Contents
1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. - 3 2.0 Problem ....................................................................................................................................................... - 4 2.1 Delimitation .................................................................................................................................................... - 4 3.0 Research design and Methodology .............................................................................................................. - 6 3.1 Research design .............................................................................................................................................. - 6 3.2 Method and considerations ........................................................................................................................... - 6 3.3 Synopsis .......................................................................................................................................................... - 7 4.0 Theory.......................................................................................................................................................... - 8 4.1 Realism ........................................................................................................................................................... - 8 4.1.1 Neorealism .............................................................................................................................................. - 8 4.1.2 Offensive realism .................................................................................................................................... - 9 4.1.3 Defensive realism .................................................................................................................................. - 10 4.2 Hard and soft power .................................................................................................................................... - 10 5.0 The Historical perspective .......................................................................................................................... - 11 5.1 Russian Civil War .......................................................................................................................................... - 11 5.2 Ukraine famine 1932-1933 ........................................................................................................................... - 12 5.3 Population transfers 1930’s ......................................................................................................................... - 13 5.4 Second World War ....................................................................................................................................... - 13 5.5 The Cold War ................................................................................................................................................ - 14 5.5.1 WEU & Hungary .................................................................................................................................... - 14 5.5.2 Berlin Wall & Cuban Missile Crisis......................................................................................................... - 15 5.5.3 Prague Spring ........................................................................................................................................ - 15 5.5.4 Fatigue & change .................................................................................................................................. - 16 5.5.5 Fall of Berlin Wall and collapse of USSR ................................................................................................ - 16 5.6 The rebirth of Eastern Europe ...................................................................................................................... - 17 5.6.1 Ukraine after 1991 ................................................................................................................................ - 17 5.6.2 Belarus after 1991 ................................................................................................................................. - 18 5.6.3 Georgia after 1991 ................................................................................................................................ - 18 5.7 Crises between EU member states and Russia 2000-2008 .......................................................................... - 19 5.7.1 Non-citizen laws in The Baltics .............................................................................................................. - 19 5.7.2 Kaliningrad Border Control ................................................................................................................... - 19 5.7.3 Polish raw meat crisis............................................................................................................................ - 20 5.7.4 Siberian flights ...................................................................................................................................... - 20 5.7.5 Ukraine-Russia gas crisis’s ..................................................................................................................... - 20 5.7.6 Estonia incidents ................................................................................................................................... - 20 5.7.7 Russian flyovers .................................................................................................................................... - 21 6.0 Eastern European Policy: From ENP to EaP ................................................................................................ - 21 6.1 The creation of ENP ...................................................................................................................................... - 21 6.2 Eastern Partnership Agreement ................................................................................................................... - 22 6.3. EU’s relationship agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus ............................................................. - 23 6.3.1 EU-Ukraine relations ............................................................................................................................. - 23 6.3.2 EU-Georgia relations ............................................................................................................................. - 24 6.3.3 EU-Belarus relations .............................................................................................................................. - 24 7.0 National preferences in EaP ....................................................................................................................... - 25 7.1 German approach......................................................................................................................................... - 25 6.4.2 Polish approach ..................................................................................................................................... - 26 7.0 Russian perspective on EaP ........................................................................................................................ - 27 7.1 The Russian skepticism ................................................................................................................................. - 27 8.0 Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................... - 29 -
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8.1 Ukraine ......................................................................................................................................................... - 29 8.1.1 Gas conflict 2009 ................................................................................................................................... - 30 8.1.2 Gas crisis according to “German approach” ......................................................................................... - 30 8.1.3 Gas crisis according to “Polish approach” ............................................................................................. - 32 8.1.4 Presidency of Czech Republic and Poland............................................................................................. - 32 8.1.5 The case of Tymoshenko ....................................................................................................................... - 33 8.1.6 Russia and Ukraine ................................................................................................................................ - 33 8.1.7 EU response to political development in Ukraine................................................................................. - 34 8.1.8 EU member state reactions to the trial of Tymoshenko ....................................................................... - 34 8.1.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. - 35 8.2 Georgia ......................................................................................................................................................... - 36 8.2.1 Overview of Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008 ........................................................................................ - 36 8.2.2 Reactions to the conflict ....................................................................................................................... - 37 8.2.3 EU and EaP in Georgia ........................................................................................................................... - 38 8.2.4 Georgia and Bilateral agreements ........................................................................................................ - 40 8.2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. - 41 8.3 Belarus .......................................................................................................................................................... - 42 8.3.1 EU and EaP in Belarus ........................................................................................................................... - 42 8.3.2 Belarus and bilateral agreements ......................................................................................................... - 44 8.3.3 Russia the logical partner ...................................................................................................................... - 45 8.3.4 Belarus in conflict with EU .................................................................................................................... - 45 8.3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. - 46 8.4 Summary of analysis ..................................................................................................................................... - 47 9.0 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. - 48 10.0 Litterature ................................................................................................................................................ - 50 10.1 Books .......................................................................................................................................................... - 50 10.2 Articles ........................................................................................................................................................ - 50 10.3 Web sources ............................................................................................................................................... - 52 10.4 Additional sources ...................................................................................................................................... - 56 -
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1.0 Introduction
The troubled relationship between EU and Russia is a lengthy conflict that through time has had a
remarkable impact on the geopolitical world stage. First witnessed as a conflict between ideologies,
capitalism and communism, and since the fall of the Berlin Wall, when political détente was expected,
the tensions entered a new stage. Eastern Europe, which consisted of new independent states, formerly
under the command of the now defunct Soviet Union, became the battleground of a new informal
conflict between East and West.
While Russians try to retain their influence sphere of former Soviet states in Eastern Europe, the EU has
created various initiatives to develop deeper integration with these states, namely through ENP and
Eastern Partnership. Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine takes part in EaP, a
multi-governmental cooperation between EU and the former Soviet states. This relationship between
EU and its member states on one side and Russia on the other will be the underlying frame for our
project, looked upon in a realist perspective. We want to analyse the different approaches towards
countries in the EaP, through the tools of EaP and bilateral agreements. We find of scientific interest to
ask, why there is need for EaP when bilateral agreements is already in place between the EaP states and
EU countries and a multilateral framework through the ENP initiative already exists.
More specifically we want to research the relationship between EU and its member countries, and three
EaP countries Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus. We would like to analyse the substantial outcomes of two
different approaches; the common EU approach, with EU as a unitary actor, through EaP and one
through bilateral agreements as the member states individually conduct with the three EaP countries.
We see EU as a political system with different actors (the member states) and thereby different
approaches. In this project we will focus on two of the most thorough approaches towards Russia and
the EaP countries in the EU, namely the “German (or Scandinavian) approach” and the “Polish
approach”, commonly used by the Polish administration. Besides focusing on these two, we are
mentioning a more project-based approach adopted by e.g the Czechs. In other words, the approaches
and national preferences are highly embedded in this project.
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2.0 Problem
The EaP is the official EU attempt to transform and integrate EU’s Eastern neighbours into the idea and
values of EU. It is meant as a tool to help neighbouring states of the EU towards democracy, human
rights and a good relationship with the EU. The question is, however, to which degree the EaP works as
intended. Several scholars have criticized EaP through time. Some suggest that the EaP does not
contribute with any added value to those countries that already participates in the ENP (Schäffer, 2009).
Others see the EaP as “burial ground” for the hopes of further enlargement of the EU, because of the
lack of differentiation between the partner countries in the EaP approach (Verdun et. al., 2011).
In this project we want to find out how the EaP works in practice, and how it works in comparison with
the intergovernmental agreements that also exists between the member states of EU and the EaP
countries. That said, we want to discover how multilateral agreements with EaP countries work within
the EaP frame on one hand, and how bilateral agreements works on the other. The question that arises
in this connection is basically, whether there is actually need for both of them?
The project will be written within the frame of a realist perspective, which practically means, that we
assume that every state have their sovereign interests, which they defend as their first priority. We
acknowledge that this simplistic theory is not perfect, but it is one way to look at it. We are of the
opinion, that through the eyes of the theory, this certain subject could somewhat be understood and
explained.
EU consists of 27 different member states, and when it comes to dealing with EaP, they have different
approaches and opinions towards dealing with the challenge. In this project we will present the two
main approaches that some scholars points to in this context, namely the “German approach” and the
“Polish approach” respectively. To conduct this research project, which concentrates on three EaP
countries in particular, we have decided to use the following research question:
Why is there a common EU approach towards Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus through EaP, when there
are existing bilateral agreements between the mentioned countries and EU member states?
2.1 Delimitation
The EaP initiative consists of six countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and
Belarus. In this project we have decided to concentrate on those three states that we consider the most
interesting, when it comes to our chosen context. These three states are Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus.
We find them very interesting because each of them represents a unique situation and case, when it
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comes to the underlying EU-Russia relation. Georgia has been involved in a war with Russia, Belarus is
the “last dictatorship” in Europe and Ukraine is a big country that borders both EU and Russia, and as a
result of its size, is of a big importance geopolitically. We recognize the scientific interest in analyzing the
three other countries in order to draw the common picture of EaP, but due to priorities and the limit of
this project, we have decided to leave them completely out of the project, so we can focus completely
on the three other countries.
When dealing with a subject like the mentioned, it is of severe importance to sort the scientific material,
so we only got the material that we need to answer the research question. Therefore, we will not focus
on certain EU member countries’ internal debates and likewise, we will not focus on the political debate
in the European Parliament, unless we find something there which we consider to be nationwide. In
other words, we will not use something from the “low-practice policy debate”, which is likely to occur in
every parliament, national or European. In a project on this subject, mainly relaying on reactions from
EU member countries, it is somewhat necessary to sort in the reactions we want to focus on. Therefore,
we have chosen only to mention the reaction of the countries, which seems to have the biggest interest
in the EaP cooperation and bilateral agreements with the countries.
In our project we mention historical events, which could practically be project subjects in itself (gas
crisis, South Ossetian War etc.). These events will only be mentioned to the degree, which they are
relevant to our chosen subject. As the main aim of this project is to give a contemporary picture of EaP
and bilateral agreements, it is necessary to set a certain time frame in which our analysis will take place.
The EaP was founded in 2008, so nothing earlier than that year will be subject to analysis. On the other
end of the time scale, we will set the Russian legislative election, the 4. December, as end our date.
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3.0 Research design and Methodology
In this chapter, the purpose is to give a statement about which scientific methods and research design
this paper will use in terms of performing and fulfilling its goals. Our methodological considerations will
be mentioned, and a complete synopsis concerning the whole project will be presented to give the
reader an overview, when it comes to structure.
3.1 Research design
The aim of this project paper is to perform an analysis on three specific countries, all participating in the
EU’s Eastern Partnership program. These three countries are Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus. To perform
this analysis in a satisfactory way, we have decided to use a multiple case study model as mentioned in
Robert K. Yin’s book ”Case Study Research – Design and Methods”.
The project will contain three separate analysis parts, one concerning each country case. Underlying to
that, each analysis part will include several analysis units. Each analysis unit will be connected to
empirical material and events with relevance to our problem formulation, which thereby makes our
design of this project a multiple case design with embedded analysis units (Yin, 2009: pp. 46-53).
3.2 Method and considerations
The method used in this project paper will primarily be qualitative, such as document analysis of which
scientific articles concerning the matter will be the largest part. Furthermore, journalistic sources will be
used to document events and happenings of relevance to the chosen subject and the problem
formulation. It will not be possible in a meaningful way to create any data by ourselves, for example,
focus groups and interviews, as the aim is to research macro-tendencies in Belarus, Ukraine and
Georgia, and we will thereby not be able to contribute with any new data in a meaningful way.
Likewise, the use of quantitative data will be limited and only used when relevant. This way of primarily
using qualitative data requires a sufficient amount of source criticism to assure that the fragmented
reality image it represents is actual and true (Bryman, 2004; s. 380-381). The general purpose of our
research will be performed inductive. Thus, we will use specific cases with a different outlook in terms of
creating some knowledge that might give insight about general tendencies, notably about EaP influence
in case countries versus bilateral agreements.
We have decided to treat each of the three case countries in our analysis as unitary actors, because it
would be too complex to include their internal politics as another dimension of our project. In contrast,
we acknowledge the diversities of the European Union and its member states. Therefore, we distinguish
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between when member states are acting as sovereign states and when EU is acting as a cohesive union.
More specifically we have chosen to set up two different approaches; those are prevalent among the EU
member states when it comes to dealing with international relations towards Russia and states in the
EaP. We have named these two approaches the “German approach” and the “Polish approach” and
their content will be presented later in this project. Russia will be considered as a unitary actor, though
it is not of our intention to analyse its motivation in policy decisions.
3.3 Synopsis
This project will start with an introduction, presenting the general context, followed by the problem
formulation and the logical delimitation of the project with chosen inclusions and exclusions. Afterwards
our methodology and research design will be looked at in a chapter, right before we present our
theoretical framework, consisting of realist theories, and theories on hard and soft power, which are of
some relevance to the chosen subject.
A historical perspective chapter about the internal relations the main actors between, from 1917 till
today, will come afterwards, in order to present a substantial base of historical knowledge to make such
a thing like path dependency visible to the reader. Furthermore, a listing of contemporary disputes
between EU and Russia will be mentioned in this section. After the history chapter, we will present a
chapter in which the EaP initiative in practice will be gone through, as well as our two aforementioned
approaches, the “Polish approach” and the “German approach” will be documented in order to use in
the following analysis chapter. Additionally, a short review of the difference between bilateral
agreements and multilateral agreements will be conducted. In the following chapter, the Russian
perspective of EaP and the EU member states’ commitment in former Russian sphere of influence will
be presented.
