their UNHCR refugee
documentation that granted them free services at Jordan’s public hospitals. However, even before
Jordan decided to terminate this access, Syrians lacking proper documentation (primarily those
who could not afford the fees of renewing their expired UNHCR registration) looked to other
forms of medical support. Freelance volunteer Syrian doctors, who are prohibited by Jordanian
111
A handful of Syrian doctors informed me of the SNC’s donation of $100,000 to various Syrian clinics in Amman
in August 2014. The fact that this was surprising yet unimpressive to them illustrates their attitude toward Syria’s
formal political opposition.
112
Al Al-Abed, Tareq, “Who Controls Syrian Border Crossings?” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East (July
17, 2014): accessed September 2014.
50
law from practicing medicine in Jordan, largely met this need. 113 Besides providing everyday
healthcare to Syrian refugees, there undoubtedly exists a tremendous need for Syrian doctors in
private Jordanian hospitals, whereto injured Syrians, coming directly from battle sites and the
sites of various forms of violence and destruction inside Syria, are escorted by a combination of
Jordanian security and police.114
These hospitals only started receiving Syrian patients from the borders in the summer of
2013. At this time, Syrian doctors in Jordan organized to request entire floors of private hospitals
in Amman in which to treat injured Syrians. In interviews I conducted at a handful of these
hospitals, Syrian doctors characterized their groups as informal. The doctors had been brought
together by community networks, often originating in Syria, as well as by a common desire to
provide relief to war victims. Before March 2011, many of these doctors were working at Syrian
government hospitals. Once uprisings throughout the country began, these hospitals became
dangerous spaces, and soon, completely off-limits, to injured protesters and anyone perceived to
be siding with the opposition. Even now, Syrian doctors who treat the civilian victims of regime
violence continue to face threats, detention, and death at the hands of the Syrian government.
Today, Syrian doctors who remain working in Syria’s field hospitals stay connected to those who
have left for neighboring countries through support networks that mobilize funds, medical
supplies, and medicine for Syria’s injured and ill. They also use their connections to provide
synchronized responses to daily events (attacks) in south Syria and to personally monitor trauma
victims as they make their way to private ICUs in Jordan.115
In an interview I conducted with a Jordanian Health Ministry official, he stated that there
113
Montoya, Interview with freelance Syrian doctor, Dr. Nasser, Irbid, Jordan, August 15, 2014.
Detailed in Chapter 6
115
Montoya, Interview with field doctor from Dera’a, in Irbid, Jordan on August 2, 2014.
114
51
was a procedure in place for Syrian doctors to obtain a Jordanian license and therefore practice
medicine legally in their host country: they must first pass the Jordanian Medical Council exams,
register with the state, and join the Jordan Medical Association.116 Based on various Syrian
doctors’ accounts, the process of obtaining a Jordanian license is not only difficult, but
essentially unheard of. Once again, the discrepancy between official policy and actual practice is
clear. These accounts align with Jordan’s attempts to keep Syrians from entering the labor
market, both by making work permits expensive and difficult to obtain and by generating fear of
the consequences for being caught working illegally.
On paper, unregistered Syrian doctors are restricted to managing the logistics of patient
transfers. Yet with the continual influx of war victims from the borders and few Jordanian
doctors to treat them, many Syrian doctors are compelled to defy Jordan’s policies in order to
treat Syrian patients. In the hospitals I visited, Jordanian doctors often help give the guise of
compliance by briefly visiting Syrian wards each day to sign off on official documents and
register the surgeries of Syrian patients. Thus, they help Syrian doctors avoid the state’s punitive
measures for Syrians who are caught working illegally. In order to deal with the Health
Ministry’s monthly visits, Dr. “Al-Ghouta”, instated a protocol for Syrian doctors in his hospital
to hide in the basement, and Dr. “Muadamiyat” uses a fake patient ID to disguise himself.117 The
same health ministry official I interviewed acknowledged that most Syrian doctors in Jordan
quite literally work underground. For over a year, it seemed that as long as Syrian doctors
continued filling in for the lack of doctors treating incoming wounded Syrians, and as long as
they steered clear of politics, the Jordanian government would continue to turn something of an
116
Montoya, Interview with Dr. Nasser Al Adham, director of Syrian refugee affairs at Ministry of Health, at
Ministry of Health in Amman, Jordan on August 18, 2014.
