Civil Rights Amendments, Laws, and Supreme Court Cases
13th Amendment
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
Formally abolishing slavery in the United States, the 13th Amendment was passed by the Congress on
January 31, 1865, and ratified by the states on December 6, 1865.
14th Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives
in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied
to any of the male (/constitution/amendment xix) inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age
(/constitution/amendment xxvi), and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such state.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or
hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature,
or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but
all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
15th Amendment
The 15th Amendment to the Constitution granted African American men the right to vote by declaring that the
"right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
19th Amendment
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
24th Amendment
Section 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice
President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
Section 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
26th Amendment
Section 1.
The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.
Section 2.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Supreme Court Cases
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
The Plessy v. Ferguson Decision
Although the Declaration of Independence stated that "All men are created equal," due to the institution of
slavery, this statement was not to be grounded in law in the United States until after the Civil War (and,
arguably, not completely fulfilled for many years thereafter). In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was
ratified and finally put an end to slavery. Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) strengthened the
legal rights of newly freed slaves by stating, among other things, that no state shall deprive anyone of either
"due process of law" or of the "equal protection of the law." Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment (1870)
further strengthened the legal rights of newly freed slaves by prohibiting states from denying anyone the
right to vote due to race.
Despite these Amendments, African Americans were often treated differently than whites in many parts of the
country, especially in the South. In fact, many state legislatures enacted laws that led to the legally mandated
segregation of the races. In other words, the laws of many states decreed that blacks and whites could not use
the same public facilities, ride the same buses, attend the same schools, etc. These laws came to be known as
Jim Crow laws. Although many people felt that these laws were unjust, it was not until the 1890s that they
were directly challenged in court. In 1892, an African American man named Homer Plessy refused to give up his
seat to a white man on a train in New Orleans, as he was required to do by Louisiana state law. For this
action he was arrested. Plessy, contending that the Louisiana law separating blacks from whites on trains
violated the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, decided to fight
his arrest in court. By 1896, his case had made it all the way to the United States Supreme Court. By a vote of
81, the Supreme Court ruled against Plessy. In the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Henry Billings Brown,
writing the majority opinion, stated that:
The lone dissenter, Justice John Marshal Harlan, interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment another way, stated,
"Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Justice Harlan’s
dissent would become a rallying cry for those in later generations that wished to declare segregation
unconstitutional.
Sadly, as a result of the Plessy decision, in the early twentieth century the Supreme Court continued to uphold
the legality of Jim Crow laws and other forms of racial discrimination. In the case of Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education†(1899), for instance, the Court refused to issue an injunction preventing a school
board from spending tax money on a white high school when the same school board voted to close down a
black high school for financial reasons. Moreover, in Gong & Lum v.Rice (1927), the Court upheld a school’s
decision to bar a person of Chinese descent from a "white" school.
The Road to Brown v. Board
Early Cases
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy and similar cases, many people continued to press for the
abolition of Jim Crow and other racially discriminatory laws. One particular organization that fought for racial
equality was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) founded in 1909. For
about the first 20 years of its existence, it tried to persuade Congress and other legislative bodies to enact laws
that would protect African Americans from lynchings and other racist actions. Beginning in the 1930s, though,
the NAACP's Legal Defense and Education Fund began to turn to the courts to try to make progress in
overcoming legally sanctioned discrimination. From 1935 to 1938, the legal arm of the NAACP was headed by
Charles Hamilton Houston. Houston, together with Thurgood Marshall, devised a strategy to attack Jim Crow
laws by striking at them where they were perhaps weakest—in the field of education. Although Marshall played
a crucial role in all of the cases listed below, Houston was the head of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund while Murray v. Maryland and Missouri v. Gaines & Canada were decided. After Houston
returned to private practice in 1938, Marshall became head of the Fund and used it to argue the cases of
Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education.
Sweatt v. Painter
Encouraged by their victory in Gaines’ case, the NAACP continued to attack legally sanctioned racial
discrimination in higher education. In 1946, an African American man named Heman Sweat applied to the
University of Texas’ "white" law school. Hoping that it would not have to admit Sweat to the "white" law school
if a "black" school already existed, elsewhere on the University’s campus, the state hastily set up an
underfunded "black" law school. At this point, Sweat employed the services of Thurgood Marshall and the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and sued to be admitted to the University’s "white" law school. He
argued that the education that he was receiving in the "black" law school was not of the same academic caliber
as the education that he would be receiving if he attended the "white" law school. When the case reached the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1950, the Court unanimously agreed with him, citing as its reason the blatant
inequalities between the University’s law school (the school for whites) and the hastily erected school for
blacks. In other words, the "black" law school was "separate," but not "equal." Like the Murray case, the Court
found the only appropriate remedy for this situation was to admit Sweat to the University’s law school.