The analysis will be conducted in three parts as a result of the design we have chosen, as mentioned in
our methodology chapter. The Georgia part will be centered around The South Ossetian war in 2008, its
aftermath and the reactions from EU through the EaP program and certain member states’ bilateral
agreements with Georgia following the war with Russia. The Ukraine part will be about the latest gas
crisis between Ukraine-Russia, the energy dependency of EU countries and in the end the jailing of
former Prime Minister Yulia Tymochenko, which caused some controversy in the EU-Ukraine
relationship. The Belarus part will primarily focus on EU’s effort to implement democratic reforms in the
country, and how EaP and the countries of EU try to influence the country, either through the EaP
program or bilateral agreements. The analysis will end with us reviewing the main points of the analysis.
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At last we will draw together the threads in order to make a conclusion and thereby answer the
question raised in our problem formulation.
4.0 Theory
In this theory chapter, the core points of the realism theory will be documented. That will be realist
theory, and some of the subdivisions of it; namely structural realism (neorealism), offensive realism and
defensive realism. Furthermore, soft and hard power will be gone through in the end of this chapter, as
it is as well relevant for the chosen context.
4.1 Realism
Realism was the most prominent theory in international relations during the Cold War, and it focuses on
the struggle of power between states and the constant condition of conflict. (Walt, 1998) The interests
of the state are determining the actions of the state and the international system and the states are in
constant competition with each other (Waltz, 1979: pp. 117). Realism is focusing on human nature and
calls humans egoistic, claiming that the human nature is the constricting influence on politics, while at
the same time assumes that international system is in a state of anarchy, as there is no central authority,
thus making conflicts more likely (Donnelly, 2000: pp. 10-11).
Realism views international politics as a struggle with the aim to gain as much power as possible, in
other words “relative gains”, because all states are in constant threat of conflict. Nation-states are the
main actors in the international system and they serve as unitary and coherent units, while international
actors have very little importance. Another crucial aspect of realism is the dominance of “high politics”
(military security) over “low politics” (economic and social affairs) (Keohane et. al., 1997: pp. 23).
International system is constantly in danger of conflict, as there is either a possibility or an actual conflict
between states. The use of force is the most effective tool for foreign policy, as states are continuously
defending their interests from various threats, real or not. The international system can be called stable,
when there is a “balance of power”. The relationships between the states are so fragile that no political
integration is taking place, or if there is some cooperation, then it only lasts for a short time or as long as
the strongest country can gain advantages for itself and its national interests (Keohane et. al., 1997: pp.
24).
4.1.1 Neorealism
Neorealism, also called structural realism, derives from classical realism, because it does not focus on
human nature; rather it is more interested in the international politics as a structured international
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system and its effects. The international system has various structural constraints that dictate the
behavior of the states and can influence the actions of the states (Waltz, 1990). Unlike realism,
neorealism claims that states don’t have the power to influence or shape the international system as
there are constraints. They are “passive bearers”, that have to accept the structure of the international
political system, which is in direct contrast with Morgenthau, who as a prominent realist, has said that
states had the power to shape the international system (Hobson, 2000: pp. 17).
Neorealism also denounces that, because of anarchy, states will not choose long-term cooperation to
gain something, because they fear that other state will gain more, which would result in new threats.
Because of that the states will protect their own interests rather than cooperating with other actors.
Neorealism also theorises that the sovereignty is the most important aspect of the state in international
system and neither globalization nor economic interdependence is of significant influence. Internal
properties of the states also do not shape or influence the behavior of the state or international politics
(Hobson, 2000: pp. 18).
Concerning the balance of power, unlike in a hierarchic system, Kenneth Waltz argues, that less
powerful states will not “bandwagon”, that is, the states will not side with the stronger states, but they
will band together with other smaller states to balance the hegemonic states. Otherwise, these actors
would just fall prey to the superpower (Waltz, 1990: pp. 126).
4.1.2 Offensive realism
Offensive realism argues that, because the international system is ruled by anarchy, it is necessary for
the states to increase their power compared to other states, as otherwise there is uncertainty and fear
that other states could attack them. States will do everything to expand if the benefits of expanding
their military prowess are bigger that the costs. This expansion usually is done by arms buildup,
unilateral diplomacy, expansion (Taliaferro, 2000). The main aim of offensive realism is to achieve
hegemony, as then there would not be any opportunity for other state to be a threat. No state believes
that they have enough power to survive, and there is always a necessity for more power (Mearsheimer,
2001: pp. 35).
Therefore states intentionally lower the security of other countries by seeking their own. The conflict
between states is genuine and there cannot be peaceful resolutions, as offensive realism views conflict
as the very nature of international system. Therefore, there cannot be long-term alliances between
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states, only temporary cooperation. Rather, states dedicate all of their time and resources to increase
their own security and military power, to prepare for conflict that cannot be avoided (Shiping, 2008).
4.1.3 Defensive realism
Defensive realism, on the other hand, assumes that international system compels states to expand only
if certain conditions have been met. This theory accepts that even if nation-states find military buildup
necessary for better security and safety of the state, these actions create hostility and suspicion from
other countries, as they only see new threats. Because of that, defensive realism proclaims that it is
better to seek moderate strategies of expansion rather than aggressive military buildup. Even the
military, economically advanced states should constrain themselves and not create illusions of threat
(Taliaferro, 2000).
Therefore, unlike offensive realism, states do not increase their power with the aim to lower the security
of other states and defensive realism believes that there is a chance to resolve conflicts peacefully, as
well as there is a possibility for cooperation between states. There is even a possibility to form defensive
alliances to resist aggressive countries that are trying to increase their security at the sake of other
states (Snyder, 1991: pp. 11-12).
4.2 Hard and soft power
Hard power can be described as the ability to force actors to do something that is desirable for the other
actor, that is, coercion. In most cases the coercion would be used because actors wouldn’t otherwise do
what is asked of them. The ability to use hard power is dependent on the actor’s military capabilities and
economic prowess (Nye, 2006: pp. 26). Hard power can use either threats (“sticks”) or rewards
(“carrots”) to influence others, or to gain advantages in interdependent relations with other actors, for
example, when in 1971 USA stopped the “gold dollar” system, thus gaining power in the international
community (Keohane et. al, 1998: pp. 86). In most common practice, hard power can be expressed as
military intervention, for example, USA invasion in Iraq, or coercive diplomacy, when various pressures
are used to reach desirable outcome, or as economic sanctions to punish or force an actor to do what
other actor wants (Wagner, 2005). This kind of power can be used in relations with neighbour countries,
as well as in international environment, for example, a country using its veto rights in the UN Security
Council to prevent any actions that could clash with its national interests.
On the other hand, the concept of soft power, as described by the author of the concept, Joseph S. Nye
Jr., suggests that it is possible to get desirable outcomes without using coercion, but by making others
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want what the other actor has. That is mainly achieved by making something very attractive that would
make others want to fallow the same rules or adopt various norms or views, thus getting the desired
results. The ability to use attraction makes it possible to spend less time and resources on coercion
(Keohane et. al, 1998).
Various tools can be used to implement soft power, for example, by making the culture, values or ideas
appealing or by being able to set agenda in various institutions and norms, where the preferences and
positions of others are formulated(ibid.). The use of reputation and public diplomacy has also become a
resource of soft power, as it can give the necessary tools to influence other actors without the use of
hard power, by, for example, using long-term relations and communication between countries (Nye,
2004).
Important aspect of soft power is the distribution of information. Countries can project their attractive
image to the rest of the world by disseminating information about the culture, ideals, various views, as
well as using information to shape public opinion. The promotion of culture and ideas of USA, through
various information outlets like TV, movies, news, can be used as an example of how soft power can
work. However, the use of soft power can lead to negative results as well, as in the information age it is
hard to limit unfavorable information as now government is not the only information outlet anymore.
Also, the decisions and policies of the government can create a negative image, thus making the results
of soft power dependent on the acceptance of the receivers (ibid.).
5.0 The Historical perspective
In this chapter, the aim is to give an overview over the historical baggage that the main actors in this
project have from their often dramatic past. In this chapter, we are eager to choose sequences from the
relevance of our project and the mentioned actors and not necessarily from what is normally considered
the most important general history. Starting from Russian Civil War 1917-1921, over Second World War,
through the Cold War and ending with the experiences of the past years. The chapter will be written in
chronological order, and we reckon that not all relevant historical sequences can be mentioned due to
delimitation.
5.1 Russian Civil War
The Russian Civil War was a multi-party conflict between the revolutionary Red Army, containing The
Bolsheviks, and the anti-communist White Army, containing royal loyalists from what is Belarus,
Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics today. Some central powers in Europe, including The German Empire
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and Austria-Hungary, participated in the war against the revolutionary Red Army in order to avoid the
threat of communism.
The civil war reached a temporary stalemate in March 1918, when the central powers and The Red Army
signed a peace treaty named “Treaty of Brest-Litovsk” and definitely ended the Russian involvement in
World War I (Chernev, 2011: pp. 369). The aim of the treaty was primarily to secure of the
independence of many small states fighting in The White Army. Among these states were Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania.
In a time of peace, dismay broke out internally among the involved parties, as The White Army and The
Red Army respectively, used very controversial and gruesome ways to recruit new soldiers. Examples of
soldiers on both sides forcing civilians to army conscription by kidnapping their families became
common practice at this stage of the conflict (Williams, 1987).
The war broke out once again in 1919. The Bolshevists had a bad run at the election of the settling
Constituent Assembly, and as a result they dissolved the Assembly. After the dissolution the Civil War
was effectively restarted (Thompson, 1996: pp. 159) against the non-communist opposition, which at
this stage consisted of several political fractions. Several other, mainly local, fractions with nationalist
preferences participated in the war as well, fighting the revolutionary Bolsheviks. At this stage of the
war, The Red Army was far more organized than their counterpart (Nielsen, 1980: pp. 41-45), and in
1920-1921 the White Army was defeated, although notable resistance continued to take place until the
summer of 1923. As a sideshow to the civil war, a famine broke out in 1921 killing 10 million people
(Yavkolev, 2002: pp. 155-156).
5.2 Ukraine famine 1932-1933
Vladimir Lenin's death in 1924 contributed to a power struggle inside the power circles of USSR, ending
with Josef Stalin seizing power shortly after. With Stalin's takeover, a new and bloody chapter of the
Russian history would begin. The following years featured cleansings inside the Communist Party, and as
a consequence all of Stalin's internal opposition was removed from power and ultimately executed
(Getty et al., 1993: pp. 1017-1033). Stalin soon started a comprehensive collectivization process in order
to establish collective labor farms, and thereby outlawing individual land ownership. By the beginning of
the 1930's, over 90% of the Russian land was collectivized, and The Soviet Union was on the way to
become a great industrial power. This, however, had severe human costs in the process.
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A cruel side effect of this collectivization process made by Stalin occurred in Ukraine in the years 19321933, where famine hit. Estimations suggest that 5-6 million people lost their lives as a result of Stalin's
collectivization policies and the following hunger (web1). Some historians, however, argue that the manmade famine - commonly referred to as Holodomor - was seen as a Soviet attack on what the USSR
considered "Ukrainian nationalism" (Marples, 2005; Bilinsky, 1999: pp. 147-156).
Currently there is some disagreement throughout the world whether this famine should be considered
genocide or not. Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko was very clear on this matter, calling
Holodomor “genocide” (web2). On the other hand, his successor Viktor Yanukovych back in 2007
described the incident as "a common tragedy" adding that it would be wrong to consider it as genocide
(web3).
5.3 Population transfers 1930’s
Throughout the 1930's, Stalin's policies became more and more radical and drastic. Among the more
radical initiatives were the forced population transfer policies, which became a staple under Stalin's
guidance. On many occasions huge populations were consequently removed from their neighbourhood
and forced to live elsewhere. These transfers had various reasons, for example, the Soviet regime
considered them as Kulaks - rich people - and in other cases their ethnical origin was the reason. Some
estimates show that up to 43% of the relocated people died from diseases and hunger (web4).
The relocation of people started early with 100.000 Poles forced out of Poland for Siberia in 1930, and
other nationalities were soon to follow. Especially citizens from Belarus, The Baltics, Ukraine, Poland,
Finland and Romania became victims of these population transfer campaigns, which saw ordinary
people of certain ethnic origin reduced to forced labor (Nielsen, 1980: pp. 89-98).
5.4 Second World War
Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in 1939, which consisted of a partition
of Poland between the two superpowers (Krivickas, 1989). Throughout the war, especially Poland
became the victim of some of the war’s most cruel single sequences. Over 300.000 Polish Jews died in
the Warsaw Ghettos throughout the war (Peters, 2006), and about 22.000 Polish military personnel and
police officers were killed by mass execution by the Russian secret police NKVD in the Katyn forest
during April and May 1940 (Kużniar-Plota, 2004).
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As the German war machine started to decline during the war, the Russians began their march towards
Berlin in the heart of Nazi-Germany. In the process they conquered all land on the road to Berlin,
including Poland, and when the war ended in 1945, the USSR decided to annex The Baltics and make the
rest of Eastern Europe a sphere of influence through military and strategic hegemony.
5.5 The Cold War
Throughout World War II, the western allied countries and The Soviet Union had fought on the same
side against The Axis Powers, led by Hitler’s German Nazi regime. But now, as peace was once again
established in Europe, an old conflict suddenly surfaced again: the conflict between democracy and
market economy in the west, and communism in the east (Grimnes, 1986; pp. 8-12). Many eastern
European states had fallen into communism, actively led by Stalin; as communist revolutions in North
Korea and China helped the ideology on its way as well (ibid.). In many states like Hungary, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and The Baltics many considered this an occupation from the Russians. Germany was
petitioned in East and West. In West-Germany democracy and denazification was on the agenda, while
East-Germany became a single party communist state.