117
Montoya, Interview with anonymous Syrian doctors at Bayader Hospital in Amman, Jordan on August 19, 2014.
52
acquiescent blind eye to these predominantly wageless doctors.
Throughout my survey of Syrian civil society and support networks, I observed the
uncompensated work of Syrian activists persist despite an increasingly charged political climate
set against them. In the next chapter, I will move my focus to the changes in environment that
Syrian communities have developed in over the past four years, with the Jordanian government
at the head of enacting those changes.
CHAPTER 6
Jordan’s Evolving Response to Syrian
Refugees
The latter part of this case study outlines the rise of Jordanian state control over Syrian
refugee communities within its borders. With state monitoring of informal (not state-supported)
activism, Syrian communities come into direct contact with Jordan’s formal regulations and
institutions. Moreover, due to the rise of security concerns in Jordan, particularly since the
escalation of more dangerous armed groups in Syria and Iraq (Jabhat an-Nusra, the Islamic State,
and others), Jordan’s policies for dealing with Syrian refugees in urban centers, refugee camps,
and borders areas increasingly prioritize national security. Over the four years of Syria’s war,
one sees the evolution of the nature of the conflict reflected in Jordan’s treatment of Syrian
refugees.
Uncontrollable influx of Syrians creates need for institutionalized practice in Jordan
53
Jordan’s acceptance of injured Syrians is largely seen as a humanitarian obligation. The
independent international organization, Doctors Without Borders (MSF), is present at Jordan’s
border hospitals. This arrangement presumes the Jordanian government’s collaboration in
addressing the “spillover” of Syrian victims into its borders. Unlike MSF, publicly funded
international organizations are constrained from providing relief to non-civilians, particularly if
“there are serious reasons for considering that [they have] committed a crime against peace, a
war crime, or a crime against humanity.”118 For any entity that is expected to remain neutral,
extending care to even the moderate opposition can be problematic. The same standard applies to
Jordan, as the kingdom has exercised diplomatic caution since early in the conflict and claims to
be a neutral bystander in the ongoing war.119
In this context, the overlaps and contradictions between caring for Syrian civilians and
managing the interests of the Syrian opposition are constant and ongoing. Keeping non-civilians
out of Jordan becomes more complicated when dealing with Syrians who didn’t deliberately
leave their homes for Jordan (and are not actively seeking refugee status) but rather were rushed
to the borders by the FSA. As injured war victims, they come from both civilian neighborhoods
and from the sites of skirmishes and their injuries largely exceed the capacities of Syrian field
hospitals.120
Although the Jordanian military and intelligence employ strict identification screening
118
UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty
Series
119
Davis, Carlo, “Jordan ‘Forced’ into Syrian Intervention? Economic Conditions Pressure Abdullah to Allow U.S.
Presence, Analysts Say,” The Huffington Post..(18 April 2013): accessed July 2014.
120
The following procedures for accepting injured Syrians were confirmed to be in place until November 2014. Due
to the gradual border closing that began at that time, I am unsure whether or not injured Syrian civilians and fighters
are currently allowed inside Jordan’s borders and hospitals for treatment, and if not, at what precise time this change
occurred.
54
methods throughout the registration process for refugees, they generally apply much looser
policies to injured Syrians seeking medical treatment. The procedures in place to manage this
influx supposedly privilege injured civilians and Syria’s moderate opposition (the FSA), yet
Jordan’s open-door policy inadvertently has extended to injured fighters from al-Qaida’s
affiliate, Jabhat an-Nusra, and possibly other active groups in Syria.
Jordanian security, intelligence, and medical personnel are undoubtedly aware of this.
Officials actively control the movement of Syrian trauma patients in Jordan in order to
compensate for their humanitarian open-door policies. Practicing similar movement control was
common when Palestinian refugees from Iraq living in Jordan’s Ruwaishid camp sought medical
treatment in Jordan’s cities after the 2003 American invasion.121 Now, members of Jordan’s
Civilian Defense escort injured Syrians to their first stop at the public Ramtha Government
Hospital. Here, Doctors without Borders specializes in lighter procedures. However, trauma
patients with bone and spinal cord injuries who require specialized attention are allowed to
proceed both deeper into the system and further inside Jordan’s borders, to private hospitals in
Amman, Zarqa, etc. Police officers supervise these patients’ stay, whether an unaccompanied
male or a family of patients, at one of several private, specialized hospitals. This route officially
terminates at the Joint Registration Center at Ruba’a al-Sarhan, close to the Syrian border in the
al-Mafraq governorate. There, individuals are registered and officials assess whether they will be
sent to al-Za’tari camp (to be escorted by police to further medical appointments at a later date)
or back to the dangerous zones in Syria from which they came.122
121
Frelick, Bill, 2006. Silent treatment: fleeing Iraq, Surviving Jordan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 80.
