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Advantage (___): Mexican Relations
First note, now is the KEY time for US-Mexican relations
Seguin, 2013 (Israel Hernández Seguin is Deputy Director of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations
(COMEXI). He also chairs the Council’s Youth Program and founded Internacionalistas, a magazine on global trends,
“Open Borders: Collaboration between Mexico and the U.S,” Chicago Policy Review, February 14, 2013,
http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2013/02/14/5011/;)
The change in administration in both countries offers a new opportunity to refocus the priorities of the
bilateral relationship. But it is Mexico that needs to take the lead at reframing the agenda, as the United States
will always remain concentrated on issues of pressing domestic interest. Fortunately, Mexican President Enrique
Peña Nieto has stated his administration’s interest in strengthening the economic relationship between both
countries.¶ Many experts have recommended building a regional economic agenda for North American
competitiveness. This requires strong political communication and strategic thinking about all the opportunities
and potentials that lie ahead. It is challenging to maneuver a regional agenda for competitiveness, however,
when the United States seems more focused currently on building its economic relationship with Asia , as
seen by the recent emphasis in the Trans Pacific Partnership.
Specifically, current modes of cooperation are insufficient
Duncan Wood, Professor of International Relations at ITAM and a Senior Associate with Wood 2012 [Duncan Wood is a
professor of International Relations at ITAM and a Senior Associate with CSIS, “Mexico’s Democratic Challenges”,
http://csis.org/files/publication/twqfall2012_Wood.pdf]
Finally, on security issues, the change in style, taking a less ‘‘hardline’’ approach, which seems likely from Pen˜a Nieto, will
not jeopardize the close relationship that has developed between the two countries through the Merida Initiative (a bilateral
agreement between the United States and Mexico providing $1.6 billion in aid in the form of training, equipment and
intelligence sharing) and related cooperative mechanisms. It would not be an exaggeration to say that security
cooperation is at a higher level than ever between the United States and Mexico, and the PRI understands
this. However, policy documents coming out of the Fundacio´n Colosio, the party’s think tank, suggest that the new
government will be less inclined to place security cooperation so prominently in the public eye, and will
instead seek to continue the project behind the scenes.15 Influential foreign policy advisors to Pen˜a Nieto,
such as former ambassador Jorge Montan˜o, have complained that Calderon’s focus on security in the
bilateral relationship has been highly damaging to Mexico’s image in Washington, and therefore needs to
be downplayed in the public arena.16
And, the plan spills over to broader cooperation
Wood, 2010 (Duncan Wood, , Duncan Wood is director of the Mexico Institute at the Wood- row Wilson Center for Scholars and a professor at the Instituto
Tecnológico Autónomo de Mexico(ITAM) in Mexico City, “Growing Potential for US- Mexico Energy Cooperation,” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Mexico Institute,
http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_energy.pdf;)
/Oil and gas/ As noted above, the
history of cooperation between the United States and Mexico on oil issues has been
limited by the historical sensitivity of Mexico’s government and people to any hint of interference from the
U.S. in what has traditionally been seen as a central element in the nation’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, recent
years have shown a softening on this sensitivity, in part due to generational change, in part due to political
change, and in part due to the success of negotiating a Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in 2012.
That agreement laid out a framework for determining the management and exploitation of cross- border oil reserves, and was hailed as a positive development. It was quickly
ratified in the Mexican Senate, but is has yet to be ratified in the United States, and so has not yet come into force. Before moving on to discuss new areas of cooperation, it is
important that this existing agreement is ratified. It is widely expected that the government of Enrique Peña Nieto will present an energy reform initiative to the Mexican
Congress early in 2013. While it is still unknown how ambitious that reform proposal will be, it is thought that the government will present an initiative that will be aimed at
opening the sector to greater levels of private participation in refining, petrochemicals and even in exploration and production. Such
an opening will of
course offer significant possibilities for foreign as well as Mexican firms, and will also open the door to
new areas of technical and regulatory collaboration between the two countries. Mexico’s energy establishment, and
Mexico the most interesting
plays in the future will be found in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, in the as yet untapped shale
reserves that are found throughout the east of the country, and in the geologically-complex fields of Chicontepec, where Pemex has been
consistently failing to meet production targets over the past four years. The application of cutting-edge technologies and techniques
from U.S. firms would likely be important in all three of these areas, and the experience of American firms
in shale plays would provide them with an advantage in the event of an opening in that area. Of particular
increasingly it seems, the government, hope that private investment will occur in unconventional hydrocarbons sector. For
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interest in this regard is the experience of U.S. firms in the hydraulic fracturing fracking business. The ability to extract shale oil
and gas in areas that suffer from water shortages (such as Texas) will be crucial to developing shale resources in Mexico, particularly in the north of the country. In fact existing
knowledge of the geological characteristics of the Eagle Ford formation will also be crucial in exploiting its oil and gas reserves in Coahuila, where the formation extends. One
Mexican company, Alfa, has already worked extensively with U.S. partners in the shale industry north of
the border, and we can expect higher levels of private sector collaboration to develop. Beyond exploration and production,
the pressing need for infrastructure stands out as an area with high potential for bilateral collaboration. First, it is vital that large scale construction of gas pipelines occurs, both
within Mexico and across the border. Within Mexico, the Calderon administration identified the need for multi-billion dollar investments in the creation of a truly national gas
pipeline network: at the present time the majority of western portion of the country lacks access to natural gas. Secondly, as was made painfully clear to a number of private
sector industrial consumers during 2012, during times of short supply, the country lacks the capacity to import extra supplies of gas from the United States due to the limitations
of the cross-border pipeline network. In 2012 this led to complaints from companies that they were unable to secure stable and sufficient supplies of gas for their manufacturing
processes. The prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico and the U.S. shale gas industry offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a petrochemical
production and export platform. The last major area for hydrocarbons cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico concerns regulation. As Mexico contemplates the opening of
its oil and gas industries, an issue of considerable concern is that of strengthening the regulatory agency, the Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH) and of designing
national regulations that will provide a level playing field between public and private sector actors, and will ensure the efficient and safe functioning of the industry. Of particular
concern, given the experience of recent years, is to guarantee environmental protection and operational safety, especially in deep water exploration and production (E&P).
Institutional ties between the CNH and U.S. regulatory agencies have been slowly developing since the creation of the Comisión in 2009, and were particularly important in the
context of the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. It is imperative that this cooperation is consolidated and strengthened into the future, and offers a low cost
opportunity in one of the least sensitive areas of the Mexican oil and gas sector.
Energy cooperation is at the core of the entire relationship
Baker Institute 11 – (August 28th 2011, James a. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, A non-partisan
organizations focusing on the study, formulation, execution, and criticism of public policy, “THE FUTURE OF OIL IN
MEXICO,” http://bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/news/news/the-future-of-oil-in-mexico)
The energy industry plays an important role in the Mexican economy, and energy trade is a major component to the U.S.Mexico relationship. The Mexican government relies on the oil industry for 35 percent of total government revenues,
Mexico is the third-largest foreign crude oil
supplier to the United States. However, with declining production and rising demand, Mexico could become a net oil importer
in the coming decade. President Calderón pushed for energy sector reform in Mexico, but more reforms will be needed for Mexico to
reverse its current path toward importer status. To examine these issues, this study identifies the dynamics of the political trends in Mexico that
including taxes and direct payments from Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the state oil company.
will impact future energy policy. Through this project, the Baker Institute seeks to promote a better understanding of the challenges facing Mexico’s oil
sector and to enhance the debate among policymakers, the media and industry on these important issues.
Strong relations are key to effective border security strategies and intelligence sharing
Fox News Latino 7/5 (U.S. Wants More Intelligence Cooperation With Mexico, White House Report States;
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/05/us-wants-more-intelligence-cooperation-with-mexico-white-house-reportstates/)
A newly released White House report on the U.S. border with Mexico highlights the Obama administration's strategic shift
toward forgoing a closer working relationship with its southern neighbor. This, despite recent restrictions by Enrique Peña
Nieto's government on who American intelligence services can contact in Mexico. The White House's 2013 National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy illustrated nine points that focus on interdiction, tackling drug cartels along the
border, halting money laundering, building up stronger communities and strengthening ties between the two nations in terms
of counternarcotics. “The U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship continues to grow based on strong, multi-layered institutional
ties,” the report stated. “Based on principles of shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence,
the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that continues to transform and strengthen the bilateral relationship in 2013
and beyond.” While the U.S. report touts a need for greater cooperation, new Mexican security policies could hamper that. A
recent decision by the Mexican government has ordered a halt in direct communications between American intelligence
agencies and their counterparts south of the border. Now instead of directly consulting local law enforcement, agencies like
the DEA and FBI will have to contact Mexico's Interior Ministry before being passed along through the proper channels.
Intelligence sharing, however, was a major talking point when President Barack Obama met with his Mexican counterpart
back in May. Despite scarce details about the meeting, the two leaders discussed border security and the use of drones along
the 1,954-mile shared border. Peña Nieto downplayed the notion that the new, more centralized arrangement would damage
its security partnership with the United States. He said Obama agreed during their private meeting earlier in the day to
"cooperate on the basis of mutual respect" to promote an efficient and effective strategy. "I think the U.S. government wants
to make sure that Peña Nieto is on the same page as Obama, that he wants to pursue the cartels as consistently and
aggressively as [former Mexican President] Calderón did during his presidency," Alex Sanchez, a security analyst at the
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, told ABC News. Even as the Obama administration hopes that Peña Nieto will continue to
go on the offensive against the drug cartels in Mexico, the report suggests a more humanitarian approach to the drug war.
Besides counternarcotics efforts, a solid portion of the report concerns community building measures along the border, ways
to deal with substance abuse and violence, as well as health and education programs.
And, border vulnerabilities make CBW and nuclear terrorism inevitable
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Krikorian 2004 (Mark, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies, MA from Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Keeping Terror Out: Immigration Policy and Asymmetric Warfare”, April 2004,
http://www.cis.org/node/380)
Because of the asymmetric nature of the threat, the burden of homeland defense is not borne mainly by our armed forces but
by agencies formerly seen as civilian entities - mainly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). And of DHS's expansive
portfolio, immigration control is central. The reason is elementary: no matter the weapon or delivery system - hijacked
airliners, shipping containers, suitcase nukes, anthrax spores - operatives are required to carry out the attacks. Those
operatives have to enter and work in the United States. In a very real sense, the primary weapons of our enemies are not
inanimate objects at all, but rather the terrorists themselves - especially in the case of suicide attackers. Thus keeping the
terrorists out or apprehending them after they get in is indispensable to victory. As President Bush said recently, "Our country
is a battlefield in the first war of the 21st century."
Nuclear terrorism is inevitable in the status quo—only shutting down the border will solve
Graham Allison, Prof @ Harvard, 25 January 2010 (Foreign Policy, A Failure to Imagine the Worst,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/25/a_failure_to_imagine_the_worst?page=0,0)
In his first speech to the U.N. Security Council, U.S. President Barack Obama challenged members to think about the impact
of a single nuclear bomb. He said: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -- be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or
Beijing, London or Paris -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people." The consequences, he noted, would "destabilize our
security, our economies, and our very way of life." Before the Sept. 11, 2001, assault on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon, who could have imagined that terrorists would mount an attack on the American homeland that would kill more
citizens than Japan did at Pearl Harbor? As then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission: "No
one could have imagined them taking a plane, slamming it into the Pentagon ... into the World Trade Center, using planes as
missiles." For most Americans, the idea of international terrorists conducting a successful attack on their homeland, killing
thousands of citizens, was not just unlikely. It was inconceivable. As is now evident, assertions about what is "imaginable" or
"conceivable," however, are propositions about our minds, not about what is objectively possible. Prior to 9/11, how unlikely
was a megaterrorist attack on the American homeland? In the previous decade, al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in
1993, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000 had together killed almost 250 and injured
nearly 6,000. Moreover, the organization was actively training thousands of recruits in camps in Afghanistan for future
terrorist operations. Thinking about risks we face today, we should reflect on the major conclusion of the bipartisan 9/11
Commission established to investigate that catastrophe. The U.S. national security establishment's principal failure prior to
Sept. 11, 2001, was, the commission found, a "failure of imagination." Summarized in a single sentence, the question now is:
Are we at risk of an equivalent failure to imagine a nuclear 9/11? After the recent attempted terrorist attack on Northwest
Airlines Flight 253, this question is more urgent than ever. The thought that terrorists could successfully explode a nuclear
bomb in an American city killing hundreds of thousands of people seems incomprehensible. This essential incredulity is
rooted in three deeply ingrained presumptions. First, no one could seriously intend to kill hundreds of thousands of people in
a single attack. Second, only states are capable of mass destruction; nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear
weapons. Third, terrorists would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American city. In a nutshell, these presumptions
lead to the conclusion: inconceivable. Why then does Obama call nuclear terrorism "the single most important national
security threat that we face" and "a threat that rises above all others in urgency?" Why the unanimity among those who have
shouldered responsibility for U.S. national security in recent years that this is a grave and present danger? In former CIA
Director George Tenet's assessment, "the main threat is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden]
and his operatives desperately want to go." When asked recently what keeps him awake at night, Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates answered: "It's the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Leaders
who have reached this conclusion about the genuine urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat are not unaware of their skeptics'
presumptions. Rather, they have examined the evidence, much of which has been painstakingly compiled here by Rolf
Mowatt-Larssen, former head of the CIA's terrorism and weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts, and much of which remains
classified. Specifically, who is seriously motivated to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans? Osama bin Laden, who has
declared his intention to kill "4 million Americans -- including 2 million children." The deeply held belief that even if they
wanted to, "men in caves can't do this" was then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's view when Tenet flew to Islamabad
to see him after 9/11. As Tenet (assisted by Mowatt-Larssen) took him step by step through the evidence, he discovered that
indeed they could. Terrorists' opportunities to bring a bomb into the United States follow the same trails along which 275
tons of drugs and 3 million people crossed U.S. borders illegally last year. In 2007, Congress established a successor to the
9/11 Commission to focus on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. This bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of
WMD Proliferation and Terrorism issued its report to Congress and the Obama administration in December 2008. In the
commission's unanimous judgment: "it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist
attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." Faced with the possibility of an American Hiroshima, many Americans
are paralyzed by a combination of denial and fatalism. Either it hasn't happened, so it's not going to happen; or, if it is going
to happen, there's nothing we can do to stop it. Both propositions are wrong. The countdown to a nuclear 9/11 can be stopped,
but only by realistic recognition of the threat, a clear agenda for action, and relentless determination to pursue it.
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Terrorists have already stolen nuclear material and are preparing to attack
John Zarocostas, The Washington Times, 10 December 2007 (Pre-empting a dirty bomb threat: global effort aims to stop
illegal nuclear trade with terrorists, ln)
Security officials warn that terrorists are trying to obtain radioactive mater-ials to construct a "dirty bomb" and have called on
countries around the globe to intensify efforts to stem the illicit traffic in nuclear bomb-making materials. "Since 2001, there
have been several attempts to obtain radiological material for use in a 'dirty bomb,' " said William Nye, director of counter-terrorism and intelligence at
Britain's Home Office. He noted that in the investigation codenamed Operation Rhyme, eight terrorists were convicted for planning attacks on buildings in the United Kingdom and the United States. Besides
planning to blow up limousines packed with gas cylinders and explosives, the cell's members "were considering using a radioactive bomb," he recently told an international conference in Edinburgh, Scotland,
A new United Nations report on nuclear terrorism by the Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) said
the most likely nuclear threat is terrorists' building a "dirty bomb," in which an ordinary explosive disperses radioactive mater-ials. These materials are widely used
organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
worldwide and often not adequately controlled. The report said a simulation showed that a dirty-bomb attack in Lower Manhattan would "spread radioactive fallout over sixty blocks. Immediate casualties
would be limited to victims of the immediate blast. The aftereffects, including relocation and cleanup, would cost tens of billions of dollars." Former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
such weapons can be constructed using materials such as cobalt and cesium, which
are available for use in hospitals and other industries. "That's why it's important to have good controls over all nuclear materials," he said. Patricia Lewis,
Hans Blix said a dirty would have "a terror effect" and noted that
UNIDIR director, said a dirty bomb would not cause much damage but over time would increase levels. She also said that news of a radioactive blast could cause mass panic and
that the economic and cleanup costs would be enormous. In Edinburgh, Mr. Nye stressed to security specialists from more than 60 countries, including the United States, that "we
have seen al Qaeda's leader in Iraq calling for nuclear scientists to join global jihad and there is no doubt that core al Qaeda
retains the ambition to build or obtain nuclear weapons." He said that at the moment, "it is questionable" whether the intent is
supported by real capability but cautioned that a series of successful interceptions of radiological and fissile material by
security forces show that it is possible to obtain materials, painting a worrying picture of a continuing and increasing threat.
In its 2006 annual report, the Vienna-based IAEA reported 149 incidents of illicit nuclear-materials trafficking in that year.
The total included 15 seizures of nuclear and radioactive material from people involved in trafficking and smuggling, the IAEA
report said. "We are in the same global boat in the fight against nuclear terrorism," Tomihiro Taniguchi, IAEA deputy director general. "There is now universal recognition of the
illicit trafficking problem and more uniform agreement on the need to take action to combat nuclear terrorism," Mr. Taniguchi said.
The report said one incident
involved the seizure of uranium enriched to 89 percent. The IAEA said more than 50 percent involved theft and loss of
material. It also noted that in about 75 percent of the cases, the material has not been recovered, "adding to the pool of lost
material, some of which is potentially available for malicious use." In late November, authorities in Slovakia arrested two Hungarians and a Ukrainian
in an attempted sale of uranium, according to an Associated Press report. Steven Aoki, deputy undersecretary for counterterrorism, told delegates that the IAEA database
has recorded more than 600 incidents since 1993 and pointed out that while the vast majority turned out to be scams and
frauds, "there have certainly been at least a few cases in which traffickers managed to obtain actual weapons-grade nuclear
material." Mr. Aoki said that recently, 60 countries have joined co-sponsors United States and Russia as partners in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, under which nations share
techniques to fight the threat and participate in joint exercises. This has included, he said, establishing cooperative procedures "to interdict sea and air shipments of materials related to weapons of mass
destruction, potentially including nuclear materials and related technology." The U.S. also is actively cooperating with allies and interested countries around the world to boost surveillance at major ports and
border crossings, according to U.S. officials. This includes the installation of radiation-detection equipment in ports around the world such as Antwerp, Belgium; Rotterdam, the Netherlands; and Singapore. In
October, in a statement to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Mr. Aoki said that "in this post-Cold-War world, nuclear terrorism may be the single most catastrophic threat that this nation faces."
Besides terrorists acquiring materials to construct radioactive dispersal devices (RDD) or dirty bombs, Mr. Aoki warned that
they could also acquire special nuclear materials - plutonium or enriched uranium - and build an improvised nuclear device,
or acquire one from a nuclear weapons state.
Specifically, al Qaeda has the motive and means to go nuclear
James R. Van De Velde, Booz Allen Hamilton, Washington, DC, August 2010 (“The Impossible Challenge of Deterring
“Nuclear Terrorism” by Al Qaeda”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 8)
Many of the 33 U.S. State Department-designated foreign terrorist organizations worldwide have expressed interest in
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) capabilities. And several terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda,
remain interested today in such materials and weapons; some groups have specifically shown interest in nuclear weapons as
well. A September 2006 statement by Al Qaeda in Iraq called on scientists to join the struggle in Iraq and produce
unconventional weapons against American forces in that country.10 Al Qaeda leadership in particular has shown a consistent
interest in the development of a nuclear capability and other WMD. Former senior Al Qaeda operations planner Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) confirmed in March 2003 that senior Al Qaeda leadership—including bin Laden, Ayman alZawahiri, and Muhammad 'Atif (a.k.a. Abu Hamza al-Masri)—all believed that obtaining a CBRN capability was necessary
and that they were intent on developing weapons that could cause large numbers of casualties. Following Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998,
bin Laden urged Muslims to follow Pakistan's example and “not be lax in possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.” In a 1999 interview, bin Laden called acquisition
of WMD a “religious duty.”11 As has been widely reported, in May 2003 ,
a Saudi cleric, Nasir Bin Hamad Al-Fahd, produced the only widely
recognized fatwa on the use of WMD. In “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against
Infidels”—a 25 page fatwa—Fahd argues that the Western ban on use of weapons of mass destruction “was not to protect
humanity but to protect themselves and monopolize such weapons.”12 Al-Fahd asserts that Americans and the West have killed ten million Muslims
and, therefore, “If a bomb that killed ten million of them and burned as much of their land as they have burned Muslims land were dropped on them it would be permissible, with
the current Al Qaeda leadership likely sympathizes with this
perspective. To state the obvious, using a WMD today would be “high impact and low cost” for a terrorist group: they have
no headquarters, for instance, to threaten in retaliation. And they accept death as part of their operation. And in reply, the
West has developed no deterrence policy based on punishment.
no need to mention any other argument.”13 It seems reasonable to conclude that
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That escalates to global nuclear war and extinction
Speice 2006 – 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm
and Mary L. Rev. 1427
Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a
result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a
nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or
given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally
threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is
necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to
constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear
device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it
was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective
means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial
complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was
collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and
who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to
sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to
terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be
devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the
United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and
potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material
from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This
proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the
likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.
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Advantage (___): Oil
First note, Mexican oil production is dwindling now-new sources of investment are necessary
Marcos et al, ’12 (“A New Beginning for Mexican Oil: principles and recommendations for a reform in Mexico’s
national interest” Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), previously known as Instituto Tecnológico de
México(ITM), was founded on March 29th, 1946, by the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura(Mexican Cultural Association) --‐
a renowned group of bankers, industrialists, and businessmen who, led by Raúl Baillères, worked to make higher education
the driving force behind industrial and economic change in Mexico.)
Although the purpose of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of the challenges facing
the oil and gas sector and the national oil company in Mexico, it is nonetheless important that we state
clearly what both the short--‐ and long--‐ term problems are, so that we can then move on to discuss
potential solutions. In recent years, these problems have become well--‐ known to the Mexican public
and to the political and economic elites in the country. The most notable, and most pressing energy
problem facing Mexico, of course, concerns the rapid decline in oil production experienced by the
company over the past 8 years. From a high point of 3.4 million barrels a day in 2004, crude production
has fallen to a low of 2.55 million in 2012, that is to say that there has been a 20 percent drop in national
production. Although Pemex has had success in 2011 in stabilizing production at this level, the outlook
for the next few years is worrying, as experts are predicting significant declines in the nation’s two most
productive fields, Ku Maloob Zaap and Cantarell, even at faster rates than those predicted by official
sources. Declines at these fields could cut as much as half a million barrels per day from national
production. The significance of the decline in production to date is a story that has been told many
times: not only does the extraction of less oil impact Pemex as a company, it hits national finances hard
since oil revenues continue to account for around 30% of the Federal government’s income. Just this
brief overview of the challenges facing the oil industry in Mexico shows us that fundamental change is
desperately needed. Current arrangements were largely designed to satisfy the political, social and
economic needs of previous generations, and economic models, and were not designed to face the
multiple challenges of the modern hydrocarbons industry and national economy that is much bigger and
more dynamic than ever before. As this paper will discuss below, the global oil and gas industries (as
well as the global economy in general) have gone through unprecedented change in the past two
decades, with unforeseen new challenges and innovations fundamentally altering the business of
exploration and production. During this same period Mexico’s national hydrocarbons sector has
stagnated, held back from reacting to these changes by constitutional, policy, financial and regulatory
limitations, and above all the perverse incentives provided by a huge and ready supply of easy oil. Now
that the multiple problems facing the sector are obvious, and the easy oil has been used up, Mexico must
empower the sector with the capacity to react to these past developments and to be able to predict future
transformations.
Mexico can’t fix status quo investment gaps on its own
Medlock 11 – (August 28th 2011, Kenneth B. Medlock Ph.D., Economics Professor at Rice University, “Scenarios for Oil
Supply, Demand and Net Exports for Mexico”, pg. 12, http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pubMedlockSoligoScenarios-04292011.pdf
It is believed that Mexico has substantial resources in the deepwater areas of the Gulf of Mexico. The U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) puts the mean estimate of those resources at 10 billion barrels . However, Pemex does not currently possess the
know-how and technology to develop these resources, and the recent spill in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico may, in any case, further delay
development. Even if new reforms would allow Pemex to partner with private firms to give it access to needed technology, the required lead times to
undertake seismic and development work, including the necessary infrastructure to handle production, suggests that oil from deepwater areas will be not be
produced for many years.8 In the meantime, Mexico will have to depend on its shallow water and onshore resources. Nevertheless, deepwater
development may be necessary to ensure long-term export capability and revenue generation. In this paper, we model Mexican oil
demand and supply to examine some possible scenarios for the future of Mexican oil exports. We find that under reasonable, average assumptions about
Mexican economic and population trends, Mexico could become a net importer of oil within the next 10 years if it fails to sufficiently
invest in upstream activities utilizing advanced technologies. Investment in oil field development has accelerated during the last two years but
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the results so far do not point to a reversal of the downward trend, given technical and geological barriers.9
Thus, without major changes, Mexico
may be heading for yet another crisis in both its balance of payments and federal budget accounts.
That’s driving up oil prices writ large-Mexican production is key
Alter 12 ( Diane Alter, Contributing Writer: April 2012; Money Morning, 2012,
http://moneymorning.com/2012/08/24/oil-prices-promise-to-head-higher-as-mexican-production-dwindles/)
In addition to Iranian threats and growing demand, dwindling production of crude in Mexico promises to push oil
prices higher as well. Mexico is the third biggest exporter of oil to the United States. That's bad news for the
U.S. economy which always gets hit when oil prices rise. From 2004 to 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy reports such
jolts, along with OPEC price manipulation, cost roughly $1.9 trillion. Plus, a recession followed each major blow. According to the
¶
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Mexican oil production reached a peak of 3.2 million barrels a day in 2008. And by 2011, it
wasn't even producing 3 million barrels a day. Since then oil
production has slipped to 2.5 million barrels a day. Worse
a decade if it cannot find fresh discoveries to make up for
still, Mexico could actually become a net importer of oil within
the 25% production drop since 2004 and fails to change its current policies.
The plan solves-four ways:
Fist, the US is key to initiate reforms necessary to revitalize the Mexican oil and gas industry
Snow ’13 (Nick Snow, editor for Oil and Gas journal, Mexico’s energy reforms will need to be bold, experts suggest, June
21, 2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/06/mexico-s-energy-reforms-will-need-to-be-bold-experts-suggest.html)
Mexico’s government, which is expected to announce energy reforms in August, will need to take bold steps if it expects to meaningfully participate in North America’s oil and
gas renaissance, experts said at a Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies forum. “ North
America’s oil and gas revolution is of enormous
importance to Mexico,” said Ernesto Marcos Giacoman, founding partner of Marcos y Associados, a consulting firm specializing in Mexico’s energy industry. “If
we don’t do more serious reforms, more Mexican companies will start to build plans in the US because natural gas prices are lower, and Mexico will lose its competitive
advantage.” “A good part of Mexico’s private sector is withholding investment in [national oil company Petroleos Mexicanos] because it wants to see what happens with the
reforms,” added Juan Pardinas Carpizo, general director of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness. “The sooner this is resolved, the better.” Duncan
Wood, who directs the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute and led the June 21 discussion, said Enrique Pena Nieto became president in December after campaigning to reform the
political reforms agreed to move legislation ahead, and fiscal and energy reform proposals are
pending, he indicated. “This time around, everyone recognizes that changes need to be made,” Wood said. “There’s not agreement
government overall. Other
yet on what those changes will be.” It’s generally assumed that Pemex will continue to own Mexico’s hydrocarbon resources, but production-sharing contracts and labor reform
have been mentioned, according to Marcos. Downstream private investment also might be allowed, and the national hydrocarbons commission could have more regulatory power,
he said. “The last time I checked, there were no chemical molecules on Mexico’s flag, but everyone treats it that way,” said Pardinas. “The challenge the next few months will be
to draw a line from oil and other chemical molecules through a national company with a confused corporate identity.” The US could help reform efforts by
releasing more information about dramatic changes under way in North American energy so Mexico would understand what it’s missing, he added. Pemex is the only one in the
world that operates from the wellhead to the retailer, Pardinas said. “Even Cuba is more competitive,” he observed.
The country also badly needs to
connect US gas transmission systems with Mexico’s industries, he said. “In parts of Mexico, we’re paying prices similar to China,”
Pardinas said. “ It’s essential to build infrastructure to bring US gas to Mexican industry, not only for energy
security but also for economic growth.”
Second, the plan boosts transboundary cooperation necessary to resolve disputes blocking access
now
US Department of State, ’12 (“US-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement” Fact Sheet, Office of the
Spokesperson, Washington D.C., February 20th, 2012. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184235.htm)
The United States and Mexico today signed an agreement concerning the development of oil and gas
reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of
Mexico. The Agreement is designed to enhance energy security in North America and support our
shared duty to exercise responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico. It is built on a commitment to the
safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety
and environmental standards. Further Growth in the Bilateral Energy Relationship: [First,] This
Agreement has been a catalyst for increased engagement between our respective safety regulators for the
oil and gas sector. That engagement is expected to deepen in the years ahead as we work together to
exercise responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico. [Second,] Mexico is consistently one of the top
three exporters of petroleum to the United States. It ranked second behind Canada in 2010 with exports
to the United States of 1.3 million barrels per day. The United States and Mexico launched the Bilateral
Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change in April 2009 to explore ways to further develop the
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potential of this important energy trading relationship. With its focus on renewable energy, energy
efficiency, adaptation, market mechanisms, forestry and land use, green jobs, low carbon energy
technology development and capacity building, the Bilateral Framework has supported work on
common emissions standards for heavy vehicles, closer integration of electricity grids and development
of solar and wind energy generation plants in the border region.
Third, the plan boosts US oil access
Wood 12 [Duncan Wood is a professor of International Relations at ITAM and a Senior
Associate with CSIS, “Mexico’s Democratic Challenges”,
http://csis.org/files/publication/twqfall2012_Wood.pdf]
The prospect of significant reforms in the areas of energy, labor, and fiscal affairs has important
ramifications for the United States. If energy reform does indeed lead to opening the oil and gas sector, U.S. oil
companies will have opportunities to participate and perhaps share in the profits in ways not seen since the
nationalization of Mexican oil in 1938. A boost in Mexican oil production also benefits the United States by
guaranteeing exports from a country that has been one of the United States’ most reliable suppliers in
recent decades.