Brown v. Board of Education (1954,1955)
The case that came to be known as Brown v. Board of Education was actually the name given to five separate
cases that were heard by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the issue of segregation in public schools. These
cases were Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Briggs v. Elliot, Davis v. Board of Education of Prince
Edward County (VA.), Boiling v. Sharpe, and Gebhart v. Ethel. While the facts of each case are different, the
main issue in each was the constitutionality of state sponsored segregation in public schools. Once again,
Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund handled these cases.
Although it acknowledged some of the plaintiffs’/plaintiffs claims, a three judge panel at the U.S. District Court
that heard the cases ruled in favor of the school boards. The plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
When the cases came before the Supreme Court in 1952, the Court consolidated all five cases under the name
of Brown v. Board of Education. Marshall personally argued the case before the Court. Although he raised a
variety of legal issues on appeal, the most common one was that separate school systems for blacks and
whites were inherently unequal, and thus violate the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, relying on sociological tests, such as the one performed by social scientist
Kenneth Clark, and other data, he also argued that segregated school systems had a tendency to make black
children feel inferior to white children, and thus such a system should not be legally permissible.
Meeting to decide the case, the Justices of the Supreme Court realized that they were deeply divided over the
issues raised. While most wanted to reverse Plessy and declare segregation in public schools to be
unconstitutional, they had various reasons for doing so. Unable to come to a solution by June 1953 (the end of
the Court's 19521953 term), the Court decided to rehear the case in December 1953. During the intervening
months, however, Chief Justice Fred Vinson died and was replaced by Gov. Earl Warren of California. After the
case was reheard in 1953, Chief Justice Warren was able to do something that his predecessor had not—i.e.
bring all of the Justices to agree to support a unanimous decision declaring segregation in public schools
unconstitutional. On May 14, 1954, he delivered the opinion of the Court, stating that "We conclude that in the
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. . .”
Expecting opposition to its ruling, especially in the southern states, the Supreme Court did not immediately try
to give direction for the implementation of its ruling. Rather, it asked the attorney generals of all states with
laws permitting segregation in their public schools to submit plans for how to proceed with desegregation. After
still more hearings before the Court concerning the matter of desegregation, on May 31, 1955, the Justices
handed down a plan for how it was to proceed; desegregation was to proceed with "all deliberate speed."
Although it would be many years before all segregated school systems were to be desegregated, Brown and
Brown II (as the Courts plan for how to desegregate schools came to be called) were responsible for getting
the process underway.
MENDEZ V. WESTMINSTER BACKGROUND
While Brown v. Board of Education is a widely known landmark Supreme Court case, few can trace its
origins to the case of nine year old Sylvia Mendez in Mendez v. Westminster.
Sylvia’s case, which was decided in the federal courts in California, preceded Brown by about eight years.
Thurgood Marshall represented Sylvia Mendez and Linda Brown. Marshall used some of the same
arguments from Mendez to win Brown v. Board of Education.
Hernendez v. Texas
HERNÁNDEZ V. STATE OF TEXAS. The first and only Mexican-American civil-rights case heard and
decided by the United States Supreme Court during the post-World War II period was Hernández v. the
State of Texas. In 1950 Pete Hernández, a migrant cotton picker, was accused of murdering Joe Espinosa
in Edna, Texas, a small town in Jackson County, where no person of Mexican origin had served on a jury
for at least twenty-five years. Gustavo (Gus) Garcíaqv, an experienced Mexican-American civil-rights
lawyer, agreed to represent the accused without fee. García envisioned the Hernández case as a challenge
to the systematic exclusion of persons of Mexican origin from all types of jury duty in at least seventy
counties in Texas. It was not surprising to him when Hernández was found guilty and the decision was
upheld by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
The Supreme Court acted upon a writ of certiorari and heard the arguments on January 11, 1954. With García
were James de Anda and Chris Alderete of the American G.I. Forum and Carlos Cadena and John J. Herrera of
the League of United Latin American Citizens. García argued that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
protection not only on the basis of race, Caucasian and Negro, but also class. Those who administered the
process of jury selection introduced discrimination because of exclusion based on class. The state of Texas
contended that the Fourteenth Amendment covered only whites and blacks, and that Mexican Americans are
white. The state admitted that no person with a Spanish surname had served on any type of jury for twenty-five
years, but that this absence only indicated coincidence, not a pattern of attitude and behavior. García and his
associates presented comprehensive evidence that in Jackson County discrimination and segregation were
common practice, and Mexican Americans were treated as a class apart.