5.5.1 WEU & Hungary
While a raging war unfolded in Korea between the communist North and the democratically willed
South, thereby serving as the first proxy war between the East and West post-war, USSR supreme leader
Josef Stalin passed away in March 1953 and was replaced by Nikita Khrushchev. Meanwhile in Europe, a
military defense alliance called Western European Union (WEU) became reality in 1954, after the former
Axis powers West-Germany and Italy were unified with the five members (UK, France and Benelux) of
the so called Brussels Treaty from 1948 (web5). The main aim of the defensive alliance was to enhance
the security of the member states collectively, in order to offset the military strength of the Soviet
Union. As time went by the states became members of NATO as well, and the practical role of WEU in
defence matters was outplayed effectively, leaving NATO as the main actor.
In October of 1956 Soviet troops invaded Hungary, and crushed a rebellion led by the former political
leader of Hungary, the dethroned Imre Nagy. Nagy, who was a reform communist, was the marionette
leader of Hungary from 1953 until 1955, and tried to implement more reformist version of communism.
As a result of this he was deposed as head of the Council of Ministers in his homeland and was banned
from all posts in the Communist Party (Gati, 2006; pp. 64). In the slipstream of these events social unrest
started to form in Hungary, which resulted in mass protests and a revolution in which Imre Nagy and his
allies took power from the Soviet influenced regime. The Russians were soon to react and after a little
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over three weeks’ time, the Soviet forces took power in Hungary once again with an iron fist. A new proSoviet government was installed and Imre Nagy and his allies were executed, whilst over 200.000
Hungarians fled the country as a result of the events (web6) (Cseresnyés, 1999).
The refugee flow from Hungary to the West combined with the massive shock over the Soviet nontolerance towards the Hungarian self-determinacy, caused severe outrage in the Western world, and
made it clear to many what the Soviet Union was ready to do to defend their interests (Grimnes, 1986:
pp. 205-209).
5.5.2 Berlin Wall & Cuban Missile Crisis
August of 1961 saw the raise of one of the most iconic constructions throughout the 20. Century: The
Berlin Wall. The wall was built by the East German government and was meant as a measure to avoid
people fleeing from East Germany to the West (Hansen, 2009: pp. 47-50). Over 350.000 people had left
East Germany from 1960 until the wall had effectively segregated the city of Berlin from August 13, 1961
(ibid.). The building of the wall made the conflict between East and West very tangible in the middle of
the European mainland, and came to stand as the very symbol of The Cold War. The reactions from the
West were unambiguous condemnation of the Wall describing it continuously as “The Wall of Shame”
(web7). American president John F. Kennedy once articulated the sense of feeling by saying “Ich bin ein
Berliner” (“I’m a Berliner”), and thereby he sent the signal, that everybody in the West sympathized with
the population trapped in West-Berlin (Hansen, 2009: pp. 125-130).
The conflict between the two superpowers, U.S. and Soviet Union, came close to actual military combat
in 1962. The new Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who had seized power in 1959, planned together with
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to set missiles in Cuba, which U.S. considered offensive and threatening
(Dobbs, 2008: pp. 19-25). The missiles were supposed to come from USSR via ship. As a precaution to
cope with this threat, U.S. launched a blockade around Cuba to avoid Russian ships ever reaching the
island. Regardless of this, the Russian ships loaded with missiles continued and the world was on verge
of nuclear war. The crisis intensified and secret negotiations were made to reach a solution to the
matter. It all ended with U.S. promising to remove missiles in Turkey in return for the missile ships to
turn around, returning to Russia (Glover, 2000: pp. 464).
5.5.3 Prague Spring
Space Race and Vietnam War was on the agenda up through the 1960s. In Europe though, the events in
Prague in the spring of 1968 took the main focus. The Czech communist party had elected the reformist
Alexander Dubcek as new chairman in the beginning of 1968, and he promised the people reforms and
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changes, mainly in form of a number of civil liberties which had been outlawed up until. The changes
were implemented in the spring of 1968(web8). This caused quite some discontent in the Soviet Union,
now headed by Leonid Brezhnev, and in the fall of the same year the Warsaw Pact nations invaded
Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring initiatives were rolled back, and Alexander Dubcek was deposed as
chairman of the Czech communist party, this resulting in mass protests throughout the whole country.
The symbol of the events became the young student Jan Palach who committed suicide by setting
himself on fire (web9). The events in Prague once again caused outrage in the West in particular
(Hughes, 2004).
5.5.4 Fatigue & change
The 1970’s saw thawing between East and West, as the relations between USSR and USA became better
than ever before. But soon discontent could be seen once again. One reason was the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan from 1979 till 1989, and another the continuous arms race between East and West. At
the same time the political pressure for reforms and change from West towards East started to grow
intensively, mastered by the neo-conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the
American president Ronald Reagan (Matlock, 2004; pp. 26-31).
In some Soviet influenced countries the signs of fatigue began to show in the end of the 1970’s and the
beginning of the 1980’s. In Poland, The Solidarity Movement led by Lech Walesa began to show their
strength, thereby challenging the Soviet influenced government. In 1981, they reached 9.5 million
members or 1/3 of the Polish workers and became a power factor in the society (Ash, 2002).
In 1985 change arrived as USSR chose a new and relatively young political leader, who was a reformist.
Mikhail Gorbachev took over and soon two new terms were introduced to the political life of the Soviet
citizens: Glasnost and Perestrojka (“Openness” and “reconstruction”). As a result the citizens of the
Soviet Union were gifted with a number of civil liberties, including free speech, as well as a
reconstruction phase of the Union was introduced (Matlock, 2004: pp. 196-200).
5.5.5 Fall of Berlin Wall and collapse of USSR
Despite of the reform agenda not only in USSR, but also in several other countries, it proved to be the
last gasp of a crumbling political system. It all started in Hungary May 1989. The government of Hungary
was forced to open the border to Austria which in reality meant that it now became possible to travel
from East to West (web10). In August the same year a Pan-European Picnic took place on the HungarianAustrian border, which effectively led to the fall of the Berlin Wall three months later in November 1989
(web11).
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The fall of the Berlin Wall became a landmark event and started a series of revolutions throughout
Eastern Europe. Some of them were relatively peaceful, like the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia.
Other revolutions ended more violently, like in Romania, where the execution of long-time dictator
Nicolae Ceausescu became the end of communism there. In the beginning the revolutions were fenced
only to include the satellite states of the Soviet Union, but not USSR in itself. That changed in March
1990, when Lithuania declared its independence from USSR as the first Soviet Republic to do so. Within
the next year several Soviet states declared their independence (King, 2009) and the union was in deep
crisis.
A fight between reformists, among them supreme leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and old school hardliners
broke out in August, 1991. The hardliners tried to seize power from Gorbachev in order to “restore
order” in the Soviet Union. By “restoring order” they meant to use force against the republics that
wanted their independence (Albats et al, 1994; pp. 276-293). The coup failed after only a few days as it
became clear that the people took the reformists side, and by the end of 1991 it was all over.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union came into reality on 25. December 1991, resulting in 15 new states
of which Russia is by far the largest.
5.6 The rebirth of Eastern Europe
In the slipstream of the Soviet collapse, political and economic chaos ruled throughout Eastern Europe
and especially in Russia itself. A period of economic shock therapy became reality, when planned
economy was suddenly exchanged with Western style capitalism, which caused severe problems in the
years following the dissolution of USSR (Sachs, 2000). In the rest of Eastern Europe the experiences of
the new order were mixed. Some states ended liberal democracies, others as post-soviet dictatorships.
Germany saw a long-waited unification between East-Germany and West-Germany in 1990, while
Poland experienced transformation to democracy, and used a few years to the transition.
5.6.1 Ukraine after 1991
Independence came to Ukraine in December 1991. Ukraine was a huge contributor to the annual Soviet
GDP along with a large scale population unlike many other former Soviet States. The country, however,
faced a huge administrative challenge at the end of 1991, when a new constitution was to be designed.
The lack of democracy experience made progress hard to reach. Even though a democratic transition
began, slowly the lack of political structure proved it difficult, while the country suffered during the
economic transition process in the beginning of the 1990’s (web13). Corruption, scandals and even
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political murders (web14) were a reality in Ukraine throughout the period of Leonid Kuchma’s
presidency (1994-2005). Things changed by the 2004 presidential election, when a new reformist
candidate Victor Yushchenko was elected President during The Orange Revolution. However, the
political honeymoon in Ukraine was short as the true transformation to democratic traditions still
seemed unreachable. President Yushchenko disappointed his people and at the following election in
2010, he lost to his pro-Russian rival Victor Yanukovych, who took office shortly after.
5.6.2 Belarus after 1991
In Belarus, the post-Soviet period had a contradictory outcome compared to other of the former states
in USSR. The old elite had preserved their political authority and economic power, influencing the
political and economic balance in the republic. In 1994, Alexander Lukashenko became the President
and he continued the state-owned strategy as seen in the Soviet era like nothing had happened. After a
constitutional crisis in November 1996 (web13), Lukashenko tightened his grip on power in Belarus.
Through this period, Belarus and Russia kept close diplomatic ties and were major economic partners
through trade cooperation, and Belarusian dependence on Russian raw materials. Further supranational
cooperation was made by a chain of treaties between 1996-1999, calling for single citizenship, common
foreign and defense policy and a monetary union (web15). As time went on Belarus became more and
more isolated, and described by some as “the last dictatorship in Europe” (web16). This is backed by
several election results from the country, leaving the impression of Alexander Lukashenko as an
authoritarian President (web15).
5.6.3 Georgia after 1991
Georgia’s development followed similar trajectory of many other former Soviet states in the Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia area. This meant no real change and a form of “continuation” of the Soviet
style politics that were seen in countries like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As a blatant symbol
of this phenomenon, the former Soviet foreign minister Edouard Shevardnadze became the President of
Georgia from 1995 until 2003. Shevardnadze resigned after huge demonstrations in 2003 that is now
known as the Rose Revolution, which led to Mikhail Saakashvili becoming president. Saakashvili soon
changed the perspective of Georgia politically, leading the former Soviet republic away from Russia and
towards NATO, Europe and United States. In fact, 77% of the Georgian population voted in favour of
NATO membership in 2008. (web17). As president, Saakashvili had to deal with two frozen conflicts on
Georgian soil - the Abkhazia conflict and the South Ossetia conflict. The latter one led to the South
Ossetia war in 2008 that will be mentioned again later on.
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5.7 Crises between EU member states and Russia 2000-2008
Since the beginning of the new millennium, relations between EU and Russia have continued to improve
steadily. However, in the last few years there have been several cases that can be characterized as
having a noticeable influence, thereby hindering the relations to develop in the right direction. In this
short chapter the aim is to present an overview of some of the most conspicuous incidents.
One of the biggest issues during this period, The South Ossetia War, will not be mentioned in this exact
chapter as it will be a part of the project’s analysis.
5.7.1 Non-citizen laws in The Baltics
One of the long standing issues between Europe and Russia is the situation with the Russian speaking
non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia. Since regaining their independence, these countries have passed laws
that gave the status of citizenship to those, who had the citizenship before 1940. Thus the status of
“non-citizen” was given to people, who migrated to these countries after 1940 and were required to
complete the process of naturalization (web18). After these laws Estonia and Latvia issued additional
laws, as more countries denied recognizing the Soviet passports of non-citizens. In the end Latvia and
Estonia issued the so called “alien passports”. (Lottman, 2008: pp. 506-512)
Treatment of Russian speaking minorities has been criticized by international organizations, which have
had various monitoring missions in Estonia and Latvia. While these monitoring missions have been
deemed to be a success, Russia has criticized Estonia and Latvia by using NGO’s, media, various
international forums, as well as using various sanctions. (Lottman, 2008) EU acknowledges necessity for
improvement and regularly calls for action, but has also acknowledged the progress and that
naturalization process and the given rights of the minorities are not against EU standards. (web19)
5.7.2 Kaliningrad Border Control
With the pending EU enlargement in 2004, the question of Kaliningrad region was important, as the
region became an enclave of EU. Problems like border control, visas and travel were just the immediate
ones as Kaliningrad would be firmly in the middle of the Schengen zone. (Vitunic, 2002) The European
Commission addressed these issues in 2004 in a Joint Statement, by focusing on the development
differences between Kaliningrad and its surrounding countries, as well as transit arrangements to ensure
the mobility of Kaliningrad citizens. Various agreements and cooperation between EU and Russia have
been made and Kaliningrad was declared a Russian Special Economic Zone (web 20).
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5.7.3 Polish raw meat crisis
Another issue that hindered EU–Russia relations was that of the Russian ban on Polish raw meat in 2005.
Russia argued that the reason for the ban was the unsatisfactory measures taken to ensure the quality
of the Polish meat, announcing that due to lax regulations meat from third world countries could enter
Russia with Polish certificates. Warsaw insisted that the ban was disproportionate and discriminatory.