Fourth, the plan ensures energy independence for the region away from other exporters
Wood, 10 (Duncan Wood, , Duncan Wood is director of the Mexico Institute at the Wood- row Wilson Center for Scholars and a professor at the Instituto Tecnológico
Autónomo de Mexico(ITAM) in Mexico City, “Growing Potential for US- Mexico Energy Cooperation,” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Mexico Institute,
http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_energy.pdf;)
The potential for effective collaboration between the two countries on questions on energy and climate
change is huge. As a region, North America currently offers the most positive outlook in the world in terms
of cheap, clean energy, largely thanks to the shale revolution that has taken place in recent years. Moreover, also thanks to
shale, the United States , Canada and Mexico all have the chance to become energy independent and
become net energy exporters to the world . The governments of the U.S. and Mexico should therefore
undertake intensive discussions early in the new administrations to identify priority areas in the short- and
medium-terms and should create institutional mechanisms through which these priorities can be pursued.
In many cases these discussions will be bilateral, but on some long-term issues, such as climate change, for example, it makes
sense to adopt a more regional approach, incorporating Canada into the process. As Mexico undertakes a new energy reform
process, the landscape for hydrocarbons and electricity will be subject to significant change. Mexico’s new government
has decided that the existing state-led approach to oil and gas exploitation is no longer valid, and no longer
serves the interests of the nation. This change will offer new opportunities for U.S. firms and potential
competitiveness gains for the American economy. The establishment of a clear agenda for talks on bilateral
cooperation is therefore a priority that should not be underestimated.
Next, reducing foreign oil dependency is key to solve great power war
Rosen 2010 - Deputy General Counsel @ Center for Naval Analyses & Professor of Homeland Security Law and Policy @ George Washington
University [Mark E. Rosen, ?Energy Independence and Climate Change: The Economic and National Security Consequences of Failing to Act,? University
of Richmond Law Review, March 2010 (Vol. 44, Issue 3)]
President Roosevelt’s tacit agreement in 1945 with Saudi Ara- bia promising U.S. protection in return for special U.S. access to Saudi oil
has more or less put the United States in the middle of four regional conflicts: Israel vs. Arab nations, Iraq vs. Iran, Iraq vs.
Kuwait, and the United States vs. Iraq.65 The links between access to oil and national security became explicit during the
Carter administration, in which the United States signaled its willingness to use military force to protect the world’s access
to oil in order to protect the global market.66 During that period, some international lawyers apparently reasoned that access to oil— essential for the generation of energy and
food—is a fundamental human right, which might reasonably justify the use of armed force to protect commercial access.67 Indeed, shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, President Bush
imposed a de facto military blockade of Iraq in advance of an authorization by the UN Security Council for states to take military action to re- move Iraqi forces from Kuwait.68 This action was the first time
since the Vietnam War that the United States had used military force to protect an economic interest.69 The action prompted criti- cisms from many—including the UN Secretary General—that the United
States must work through the Security Council.70 Given that blockades are generally considered equivalent to the aggres- sive use of armed force under a traditional law-of-war analysis,71 the 1990 blockade
vignette clearly demonstrates that the United States—and presumably other states as well—regard access to oil as a fundamental right, which may legally justify the use of mili- tary force. There is a
American dependence on imported oil constitutes a threat to the United States because a
substantial portion of those oil re- serves are controlled by governments that have historically pur- sued policies inimical to
U.S. interests. For example, Venezuela, which represents eleven percent of U.S. oil imports, “regularly espouses antiAmerican and anti-Western rhetoric both at home and abroad . . . [and] . . . promotes . . . [an] anti-U.S. influence in parts of Latin and South
growing consensus in U.S. national security circles that
America . . .”72 that retards the growth of friendly political and economic ties among the United States, Ve- nezuela, and a few other states in Latin and
South America. This scenario plays out in many different regions. Russia, for example, has used its oil leverage to exert extreme political
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pressure upon Ukraine and Belarus.73 Longstanding Western commercial rela- tions with repressive regimes in the Middle
East—i.e., Iran, Su- dan, and Saudi Arabia—raise similar issues because of the mixed strategic messages that are being sent.
Of course, large wealth transfers have allowed the Taliban in Saudi Arabia to bankroll terrorism.74 A. Chokepoints and
Flashpoints For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will most likely be involved in protecting access to oil supplies—
including the politi- cal independence of oil producers—and the global movements of using oil to help sustain the smooth
functioning of the world economy. The security challenges associated with preserving access to oil are complicated by
geographical “chokepoints,” through which oil flows or is transported, but which are vulnera- ble to piracy or closure.75
“Flashpoints” also exist as a result of po- litical—and sometimes military—competition to secure commer- cial or sovereign
access to oil in the face of disputed maritime and land claims that are associated with oil and gas deposits. Togeth- er, these
challenges have necessitated that the United States and its allies maintain costly navies and air forces to protect sea lanes,
ocean access, and maintain a presence to deter military competition in disputed regions. A selection of today’s chokepoints
and flashpoints follow There have been past threats by Iran to militarily close the strait.79 Additionally, there are ongoing territorial disputes
between the United Arab Emi- rates and Iran over ownership of three islands that are located in approaches to the strait.80 Closure of the strait would cause severe disruption in the movements of the world’s
oil supplies and, at a minimum, cause significant price increases and perhaps supply shortages in many regions for the duration of the closure.81 Dur- ing the War of the Tankers, oil prices increased from $13
per bar- rel to $31 a barrel due to supply disruptions and other “fear” fac- tors.82 Bab el-Mandeb. The strait separates Africa (Djibouti and Eri- trea) and Asia (Yemen), and it connects the Red Sea to the
Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Aden. The strait is an oil transit chokepoint since most of Europe’s crude oil from the Middle East passes north through Bab el-Mandeb into the Mediterranean via the Suez
Canal.83 Closure of the strait due to terrorist activities or for political/military reasons, could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline complex, diverting them
around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope).84 This would add greatly to transit time and cost, and would effectively tie-up spare tanker capacity. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb would
effectively block non-oil shipping from using the Suez Canal.85 In October 2002 the French-flagged tanker Limburg was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists.86 During the Yom Kippur War in
The Turkish Straits and Caspian Oil.
1973, Egypt closed the strait as a means of blockading the southern Israeli port of Eilat.87
The term “Turkish Straits” refers to the two
narrow straits in northwestern Turkey, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which connect the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea on one side and the Aegean arm of the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Turkey
and Russia have been locked in a longstanding dispute over passage issues involv- ing the Turkish Straits.88 The 1936 Montreux Convention puts Turkey in charge of regulating traffic through the straits;89
yet Turkey has been hard pressed to stop an onslaught of Russian, Ukrainian, and Cypriot tankers, which transport Caspian Sea oil to markets in Western Europe.90 Because of the very heavy ship- ping
traffic and very challenging geography, there have been many collisions and groundings in the past, creating terrible pol- lution incidents and death.91 Thus far, none of these incidents have been attributed to
state-on-state-conflict or terrorism;92 how- ever, the confined waterway is an especially attractive target be- cause of the grave economic and environmental damage that would result from a well-timed and
well-placed attack on a loaded tanker. The issues surrounding the straits are also a subset of larger problems associated with the exploitation of Caspian oil, including severe pollution of the Caspian Sea as a
result of im- prudent extraction techniques, as well as the ever-present poten- tial for conflict among the various claimants to the Caspian’s hy- drocarbon resources due to an inability of the various Caspian
China vs. Japan.
The Daiyu/Senkaku islands located in the East China Sea have become an increasingly contentious dispute because both
littoral states to agree on their maritime boundaries—and their legal areas in which to drill.93 Any one of these problems could be- come a major flashpoint in the future.
claimants have, in the past, used modern military platforms to patrol the areas of their claims in which there are suspected oil and gas deposits in the seabed.94 In September 2005, for example, China
dispatched five warships to disputed waters surrounding its oil and gas platforms, which were spotted by a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft.95 There have been other simi- lar military-to-military
encounters.96 Given the fact that both countries have modern armed forces and are comparatively ener- gy starved, it is not difficult to envision serious conflict erupting over these disputed areas.
The
Arctic Super Highway. Traditionalists would probably not
include the Arctic as a security chokepoint. The oil connection is reasonably well known: “22 percent of the world’s undiscovered
energy reserves are projected to be in the region (including 13 percent of the world’s petroleum and 30 percent of natural gas).”97 However, given the very small margins that transporters earn transporting oil
from point A to B,98 shipping companies are al- ways in search of shorter routes to transport oil to market. As the thawing of the Arctic Ocean continues as a result of climate change, this may create new
shipping routes that transporters of oil and other goods will use to maximize their profits and minim- ize their transit times. As supplies of readily exploitable crude oil are reduced, the probability increases
that some of this trade will result from exploitation activities in the land and littoral areas adjacent to the Arctic Sea. This development is concerning for a number of reasons: (1) the area is very remote and
could provide a safe haven to pirates seeking to hijack cargoes; (2) the environ- mental sensitivity of the area, and the concomitant difficulty of mounting a cleanup effort, means that an oil spill in that marine
environment will be much more persistent than an oil spill in temperate waters;100 (3) the Arctic presents unique navigational difficulties due to the lack of good charts, navigational aids, and
communications towers, as well as the impacts of extreme cold on the operational effectiveness of systems;101 (4) the unsettled na- ture of claims by various countries, including the United States, to the
seabed continental shelf resources in the littoral areas off their coastlines creates the potential for military competition and conflict over these claims.102 The International Maritime Organi- zation (“IMO”) is
now circulating draft guidelines for ships oper- ating in Arctic areas to promote—but not require—ship harden- ing against an iceberg strike, better crew training, and environmental protection measures.103
These guidelines are mere- ly advisory and can only be implemented via the flag states.104 Al- so, neither IMO nor any of the UN Law of the Sea Institutions have mandatory jurisdiction over any of the
flashpoint issues re- lating to competing continental shelf claims in the Arctic,105 mean- ing that any disputes will remain unresolved for a long time. The above is only a selected list of potential flashpoints
in which oil is the main culprit. Disputes between China and six other nations of the Spratly Islands, and other territories in the South China Sea, remain unresolved.106 The Spratly Islands could become a
The strategic straits of Malacca,
Lombok, and Sunda in Southeast Asia are absolutely essential to the movement of raw materials to Japan, Korea, and
China.108 Be- cause of Lombok’s depth and strategic location, it is a major tran- sit route for very large crude carriers that move between the Middle East and Asia.109 Lombok is an undefended
flashpoint in the future, involving the United States or its allies, because of the proximity of those areas to the major sea routes to Japan and Korea.107
waterway that is only eighteen kilometers in width at its southern opening, mak- ing it an attractive chokepoint for hijacking or eco-terrorism in which the waters of the environmentally sensitive Indonesian
archipelago would be held hostage.110
Also, high oil prices wreck the US economy
Tverberg 1-8, ’12 - Editor @ the Oil Drum
Why 2013 Will End in a Severe Recession, Gail Tverberg, Tue, 08 January 2013
http://oilprice.com/Finance/the-Economy/Why-2013-will-End-in-a-Severe-Recession.html
We have been hearing a lot about escaping the fiscal cliff, but our problem isn’t solved. The fixes to date have been partial and temporary. There are many
US economy will enter a severe recession by
the end of 2013.¶ My expectation is that credit markets are likely see increased defaults, as workers find their wages squeezed by
painful decisions ahead. Based on what I can see, the most likely outcome is that the
higher Social Security taxes, and as government programs are cut back. Credit is likely to decrease in availability and become higher-priced. It is quite
possible that credit
problems will adversely affect the international trade system. Stock markets will tend to perform poorly.
The F ederal R eserve will try to intervene in credit markets, but if the US government is one of the defaulters (at least temporarily), it may not be
able to completely fix the situation.¶ Less credit will tend to hold down prices of goods and services. Fewer people will be working, though,
so even at reduced prices, many people will find discretionary items such as larger homes, new cars, and restaurant meals to be unaffordable. Thus, once the
recession is in force, car sales are likely to drop, and prices of resale homes will again decline. ¶ Oil prices may temporarily drop. This price
decrease, together with a drop in credit availability, is likely to lead to a reduction in drilling in high-priced locations, such as US oil shale (tight oil) plays.¶
Other energy sources are also likely to be affected. Demand for electricity is likely to drop. Renewable energy investment is likely to decline because of less
electricity demand and less credit availability. By 2014 and 2015, less government funding may also play a role. ¶ This
recession is likely be
very long term . In fact, based on my view of the reasons for the recession, it may never be possible to exit from it
completely .¶ I base the foregoing views on several observations:¶ 1. High oil prices are a major cause of the U nited S tates Federal
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Government’s current financial problems. The financial difficulties occur because high oil prices tend to lead to unemployment,
and high unemployment tends to lead to higher government expenditures and lower government revenue. This is especially true for oil importers.¶ 2. The
United States and world’s oil problems have not been solved. While there are new sources of oil, they tend to be sources of expensive oil, so
they don’t solve the problem of high-priced oil. Furthermore, if our real economic problem is high-priced oil, and we have no way of permanently reducing
oil prices,
high oil prices can be expected to cause a long-term drag on economic growth .
US is key to the global economy
Caploe 9 David, CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia.,
“Focus still on America to lead global recovery”, April 7, The Strait Times, lexis
IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting
with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is
the global economy has in
fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they
sell to countries that sell to the US. This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also
enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, this deep inter-connection
between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'subprime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great
Depression. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that there is no other engine for the world economy - and
hasn't been for the last six decades. If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus,
US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world . Consequently, it is a matter of global
going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that
concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie'
banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why
they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are
If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine,
which country will? The obvious answer is China. But that is unrealistic for three reasons. First, China's economic health is
more tied to America's than practically any other country in the world . Indeed, the reason China has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US
Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it has structured its own economy to complement America's. The only way China can serve as the engine of the global
economy is if the US starts pulling it first. Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far
outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global
consumer of last resort. China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income , even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest
failing not just there but around the world as well. Which raises the question:
economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of
the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale.
Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about
is monetary
becoming the engine of the world economy : What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency? This is an extremely complex issue that the
US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US
It will try to avoid
the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much more confident in its ability to handle the
manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, the US will remain the engine of global
economic recovery for the foreseeable future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US and it is going to have to be solved there too .
some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history.
Economic collapse precipitates great power wars
Walter Mead, CFR, 4 February 2009 (Only Makes you stronger: Why the recession bolstered America,
http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts)
History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less
reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist
system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the
Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is
almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in
1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns
into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The
United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.
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Solvency
First, the plan resolves outstanding transboundary disputes and boost cooperation-that’s key to
accessing untapped reserves
Wood, 2012 (Duncan Wood is professor and director of the International Relations Program at the Instituto
Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City. He is also a researcher in the Centro de Derecho
Económico Internacional (CDEI) at ITAM. He is a member of the Mexican National Research System. Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, “US-Mexico Cross Border Energy Cooperation: a new era in the Gulf of
Mexico”. Monthly Report on PEMEX and U.S.-Mexico Energy Cooperation, March 2012.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/March_2012_Transboundary_Oil_Agreement_0.pdf)
On the 20th of February, the governments of Mexico and the United States signed a Transboundary
Hydrocarbons Agreement that resolves the question of what to do with potential oil reserves along
the dividing line between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico. Two areas in particular have been
disputed for a number of years: the Western and Eastern polygons, or "donut holes" as they are more
colloquially known, comprise over 500 miles of the maritime border between the two countries and are
thought to hold billions of barrels of crude oil (though nobody is sure quite how much, as
comprehensive seismic scans have not been undertaken). The signing of the treaty is extremely good
news as it marks the end of a decades-long process to try to determine oil rights in these two areas,
opening the door to exploration and production that offers the prospect of exciting new modes of
cooperation between Pemex and private oil companies. The Transboundary Agreement is a major
step forward for energy relations between the two countries, providing a major boost to Pemex as
it tries to improve its reserve position and its production outlook. The prospect of significant oil
discoveries in the border region, and the possibility of working alongside the private sector, is intriguing
and controversial, to say the least. What is certain is that the Treaty sets a new framework for
cooperation between the two countries that will produce new ways of thinking about oil
production in Mexico, an issue that will surely be of importance in the looming debate over energy
reform.
And, the plan is necessary to secure private investment and provide stability to the relationship
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2012 (“Oil, Mexico and the Transboundary Agreement”. 112th
Congress, 2nd Session. A Minority Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States
Senate)
Mexican hydrocarbon resources belong to the Mexican people. Popular enthusiasm and national pride is attached to those resources, and many Mexicans directly depend on the existing oil in- dustry for their livelihood and business interests. Crossing
into the territory of energy sector reform requires political courage on be- half of Mexican politicians. The United States
government em- phatically recognizes the privileged position of oil in Mexico’s poli- tics. Nonetheless, the United States
has direct interests in the future of oil and natural gas in Mexico. Most important among U.S. inter- ests is enhancing the
prosperity of the Mexican people. With strong cultural ties and a shared border, the U.S. benefits when Mexico grows.
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) has successfully staved off years of decreasing oil production and discovered deep water resources, but it has not been able to meaningfully increase produc- tion beyond its zone of comfort in shallow water. Without
reform, Mexico’s oil resources will not be developed in a way that trans- lates into a higher quality of life for Mexicans.
Benefits of physical barrels of oil produced are potentially much greater in relative importance on the Mexican side of the
border, which is experiencing decline in key fields, and that would be sub- stantially beneficial to U.S. interests in Mexican
economic growth. As discussed above, Mexico needs new oil production. Developing deep offshore production would help
diversify the Mexican oil port- folio, providing economic benefit to the Mexican state whether that oil is sold for export
markets or used domestically. Moreover, hav- ing IOCs working with PEMEX to boost domestic Mexican produc- tion will
provide useful commercial opportunities and, importantly, boost confidence that Mexico will have significant oil available to
export to the United States. As a reliable, proximate, and friendly neighbor, Mexican oil imports support U.S. energy
security. First, the TBA will, for the first time, allow U.S.-listed IOCs to work in partnership with PEMEX, not including
service contracts. Many observers are optimistic that the TBA is the metaphorical camel’s nose under the tent, paving the
way to broader reform in Mexico. There is no guarantee of such an outcome, however, failure for the U.S. to approve the
TBA may put a drag on Mexican domes- tic energy reform momentum. The TBA helps demonstrate that Mexico’s oil
patrimony can be protected in a joint production re- gime with U.S. companies. It was suggested by some senior officials that
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passage of the TBA could help prompt broader domestic en- ergy reform in Mexico. Second, it is unlikely that the U.S.
maritime border areas would be developed without the TBA, whereas a PEMEX official indicated desire to begin exploration
on the Mexican side of the border. Po- tential U.S. opponents of the TBA may argue that given PEMEX’s limited ability to
explore in deep water, the real effect of the TBA will be to reduce IOCs’ competitive advantages. In other words, the
opposition argument could state, the U.S. should simply move for- ward with exploration since our companies have the
capital and technology to move more quickly than PEMEX. That criticism ne- glects the reality that, over the long-term, the
IOCs have a greater interest in investing throughout Mexican territory than they do in a sliver of U.S. area along the maritime
border. Therefore, those IOCs would not risk enraging the Mexican government by, poten- tially, draining Mexican resources
from U.S. territory. Thus, U.S. interests in increased safe and secure domestic oil production along the border will be best
met with the TBA. Finally, passage of the TBA would boost U.S.-Mexico relations on energy issues, which have traditionally
lagged. Mexican officials roundly expressed support for the TBA and expectation for U.S. ratification in conversation with
the authors. The political impact of not approving and implementing the TBA would set back U.S.- Mexican relations on
energy specifically and more broadly. Each of our countries has hot button domestic political issues that take courage for
political leaders to address. In Mexico, oil is one such issue, and members of both the PAN and PRI put their political weight
behind ratification in Mexico. The U.S. not fulfilling its side of the agreement would, therefore, be seen as a violation of trust
and could erode confidence. In the extreme, although unlikely, if Mexico proceeds with domestic energy reforms, U.S.
companies could be shut out of certain opportunities until the TBA is ratified. However, bilateral benefits of approving the
agreement do not re- quire immediate passage; U.S. commitment can be demonstrated by the Obama administration formally
submitting the TBA for Congressional approval and commencement of Congressional hear- ings.
The plan is THE key to boosting the relationship and ensuring extensive hydrocarbon
infrastructure access
Wood, 2012 (Duncan Wood, Duncan Wood is director of the Mexico Institute at the Wood- row Wilson Center for Scholars and a professor at the Instituto Tecnológico
Autónomo de Mexico(ITAM) in Mexico City, “Recommendations for a New Administration: Safeguarding Progress with Mexico,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://csis.org/files/publication/121211_DWood_Mexico_HemFocus.pdf;)
Of course the new government arrives with its own priorities for the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and it is
essential that the follow-on Obama administration recognizes them. During the presidential campaign in Mexico,
the PRI made repeated statements call- ing for a new focus in the bilateral relationship, one that emphasizes
the positive elements of cooperation rather than just Mexico’s serious security problems. Moreover, Mexico’s new
president has a number of domestic policy priorities that are of immediate interest to the United States,
which will provide useful opportunities for engagement. Based on these, one might identify a number of areas for
bilateral cooperation: Continue to support the slow but steady move toward modernization of the energy sector,
focusing on the issues of energy security, a diverse energy matrix, and boosting Mexican oil and gas
production. This will require continued sensitivity to Mexican concerns over sovereignty and privatization,
but technical assistance and public education will be key components. The Economy and Energy Despite
disappointing growth figures over the past de- cade, Mexico currently presents itself as one of the most attractive
emerging markets for international investors . With an estimated GDP growth rate of 3.5 to 4 percent,
Mexico has recently surpassed Brazil as the main focus for economic optimism in Latin America and is well placed to
continue that trajectory. The fact that the two countries not only trade with each other, but make things together, has led to a
high level of interdependence be- tween the production chains in Mexico and the United States (and, of course, Canada), and
this is a continuing source of strength for NAFTA partners. Still, one of the reasons behind Mexico’s recent
lackluster economic performance has been its failure to implement the structural reforms needed to bring
about higher lev- els of growth. Of primary importance here is the area of energy policy. The decline of oil
production and reserves, and the multiple financial and administrative challenges facing Pemex, were not
adequately addressed by the Calderón government and are now a priority area for the new PRI
administration. If the new Congress that took over in September 2012 could pass a significant energy reform
that allows more private investment in the oil sec- tor and frees up Pemex to work with private firms, there
will be important new opportunities for U.S. energy firms. Continuing to engage with Mexican authorities
and civil society over the question of effective energy policy, while at the same time respecting Mexican
sensitivities , should be a priority for the new U.S. government. Beyond oil, the energy sector in Mexico would
also benefit from close cooperation with U.S. partners in the areas of shale gas development and the
construction of a modern and adequate transborder gas pipeline network to bring natural gas to market.
Integrated North American pro- duction stands to benefit from historically low energy prices thanks to the
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shale gas revolution—but only if that gas can find its way to the industrial consumers and elec- tricity
generators that currently lack access. Investing in and coordinating policy on such regional energy infrastructure must be a theme for bilateral relations . Mexico’s current political environment offers better
probabilities of real legislative progress than at any point since the mid-1990s. With the governing PRI party
close to a majority in the legislature, and with a policy program that is similar to that of the outgoing PAN administra- tion,
there is the chance for even more fruitful coopera- tion. Although the U.S. Congress may not offer the same
optimistic outlook, the U.S. administration should seize this opportunity to work with the new PRI
government to encourage constructive change.
Finally, the mere perception of the plan means the plan solves immediately
Luhnow and Iliff, 2013 (For the past decade, David Luhnow has been The Wall Street Journal’s Bureau Chief in Latin American, winner of the 2012Columbia
University School of Journalism Cabot Prize for Latin America and Carribean reporting, and Laurence Iliff, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal. “Mexico Moves on Energy in
Economic Reset,” The Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324162304578302343638712694.html;)
For decades, Mexico's energy policy has largely boiled down to exporting oil for cash to fund state spending.
Now the new government is negotiating with rival political parties to curb that practice and instead use
state monopoly Petróleos Mexicanos to a different end: cheaper energy, said Pemex CEO Emilio Lozoya. In an
interview with The Wall Street Journal, the 38-year-old chief said the administration of President Enrique Peña
Nieto was striving to overhaul tax and energy laws this year that Mr. Lozoya said would result in cheaper
energy for consumers and companies that could drive a more competitive economy. Now, the Mexican
government relies on Pemex, one of the world's biggest oil firms, for 35% of government spending, leaving
the company with little left over to invest in areas like natural gas. Private companies, meanwhile, are
largely barred from investing thanks to Mexico's nationalistic energy laws. The result is an energy-rich country
where companies often pay higher prices for energy than elsewhere. Mexico has large reserves of natural gas, for instance.
But since Pemex doesn't invest enough in gas, the country imports gas from the U.S.—raising costs to Mexican firms as they
try to compete with global players like China. "Energy ought to be looked at on a competitive basis and not as a foreignexchange generator," Mr. Lozoya said, pointing to a prospective investment boost in industries ranging from gas to
petrochemicals to fertilizers. Complicating matters, Mexico's oil output has slipped to 2.55 million barrels a day from a peak
of 3.4 million in 2004, as easy oil in the Gulf is replaced by more difficult reserves of deep-water oil and heavy oil onshore.
To boost production, the company will need more money, technology and know-how. Changing Mexico's energy laws
is widely seen as an important test for a country that captured the imagination of investors for linking its
economy in a free-trade deal with the U.S. in the mid-1990s, but which saw its star dim to other emerging
markets like China and Brazil in recent years. For Mexico, beset by drug violence the past few years, such
a move would send a powerful signal to investors, likely driving billions in foreign investment, economists
say. "This is all about regaining the reform momentum, and you don't see that that often in emerging markets today. Taking
on those taboos, and those changes, it would re-establish the Mexican narrative as a reformer and be very positive," said Gray
Newman, chief economist for Latin America at Morgan Stanley MS -0.65% . Change won't be easy. The oil
nationalization in 1938, by Mr. Peña Nieto's own Institutional Revolutionary Party, is seen as a key event in Mexican
identity. Some leftist lawmakers, Mexican contractors and even some foreign oil-service firms that work with Pemex on a fee
basis might see change as a threat, analysts say. The freshly appointed Mr. Lozoya, the youngest ever Pemex chief and who
is seen as close to the president, was careful not to discuss specifics about proposed changes to energy laws in the Tuesday
interview, saying it was up to Mexico's political parties. But he did point out that political parties here from left to right had
already come together in recent months on topics like education and labor reform. "Obviously, our challenge is we need to
deliver on the pending reforms and governing responsibly over the next years, but I do see this as a very good opportunity for
Mexico to retake a path of higher productivity and higher economic growth," he said. Mexico's conservative opposition, the
National Action Party, largely favors a broader opening of the energy business to private investment, while the leftist Party of
the Democratic Revolution has proposed a more limited opening for areas like refining. Mr. Newman believes Mr. Peña
Nieto may well deliver a broad-ranging reform. "I don't think the prospects for reform have been this strong in Mexico in
over 20 years," Mr. Newman said. The son of a former energy minister, Mr. Lozoya has had a tough start as head of
Mexico's largest company, which had 2011 sales of $111 billion. An explosion at a Pemex office building at the company's
Mexico City headquarters last month killed 37 workers. The company said the blast was caused by a buildup of methane in
the building's cellar, but doesn't yet know what caused the gas to accumulate. The investigation, led by the country's attorney
general's office, will take a few more weeks, Mr. Lozoya said. "We are in mourning, but we're standing and looking forward,
and working on our modernization plans," said the executive, who is the grandson of a revolutionary general and politician.
He pointed to the shale-gas revolution in the U.S., along with deep-water and heavy oil, as examples of how Mexico can
benefit from new technologies that boost energy output, lower prices and create jobs. Mexico may hold the world's fourth14
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biggest reserves of shale gas, according to the U.S. government. But Pemex has drilled only a few wells and not produced
any gas. "Mexico ought to be producing more of its own gas, and eventually exporting it," Mr. Lozoya, a lawyer and
economist who got his master's degree in public policy at Harvard said. " Clearly the geology that you have in some
parts of the U.S. extends into Mexican territory. So it's a matter of just investing and getting it done." Mr.
Lozoya also envisions Pemex acting as a lever of development for the economy, spurring the development of a stronger oil
service sector and promote new industries like ethanol. "It is important we support medium-size companies, together with
programs from national development banks, so they can access credit and be suppliers to Pemex, and make sure over the next
few years that we develop a strong oil-servicing industry in Mexico that can grow and be regionally competitive," he said,
speaking in English. The government is considering slowly replacing additives like MTBE in gasoline with ethanol, he said.
Pemex would act as the buyer and gatekeeper to the industry, Mr. Lozoya said. Last year, Pemex had to abandon its second
tender for ethanol to be used as a gasoline additive because the offers made were above the price the oil company was
prepared to pay. Mr. Lozoya said Pemex would be prepared to pay "above average prices" to firms. "Pemex may end up
paying a little bit more, but it would have a positive impact on the environment and on jobs domestically, so it would be
worth it," he said. "I foresee and I hope that in a couple of years we'll have a much stronger energy sector with many more
medium-size companies present in it; and that Pemex becomes a much stronger development lever of the country."
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Relations Advantage-Plan Solves
Cooperation over oil is key to the US/Mexican alliance
Wood, 10 (Duncan Wood, , Duncan Wood is director of the Mexico Institute at the Wood- row Wilson Center for Scholars and a professor at the Instituto Tecnológico
Autónomo de Mexico(ITAM) in Mexico City, “Growing Potential for US- Mexico Energy Cooperation,” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Mexico Institute,
http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_energy.pdf;)
/Oil and gas/ As noted above, the
history of cooperation between the United States and Mexico on oil issues has been
limited by the historical sensitivity of Mexico’s government and people to any hint of interference from the
U.S. in what has traditionally been seen as a central element in the nation’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, recent
years have shown a softening on this sensitivity, in part due to generational change, in part due to political
change, and in part due to the success of negotiating a Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in 2012.