122 Montoya, Katy. “Humanitarian Crisis: Health Care and Jordan’s 600,000 Syrian Refugees.” Informed
Comment: Thoughts on Middle East, History, and Religion. 16 October 2014. Web.
55
The movement of Syrians through informal social networks is much harder for Jordanian
officials to regulate. Loopholes exist in the surveillance procedures that the state increasingly
imposes on Syrian refugees. While Jordanian officials claim that it is not possible for recovering
Syrian trauma patients to escape the regulated system that leads them to al-Za’atari or back to
Syria, certain intermediaries intervene on behalf of these vulnerable individuals. One such
humanitarian, Faris (pseudonym)123, from Irbid in north Jordan, works in complete service of the
Syrian community. Since retiring from decades of service in the Jordanian Security, he has used
his wasta, a cultural term denoting extensive social connections and certain privilege and status,
to pull young Syrian men out of this often merciless system. Given his strong connections to
Jordanian security, he frequently visits al-Za’tari Camp and private hospitals to follow up on
special cases that come to his attention through his ties to the greater Syrian community. Solely
through informal consent (no paperwork), security forces at al-Za’atari Camp allow him to pull
out Syrian individuals in order to provide them with needed surgeries and rehabilitation. Until
recently, when al-Za’atari Camp did not have a maternity ward giving birth, many of those that
Faris brought out of the camp were pregnant women. Nonetheless, even as a well-established
East-Bank Jordanian, Faris is subject to monitoring by Jordanian authorities. He explains that the
authorities’ primary concern with his work is ensuring that only moderate Syrian nationals—not
fighters from extremist groups, Palestinian refugees from Syria, or foreign fighters—seek refuge
in Jordan.
Jordan has overcompensated, perhaps, to dispel rumors suggesting that it is providing
refuge to non-moderate armed oppositions groups. At the same time, the evolution of its policies
toward Syrian refugees reflects the increasing security concerns at its borders. An article in the
123
Read more about “Faris” in Chapter 6
56
Forced Migration Review notes that since 2013, “Jordan has imposed bans on unaccompanied
men from entering the country.”124 The new threat of Islamic State fighters entering the country
compounds existing fears of Syrian regime agents penetrating the closely monitored borders, as
Jordanian border security officials explained to me. The same article describes a common
occurrence in conflict-ridden countries, where a separate political logic often applies to male
refugees of fighting age (as opposed to families, women, and children).125 Specifically, host
country policies toward adult males overemphasize their potential for picking up arms, and thus
discriminate against them by denying them civilian status. Scoping out possible threats to
Jordanian domestic security and curbing extremism are increasingly coming at the expense of
offering refuge to some of Syria’s most vulnerable displaced individuals.
Recent blanket changes in policy and practice
During the summer of 2014, rumors began to circulate in the international press about
Jordan’s repatriation of illegal Syrian workers and the strict limits imposed on Syrian refugees
waiting to enter from the border. Syrian social workers reported cases of Jordanian authorities
forcibly relocating unregistered urban refugees to live in refugee camps. The interviews I
conducted this summer with Syrian social workers upheld these claims. Meanwhile, official
Jordanian press denied Jordan’s involvement in deporting refugees back to Syria. 126 Months
later, international organizations and researchers have been able to substantiate these claims. A
November 2014 report released by Boston University (BU) compiles interviews with
124
Davis, Rochelle, Abbie Taylor, and Emma Murphy. “Gender, Conscription and Protection, and the War in
Syria.” Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University (Sept. 2014): accessed October 2014.
125
Davis et al, “Gender”
126
“Labor Ministry Considering New Measures for Working Syrians.” Jordan Times. (Aug. 2, 2014): accessed
November 2014.