(Roth, 2009) EU assured Russia that EU standards would be implemented, but in 2006 Russia still had
not lifted it, which resulted in Poland’s veto of the EU-Russia partnership agreement, as well as threats
of vetoing the Russia’s WTO application. The result was both sides imposing various bans and
restrictions on import. (Forsberg et al., 2008) EU response was described as “lukewarm”, but Union
remained united and continued to support Poland till in 2007 the new Polish government sought to
improve the relations with Russia by lifting the ban on Russia’s OECD talks, which allowed Russia to
blame everything on the previous Polish government and. After some inspections of Polish meat plants,
the ban of the meat was lifted in 2007 and 2008. (Roth, 2009)
5.7.4 Siberian flights
One problematic aspect of relations between Russia and EU is the flight fees over Siberia. Russia is the
only country in the world, who is demanding such fees and for EU that is against 1944 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation. Furthermore, it is not beneficial for European companies to
pay these fees and EU has given this issue a top priority in relations with Russia by connecting the
abolishment of fees with the Russian entrance into WTO. However, Russia considers the fees as business
relations and that they should not give them up without compensation. Agreement was reached to be
signed in 2007, but Russia has not signed it. (Forsberg et al., 2008)
5.7.5 Ukraine-Russia gas crisis’s
In recent years there have been several disputes between Russia and Ukraine concerning gas supplies. In
2005, Russia and Ukraine talks about gas prices failed, and Russia accused Ukraine of stealing gas that
was intended for other European countries, while Ukraine denied everything. In January 2006 Russia cut
off Ukraine’s gas supply, which reflected on other European countries. (Stern, 2006) After reaching an
agreement, the gas supply was restored, but soon afterwards in 2007 and following years other conflicts
emerged between Ukraine and Russia.
5.7.6 Estonia incidents
April 2007 saw another conflict arise, this time between Estonia and Russia. It started by the removal of
the Bronze soldier monument in Tallinn, Estonia, that was initiated by the nationalists, who insisted that
this monument was the reminder of the Soviet rule. Amidst violent demonstrations, the monument was
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removed from the city centre, which promoted a sharp retort from Russia, announcing the actions of
Estonia as “blasphemous” and promising that this event would cause serious consequences for the
relations of Russia and Estonia. (web21) Although EU officials understood the reasons of Estonia to
remove the monument, disappointment was expressed for not considering the consequences of these
actions. (web22) This was followed by the attack on the Estonian embassy in Moscow that caused strong
protests from US, NATO and EU. A deal brokered by Germany ended the attack on the embassy, but in
early May Estonia suffered from a huge “cyber-attack” and Estonian officials have accused Russia,
although no concrete evidence has been brought forward. (web23)
5.7.7 Russian flyovers
Russia has often created tensions by breeching airspace of EU member states, for example, in 2010 two
Russian fighter jets entered Baltic airspace and did not identify themselves forcing NATO to escort them
out of the Baltic airspace. (web24) In 2005, a Russian fighter jet crashed in Lithuania, sparking new
tensions between Russia and Lithuania. It has been said that Russia has been flying into Baltic and
Finnish airspaces to provoke them. (web25) Nevertheless, these flyovers have caused various tensions
to rise, especially after the Georgia-Russian War in 2008.
6.0 Eastern European Policy: From ENP to EaP
The following chapter will present the creation of ENP and afterwards describe the incentives for
creating EaP in the sphere of an “Eastern Policy”. The ENP and EaP will later on be briefly compared to
explore potential differences. EU’s multilateral and bilateral agreements with the EaP countries will be
sketched from a historical viewpoint subsequently. A section will follow about national preferences of
Poland and Germany in Eastern European Policy to determine different approaches within EU because
of the importance of bilateral agreements as part of the cooperation in the process of integration with
EaP countries.
6.1 The creation of ENP
After the two EU enlargement rounds in 2004 and in 2007 respectively, expanded borders and new
problems regarding mutual security promoting, environmental protection and ensuring economic
prosperity were some of the challenges EU had to face. These circumstances brought in a need for policy
tools to deal with the opportunities and challenges. As an instrument for strengthening the relation with
Eastern Europe, the Commission presented “Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A Framework for relations
with our Eastern and Southern neighbors” as the first draft of a cooperation in March 2003 (Mocanu,
2010 p. 42). The Eastern Europe Policy initiative was further developed with the ENP Strategic Paper in
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2004, which was connected to co-political cooperation and Common Foreign and Security Policy in
partnership with Eastern and Southern neighbouring countries (web 26).
The procedural process of political and economic commitment is specified in the operational tool of ENP
- The Action Plans - in mutual agreement between EU and the targeted countries. Through Association
Agreements, EU sets out conditionality guidelines in political matters, trade and human rights reforms in
exchange of prospect in involvement in EU’s internal market and further economic integration (web 27).
6.2 Eastern Partnership Agreement
In the post-enlargement period, Poland, with the assistance of Sweden, proposed a new Eastern Europe
policy on May 26, 2008 in Brussels (web 28). The successive enlargement processes in 2004 and 2007, in
Eastern and Central Europe, had expanded the size of EU, bringing its geographical scope closer to
several post-Soviet republics and to Russia in the East. The foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden,
Radoslaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt, presented the initiative at the EU General Affairs and External Relations
Council in Brussels May 2008. According to a EU summit declaration in early 2009, the EaP was to
develop:”…an increasingly close relationship with its Eastern partners.” (web 29). Furthermore, it was
to enhance the fight against corruption and organized crime in Eastern Europe and going beyond the
framework of ENP in strengthening the energy security between EU member states and EaP countries
(Schäffer, 2009: pp. 1).
At the presentation of the initiative in Brussels, Sikorski said: “To the south we have neighbours of
Europe. To the East, we have European neighbours… They all have the right one day to apply” and that
the partnership should be embedded in the EU structure. He thereby distinguished the initiative from
EU’s focus on EU’s southern flank through the French-driven initiative “The Union of the
Mediterranean” – a tool already applied to the ENP (Lapczynski, 2009: p. 145)
The Eastern Partnership Agreement was signed in Prague on May 7 2009 between 27 member states
and Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. As practical platforms, working groups
within the EaP were established. The work of the groups is implemented in meetings twice a year in four
thematic platforms (web 30) consisting of cooperation related to subjects as environment, education,
agriculture and energy security and others. In November 2009, one of the outcomes was, in terms of
energy security, an agreement of shaping an integrated sustainable energy policy for the EaP countries,
where national interests were taken into account (web 31).
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To sum up, the EaP has developed from a Polish initiative of bringing more focus on Eastern Europe in
the post-enlargement period to strengthen relationship with EaP countries. It was furthermore
established to counterbalance the “Union of the Mediterranean” and EU’s focus on the southern flank
of Europe.
6.3. EU’s relationship agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus
This section points out main events according to the EU relationship with Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus
in terms of cooperation in bilateral and multilateral agreements. It will be presented from a historical
perspective to give an overview of the process and development in relation between EU and the three
EaP countries.
6.3.1 EU-Ukraine relations
Formal EU-Ukraine relations were inaugurated already with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(PCA) in 1998, providing cooperation within political and economic areas. Of the objectives, common
promotion of security and stability as well as development of human rights and democratic principles,
were important. With the enlargement in 2004, Ukraine became a direct neighbour to EU, bringing new
opportunities and challenges to the European Neighbourhood Policy in light of Ukraine’s potential
involvement in EU’s internal market, EU programs and policies.
As a member of United Nations, Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe and a participating
nation in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina Ukraine is in an important multilateralembedded relation in joint actions towards stability and security issues as terrorism and crime with EU
(web 27). As a successor agreement to the PCA, Association Agreements between EU and Ukraine In
2008 in Paris strengthened the political and economic relations, while further cooperation was initiates
with the adopted EU-Ukraine Agenda in November 2009 (web 32).
Lately, the relationship has been damaged due to the controversial case of ex-Premier Minster Yulia
Tymoshenko, causing outcry and condemnation in EU, concerning the methods used in that case. EU
claimed that president Yanokovych was abusing his political power to influence the decision of jailing
Tymoshenko (web 33).
The High Representative Catherine Ashton stated: “I believe the offer of concluding the association
agreement should remain on the table” and that she encourage Yanokovych to express ”… unhappiness
with the criminal code in Ukraine and recognize the need for changes” as a solution to save the
Association Agreements and influence the political decisions of Kiev (web 34).
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6.3.2 EU-Georgia relations
As with Ukraine and EU, improved bilateral relations with Georgia were established one year later in July
1999, although coordinated cooperation already began in 1991 with the Technical Assistance to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program. This initiative included bilateral assistance to 12
post-Soviet countries and Mongolia in democracy and economy changes (Rinnert, 2011 p. 5).
The PCA with the Georgian authorities was designed to fulfil purpose of closer relationship between EU
and Georgia, involving deeper economic integration and political co-operation. Further on, the ENP FiveYear Action Plan in November 2006 helped this on the way, and when Georgia joined the Eastern
Partnership initiative in May 2009, it brought in deeper integration of Georgia with the European
structures. These bilateral agreements were established along with the Country Strategy Paper 20072013 presenting EU’s objective, policy responses and areas of priority (web 35; web 36).
The EaP cooperation began with Association Agreements in Batumi, Georgia on July 15th, 2010
advancing the Georgian-EU relation. Further implementation of visa facilitation agreements was made in
2008, and in 2010 with law convergence processes to EU’s Acquis Communautaire (Rinnert, 2011 p. 11).
In the aftermath of the Georgian war joint cooperation between EU and Georgia evolved through closer
relations between governments, promoting dialogue, as well as peace agreements initiatives were
implemented (web 36).
6.3.3 EU-Belarus relations
The EU-Belarus relation has for a long time been constrained by the Belarus being unable to live up to
EU’s standards of democratic conditionality, human rights and the rule of law. In November 2006, EU
released the “What the European Union could bring Belarus” giving a perspective on full membership
with Belarus in European Neighbourhood Policy (web 37). The paper describes how EU could financially
assist Belarus in both deeper economic relationship and improve life quality of the Belarusian
population. Most notably EU negatively points out the authoritarian regime of President Lukashenko
“...preventing us from offering Belarus full participation on our neighbourhood policy” requesting
political, economic and administrative reforms (web 38). EU’s willingness and interest in involving
Belarus in the multilateral activities of the Eastern Partnership has opened the possibility of inclusion of
Belarus, if it progress on issues of human rights and democratisation (web 37). As of today Belarus is
part of the Eastern Partnership, although it seemingly dropped out of the Partnership Agreement, when
the former Soviet republic refused to participate in Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw from
September 29-30, 2011 due to “unprecedentedly discriminatory attitudes” (web 39). Three days later
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the Foreign Minister of Belarus Sergei Martynov declared: “We’ve not participating in the summit in
Warsaw, but Belarus will continue participating in the “Eastern Partnership” (web 40).
7.0 National preferences in EaP
In 2008, Poland proposed a further implementation of Eastern policy, when the Polish commissioner
Danuta Hubner told the Rzeczpospolita newspaper that: "The EU's eastern policy is of interest to the
whole EU” (web 28). Most of the EU member states agreed on the necessity of increasing involvement in
Eastern Europe, in the interest of EU, through multilateral and bilateral agreements as the previous
chapter enlightened. This chapter goes beyond the interest of EU as a unitary actor and tries to explain
some of the national interests and approaches existing in the cooperation with Eastern European states.
The focus will be on the “German approach” and the “Polish approach” as they demonstrate two
dissimilar strategies in approaching bilateral cooperation with the EaP countries.
Though their names are the “Polish approach” and the “German approach”, it should be said, that they
each represent of a way of handling and thinking of the EaP states. Thereby, it means that it is not only
or necessarily Germany or Poland that represents them; it could as well be other states.
7.1 German approach
Above the joint “Eastern Partnership Agreement”, Germany has made its own bilateral agreement with
the partnership countries to the East. In compliance to the accumulated legislation in Acquis
Communautaire, Germany has brought in closer cooperation by signing deep free trade areas and
legislation harmonization agreements with the partnership countries. German interest lies within the
significant export and investors’ possibilities in a region of great economic growth (web 41). The
approach is known for its use of multidimensional instruments in trans-border cooperation without
interfering directly in the progress of political dialogue, and it is especially a common approach among
German and Scandinavian representatives (Shapovalova, 2010: pp. 72).
Furthermore, the German preferences are characterized by a critical viewpoint on both EaP as a preaccession instrument and Germany’s strategic relation to Russia. Since the enlargement processes in
2004 and 2007, Germany’s political elites and society have marked dissatisfaction with further
expansion of the borders of the European Union. In other words, Germany and the rest of EU are
suffering of “enlargement fatigue”. A further enlargement of Ukraine or Georgia could, from a German
standpoint, lead to weakness of the leading tandem of France and Germany in EU and ultimately
weaken the influence of Germany (web 41).
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The “German approach” of having mainly economic relationship to East Europe is also due to Germany’s
gas resource relations with Russia, with which Germany tries to constrain Russia by making EU and
Russia interdependent on each other. With the opening of The Russian-German gas pipeline in Nord
Stream in November 2011, Western Europe and Russian gas reserves are now directly linked, bypassing
transit routes of Ukraine, Belarus and Poland (web 42).
The “German approach” is fundamentally benefiting from a close economic relation to the EaP
countries, but avoiding further integration of the EaP countries in EU structures. Deeper integration in
the aftermath of enlargement processes in 2004 and 2007 would weaken the German position in EU and
potentially bring insecurity in the gas relationship with Russia.
6.4.2 Polish approach
Poland on the other hand takes a position in which they mainly focus on promoting values and
strengthening of civil society contacts (Lapczynski, 2009: pp. 144-145). The Polish administration, as the
initiator of EaP together with Sweden, also has obvious incentives in strengthening the policy towards
the Eastern European countries. This approach presents an upgrading of relations in political dialogue
and offers opportunities for the deepest integration possible of the partner countries (Shapovalova,
2010: pp. 73).
Polish focus on strengthening relations throughout the 1990’s was mainly directed towards Belarus and
Ukraine, with lesser attention to Georgia. With the Polish accession to EU in 2004, it was able to act
towards enhancing the Eastern policy of EU. Poland was also in position to contribute to its strategic
concept in foreign policy, which is historically embedded in Eastern Europe, because of its relations to
former Soviet republics. Many of these states were partially affiliated with Poland before WW II
(Cianciara, 2008: pp. 4-14).