That agreement laid out a framework for determining the management and exploitation of cross- border oil reserves, and was hailed as a positive development. It was quickly
ratified in the Mexican Senate, but is has yet to be ratified in the United States, and so has not yet come into force. Before moving on to discuss new areas of cooperation, it is
important that this existing agreement is ratified. It is widely expected that the government of Enrique Peña Nieto will present an energy reform initiative to the Mexican
Congress early in 2013. While it is still unknown how ambitious that reform proposal will be, it is thought that the government will present an initiative that will be aimed at
opening the sector to greater levels of private participation in refining, petrochemicals and even in exploration and production. Such
an opening will of
course offer significant possibilities for foreign as well as Mexican firms, and will also open the door to
new areas of technical and regulatory collaboration between the two countries. Mexico’s energy establishment, and
increasingly it seems, the government, hope that private investment will occur in unconventional hydrocarbons sector. For Mexico the most interesting
plays in the future will be found in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, in the as yet untapped shale
reserves that are found throughout the east of the country, and in the geologically-complex fields of Chicontepec, where Pemex has been
consistently failing to meet production targets over the past four years. The application of cutting-edge technologies and techniques
from U.S. firms would likely be important in all three of these areas, and the experience of American firms
in shale plays would provide them with an advantage in the event of an opening in that area. Of particular
interest in this regard is the experience of U.S. firms in the hydraulic fracturing fracking business. The ability to extract shale oil
and gas in areas that suffer from water shortages (such as Texas) will be crucial to developing shale resources in Mexico, particularly in the north of the country. In fact existing
knowledge of the geological characteristics of the Eagle Ford formation will also be crucial in exploiting its oil and gas reserves in Coahuila, where the formation extends. One
Mexican company, Alfa, has already worked extensively with U.S. partners in the shale industry north of
the border, and we can expect higher levels of private sector collaboration to develop. Beyond exploration and production,
the pressing need for infrastructure stands out as an area with high potential for bilateral collaboration. First, it is vital that large scale construction of gas pipelines occurs, both
within Mexico and across the border. Within Mexico, the Calderon administration identified the need for multi-billion dollar investments in the creation of a truly national gas
pipeline network: at the present time the majority of western portion of the country lacks access to natural gas. Secondly, as was made painfully clear to a number of private
sector industrial consumers during 2012, during times of short supply, the country lacks the capacity to import extra supplies of gas from the United States due to the limitations
of the cross-border pipeline network. In 2012 this led to complaints from companies that they were unable to secure stable and sufficient supplies of gas for their manufacturing
processes. The prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico and the U.S. shale gas industry offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a petrochemical
production and export platform. The last major area for hydrocarbons cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico concerns regulation. As Mexico contemplates the opening of
its oil and gas industries, an issue of considerable concern is that of strengthening the regulatory agency, the Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH) and of designing
national regulations that will provide a level playing field between public and private sector actors, and will ensure the efficient and safe functioning of the industry. Of particular
concern, given the experience of recent years, is to guarantee environmental protection and operational safety, especially in deep water exploration and production (E&P).
Institutional ties between the CNH and U.S. regulatory agencies have been slowly developing since the creation of the Comisión in 2009, and were particularly important in the
context of the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. It is imperative that this cooperation is consolidated and strengthened into the future, and offers a low cost
opportunity in one of the least sensitive areas of the Mexican oil and gas sector.
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Relations Advantage-Border Security Key to Terror
Porous American borders mean smuggling a weapon in would be easy
Allison 2004 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Prof of Government at
Harvard, former assistance Sec. Of Defense for policy, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 10-11)
Third, terrorists would not find it difficult to smuggle such a nuclear device into the United States. The nuclear material in
question is smaller than a football. Even an assembled device, like a suit-ease nuclear weapon, could be sent in a Federal
Express package, shipped in a cargo container, or checked as airline baggage. Of the seven million cargo containers that
arrive in U.S. ports each year, fewer than 5 percent are opened for inspection. As the chief executive of CSX Lines, one of
the foremost container-shipping companies, noted, "If you can smuggle heroin in containers, you may be able to smuggle in a
nuclear bomb."17
US security is terrible – smuggling would be easy
Graham Allison, Harvard Government Prof, 2002 [The National Interest, "The New Containment: An Alliance Against
Nuclear Terrorism," w/ Andrei Kokoshin, Fall, LN]
Terrorists would not find it very difficult to sneak a nuclear device or nuclear fissile material into the United States via
shipping containers, trucks, ships or aircraft. Recall that the nuclear material required is smaller than a football. Even an
assembled device, like a suitcase nuclear weapon, could be shipped in a container, in the hull of a ship or in a trunk carried by an
aircraft. After this past September 11, the number of containers that are x-rayed has increased, to about 500 of the 5,000 containers currently arriving daily
at the port of New York/New Jersey-approximately 10 percent. But as the chief executive of CSX Lines, one of the foremost container-shipping companies,
put it: "If you can smuggle heroin in containers, you may be able to smuggle in a nuclear bomb." Effectively countering missile
attacks will require technological breakthroughs well beyond current systems. Success in countering covert delivery of weapons will require not just
technical advances but a conceptual breakthrough. Recent efforts to bolster border security are laudable, but they only begin to scratch the surface. More
than 500 million people, 11 million trucks and 2 million rail cars cross into the United States each year, while 7,500 foreignflag ships make 51,000 calls in U.S. ports. That's not counting the tens of thousands of people, hundreds of aircraft and numerous boats that enter
illegally and uncounted. Given this volume and the lengthy land and sea borders of the United States, even a radically renovated
and reorganized system cannot aspire to be airtight.
Illegal drug smuggling provides an easy avenue for nuclear weapons smuggling
Allison 2004 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Prof of Government at
Harvard, former assistance Sec. Of Defense for policy, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 113-115)
Terrorists who insist on an even higher likelihood of success will follow the drugs . The Bush administration has declared
that the United States is creating "a seamless air, land, and sea border that protects the United States against foreign threats
while moving legitimate goods and people into and out of the country."31 To see how far short of that aspiration current performance falls, one need
only consider the tons of drugs and thousands of people who go around, over, under, and through established checkpoints every day. Professional
smugglers have used a wide array of tools and vehicles for delivering their goods: snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, nightvision optics, global positioning system (GPS) equipment, cabin cruisers, sailing vessels, private Cessna planes—even corporate jets.
In recent years they have literally gone underground. In February 2002, officials from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) discovered a fourfoot-wide, 1,200-foot-long tunnel that ran twenty feet underground from Mexico to the small border town of Tecate,
California, seventy miles east of San Diego. Through that tunnel, an underground rail system was used to "smuggle billions of dollars' worth of cocaine,
marijuana, and other drugs into the United States for several years," according to these officials.32 The tunnel included electrical lighting and a
sophisticated ventilation system. DEA and Customs agents shut down six similar tunnels in the last nine months of 2002 , but
they know that many more exist, from simple shafts to more elaborate construction projects. The special agent in charge of the San Diego DEA office
pointed out that such tunnels "would be a secure way to facilitate the movement of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction."33 The continental United
States shares a 4,000-mile border with Canada and a 2,000-mile border with Mexico. With Alaska and Hawaii included, the borders
stretch for 7,500 miles on land and 12,400 miles along the coastline. Roughly 300 border-crossing points, 360 deepwater
seaports, and 430 commercial airports represent official points of entry into the United States. But they constitute less than 1
percent of America's entire 20,000-mile-long perimeter. To a smuggler, the U.S. border must look like a gigantic piece of
Swiss cheese, with holes big enough to drive a truck through. Indeed, in many places, the border disappears altogether.
Twenty-one different American Indian reservations stretch across hundreds of miles of the northern and southern borders, and no state or federal agency has
jurisdiction to patrol these lands. In New York, roughly ten miles of unpatrolled border crosses through the Akwesasne reservation
of the St. Regis Mohawk nation, which has denied access to U.S. agents. As the local Franklin County district attorney remarked, "Over the
years, everything has been smuggled through there, from Iranian rugs—when you weren't supposed to bring in Iranian rugs—to people, to drugs, to alcohol
and cigarettes. . . . The bad guys have always known about it."34 Four of the five Great Lakes also straddle the border with Canada. People
who set out on the lakes for an afternoon of recreational boating or fishing find no line in the water when they pass from
Canada to the United States or vice versa. In northern Maine, some houses are built right on the dividing line, with the living room or the kitchen
table technically in two countries.
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Terrorists could also smuggle weapons with illegal immigrants across the border
Allison 2004 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Prof of Government at
Harvard, former assistance Sec. Of Defense for policy, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 116)
Drug trafficking is not the only trade exploiting the holes in America's Swiss-cheese borders. Sneaking illegal immigrants
past the Border Patrol has also become a big business. Many migrants pay "coyotes"—professional human smugglers—
thousands of dollars to help them enter the country. As many as 500,000 people successfully slip across the border—through
tunnels, in the trunks of cars, or on foot overland across the southwestern deserts—and take up residence in the United States
each year, despite the more than $9 billion that our government spends each year on border controls as part of the national
homeland security effort. As one officer put it, "The best we can do is manage the border, not control it."39
Almost all the smuggling routes that are used in bringing illegal immigrants or drugs into the United States would be an
equally effective way to transport a nuclear weapon across the border. After all, a nuclear weapon is smaller than a person,
and the HEU or plutonium for a bomb's core could weigh less than the hundred-pound loads of drugs that smugglers bring in
backpacks. It is not uncommon for migrants to get themselves deep into the United States without anyone noticing. Any
sophisticated terrorist group can surely do better.
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Relations Advantage-Yes Nuclear Terror Impact
Terrorists have the means to detonate a nuclear device
Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, November 2008 (Securing the Bomb 2008, p. v)
Terrorists are still seeking nuclear weapons—and al-Qaeda is reconstituting its ability to plan and conduct complex
operations in the mountains of Pakistan. If a technically sophisticated terrorist group could get the needed nuclear materials,
it might well be able to make at least a crude nuclear bomb—capable of turning the heart of a modern city into smoldering
ruins. The horror of a terrorist nuclear attack, should it ever occur, would transform America and the world—and not for
the better. But despite substantial progress in improving nuclear security, some stockpiles of potential bomb material
remain dangerously insecure. In Russia, there have been major improvements in nuclear security—the difference between
the security in place at many nuclear sites today and the security in place in 1994 is like night and day. But Russia has the
world’s largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials, located in the world’s largest number of buildings and
bunkers; some serious security weaknesses still remain, ranging from poorly trained, sometimes suicidal guards to serious
under-funding of nuclear security; and the upgraded security systems must face huge threats, from insider theft
conspiracies to terrorist groups who have shown an ability to strike in force, without warning or mercy. In Pakistan, a
relatively small nuclear stockpile, believed to be heavily guarded, faces even more severe threats, both from nuclear
insiders with violent Islamic extremist sympathies and from outsider attack, potentially by scores or hundreds of al-Qaeda
fighters. Some 130 nuclear research reactors around the world still use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as their fuel, and
many of these have only the most modest security measures in place—in some cases, no more than a night watchman and a
chain-link fence. The break-in by armed attackers at the Pelindaba site in South Africa in November 2007—a site with
hundreds of kilograms of weapon-grade uranium—is a reminder that nuclear security is a global problem, not just a
problem in the former Soviet Union. And incidents such as the inadvertent flight of six nuclear warheads to Barksdale Air
Force Base make it clear that nuclear security requires constant vigilance, and that every country where these stockpiles
exist, including the United States, has more to do to ensure that they are effectively secured.
Terrorists will be able to steal nuclear material from Russia
Graham Allison, Harvard Government Prof, 2005 [The American Prospect, "The Gravest Danger," March, LN]
Russia's 12-time-zone expanse contains more nuclear weapons and materials than any country in the world , including more than
8,000 assembled warheads and enough weapons-usable material for 80,000 more, much of it vulnerable to theft. Thirteen years on,
according to Department of Energy data, not even half of Russia's nuclear weapons and materials have been secured to acceptable standards. These
present attractive targets for terrorists shopping for a bomb. In her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice agreed, stating, "I
really can think of nothing more important than being able to proceed with the safe dismantlement of the Soviet arsenal, with nuclear safeguards to make
certain that nuclear-weapons facilities and the like are well secured." But after America was attacked by bin Laden, what happened to U.S. spending and
related efforts to secure nuclear weapons? Funding for the critical Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program for securing loose fissile material
remained at about the same level. And the brute fact is that in Russia, fewer potential nuclear bombs were secured in the two years after
9-11 than in the two years before. Nuclear materials remain vulnerable to theft in a number of other countries as well . As
inspectors have been unraveling and retracing A.Q. Khan's global black-market network, we now know that Libya was not his only
customer. Clearly he traded nuclear secrets and technologies to the North Koreans for their assistance with Pakistani
missile programs, and inspectors are still searching for the results of his dozen trips to Iran in the '90s. Although in the past four years some highly
enriched uranium has been removed from five countries, bombs-worth amounts of nuclear material remain at risky research reactors in more than 20
transitional and developing states, including Belarus and Uzbekistan. In some cases, there is little more protecting the weapons-quality
material than a padlock and an unarmed guard.
Additionally, lax security makes gaining access to nuclear material in Pakistan relatively simple
Allison 2004 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Prof of Government at
Harvard, former assistance Sec. Of Defense for policy, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 39-40)
Musharraf's alignment with the United States has brought him into confrontation not just with the Pakistani people but with
some of the most respected figures from the country's most powerful institutions. It is a widely held belief among Pakistan's
scientific and military elite that Pakistan, as the home of the first Islamic bomb, has a duty to share its knowledge. General Hamid Gul, the former
head of ISI, has been unrepentant in his belief that Osama bin Laden was not responsible for 9/11 and that it is Pakistan's duty to develop an Islamic nuclear
infrastructure to protect Muslims in the future. In his own words, "We have the nuclear capability that can destroy Madras; surely the same
missile can do the same to Tel Aviv. Washington cannot stop Muslim suicidal attacks. . . . Taliban are still alive and along with 'friends' they will
continue the holy jihad against the U.S."52 Just as troubling, in January 2004, the New York Times obtained a brochure advertising different types of nuclear
technology available to other nations from the Khan Research Laboratories. The booklet, emblazoned with a Pakistani government stamp, was
one of a batch that had been in circulation to the world's nuclear aspirants for several years. Not until the brochure was leaked to the press did
Musharraf's government reluctantly call in Dr. Khan, who held the post of special adviser to the president, for questioning, leading very quickly to his arrest,
confession, and pardon—another attempt by Musharraf to walk the line between addressing American security concerns and placating hard-line elements within
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his country. Further revelations about the sale of nuclear materials and expertise to Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea (Khan
made thirteen visits to North Korea beginning in the 1990s)53 have brought these ominous developments to a head. The
nuclear sales took place either with Musharraf's approval or without his knowledge. It is unclear which scenario is worse.
Musharraf has also made a deal with the Islamist parties to step down as head of the military by December 2004 in exchange
for a vote of confidence to serve out his presidential term until 2007, raising questions of whether he will be able to maintain control of
the country without control of the Army. Musharraf's dilemma is compounded by the fact that he is now under American pressure to take a more conciliatory
position on the Kashmir dispute with India, another political stand that contravenes public opinion in Pakistan. Several terrorist organizations
nominally focused on the Kashmir conflict are already operating beyond Musharraf's control . One such group, Jaish-eMohammed (JEM), has been linked to several major terror attacks, including the bombing of the Indian parliament in
December 2001 and an attack in October 2000 on the local legislature in Indian-held Kashmir that killed thirty-eight people. JEM is a splinter
group of an older jihadist organization, Harkat-ulMujahideen, with close ties to Osama bin Laden. JEM has ties to the Pakistani establishment as well:
Brigadier Abdullah, the former head of the ISI's Kashmir department, is believed to have played a critical role in promoting JEM when it broke away from
Harkat.54 But JEM is hardly following orders from Islamabad. Pakistan officially banned the group in 2002 but has had
limited success in rooting it out. American intelligence officials believe that JEM was behind two separate assassination attempts aimed at
Musharraf in December 2003, including an attempt by two suicide bombers to ram pickup trucks filled with explosives into the president's motorcade on
Christmas Day.55 Under these conditions, the emergence of a splinter group armed with nuclear expertise and access from within the
Pakistani establishment looks increasingly feasible. We know that such a group would have the requisite organizational
competence and nuclear know-how. But it now seems they also have a plausible purpose to pursue nuclear terrorism, either to
express anger that Musharraf has become a puppet of the United States, to rid the country of the American infidel, or to answer bin Laden's call "to prepare as
much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God." Indeed, one can imagine elements within the military or nuclear establishment proudly
concluding that they are the only ones who can carry out bin Laden's vision.
Moreover, terrorists have multiple points of entry to the U.S., making delivery impossible to stop
Allison, ‘4 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Prof of Government at
Harvard, former assistance Sec. Of Defense for policy, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 10-11)
Third, terrorists would not find it difficult to smuggle such a nuclear device into the United States. The nuclear material in
question is smaller than a football. Even an assembled device, like a suit-ease nuclear weapon, could be sent in a Federal
Express package, shipped in a cargo container, or checked as airline baggage. Of the seven million cargo containers that
arrive in U.S. ports each year, fewer than 5 percent are opened for inspection. As the chief executive of CSX Lines, one of
the foremost container-shipping companies, noted, "If you can smuggle heroin in containers, you may be able to smuggle in a
nuclear bomb."
Once the bomb has been delivered terrorists have the motive to detonate
Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, November 2008 (Securing the Bomb 2008, p. v)
Do terrorists want nuclear weapons? For most terrorists, focused on small-scale violence to attain local objectives, the
answer is “no.” But for a small set of terrorists, the answer is clearly “yes.” Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction a “religious duty.”6 Al-Qaeda operatives have made repeated
attempts to buy nuclear material for a nuclear bomb, or to recruit nuclear expertise— including the two extremist Pakistani
nuclear weapon scientists who met with bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to discuss nuclear weapons. For years, alQaeda operatives have repeatedly ex-pressed the desire to inflict a “Hiroshima” on the United States.7 Before al-Qaeda, the
Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo also made a concerted effort to get nuclear weapons.8 With at least two groups going
down this path in the last 15 years, there is no reason to expect that others will not do so in the future. Rolf MowattLarssen, head of intelligence for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), testified to the U.S. Senate in the spring of 2008
that “al-Qaida’s nuclear intent remains clear,” citing, among other things, bin Laden’s successful effort, in 2003, to get a
radical Saudi cleric to issue a religious ruling, or fatwa, authorizing the use of nuclear weapons on American civilians.9
Mowatt -Larssen warned that the world’s efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining the ability “to develop and detonate a
nuclear weapon” are likely to be “tested” in “the early years of the 21st century.”
20
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
Relations Advantage-Yes Retaliation
The U.S. will target the state from which the nuclear material was acquired-this escalates to
nuclear apocalypse
Beljac 2008 (Marko, PhD at Monash University, Teaches at LaTrobe University and the University of Melbourne, "The
nuclear terror of Bush 'negligence policy", June 16th, Eureka Street, Vo 18 No 12,
http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=75850
It was not widely reported, but in February the Bush Administration enacted what may turn out to be one of the most
significant policy decisions it has made in response to 9/11. President Bush signed new presidential guidance that provides an
entirely new mission for US nuclear forces. The White House has effectively developed a new policy on the deterrence of
nuclear terrorism. The policy was announced in a little-noted closed speech given by Stephen Hadley, President Bush's
national security adviser, at Stanford University. He stated that, 'as part of this strategy to combat nuclear terrorism, the
President has approved a new declaratory policy to help deter terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction against the
United States, our friends, and allies'. He also stated that, 'as many of you know, the United States has made clear for many
years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the
United States, our people, our forces and our friends and allies'. The phrase 'overwhelming force' has always been
understood to refer to the employment of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has seemingly developed a farreaching policy that is partly designed to deter the acquisition of fissile material by terrorists. It would seek to deter al Qaeda
indirectly by deterring state actors from providing assistance, such as knowingly transferring fissile material to terrorists. But
more may be at play here. The United States may actually have developed a 'negligence doctrine' for the deterrence of
nuclear terrorism. As former Bush Administration official Elbridge Colby observed of the new policy, 'any and all thinking of
participation, complicity, or negligence in the face of a catastrophic attack against the United States or its allies should have
reason to worry about the retaliation that would follow'. If through nuclear forensics the fissile material used in a nuclear
terrorist attack were attributed to a Russian or Pakistani facility, the United States may well respond, under the new policy,
by striking Russia or Pakistan using nuclear weapons. This would be a proportionate attack, most likely employing lowyield B61-11 nuclear weapons. A negligence doctrine would involve striking even if the fissile materials were stolen, not just
knowingly leaked, from one of their facilities on grounds that they were 'negligent' in their handling of fissile materials. Most
analysts argue that should fissile material be stolen and used to fuel an improvised bomb it would most likely come from a
Russian facility. The central aspect of any deterrence posture is credibility — advocates of a negligence doctrine argue that
this type of deterrence would be credible because the United States has, or will soon have, a nuclear first strike capability
against Russia. This is extremely wishful thinking. By no means can the US be said to have a first strike capability. In fact, a
negligence doctrine increases the chance of what should properly be regarded as the leading security threat facing the world,
namely inadvertent nuclear war. Imagine if a nuclear weapon was detonated in New York that employed fissile material
attributed to a Russian nuclear facility, and that, immediately thereafter, the US decided to adhere to a negligence policy and
strike back with a limited low yield nuclear strike. Russia would likely respond in kind. This would set off a chain reaction
leading, at best, to limited and controlled exchanges or, at worst, to an all out exchange. Quite literally, the Bush
Administration may have handed al Qaeda the keys to Armageddon. The negligence doctrine quite clearly violates the
most elementary principles of natural justice. It is clear that the civilian population of, say, Pakistan would in no way be
liable for negligence. If implemented — and policies such as this can create 'commitment traps' — the negligence doctrine
will properly be taken as a monumental act of injustice throughout the Islamic world, which would support al Qaeda's
political objectives. In the so-called 'war on terror' there is more to be gained through consideration of issues such as Middle
East policy and inter-cultural and religious dialogue than there is in military posturing.
Overwhelming pressure from the public and within the gov prompts nuclear retaliation
Caitlin Talmadge, PhD candidate and member of the Security Studies Program in the Department of Political Science at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 2007 (Deterring a Nuclear 9/11, The Washington Quarterly 30:2, Project
Muse)
U.S. leaders also would want to emphasize that retaliation, perhaps in kind, perhaps through devastatingly precise
conventional attacks, would be strategically necessary and politically unavoidable in the aftermath of a terrorist nuclear
detonation. The U.S. government could not sit idly by, knowing the origin of a terrorist nuclear weapon detonated on its soil,
and not retaliate against the state(s) or substate organization(s) responsible for it, especially if those states or organizations
had a history of supporting terrorism. To do otherwise would be to invite follow-on attacks and to allow the deaths of
hundreds of thousands of Americans to go unanswered. The American public would demand retribution, especially if the
terrorists themselves were nowhere to be found. Or so U.S. leaders could claim, whether it is true now or not. The more that
U.S. leaders publicly emphasize the possession of an attribution capability and a willingness to retaliate against those who
assist terrorists, the more the public will in fact expect such retaliation.
21
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
Relations Advantage-Terrorists Can Build the Bomb
Wrong – if they have the material, they could do it easily
Matthew Bunn, senior research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Issues in Science and Technology,
Winter 2005, PP. 55-62
Second, if terrorists could obtain the HEU or plutonium that are the essential ingredients of a nuclear bomb, making a bomb
might well be within the capabilities of a sophisticated group. One study by the now-defunct congressional Office of
Technology Assessment summarized the threat: "A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the
classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device . . . Only modest machine-shop
facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required."
Terrorists only need materials – construction and delivery aren’t a problem
Cirincione , (Senior Associate and Director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace), 2005 (Joseph, Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, 19 ND J. L. Ethics &
Pub Pol'y 339, lexis)
<One of the debating points in the 2004 Presidential Election was that John Kerry said he was going to get the job done in the next four years, not in the next
ten years as currently planned. The current administration is still piddling along with budgets of about one billion dollars a year on these programs. Kerry
said he would triple that amount. More than that, there are these stockpiles of nuclear material out there in reactors in about forty other
nations. People have civilian research reactors that the Russians and we sold them during the 1950's and 1960's that
use [*346] highly enriched uranium. The fuel is ideal for terrorist use - you can simply take it and put it in a bomb. The
hardest thing for a terrorist to do in constructing a nuclear weapon is getting the material. Every step after that is easier for
them and harder for us to stop. The designs are well known. If they can get the material, either a softball sized chunk of highly enriched
uranium, twenty-five kilograms, or about four or five kilograms of plutonium, the designs are pretty well known. There is enough technology, and
there are enough scientists on the market that they can bribe or coerce to help. Once they put it in a package, delivery is easy.
As Kerry said during the campaign, most of our cargo is not inspected when it comes into this country. All you need to do is put it
on a cargo ship heading into lower Manhattan, and way before it gets to customs you can detonate the device.>
Building the bomb is easy – almost no expertise required
Allison 2004 (Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Prof of Government at
Harvard, former assistance Sec. Of Defense for policy, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 92-93)
National security experts agree that the most likely way terrorists will obtain a nuclear bomb will not be to steal or purchase
a fully operational device but to buy fissile material and construct their own. President Bush was correct when he argued that
if Saddam Hussein had obtained a softball-size lump of HEU, he "could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." With the
same quantity of HEU, Al Qaeda or another terrorist group could do the same. It took the genius of Albert Einstein and numerous
other Nobel Prize–winning physicists to imagine and construct the first nuclear weapon. But that was sixty years ago. Nonetheless, in the popular
imagination, the belief persists that building a nuclear weapon requires Manhattan Project—style science. Those who work with nuclear
weapons have always known better. David Lilienthal, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, acknowledged in
1948 that the myth of a secret formula was "nothing less than a gigantic hoax."22 And Theodore Taylor, the nuclear
physicist who designed America's smallest and largest atomic bombs, has repeatedly stated that given fissile material,
building a bomb is "very easy. Double underline. Very easy."23
In 1979, Secretary of Energy James R. Schlesinger asked for a federal court injunction to prevent the publication of an article in the Progressive
magazine titled "The H-Bomb Secret." 24 For only the second time in American history—the first being the Nixon administration's attempted
censorship of the Pentagon Papers—the government sought to exercise "prior restraint" to block a publication it judged damaging to the national
interest. The article described the physics of the hydrogen bomb in such detail that it would have been classified Top Secret if it had been a government
document. But after a six-month court battle, the article appeared in the Progressive exactly as originally written, complete with schematics of
a thermonuclear weapon. It is now available on the Internet.25 Recent revelations about A. Q. Khan's nuclear network demonstrated that
complete fission bomb designs are now available for sale on the black market.26 An official at the International Atomic
Energy Agency who reviewed plans confiscated in Libya remarked to the journalist Seymour Hersh that the design in
question was "a sweet little bomb" that would be "too big and too heavy for a Scud, but it'll go into a family car"—a
"terrorist's dream."
22
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
Relations Advantage-Terrorists Want the Bomb
You’re wrong-Al Qaeda actively seeking a nuclear weapon-multiple factors prove
Evan Montgomery, PhD candidate @ UVA and Research Fellow, 2009 (Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the threat,
developing a response, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)
Given the events of the past several years, it is hardly surprising that, at present, the threat of WMD terrorism in general and
nuclear terrorism in particular comes primarily from Osama bin Laden and his followers, who have not only expressed a
willingness to use WMD against their enemies, but who have also made repeated — although largely unsuccessful — efforts
to acquire unconventional weapons. Al Qaeda’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction has been well documented in recent
years, as evidenced by a number of highly publicized incidents, including the purchase of a container believed to contain
uranium (but which was in fact counterfeit) by a bin Laden representative in Sudan;55 bin Laden’s own reference to the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a “religious duty;”56 his success at prompting a well-known Saudi cleric to
issue a fatwa (or religious opinion) sanctioning mass murder with WMD;57 the group’s claim to have purchased several socalled suitcase nuclear weapons from former Soviet scientists;58 intelligence reports over a period of several months in
2002 and 2003 indicating that al Qaeda was negotiating the purchase of three Russian nuclear weapons;59 and a meeting that
took place between bin willingness to use WMD against their enemies, but have also made repeated efforts to acquire
unconventional weapons. Laden, Zawahiri, and two high ranking Pakistani nuclear scientists who “appear to have provided
Al Qaeda a road map to building nuclear weapons.”60 Initially, the group’s interest in WMD appears to have been driven by
the hope of deterring the United States from invading its sanctuary in Afghanistan by acquiring several nuclear weapons,
smuggling them into the United States, and using them to retaliate in the event of an American attack.61 Over time this view
changed, however, and the group began to consider unconventional weapons as something that should be used in a first
strike against its enemies.62 Bin Laden in particular was and perhaps remains focused primarily on acquiring nuclear
weapons, which have apparently been the subject of his attention since at least 1992.63 Journalist Steve Coll describes how
these weapons fit within bin Laden’s worldview: Since the late 1980s and certainly since 1991, bin Laden has seen the
United States as the principal invader of the Muslim world because of its support for the Saudi Royal family, Israel and
other Middle Eastern governments he labels apostate. In often tedious debates with comrades during the 1990s, he has
argued that only by attacking distant America could al Qaeda hope to mortally wound the Middle East’s frontline
authoritarian governments. His inspiration, repeatedly cited in his writings and interviews, is the American atomic bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which he says shocked Japan’s fading imperial government into a surrender it might not
otherwise have contemplated. Bin Laden has said several times that he is seeking to acquire and use nuclear weapons not
only because it is God’s will, but because he wants to do to Ame
And – al Qaeda is different – they have no qualms about using nukes against the US
Matthew Bunn, Harvard Senior Research Associate, Managing the Atom Project, 2004 [Securing the Bomb: An Agenda
for Action, w/ Anthony Wier, May, http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf]
Reality: This conclusion is correct for the vast majority of the world’s terrorist groups. Focused on local issues, seeking to become the governments of
the areas now controlled by their enemies (and thus not wanting to destroy those areas), needing to build political support that might be undermined by the
horror and wanton destruction of innocent life that would result from a nuclear attack, most terrorists probably would not want to get and use a
nuclear bomb even if they could readily do so. 8 But al Qaeda is different. They are focused on a global struggle, for which
the immense power of nuclear weapons might be seen as necessary, not a local battle for which such weapons are
unneeded. They have gone to considerable lengths to justify to their supporters and audiences the use of mass violence, including the mass killing of
innocent civilians. And they have explicitly set inflicting the maximum possible level of damage on the United States and its
allies as one of their organizational goals. Al Qaeda’s spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, has argued that the group “has the right
to kill 4 million Americans—2 million of them children,” in retaliation for the deaths the group believes the United States and Israel have
inflicted on Muslims.9 Al Qaeda’s followers believe, in effect, that they brought down the Soviet Union—that the mujahedeen’s success in forcing the
Soviet Union from Afghanistan was a key factor leading to the Soviet collapse. And they appear to believe that the United States, too, is a
“paper tiger” which can be driven to collapse—that the 9/11 attacks inflicted grievous damage on U.S. economic power (Osama bin Laden once
estimated the total cost at $1 trillion), and that still larger blows are needed to bring the United States down. As bin Laden put it in a message to his followers
in December 2001, “America is in retreat by the grace of God Almighty and economic attrition is continuing up to today. But it needs further blows. The
young men need to seek out the nodes of the American economy and strike the enemy’s nodes.” The notion that major blows could cause the
collapse of the United States is, in essence, al Qaeda’s idea of how it will achieve victory. A nuclear blast incinerating a
U.S. city would be exactly the kind of blow they want. Bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network have made their desire
for nuclear weapons for use against the United States and its allies explicit, by both word and deed. Bin Laden has called the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) a “religious duty.”12 Intercepted al Qaeda communications
reportedly have referred to inflicting a “Hiroshima” on the United States .13 Al Qaeda operatives have made repeated attempts to buy
stolen nuclear material from which to make a nuclear bomb. They have tried to recruit nuclear weapon scientists to help them. The extensive
downloaded materials on nuclear weapons (and crude bomb design drawings) found in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan make clear
the group’s continuing desire for a nuclear capability.14 Detailed analysis of al Qaeda’s efforts suggests that, had they not been deprived of
their Afghanistan sanctuary, and had they acquired nuclear material, their quest for a nuclear weapon might have succeeded within a few years— and the
23
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
danger that it could succeed elsewhere still remains. As President Bush has summarized the situation, “These same terrorists are searching for weapons of
mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons the moment they are
capable of doing so. No hint of conscience would prevent it.” Indeed, the President has warned not only that al Qaeda is seeking weapons of mass
destruction for use against the United States and its allies, but that, even after the removal of their Afghanistan sanctuary , “the
evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.” Moreover, al Qaeda and its far-flung network of affiliates are not the only terrorists with such
ambitions. Some statements by Chechen terrorists and documents seized from them have also suggested an interest in largescale nuclear terrorism—either by sabotage of a major nuclear facility or use of a nuclear bomb—and Chechen terrorists have repeatedly
indicated an interest in the use of radiological weapons (including the placement of a container of radiological material in a Moscow park in
1995).