57
international organizations and the testimonials of affected Syrians, providing conclusive
evidence of Jordan’s practice of forced-repatriation. In fact, escalating concerns over refugee
control and domestic security have created a charged political climate surrounding these matters.
It is clear that new security priorities have prompted authorities to deport threatening and
nonthreatening Syrian refugees alike. As the BU report states, “Syrian nationals are being
deported in some instances for violating laws, such as working illegally. Others are deported for
posing security problems, usually as a result of political actions, regardless of specific
affiliation.”127 Through this harsh practice, Jordan may damage its international image, even if
the kingdom is not a signee of the 1951 Refugee Convention.128
Meanwhile, Jordan’s increasingly repressive practices have created an even more hostile
climate for activists and humanitarian care givers. Instances of Jordan’s arbitrary crackdown on
various clinics where Syrian doctors are known to work have been ongoing. For example, in
May of 2014, authorities closed a large clinic providing free services to Syrian refugees that was
operating out of Irbid’s Chamber of Commerce (Ghurfah al-tijarah), attracting media attention
and widespread criticism of this arbitrary practice129 Even more serious is Human Rights
Watch’s December 2014 report on the ongoing deportations of Syrian medical workers “caught”
treating Syrian patients at Ramtha Public Hospital as well as at private hospitals around
Jordan.130 It is safe to conclude that Jordanian authorities may have already or may soon close
rehabilitation centers and Syrian hospital wards that were a part of this study.
127
Akram, Protecting, 63
Refoulement is also prohibited by Jordanian domestic law as well as the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture,
to which Jordan is also a signee
128
129
130
“Irbid health shuts down the Chamber of Commerce’s health center due to legal violations,” (title translated)
Addustour (May 3, 2014): accessed May 2014.
“Jordan: Syrian Medical Workers Deported.” Human Rights Watch (Dec. 8 2014): accessed Dec. 8, 2014.
58
A group of Syrian psychologists and psychiatrists who founded the initiative Bright
Future to provide mental health services to Syrians also discussed the insurmountable obstacles
to freely operating that Jordan’s Ministry of Labor imposed on their organization. They
ultimately decided to relocate to Turkey, where policies toward Syrian refugees are lauded for
their general generosity.131 Despite the unfavorable, even dangerous conditions, many Syrian
doctors and activists continue their work out of conviction in the importance of the services they
provide. Nonetheless, as Jordan’s repressive policies only become more severe, more
organizations are discouraged from founding or continuing their social initiatives. Alternatively,
as in the case of Bright Future, other humanitarians may decide to leave Jordan altogether and
provide services where they believe they will be able to operate at a fuller capacity.
As my initial research question hypothesized, the restriction of the freedom of Syrian
refugees and increased state regulation of their affairs is increasingly prevalent in the Jordan’s
approach to hosting this population. However, it is not certain that security concerns fully
account for the Jordanian regime’s logic. This possibility is complicated by a host of complex
coinciding factors.
Beyond security concerns: complexities of hosting refugees long-term
According to the same Boston University report, Jordan’s Ministry of the Interior,
particularly the Department of Security Intelligence, has assumed a head role in the registration
and monitoring of Syrian refugees. The government recently replaced the Jordanian non-profit,
the Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO), with an organization headed by the
Ministry of Interior, the Syrian Refugee Camp Directorate, to direct al-Za’tari camp. While
131
Interview at Bright Future office in Amman Jordan on August 19, 2014.
59
ostensibly, such moves exemplify the government’s push to address Syrian matters “through a
national security lens,”132 a closer look at the situation in al-Za’atari Camp reveals that a great
deal of graft was taking place within the JHCO, leading to the disappearance of large amounts of
monetary donations.133 Various non-governmental organizations operating in al-Za’atari Camp
now look favorably upon the change in management to the Ministry of Interior, hoping it will
address the culture of corruption that previously prevailed.