Besides boosting relationship with the post-Soviet states, the Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski
stated in 2010, that one the important foreign policy pillars was to have a close relationship with U.S
through Poland’s NATO membership (web 43). Polish preferences in having a close relationship towards
U.S were witnessed in August 2008, when U.S and Poland discussed installing missile shield deal on
Polish territory (web 44). The Polish interest in the East should, besides close relationship to U.S, be seen
in the light of the unstable situation in Belarus, instability in Ukraine and it’s relation to Russia
(Lapczynski; 2009: pp. 145). In other words, the “Polish approach” has been a promotion of deep
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integration with EaP countries as well as establishing close links to U.S, in order to weaken the
traditional Russian sphere of influence.
Other approaches towards Eastern countries to be mentioned are primarily project-oriented as well as
deepening of economic integration through expansion of the European Economic Space. The inclusion
of East European states in the European Free Trade Association approach was presented by Czech
administration as a strategy of progress towards integration for these states (Shapovalova, 2010: pp.
73).
7.0 Russian perspective on EaP
While EU sees the Eastern Partnership as an instrument to promote cooperation and stability east of its
borders, Russia has a different perspective on EaP. In this chapter an overview of Russia’s reaction to
EaP and will be given, and the general Russian perspective towards EU policies will be presented.
7.1 The Russian skepticism
Since the beginning Russia reacted to EaP with skepticism and after the initiative of EaP was proposed,
one of the first reactions from the Russian government, was that of Sergei Mironov, who is a Kremlin
loyalist, when he commented that there shouldn’t be a separate policy towards East by the EU, because
various bilateral agreements already are in place, thus making a common policy unnecessary. (web45)
But one of the first open criticisms of the Eastern Partnership came from the Foreign Minister of Russian
Federation Sergei Lavrov, who on March 21, 2009, while addressing the annual Brussels Forum,
expressed that EU could be using this partnership to exercise its own influence in the East and that for
some countries this could be sending a message that EaP countries would have to choose a side – either
Russia or EU. Foreign Minister also condemned the pressure EU had placed on Belarus, by announcing
that if Belarus wanted to take part in EaP, it couldn’t recognize the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. (web46)
The topic of Eastern Partnership was also raised in the Russia-EU summit in Khabarovsk, May 2009,
when during the press conference the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev expressed his opinion and
warned that there were threats of political instability, as some governments would see the EaP as a
partnership against Russia. Representatives of EU - President José Manuel Barroso, High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and Czech President Vaclav Klaus all tried to
convince President Medvedev that EaP was not geared against Russia, as well as expressed the hope for
Russia to take part in the partnership, but he was still concerned with various aspects of the EaP, while
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at the same time wishing success to it, if it was essentially just a means to deeper economic
cooperation. (web47) During talks with Belarusian journalists in October 2009, Medvedev took on
mostly the same position as the one he held during Russia-EU summit as the President remarked, that
he didn’t see any particular usefulness to the Eastern Partnership, although he expressed hope that this
partnership would serve as a support for the participating countries. At the same time he concluded
that he did not see anything in the EaP itself that could be turned against Russia itself, but the President
also warned not to use this partnership as means to try to discuss anything remotely anti-Russian.
(web48)
From Russian perspective EaP can be seen as a declarative initiative, with its aims and objectives hard to
implement and realize. Most of its statements and documents are too vague with distant possibilities of
visa liberalization or membership of EU, thus many Russian analysts have expressed the idea that the
real goals of EaP are entirely different from those that have been stated. One of the real aims of Eastern
Partnership has been expressed to decrease dependence on Russia in energy sector, as both Ukraine
and Georgia are important transit countries, while other EaP countries also have strategic importance in
this area. (Сергунин, 2009: pp. 206) Another aim of EaP from Russian perspective is the EU attempts to
gain influence in this region and underwhelm Russia’s geopolitical influence. This can be seen to be done
by lessening the power of Russia over the Eastern partnership countries and most Russian experts don’t
believe the statements of various EU officials, who claim that EaP is in no way anti-Russian. (Сергунин,
2009: pp. 207) The question of Kaliningrad has also been mentioned by Russian experts in the context of
EaP, as EU’s initiative is seen as an attempt to bring Kaliningrad back to EU and Russia’s agenda, as EU
sees Kaliningrad as a transit point that could help EU secure its outer borders and influence zone though
EaP initiative. But Russia declined to include this region under the sphere of action of EaP, thus many
Russian experts deem that EU’s plans were interrupted. (Сергунин, 2009: pp. 209)
The negative attitude towards EaP can also be attributed to the 2008 Russian – Georgian crisis as many
Russian officials and citizens believe that the partnership is a response to what happened in 2008. There
is no questioning that the events in 2008 had an influence on the initiative as was argued by EU, that the
war made it clear, that there is need for deeper integration in eastern part of Europe, thus sending a
message to Russia, that EU is trying to draw lines in the region and exert its influence. (Haukkala, 2009)
But there are signs that Russia might participate in Eastern Partnership by taking part in some projects
that could be characterized as to be in Russia’s own interests. (Stewart, 2009)
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From Russian perspective the EaP can have two serious consequences for Russia. Firstly, if partnership
countries were to gain economic integration with EU and they would have to adapt EU norms and
standards, it could influence their trade regime with Russia, more so as it is not a member of WTO yet.
This would possibly influence Russia’s competiveness as partner countries would orient themselves
towards EU rather than Russia. The question of visa and travels to Russia would also be important as
many people from EaP countries are living or working in Russia, thus making it necessary to implement
changes to address these issues. Secondly, Russia perceives that EaP encroaches on its sphere of
influence, as Russia has special interest in the region, and the EaP could be seen as against Russia.
(Wittkowsky, 2009: pp. 17-19)
To sum up, most Russian academics and experts evaluate EaP rather negatively, calling it just an excuse
for its eastern neighbours and a “bureaucratic machine” of EU, while denouncing the project very hard
to implement and that it could have serious consequences for Russian national interests, as well as for
the regional security system. (Сергунин, 2009: pp. 209)
8.0 Analysis
As mentioned earlier in this project, we have decided to conduct a multiple case study with three EaP
states and their relationship with EU and the member countries. The first part about Ukraine will go
through the gas crisis of 2009 and the case about the jailing of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymochenko.
The second part containing Georgia will center round the South Ossetia War in 2008 and the reactions
from EU and the member countries. Finally, the third analysis part about Belarus will contain the EU
efforts to implement democratic reforms in Belarus, and the presidential election in 2010, that changed
a lot in the relationship between EU and Belarus.
8.1 Ukraine
Ukraine is the single largest importer of gas from Russia and as a transit country it makes several
European countries highly dependent on both Russia’s gas and Ukraine as a transit country. In early
January of 2009, 16 member states and Moldova suffered from a gas dispute between Russia and
Ukraine. In the first week of January there was a drastic cut off to the European states´ gas supply after
internal contract disagreements between Russia and Ukraine. Later in January, when the gas supply was
completely cut off, it had severe consequences leading to a humanitarian crisis in the Balkan region and
economic problems, especially in Slovakia (Yafimava; p. 4-5, 2009).
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This conflict was followed by the Tymochenko legal case, which caught the attention of EU and
constrained the integration process of the association agreements between EU and Ukraine. In the
middle of 2009 Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko declared her candidacy for the presidential
elections in 2010 (web 49). The presidential election did not go in favour of Tymoshenko and she lost
with a small margin to the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanokovych. Few days later she said that the
election was illegal because of deceit, declaring: "Not going to the courts today would mean leaving
Ukraine to criminals without a fight.” The reaction was a consequence of long time parliamentarian
conflict and distrust (web 50).
8.1.1 Gas conflict 2009
The gas crisis in 2009 made a certain and different impact on relations between east and west. Member
states like Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, The Czech Republic and Greece experienced decreasing
pressure in their pipelines, when Russia as a consequence of discrepancy between the two countries
closed the gas supply to Ukraine (web 51). Between the mentioned countries, there were cuts between
33 and 100%, while the consequences in Western European member states – Germany and France,
were smaller, as they suffered only from a 10-15 % cut off respectively (table 1). It is clear that the
Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute has affected EU member states differently, but the crisis has clearly shown
a lack of comprehensive EU energy strategy.
The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis is interesting because it affected the European population directly and
because some member states exhibited an alarming reaction in the aftermath of the dispute. They were
going outside multilateral consensus of EU towards the advantage of the nation state. The reaction
analysis will be examined from the “German approach” and the “Polish approach” to examine the
contradictions of interest within the two approaches. This is performed to see if there is a necessity to
seek multilateral cooperation through EaP or if the gas crisis provoked a need to a higher degree seeking
bilateral agreements in the interest of the nation state.
8.1.2 Gas crisis according to “German approach”
As written early in this paper, the “German approach” towards Eastern Europe contains two main
points. They are to secure political and economic benefits for the nation state and keep a balance of
power with Russia in order to ensure the political and economic advantages and the strategic
partnership with Russia. Thus the “German approach” of responding to the gas crisis should be seen in
the light of its bilateral relation to Russia and likewise EU member states’ use of “soft power”. In several
ways the gas dispute did interfere in Germany’s preferences towards Ukraine and Russia. The strategic
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relation to Russia as a supplier of gas became insecure; while Germany’s economic and political interest
in Ukraine was threatened. Some analysts have even questioned Germany’s commitment to multilateral
cooperation within EU in foreign and security matters.
Germany is of today Russia’s largest trading partner, which could explain why Germany tries to ensure
that Russia does not feel threatened by EU (Belkin; p. 8, 2009). At the same time Germany has to
represent EU’s interest in foreign and security issues, because of its position as the largest economy in
EU, and because it is widely considered as the driving force together with France in European
integration. As the gas dispute went on, it showed how EU was diplomatically constrained due to
national interest of energy security. As an engine for European integration, Germany created potential
conflict among member states as it sought to secure its own advantage in receiving non-renewable
energy (web 52).
One of the methods in response the gas crisis 2007 was the establishment of the Nord Stream gas
pipeline through the Baltic Sea from Russia-Germany in January 2005 under Germany’s former
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. When the gas pipeline opened in November 2011, Angela Merkel stated
that the project signaled a “safe, sustainable partnership with Russia in the future” (web 53). In terms of
the ”German approach” it harmonises very well with the ideas of having a reliable relationship towards
Russia. Geographically, the gas pipeline creates a direct link from Russia to Germany and bypasses
transit countries like Belarus, Poland and Ukraine, but also politically the incentives for the pipeline were
clear, hence stabilizing relations with Russia in the post-gas crisis period and avoiding further disruption
in gas supply were the aims of the Nord Stream pipeline. France sought a similar “German approach”,
although French President Nicolas Sarkozy said: “The Russians must respect their contractual obligations
to the Europeans"(web 54). Firstly, as Russia is the second biggest supplier of natural gas and crude oil,
Russia and France are highly interdependent (web 55). Secondly, the French owned company GDF Suez
holds a 9 % shareholder in the Nord Stream pipeline (Web 56). Altogether it enhances the Russo-French
gas supply cooperation. France and Germany, as well as Italy have used the “German approach” in
reaction to the gas crisis. The healthy economic relations between Russia and Italy, which had a record
turnover in trade in 2007, are actively supported from both sides. The Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi outlined the necessity of boosting a strong relationship in the field of energy with Russia and
even declaring his “sympathy” for Russia in the gas dispute by saying that - Europeans should not be
worried by the crisis: “I can understand Gazprom’s reasons” (web 57).
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8.1.3 Gas crisis according to “Polish approach”
The ”Polish approach” is adopted by other EU member states in the reaction the gas dispute of 2009. As
described early in this paper, the approach pursues a much more multilateral-embedded relation to the
EaP countries.
One of the solutions to the gas crisis was a collective enhancement of EU’s energy policy. This approach
in the aftermath of the gas crisis is somewhat contrary to the “German approach’s” focus on securing
national benefits through agreements building on bilateral framework. The “Polish approach” has been
adopted by the Czech’s, especially during their EU Presidency, Poland and numerous new EU member
states in East and Central Europe, whom were heavily affected by the 2009 gas crisis. As initiator of the
EaP, Poland has in many cases been an avid supporter of further integration with EU’s East European
neighbours. The gas crisis of 2009 has especially confirmed the importance of including cooperation in
energy sector between EU and the EaP states. In particular as we see in article 8 in the Joint Declaration
of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit: “The Eastern Partnership aims to strengthen energy security
through cooperation with regard to long-term stable and secure energy supply and transit…” (web 58).
The Presidencies in the Council of the European Union of both Czech Republic and Poland are going to
be the framework of the “Polish approach” in reaction to the gas crisis.
8.1.4 Presidency of Czech Republic and Poland
During the gas crisis of 2009, Czech Republic had the EU Presidency and one of the official top priorities
for the Czech Presidency was common energy policy. Two of the achievements during the Czech
Presidency were a strengthening of the European energy security and modernisation of gas lines to
Ukraine (web 59). One of the reasons why the Czech Republic seeks deeper integration is because most
East and central member states are more dependent on Russia’s gas, compared to older member states,
thus the outcome of energy crisis is serious for smaller member states. This means that the new
member states are keener on developing a common energy policy for security reasons. Thus it is in the
interest of East and Central European member states to use the “Polish approach” in order to
strengthen EU common energy policy (Daviná; p. 108, 2010).