Delgado v. Bastrop
Edgewood ISD v. Kirby
Tinker v. Des Moines
Background: At a public school in Des Moines, Iowa, students organized a silent protest against the Vietnam
War. Students planned to wear black armbands to school to protest the fighting but the principal found out and
told the students they would be suspended if they wore the armbands. Despite the warning, students wore the
armbands and were suspended. During their suspension the students' parents sued the school for
violating their children's right to free speech. A U.S. district court sided with the school, ruling that wearing
armbands could disrupt learning. The students appealed the ruling to a U.S. Court of Appeals but lost and took
their case to the United States Supreme Court.
Decision: In 1969 the United States Supreme Court ruled in a 7-2 decision in favor of the students. The high
court agreed that students' free rights should be protected and said, "Students don't shed their constitutional
rights at the school house gates."
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of
the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to
attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the
eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.
Question
Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First
Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious
reasons?
Decision
In a unamimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade.
In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of
secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion,"
and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education
cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the
majority regarding Yoder.
Miranda v. Arizona
Facts of the Case
The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which
defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way."
In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an
inculpatory statement all without being notified of his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States,
the petitioner was arrested by the FBI, interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his
right to counsel. Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days
without notification of his right to counsel. In all these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers,
detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In none of the cases
were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation.
Question
Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to counsel and their
protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment?
The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of
defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege
against self- incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of
an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to
suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during
interrogations.
White v. Regester
In 1964, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that members of the U.S. House of
Representatives must be chosen from districts approximately equal in population. That same year, in
Reynolds v. Sims, the Court ruled that members of both houses of a state legislature must be chosen from
districts approximately equal in population.
In 1970, as required by the Texas Constitution after each national census, the Texas Legislature drew up a
reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives but was unable to agree upon a
reapportionment plan for the Texas Senate. Litigation was immediately filed in a Texas District Court
challenging the constitutionality of the reapportionment plan for the Texas House. The Texas Supreme Court
eventually ruled that the legislature’s House reapportionment plan violated the Texas Constitution. Meanwhile,
as required by the Texas Constitution, the Legislative Redistricting Board began the task of reapportioning the
Texas Senate. Because of the judicial invalidation of the House reapportionment plan, the Board soon also
had to work on reapportioning the Texas House.
In October 1971, the Board released its proposed reapportionment plans for both chambers of the Texas
Legislature. Four lawsuits, eventually consolidated, were filed in a three-judge U.S. District Court. With respect
to the House plan, these lawsuits alleged that the districts as drawn contained impermissible deviations from
population equality and that the plan’s multi-member districts for Dallas and Bexar counties were
constitutionally invalid because they diluted the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities. The three-judge
District Court upheld the reapportionment plan for the Senate but agreed with both arguments made by the
plaintiffs and found the House plan unconstitutional. This court gave the Texas Legislature until July 1973 to
reapportion the Texas House but did allow the Legislative Redistricting Board’s plan to be used for the 1972
elections except for the requirement that the multi-member districts for Dallas and Bexar counties be
reconstituted into single-member districts. As provided by law, the judgment of the three-judge U.S. District
Court was appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Legislation
Civil Rights Act of 1957
The Act marked the first occasion since Reconstruction that the federal government undertook significant
legislative action to protect civil rights. Although influential southern congressman whittled down the bill?s initial
scope, it still included a number of important provisions for the protection of voting rights. It established the Civil
Rights Division in the Justice Department, and empowered federal officials to prosecute individuals that
conspired to deny or abridge another citizen?s right to vote. Moreover, it also created a six-member U.S. Civil
Rights Commission charged with investigating allegations of voter infringement. But, perhaps most importantly,
the Civil Rights Act of 1957 signaled a growing federal commitment to the cause of civil rights .
Civil Rights Act of 1964
The provisions of this civil rights act forbade discrimination on the basis of sex as well as race in hiring,
promoting, and firing.
Civil Rights Act of 1991
The 1991 Act amended several of the statutes enforced by EEOC, both substantively and procedurally.
Previously, jury trials were possible only in cases brought under the EPA or the ADEA. Under the
provisions of the 1991 Act, parties could now obtain jury trials, and recover compensatory and punitive
damages in Title VII and ADA lawsuits involving intentional discrimination. The Act placed statutory caps
on the amount of damages that could be awarded for future pecuniary losses, pain and suffering, and
punitive damages, based on employer size. The maximum award of compensatory and punitive
damages combined was set at $300,000 for the largest employers (more than 500 employees).
In addition, the 1991 Act added a new subsection to Title VII, codifying the disparate impact theory of
discrimination, essentially putting the law back as it had been prior to Wards Cove. And in response to PriceWaterhouse, the Act provided that where the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a motivating factor for an
employment decision, the employer is liable for injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs (but not individual
monetary or affirmative relief) even though it proves it would have made the same decision in the absence of a
discriminatory motive. The Act also provided employment discrimination protection to employees of Congress
and some high-level political appointees. Lastly, Title VII and ADA coverage was extended to include American
and American-controlled employers operating abroad.