Furthermore, the security panic that has seized Jordan over the past year coincides with
various escalating crises surrounding Jordan on all sides. While border clashes intensified on the
Jordan-Syria border, reminding Jordanians of the proximity of Syria’s war, 134 the divisions
between al-Qaeda Iraq and Jabhat an-Nusra led to the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq
(ISIS) and the announcement of their caliphate on June 30, 2014 that claimed Mosul, Iraq’s
second largest city, as its capital. Between these groups, Jordanians represent the largest
nationality among foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.135 Pockets of Jordan have since seen various
outbursts of support for ISIS, particularly in the historically marginalized and “rebellious” Ma’an
governorate, giving the government more reason to fear the infiltration of ISIS into its borders.136
Meanwhile, on Jordan’s western border, the announcement of a Hamas-Fatah unity government,
linking Israel’s enemy government in the Gaza Strip to the more moderate Palestinian Authority
in the West Bank, led to Israel’s massive crackdown on occupation resistance groups in the West
132
Susan M. Akram and Boston University Law Students. Protecting Syrian Refugee: Laws, Policies, and Global
Responsibility Sharing. Publication. P.p.: Boston U Law School, 2014. p.56.
133
Montoya, Skype interview with Susan Akram, on February 20, 2015.
134
Ahmad al-Teemy, “Shelling from Syria lands close to Ramtha’s purification plant,”(Transl. title) Al-Ghad (June
16, 2014): accessed July 2014.
135
Mona Alami, “The New Generation of Jordanian Jihadi Fighters,” Sada Journal; Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (February 18, 2014): accessed February 2015.
136
Alice Su, “All Fades to Black: Jordanian city Ma’an copes with Islamic State threat” Al Jazeera America (Sept.
2, 2014): accessed Sept. 2014.
60
Bank and ultimately, the latest in a series of extremely destructive Israeli operation in Gaza in
the summer of 2014.137
Lodged between these domestic concerns as well as strained diplomatic relations with
Syria and Israel, Jordan’s recent policy changes largely reflect a sense of urgency in attempting
to avoid its own crisis. It is easy to see the restricting of freedoms across various segments of
Jordan’s population, not solely Syrian refugee communities. A conversation with the co-founder
of 7iber, one of the few (if not the only) independent media platforms still operating in Jordan,
helped reveal the extent of the government’s perseverance in restricting robust political
discussion and limiting critical voices.138 She spoke about 7iber’s resilience amidst continuous
attempts by the government to restrict and even shut down the media platform. When coupled
with Jordan’s recent blanket legislative changes,139 it is clear that Jordan’s evolving policies on
Syria are part of a wider move to counter domestic and regional instability with restricted
freedom and state control
CONCLUSION
Monitoring a Situation in Flux
With a wide range of factors contributing to the instability in Jordan, there are several
concluding questions that one can ask.
Given the escalating security concerns posed by cooperating with the Free Syrian Army,
is the cost of quietly supporting Syria’s moderate opposition is becoming too high?
Alternatively, the Jordanian government has found more covert ways of supporting Syria’s
137
Noam Chomsky, “The real reason Israel “mows the lawn” in Gaza” Alternet (Sept. 9, 2014): accessed February
2015.
138
Montoya, Interview with Lina Ejeilat (7iber Editor-in-Chief), in 7iber office in Amman on August 5, 2014.
139
Detailed in Chapter 4
61
moderate opposition? Could it also be that after almost four years of conflict, the Jordanian
government, like a significant number of Syrian refugees, is considering reconciliation with alAssad’s regime?140
Perhaps, one should start with the safer assumption. Jordan’s growing impatience most
likely stems from the utter lack of a solution to Syria’s persistent war and the resulting refugee
crisis. Its steady deviation from humanitarian obligation seems to reveal the kingdom’s
apprehensions toward hosting another refugee population, long-term. With its recent cut-off of
health services, its stricter control of Syrian refugee movement, and identity-screening within its
cities, it is also apparent that Jordan is trying to make life for refugees living in Jordan’s urban
areas increasingly difficult. As this continues and urban refugees become less and less able to
independently support themselves, returning to the refugee camps (where greater financial aid
and many free NGO services are reserved for refugees in the camps) not only seems more
attractive, but a necessity. 141 Moving refugees into the camps would move foreign financial aid
from the domain of the government’s control to that of the UNHCR, however it would also
alleviate Jordan’s strained labor, housing, education, and other social sectors that are struggling
to accommodate so many urban refugees.
The challenges that Jordan faces as a result of the Syrian war and in hosting another
refugee population are not only domestic. Jordan, like its neighbors, is extremely susceptible to
the rippling effects of regional crises. As a Major non-NATO ally to the United States, the latter
realizes that Jordanian instability has potentially destabilizing effects for the United States’
interests around the world. It is important to acknowledge that for better or for worse, the
140
Stevens, Matthew. “Dreaming of Home: Syrian Refugees in Jordan’s Cities- Will They Repatriated?”