Recently, in 2011, the Polish EU Presidency has put further focus on common energy policy. One of the
key highlights of the Polish Presidency is to seek a deeper integration of the EaP and finishing
negotiations on Association Agreements (AA) with Ukraine (web 60). The aim of strengthening
multilateral cooperation with Eastern Europe and Ukraine through EaP is in clear correlation with the
“Polish approach”. In the “Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union”
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one of Poland’s priorities is to “…play a role in defining the EU’s External Energy Policy. The
enhancement of this policy is our priority.”(web 61). By focusing on EaP and EU’s energy policy during its
presidency, Poland tries to influence EU integration to the advantage of its national preferences. After
the gas crisis of 2009, where Poland and other East and central states suffered, the Presidency has made
an opportunity for Poland to set out pointers for EU integration. As mentioned another top priority of
Polish Presidency is to sign final parts of AA with Ukraine. In the post-gas crisis of 2009, this would
consolidate Polish position in EU by enhancing partnership with EaP countries in the light of Poland’s
position towards Russia. Something Poland has strived for since the creation of EaP.
8.1.5 The case of Tymoshenko
Since 10th of May, 2010 accusations of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, abusing her power
during signing gas agreements with Russia in 2009 (web 62). The accusation was more precisely
concerned with harming gas import contracts between the Ukrainian state company Naftogaz and
Russia. Judge Kireyev formulated during the trial that Tymoshenko “... used her powers for criminal ends
and, acting deliberately, carried out actions... which led to serious consequences" (web 63). In response
to the trial decision on 11 of October, 2011 of sentencing Tymoshenko to seven years of prison, EU was
disappointed with the verdict, declaring its concerns regarding future EU-Ukraine relationship.
Tymoshenko accused her rival Yanokovych, who won the presidential election, of influencing the trial
proceedings, as it would put him in a better political position (Ibid.).
8.1.6 Russia and Ukraine
Although there has been a hostile relationship between Russia and Ukraine, especially during the gas
dispute in 2009, the newly elected Viktor Yanokovych and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a
new bilateral agreement between the two republics in April 2010. The agreement contained for Ukraine
a 30 % cut of in gas imported from Russia, in exchange for Russia extending the lease of a naval base in
The Black Sea for 25 years (web 64). It was seen as a contributor to peace between the two countries
and the foundation of an improved relationship. A relationship which, during the gas crisis, was
characterized of Russia’s use of “hard power”. Former president Viktor Yushchenko was seen as having a
more anti-Russian mind-set than his successor, especially regarding the question of Russian naval base
in Black Sea in Ukrainian waters (Ibid.). The case showed an improvement in Ukraine-Russo relations and
it seemed that prosperity of EU-Ukrainian relation similarly was continuing, when Yanukovych on June
24, 2010 promised to incorporate EU legislation in necessity of creating free-trade bilateral areas (web
65).
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8.1.7 EU response to political development in Ukraine
The case of Tymoshenko has obviously constrained prospect of deep bilateral integration through
Association Agreements between EU and Ukraine. In September 2011, before the trial of Tymoshenko,
The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton
stated that: "…they are extremely concerned about the Tymoshenko case, and have warned that if there
is no reversal in the approach of Ukrainian authorities, the agreement will face problems in ratification.”
(web 66). It is clear that EU-Ukraine relationship has been fluctuating since the initiate cooperation
within the framework of EaP. As policy analyst in European Policy Centre, Amanda Paul says that
Ukraine “…is often perceived as viewing Kyiv through the prism of its relationship with Russia” (Paul;
2011). With the election of pro-Russian Yanokovych president and EU’s response to of the outcome of
the Tymoshenko trial, EU could seemingly lose its patience with Ukraine. But with a market potential of
46 million consumers and its geopolitical important position to Russia, it provides incentive for deeper
integration, as it potentially would weaken Ukraine’s links to Moscow.
8.1.8 EU member state reactions to the trial of Tymoshenko
As the “Polish approach” is searching for deep integration with EaP countries, two aspects are
restraining the objective of an EU-integrated Eastern Europe. Firstly, the unstable political environment
in Ukraine makes an obstacle, secondly, the fact that Russia in the background knows the geopolitical
advantage in having cooperation with Ukraine. The Tymoshenko case has been a political dispute, which
only made Ukrainian integration more difficult. With the focus on AA with Ukraine during the Polish EU
Presidency (web 60) it is clear that Poland seeks to get back on track with “euro-integration” in the
aftermath of Tymoshenko. There is simply too much at stakes if backward integration of Ukraine is
happening and more influence is given to Russia. In worst-case scenario, the jailing of Tymoshenko and
Yanokovych’s interest in Russian integration, could lead to a new authoritarian regime with close links to
Moscow (web 67). This would be a geopolitical disaster for not only the EaP project, but also for EU
security and defence policy, as it would create instability in the region.
As the “German approach” is in favour of having “low politics” ties with Ukraine, there is a great
economic interest in the market potential for the German and French industry in exports and
investment. The trade relations and other economic aspects of AA between EU and Ukraine suit large EU
countries dependent on export and investment, but the “German approach” has also its limitations
regarding deep integration of Ukraine and other EaP countries. Germany and also France are less
“motivated” for Ukraine integration compared to Poland and the Czech Republic (web 68). In October
2011, the thought of diversified approaches from EU member states towards Ukrainian integration was
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brought to attention by Ukraine’s ambassador to the EU, Kostyantyn Yeliseyev. He claimed that: “Some
sceptical member states would like to hear from us: 'you don't like us’” and “…Regardless of the fact that
some member states don't want to pursue further integration, our position remains unchanged…” (web
69). Earlier, he said that EU member states like Germany and France used the Tymoshenko as an excuse
to discontinue integration of EU (Ibid.). From a “German approach” there is good reason not to go into
further integration with Ukraine, especially in the context of Tymoshenko. But it would definitely be of
interest to keep economic links to Ukraine as it would be of national interest. On the other side the
“Polish approach” sees the Tymoshenko case of a reason for EU and the EaP to integrate Ukraine as
much as possible, as it would keep Russia away. Yulia Tymoshenko has provoked a reaction that would,
from “Polish approach”, lead to anti-Russian actions using EaP and other EU tools and integrate Ukraine,
thereby stabilizing Eastern Europe in geopolitical respect. All this is in the interest of nation states in avid
support of the EaP and the Eastern European project.
8.1.9 Conclusion
As we have observed during the gas crisis of 2009, the situation in many EU member states has been a
matter of national security. That is why EaP cooperation is of major importance for some of the
particularly smaller member states because it enhances the geopolitical position when dealing with
energy security crisis, but it also shows differentiated reactions from EU’s member states as the gas
crisis of 2009 has shown. The reactions can be divided into the “Polish approach” and the “German
approach” each used in the interest of the member state. Germany and Italy has used the “German
approach” in the aftermath of the gas crisis in 2009. Nonetheless, there has been a priority of
maintaining a stable bilateral relationship between Russia and Italy and Germany in terms of energy
security. On the other hand, Poland and Czech Republic has, through their EU Presidencies, sought to
integrate multilateral cooperation even more with the Ukraine and the other EaP states. In the period
after the gas crisis 2009, it has been necessary to consolidate their strategic position in EU towards the
older member states and Russia as an influential unit on Ukraine.
The verdict of Yulia Tymoshenko has obviously caused an EU outcry. In the light of recent improved
relations between Ukraine and Russia, EU as a unitary actor and member states know the importance of
getting back on track with Ukraine. The “German approach” is though slightly more reluctant to use EU’s
political power to enhance the insecure links with Ukraine as it would jeopardise the relationship with
Russia. Member states taking on the “Polish approach” are on the other hand much more determined
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on deeper integration after the Tymoshenko case and Ukraine’s shift away from Russia. Not only is
Ukraine the largest country among the EaP countries; it also plays a crucial geopolitical role.
8.2 Georgia
In this section the case study about Georgia, including the Georgia-Russia war in 2008 and its aftermath,
will be used to give insight on how Eastern Partnership as a multilateral approach and bilateral
agreements between Georgia and EU member states can influence Georgia, by the use of “soft power”.
During the analysis a short overview of the conflict will be given, as well as the reactions towards the
conflict to give insight into national preferences rooted in the “German” and “Polish approaches” of EU
member states. Also, the impact of the conflict on the Eastern Partnership will be looked at, as well as
the efforts of EU as a unitary actor, for example EaP, and the member states with their national
preferences, to cooperate with Georgia, will be researched during and after the Georgia-Russia conflict
in 2008. This will be done to uncover the necessity of EaP, when there are already other cooperation
forms between various EU member states and Georgia.
8.2.1 Overview of Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008
One of the major conflicts in recent years has been the Georgia-Russia crisis in 2008 that started with
tensions between the two states and evolved into an open military conflict. The conflict escalated when
Russia developed closer relations with separatist regions in Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and
initiated some procedures that could be seen as a way towards an announcement of the independence
of these regions (web 70). Some experts have argued that the main goals of Russia in this context were
to stop Georgia from thinking about joining NATO, as well as to remove the Saakashvili government and
to turn it pro-Russian. Not to mention the signal Russia wanted to send other neighbours, that Russia is
not afraid to use force (Popescu, N., et.al., 2008: p 3). Conflict further accelerated with various small
attacks, for example, bomb attacks on villages and shooting down aircrafts on all sides, resulting in
provocations from both sides. The official response of Georgia was that they claimed that Russian troops
were entering Georgia and they were only retaliating (Toal, G. 2008: p 684-5).
In August 7 Georgia made a large scale attack on South Ossetia and in a short period of time had
captured most of Tskhinvali. This caused Russia to react immediately and it sent huge amount of troops
to defend South Ossetia. The Georgians were military inferior to the Russian troops and after driving
Georgians out of Tskhinvali, the Russians continued into Georgian territory and occupied a large part of
it, while inflicting infrastructural damage. After five days of heavy fighting both sides reached a cease
fire on August 12 with the help of EU. Russia established buffer zones around Abkhazia and South
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Ossetia by claiming to protect he separatist regions and very slowly withdrew its troops from Georgia
(Nichol, J. 2008: p 5-6).
8.2.2 Reactions to the conflict
Most of international organizations and governments criticized the conflict and found both Russia and
Georgia guilty of the violent conflict. EU issued various declaratory statements, condemning Russia for
its excessive use of “hard power” and the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, as well as discussed the future of relations with Russia in their emergency summit in September
2008 (web 71). However, the reactions of various national governments differed, sometimes very
radically. For example, Italy pressured for not taking a strong position, as it might damage EU’s interests
regarding Russia, which makes them aligned with the “German approach”, while Eastern European
countries called for more concrete actions (Nichol, J. 2008: p 16).
Arguably, one of the strongest negative reactions has come from Poland, for whom the Georgia-Russia
crisis has reawaken fears about its security, and the growing perception that Russia is seeking to regain
its influence over the former Soviet countries. This fear was affirmed by leaked information from
Wikileaks that showed that Poland is viewing Russia as an increasing threat and it is necessary to seek
protection from Russia (web 72). As a result, the U.S. and Poland defense missile project, which would
allow U.S. to install a missile defense base in Poland, was sped up, as any hesitations over the project
seemed unimportant in the light of Russian military invasion of Georgia. With this deal, Poland was
seeking to ensure its safety, in case of an attack. However, the Polish actions created the opposite
situation, as Russia condemned the Polish – U.S. deal and explicitly announced that the actions of
Poland would be seen as an aggressive act, creating more tension in the region (web 73). Thus, while
trying to secure their defense against Russia, Poland essentially drew the suspicion of Russia towards
itself, increasing the fears and uncertainty of Poland.
Baltic States also took on similar position to that of Poland, by issuing a joint statement, declaring their
support to Georgia, while stating, that:
“Justification of Russia’s actions in Georgia by the need to protect its citizens is unacceptable. Alleged
reasons for taking up a war against Georgia raise concerns about the future in every state with Russian
citizens living on its territory.” (web 74)
These countries joined Poland and Ukraine to visit Georgia as well, to show support for the sovereignty
of Georgia (web 75). The reaction from Poland and other former Soviet Union countries clearly reveals
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their national preferences regarding the conflict and Russia, as these countries fear, that Russia could
threaten and attack them as well, which could be interpreted as typical of the “Polish approach”.
Germany and France, as well as some other West European countries, were in line with the “German
approach” seeking neutrality, and trying not to blame one specific side. During a meeting in Sochi in
2008 German Chancellor Angela Merkel used the phrase: "in some aspects disproportionate", while
talking about Russia’s use of force, at the same time agreeing that some actions of Russia could be called
“reasonable” (web 76). A phrase with which, the Germans tried to seek balance in relations between
Georgia and Russia.
One of the reasons as to why Germany hesitated to take a more concrete stance on Georgia-Russia
conflict has been mentioned the energy dependency, as Russia was responsible for around 46 % of
Germany’s gas imports in 2008, and the energy dependency could be a reason for the level of reaction
towards the conflict (Moraski, B., Giurcanu, M., 2011: p 8; 18) Thus, Germany would have it in its
national interests not to adopt a very strong reaction towards Russia regarding the conflict, as that could
possibly threaten the relationship between Russia and Germany.
8.2.3 EU and EaP in Georgia
Georgia’s and EU relations accelerated after the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, as Georgia tried to display
its commitment to EU and its values and position itself as a Western country in South Caucasus region
(Alieva, L., 2006: p 4). After the violent conflict with Russia in 2008 the necessity for more security was
even more important.
Although during the Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008 the Eastern Partnership was not yet implemented,
the conflict had a very strong influence on the development of EaP. As the idea about the Eastern
Partnership was developed by Poland and Sweden (and partly Czech Republic) before the actual war,
the conflict itself accelerated the implementation of EaP. It became clear that it was necessary to ensure
the stability and security of the region by creating stronger ties with the countries in the South Caucasus
region (Bardakci, M., 2010: p 221). This shows that EU member states recognize that it is in their own
interests to ensure security in this region; otherwise it could threaten the security of the EU and its
member states.