24
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
Relations Advantage-Climate Change Impact
Ernesto Zedillo, co-chair; President of Mexico, Thomas R. Pickering, Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Members of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, Mauricio Cárdenas,
Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative, Brookings, and Leonardo MartinezDiaz, Deputy Director of the Commission; Political Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings.
Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission. The Brookings Institution. November 2008 (“Rethinking U.S.–
Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.pdf)
Addressing the challenge of energy security will require making energy consumption more efficient and developing new
energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge of climate change will require finding ways to control carbon emissions,
helping the world shift away from carbon-intensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing
ecosystems. Potential solutions to these problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a sustained
hemispheric partnership. Latin America has enormous potential to help meet the world’s growing thirst for energy,
both in terms of hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves.
Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazil’s oil reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if recent
discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great potential in solar energy
generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world
leader in sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and
wind power, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the hemisphere’s
energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production (especially deep
offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil
alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major
investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian
electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to
connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America.
Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution.
Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However,
efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism
has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional
cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines,
remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production
and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains
underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will
require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners.
25
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
Relations Advantage-Economy Impact
Relations key to solve environmental and economic collapse
Starr, adjunct fellow specializing in Mexico at the Pacific Council on International Policy, 2009 (Pamela K., “Mexico and
the United States: A Window of Opportunity?”, Pacific Council on International Policy, April 2009,
http://www.pacificcouncil.org/pdfs/Mexico_and_the_United_States.pdf)
The answer to these questions is of utmost importance to the United States. With a profound economic crisis dominating the
agenda of the new Obama administration and two wars, China’s rise, and growing Russian belligerence demanding foreign
policy attention, Mexico’s signifi cance to the United States was largely overlooked during the 2008 presidential campaign.
Yet no other country has more effect on the daily lives of Americans, a fact that extends well beyond the headline- grabbing
problems associated with the drug trade and undocumented immigrants. Mexico has an impact on our ability to protect
public health, provide environmental protection, and ensure energy security. It affects prices, salaries, and job creation in the
U.S. economy, and it is a key driver of the evident demographic shift in the U.S. population. Mexico’s infl uence across this
wide range of issues can be positive as well as negative, creating real opportunities as well as challenges not just for
policymakers in Washington but also for those in state capitals and local communities throughout the nation.2 Mexico also
matters to the United States as a reliable regional partner, albeit a prickly one at times. It shares, for example, the U.S.
interest in limiting the reach of Venezuelan economic and political infl uence in the Americas. And good U.S. relations with
the rest of Latin America begin, to a significant degree, with Mexico. Beyond Mexico, no other country has more effect on
the daily lives of Americans
26
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
Oil Advantage-Plan Solves
Plan boosts oil and energy production-multiple reasons
Baker, 4/20 (Baker & Associates offers niche-market consulting services and business intelligence related to Mexico's oil
and gas, power and chemical industries. Subject matter expert and publisher George Baker, who spearheads the firm, carried
out consulting assignments starting in the late 1970s at the height of the Oil Boom in Mexico. “Bill Introduced to Approve
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement with Mexico”. http://www.energia.com/news-commentary-bill-introduced-toapprove-transboundary-hydrocarbon-agreement-with-mexico/)
For the past year and two months, the Obama administration has waited for the right moment to present
the framework agreement for the development of cross-border oil reservoirs. The agreement had been
negotiated with Mexico during 2010-11 and was signed on February 20, 2012. In December 2012, a
report was issued by a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that argued for the
submission and approval of the agreement with Mexico (the so-called Lugar Report). In relation to the
submission of the agreement, during the first four months of 2013, there were no visible signs of life in
the State Department. Impatient with the lack of progress, Congressman Jeff Duncan (of South Carolina)
said: “We’re choosing to act instead of allowing the Administration to continue dragging its feet on
energy development.” Rep. Duncan asserts. H.R. Bill 1613 would authorize the implementation of the
agreement by amending the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953. Arguments offered in favor of
this measure include the following: 1. Lifting of the drilling moratorium of the so-called Western Gap 2.
Provides a framework for the safe management of transboundary resources 3. Provides for certainty to
oil companies who would lease blocks adjacent to the border 4. Adds to energy and job creation 5.
Furthers energy reform in Mexico 6. An additional step toward energy independence of the Western
Hemisphere.
More ev-the US is key
CSIS, 10 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s more than 200
full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look to the future and anticipate change. Information
extracted from the book Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico by Sidney Weintraub, http://csis.org/programs/simon-chair-political-economy/unequal-partnersunited-states-and-mexico/energy;)
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution gave the nation direct dominion and sovereignty over the natural
resources of Mexico, reflecting a Mexican desire to preclude outside foreign influence in what is seen as state
property. In 1938, during the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas, foreign oil properties were expropriated and
nationalized. These historical events remain emotionally charged subjects which are immensely popular in
Mexico, because they are seen as a counter-blow to the more familiar dependency syndrome. Currently this has stunted
Mexico’s national oil company, Pemex, from drilling in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, where
Pemex has little similar experience and lacks the finances to undertake take these expensive risks. Mexico
has tried to entice foreign oil companies, to drill in the deep waters of the Gulf under general service
contracts but has attracted little interest. These companies generally do not wish to act as service providers,
but rather as equity risk takers able to book the oil as they seek financing and share in the benefits of success.
Mexico is unable to do this because the Mexican constitution prohibits private equity in Mexico’s oil
resources. The company has been largely unsuccessful in recent years in finding enough new oil to replace
the oil that is produced—and even that is declining rapidly as old wells become less productive— and its
proven reserves are now down to an estimated nine years. Pemex is now insufficiently able to finance its own exploration and
production and operates at a bookkeeping loss, because of the large government take. While the government collects about 11
percent of GDP in taxes, its expenditures are closer to 19 percent of GDP. Most of the remainder is taken from the gross
revenue of Pemex.
27
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
Oil Advantage-A2: PEMEX Sufficient
Mexico alone cannot sustain oil production
Wood 10 (Duncan Wood, Director, International Relations,Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. “The Outlook for Energy
Reform in Latin America” ’10 http://theislamistsarecoming.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Energy.pdf)
The headlines from the oil industry in Mexico in recent years have been predominantly negative. Falling production, the
unstoppable decline of the Cantarell giant oil field, the failure to find alternative reserves, and the uninspiring reforms of the
fall of 2008 have pointed towards a less than shining future for Mexican oil companies. PEMEX’s constitutionally mandated
monopoly position in oil production remains unaltered and is unlikely to be modified in the near future. These factors are
viewed as major threats to Mexico’s oil independence. In 2004 Mexican output reached its historic peak, producing 3.38
million barrels of crude petroleum a day. This peak was driven by the huge amounts of oil coming out of Cantarell, a mature
field that was being injected with nitrogen to increase flow and compensate for falling pressure in its wells. But from 2004
onwards, the numbers began to fall at an increasing rate as Cantarell’s pressure dropped even further. Although other fields
were being developed, none had the potential capacity of Cantarell, and furthermore, even if combined, they could not
replace the mature field’s falling production.
Mexico’s ability to indigenously build up oil infrastructure can’t solve on its own
Snow 13 (Nick Snow, editor for Oil and Gas Journal. “USEA panel: Infrastructure high North American energy priority”
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-6a/general-interest/usea-panel-infrastructure-high-north-american.html )
Mexico's gas pipeline network has grown, but still is not adequate, according to Javier Humberto Estrada, assistant
secretary for planning and energy information in the country's Department of Energy. "We have only one trunk line
connecting the northern and southern systems, for instance," he said. Its recently adopted National Energy Strategy provides a
framework for examining the issue of energy demand growing more quickly than either electricity or oil and gas production,
Estrada said. "We need to examine the energy infrastructure we have, and what we're going to need," he maintained. In
addition to pipelines, the strategy identifies refining, oil production, and beginning a transition to alternatives as its main
energy challenges, Estrada said. "Mexico will need to develop more of its deepwater crude, more tight oil, and more
enhanced recovery," he said. It already has adopted reforms aimed at increasing investment from outside the country, and
legislators continue to discuss ways to do more, he indicated. "In the areas where investments are possible, we're talking
about hundreds of billions of dollars in the next 10 years," he said.
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Oil Advantage-Russia Impact
High Oil Prices undermine the Russian economy and undermine reform efforts which are key to
economic growth
Prime-Tass English-language Business Newswire October 13, 2005
Oil prices may be at all time highs, but Russia's GDP growth in 2005 is expected to decline from its 2004 level even as
oil money is pouring into government coffers. Although it is often said that the Russian economy is booming
thanks to the high oil price this is not the current reality. What is worse, some economists argue, even higher oil prices may
damage Russian economic reforms and increase the government's control over the economy. Russia's GDP, rose
5.8% in January-August, according to the Economic Development and Trade Ministry. GDP was up 7.3% in January-August last year. 'A more
accurate statement is that Russia is maintaining a high growth rate thanks to a high oil price,' Natalya Orlova, economist at Alfa Bank, said. 'The
problem is that the growth rate is not accelerating. Russia's GDP growth was 7.1% in 2004 and will fall to just under 6% in 2005. Should oil prices
drop, the growth rate could fall to 3% or 4%,' she added. But the financial situation of the Russian government has significantly improved thanks to
high oil prices, economists said. 'Most of the gains from (high oil prices) are simply going to radically improve the state's international balance
sheet,' Al Breach, chief economist at Brunswick UBS, said in a September report. 'There are considerable second-order effects of this improvement,
but it is not the oil money directly that is fuelling the rapid domestic demand growth.' 'The clear beneficiaries
of the high (oil) prices are the budget and Stabilization Fund,' Breach added. Breach said that since big oil receipts now go to the budget surplus and
reserves the economy is running on U.S. USD 30 per barrel oil price, not USD 60 per barrel oil price. "This is very positive: it boosts creditworthiness, keeps vulnerability to oil prices low, and
allows for sustained, strong expansion,' Breach said. However, the downturn in GDP growth along with protests by dissatisfied public sector workers over low salaries has only increased pressure
on the government to spend from the Stabilization Fund. The Stabilization Fund, which was established on January 1, 2004, accumulates the federal budget's extra revenues from progressive oil
export taxes on Urals blend oil prices exceeding USD 20 per barrel. President Vladimir Putin has signed a bill into a law hiking the base oil price used for calculating contributions to the
Stabilization Fund to USD 27 per barrel starting January 1, 2006. Established in 2004, the Stabilization Fund has accumulated 960.7 billion rubles as of October 1. The Fund is projected to amount
to 1.425 trillion rubles as of January 1, 2006, Russia's Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said last month. Putin said on September 27 that Russia's Stabilization Fund would not be used for social
purposes, but to stabilize the Russian economy. "It (Stabilization Fund) is being formed not to resolve social issues but to keep macroeconomic figures stable, to not destroy the economy, to prevent
prices hikes and restrict inflation," Putin said. Russian government officials have also reiterated that the fund is only to be used for reserve purchases and debt repayment. The Finance Ministry plans
to pay USD 10 billion-USD 15 billion on Russia's sovereign foreign debt ahead of schedule in 2006, Kudrin said last month. In the remainder of this year, Russia plans to pay USD 3 billion-USD 5
billion on Russia's sovereign foreign debt ahead of schedule, Kudrin added. The early debt repayment is to be financed from Russia's Stabilization Fund, he added. So far this year Russia paid USD
18.3 billion ahead of schedule to the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, and the Paris Club of creditors. 'Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has so far won the fight so that all money going to the
Stabilization Fund can only be used for reserve purchases or debt repayment,' Breach said. 'While there is loosening planned in 2006, the budget should balance at USD 33 per barrel Brent prices,'
Allowing too much cash to be tied up in the
Stabilization Fund could be a drag on the economy, O rlova of Alfa Bank said. 'I don't believe the government is properly
he added. Some economists believe the time has already come to remove the lock from the Stabilization Fund.
managing the oil revenues,' she said. 'The Stabilization Fund has expanded greatly and the economy needs this money. They should increase
spending, but first they have to define where the money should be spent and evaluate the macroeconomic implications,' Orlova added. Funds
must be allocated for projects in a way that will minimize the inflationary impact, analysts said, such as projects to
improve infrastructure or create employment. 'However, the government should not necessarily expect to meet its goal of lowering inflation to 4%
in two years (if spending is increased),' she added. Other economists believe any spending from the Stabilization Fund would be irresponsible given
the government's stated goal to lower inflation. 'I don't think any (of the money) in the Stabilization Fund should be released, there are other sources
within the budget that can be reallocated to achieve the government's spending priorities,' Yevgeny Nadorshin, chief economist at Trust Investment
Bank, said. 'There is a very important reason for this, and that is a political and economic obligation to lower inflation. If the CBR (Central Bank of
Russia) continues its current exchange rate policy they need the Stabilization Fund to remain untouched (in order to control inflation),' Nadorshin
said. Nadorshin believes the government will not have misgivings about spending from the Stabilization Fund if oil prices decline. 'The
government always has an intention to spend from the Stabilization Fund if oil prices decrease,' Nadorshin said. 'I
disagree with this policy. As soon as they touch the Stabilization Fund will face monetary problems, namely
high inflation. If the government is faced with a budget deficit I would rather they finance the debt with bonds instead of turning to the
Stabilization Fund.' With Duma elections scheduled for 2007 and a presidential election in 2008 politicians could have another excuse to spend
from the Stabilization Fund in order to curry favor with voters. 'There will probably be some pressure (on politicians) to increase spending, but any
expansion of spending would most likely be moderate, healthy and would not have adverse affects,' Orlova of Alfa Bank said. But some analysts
said it is possible that oil prices rise to USD 100 per barrel and remain at that level for an extended period of time. 'Under our USD 100 per barrel
scenario the picture starts to border on the surreal: Putin's goal of doubling GDP by 2012 would be met in 2011 and his 2000 target of catching
Portugal on a GDP per capita basis within 15 years would have been achieved in 2012,' Peter Westin, chief economist at Aton Capital, wrote in a
recent report. But Orlova said the picture may not be that exciting. 'The implications are that Russia will become more dependent on oil, local
producers will loose their competitiveness to importers and the budget will rely even more on oil revenues,' she said Orlova. This scenario would be
negative for Russia, Nadorshin of Trust Bank said. 'High oil prices do not always bring extraordinary growth,' he said.
'Domestic energy prices also increase, causing the producer price index to rise, making it problematic for
industry to develop. I would expect stagnation to occur, even in an environment with an incredibly high budget
surplus. (An oil price of USD 100) would threaten institutional modifications necessary for the economy to expand,'
he added. Contrary to popular opinion, oil wealth is not always a blessing and can create more problems than
it solves, economists said. 'Oil wealth allows governments to pursue populist, short-termist policy and reduces
the incentive to make hard decisions,' Breach said. 'For example, why privatize UES and the electricity industry when one could simply
use some of the ample state funds to renew its capital stock? Or worse still, why not buy up more previously privatized assets? Put another way, the
best case would be for the oil windfall to be used to help mitigate the effects of speeded-up reform, rather than used to delay needed ones,' he added.
End
Russian economic collapse causes nuclear conflict
Steven David, Prof. of political science at Johns Hopkins, 1999, Foreign Affairs
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause . From 1989 to the present, the GDP has
fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists
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declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month).
Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the
country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for
transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show,
Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A
future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the
Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between
government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending
mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new
guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who
dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow
ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control
over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.
Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts
will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the
central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy
collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have
their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may
motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for
autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should
Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe . A major power
like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke
opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe.
Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear
plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the
sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific
regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its
nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen.
Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered
throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however,
Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide
range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat
America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that
would follow a Russian civil war.
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Add On-Global Warming
Declining access to Mexican oil will force the US to shift to tar sands
Krauss and Malkin ’10 (Clifford Krauss and Elisabeth Malkin, journalists for the NY Times, Mexico Oil Politics
Keeps Riches Just Out of Reach, March 8, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/business/global/09pemex.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
Pemex, is entering a period of turmoil. Oil production in its aging fields is
sagging so rapidly that Mexico, long one of the world’s top oil-exporting countries, could begin importing
oil within the decade.¶ Mexico is among the three leading foreign suppliers of oil to the United States, along with
Canada and Saudi Arabia. Mexican barrels can be replaced, but at a cost. It means greater American dependence on unfriendly countries
like Venezuela, unstable countries like Nigeria and Iraq, and on the oil sands of Canada, an
environmentally destructive form of oil production.¶ “As you lose Mexican oil, you lose a critical supply,” said Jeremy M. Martin, director of the
energy program at the Institute of the Americas at the University of California, San Diego. “It’s not just about energy security but national
security, because our neighbor’s economic and political well-being is largely linked to its capacity to
produce and export oil.”
The national oil company created after the 1938 seizure,
That’s the single largest internal link to global warming
Villarreal ’13 (Ryan Villarreal, foreign affairs reporter for International Business Times, Canada Eyes Tar Sands Oil
Boom In A Project That Could Damage The Environment And Destroy Ecosystems, March 22, 2013,
http://www.ibtimes.com/canada-eyes-tar-sands-oil-boom-project-could-damage-environment-destroy-ecosystems-1130699
The Canadian government’s intention to continue expanding development of the tar
sands is clear, while environmental groups and local indigenous
tribes -- referred to as First Nations -- are demanding a halt to oil extraction. “[B]itumen … is turned into oil through complex and
energy-intensive processes that cause widespread environmental damage,” Greenpeace Canada says on its website.¶
“These processes pollute the Athabasca River, lace the air with toxins and convert farmland into wasteland .
Large areas of the boreal forest are clearcut to make way for development in the tar sands, the fastestgrowing source of greenhouse gas emissions in Canada,” it adds.¶ In January an independent environmental
study commissioned by the Canadian government examined six lakes near tar sands surface mining sites
and found increasing levels of petroleum-linked carcinogens over time in step with oil development.¶ “In this
study, with the exception of one lake very close to the oil sands, the levels of these contaminants did not exceed Canadian guidelines and were low compared
to urban areas,” said Adam Sweet, press secretary for the government ministry Environment Canada. ¶ The head researcher on the study, John P.
Smol, a
professor of biology at the University of Kingston, said that while current levels were not necessarily
harmful, the health risks would increase over time.¶ “It’s going to get worse,” said Smol, Reuters reports. “It’s not too late, but the
trend is not looking good.Ӧ This host of environmental issues has also affected the First Nations in the Athabasca
region.¶ “Expansion of the tar sands in my peoples’ homelands means a death sentence for our way for life,
destruction of eco-systems vital to the continuation of our inherent treaty rights and massive contributions
to catastrophic global climate change, a fate we all share,” said Chief Allan Adam of the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, in a
recent statement.¶ While current tar sands development is not taking place directly on First Nations’ land, it has affected the water
systems and wildlife that they depend on and consider part of their cultural heritage.
Extinction
Flournoy 11 – (Dec. 2011, citing Feng Hsu, PhD in Engingeering Science, NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight
Center, former research fellow of Brookhaven National Laboratory in the fields of risk assessment, risk-based decision
making, safety & reliability and mission assurances for nuclear power, space launch, energy infrastructure and other social
and engineering systems, Don Flournoy, PhD, University of Texas, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for
the NASA ACTS Satellite, Professor of Telecommunications, Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, "Solar
Power Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-1)
In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research
center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the
potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling(Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were
engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific
information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this
research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are
rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to
human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a)there
is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s
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atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of
the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if
we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into
Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show
with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will
in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic
climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any
chances” (Hsu 2010 ) .
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Add On-Natural Gas
Plan massively boosts US access to natural gas
Committee Press Office 13 (House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement
with Mexico, 2013,
http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794)
Today, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1613, the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization
Act, with a bipartisan vote of 256-171. This legislation, sponsored by Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03), would approve and implement the terms of
the U.S. - Mexico
Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, signed by the Obama Administration in 2012, that governs
the development of shared oil and natural gas resources along the U.S. – Mexico maritime border in the
Gulf of Mexico. The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as
much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy
production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of millions of dollars in new
revenue. The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future implementation of similar transboundary
hydrocarbon agreements with other nations. “By passing this Transboundary Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create
jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources
located between our two countries in the Gulf. The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and
would help create American jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet
of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The agreement
also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and establishes a framework for possible
future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that
it received strong bipartisan support.”
Low prices are stabilizing and key to long-term investment
CCES 12 – Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2012, "Natural Gas in the Industrial Sector,"
www.c2es.org/docUploads/natural-gas-industrial-sector.pdf
Increased availability and low prices of natural gas have significant implications for domestic manufacturing, which has
historically been concerned about supply availability and price volatility. Recently, abundant supply and low prices have led to
an increase in domestic manufacturing, creating new jobs and economic value. Numerous companies have cited natural
gas supply and price in announcing plans to open new facilities in the chemicals, plastics, steel, and other industries in the
United States.18 In the past few years, the number of firms disclosing the positive impact of new gas resources for facility power
generation and feedstock use to the Securities and Exchange Commission has increased substantially.19 In 2010, exports of basic
chemicals and plastics increased 28 percent from the previous year, yielding a trade surplus of $16.4 billion. 20 If the
expectation that low prices will continue is correct, these economic benefits would be significant over the long term. A study by the
American Chemistry Council, for instance, estimates that a 25 percent increase in ethane supplies would yield a $32.8 billion increase in
U.S. chemical production.21 Industry, however, needs more than just abundance and low prices to maintain use of natural gas. Price stability is
necessary to encourage long-term investments in industry, and increased natural gas supplies also have the potential
to stabilize prices .22
They’re key to manufacturing and the chemical industry
PWC 11 – PwC's Industrial Products (IP) practice provides financial, operational, and strategic services to global
organizations. December 2011, "Shale Gas - A Renaissance in US Manufacturing?"www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industrialproducts/assets/pwc-shale-gas-us-manufacturing-renaissance.pdf
The economic environment remains difficult for many US manufacturers, with soft demand and margin pressures making it
harder to grow their domestic workforces. In this analysis, we present our point of view on how shale gas resources can help the sector
address these challenges and create more jobs in the United States.¶ Executive summary¶ Shale, savings, growth, and jobs¶ During the last
couple of years, increased commercialization of alternative energy has ushered in mounting debate on the impact – or lack of impact – that the deployment
of new energy sources has on US job creation. Shale gas is one such alternative energy source that has drawn momentous investment and discussion as the
country pursues a cleaner and more sustainable energy mix. Indeed, the shale gas industry has captured national attention, with even the names of reserves –
Marcellus, Utica, Bakken, Barnett, and Eagle Ford – recognizable as national assets by even the casual observer… And for good reason. The amount of
shale gas in these reserves and others potentially makes the United States one of the top producers of shale gas in the world.¶
While there has been a sharp focus cast upon shale gas – both on its potential promise and possible drawbacks – as a tenable energy source, there has been
less focus on how shale gas impacts other industries. This led PsC to ask a simple but important question: “What could a growing shale gas industry mean
for manufacturing job creation in the United States going forward?” ¶ Potential opportunities¶ A PwC analysis finds that full-scale and robust shale
gas development through 2025 would likely have a number of knock-on effects for other industries, particularly the
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manufacturing and chemical sectors. Given a scenario calling for high recovery of shale gas and low prices of natural gas, the
US manufacturing sector and the broader US economy could stand to benefit in the following ways:¶ Energy affordability¶
Lower feedstock and energy costs could help US manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion
annually through 2025.¶ Demand growth¶ In 2011, 17 chemical, metal, and industrial manufacturers commented in SBC filings that
shale gas developments drove demand for their products, compared to none in 2008. ¶ More jobs¶ US manufacturing companies
could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 due to benefits from affordable energy and demand for
products used to extract the gas.¶ This report demonstrates how shale gas can lead to each of these opportunities, based upon our analysis of trends
in, and forecasts of, the domestic economy, manufacturing, and employment.¶ An increase in domestic investment¶ With shale gas resources more
abundant than previously thought, US manufacturers can look forward to multiple new opportunities and a significant uptick
in employment in the sector. Chemicals and metals companies are expected to gain the greatest benefit over the
next several years. Chemicals companies can acquire affordable feedstock, meriting greater capital expenditures in
the United States. For metals companies and some industrial manufacturers, opportunities abound to sell the equipment
required for more robust drilling activity. ¶ Many companies have already announced new investment plans geared to the
development of shale gas. Our research on recent capex plans shows an increase in domestic investment going to support
incremental gas production, along with more explicit communication to investors about shale-related growth opportunities.
An underappreciated part of the shale gas story is the substantial cost benefit to manufacturers, based on estimates of future
natural gas prices as more shale gas is recovered., Historically, there has been an indirect relationship between the level of
energy prices, such as those for natural gas, and the level of domestic manufacturing employment, as manufacturers consume
approximately one-third of all the energy produced in the United States. Consequentially, this relatively abundant domestic
energy source has the potential to drive an uptick in US manufacturing over the long term and create new jobs in the
sector.
Manufacturing is key to the economy and competitiveness – massive multiplier effects
Boushey 12 – Heather Boushey, Senior Economist, Center for American Progress Action Fund, July 19th, 2012,
"Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Meanson Tax Reform and the U.S.
Manufacturing Sector" waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/boushey_testimony.pdf
Having a strong manufacturing industry in the United States should be at the top of our national economic agenda.