Syria Comment RSS. N.p. 16 Sept. 2014. Web.
141
Katy Montoya, Interview with ARDD-Legal Service Project Manager, March 5, 2015.
62
changes in Jordan’s government policies are not just a reflection of the monarchy, but to a much
greater degree a reflection of the United States’ strategic interests in the Middle East. These
prioritize Jordan’s domestic security and stability above all else. Given the context of the United
States’ “War on Terror,” specifically the United States’ covert methods in waging this war, it is
reasonable to expect that the humanitarian concerns of Jordan’s Syrian refugee population are
not prioritized over “Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror capabilities.”142 Hightechnology surveillance is the new face of the security-state, which Jordan will increasingly
strive to become.
However, my research angle does not come from an International Relations perspective
but rather from a Political Anthropology lens that focuses on the situation at the community
level. Thus, I find it more pertinent to ask how it is that Jordan’s evolving political agenda will
affect its treatment of Syrian refugees and the consequent wellbeing of these communities. Can
their informal networks withstand repressive host country policies? How will underhanded
practices like repatriation undermine the resilience and cohesiveness of the larger Syrian
community?
In light of the considerations presented in this case study, we are forced to question what
constitutes informal politics and what constitutes underground activity and furthermore, how
these modes of operation exist and function vis-à-vis the other. Previous scholarship on
community-level politics (that circumvent formal and state institutions) suggests that informal
and underground activities can take place because their activities are largely invisible to or
142
Congressional Research Service, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, By Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-5700
(Washington D.C.: March 17, 2015).
63
ignored by the state. The case of Syrian refugees in Jordan brings new considerations to these
understandings.
Specifically, this case study adds a new variable to the underground-invisible spectrum
by making explicit that not only non-state actors and dissidents choose to hide their actions from
the state. The state also chooses to engage with, and thereby supports, certain “underground”
activities that fall within its interests. This type of government activity is dissimulated or
obscured to large media outlets, governments, and the state’s own population. As in the case of
Jordanian border security facilitating the border passage of Syrian opposition fighters, the state
sanctioned certain underground activities because sectors of its government were complicit in
these activities. This merits the supposition that even without the direct involvement of state
apparatuses, Jordan might have also permitted so-called underground activities to take place
under its close watch. It is unclear to what extent Jordan continues to facilitate some forms of
Syrian border trafficking, and to what extent it now restricts or even punishes Syrian traffickers.
Nonetheless, it is clear that if Jordan is still engaged in supporting Syrian rebels, regional
security conditions as well as other factors have forced the government to render its support even
less apparent. The contemporary case of Jordan-Syria demonstrates that the visibility of
underground activities (to the state) does not determine the activities’ legality. Furthermore, it
demonstrates that “underground activity” is not always “invisible”, since the Jordanian
government does not (or did not) overlook the clandestine activities of non-state, dissident Syrian
actors.
Notions of formal and informal state procedures in this case are also fluid insofar as the
Jordanian state does not present itself as a homogenous entity. Throughout my fieldwork, while
meeting with diversely ranking officials and representatives of “the state,” I observed that these
64
workers, in their capacity as individuals, may very well have been deviating from the state’s
“formal” vision for policy-enactment. The members of the mukhabarat that met monthly with
Faris, for example, seemed to operate and react to his activities based on their relationship to him
and their perceptions of his social standing. Rather than applying uniform policies, government
workers often created and enacted exceptions to the rule. This, too, might have been out of the
purview of the state. It is unclear to what extent the Jordanian government considers this
quotidian practice, largely shaped by government workers’ personal interests, acceptable policy.
This merits the question: how do these practices affect citizens’ and non-citizens’ perceptions of
the formality (legitimacy or bindingness) of Jordanian state policies. Thus, in conceptualizing
notions of informal politics, one must not only think about non-state actors’ actions falling
within or out of the bounds of formality and legality, but also the state’s various tolerances of
informal modalities, “illegal” activities, and exceptions to the rule.