Voting Rights Act of 1965
By 1965 concerted efforts to break the grip of state disfranchisement had been under way for some time, but
had achieved only modest success overall and in some areas had proved almost entirely ineffectual. The
murder of voting-rights activists in Philadelphia, Mississippi, gained national attention, along with numerous
other acts of violence and terrorism. Finally, the unprovoked attack on March 7, 1965, by state troopers on
peaceful marchers crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama, en route to the state capitol in
Montgomery, persuaded the President and Congress to overcome Southern legislators' resistance to effective
voting rights legislation. President Johnson issued a call for a strong voting rights law and hearings began
soon thereafter on the bill that would become the Voting Rights Act.
Congress determined that the existing federal anti-discrimination laws were not sufficient to overcome the
resistance by state officials to enforcement of the 15th Amendment. The legislative hearings showed that the
Department of Justice's efforts to eliminate discriminatory election practices by litigation on a case-by-case
basis had been unsuccessful in opening up the registration process; as soon as one discriminatory practice or
procedure was proven to be unconstitutional and enjoined, a new one would be substituted in its place and
litigation would have to commence anew.
President Johnson signed the resulting legislation into law on August 6, 1965. Section 2 of the Act, which
closely followed the language of the 15th amendment, applied a nationwide prohibition against the denial or
abridgment of the right to vote on the literacy tests on a nationwide basis. Among its other provisions, the Act
contained special enforcement provisions targeted at those areas of the country where Congress believed the
potential for discrimination to be the greatest. Under Section 5, jurisdictions covered by these special
provisions could not implement any change affecting voting until the Attorney General or the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the change did not have a discriminatory purpose
and would not have a discriminatory effect. In addition, the Attorney General could designate a county covered
by these special provisions for the appointment of a federal examiner to review the qualifications of persons
who wanted to register to vote. Further, in those counties where a federal examiner was serving, the Attorney
General could request that federal observers monitor activities within the county's polling place.
The Voting Rights Act had not included a provision prohibiting poll taxes, but had directed the Attorney General
to challenge its use. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Supreme Court
held Virginia's poll tax to be unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment. Between 1965 and 1969 the
Supreme Court also issued several key decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 5 and affirming the
broad range of voting practices that required Section 5 review. As the Supreme Court put it in its 1966 decision
upholding the constitutionality of the Act:
Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat wide-spread and persistent
discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the
obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After enduring nearly a century of systematic
resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia
from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.
American Indian Citizenship Act of 1924
With Congress’ passage of the Indian Citizenship Act, the government of the United States confers
citizenship on all Native Americans born within the territorial limits of the country.
Before the Civil War, citizenship was often limited to Native Americans of one-half or less Indian blood. In the
Reconstruction period, progressive Republicans in Congress sought to accelerate the granting of citizenship
to friendly tribes, though state support for these measures was often limited. In 1888, most Native American
women married to U.S. citizens were conferred with citizenship, and in 1919 Native American veterans of
World War I were offered citizenship. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act, an all-inclusive act, was passed by
Congress. The privileges of citizenship, however, were largely governed by state law, and the right to vote
was often denied to Native Americans in the early 20th century.
Affirmative Action – California v. Bakke
Facts of the Case
Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California
Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering
class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an
effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications
(college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years
Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme
Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.
Question
Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's
application for admission to its medical school?
Legal provision: Equal Protection
Split Voted
No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota
system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed,
casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell
argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in
admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well,
contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed
to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial
minorities through affirmative action.
Title IX of the Education Code
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 protects people from discrimination based on sex in
education programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance.
The Title IX regulation describes the conduct that violates Title IX. Examples of the types of
discrimination that are covered under Title IX include sexual harassment, the failure to provide equal
opportunity in athletics, and discrimination based on pregnancy. To enforce Title IX, the U.S.
Department of Education maintains an Office for Civil Rights, with headquarters in Washington, DC
and 12 offices across the United States.
Define each amendment and determine its intent (2pts)
13th Amendment
14th Amendment
15th Amendment
19th Amendment
20th Amendment
21st Amendment
24th Amendment
26th Amendment
For each Supreme Court Case your answer will include the following: (4pts)
1) Background
2) Ruling
3) Impact
4) Amendment(s) involved
Define and determine the area of civil rights each law was meant to address.
Civil Rights Act of 1957
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Civil Rights Act of 1991
Voting Rights Act of 1965
American Indian Citizenship Act of 1924
What purpose did affirmative action serve? Is it constitutional (see California v.
Bakee)
Why did the Supreme Court determine it was important ensure each individual
was notified of their rights in Miranda v. Arizona.