Without a vibrant and innovative manufacturing base, we will not be a global leader for long. Moreover, as more
of our energy future will rely on high-tech manufacturing , our economic competitiveness will be even more
closely aligned with our ability to be an innovator and producer of manufactured goods .¶ Further, this is an
urgent national issue and one of those cases where success begets success. Economists have begun to study and show that the
“industrial commons” matters for innovation and the extent to which we allow manufacturing processes to continue to go
overseas, we only make it that much harder to regain our place as a global leader. 11 As my colleagues Michael Ettlinger and Kate
Gordon have put it, “the cross-fertilization and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and government is vital to our nation’s
economic competitiveness.”12¶
Manufacturing is not only a key part of our economy, but moving forward it will remain
critical to our nation’s economic vitality ¶ The U.S. manufacturing sector is still a force internationally and an
important part of our economy, despite employment losses and the relative rise in manufacturing in other countries
over the past few decades.13 Last year, manufacturing contributed over $1.8 trillion to U.S. g ross d omestic
p roduct, or about 12 percent of the economy. 14 Two years ago, manufacturing accounted for 60 percent of all U.S. exports.15 In 2008,
the United States ranked first in the world in manufacturing value added, and it was the third largest exporter of manufactured goods to the world, behind
only China and Germany and ahead of Japan and France.16 Between 1979 and 2010 manufacturing output per hour of labor in the United States increased
by an average of 4 percent annually, and the United States has one of the world’s most productive workforces.17 Moreover, in 2009 there were 11.8
million direct jobs in manufacturing and 6.8 million additional jobs in related sectors.18 Put another way, one in six U.S.
private-sector jobs is directly linked to manufacturing .19¶ Yet the industry suffered declines in the 2000s. The U.S. share of
worldwide manufacturing value added dropped from 26 percent in 1998 to less than 20 percent in 2007, and we have gone from being a net exporter of
manufactured goods in the 1960s to a net importer.20 Manufacturing as a share of U.S. GDP has declined from more than 15 percent in 1998 to 11 percent
in 2009.21 And jobs in U.S. manufacturing declined from 17.6 million in January 1998 to 11.5 million in January 2010.22 And although the manufacturing
sector has gained jobs in every month since then, for a total of 504,000 jobs as of June 2012, its share of total employment is down from 16.8 percent in 1998
to 10.8 percent today.23¶ These trends matter because the United States needs a strong manufacturing sector. Manufacturing
provides good, middle-class jobs ; propels U.S. leadership in technology and innovation, which is critical to our
economic growth and vitality; and is important to balancing the trade deficit , as well as important for our nation’s
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long-term national security . The manufacturing sector has historically been a source of solid, middle-class jobs and it
continues to be so today. The average manufacturing worker earns a weekly wage that is 8.4 percent higher than nonmanufacturing workers, taking into account worker and job characteristics that influence wages, including unionization .24
Economist Susan Helper and her colleagues conclude that the economic evidence points to the fact that “the main reason
why manufacturing wages and benefits are higher than those outside of manufacturing is that manufacturers need to pay
higher wages to ensure that their workers are appropriately skilled and motivated.” 25 U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a
broad range of jobs in other industries, including higher skill service jobs such as accountants, bankers, and lawyers, as
well as a broad range of other jobs such as basic research and technology development, product and process engineering and
design, operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work.26 Compared to jobs in other economic sectors,
manufacturing jobs have the highest “multiplier effect ,” that is, the largest effect on the overall economy for each
job created, relative to jobs in other industries. To put this in perspective, each job in motor vehicle manufacturing creates 8.6 indirect jobs,
each job in computer manufacturing creates 5.6 indirect jobs, and
each job in steel product manufacturing creates 10.3 indirect
jobs. 27¶ Manufacturing is also important because it fuels the United States’ leadership in technology and innovation, which
are critical to maintain for our future economic competitiveness. 28 Manufacturing firms are more likely to innovate
than firms in other industries: Research from the National Science Foundation finds that 22 percent of
manufacturing companies are active innovators compared to only 8 percent of nonmanufacturing companies. 29 This
number is even higher for specific sectors within manufacturing. For example, in computer and electronic products
manufacturing, 45 percent of companies are product innovators and 33 percent are process innovators.30 Manufacturing
firms also perform the vast majority of private research and development: Despite comprising just 12 percent of the nation’s GDP in
manufacturing companies contributed 70 percent of private r esearch and d evelopment spending.31 ¶ In addition to
what manufacturers spend on innovation, there is increasingly strong empirical evidence showing a tight link between
2007,
innovation and manufacturing production. Economic research now shows that the U nited S tates will not likely be able to
keep the highly skilled technical jobs if the production jobs go overseas . Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and
Willy Shih have written about the decline of the “industrial commons” in the United States: the collective R&D, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities
many types of manufacturing, geographic proximity is key to
having a strong “commons,” and they point to evidence showing that there are few hightech industries where the
feedback loop from the manufacturing process is not a factor in developing new products. 33 As they put it, “product and
process innovation are intertwined.” Pisano and Shih point to the example of rechargeable batteries as a product where innovation followed
manufacturing. Rechargeable battery manufacturing left the United States many years ago, leading to the migration of the
batteries commons to Asia. Now new technology (batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles) are being designed in Asia where
the commons are located. I’d draw your attention to a January New York Times article on China’s increasing investment in research and development,
which asked, “Our global competitiveness is based on being the origin of the newest, best ideas. How will we fare if those ideas
that mutually reinforce each other to sustain innovation.32 For
originate somewhere else?”34
US competitiveness solves hegemony and great power war
Baru 9 – Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current
Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 - 168
Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the
foundation of power
was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the
side with more flourishing productive base'.3 Drawing
attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological
innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power
projection
and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The
fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive
balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the
outcomes of the
major Great Power wars , where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view,
the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability
financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma.
to find adequate
Domestic manufacturing is vital to US military tech innovation – dependence on foreign suppliers
guts security
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Ettlinger and Gordon 11 – Michael Ettlinger is the Vice President for Economic Policy at American Progress. Kate
is a Senior Fellow at American Progress. “The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing,” April,
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf
Beyond innovation and competitiveness, basing
manufacturing in the United States also is important to our overall national
and economic security. The most clear-cut example of this, of course, is the importance of being able to
produce for the needs of our armed forces. The importance of domestic capabilities in defense manufacturing is obvious— one
doesn’t want to be dependent on foreign suppliers in a time of conflict. Equally obvious is the importance of
keeping innovations in military technology close to home.
Military tech innovation is key to hegemony
Segal 4 – Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Foreign Affairs,
November 2004 - December 2004, Is America Losing Its Edge?, Adam Segal, Pg. 2 Vol. 83 No. 6, Technology Enterprises in
China.
The
U nited S tates' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and industries faster than
anyone else. For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's
economic prosperity and
military power . It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the
Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead. ¶ Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping, and
the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and
preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation
of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan
is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing
database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer
chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced
the U nited S tates' technical dominance
remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as
the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The
materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing. ¶ Although
U nited S tates will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies ; it can remain dominant only
by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the U nited
S tates must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home.
Heg decline causes nuclear war and extinction
Barnett 11 – Thomas P.M. Barnett is Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis &
Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief
Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department
of Defense, March 7th, 2011, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,”
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads
It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global
order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack
of mass violence . That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do
take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we
will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the
ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of
system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global
order
since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As
the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the
greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global
dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely
conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing
equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped
up and changed everything by ushering in our now- perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the
international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted
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was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the
liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a
profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris"
actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American
military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now
imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions
erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most
vigorously revisionist force. ¶ As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex,
again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly
head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a
period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million
deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting,
researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people.
Though admittedly crude, these
calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative
drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity , something the
American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But
given how things turned out the
last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power , in all of
its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.
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Add On-US Economy
Plan solves the US economy
Committee on Natural Resources 04/25/13, [The House Committee on Natural Resources
considers legislation about American energy production, mineral lands and mining, fisheries and
wildlife, public lands, oceans, Native Americans, irrigation and reclamation, “Witnesses Stress
Importance of Transboundary Agreement, Developing Shared Energy Reserves”
http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=331599]
Today, the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources held an oversight hearing on the U.S. Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement to examine steps needed for its implementation and a legislative hearing on
H.R. 1613, the “Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act.” This important
legislation implements the U.S. – Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs Agreement by lifting the
current moratorium on drilling in the Western Gap area of the Gulf of Mexico. It also provides the
certainty needed to develop energy along the entirety of the U.S./Mexico maritime border in the Gulf of
Mexico - allowing for expanded energy development in the Gulf of Mexico to create jobs, lower energy
prices, and make America more energy secure.
“This Agreement, if implemented correctly, is a rare opportunity to expand US energy production, create
new American jobs, and grow our economy by opening new areas to oil and natural resources
development,” said Subcommittee Chairman Doug Lamborn (CO-05). “It is important that we get it right
so that we may, along with our ally Mexico, set an example on how together we may foster the shared goal
of developing our nation’s outer continental shelf for economic prosperity and energy security.”
Economic collapse precipitates great power wars
Walter Mead, CFR, 4 February 2009 (Only Makes you stronger: Why the recession bolstered America,
http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts)
History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less
reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist
system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the
Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is
almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in
1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns
into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The
United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.
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Add On-Mexico Economy
Mexican economic decline causes a flood of refugees, resulting in terrorism
Michael Brown, Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Department of Homeland Security, “Border Control: Collapse of
Mexico Is A Homeland Security & National Security Issue,” 1/14/ 2009, http://michaelbrowntoday.com/journal/2009/1/15/border-control-collapse-ofmexico-is-a-homeland-security-nat.html
By failing to secure the borders and control immigration, we have opened ourselves up to a frightening scenario. The United
States could face a flood of refugees from Mexico if it were to collapse, overwhelming state and local governments
along the U.S.-Mexico border. During a time of economic duress, the costs would be overwhelming and would simply add
to the already burgeoning costs at the federal level. Immigration and border control never was nor should it ever be about racism. Immigration
and border control are national security and homeland security issues. Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could, and probably
already have, infiltrated the United States, just laying in wait to attack at an appropriately vulnerable time .
US-Mexican border terrorism results in bioterror attacks
Ken Timmerman, Newsmax correspondent, “FBI Director Mueller: Al-Qaida Still Wants Nuclear Bomb,” 3/18/2010,
http://newsmax.com/Newsfront/mueller-fbi-alqaida-nuclear/2010/03/18/id/353169
FBI Director Robert Mueller warned Congress on Wednesday of ongoing al-Qaida efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction to attack the United States. “Al-Qaida remains committed to its goal of conducting attacks inside the United
States,” Mueller told a House appropriations subcommittee. “Further, al-Qaida’s continued efforts to access chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear material pose a serious threat to the United States.” To accomplish its goals of new attacks on the American
homeland, al-Qaida “seeks to infiltrate overseas operatives who have no known nexus to terrorism into the United States using
both legal and illegal methods of entry,” Mueller said. In February, Sheikh Abdullah al-Nasifi, a known al-Qaida recruiter in Kuwait,
boasted on al Jazeera television that Mexico’s border with the United States was the ideal infiltration point for
terrorists seeking to attack America. “Four pounds of anthrax – in a suitcase this big – carried by a fighter through tunnels from
Mexico into the U.S., are guaranteed to kill 330,000 Americans within a single hour if it is properly spread in population
centers there,” al-Nasifi said.
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Add On Extension-Natural Gas Solvency
TBA Provides Mexico With the Ability to use Natural Gas Reserves
Smart Energy Resources 12 (U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, 2012,
http://www.smartenergyuniverse.com/regulatory-update/13077-u-s-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement)
While oil provides vital government revenue,
lack of natural gas development threatens to stunt Mexican industry. It is
reported that parts of Mexico could face natural gas shortages in the coming year. Meanwhile, Mexico sits on a
sea of unconventional natural gas reserve.¶ The United States government estimates that Mexico has one of
the largest shale gas reserves in the world at more than 680 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of technically recoverable reserves,
although Mexico itself uses estimates as low as 140 tcf. Much of that shale gas is thought to be contained in an extension of the Eagle Ford
formation that is already producing in Texas. PEMEX reportedly has drilled just a handful of exploratory wells, and with prices being held down
by the United States gas boom, it has little economic incentive to invest heavily in shale in its own right, let alone the opportunity cost of that
capital compared to much more lucrative oil. Absent natural gas pricing reform, it is unlikely that PEMEX will choose to invest heavily into
shale gas.¶ The
Transboundary Agreement (TBA) provides a bilateral basis upon which both countries can
develop the legal framework necessary for joint production of oil and natural gas reserves that extend
across our national maritime borders in the Gulf of Mexico.
TBA Produces Billion Cubic Meter increase in Natural Gas
Offshore 13 (US House passes GoM transboundary agreement with Mexico, 2013, http://www.offshoremag.com/articles/2013/06/us-house-passes-gom-transboundary-agreement-with-mexico.html)
The US House of Representatives has passed the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements
Authorization Act.¶ The act approves and implements an agreement signed in 2012 that governs development of shared
oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Mexico along the US/Mexico maritime border .¶ The move opens 1.5 million acres
(6,070 sq km) in the GoM with as much as 172 MMbbl of oil and 304 bcf (8.6 bcm) of natural gas, said
Rep. Jeff Duncan, bill sponsor.
TBA Allows Exploitation of Natural Gas Rich Deposits
Koopferstock 12 (Benjamin Koopferstock, Law student at Washington and Lee. Lexington, VA, US-Mexico
Transboundary Agreement, 2013, http://jeceblog.com/2012/03/21/us-mexico-transboundary-agreement/)
This Transboundary Agreement removes uncertainties regarding development of transboundary resources
in the resource-rich Gulf of Mexico. As a result of this Agreement, nearly 1.5 million acres of the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf will now be made more accessible for exploration and production activities. Estimates by
the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) indicate this area contains as much as
172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas.
TBA Creates Billions of New Cubic Feet for Natural Gas Harvesting
Associated Press 12 (US, Mexico agree to cooperate on oil, gas drilling below maritime border, 2012,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/02/20/us-mexico-agree-to-cooperate-on-oil-gas-drilling-below-maritime-border/)
Under the agreement, U.S. companies will now be allowed to partner with Mexico's national oil company in
drilling. But neither country is constrained by the other.¶ If the two governments can't agree on how to exploit a reservoir,
either can take its share unilaterally.¶ The U.S. Interior Department said the agreement makes nearly 1.5 million
acres of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf more accessible for exploration and production activities.¶ The area
could contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, it said.
TBA Leads to Natural Gas Led Energy Renaissance
Committee on Foreign Relations 12 (S. PRT. 112-43 - OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY
AGREEMENT, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm)
The Transboundary Agreement (TBA) provides a bilateral ¶ basis upon which both countries can develop
the legal framework ¶ necessary for joint production of oil and natural gas reserves ¶ that extend across our national
maritime borders in the Gulf of ¶ Mexico.¶ The United States and Canada are radically transforming ¶ global energy
markets. Unconventional oil and natural gas has ¶ led to a renaissance in North American energy
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production. ¶ Alongside continued growth in renewable fuel and power sources ¶ and energy efficiency, the continent is poised to be ¶ functionally selfsufficient in energy. Mexico should be ¶ invited to join in the U.S.-Canada driven resurgence.
Reform Necessary To Reach Natural Gas Deposits
Urdanenta 10 (Karla Udanenta, Urdaneta is a Venezuelan lawyer who graduated cum laude in 2005 from the
Universidad Catolica Andres Bello in Caracas, Transboundary petroleum reservoirs: a recommended approach for the United
States and Mexico in the deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico, 2010,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Transboundary+petroleum+reservoirs%3A+a+recommended+approach+for+the...a0232945504)
The Gulf of Mexico (GOM) contains important reserves of oil and natural gas. Some of these reserves have been
exploited and produced by Mexico and the United States during the few last years. However, the exploitation of these resources
has been slow because much of this resource base is located in ultra-deep waters of the GOM, where exploitation and
production are very risky, and where the required advanced technology has been recently developed. In view of this
situation, until a few decades ago, there was little conflict between the United States and Mexico regarding the exploitation of oil and natural
gas reserves in the GOM. Each country was able to produce those resources located in the adjacent shallow waters of the GOM, far from the
maritime boundaries that divide the deep GOM. ¶ For
both countries, the preservation and optimal use of
hydrocarbons, including those located in transboundary reservoirs, are matters of priority and necessity.
However, the development of transboundary reservoirs concerns not just one country; it involves different states' interests, each with its own
distinct domestic issues.
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Add On Extension-Natural Gas Uniqueness
Natural Gas Demand Increasing Now
Blackmon 13 (David Blackmon, Managing director of Strategic Communications for FTI Consulting, Increased Demand
For Shale Natural Gas Is Good For Us All, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2013/06/04/increased-demandfor-shale-natural-gas-is-good-for-us-all/)
A new report from Barclays Capital predicts a “Tectonic Shift” in demand for natural gas in the United
States by 2020. While this report will no doubt be used by the prophets of “peak gas” theory as ammunition for the
construction of new strawman fright scenarios, the reality is this is nothing but good news for the American public.
That’s all happened in just the last five years, and during a time in which the price for natural gas became quite depressed,
and the number of rigs actively drilling for natural gas wells fell from about 1600 in 2008 to around 400
today. The reality is that many of these deep, high pressure wells that typify many of the prolific shale plays
in the U.S. simply are not economic to drill at the $2 to $3 prices we’ve seen from 2010 through 2012. As a
result, the great majority of natural gas wells that were drilled during that time frame were wells operators were obligated to
drill in order to hold their leases by production. ¶ As we’ve pointed out before, this means that there is an enormous
amount of excess drilling capacity in the system all over the country, given that lease obligation wells represent a
small fraction of the potential wells that are ultimately available to be drilled. ¶ As the price has risen in recent months
back to the $4 to $4.30 range, we’ve already begun to see leasing activity in dry gas areas like the Haynesville
Shale and the Eastern third of the Eagle Ford Shale begin to pick up, and will no doubt begin to see increased natural
gas rig counts if the price holds in that range, where so many more projects are in fact economic to drill.
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Add On Extension-Natural Gas Impact
US gas supply is key to prevent Russian energy leverage over Europe
Koven 12 – Colonel Alexander L. Koven, United States Air Force, United States Army War College, January 3rd, 2012,
"Under the Yoke: Europe's Natural Gas Dependency on Russia," www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA561551
UNDER THE YOKE: EUROPE'S NATURAL GAS DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIA
Rising shale gas supplies have significantly reduced U.S. requirements for LNG, a move that has already had geopolitical
implications. This shift has played a key role in weakening Russia's ability to wield an 'energy weapon' over its
European customers by offering European customers an alternative supply in the form of LNG displaced from the U.S.
market.80
European gas independence from Russia solves Russian aggression, terrorism, and EU relations
Medlock et al. 11 – Dr. Kenneth B. Medlock, Ph.D. in economics, fellow in Energy and Resource Economics at the
Baker Institute, and former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy and the California Energy Commission, AND*** Amy
Myers Jaffe, graduate from Princeton University, fellow of Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Baker
Institute, and associate director of the Rice Energy Program, AND*** Dr. Peter R. Hartley, Ph.D in economics at Rice
University, July 2011, "Shale Gas and U.S. National Security,” http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas07192011.pdf
The dramatic lessening of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas will likely have considerable geopolitical implications in
thwarting Russia’s ability to exercise an “energy” weapon or to unduly influence political outcomes on the
Continent. European buyers will have ample alternatives to Russian supplies, thereby reducing Moscow’s political
leverage. This outcome would also contribute positively to the balance of power between Russia and the EU, putting Europe
in a stronger position to influence Russian foreign policy near Europe’s borders. To wit, Europe’s high dependence on
Russian pipeline natural gas supplies made it difficult for certain European leaders to engage in diplomacy objecting to Russia’s
invasion of Georgia
in 2008 and
weakened their support of the shaky election of pro-Western Ukrainian president Viktor
Yushchenko, who was negatively targeted by Moscow for his anti-Russian stances.¶ A more diverse energy supply for Europe enhances U.S.
interests by buttressing Europe’s abilities to resist Russian interference in European affairs and help border states in the
Balkans and Eastern Europe assert greater foreign policy independence from Moscow. U.S. coalitions with European nations
are an important element to U.S. national security, including efforts to combat international terrorism and prevent
humanitarian crises . An energy-independent Europe will be better positioned to join with the United States in global
peacekeeping and other international initiatives that might not have the full support of Russia.
Russian aggression causes nuclear war
Blank 9 – Dr. Stephen Blank is a Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the
U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama
Administration?” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf
Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a
multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers , it is unlikely that they will go to war with each
other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear
instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states
or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of
crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,¶
The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these
states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus
international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be
used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to
the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant ; and second, crises increase the
possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171¶ Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding
their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing
consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten
other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of
action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,¶ But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring
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about more cooperative security], the
consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited
mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the
interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired.
Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations
marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the
credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and
states] extend
alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172
There’s a high risk of nuclear terrorism – causes extinction
Hellman 8 [Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence”
SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf]
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article
focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon
would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day
would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be
changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant . Former Secretary of
Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50
percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes,
“We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear
terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In
a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the
“probability of
an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10
years ,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a
government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with
the approach of this article. Because terrorism
is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk
analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall
risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention.
Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be
incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are
unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total
neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important . The cosT of World War
iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of
a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines
a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed
World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that
number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest
to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an
extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just
have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different
view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a
Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess
even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a
high risk that Western
civilization will be destroyed ”
[McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry,
Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally
irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official
studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths
would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160
million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These
calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of
adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. …
further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious
ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the
ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a
nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth , much as many scientists now believe the
K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking
Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a fullscale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer
nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large
volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be,
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prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th
anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
File Title
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File Title
Solvency-A2: US Can’t Legally Invest
Wrong
Hendricks 13 (David Hendricks, David Hendrix, P.E., is president of The Hendrix Group, Inc., a metallurgical engineering
consulting company providing materials engineering and corrosion services to the chemical, refining, oil & gas, pulp &
paper, and insurance/legal communities, Proposal could bring U.S. investment to Mexico's oil industry, 2013,
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Proposal-could-bring-U-S-investment-to-Mexico-s-4422220.php)
In the next few months, expect a proposed constitutional amendment - pushed by the Mexican president to open the nation's energy sector to foreign participation.
The proposal, if it passes, would be full of historic sweep. President Enrique Peña Nieto's administration is preparing an
amendment that would apply to newer technologies and equipment than what already is employed by the
federally owned monopoly, Petróleos Mexicanos.That would allow U.S. and other foreign drilling
companies to invest in risk-sharing investments in Mexico for the first time since 1938, but only if the drilling involves shale and deep-water
drilling sites.So says Shannon O'Neil, a leading analyst of U.S.-Mexico relations and senior fellow for Latin America studies at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations.
Her groundbreaking book, "Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States and the Road Ahead," is being published this week by Oxford University Press.
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File Title
A2: Politics-Pol Cap Link Turn
Plan has massive bipartisan support in Congress and is a win for Obama
Martin et al, 5/3 (Jeremy is a frequent commentator and writer on Latin American and energy issues speaking at
international conferences and appearing in both print and broadcast media. He has testified before the US Congress on energy
issues in Latin America. Working at a think tank -- the Institute of the Americas at the University of California, San Diego
(UCSD) -- Jeremy spends his time delving into the geopolitics of energy and closely following energy industry trends and
policy issues across the Americas. “U.S. Should Act Quickly on Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement With Mexico”
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12923/u-s-should-act-quickly-ontransboundary-hydrocarbon-agreement-with-mexico)JQ
Mexico underscored its commitment to the agreement by quickly ratifying it; the Mexican Senate approved the treaty in April
2012.
In the United States, meanwhile, progress stalled for more than a year. But just in time for yesterday’s bilateral meeting, the
agreement is again under discussion as legislators revive the dormant ratification process, which is good news for those eager
to see its approval in the U.S. Indeed, according to the White House, Obama spoke in positive terms yesterday about the
recent progress made on the agreement: Both the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the House
Committee on Natural Resources recently held hearings focused on the challenges and opportunities that approval of the
accord would present for the United States. On April 18, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that would
make way for the approval and implementation of the terms of the agreement.
These are all positive steps, and their progress will be monitored closely by U.S. and international observers, especially
Mexico. But it bears underscoring that further delay in U.S. adoption of the agreement makes little sense. The agreement is
not an overly polarizing issue domestically: in fact, quite the opposite. Several lawmakers have described it as a win-win for
both Mexico and the U.S.
House vote proves the turn-broad bipartisan and GOP support for the plan
CNR 6/27/13 (Committee on Natural Resources, The U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources, or Natural Resources
Committee (often referred to as simply "Resources") is a Congressional committee of the United States House of
Representatives. “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico,” Press Release, June 27,
2013, http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794;)JQ
WASHINGTON, D.C., June 27, 2013 - Today, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1613, the Outer Continential Shelf
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act, with a bipartisan vote of 256-171. This legislation, sponsored
by Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03), would approve and implement the terms of the U.S. - Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons
Agreement, signed by the Obama Administration in 2012, that governs the development of shared oil and natural gas
resources along the U.S. – Mexico maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico. ¶ ¶ The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million
acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of
natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of
millions of dollars in new revenue. ¶ The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future
implementation of similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements with other nations.¶ “By passing this Transboundary
Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its
kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources located between our two countries in the Gulf.
The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and would help create American
jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion
cubic feet of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The
agreement also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and
establishes a framework for possible future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this
legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that it received strong bipartisan support.” ¶ “These areas in the Gulf
of Mexico are ready to be explored and developed and this bill will give U.S. job creators the certainty they need to move
forward. Activity can begin once this agreement is enacted,” said Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings.
“The Natural Resources Committee and Congressman Duncan have worked hard to advance this bill and get it signed into
law. It’s important to American energy, American jobs and American energy security. And it is important to supporting a
positive relationship with our neighbor to the south, Mexico.”
The turn outweighs the link-spun in multiple different ways to receive bipartisan backing
CFR, 12 (Committee on Foreign Relations, a US Senate Committee, OIL, MEXICO, AND THE¶ TRANSBOUNDARY
AGREEMENT¶ A MINORITY STAFF REPORT¶ PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE¶ COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
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File Title
RELATIONS¶ UNITED STATES SENATE, US Government, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm;)JQ
There is reason to believe that the TBA can receive broad ¶ bipartisan backing in Congress. It would benefit bilateral ¶
relations, promote domestic oil production, and improve ¶ environmental protections in the Gulf of Mexico. Following ¶
normal Congressional procedure to ensure the agreement is ¶ vetted and implementing legislation is reasoned will benefit ¶
each of those goals. External proponents of the TBA will need ¶ to increase communication and advocacy to improve the ¶
likelihood of Congressional leaders acting on the agreement in ¶ the 113th U.S. Congress.
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File Title
A2: Politics-Oil Lobby Link Turn
The API backs the plan
Carroll 6/27/13—(Carlton Carroll, a spokesperson for American Petroleum Institute, “API welcomes House passage of
U.S./Mexico oil and natural gas agreement,” http://www.api.org/news-and-media/news/newsitems/2013/june-2013/apiwelcomes-house-passage-of-us-mexico-oil-and-natural-gas-agreement)
WASHINGTON, June 27, 2013 – API Senior Director of Federal Relations Khary Cauthen welcomed passage of H.R. 1613
in the U.S. House of Representatives that would establish a transboundary agreement to allow joint energy development
projects between U.S. energy companies and the Mexican state owned oil company. “This agreement with Mexico would
help US oil and natural gas companies develop energy resources in the Gulf of Mexico and in turn create more jobs and
enhance our energy security,” Cauthen said. “The agreement creates certainty for American companies looking to invest in
new energy projects by establishing a process for managing oil and gas reservoirs along the boundary region in the Gulf of
Mexico.”
API is one of the most powerful lobby groups in Congress
Levine 2010—(Carrie Levine, June 20th 2010, CREW’s research director, American Petroleum Institute Pours on Cash to
Influence Hill http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/07/american-petroleum-institute-ramps-up-lobbying.html)
The second quarter was a busy one for the oil and gas industry in the wake of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. For the
American Petroleum Institute, the trade association that represents the oil and natural gas industries, it was $2.3 million worth
of busy. That was the tab for API's second-quarter lobbying efforts, according to lobbying disclosure reports released
today.API's lobbying report shows that API lobbied on a series of legislative initiatives linked to the spill, including measures
on oil company liability and the administration's moratorium on deep-water drilling. The group also reported lobbying on the
financial services overhaul and other legislation. “API is keenly focused on our industry’s efforts to create jobs and spur our
economic recovery," said Eric Wohlschlegel, a spokesman for API, in an e-mail. "The increase in our advocacy is a direct
response to anti-jobs legislation, and our continued efforts to improve safety measures, foster economic growth, effectively
respond to emergencies, and strengthen emergency preparedness.” The lobbying expenses also reflect increased lobbying
activity driven by the spill. In the first quarter, before the spill in the gulf, the group spent $1.26 million lobbying the federal
government, disclosure reports show. Last year, API spent $1.86 million in the second quarter. The $2.3 million lobbying tab
includes the bill for lobbying by outside firms. API paid Prime Policy Group $100,000 in the second quarter. Ogilvy
Government Relations got $80,000, and Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti reported receiving $60,000.
The turn is unique-the API wants the plan, not the current bill in Congress
Gray 5/9/13—(Ian Gray, May 9th 2013, an Gary is the Senior Policy Manager for Extractive Industries at Oxfam America,
“A back door attack on oil payment transparency”, http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/09/a-back-door-attackon-oil-payment-transparency/)
My guess is that the oil industry lobby wants this TBA approved far more than it wants this unnecessary Section 1504
exemption. Surya Gunasekara, a tax and trade counsel with the American Petroleum Institute told me that there is “no doubt”
that API cares more about Gulf of Mexico access than the proposed Section 1504 exemption
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File Title
A2: Politics-No Internal Link
No unique internal link-Obama has already spent the necessary pol cap on the plan
Duncan et al, 6/25 (STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
H.R. 1613 – “Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act”, Rep. Duncan, R-SC, and
17 cosponsors, June 25, 2013)GY
The Administration supports the goal of H.R. 1613 to provide Congressional approval of the Agreement between the United
States of America and the United Mexican States Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico
and to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to take the actions necessary to implement the Agreement. Implementation of
the Agreement would establish a framework for the cooperative exploration and development of oil and gas reservoirs that
cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico and would make nearly 1.5
million acres of the Outer Continental Shelf, currently subject to a moratorium under the Western Gap Treaty, immediately
available for leasing.
The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress to enact implementing legislation that would focus on the
U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Agreement, without the inclusion of extraneous and unnecessary provisions. The Department of
the Interior estimates that the transboundary area subject to the Western Gap Treaty moratorium contains as much as 172
million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. Implementing this Agreement will offer significant
opportunities for responsible and efficient exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources in an expanded area along
the U.S.-Mexico maritime boundary as well as significant new opportunities for U.S. companies.
50
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File Title
A2: China Sphere DA-No Uniqueness
Tensions now over access to the US
Knowland 06/10/2013, [WSWS, “China’s president visits Mexico and Central America seeking
economic ties”, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html]
Relations between China and Mexico have been tepid in the past, and they worsened after former President Felipe Calderon
hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011.
More fundamentally, their economic relations have been unbalanced. In 2012 the value of China’s exports to Mexico were
ten times those of Mexico to China, $57 billion to $5.7 billion. Mexico exported to China copper and other minerals, oil,
cotton and car parts, and imported electronics, toys, plastics and furniture.
Mexico and China also have been direct competitors in supplying the US market with manufactured goods.
Mexican businessmen have long felt threatened by China undercutting them as a cheap labor platform,
particularly in electronic and consumer products industries.
A decade ago Mexico’s average labor costs were nearly three times higher than China’s. Recently that labor-cost
differential has narrowed sharply, eating into Chinese cost advantage, so Mexico has regained some US
market share. According to at least one report this year, hourly wages in Mexico are now lower than in China.
Mexican companies still complain that Chinese workplace rules on “flexibility”, lower quality control and
lack of respect for intellectual property rights continue to permit unfair competition.
Relations low now
Knowland 06/10/13, [WSWS, “China’s president visits Mexico and Central America seeking
economic ties”, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html]
Xi also called on the two countries to oppose protectionism and try to resolve trade disagreements through
consultation. He and Peña Nieto agreed to end a dispute over Chinese textiles that had led to litigation.
The Chinese sought to sign at least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism (a huge
Mexican industry), science and technology during Xi’s visit. All that was accomplished, however, were
agreements to cooperate on commercial defense, and on access for Mexican tequila and Mexican pork to
the Chinese market.
Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade said it was “too soon” for a free-trade agreement between the
two countries, perhaps reflecting caution as to the effect of courting China on Mexico’s neighbor to the
north. Mexico, along with the US and other Pacific Rim countries, but not China, is party to the Trans-Pacific Partnership
negotiations, an effort to increase trade among the Americas, Asia and Australasia. Mexico is keen not to jeopardize those
talks.
Mexico views China as an unfair economic competitor
de la Siega 06/10/13, [Virginia de la Siega is a member of the national leadership (CPN) and the
International Commission of the NPA in France, “What is China’s interest in Latin America?”,
http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1883]
Mexico, Latin America’s third APEC member has been particularly affected for two main reasons: its
close ties with the US economy and the overlap between Chinese and Mexican exports. Of Mexico’s 20
main exporting sectors, 12 are in open competition with China. This not only reduces Mexico’s possibility
to export to China to only about 3% of its total exports, but it also affects its trade relations with the USA.
In 2003, China ousted Mexico from its position as the second largest exporter to the USA. With a $28bn trade deficit with
China, it is no wonder that the Mexican government wants to review the trade agreements. An official of the Mexican
government complained that “for every $30 of Chinese goods that Mexico imports, Mexico only exports $1
of Mexican goods to China.”
US military cooperation now
Seelke and Finklea 06/12/13, [Clare Ribando Seelke is a specialist in Latin American affairs
and Kristin M. Finklea is an analyst in domestic security, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond”, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/210921.pdf]
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File Title
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation increased significantly as a result of the development and
implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and
Central America first funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and
equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak institutions
and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now
focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st
century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican
government pledged to intensify its anticrime efforts and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit
trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Inaugurated on December 1, 2012, Mexican President Enrique Peña
Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a shift in focus toward reducing violent crime in
Mexico. Peña Nieto has begun to adjust the process and priorities of U.S.-Mexican efforts, adjustments which President
Obama has pledged to support. The Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through which Mérida training and equipment
requests are coordinated and intelligence is channeled. The Mexican government is requesting increased assistance for
judicial reform and prevention efforts, but limiting U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence operations.
As the Peña Nieto government fleshes out its security strategy, Mérida programs are likely to be adjusted in order
to support those efforts that align with U.S. priorities.
More ev
Seelke and Finklea 06/12/13, [Clare Ribando Seelke is a specialist in Latin American affairs
and Kristin M. Finklea is an analyst in domestic security, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond”, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/210921.pdf]
During the Calderón Administration, Mexico focused much of its efforts on dismantling the leadership of
the major DTOs. U.S. assistance appropriated during the first phase of the Mérida Initiative (FY2008FY2010) enabled the purchase of equipment to support the efforts of federal security forces engaged in anti-DTO efforts.
That equipment included $590.5 million worth of aircraft and helicopters, as well as forensic equipment for the Federal
Police and Attorney General’s respective crime laboratories. As the DTOs continue to employ new weapons, new types of
training and/or equipment may be needed to help security officials combat those new threats. As the Peña Nieto government
moves to establish a National Gendarmerie, assistance may be requested to assist that entity, as well as existing federal
forces.
The Mexican government has increasingly been conceptualizing the DTOs as for-profit corporations.
Consequently, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it, has begun to focus more attention on disrupting the
criminal proceeds used to finance DTOs’ operations. In August 2010, the Mexican government imposed
limits on the amount of U.S. dollars that individuals can exchange or deposit each month. In October 2012, the
Mexican Congress approved an antimoney laundering law establishing a financial crimes unit within the Attorney General’s
office (PGR), subjecting industries vulnerable to money laundering to new reporting requirements, and creating new criminal
offenses for money laundering. Future Mérida assistance could be used to provide additional equipment and
technical assistance to units within the Finance Ministry and the PGR that are investigating money
laundering cases.
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File Title
A2: China Sphere DA-No Internal
Mexico is not in China’s sphere-laundry list of reasons
Powell 02/03/13, [PulsAmerica, “China/Latin America: Mexican Relations with China at
Lowest Ebb in Recent Years According to Experts”,
http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2013/02/03/chinalatin-america-mexican-relations-with-china-atlowest-ebb-in-recent-years-according-to-experts/]
Mexico is ‘completely clueless when it comes to China… There’s no strategy that adequately reflects
China’s global importance and does justice to our second leading trade partner. I don’t think economic
and trade relations can get any worse.’ This damning assessment of Sino-Mexican relations came from Enrique
Dussel, director of the Center for China-Mexico Studies of the National Autonomous University of Mexico.
Mr Dussel is not alone in his view; indeed he is one of a group of 100 academics, businessmen and politicians who have
devised a Strategic Agenda for Mexico-China Relations, which was presented to President Peña Nieto shortly after he took
office. The proposed agenda covers the economy, culture, environment and education, and highlights the absence of a
coherent short and long term plan for China. It also stresses the need to prioritise forming a strategy, in conjunction
with Beijing, otherwise trade and economic ties will suffer.
This issue has been brought into sharp focus in recent weeks over the Dragon Mart controversy, (see last
week’s article). Plans to build Chinese-financed retail complex near Cancun have received widespread
criticism in Mexico from environmental groups and public figures who questioned the transparency of
China’s trade practices. It is the latest incident in a somewhat chequered history; last year Mexico filed a
complaint against China in the WTO over malpractice in the textile industry, and in 2011 Mexico failed in
its bid for the International Monetary Fund’s head position when China refused to back candidate Agustin
Carstens.
Such tensions will not help Mexico in resolving issues within the bilateral economic relationship. Mexico
has a starkly negative trade deficit with China, importing $52bn worth of Chinese goods in 2011 while
exporting just $2bn worth in return. Furthermore China’s FDI in Mexico is surprisingly low ; the two
countries disagree widely about the exact figure (Mexico estimates the 2011 figure to be $157m while China puts it at
$614m), however put into perspective both figures are noticeably paltry compared to the US 2011 contribution of $8bn.
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File Title
A2: Russia Sphere DA-No Uniqueness
The DA is not unique-security cooperation now
Forbes, 13 (Forbes, Forbes is an American business magazine owned by Forbes, Inc. Published biweekly, it features
original articles on finance, industry, investing, and marketing topics. Forbes also reports on related subjects such as
technology, communications, science, and law, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation Against Cartels Remains Strong,” Forbes, May
16, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/16/u-s-mexico-cooperation-against-cartels-remains-strong/;)
Such rumors were certainly understandable, given the arrangement that had existed for many years between some senior members of Pena Nieto’s
Institutional Revolutionary Party and some powerful cartel figures during the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s long reign in Mexico prior to the election of
Vicente Fox of the National Action Party in 2000. However, as we argued in 2011 and repeated in March 2013, much has changed in Mexico since 2000,
and the new reality in Mexico means that it would be impossible for the Pena Nieto administration to reach any sort of deal with the cartels even if it made
an attempt.¶ But the rumors of the Pena Nieto government reaching an accommodation with some cartel figures such as Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera
have persisted, even as the Mexican government arrests key operatives in Guzman’s network, such as Ines Coronel Barreras, Guzman’s father-in-law, who
was arrested May 1 in Agua Prieta, Mexico. Indeed, on April 27, Washington
Post reporter Dana Priest published a detailed article
outlining how U.S. authorities were fearful that the Mexican government was restructuring its security
relationship with the U.S. government so that it could more easily reach an unofficial truce with cartel leaders. Yet four
days later, Coronel — a significant cartel figure — was arrested in a joint operation between the Mexicans and
Americans.¶ Clearly, there is some confusion on the U.S. side about the approach the Pena Nieto government is taking, but conversations with both
U.S. and Mexican officials reveal that these changes in Mexico’s approach do not appear to be as drastic as some have feared. There will need to be
adjustments on both sides of the border while organizational changes are underway in Mexico, but this
does not mean that bilateral U.S.-Mexico cooperation will decline in the long term.¶.¶ The theory is that by providing
security, stability and economic opportunity the government can undercut the cartels’ ability to recruit youth who currently see little other options in life but
to join the cartels.¶ To truly succeed, especially in the most lawless areas, the Mexican government is going to have to begin to build institutions — and
public trust in those institutions — from the ground up. The officials we have talked to hold Juarez up as an example they hope to follow in other locations,
though they say they learned a lot of lessons in Juarez that will allow them to streamline their efforts elsewhere. Obviously, before they can begin building,
they recognize that they will have to seize, consolidate and hold territory, and this is the role they envision for the newly created gendarmerie, or paramilitary
police.¶ The gendarmerie is important to this rebuilding effort because the military is incapable of serving in an investigative law enforcement role. They are
deployed to pursue active shooters and target members of the cartels, but much of the crime affecting Mexico’s citizens and companies falls outside the
military’s purview. The military also has a tendency to be heavy-handed, and reports of human rights abuses are quite common. Transforming from a
national security to a law enforcement approach requires the formation of an effective police force that is able to conduct community policing while pursuing
car thieves, extortionists, kidnappers and street gangs in addition to cartel gunmen. ¶ Certainly the
U.S. government was very involved in
the Calderon administration’s kinetic approach to the cartel problem, as shown by the very heavy collaboration between the
two governments. The collaboration was so heavy, in fact, that some incoming Pena Nieto administration figures were shocked by how integrated the
Americans had become. The U.S. officials who told Dana Priest they were uncomfortable with the new Mexican government’s approach to cartel violence
were undoubtedly among those deeply involved in this process — perhaps so deeply involved that they could not recognize that in the big picture, their
approach was failing to reduce the violence in Mexico. Indeed, from the Mexican perspective, the U.S. efforts have been focused on reducing the flow of
narcotics into the United States regardless of the impact of those efforts on Mexico’s security environment. ¶ However, as seen by the May 1 arrest of
Coronel, which a Mexican official described as a classic joint operation involving the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration and Mexican Federal Police,
the Mexican authorities do intend to continue to work very closely with their American counterparts. But that cooperation must occur within the new
framework established for the anti-cartel efforts. That means that plans for cooperation must be presented through the Mexican Interior Ministry so that the
efforts can be centrally coordinated. Much of the current peer-to-peer cooperation can continue, but within that structure. ¶ Consolidation and Coordination¶
As in the United States, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Mexico have terrible problems with coordination and information sharing. The
current administration is attempting to correct this by centralizing the anti-cartel efforts at the federal level and by creating coordination centers to oversee
operations in the various regions. These regional centers will collect information at the state and regional level and send it up to the national center.
However, one huge factor inhibiting information sharing in Mexico — and between the Americans and Mexicans — is the longstanding problem of
corruption in the Mexican government. In the past, drug czars, senior police officials and very senior politicians have been accused of being on cartel
payrolls. This makes trust critical, and lack of trust has caused some Mexican and most American agencies to restrict the sharing of intelligence to only
select, trusted contacts. Centralizing coordination will interfere with this selective information flow in the short term, and it is going to take time for this new
coordination effort to earn the trust of both Mexican and American agencies. There remains fear that consolidation will also centralize corruption and make
it easier for the cartels to gather intelligence.
More evidence
Seelke and Finklea, 13 (Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs; Kristin M. Finklea, Analyst in
Domestic Security, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” Congressional Research
Service, 6/12/13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf;)
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation increased significantly as a result of the development and
implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and Central
America first funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican counterdrug
forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak institutions and underlying societal problems
that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now focuses on (1) disrupting
organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4)
building strong and resilient communities. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to
intensify its anticrime efforts and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of
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firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.¶ Inaugurated on December 1, 2012, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has
File Title
vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a shift in focus toward reducing violent
crime in Mexico. Peña Nieto has begun to adjust the process and priorities of U.S.-Mexican efforts, adjustments which
President Obama has pledged to support. The Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through which Mérida training and
equipment requests are coordinated and intelligence is channeled. The Mexican government is requesting increased
assistance for judicial reform and prevention efforts, but limiting U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and
intelligence operations. As the Peña Nieto government fleshes out its security strategy, Mérida programs are likely to be
adjusted in order to support those efforts that align with U.S. priorities.¶ The 113th Congress is likely to continue
funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative and related domestic initiatives, but may also consider
supporting new programs. From FY2008 to FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in Mérida assistance for
Mexico, roughly $1.2 billion of which had been delivered as of April 2013. The Obama Administration asked for $234.0
million for Mérida programs in in its FY2013 budget request and $183 million in its FY2014 request.
Russia is losing ground in Mexico now-declining trade flows prove
Paniev, 12 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), “RUSSIA TURNING
ON LATIN AMERICA,” Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, v.1, n.1, Jan-Jun 2012, pgs 37-49.)
The accumulated experience of business cooperation testifies that the economies of Russia and the majority of Latin America states complement each other:
the Latin Americans require Russian exports and vice versa. This, undoubtedly, is a positive macroeconomic situation which has developed quite naturally.
However, while being implemented these favorable preconditions are still experiencing a lot of difficulties . No wonder
that almost all the documents on the results of the visits of any level include the provision that
the current level of Russian-Latin
American economic ties is still out of keeping with the potential.¶ Such claim has every reason to exist. Firstly,
Russian business in most Latin American countries is still poorly known, and the business image of Russian
enterprises often leaves much to be desired. The most important channel in marketing commercial proposals and
investment projects for the leading Russian companies remains within the framework of top-level official visits to
the region. This was the case, for example, during the trip of Vladimir Putin to Mexico, Brazil and Chile in 2004 and
Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba in 2008. Secondly, Russian entrepreneurs face tough competition from
the Western, and recently from the Chinese companies. Both of these actively resort to their governments in case of difficulties and use
every type of resources to establish relationships with local authorities and media in order to secure the most favored treatment. Thirdly, the structure
of Russian exports to Latin America tend to become more primitive than before. For quite a while the basis of Russian
supplies to the region is formed by goods attributable to the group of semi-finished products including fertilizers,
rolled steel, paper and cardboard products. In certain categories of hi-tech products Brazil and Mexico have left
Russia far behind. It is hard to believe, but just 20 years ago the situation was completely different: out of 25,3 thousand cars imported by Brazil 23,1
thousand were made by Russian VAZ manufacturer8. ¶ Finally, the system of mutual settlements, investment and scientific and
technical cooperation remain vulnerable even though the high-tech industry is exactly what can become a
locomotive of successful partnership. In this respect both Moscow, and Latin American capitals set their hopes upon the so-called
technological alliance. In case of Brazil, for example, such alliance is most likely to reveal itself in aerospace industry. The more so, because as far back as
in 2006 the parties signed an agreement on mutual protection of technologies in the area of space exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
The Brazilians are interested in using our technology to produce liquid fuel for their launch vehicles. It is less explosive hazardous than the dry fuel and will
allow to avoid the tragedy which occurred at the Brazilian Alcantara launch area in 2003, when 21 people were killed.
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File Title
A2: Russia Sphere DA-No Internal
No internal-Russia isn’t attempting to expand into the region
Wells, 13 (Miriam, Miriam Wells is a British freelance journalist based in Medellín. “Should Russian Anti-Drug Aid to
LatAm Worry the US,” Insight Crime, April 26, 2013, http://m.insightcrime.org/pages/article/4051;)
As Russia deepens its military and counternarcotics involvement in Latin America, the United States has to
decide whether this represents competition, or welcome cooperation in the war on drugs.¶ In March, Russian
drug czar Viktor Ivanov visited Nicaragua to inaugurate a new Managua counternarcotics training center financed by
Moscow, which will train not only Nicaraguan police but also officers from neighboring countries. Russia has also agreed to
supply Nicaragua with firearms, helicopters and urban assault vehicles, reported the Nicaragua Dispatch, with the aim of
making the country a "locomotive and stronghold" for Central America's fight against drug trafficking. ¶ On the way to
Nicaragua, Ivanov visited Peru, where the two nations signed an agreement to cooperate on counternarcotics. Later that
month, the Peruvian government made a $406 million deal to buy 24 Russian helicopters. During his trip, Ivanov also took
part in a conference of police chiefs across Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico and Colombia, and was thanked for
Russia's help to regional forces.¶ Earlier in March, the first major joint Russian-Nicaraguan anti-drug operation dismantled a
Nicaragua-based trafficking ring that allegedly supplied drugs to Europe, arresting 26 people and seizing around 1.2 tons of
cocaine.¶ Ivanov's tour follows a similar trip last year in which he visited Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama,
offering counternarcotics support and training for police officers. ¶ US Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement William Brownfield told the Nicaragua Dispatch that he "welcome[d] any contribution, and
donation and any support that the Russian government wants to give in this hemisphere." Russia's assistance to
Nicaragua was "complementary" to the United States' work in the "Northern Triangle" (El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala), said Brownfield.¶ The US Army's Strategic Studies Institute has labelled Russia's increasing
involvement in Latin America as "a fundamentally geopolitical approach directed against the US with an
economic component." Others dismiss this as fearmongering, pointing out that Russia has a genuine interest in fighting
drug trafficking. Its hardline approach to drugs within its own borders, under which dealers are likened to "serial killers" and
addicts forced into harsh treatment centers or jailed, has been roundly criticized by international observers. The arms trade,
meanwhile, is one of its leading industries, which it naturally seeks to expand into new markets. ¶ "We're well past the
Cold War era," analyst James Bosworth told InSight Crime. " This really is about drug trafficking and economic
interests. The US has nothing to worry about. As long as Washington doesn't overreact in response, it won't
impact US influence or interests in the region . Combating organized crime is a potential area for
cooperation, not competition, with Russia."
No zero sum tradeoff
RIA, 10 (Ria Novosti, one of the largest news agencies in Russia, “U.S. okays Russia's intention to help Mexico fight
drug criminality,” Ria Novosti, February 18, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/world/20100218/157921859.html;)
The United States has no objections to Russian-Mexican joint efforts to fight drug trafficking in the Latin
American state, US State Department spokesman Mark Toner has said. ¶ Russia has reiterated its readiness to help Mexico
fight the drug criminality, a major woe for the U.S. neighbor. The joint U.S.-Mexican Merida Initiative with the same goal
has been widely criticized. Critics say the project has yielded no significant results despite huge investments. ¶ Answering the
journalist's question on how the U.S. views Russia's initiative, Toner said there were no grounds for anxiety.¶ "I mean,
Mexico is a close neighbor, friend, partner with the United States. I would just say it's welcome to pursue bilateral
relationships with any country it wants to, including Russia," he said.¶ When asked on whether the
strengthening of ties between Russia and Mexico would affect U.S.-Russian relations, Toner said "no, I don't
believe so."¶ Merida Initiative is a security cooperation between the United States, Mexico and Central American states
aimed at combating the drug trafficking, transnational crime and money laundering. The assistance includes training,
equipment and intelligence.¶ Mexico has been the main hub for drug trafficking from Latin America to the U.S., with annual
drug supplies estimated at around $40 billion. Some 45,000 servicemen have been involved in anti-drug operations at the
border between the two countries.¶ In his New Year's speech, Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared fighting drug
crimes in Mexico the government's top priority for 2010.
Russia is explicitly ignoring Latin America to focus on Eurasia
Cohen, 6/25/13 (Ariel, Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. , is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy
Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, “Russia’s Eurasian Union Could Endanger The Neighborhood And US Interests,” Valdai
Discussion Club, June 25, 2013, http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/59580.html;)
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File Title
In the fall of 2011, Russian President Vladimir Putin
proposed forming a Eurasian Union (EAU) with Kazakhstan and
Belarus. In November 2011, the presidents of these three countries signed an agreement to launch the Eurasian
Union and make it fully operational by 2015.¶ Stretching from the Polish border to the Pacific, the length of
the former Soviet Union, the new Eurasian Union will be the nucleus of a larger transnational entity.
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are uniting their economies, legal systems, and customs services to create
a stronger Eurasian global player. They are coordinating their militaries through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Putin is
pushing for more coordination of their security services. This geopolitical consolidation will likely affect their neighbors’
sovereignty, independence, and political orientation. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan,
and Ukraine may be considered for future membership in the Eurasian Union.¶ A Eurasian Union that
evolves into a Russian sphere of influence would adopt a mercantilist approach to the global economy. It will likely monopolize regional
security, could threaten regional stability, and undermine economic and political freedom in Central Asia and beyond. U.S. policy should hedge against such efforts
and make the case that an open economic environment offers a greater prospect for regional development. Such an approach would serve U.S. interests and create
a better environment for a peaceful and prosperous Central Asia. The U.S. should organize an interagency effort to promote good governance and rule-based
market economics as well as to combat efforts to close markets to the West. ¶ ¶ ¶ The
Eurasian Union: Putin’s Top Geopolitical Priority ¶
Vladimir Putin famously said in 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century and a genuine tragedy for
the Russian people.[1] While focusing on the post-Soviet erosion of Russian power and the rise of the U.S., NATO, China, and India on the global stage, the Russian
Putin proposed forming a
Eurasian Union as part of his presidential election campaign.[2] He envisioned integrating Russia and
ultimately all of the former Soviet republics, except the Baltic states, by removing barriers to the flow of
goods and people within a common economic space and by harmonizing domestic and external policies and
legislation. He wrote:¶ ¶ It is crucial that the Common Economic Space [the precursor of the Eurasian Union] is rooted in coordinated action in key
leader disregarded the quest of the 14 former Soviet states for independence. In an article in Izvestia in October 2011,
institutional areas such as: macroeconomics, ensuring competition, technical regulations, agricultural subsidies, transport, and natural monopolies tariffs. Later,
this framework will also include common visa and migration policies, allowing border controls between our states to be lifted. In fact, we are adapting the
experience of the Schengen [visa] Agreement that benefits Europeans as well as everyone who comes to work, study, or holiday in the EU.[3] ¶ ¶ The high-level
leadership, speed, large staff, and considerable funding set the Eurasian Union apart from past integration efforts. In 2010, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
implemented a uniform external customs tariff and adopted a customs code. In 2011, they lifted internal border controls. In July 2012, they inaugurated the Single
Economic Space and a Eurasian Economic Commission in Moscow to administer it. The commission is headed by Victor Khristenko, former Russian Vice Premier
and Minister of Industry and Energy, and 85 percent of its personnel are citizens of Russia. The
presidents of Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan signed the agreement to launch the Eurasian Union in November 2011. It will be fully
functional in 2015, and then, as Khristenko said, “longer-term action” can be considered, presumably leading to further integration.[4]¶ ¶ Not Like
the European Union¶ The Eurasian Union is based on two major documents: the Customs Code and the Codified
Agreement on the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, which spell out the legal rules and norms for the functioning of
a common market. This is a major break with past integration efforts , which generated hundreds of vague, fragmented
agreements that largely remained unimplemented.¶ The key institution is the Eurasian Commission, which was launched in July 2012. Similar to the
Commission of the European Union, its main responsibility is to ensure smooth operation of the common market
by enforcing rules and regulations and to carry out initiatives for further integration. The commission has jurisdiction
over tariff and non-tariff regulation (e.g., sanitary controls), customs administration, technical regulation, competition policy, energy, transport, intellectual
property protection, migration, and other areas.¶ The commission’s employees are formally “supranational bureaucrats” who supposedly take no instructions from
their member states and act in the interests of the EAU as a whole. The commission’s headquarters is located in downtown Moscow, although its future
headquarters might be relocated to Astana upon Kazakhstan’s insistence. Unlike the EU, the EAU Commission will make decisions by majority vote, not by
consensus. Of course, Russia will dominate the decision-making process with its 57 percent vote, while Belarus and Kazakhstan have 21.5 percent each. ¶ ¶ The
Military Dimension¶ The Eurasian Union can be seen as a “soft power”—primarily economic—project. Russia hopes to translate its relatively large population,
power, wealth, and size into greater influence around its periphery. With 600 years of empire building behind them, the
Russian leaders are well
aware that they must back up this influence with a hard power (military and security) component. The
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) charter signed in 2002 entered into force in 2006, when its members appointed a secretary general to lead the
organization. The CSTO includes the other Customs Union members—Belarus and Kazakhstan—as well as several potential members: Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in July 2012.¶ ¶ As
a military alliance, the CSTO is dominated by the Russian
armed forces, which maintain military bases in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Russia also
controlled until recently the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan; three military bases in Abkhazia and one
base in South Ossetia, regions of Georgia that are occupied by Russia; ground forces in Transnistria, Moldova; an infantry
division in Tajikistan; and a naval base in Sevastopol, Ukraine. The Russian Federation is currently spending $800 billion to reform and rearm the military, which
will force the CSTO to adapt the alliance to the context of Eurasian integration.[5]¶ In February 2009, the CSTO agreed to form the Rapid Reaction Forces (KSOR),
a permanent combat-ready military component for crisis response. As one military expert writes, the alliance is moving toward establishing a unified command
and empowering the Joint Chief of Staff in charge of CSTO military forces, effectively creating a military arm of the Eurasian Union.[6] Russia’s airborne forces,
which constitute the majority of KSOR troops, are expanding from 7,500 to 20,000 troops by 2017. The Russian Defense Ministry nominated General Vladimir
Shamanov, the popular commander of Russia’s airborne troops, to be the next CSTO Chief of Staff.[7] ¶ The CSTO has sought partnerships with NATO and the U.N.
to boost its legitimacy, but its overtures to Washington have been unsuccessful, as the White House has been careful to avoid legitimizing Russia’s presence in the
post-Soviet space.[8]¶ ¶ Russia’s Eurasian Vocation¶ Geographically,
Russia has been a Eurasian power since its conquests of
Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East in the 16th–19th centuries.[9] The Russian Empire undertook
numerous campaigns to gain territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia, taking Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan from the Ottomans and the Persian Empire and bringing to heel the khanates of Khiva,
Khorezm, and Bukhara in the 19th century.[10] However, Eurasianism as a political ideology emerged
after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Russian émigré thinkers formulated a third way for Russia
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between East and West and between capitalism and socialism. The idea never fully developed due to the
predominance of Leninism.¶ ¶ Debate on Eurasianism reemerged following the Soviet collapse in 1991, dividing those who favored integration with
Western Europe and the U.S. and those who argued that Russia should focus on dominating Ukraine, Belarus, and the Eurasian “heartland,” including Central Asia
and the Caucasus, in opposition to the West.¶ In the 1990s the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had little supranational power and
eclining Russian influence over the post-Soviet space alarmed Kremlin strategists who
feared that Russian security would suffer if Russia failed to regain some clout there, possibly leading to
NATO membership by such countries as Ukraine and Georgia.¶ Yevgeny Primakov, who served as director of Russia’s Foreign
participation was lukewarm. D
Intelligence Service (1991–1996), foreign minister (1996–1998), and prime minister (1998–1999) envisioned the emergence of a multipolar world, in which
American influence would be first diluted and then opposed. He envisaged future integration of the CIS countries with Russia. He also actively supported and
personally managed Russia’s collaboration with anti-Western states—such as Iraq, Iran, and China—to promote a multipolar international order.[11] The 1996
treaty of integration with Belarus, which created the Union State, was post-communist Russia’s first major foreign policy step to reintegrate the former empire. ¶ In
the 2000s, rising energy prices enabled Russia’s resurgence in the neighborhood and on the world stage. In October 2000, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) with the declared goal of creating a customs union and single economic
space.[12]¶ Today, Moscow opposes Western attempts to reach out to the post-Soviet countries. Russia was even upset with the EU’s Eastern Partnership program,
Dmitry Medvedev called for a “sphere of
privileged influence” in the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia war, and his half-baked proposal of a treaty on
European security failed to find support in the West.[13]¶ ¶ Vladimir Putin’s promotion of the Eurasian
Union in the fall of 2011 is a multipronged and strategic move aimed at:¶ - Creating an independent pole in
the perceived global multipolar system, consolidating the Eastern Slavic and Christian Orthodox
demographic core with the industrial and natural resources potential of Kazakhstan;¶ - Meeting the Chinese economic
which was launched in 2009 to facilitate relations with post-Soviet states. President
challenges, primarily in Central Asia; and¶ - Opposing the Islamist expansion into Central Asia, the North Caucasus, Siberia, the Urals, and the Volga region. ¶ ¶
Russia Turning East¶ Russia is also undertaking its own “pivot to Asia” for political and economic reasons. First, the Putin administration is tired of the Western
leaders “lecturing” them about political freedoms and human rights. Second, as Russian trade with the EU stagnates and business with the U.S. remains
abnormally low due to hostility, analysts
point to the Kremlin spending $20 billion to host foreign delegations at the
recent Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Vladivostok as a sign that Russia is turning
away from recession-stricken Europe and toward Asia.[14] Although the EU accounts for 50 percent of Russian foreign trade and is a
major cultural influence and tourism destination, in 2012, China surpassed Germany as Russia’s top trading partner for the first time.[15] Russia’s Far Eastern and
Siberian Federal Districts, which share land borders with China, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, account for 66 percent of Russia’s territory. With Asia’s growing
importance, it is understandable that Eurasian integration is strategically appealing to the Russian leadership.¶ ¶ The Drivers for Eurasian Union¶ To date,
the
Eurasian Union is the most serious attempt by post-communist Russia to recreate a deeply integrated sphere
of influence . The Russian elites already refer to it as Bolshaya strana (the Big Country). While Vladimir Putin states that the Eurasian Union is not an
attempt to restore what did not work in the past but to achieve greater integration based on new values, politics, and economy, the project appears to
head straight for the past—to Soviet-like integration.[16]¶ This comes at a cost to Russia and Eurasia’s partners. The proposed union
will likely divert its trade away from the rest of the world. According to one World Bank study, Kazakhstan actually lost real income per capita in 2011, mostly due
to the Customs Union’s higher external tariffs, which hinder trade diversification.[17] ¶ The Eurasian Union may also harm the economies of neighboring nonmembers. Russia has been courting Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine to join the organization, but Azerbaijan and Georgia have clearly indicated that
they will not become members.¶ The
Eurasian project flows not only from Russia’s preoccupation with influence and
prestige in the post-Soviet space, but also from Russia’s need to adapt to the changing international
environment. Thus, the Russians are apprehensive about the expected U.S. pullout from Afghanistan in 2014 and are determined to maintain security in the
region. Russia’s goals in Central Asia include containing radical Islam and fighting narcotics trafficking.¶ ¶ Containment of Islamic Fundamentalism and Fighting
Narcotics Trafficking. Russia is facing an Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus that threatens to turn the whole region into a haven for international
terrorism. Following the American departure from Afghanistan in 2014, a surge of extremists from Afghanistan into Central Asia and from the North Caucasus into
the rest of Russia would be Moscow’s worst nightmare. Russia currently has the 201st Division (approximately 7,000 personnel) in Tajikistan, the Kant airbase in
Kyrgyzstan, and the 102st Military Base (approximately 3,000 personnel) in Gyumri, Armenia. Russia intends to build a major counterterrorism center in Osh,
Kyrgyzstan. The CSTO’s efforts are directed at reforming and integrating allied forces, including air defenses, and making them compatible and interoperable;
boosting weapons sales; conducting training and exercises; and expanding its network of military bases. A major $800 billion military reform program is aimed at
creating well-equipped mobile brigades capable of fast response to local and regional conflicts.[18] ¶ Insurgency, cross-border infiltration, and smuggling are
especially acute in Tajikistan, which shares a porous 800-mile border with Afghanistan. This long border is the major avenue for smuggling Afghan drugs to Russia
and Europe. In Russia, which has approximately 2.5 million heroin addicts, drugs have become a health disaster. ¶ ¶ Building a Sphere of Influence. Russia
is
striving to create a sphere of influence in Eurasia, making it more difficult for foreign powers, especially
the U.S. and China, to operate in Central Asia, the Caucasus, or the western tier of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Belarus,
Moldova, and Ukraine). The Kremlin was frightened by “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia and views them as U.S.-led conspiracies aimed at undermining
Russian influence. Furthermore, some nationalists and Eurasianists view the revolutions as rehearsals by pro-American political forces to topple the current
regime in Russia.¶ The Kremlin has supported the NATO military mission in Afghanistan, but Moscow (and Beijing) have never been comfortable with the U.S.
military presence in Central Asia. The Kremlin pressured Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas Air Base at Bishkek’s international airport in 2008 and 2010 in exchange
for discounted loans of over $1 billion. Kyrgyzstan promised to shut the base, but never did because Russia failed to provide the loans.[19]¶ Russia’s strategic and
defense partnership with Kazakhstan is of crucial importance. Moscow views the Kazakh territory as a buffer separating the mostly unguarded 5,000-kilometer
Russian frontier from instability originating in other Muslim-populated states in Central Asia and beyond. By 2013, Astana and Moscow plan to integrate their
common air and missile defense command with Russia’s latest S-400 “Triumph” missile defense systems deployed in Kazakhstan,[20] and they are calling for
active military cooperation within the CSTO.[21]¶ ¶ Control of Natural Resources and Key Infrastructure. The
Eurasian Union is modeled after
the 19th century customs and currency unions, which were at the heart of spheres of influence in Central
Europe. Whether the proposed union has a sound foundation and the potential to promote stability and prosperity in the post-Soviet space is debatable. To a
significant degree, its success will depend on Russia’s willingness to play by the rules and to act as an impartial and reliable partner, not as a hegemon which
manipulates the organization for its own gains.¶ Of course,
Russia’s imperial past and endemic corruption undermine its
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trustworthiness and economic leadership . Russia ranks an abysmal 133rd in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index, 112th in the World Bank’s Doing Business index, and 139th in the Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom .[22] Its history of conquest, exploitation, and hardball politics with its neighbors does not help and
sometimes backfires.[23] That history makes it difficult to see how Russia can effectively and cooperatively lead a supranational rule-based economic organization.