As for EU itself, before August 2008 EU was more passive in its involvement in Georgia and its internal
conflicts, but during and after events of August 2008, EU became more prominent in Georgia, as it was
EU, led by French Presidency, that brokered the six-point deal for ceasefire between Georgia and Russia
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on August 12. EU also actively participated in the aftermath of the conflict by donating 500 million Euros
in the time period of 2008-2010 to help combat the consequences of the war and implementing the
Monitoring Mission in Georgia. After OSCE and UN missions were closed because of the Russian veto, EU
was the only international actor in the country (Bardakci, M., 2010: p 225-6), thus raising EU profile in
conflict resolution in Georgia.
After the EaP come into force on May 2009, Eastern Partnership has had some success in Georgia. On
July 15, 2010 in Batumi negotiations for an Association Agreement between EU and Georgia began, that
would deepen the cooperation and develop democratic values. EU’s High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton in these negotiations praised that: „In recent years Georgia
has made significant efforts in democratisation, combating corruption and in economic development.”
(web 77). Thus, EU itself has confirmed that various conditions to sign the Association Agreement had
been met by Georgia and that using EaP as an instrument, some development in Georgia is evident.
Another important aspect of EaP in Georgia was the visa facilitation agreement that was signed in June
2010, after EU had already promised to initiate the process right after the Georgia and Russia conflict in
2008. Though, this agreement cannot be interpreted as a significant success of EaP, as various similar
agreements have been signed before, although the new agreement contains some small changes, for
example, the reduction in visa fees (Rinnert, D. 2011: p 11).
To sign the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), Georgia must synchronize Georgia
and EU’s laws, which has been creating problems. But there has been improvement in this area, as
Georgia recently has started to implement various necessary reforms. The EaP has also contributed to
development and cooperation of civil society in Georgia, by implementing the Civil Society Forum to
improve the dialogue between the civil society and the government, as well as to increase the
participation of these organizations in the EaP and to develop cooperation between EU and EaP partner
country civil societies. Georgia has created the National platform, that gathers around 70 organizations
already and several meetings have taken place since then (web 78).
The “Polish approach” is very dominant in these areas of EaP in Georgia, as they strengthen the
cooperation between civil societies and create political dialogue, while at the same time the “German
approach” for economic relationship is present in various trade agreements and those aims of EaP that
call for enchanted trade relations.
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While EaP seems to have had some effect on Georgia after the South Ossetia War, the improvements
have not been very substantial, as the program is hindered by various obstacles, for example, the small
budget of the program, not enough attention to the conflict resolution and security in Georgia, as well
as not enough short-term incentives, as for example, DCFTA is going to take a lot of time to sign and
implement, thus at the moment Eastern Partnership cannot show impressive results. Not to mention
that various and necessary reforms have not been implemented, which the Georgian government has
been blamed for. (Rinnert, D. 2011: p 12-5).
8.2.4 Georgia and Bilateral agreements
Individual member states did not participate in the resolution of the conflict, thus making their role in
the actual conflict of Georgia-Russia non-influential. That can be seen as a good thing, as it prevented
the national preferences of the member states to interfere in the resolution (Bardakci, M., 2010: p 227).
But Georgia had, and still has various bilateral agreements with EU member states, that promote
economic relations and cooperation in various areas.
Russia was the biggest trade partner of Georgia before 2006, but then it banned various Georgian
products, for example, fruits and vegetables, wine. After 2006 the biggest trade partners of Georgia
became EU, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere (web 79). Now the 27 member states of EU
are the biggest trade partners of Georgia as EU accounts for 31, 7 % of trade with Georgia, but trade
with Russia only accounts for 4,4 %. The influence of the Georgia – Russia war can be seen, as well as the
fallowing financial crisis, as in 2008 Georgia’s export fell 39,8 %, while in 2009 import fell 21,9 % (web
80). Individually the biggest trading partners of Georgia were Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and only then
an EU member state - Germany in 2009 (web 81). It can be concluded that no individual EU member
state is powerful enough in trade relations with Georgia to influence the state on its own.
Reflective on the “German approach”, Georgia and Germany have good relations, and through bilateral
agreements both countries cooperate politically and economically. After the Georgia-Russia war
Germany was one of the first to provide Georgia with humanitarian aid and donated around 33.7 million
Euros to help reconstruct infrastructure and help the refugees. Chancellor Merkel also showed her
support by visiting Tbilisi after the conflict. Not to forget that Germany is one of the biggest bilateral
development cooperation partners to Georgia, only behind US and most of the assistance is
concentrated on democratic development, as well as economic cooperation and energy. Germany also
cooperates with Georgia in energy sector (Ibid.), as Georgia is an important transit country thus trying to
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lower the dependency on Russia for gas, which is in line with “German approach”, as Germany wishes to
keep Russia in line.
Germany and Georgia also cooperate in the framework of Caucasus Initiative that is a part of German
Development Cooperation. In this Initiative Germany supports various cooperation projects to prevent
conflicts, promote energy sector and democracy and other elements that contribute to the stability of
Georgia and the Caucasus region (web 82). Germany, the same as EU, wants stability in the region, as
otherwise it could hinder both the development and relations with Russia, therefore, these various
projects are also embedded with national interests of German government. It also then can be
understood why Germany did not take a stronger stance against Russia after August 2008, as it was not
in Germany’s interests to damage its relations with Russia.
At the same time, Georgia and Poland have even more closer relations, as their foreign priorities are
very similar, even if the turnover of Georgia-Poland trade is not very high – only 53,97 million Euros in
2010 (web 83). But Poland was very supportive during the Georgia and Russia war, by issuing various
joint statements, condemning Russia’s actions, as well as showing support by visiting Tbilisi after the
conflict. (Ibid.) Also Poland has been actively providing support to Georgia since 2004, to help in
stabilizing and developing former Soviet states. In 2008 Poland implemented 36 aid projects and
provided help for victims of Georgia-Russia conflict, as well as transferred funds to other organizations
for projects. In 2009 Georgia was priority in “Poland's Development Co-operation Program”, as well as
Poland helped fund some other projects that dealt with refugees and humanitarian aid. One of the main
goals for this program was the rebuilding of the destroyed infrastructure and support for the proWestern stance (web 84). Poland has actively provided support to former Soviet Union countries, by
cooperating and helping in development. It could be explained by “Polish approach” through deep
integration and promotion of democratic values and civic society to make sure that Georgia is more
turned towards West, as Poland tries to create stability in the region.
8.2.5 Conclusion
Georgia came into the spotlight of EU, Russia and the rest of the world after the South Ossetia War in
2008. The EaP was in part accelerated just by the conflict, to provide stability and security in the region,
as EU recognized the need to respond to Russia’s aggression and the need for a common approach in
the country.
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The EaP is aligned with the “Polish approach” and as EaP is still in its early stages, some small
advancements can be seen in the case of Georgia, for example, new Association Agreement and
development of civil society in Georgia, as the country is very interested and enthusiastic to become
closer with EU in the framework of a common EU approach. It is in their interests to seek other means of
cooperation and security away from Russia. At the same time it cannot be denied that EaP has its
problems that hinder deeper integration, for example, lack of financing, not enough short-term
incentives and other problems. On the other hand, Georgia and its bilateral relations with individual EU
member states, namely Germany and France, on the other hand are in line with the “German
approach”, seeking mutual benefits for each state. EU is the main trade partner of Georgia, so the
“German approach” is likely to be a success in the case of Georgia.
8.3 Belarus
In this analysis section, the aim is to give insight in how the EaP functions in Belarus and how bilateral
cooperation with the EU member states makes an impact on the country. Furthermore, the latest
development in the relations between Belarus and EU, and the recent resurgence in the relationship
between Belarus and Russia, will be subject for analysis.
8.3.1 EU and EaP in Belarus
From a EU perspective Belarus is viewed as an authoritarian regime, and that affects the EU relations
with the country, as the main interests of EU in the country are to create democratisation, functioning
institutions and essentially a more stable political situation. Originally, Belarus appeared quite
indifferent with the EU, as their role as a transit country role connected to EU-Russia trade made Russia
and Belarus interdependent of each other (60% of the EU-Russia trade went through Belarus) (Portela,
2011). However, that changed with the gas crisis in 2007 as Russia raised the gas price for Belarus, and
the Belarusian economy took severe damage, which caused the country to turn towards EU instead
(Ibid.).
An example of this was the 2008 parliamentary election, which saw signs of democratic progress such as
free access to the media, free rights to run as a candidate etc., although no real opposition candidates
were elected to the national assembly. Even though EU took time to acknowledge the progress made in
Belarus, and the Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb, who at that time was the president of OSCE,
was quoted for saying: ‘it is time to turn the page in Belarusian–European relations … there is a clear
mood that Belarus is moving in the right direction” (web 85) (European Council, 2008). It was soon
- 42 -
followed up by an official restoration of relations between EU and Belarusian authorities, which had
been frozen for years (Portela, 2011).
EU had, and still has, a wide range of sanctions towards the Lukashenko regime, which somewhat makes
it problematic in reality to enforce an effective approach towards the country, when it comes to the
more traditional development based on building up institutions. Due to the political state of Belarus, the
EU therefore sets demands for the Belarusian regime to achieve, if more substantial help should reach
Belarus. At the “EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue” summit in the summer of 2009, EU voiced concerns
over the lack of freedom of expression, capital punishment, lack of media freedom and abused human
rights in the country (web 86).
In return for changing these conditions, the regime was promised deeper integration (first as repeal of
political and economic sanctions) with the EU. From Belarus though, the approach towards this matter
was more pragmatic than the seemingly more idealistic EU approach. The goals mentioned were
described as “justifiable and objective” by deputy foreign minister Valery Voronetsky, although still
“…absurd, and shows complete lack of understanding of the situation in Belarus”. (Korosteleva, 2010:
pp. 241)
The promised democracy development in Belarus was monitored afterwards, and followed up by the
German and Polish foreign ministers visiting Minsk in November of 2010. They met with representatives
of both the Lukashenko regime and opposition leaders, shortly before the presidential election in
December 2010. On that occasion the then-foreign minister of Germany, Guido Westerwelle, said
directly to the Belarus president: “From our view of things, the presidential elections will be a litmus test
for your commitment to democracy” (web 87). His Polish colleague, foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski,
went even further as he said that a fair election could lead to a “'generous offer of opening on the part
of the EU” (ibid.), thereby taking Belarus closer to EU if they succeeded in having a democratic election.
The reality, however, turned out differently, as the presidential election ended in an unsatisfying way
from EU perspective. Lukashenko was reelected with nearly 80 percent of the total votes, and reports
indicated that the election was rigged. Furthermore, the beating and even torture of those presidential
candidates, who ran against Lukashenko, became known in the aftermath of the election (web 88). The
presidential election was met with disgust from EU leaders, who felt cheated by the president of
Belarus. The foreign ministers of Sweden, Poland, Germany and Czech Republic, the four countries
mainly behind the EaP initiative, issued a joint statement on 23. December 2010:
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“There can be no business-as-usual between the European Union and Belarus’ president, Alexander
Lukashenko, after what has happened since the presidential election in Belarus (.) Then everything
changed. [...] continued positive engagement with Mr. Lukashenko at the moment seems to be a waste
of time and money. He has made his choice — and it is a choice against everything the European Union
stands for." (web 89)
Therefore, there understandably has not been any significant development since then, regarding
financial help towards Belarus. As a matter of fact, the EaP seems to be constrained in its purpose,
which establishes a conflict of interest with EU as fighters for democracy on one hand; an authoritarian
regime led by President Alexander Lukashenko on the other hand. This setup provides a picture of a
cooperation that was doomed to fail in the case of Belarus, because it was completely dependent on the
good will of Alexander Lukashenko.
Some criticism of the EaP involvement in Belarus has been issued, namely from the German ambassador
in Belarus, Christof Weil. He accused EU of not having Belarus in mind when trying to help them. He
points out, that Belarus in EU circles is considered a “transit country” or a buffer state between EU and
Russia, and nothing more (Korosteleva, 2010: pp. 236). Neither Russia nor EU has any direct interest in
the country itself; but the country remains of interest for both because of their counterpart (ibid.). If this
is somewhat close to the truth or if it is the general German perception, it could very well be a sign that
the “Polish approach” has prevailed in the case of Belarus.
8.3.2 Belarus and bilateral agreements
While Belarus’ main trade partner remains Russia with 48.2% of overall trade, the 27 EU-states are in
second spot with 25.1% in the year 2010 (web 90). Belarusian imports from EU27 were around 6 billion
Euros in 2010, while exports were at 4.4 billion Euros. This means a trade balance on -1.6 billion in 2010,
compared to a surplus of 1.9 billion in the year before (ibid.). For a generally economic troubled country
like Belarus this is a sudden decline, and of some interest, as the political stability and the faith in the
Lukashenko regime is dependent on economic stability (web 91). Among the biggest trade partners in
EU, Netherlands are the biggest with 11% (web 90) followed by Germany at 4.9% (web 92). The German
export to Belarus dropped 53% from 2009 till 2010, giving an impression of the economic crisis, which
hits Belarus in these years. Since that, it has only decreased further as an indirect result to the political
events following the presidential election in late 2010 (ibid.).
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As the above stated figures show, the Belarus-EU trade is not substantial or monumental enough for one
single actor inside the EU to make any real difference. The crisis that Belarus is currently experiencing
makes it hard for Belarus increase trade with EU, and due to political conditions in the country it is
impossible for any single state in the EU to make trade agreements, that are advantageous for the
Belarusians. Hence, in the Belarus case, the “German approach” seems to be inadequate in its effect.