I sought to establish causality between the case I studied—the unique circumstances of
Syrian refugee communities’ recent establishment in Jordan— and the framework through which
I approached the subject matter—the interactions of non-state actors with the Jordanian state and
its formal policies. This sort of causality would provide an answer to the question: did the
entrance of Syrian refugees into Jordan shift the pre-existing modalities of interaction between
informal communities in Jordan and the state? Did it shift the state’s pre-existing authoritarian
policies or methods of population control? A core research component that would allow me to
make such a claim is missing from my research. That is that I have not sought to create a case for
comparison with Jordan’s pre-2011 conditions—namely, Jordanian informal actors and
communities and their interactions with the state. Nonetheless, a number of factors that I do
bring to light certainly complicate the direct relationship between the Syrian refugee influx and
65
the transformation of Jordan’s policies. These include the concerns (surrounding regime
stability) that the (post-) “Arab Spring” poses for the Jordanian monarchy, the various eruptions
of regional conflict throughout 2014, as well as Jordan’s involvement in the United Statesdirected “war on terror” and gradual adoption of modern methods of state control.
Up to now, I have established that Jordan’s refugee policies have evolved over four years.
The state now perceives higher risks among the Syrian refugee population and as a result has
resorted to controlling and restricting their activities and movement. A clear extension of this
research would involve returning to Jordan in order to observe and analyze the effects of the
state’s harsher policies on the formation and workings of Syrian civil society—its clinics,
rehabilitation centers, community centers, and so forth. Using an on-the-ground perspective, I
would then be able to study how Syrian individuals are reacting to state-imposed obstacles to
securing their interests. As I will soon return to Jordan, I envision continuing this research.
Life is on halt for Syrians in Jordan who have little access to higher education,
healthcare, work, and general hope for mobility and flexibility in their lives. For many, Jordan is
just a temporary stop before refugees move on to Turkey or make the dangerous trip to Europe.
As European Union members, Australia, and now the United States offer thousands of
resettlement and asylum opportunities to Syrians, the common perception is that better treatment
and possibilities await them there.143 Jordan may be an increasingly undesirable place of refuge
for Syrians, but most have no other option than to stay and wait it out.
143
Nguyen, Katie. “UN Says Rich Nations Pledge to take 100,000 Syrian Refugees.” Reuters. 09 Dec. 2014. Web.
66
APPENDIX
Figure 1
Footnote 89
A field doctor from Deraauses
Google Maps to keep track of
regime and FSA-held areas in his
city. July 2014.
Figure 2
Footnote 90
Scene from astreet in
the Saudi Arabia-funded
areaof al-Za' atari Camp.
Aug. 2014.
Figure 3
Footnote 91
2-year old boy escorted alone to
Bayader Hospital in Amman. As a
victim of abarrel bomb dropped on
his home in Dera' a, he is receiving
life-saving treatment.
Aug. 2014.
67
Figure 4: Oral Consent Agreement Used During
Fieldwork Research
Footnote 4
Research Project: “Syrian Refugees Collectivizing in Jordan Becomes a Security Issue”
Oral Consent Agreement
In order to avoid collecting any of your identifying information, I am asking for
oral and not written consent of participants. If you understand and agree with the
statements below and agree to participate in an interview for my research, you may then
orally agree to the last statement in bold.
•
I have read the information on the study “The Effects of the Syrian War on
Jordan”.
•
By agreeing to participate in this interview, I will participate in a one-hour long
interview.
•
I will not be compensated for my time spent during this interview.
•
During the interview, will be asked questions about knowledge I have about my
work and the effects of the Syrian war and/ or Syrian refugees in Jordan.
•
I have considered the risks involved in participating in the interview when
deciding whether or not to participate in it.
•
I can change my mind about participating or decline participating with no penalty
to me.
•
After the interview, I can review, modify, and take back any of the responses I
give during the interview.
•
The information recorded in the interview will be kept confidential and my name
and other identifying information will be excluded from recorded interviews and/
or notes on the interviews.
•
All recorded and identifying information from my participation in the interview
will be destroyed by March 2014.
•
I know who to contact if I have any concerns about my participation in this
interview or about the research study I am participating in.
If you agree with the statements above and if you agree to participate in the interview,
please
say the statement below:
•
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me. I have had the
opportunity to ask questions about it and any questions I have been asked have been
68
Figure 5: Oral Consent Agreement transl. into
Modern Standard Arabic
69