Similarly, doubts remain about Russia’s capacity to manage the region with complex interethnic relations and interstate issues, especially given its serious
domestic Islamist insurgency problem and recent nationalistic and Christian Orthodox revival.[24 ]¶
The Eurasian Union will help Russia
retain privileged access to resources and help to pull the post-Soviet states’ economies into a closer Russian
orbit. Central Asia is rich in natural resources, especially energy, including oil, gas, coal, and uranium.
Russian firms have invested heavily in the Kazakh energy sector and are active across the post-Soviet
space.¶ In the West, Moscow has worked to obstruct the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline from Azerbaijan, which would bypass Russia, and has so far derailed the
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which would bring Turkmen gas to Europe. The Nord Stream gas pipeline to Germany and the planned South Stream pipeline to
European markets are part of Russia’s strategy to bypass transit countries in Europe, especially Ukraine, and enhance Europe’s dependency on energy supplies
from Russia. The Eurasian Union includes an energy commission that will make it easier for Russia to promote and impose pipelines based on Moscow’s
preferences.¶ However, when competing with China over natural resources, Moscow has not seen great success. For example, the Central Asia–China gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, constructed in 2009, has undermined Russia’s monopoly over energy exports from Central Asia. China already
controls a large portion of Kazakhstan’s energy sector and is the principal importer of Turkmen gas.[25] To counter this trend, Russia hopes that the Eurasian
Union would strengthen its grip on Central Asia.¶ Promotion of Transportation Routes via Russia. Russia wants to become a major transit country for commodities
and finished goods transported between Asia and Europe. The abolition of customs controls between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will help to increase transit
between China and Western Europe. Thus, Moscow views the possibility of major land connections between China and the West via Central Asia (bypassing
Russia) as a threat to Russian interests. ¶ Russia faces challenges because China is willing to finance and build expensive transport infrastructure in the region.
China has been expanding and upgrading its railroads to the Kazakh border, building free trade zones in Kazakhstan,[26] and exploring new routes through
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Construction of a railroad from China to Iran and to Turkey and Western Europe may become feasible in the foreseeable
future.¶ One example of Russia’s new approach is Rossotrudnichestvo, Russia’s arm for the outreach to Russian-speakers and co-ethnics, which was set up in 2008
and is headed by Konstantin Kosachev. The agency’s mission is to reach out to and work with Russian-speaking communities and other groups living in Russia’s
periphery to nurture positive views of Russia and to promote the Eurasian Union.[27] In addition to television broadcasting, Russia uses university education and
training of bureaucrats and security elites to tie its peripheral neighbors to Moscow. In September 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urged
Rossotrudnichestvo to work more actively to encourage inter-CIS cooperation in humanitarian efforts, proposing to double the number of student scholarships—
currently 10,000 per year—that Russia gives to foreigners, especially those from friendly countries. He also spoke of the need to promote the Russian language and
to protect the “legitimate rights of compatriots.” Rossotrudnichestvo is the leading platform in advancing Russian soft power abroad, including in the Eurasian
Union.[28]¶ ¶ The International Reaction¶ Attitudes toward Russia’s supranational design vary widely in the region. ¶ Central Asia. Although Kazakhstan has been
the staunchest supporter of Russia’s integration projects, many in Kazakhstan are skeptical of the idea, and some Kazakh economic sectors, such as chemicals and
agriculture, may suffer from greater competition with Russia firms. However, Kazakhstan is weary of China’s growing clout and does not want to alienate Russia,
yet it wants to keep concessions at a minimum and limit integration to economic matters.[29] ¶ Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have signaled interest in the Eurasian
Union membership, but have made no commitments. Their exports markets, migrant workers, and the need for Russian and Kazakh investment are the main
motivations for joining the Eurasian Union. Kyrgyz and Tajik elites know that the Customs Union and the potential Eurasian Union would make Russia an even
more significant stakeholder in their domestic affairs; hence, they are uncertain.[30] Neutral Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been pursuing policies of
economic and strategic emancipation from Moscow. Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov took Uzbekistan out of the CSTO in 2012 and shows no enthusiasm for Moscow’s
integration projects.¶ ¶ South Caucasus. Armenia may consider joining the Customs Union because of its economic dependence on Moscow. Russia is Armenia’s
main trading partner and controls 80 percent of its energy resources. Moscow also has a 49-year agreement to station troops at the Gyumri military base. However,
while Serge Sargsyan has praised the Eurasian Union, the dominant policy is nonetheless “not to rush” any such development.[31]¶ Azerbaijan President Ilham
Alyev has expressed no interest in the Eurasian Union or the Customs Union because they offer no benefits to Azerbaijan’s economy and are incompatible with
Azerbaijan’s pro-Western orientation.¶ Georgia withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States during the brief military conflict with Russia in August
2008. The Georgian situation remains unclear after the victory by the Georgia Dream coalition, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Yet it is difficult to imagine
that Tbilisi would warm up to membership in the Eurasian Union. ¶ Ukraine. Ukraine is one non-member of the Customs Union that Russia sees a strategic
imperative to rope into the organization. Moscow is trying to lure Kyiv by offering heavily discounted gas prices.[32] However, pro-Russian politicians in Kyiv are
unsure whether to embrace the union. Ukraine is a partner country within the European Neighborhood Policy. Kyiv is also seeking to sign an EU Association
Agreement with important trade benefits.¶ The EU Members. EU
policies in Eurasia have lacked clear goals, a strategic focus,
and able leadership. The EU Commission and other EU institutions have adopted the “wait and see”
approach toward the region, particularly toward the Eurasian Union, because some in Europe still regard
geopolitics as a dirty word. As one writer noted, the Eurasian Union seems to be designed in parallel with the European Union, rather than in
harmony with it, thus closing the door to Eurasia’s integration into the EU.[33] ¶ China. China has typically remained tight-lipped. It has neither opposed nor
endorsed the Eurasian Union. China
does not see the Eurasian Union as a significant concern because China is
already highly invested in Central Asia, especially in energy, and can ensure that its interests are properly
protected. If the Eurasian Union promotes stability in the region, China welcomes it because stability
promotes greater economic cooperation.[34] On the other hand, Belarus and Ukraine would remain in Russia’s
orbit, while China selectively pursues its business goals there.¶ ¶ Why the Eurasian Union Matters for the U.S. and the West¶ A new authoritarian, antiWestern, mercantilist Russian sphere of influence would recreate the dynamics of the 19th century Great Game
between the Romanov Empire and the British Empire and of the 20th century Cold War. It could deny NATO and the U.S. strategic
access to air, land, and sea lanes, or control them, as Moscow did during the Afghanistan campaign. This is not what the U.S. and NATO want.¶ Moscow is already
demanding an end to the U.S. presence in Central Asia. It wants American forces out of the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan. Russia
is also
pressuring Ukraine to join the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union, which would effectively foreclose
Ukraine’s European integration and future NATO membership. The geopolitical level playing field is a sine
qua non of American political engagement, just as Washington does not seriously oppose Moscow’s current
deep economic involvement in Cuba and Venezuela.¶ Russia uses all elements of state power in Eurasia,
while the U.S. and its allies limit themselves primarily to diplomacy.
Speaking to the Federal Security Service command on
February 14, 2013, Putin ordered the counterintelligence service to “deal” with opponents of post-Soviet integration, including in cyberspace. He equated
“extremists” with “terrorists,” opening the door to covert action operations against those who do not share his vision of Russian tutelage, from the Polish border to
the Pacific.[35]¶ The future of the Eurasian Union holds many unknowns. For example, Russia is unlikely to reverse the gradual decline of Russia’s economic
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influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia has already lost economic ground to China and will likely continue to do so because it lacks comparative
advantages in most sectors except energy, military, and nuclear industries. (See Table 1.)¶ Today, Moscow’s attempts to define the rules of the Eurasian geopolitical
game are adversely affecting U.S. interests. The Kremlin is excluding American security and economic interests by using force, covert action, corruption, and noncustoms trade barriers and by undermining the rule of law. ¶ Russia will attempt to construct its own ideology and define its sphere of influence in opposition to
free market, liberal values and their champions—Europe and the U.S.¶ This need not happen. It is in the interests of the United States and the peoples of Russia
and Eurasia to ensure that values of personal and economic freedom flow freely and are not subverted by expansion of Islamist radicalism or by authoritarian
powers, such as Russia and China. The West should be concerned that liberty may suffer from Russia’s quasi-imperialist agenda in the post-Soviet space. Since the
fall of 2011, the Russian government has criminalized unauthorized protests, expanded the definition of espionage, and made it harder for nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs)—especially those with foreign financing—to operate within the country.[36] One can predict that the suppression of democratic values,
organizations, and activists will be one of the Eurasian Union’s principal priorities.¶ ¶ ¶ What Should the U.S. Do About the Eurasian Union? ¶ The Bush and Obama
Administrations have viewed the region almost exclusively through the prism of Operation Enduring Freedom, particularly through building the Northern
Distribution Network, a supply system for the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. This may have been necessary, but it is not suitable for future U.S. policies.¶ The
U.S. should develop a hedge that would protect its national interests in the Central Asian and other former Soviet countries and promote constructive development.
It would also be to Russia’s benefit if her neighbors developed into functioning, prosperous states in partnership with the U.S. Such ties could open avenues for
economic and security cooperation, bringing jobs and business opportunities to American firms, and peaceful civic and economic development to peoples of the
region. In fiscal year 2011, the United States gave $47 million[37] to Eurasian countries and $50 million[38] to Eastern European countries. The vast majority
came from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Aid from the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy is comparatively low and inconsistent, fluctuating greatly from 2001 to 2011. The majority of the money from State and USAID goes to “stabilization
operations and security sector reform.”[39]¶ However, following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington will be in a much weaker position to promote
development in a region where violent Islamism, poor governance, corruption, and drug trafficking are growing problems. ¶ ¶ To remain geopolitically relevant in
the 21st-century Eastern Hemisphere geopolitics, the Obama Administration should: ¶ Prepare for involvement in the heart of Eurasia after the drawdown of the
U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. should not abandon the field to Moscow or to Beijing, its de facto regional competitor.¶ Combine the Central
Asia/Afghanistan and Russia interagency task forces. The combined task force, coordinated by the National Security Council, should systematically analyze U.S.
strategic priorities and formulate long-term U.S. policies in Russia and Eurasia, including opposition to Moscow’s neo-imperialist policies. The task force should
develop and integrate the Eurasian strategy, including the New Silk Road strategy, with the “pivot to Asia” approach. To date, this effort is lacking. Such an
interagency approach would span the Departments of Defense, State (including USAID), Energy, and Commerce and the intelligence community. Despite declining
budgets, the U.S. should put in place intelligence and Special Operations platforms and contingencies to collect critical information and surgically fight violent
Islamist threats in Central Asia past 2014. The United States should also develop an NGO component to promote good governance, rule-based market economics,
individual rights, and media freedom.¶ Boost regional geopolitical, linguistic, religious, and historical expertise in the U.S. government, while taking into account
limited budgetary resources. Since the end of the Cold War, regional expertise has declined in the intelligence community, the military, and the State Department.
While America should remember that geography and history dictate that these countries maintain good relations with Russia and China, Washington should not
see these triangular ties as a zero-sum game. It should appreciate and encourage the “multi-vector policies” of the Central Asian states, while reaching out to
secular nationalists and pro-Western circles. Thus, the U.S. and its allies should resist Russia’s strong-arm tactics to carve out a 19th century–style sphere of
influence.¶ Promote continuous bilateral U.S. involvement in Eurasia. This includes strengthening
bilateral diplomatic, political–
military, and economic partnerships and regional cooperation with key states, especially Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Strengthening these cooperative relations should be
America’s top priority in the region.¶ Expand economic and political freedom through international
organizations. The U.S. should work through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, World Trade Organization, and other institutions to
protest Moscow’s strong-arm tactics in imposing the Single Economic Space and Eurasian Union integration and to draw attention to Russia’s quasi-imperial
policies.¶ Emphasize economic freedom. The U.S. should work to prevent the Eurasian Union from closing market access and expanding state sectors. The U.S.
should oppose exclusion of U.S. weapons sales and limitations on investments in energy and other natural resources, which is already happening in Russia. The
U.S. should also oppose non-tariff barriers through WTO adjudication procedures and condition Russia’s OECD accession on economic transparency and the rule
of law for all Customs Union members. ¶ Employ U.S. public diplomacy tools, including international broadcasting and exchanges, to communicate the pre-tested
key messages to elite and mass audiences in the region.¶ ¶ Conclusion¶ Despite Moscow’s efforts to impose its will, the domination-bound, post-imperial mindset in
Moscow will likely undermine economic and political integration through the Eurasian Union. This mindset makes it difficult for Russia to contemplate a truly
voluntary, mutually beneficial integration or to allow its neighbors to prioritize relations with the U.S., EU, or China. Moscow promotes bilateral and regional
integration to keep its neighbors in Russia’s orbit, strengthening Russian influence over their politics and constraining their ability to develop relations with
outside powers.¶ Success
in Central Asia may encourage Moscow to expand its control over the Caucasus and
Eastern Europe, threatening the independence and pro-Western orientation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Ukraine—and even the Baltic states.¶ While some amount of Russian presence underpinning regional trade and development may be
unavoidable to prevent the meltdown of weak and failing states into religious or narcotics-driven civil wars and anarchy, it is not in America’s interest to encourage
unencumbered Russian hegemony in Eurasia for the reasons of regional and global balance of power. The U.S. should act multilaterally with its European allies,
Japan, India, South Korea, and its Eurasian partners to balance the Russian geopolitical offensive.
Russia knows its sphere is in Eurasia
Kramer, 8 (Andrew, Moscow Correspondent for the New York Times, “Russia Claims Its Sphere of Influence in the World,”
NYT, August 31, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/world/europe/01russia.html?_r=0;)
MOSCOW — President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia on Sunday laid
out what he said would become his government’s guiding
principles of foreign policy after its landmark conflict with Georgia — notably including a claim to a
“privileged” sphere of influence in the world.¶ Speaking to Russian television in the Black Sea resort of
Sochi, a day before a summit meeting in Brussels where European leaders were to reassess their relations with Russia, Mr. Medvedev said his
government would adhere to five principles.¶ Russia, he said, would observe international law. It would reject
what he called United States dominance of world affairs in a “unipolar” world. It would seek friendly relations with
other nations. It would defend Russian citizens and business interests abroad. And it would claim a sphere of influence in the world.¶
In part, Mr. Medvedev reiterated long-held Russian positions, like his country’s rejection of American aspirations to an exceptional role in world affairs after
the end of the cold war. The Russian authorities have also said previously that their foreign policy would include a defense of commercial interests,
sometimes citing American practice as justification.¶ In his unabashed claim to a renewed Russian sphere of influence, Mr. Medvedev said: “ Russia,
like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests. These are regions where
countries with which we have friendly relations are located.Ӧ Asked whether this sphere of influence would
be the border states around Russia, he answered, “It is the border region, but not only.”¶ Last week, Mr.
Medvedev used vehement language in announcing Russia’s recognition of the independence of South
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Ossetia and Abkhazia. Though he alluded in passing to respecting Georgia’s territorial integrity, he defended Russia’s intervention as necessary to
prevent a genocide.¶ Mr. Medvedev, inaugurated in May, was an aide to Vladimir V. Putin, the former president and now prime minister. ¶ Mr. Putin
appeared on Russian television on Sunday from the nation’s far east, where he was inspecting progress on a trans-Siberian oil pipeline to China and the
Pacific Ocean, a clear warning to Europe that Russia could find alternative customers for its energy exports. He was later shown in a forest, dressed in
camouflage and hunting a Siberian tiger with a tranquilizer gun. ¶ Leaders of the 27 members of the European Union, who will meet in an emergency session
on Monday, were considered highly unlikely to impose sanctions or go beyond diplomatic measures in expressing disapproval of Russia’s conflict with
Georgia.¶ The
members in Eastern Europe have tended to be more wary and more confrontational toward
Russia, while Western European countries have tended to be more concerned with not jeopardizing energy
imports from Russia.
More evidence
Romero, 8 (Simon, Simon Romero was Andean bureau chief from 2006 to 2011, based in Caracas, Venezuela, “Flux in Latin America
Affects Russia’s Diplomacy,” NYT, November 21, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/22/world/americas/22russia.html?pagewanted=all;)
CARACAS, Venezuela — When President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia planned
his coming trip through Latin America,
his country seemed poised to present one of the most visible challenges in years to American influence in
the region. With oil prices high, Russia was flush with cash and planning a variety of measures, including
helping Venezuela build a nuclear reactor and strengthening military ties with Cuba, a former cold war ally of the
Soviets.¶ But when Mr. Medvedev reaches the region next week, he will find it in flux in reaction to recent
events — and in some cases less receptive to his overtures. Plunging oil prices and the global financial crisis,
which have hammered Russia particularly hard, have raised questions about Russia’s reliability as an
economic partner , while Barack Obama’s victory in the presidential race has raised hopes throughout Latin
America of a new era of improved relations with the United States.¶ In this rapidly changing landscape, most Latin American
countries are recalibrating their political interests, frustrating Russia’s efforts to deepen regional ties, like the ones China established in the past decade.¶
“Russia’s
elites, including President Medvedev, look on China’s rising diplomatic and economic successes in Latin
America and in Africa with envy,” said Stephen Kotkin, the director of Russia studies at Princeton University. “They also perceive
an opportunity, much exaggerated, to send the U.S. a message in its supposed backyard.Ӧ But Mr. Medvedev
faces a hard sell in the region. In Cuba there are lingering suspicions over Russian intentions, as the Cuban
economy collapsed when the Soviets withdrew in the 1990s, as well as a reluctance to alienate an incoming
Obama administration that might push to end the trade embargo.¶ Brazil, Latin America’s largest country, which also
places a high priority on relations with an Obama administration, wants to engage Russia not as a source of weapons or military
assistance, but as an equal partner.¶ “We are not interested in buying defense products off the shelf,” said Roberto Mangabeira Unger,
Brazil’s minister of strategic affairs and the architect of a new military strategy set to be officially unveiled in December. ¶ “Unlike other South
American countries we don’t go around buying things, and we are not interested in some kind of balanceof-power politics to contain the United States,” said Mr. Mangabeira Unger, a former Harvard law professor who taught Mr. Obama
when he was at Harvard Law School. “We have friendly relations with the United States, and with the incoming administration intend to make them even
more friendly.”¶ By contrast in Venezuela, itself battered by falling oil prices, Mr. Medvedev can expect a warm welcome. President Hugo Chávez has long
sought closer ties, traveling to Russia seven times and forging deals to buy more than $4 billion in arms. Until recently, however, Russia showed little
interest in expanding ties with Venezuela beyond weapons sales and a handful of energy deals. ¶ But Russia’s position evolved in recent months, and it is
now seeking a beachhead with a raft of oil, as well as mining, banking and military contracts. Yet in choosing
to invest in Venezuela,
energy executives and foreign diplomats say, Moscow is becoming involved in one of the most problematic
countries in the region. Countries like China and Iran have faced a morass of corruption and institutional
disarray while seeking to expand their presence here.¶ The Russian foray into Latin America has been
viewed in many quarters as payback for what the Kremlin sees as an aggressive infringement by the United
States on its sphere of influence. Moscow has been angered by American plans to deploy a missile defense
system in Eastern Europe as well as by Washington’s support for Kosovo’s independence and for Georgia
in the August war, which the Kremlin claimed that the White House helped provoke.¶ In Colombia, where there is
fear over Russian-made weapons in neighboring Venezuela finding their way across the border to leftist guerrillas, Russia’s moves are partly seen as tit-fortat for the growing NATO presence in former Soviet bloc countries. “In a sense, Venezuela is becoming Russia’s Ukraine,” said Román Ortiz, a security
analyst in Bogotá, the Colombian capital.¶ Two Russian strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons made a visit to Venezuela in September, a
few weeks before Russia announced a $1 billion loan to the country for weapons purchases. And a contingent of the Russian Navy’s North Sea Fleet is now
en route to the Caribbean to take part in training exercises with the Venezuelan Navy, maneuvers scheduled to coincide with Mr. Medvedev’s visit here.¶ “If
the country has stood on its feet and is beginning to extend its economic and political roles, then it cannot remain locally focused,” said Andrei Klimov, the
deputy head of the International Affairs Committee in Russia’s Parliament. He emphasized that Russia’s policies in Latin America were not “directed against
a specific country.”¶ “It is simply that Russia has developed defined interests, and we want to realize those interests, particularly in business — in oil, gas, in
new technologies, in weapons sales,” Mr. Klimov said.¶ Meanwhile, skepticism persists even in Venezuela over Russia’s ability to expand ties that mainly
involve weapons sales into a relationship that involves greater amounts of investment and diplomatic coordination. ¶ In
diplomatic circles in
Caracas, a joke is making the rounds comparing the Latin American strategy of China, which views
market-oriented economies like Brazil, Chile and Mexico as gateways to the region, with that of Russia,
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which is largely focusing on Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In Brazil, Russia’s trade of $5.2 billion in
2007 was dwarfed by China’s $23.4 billion.¶ “The Russians have picked the most erratic and unreliable
partners in the region,” said a Bush administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, following normal diplomatic protocol.¶ And
even in areas where Russia and Venezuela are starting to cooperate, like offshore natural gas exploration,
the new alliance belies the resilience of ties to the United States, which remains by far Venezuela’s largest
trading partner.¶ When state television in Venezuela trumpeted the start of exploration this month by the country’s state oil company and a
consortium of Russian businesses amid cries of “Comrades!” all around, little attention was directed to the drilling platform they were standing on. It had
been leased from Scorpion Offshore, which monitors its rigs around the world from its home office in Houston.
Russia only cares about Eastern Europe and the Caucuses
Cohen and Blank, 11 (Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. , is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy
in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at
The Heritage Foundation. Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War College, ““Reset”
Regret: Russian “Sphere of Privileged Interests” in Eurasia Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation, July 21, 2011,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/07/reset-regret-russian-sphere-of-privileged-interests-in-eurasia-undermines-us-foreign-policy;)
For many years, Russian
diplomats have openly proclaimed that the former Soviet republics that make up the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are not truly sovereign states. Russian analysts have stated that Russia
regards the Obama Administration’s “reset” policy as a U.S. admission that the CIS is within Russia’s
sphere of influence.
The reset policy has hitherto conspicuously failed to address important U.S. interests in Eurasia, including preventing the
emergence of a hegemonic power in Eurasia, maintaining a level playing field in access to markets and natural resources, and developing democracy and
free markets based on the rule of law. Since the “reset,” President Obama has downgraded his meetings with post-Soviet heads of state, signaling a lesser
U.S. involvement and interest. Some senior U.S. officials have even told their subordinates not to bother them with the problems of the Caucasus.¶ It is clear
that Washington needs a new approach to Eurasian foreign policy to prevent an emergence of a Russian sphere of influence or another regional hegemony.
The United States should boost its diplomatic support of sovereign states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, and expand a real commitment to the region.
Specifically, Washington
should provide political support to East–West energy pipelines and uphold
sovereignty and territorial integrity under international law—even if this upsets Russia—while at the same time becoming an
active mediator in the Transnistria and South Caucasus disputes. ¶ /In Search of Eurasian Hegemony/¶ Since Boris Yeltsin demanded a
sphere of influence in the CIS in 1993, that goal has been the driving force of Russian foreign policy. Toward
that end, Russia employed every instrument of its power: energy, trade, investment, the linkage of these
factors with Russian organized crime, political subversion, intelligence penetration, and expansion of
military bases. Russia has threatened and even used military force, such as in Georgia in 2008. Today
Moscow is pressuring Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine to join a Russia-dominated customs union that
also includes Belarus and Kazakhstan.¶ Russia also controls military bases and key military industrial
facilities in Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It has been trying to subvert the
Georgian government and is using constant economic pressure to take control of Belarus’s natural gas
company and pipelines. Moscow’s policy remains to pressure the CIS countries to turn their backs on Europe and preserve Russian leverage over
its neighbors’ politics and economics. Concurrently, despite official disclaimers to the contrary, Moscow assiduously attempted to expel
the U.S. from Central Asia even as the countries in the region assist the U.S. and /NATO efforts in Afghanistan./¶
This adversarial view of the U.S., inherited from the Soviet past, helps Moscow ensure that the reset policy effectively reduces U.S.
influence in Eurasia and Eastern and Central Europe. U.S. gains from the reset policy are limited to support in Afghanistan and the
New START arms control treaty, both of which Russia would have pursued without U.S. concessions regarding the CIS.¶ /The High Price of Reset/¶ As
Moscow is trying to block NATO missile defenses and arguing that sanctions and pressure against Iran are unnecessary, the reset policy is backfiring and
needs to be reassessed. While the Administration and NATO have commendably acted to strengthen the defenses of the Baltic states, it has not done nearly
enough in the CIS. Absent coherent U.S. policies in the CIS, the vast region is likely to destabilize. Central Asia is already highly unstable, and Moscow is
seeking pretexts for inserting military forces into the area while simultaneously strengthening the autocratic regimes that rule there.¶ In the Caucasus,
Moscow is clearly working to subvert Georgia’s government and destabilize the whole region. Since the 2008 Russia–Georgia war, Russia
has
continued to support the “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, building up air, naval, and army bases there.¶
While Ukraine backtracked on its pro-Western position of the post-Orange era (2004–2010), Moscow’s attempts to pressure Ukraine since the bilateral
Russian–Ukrainian accords of 2010 have already led to a steady deterioration in Russian–Ukrainian relations, as Moscow’s pressure upon it is unremitting. ¶
In Moldova, no progress has been made in restoring the country’s territorial integrity and withdrawing the remaining Russian troops since 1992, when a
Russian-backed army detached the Slavic-majority Transnistria region and instituted a criminalized rule there. ¶ In Nagorno-Karabakh, although Moscow
mediated, with U.S. support, between Baku and Yerevan to achieve peace, it also attained a base in Gyumri, Armenia, until 2042 and secured the sales of up
to 2 billion cubic meters of Azeri natural gas per year to Russia. Meanwhile, the recent failure of the Russian-sponsored summit between Armenia and
Azerbaijan opens the way to renewed hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh that would undermine U.S. overall regional interests in the Caucasus. ¶ /New Policy
for Eurasia Needed/¶ Under the circumstances, it is very much in the U.S. interest to refashion a coherent policy to strengthen the CIS’s sovereignty and
security.¶ The U.S. should emphasize its support for Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty, reinvigorate its efforts at defense reform, and encourage U.S.
investment and openness to trade and foreign investment in modernizing Ukraine’s nuclear and natural gas sectors while exploring for shale gas in the
country.¶ In Georgia, the Administration should clarify to Russia that renewed war would cost Moscow dearly. It needs to make clear that Moscow’s quite
visible efforts to undermine the Georgian regime will facilitate a real U.S. commitment to Georgia, including the sale of defensive arms. The Administration
should also refrain from pressuring Georgia to yield on letting Russia join the World Trade Organization (WTO) if Moscow is still unwilling to restore the
status quo ante in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow should be made to understand that it cannot build closed trade blocs in the CIS while seeking
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membership in the WTO. In other words, the U.S. should stand for and uphold the sanctity of international law and treaties even if it upsets Russia. ¶ In
addition, Washington
needs to take much greater interest in Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It
must stop thinking about Azerbaijan exclusively as a flight stop on the road to Afghanistan and make it clear that
the U.S. values its companies’ participation in the development of main natural-gas-exporting pipelines. At the same time, Washington should become an
active mediator and, if necessary, a co-guarantor of a potential future peace settlement. If the two sides do not make serious efforts to bring about peace, the
situation will likely deteriorate further.¶ Finally, the Administration should reassure local governments in Central Asia, which have supported the U.S. in
Afghanistan and now depend on America to secure them against Russian and Chinese pressure. Though the U.S. may withdraw troops from Afghanistan by
2014, America will leave behind facilities, allowing them to train their forces to defend themselves against terrorism. The U.S. needs to convert the Northern
Distribution Network into a permanently functioning regional transportation mechanism for economic development and cooperation with these states. And
simultaneously, the U.S. needs to formulate plans not just for bilateral trade and investment but for overall regional development, boosting transparent
political institutions, good governance, and the rule of law. ¶ /Invest Now, Save Later/¶ Clearly, the paramount geopolitical interest of the U.S. remains
prevention of a return of a Eurasian empire or reversal of the post–Cold War settlement in Eurasia. Moreover, failure to invest the needed resources now all
but guarantees that when the next crisis occurs—whether provoked by Islamism, Russian imperial overreach, or Chinese truculence—the cost
of confronting it will be greater than any investments that America could presently make. Prevention is always cheaper than the cure.
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A2: Environment DA-Link Turn
Oil drilling safety not kept in check without TBA approval
The Hill 6/5 (The Hill is a congressional newspaper that publishes daily when Congress is in session. “Time for USMexico Transboundary Agreement”
By Neil Brown and Carl Meacham. Brown is non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Meacham is director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. They previously served as
senior advisers on the Republican staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and authored the report Oil, Mexico, and
the Transboundary Agreement. http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/303739-time-for-us-mexico-transboundary-agreement)
//GY
Regardless of TBA approval, Mexico’s PEMEX will continue its deepwater exploration near the U.S. border. With memories
of Deepwater Horizon still fresh, it is worrisome that Mexico’s oil safety regulator, known as CNH, has almost no capacity to
provide independent on-site inspections. All facilities operating under the TBA would be subject to U.S. inspectors with the
ability to stop operations. Moreover, U.S. and Mexican regulators would work hand in hand, offering support for more
systematic improvement.
TBA allows for more environmental protections-solves spills
US State Department 13—(May 2nd 2013, US Department of State, “U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons
Agreement”
http://www.noodls.com/view/434FB37CC10A90E343700DA5413529BFA9BA8C0A#sthash.LAbQtIEe.dpuf)//JQ
The Agreement provides for ongoing cooperation between the two governments related to safety and the environment, and
also provides for joint inspection teams to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both governments will
review and approve all unitization agreements governing the exploration and development of transboundary reservoirs under
the Agreement, providing for approval of all safety and environmental measures.
Plan reduces environmental impact
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, No Date, (“Agreement between the United States and Mexico Concerning
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico”, http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Library/Publications/Agreement-between-theUnited-States-and-Mexico-Concerning-Transboundary-Hydrocarbon-Reservoirs-in-the-Gulf-of-Mexico.aspx)
The Agreement would allow leaseholders on the U.S. side of the boundary and Pemex to explore and exploit a transboundary
reservoir as a “unit,” as leaseholders are permitted to do on the U.S. side of the boundary. Unitization – where two or more leaseholders manage the
exploration and exploitation of a resource as a unit through a single operator – promotes the rational, efficient production of a resource,
reduces waste and the drilling of unnecessary wells (and therefore reduces the corresponding environmental risk).
Efficient regulators and energy policy reform solve oil spills – lack thereof leads to oil spills
Scientific American, ’10 (“Catastrophic Thinking: How to Ensure Oil Spill Disasters Do Not Happen Again”, The
Editors http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=catastrophic-thinking) //GY
Unfortunately, the less sexy human side of the equation has not gotten the same attention. The number of snafus that led to
the latest calamity is breathtaking: time-stressed managers who cut corners, regulators who were literally in bed with the
industry, politicians who hurried along an ideological agenda of deregulation.
How does an industry organize itself into teams of engineers and technicians across thousands of rigs and dozens of
companies, to reach oil trapped in increasingly forlorn places, in a way that is robust enough to tolerate human error? It is not
easy, but it can be done. High-tech, high-risk enterprises as diverse as nuclear power stations and U.S. Navy aircraft carriers
have learned to keep accident rates remarkably low. Accidents may be inevitable, but the chance of catastrophe should be
nearly zero.
Finally, if we expect oil companies to manage risk better, then society as a whole needs to do the same. The market forces
that encouraged BP to take ill-considered risks are largely of our own creation, as stockholders, consumers and citizens. The
hodgepodge of subsidies that masquerades as our current national energy policy invites disaster; it fails to grapple with the
urgent need to stop wasting energy and start encouraging clean sources. Every day we still need 85 million barrels of oil—the
equivalent of more than 25 Ixtoc spills—to keep the wheels of our society turning. President Barack Obama is entirely
correct to speak of the giant slick now oozing around Florida as another reason for a comprehensive energy policy.
Lack of regulation and safe management leads a repeat Deepwater Horizon
Blum, 1/9 (“Improving the Regulation of Offshore Oil Drills” Maxwell Blum. RegBlog, A source of regulatory news,
analysis, and opinion in affiliation with the Penn Program on Regulation)//GY
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In 2010, an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico exploded, causing the death of eleven workers and the worst oil spill in the history
of the petroleum industry. That a calamity of such magnitude could occur in an industry already subject to regulatory
oversight surprised many observers and prompted tough questions about the efficacy of the regulations that failed to prevent
it.
Bennear describes the current U.S. approach to offshore drilling regulation as a complex system of command-and-control
regulations that are designed to mandate redundancies in safety systems. She calls this approach “belts and suspenders,” with
the idea being to create a series of fail-safes that back each other up so that the risk of an accident becomes negligible. She
also notes that firms face strict liability for spills, with damages capped at $75 million.
The problem with the current regulatory approach is that it decreases the importance of compliance with each fail-safe in the
eyes of a cost-conscious firm, Bennear argues. She posits that if the risk of an accident appears negligible due to a long list of
fail-safes, why should a firm bother adhering to the letter of the next requirement? This thought process, the argument goes,
could cause a problem when employees implementing each fail-safe think the same way, possibly allowing the development
of norms that do not properly take safety into consideration.
65
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
A2: Trade Deficit DA-No Uniqueness
Trade deficit will grow in 2014
Williams and Donnelly 2012—( October 19, 2012, Brock R. Williams, Analyst in International Trade and Finance, J.
Michael Donnelly, Information Research Specialist, U.S. International Trade: Trends and Forecasts,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33577.pdf)JQ
According to IHS Global Insight, Inc., a leading U.S. economic forecasting firm, in 2012 the U.S. merchandise (goods) trade
deficit is projected to reach about $742 billion on a balance of payments basis. It is then forecasted to decline (become less
negative) in 2013 to $687 billion and then increase again in 2014 to $724 billion (see Table 6 and Figure 9). The current account deficit
is forecast to reach $514 billion for 2012 and like the merchandise deficit, it is forecast to decline (become less negative) to $446 billion in 2013 and then
increase to $503 billion in 2014.
Trade deficit high now
Crutsinger 7/3/13—(July 3rd 2013, Martin Crutsinger, AP economics writer,” U.S. Trade Deficit at 6-Month High”
http://www.theledger.com/article/20130703/NEWS/130709867?Title=U-S-Trade-Deficit-at-6-Month-High)
WASHINGTON — The
U.S. trade deficit increased in May to the highest level in six months as a weak global economy depressed
up
U.S. export sales while imports of autos and other nonpetroleum products hit an all-time high. The trade deficit rose to $45 billion in May,
12.1% from April's $40.1 billion imbalance, the Commerce Department reported Wednesday. It was the largest trade gap since November .
Exports slipped 0.3% to $187.1 billion as sales of American farm products dropped to the lowest point in more than two
years. U.S. exports have been hurt by recessions in many European countries. Imports rose 1.9% to $232.1 billion with nonpetroleum
imports hitting a record high . The trade deficit is running at an annual rate of $501.2 billion, 6.3% lower than last year's total of $534.7 billion. A
wider trade gap can restrain growth because it means U.S. consumers and businesses are spending more on foreign goods
than U.S. companies are taking in from overseas sales. But economists noted that the wider deficit does show growth in the United States
remains stronger than most other nations. That growth has helped fuel more spending by consumers on domestic and imported goods.
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Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
A2: Trade Deficit DA-Link Turn
Increase production and exports of oil will eliminate the trade deficit within the decade
Mills 13—(May 3rd 2013, Mark P. Mills, senior fellow at the Manhattan institute, “THE CASE FOR EXPORTS: America's
Hydrocarbon Industry Can Revive the Economy and Eliminate the Trade Deficit,” http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/pgi_03.htm#.Ud4JSkIkY0M)
Today, oil imports account for about 40 percent of America's $750 billion annual trade deficit, a deficit that drains the GDP and kills
jobs. Expanding the domestic production of hydrocarbons to reduce imports as well as increase exports will function as an
enormous subsidy- free stimulus to the U.S. economy, directly creating all manner of jobs across the nation and indirectly creating millions
more jobs as the nation's current account deficit shrinks. Increased production and exports of oil and gas and of energy-intensive products from
chemicals to fertilizers
can put the nation on track to wipe out the entire trade deficit within the decade , returning the nation to
a trade balance—even a surplus —that has not been enjoyed for decades. This process has already begun: increasing exports of U.S. refined
petroleum products are already pushing the trade deficit down.
Energy policy needs to evolve to solve for the trade deficit
Mills 13—(May 3rd 2013, Mark P. Mills, senior fellow at the Manhattan institute, “THE CASE FOR EXPORTS: America's
Hydrocarbon Industry Can Revive the Economy and Eliminate the Trade Deficit,” http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/pgi_03.htm#.Ud4JSkIkY0M)
As regulators struggle to get their bearings in this unfamiliar environment, policymakers should be looking at how to ensure even greater energy production.
Energy policy should be focused on how hydrocarbons can rapidly shrink the trade deficit, boosting GDP and employment
across the entire economy. In fact, America should orient policy around the heretofore radical idea of becoming a major
energy exporter. Refined oil products such as gasoline and diesel fuel are already significant American exports. But the White House continues to delay
approval of the Keystone XL pipeline, which would facilitate even greater exports of profitable diesel and gasoline from U.S. refineries designed to process
heavy oil coming from Canadian oil sands. Also, at this writing, 19 permit applications seeking permission to export natural gas are languishing within the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Tens of billions of dollars per year of economic benefits will come from natural-gas exports.[4] Encouraging energy
exports might seem like an obvious way to pull the U.S. out of its economic doldrums, but everything about the idea is
mired in political controversy.
Increasing domestic production could put the nation on track to wipe out the trade deficit
Mills 13—(May 3rd 2013, Mark P. Mills, senior fellow at the Manhattan institute, “THE CASE FOR EXPORTS: America's
Hydrocarbon Industry Can Revive the Economy and Eliminate the Trade Deficit,” http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/pgi_03.htm#.Ud4JSkIkY0M)
One of the biggest economic benefits from this energy boom will be the opportunity to eliminate America's massive GDP-shrinking and job-robbing trade
deficit. Increasing domestic production so that the U.S. can reduce imports and increase exports of fuels, combined with
increased production and exports of energy-centric products such as chemicals and fertilizers, can put the nation on track to
wipe out nearly all the $750 billion annual trade deficit. The only way to stop the private sector from achieving all this—without
subsidy—is for the government to prohibit production or inhibit sales into any market that makes economic sense.
Decrease in oil dependence cuts the trade deficit in half
Lazzaro 11—(February 16th 2011, Joseph Lazzaro, Joseph Lazzaro is the former managing editor of financial news web
sites WallStreetEurope.com and WallStreetItalia.com, based in New York. Prior to graduate training in U.S. public policy
and international economics, Lazzaro also served as a copy editor and staff writer for The Hartford (Connecticut) Courant,
“The Untold Story of the U.S. Trade Deficit: Rising Exports” http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/02/16/rising-us-exportstrade-deficit-oil-china/)
To put that in perspective, in 2010 crude oil imports accounted for $20.9 billion a month out of an average monthly trade deficit of
$41.5 billion. If the U.S. ended its dependence on imported oil, the trade deficit would be cut in half.
67
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
A2: Mexican Spending DA-No Uniqueness
Specifically Pemex spending high now
Harrup 13—(Anthony Harrup, Feburary 28th 2013, correspondent for dow jones newswire, Mexico's Pemex Plans Record
$25.3 Billion Investment in 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323978104578332400579225008.html)
MEXICO CITY--Mexico's state oil monopoly Petroleos Mexicanos plans to invest a record $25.3 billion this year, of which the
lion's share will go into upstream activities as the company works to maintain or raise oil and gas output, officials said Thursday. Chief Financial
Officer Mario Beauregard said in a conference call with analysts that 79% of the total is earmarked for exploration and production,
17% for refining, and the rest for gas processing and petrochemicals.
Mexico's Pemex is going to replace 132 vessels from its shipping fleet over the next three years at an initial investment of at
least $640 million, senior officials of the state oil and gas monopoly said at a press conference Thursday.
Pemex spending high
Fredrick 13—(James Fredrick, January 17th 2013, reporter for BN America, “Pemex budgets US$37.8bn for 2013
programs”
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/oilandgas/pemex-budgets-us378bn-for-2013-programs)
Mexico's treasury has authorized state oil company Pemex's 2013 budget that outlines spending of 476bn pesos (US$37.8bn)
compared to 442bn pesos in 2012, BNamericas has learned. E&P subsidiary PEP spending will increase slightly to 295bn pesos from 291bn pesos
in 2012. Adjusting for inflation, PEP's budget will in fact decrease. Refining unit Pemex Refinación will be allocated 106bn pesos this
year, a 21% increase compared to 87.7bn pesos in 2012. Pemex's gas and basic petrochemical branch PGPB's budget will
increase 15% to 20.3bn pesos from 17.8bn pesos a year ago, while its petrochemical arm PPQ will see a 17% increase in
spending to 19.4bn pesos from 16.5bn pesos. Finally, Pemex's corporate offices have been budgeted 35.1bn pesos this year,
20% more than in 2012. The figures only include programmed costs and exclude net financial costs for each subsidiary.
Mexican infrastructure spending high now
Case 12—(September 17th 2012, Brendan Case, Bloomberg writer, “ICA CEO Sees Mexico Infrastructure Spending Rising
by 56%”
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-17/ica-ceo-sees-mexico-infrastructure-spending-rising-by-56-.html)
Annual infrastructure spending in Mexico could climb as much as 56 percent to $70 billion in the coming years as the country
plows more money into roads, ports, water projects, and oil and gas, said Alonso Quintana, chief executive officer of Empresas ICA SAB. (ICA*)
68
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
A2: Mexican Spending DA-Link Turn
TBA key to Mexican economic prosperity and political stability
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 12—(December 21st 2012, US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/oil-mexico-and-the-transboundary-agreement.)
Senator Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, requested senior professional staff members to
review opportunities for enhanced U.S.-Mexico engagement on oil and gas issues including the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary
Agreement, which requires Congressional action to take effect. As part of that review, members of Senator Lugar’s staff traveled to Mexico City in
October 2012 to meet with then President-elect Enrique Pen ã Nieto’s transition team and leaders from the Mexican Congress, PEMEX, the Mexican energy
regulator Comisio ń Nacional de Hidrocarburos, U.S. industry, academic specialists, and U.S. officials at Embassy Mexico City.1 This report contains their
public findings and recommendations. Congressional attention to the Mexican energy situation is crit- ical for understanding bilateral issues between our
countries and for consideration of U.S. energy security. The United States has a profound interest in economic prosperity and political
stability in Mexico, and energy is foundational to both interests. Oil is vital for the Mexican federal budget, underwriting both
social programs and law and order, and the oil industry is an important aspect of broader economic activity. Stability and
growth, or lack thereof, in Mexico’s oil and gas sector can directly impact issues of bilateral concern.
69
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
A2: Kritik-Turn
Plan disrupts status quo monopolies
Wood 12 (Duncan Wood, Senior Adviser, Mexico Institute, Renewable Energy Initiative,
“http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/March_2012_Transboundary_Oil_Agreement_0.pdf” March 12)
On the 20th of February, the governments of Mexico and the United States signed a Transboundary
Hydrocarbons Agreement that
resolves the question of what to do with potential oil reserves along the dividing line between the two
countries in the Gulf of Mexico. Two areas in particular have been disputed for a number of years: the Western and Eastern polygons, or "donut holes"
as they are more colloquially known, comprise over 500 miles of the maritime border between the two countries and are thought to hold billions of barrels of
crude oil (though nobody is sure quite how much, as comprehensive seismic scans have not been undertaken). The
signing of the treaty is
extremely good news as it marks the end of a decades-long process to try to determine oil rights in these
two areas, opening the door to exploration and production that offers the prospect of exciting new modes
of cooperation between Pemex and private oil companies.¶ The question of what to do with the Gulf of Mexico's donut holes goes
back to the 1970s. Following on from negotiations in the United Nations over the International Law of the Sea, the two countries came together to determine
ownership of resources found in these two areas that were beyond their two hundred miles exclusion zones but entirely surrounded by them (thereby not
qualifying as international waters). Early discussions over the areas broke down, but in the late 1990s the two countries agreed to a ten year moratorium on
exploration and drilling in order to be able to negotiate a mutually agreeable settlement.
Government corruption in Mexico’s oil industry causes labor exploitation of oil workers.
ITF 10/30/2009, [International Transport Worker Federation focuses on the news of the condition
of transport workers around the world, “Corruption and repression in Mexico oil industry
exposed” http://www.itfglobal.org/news-online/index.cfm/newsdetail/3899]
The corruption and repression endemic in Mexico's oil industry is costing workers their lives according to
a hard-hitting report released today.
The human rights report, Campeche Basin, paradigm of labour exploitation, written by independent campaigning
journalist Ana Lilia Pérez, details a catalogue of unsafe practices, corruption and intimidation. The report puts
forward evidence claiming that in many cases workers are being sent onto rigs, tugs and support vessels
without safety equipment or training. Pérez also claims that those who are injured receive derisory
compensation payments and that the deaths of those who are killed while at work are, in some cases, being
covered up.
The gas and oil industry is controlled by the state-owned firm Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico's largest company and
the country's main source of revenue; its main oilfield, Cantarell Complex, lies in the Bay of Campeche.
Labor exploitation in the oil industry occurs due to the dynamic between oil corporatism and
organized labor in Mexico.
Horowitz 06/28/2008, [Carl F. Horowitz is director of the Organized Labor Accountability Project of the National Legal
and Policy Center, “There Will Be Corruption: How Oil, Labor, and Government Mix in Mexico”
http://townhall.com/columnists/carlhorowitz/2008/06/28/there_will_be_corruption_how_oil,_labor,_and_government_mix_i
n_mexico/page/full]
To understand oil corporatism, Mexican-style, it's necessary to grasp the role of organized labor. Pemex's
work force in recent years has averaged about 150,000 employees, roughly three-fourths of whom belong to the Union of Oil
Workers of the Mexican Republic. Yet collective bargaining, as we know it here in America, doesn't exist. There
are a few reasons for this.
First, the distinction between firm, union and government is blurred. Of the 11 persons who sit on Pemex's
board of directors, six also are members of the Mexican president's cabinet and the other five are union
officials. Undoing this arrangement would require a constitutional amendment, and few people are willing to go that extra
mile. That's one reason why Pemex executives seem to go through a revolving door. Over the past eight years ,
for example, the company has changed CEOs four times and chairmen five times.
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Harvard Debate
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File Title
A2: Kritik-Turn Extension
The Hydrocarbon Agreement Destroys Pemex Monopoly
Melgar 12’(Lourdes Melgar, director of the Center for Sustainability and Business at EGADE Business School, “Will
Mexico's incoming administration finally end the iconic state oil monopoly?”, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org
/node/3781
Deepwater drilling is likely to take center stage with the signing of the U.S.–Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement
in February 2012. The agreement, ratified by the Mexican Senate but still awaiting approval in the U.S., relieves concerns
about the so-called “straw” effect, in which Mexican oil is sipped away by the U.S. as its production advances closer to the
international maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ The agreement provides a legal framework for development of oil and
gas reservoirs that cross the maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico—the first such pact for both countries. In fact, it is viewed
as a dress rehearsal for negotiations the U.S. will have to undertake with Canada, Russia and even Cuba to address shared
reservoir exploitation.¶ Implementation will require legal and institutional adjustments in Mexico and in the United States.
Since it requires joint or coordinated production, the agreement possibly opens a new era of cooperation between PEMEX
and international oil companies. If a transboundary field were identified, PEMEX would have to work with field operators on
the U.S. side. This makes technological aptitude particularly relevant, since shared reservoirs are more likely to exist in the
deep and ultra-deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico.¶ For sovereignty, energy security and political reasons, Mexico will go the
extra mile to ensure that its hydrocarbon resources are not lost to its neighbor. This gives it a high incentive to develop the
institutional architecture—including strengthening the CNH—needed to implement the agreement. Identifying and
developing a joint reservoir would allow PEMEX to work in full partnership with companies at the cutting edge of ultradeepwater production. The experience, benefits and know-how that would be gained may reduce the reluctance to undertake
joint production and other strategic alliances that are banned by PEMEX bylaws. Implementation of the treaty could trigger
an accelerated transformation of the regime under which deepwater resources are exploited in Mexico.¶ Exciting times are in
sight. The incoming administration will be compelled to conduct a debate on the future of PEMEX, and the issue of
constitutional reform will have to be a full part of it. The Mexican oil industry can no longer thrive on amendments to
distorted schemes.
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Harvard Debate
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File Title
A2: QPQ/Conditions CP-Say No
The original negotiation of the TBA was highly controversial-Mexico will only agree on the
presently consulted form of the deal
Wood 12—(Duncan Wood, March 2012, Professor, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Senior Adviser, Mexico
Institute, Renewable Energy Initiative, “US-Mexico Cross Border Energy Cooperation: a new era in the Gulf of Mexico”
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/March_2012_Transboundary_Oil_Agreement_0.pdf)//JQ
The new agreement has already drawn attention and controversy, even before its contents were revealed to the public. After
the announcement of the signing of the deal, critics from the left in Mexico declared that the Calderon administration had
sold out to the United States, bowing to pressure from Washington and from U.S. oil interests to sign a deal that gave
disproportionate benefits to the Americans. Voices from the government rejected these accusations, but it was only last week,
when the Treaty was presented to the Mexican Senate for ratification, that the true nature of the deal became known to the
public. Ratification is expected to be relatively easy as the Mexican Senate was consulted frequently during the negotiation
process.
Mexico has other things on their agenda – will abandon the current deal if additional concerns are
added
Kathleen Hennessey, Tracy Wilkinson, 05/01/13, “Obama, Mexico leader to avoid hot topics, at least publicly”,
//CH
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/01/world/la-fg-obama-mexico-20130502
"Mexicans have an understanding of noninterference. So they do not want us to talk about energy , and
they will not talk about immigration," said Diana Negroponte, a senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at the
Brookings Institution. "It's a quid pro quo." If those issues are raised at length publicly, she said, it may signal a "degree of
irritation" in private talks. The two leaders are likely to discuss their priorities and try to exert influence at a
meeting and a dinner, both closed to journalists. Mexicans are concerned about the temporary work permits in the Senate
bill on immigration, a detail that affects the flow of workers back and forth across the border. Obama's aides have billed his
visit as a chance to shift the U.S. perception of Latin America from drug wars and illegal border crossings to a region on the
rise. This argument leans heavily on the success of Peña Nieto's reform agenda, which includes changes in
education, telecommunications, banking and energy. "What I'd say broadly is that energy is an area of great promise
and cooperation across the Americas," Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor, said Wednesday. Still, White House
officials say they've put the word out that cooperation by Mexico is welcome, but commentary less so, especially on
immigration. "We've emphasized on our side that this is a domestic political issue, primarily," said Ricardo Zuniga, senior
director for Western Hemisphere affairs on the National Security Council. "I think Peña Nieto has to be very careful," said
Carl Meacham, a director of the Americas Program at the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies. "There
are elements here who would view what he says as being partial to one side or the other. That is not helpful." Mexico's
interest is clear . About 60% of the estimated 11 million people who entered the U.S. illegally or overstayed their visas
were born in Mexico, according the Pew Hispanic Center. Any law that puts them on a path to U.S. citizenship, sets limits on
immigration or tightens border security will affect the Mexican economy.
Political disagreements will quickly hinder agreements with Mexico
Richard J. McLaughlin, 08, “FRONTIER ISSUES IN OCEAN LAW: MARINE RESOURCES, MARITIME
BOUNDARIES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA”,
http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/$002fj$002fils.2009.7.issue1$002fils.2009.7.1.1102$002fils.2009.7.1.1102.xml?t:ac=j$002fils.2009.7.issue1$002fils.2009.7.1.1102$002fils.2009.7.1.1102.xml
//CH
Given the extraordinary political sensitivity associated with any attempt to open up Mexico’s energy sector to foreign participation, it is unlikely that a
formal joint development agreement between Mexico and the U.S. to exploit transboundary hydrocarbons in the Perdido Foldbelt or Western Gap Regions is
possible in anything resembling the near term. Longstanding
historical and political disagreements will significantly
hinder any negotiations. Moreover, submitting the issue to third party mediation or adjudication will be
either politically infeasible or non-judiciable. Mutual accommodation is especially difficult when the
disagreement, as is the case in the GOM, is based primarily on domestic political and legal concerns rather
than being limited to the foreign policy arena. A more realistic approach may be for the two nations to establish TESECAs to provide a
framework for cooperation and to address common challenges inherent in managing adjoining deepwater areas in the GOM. In many parts of the world,
transboundary protected areas serve to improve regional ecological management, increase economic opportunities, foster peace, and provide a foundation for
further collaboration in other, more politically charged areas.52 TESECAs in the GOM could similarly provide an institutional forum to resolve specific
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Harvard Debate
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File Title
bilateral problems. For example, Mexican
officials have publicly expressed concern that commercial production on
the U.S. side of the maritime boundary in the Perdido Foldbelt area scheduled to begin by 2010 may
deplete transboundary reservoirs within Mexico’s territory. The validity of this assertion is currently unknown because no
detailed surveys have been conducted to determine the “unity of deposit” along the maritime boundary.54 One of the principle functions of the TESECA
could be to facilitate a detailed bi-national survey of the precise location and potential size of transboundary reservoirs. A well-planned bi-national survey of
this kind would reduce the mistrust between the parties and legitimize any future decisions regarding commercialization of transboundary reservoirs.
73
Harvard Debate
Tournament 09-10
File Title
A2: QPQ/Conditions CP-Delay DA
Esenaro 13—(April 7th 2013, Alberto Esenaro, an experienced lawyer in Mexican telecom industry, “QUICK WHITE
HOUSE RESPONSE COULD MEAN A FOOT IN THE DOOR IN MEXICO’S HYDROCARBONS SECTOR”
http://mexicanlawblog.com/quick-white-house-response-could-mean-a-foot-in-the-door-in-mexicos-hydrocarbonssector/)//JQ
Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.) spoke to The Hill recently after a House Foreign Relations committee hearing. Speaking about energy deals with
Mexico, he said: “It’s time for the administration to act. All they have to do is send the enacting legislation over here and let
us act on it, because we’re sitting on ‘go.’”
If action by the U.S. government is not prompt, as mentioned above, Mexico
may cancel the deal. Mexico, for decades, has been totally closed to foreign investments and the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which
was negotiated by Clinton and Calderón last April, offers U.S. investors a foot in the door. According to experts, if action isn’t taken by June or July of this
year, Americans could very well lose the opportunity to invest in Mexico’s oil industry forever if the proposed PEMEX reforms do not go through. One of
the reasons that my hinder a prompt response from the United States government is that the administration is deciding whether to consider the agreement as
a treaty, which would require the approval of the Senate, or as a simple agreement, which would only need a courtesy approval in Congress. In Mexico,
policy makers and industry experts understand that the election which took place last year in the U.S. is partially responsible for the delay; however, they are
hoping for a speedy resolution and are said to be growing impatient. Duncan Wood, who is an energy reform advisor to the Mexican
government and director of the Mexico Institute summed up the issue by saying the finalization of the deal “will be seen as a
very positive step forward and will encourage the process of energy reform in Mexico. Any further delay is risky. It will
send exactly the wrong message. Those people who are opposed to opening the sector in Mexico would be able to look at
this and to say, ‘see, the United States all they want is access to our oil – it’s not about what’s good for Mexico.’ ”
That leads to oil spills and collapses the economy
National Commission, ’11 (Commission is co-chaired by William K. Reilly. Reilly was Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency under President George H. W. Bush. He has served as president of World Wildlife Fund, as a founder or advisor to several business ventures, and on
many boards of directors. In 2010, he was appointed by President Barack Obama co-chair of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill and Offshore Drilling to investigate the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Report to the President; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill and Offshore Drilling – January 2011 ¶
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf)
Chapters 4 through 7 lay out the results of our investigation in detail, highlighting the¶ crucial issues we believe must
inform policy going forward: the specific engineering and¶ operating choices made in drilling the Macondo well, the
attempts to contain and respond¶ to the oil spill, and the impacts of the spill on the region’s natural
resources, economy, and¶ people—in the context of the progressive degradation of the Mississippi Delta environment.
¶ Chapters 8 through 10 present our recommendations for reforms in business practices,¶ regulatory oversight, and
broader policy concerns. We recognize that the improvements¶ we advocate all come with costs and all will take time to
implement. But inaction, as we¶ are deeply aware, runs the risk of real costs, too: in more lost lives, in broad
damage to¶ the regional economy and its long-term viability, and in further tens of billions of dollars¶ of
avoidable clean-up costs. Indeed, if the clear challenges are not addressed and another¶ disaster happens,
the entire offshore energy enterprise is threatened—and with it, the¶ nation’s economy and security. We
suggest a better option: build from this tragedy in a¶ way that makes the Gulf more resilient, the country’s energy supplies
more secure, our¶ workers safer, and our cherished natural resources better protected.
74