8.3.3 Russia the logical partner
The seminal presidential election in 2010, which meant an instant freeze in EU-Belarus relations, once
again opened up an opportunity for better relations between Belarus and Russia. That became reality in
2011, when Russia lowered the price on gas for Belarus by 50% (worth 2.7 billion dollars) (web 93), and
Belarus was given a lucrative loan to build a nuclear power plant, meaning that over time they could be
less dependent on foreign energy (web 94).
Belarus even formed the so called Eurasian Union, in effect from 2015, with Russia and Kazakhstan (web
95), which sends the signal that Belarus is definitely back in the hands of Russia. This is backed by the
fact, that Belarus sold its national gas company Beltransgaz to the Russian gas giant Gazprom in
November 2011 (web 96). The selling of Beltransgaz, along with the new and developed economic ties
with Russia, has secured a more robust Belarusian economy. This new cooperation signals a shift of
paradigm in Belarus, and creates a situation, where Belarus becomes even closer related to Russia than
before.
The Belarusian population seems to be mixed in their feelings regarding this development of foreign
relations policy. As an example of this tendency, 56% of the population supported Belarus in having
deeper integration with the EU compared in 2011, while in 2008 it was just 27% (Manaev et al, 2011: pp.
103-106). When asked the same regarding Russia, only 31% responded in a positive manner. In 2008,
54% supported deeper integration with Russia (ibid.). This shows a picture of a population that seems to
be significantly more oriented towards the EU rather than the current state of affairs.
8.3.4 Belarus in conflict with EU
30. September 2011 Belarus apparently left the EaP initiative due to “unprecedented discrimination",
referring to the travel ban of President Lukashenko before an EaP summit in Poland and allegations that
the principles of the cooperation had been changed since the start of the initiative (web 97). A few days
later, however, Belarus changed its mind, returned to the EaP program, citing its importance for Belarus.
Still today, in effect, the “high political” influence of EaP is reduced severely, while low politics issues
such as cyber criminality is still on the agenda (ibid.).
- 45 -
In October 2011, several foreign banks broke all contact with the Belarusian authorities after pressure
from human rights organizations (web 98). The banks named the treatment of political opponents in
Belarus as the cause of their choice. In November, European commissioner for CFSP, Stefan Füle from
Czech Republic, spoke for several opposition parties and NGO’s in Brussels. At this meeting, he
promised, on behalf of EU, to continuously support the opposition parties in Belarus and civil society
groups, who supports the idea of democracy, human rights and Europeanization (web 99). At the start
of December 2011, the High Representative of Foreign Affairs & Security Catherine Ashton criticized
Belarus for enforcing capital punishment on terrorists, who had killed 15 people in Minsk in April 2011:
“The European Union opposes capital punishment under all circumstances. The death penalty is
considered to be a cruel and inhuman punishment, which fails to act as a deterrent and represents an
unacceptable denial of human dignity and integrity.” (web 100)
8.3.5 Conclusion
Before Lukashenko’s reelection in 2010, the EU tried to tempt Belarus with economic “carrots” if the
country turned its political system away from oppressive handling of political opposition, abusing of
human rights and shifted to a more European way of thinking. This, basically positive approach,
however, were dropped as the Lukashenko regime showed its real face in the 2010 election. Since the
presidential election in 2010, the approach of EU has been to support the democratic minded in Belarus,
which means everyone in opposition to the leading regime (web 5). This could be interpreted as a
success for The “Polish approach” through EaP, as it is in direct opposition to the current Lukashenko
regime in Belarus, which cooperates with Russia. The effect, however, seems to be somewhat lacking as
long as Belarus keeps strong ties with Russia, as the previous year has shown.
In contrast to this way of thinking, the “German approach”, mainly reliable on bilateral cooperation
between EU member states and Belarus, seems to be unfulfilling as well. First, EU trade with Belarus is
not comprehensive enough that it can have any real effect on Belarus, as long as Russia is available at
the eastern flank. Secondly, when presented with good intentions and the prospect of more trade with
EU, Lukashenko chose another political way and thereby rejected the offer effectively.
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8.4 Summary of analysis
In this analysis part we have conducted analysis regarding our three case countries: Ukraine, Georgia
and Belarus.
In the case of Ukraine our analysis showed, that the gas crisis in 2009 had a major impact on the
geopolitical stage, and showed a picture of internal preferences inside the EU between the member
states. It was shown how especially Germany, as a representative of the “German approach”, tried to
balance their stance towards Russia, while Poland among others were in favour of a more direct
approach towards Russia based on criticism. It was furthermore shown that especially Poland and Czech
Republic, through their EU Presidencies, sought to use multilateral tools in the framework of EaP, which
was somewhat a contrast to some of the older member countries. Lastly, the Tymochenko case has
caused outcry and frozen the relationship between EU and Ukraine, which has resulted in stopping
ongoing discussions about deeper integration of Ukraine into the EU system, led by Germany and France
especially. Though, the states supporting the “Polish approach”, mainly Poland and Czech Republic, are
still determined to integrate Ukraine into EU, thereby exploiting Ukraine’s historically troubled
relationship with Russia.
Georgia is probably the most pro-European country of the three, and it seems to make a certain impact
on the results made in the country through EaP. The EaP has had its luck in influencing Georgia through
the Association Agreement and development of civil society in the country. With thats said, there is still
a need for a common EU approach, as the national preferences in the EU seems to constrain further
development in the frame of EaP. Since Georgia have been involved in a military conflict with Russia,
their willingness to cooperate with EU seems to be high, and that is one of the reasons why the EaP have
enjoyed substantial success in Georgia. Both the “German approach” and the “Polish approach” seems
to have an effect in Georgia; though the lack of unity somewhat constrains the EaP.
Regarding Belarus, a gas crisis in late 2007 sent the country towards EU and future cooperation. The EU
tempted Belarus with various sanctions and persuasion, so called “soft power”, but in the end EU was
left disappointed, as the Belarusian Lukashenko regime appeared completely out of line during the
presidential election of 2010, ignoring all democratic standards. Since then, the EaP have taken the side
of the civil groups and those who wanted democracy, while Lukashenko and Belarus on the other hand
have restored their good relations with Russia. EaP never worked as intended in Belarus, as it was
- 47 -
dependent on the good will of Alexander Lukashenko, and the bilateral agreement part with Belarus was
so substantially small compared with Belarus-Russia trade, it seemed impossible for EU to make any real
impact on the country, which remains an authoritarian regime. So even as we proved, that both the
German and the Polish approach were existing in the Belarus case, both turned not to be worthwhile.
9.0 Conclusion
In this project we have shown, how two different approaches can influence EaP partnership countries,
how they work and which effect they contribute with. It became clear at the early stages of the process,
that the three cases we have shown in Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus turned up to be exactly as different
and unique as we expected beforehand. Furthermore, the history makes an important impact in each of
the three countries, which somewhat can explain the events happening.
In general our analysis shows a very clear distinction between the so called common EU approach, which
is much in line with the “Polish approach”. This is an approach, which primarily focuses on supporting
civil society towards democracy, and demanding democratic reforms and standards from the
partnership countries in order to further talks. The problem is just, at least at this stage that this point
seems to be hard to overcome, especially in Ukraine and Belarus. In Georgia though, there have been
some substantial effect of the EaP cooperation, though the limitations are still to discern. It seems that,
not surprisingly, the EaP success is dependent on the will of the countries which are targeted. Belarus
appears very reluctant, while Georgia seems determined on European integration - while Ukraine is
somewhere in between. What is interesting in this matter is to see, that the willingness of European
integration and good relations with Russia appears to be inversely proportional. In other words, the
more pro-Russian the countries are, the more unwilling to deal with EU and the opposite way round.
The alternative approach, the “German approach”, relies on bilateral cooperation between EU member
countries and the partnership countries. The approach provides a more muddled picture; firstly,
because the approach towards each of the targeted countries in our research remains different and
apparently attuned to a number of internal and external conditions. Secondly, that the member
countries of EU and their two-headed relationship with Russia have become a determinant of their
relations towards the partnership countries. Although Germany is recognized as the engine in European
integration, it is clear that the bilateral agreements between Germany and Italy with Russia have in a
larger perspective undermined the common EU position in the issue of energy policy.
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So, as our research question put up to an “either or” answer we would instead prefer to answer in a
different way, probably adding “both”. As our research shows the reality is quite complex and the
difference between the two mentioned approaches does not seem to be the biggest problem in order to
have success with a policy towards the EaP countries.
We see the opportunity of success, may it be multilateral or bilateral, as a fundamentally question of
two different preconditions, which to a certain degree have been absent in the three countries.
1. A common EU policy: The countries need to find a common political line instead of “betting on
different horses” In order to please their relationship with Russia
2. The will of the partnership countries: Our research has shown, that will of the targeted
countries seem to be determent in order to gain any kind of success through the EaP initiative.
- 49 -
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10.3 Web sources
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(Encyclopedia Britannica, retrieved on 22. November)
2. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7111296.stm (BBC, November 2007, retrieved on 21. November 2011)
3. http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/8296.html (President’s office, 2007, retrieved on 21. November 2011)
4. http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/USSR.TAB1B.GIF (University of Hawaii, Death toll of Soviet statistics, 2003, retrieved on
14. November 2011)
5. http://www.weu.int/ (Western European Union, 2010, retrieved on 11. November 2011)
6. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc8.pdf (Soviet deputy minister of Interior)
7. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9138#axzz1dRWoHPrG (American President John F. Kennedys annual
message to the Congress, 1963)
8. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/czechoslovakia2.htm (Global Security, 2009, retrieved in 12. November
2011)
9. http://www.blisty.cz/art/12632.html (Kathryn Murphy, 2003, retrieved 11. November 2011)
10. http://old.nationalreview.com/buckley/buckley200405250859.asp (William F. Buckley, 2004, retrieved 12. November 2011)
11. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8209173.stm (BBC, 2009, retrieved 14. November 2011)
12. http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100617/159463469.html (Rianovosti, 2010, retrieved 22. November 2011)
13. http://www.ut.ee/ABVKeskus/?leht=publikatsioonid&aasta=1998&dok=ukraina_belarus (Paavo Lumiste, 1998, retrieved
22. November)
14. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/100507/ (Kiev Post, 2011, retrieved 23. November 2011)
15. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5371.htm (US Department of State, 2011, retrieved 23. November 2011)
16. http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/04/20/rice.dougherty/index.html (CNN, 2005, retrieved 23. November 2011)
17. http://www.civil.ge/eng/category.php?id=90&result=plebiscite (Civil GE, election results, 2008, retrieved 17. November
2011)
18. http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57512 (Pilsonības Likums, 1994, retrieved 10. November 2011)
19. http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/ERES1527.htm (Resolution 1527, Parlamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2006, retrieved 10. November 2011)
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20. http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/sum11_06/kaliningrad.pdf (European Commission: Factsheet, 2004, retrieved 10. November
2011)
21. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/28/world/europe/28estonia.html (New York Times, 2007, retrieved 11. November 2011)
22. http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=1900 (Council of Europe, Press Release, April 27 2007, retrieved
11. November 2011)
23. http://www.economist.com/node/9163598?story_id=9163598 (The Economist, 2007, retrieved 11. November 2011)
24. http://www.diena.lv/sabiedriba/politika/papildinata-nato-iznicinataji-no-baltijas-gaisa-telpas-pavada-divas-krievulidmasinas-754096 (Diena, 2010, retrieved 11. November 2011)
25. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4264010.stm (BBC, 2005, retrieved 10. November 2011)
26. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf (Commission Strategy Paper of 2004, retrieved 10.
December 2011)
27. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/ukraine_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf (EU country report on Ukraine,
2004, retrieved 11. December 2011)
28. http://euobserver.com/24/26194 (EU Observer, May 2008, retrieved 1. December 2011)
29. http://euobserver.com/24/27799 (EU Observer, March 2009, retrieved 3. December 2011)
30. http://www.eap-mobility.pl/en/about-eastern-partnership (EAP Mobility, retrieved 1. December 2011)
31. http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/working-groups/wg3-environment-energy/ (Civil Society Forum, retrieved 4. December 2011)
32. http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index_en.htm (EU, retrieved 3. December 2011)
33. http://euobserver.com/24/113515 (EU Observer, 3. September 2011, retrieved 12. December 2011)
34. http://euobserver.com/24/113920 (EU Observer, 13. October 2011, retrieved 11. December 2011)
35. http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm (European Commission, 2011, retrieved 2. December 2011)
36. http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/about/georgian-russian-dialogue/eu-policies-toward-georgian-russianrelations/ (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, retrieved, 1. December 2011)
37. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/documents/eu_belarus/non_paper_1106.pdf (European Commission, “What
the European Union could bring to Belarus”, 2011, retrieved 20. November 2011)
38. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/documents/eu_belarus/non_paper_1106.pdf (European Commission, “What
the European Union could bring to Belarus”, 2011, retrieved 20. November 2011)
39. http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/09/30/57251076.html (The Voice of Russia, 30. September 2011, retrieved 29. November 2011)
40. http://telegraf.by/en/2011/10/belarus-sohranila-uchastie-v-vostochnom-partnerstve (The Telegraf, 3. October 2011,
retrieved 10. December 2011)
41. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2010-06-18/germany-and-eastern-partnership (18. June 2010,
retrieved 6. December 2011)
42. http://www.cncworld.tv/news/v_show/19664_Russia-Germany_gas_pipeline_opens.shtml (CNC World, 10. November
2011, retrieved 4. December 2011)
43. http://euobserver.com/9/30593 (EU Observer, 6. August 2010, retrieved 20. December 2011)
44. http://www.infowars.com/rice-to-visit-poland-to-sign-missile-shield-deal/ (Alex Jones’s Infowars, 18. August, 2008,
retrieved 20. December 2011)
45. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/06/12/uk-eu-russia-poland-idUKL1237468520080612 (Reuters, 12. June 2008, retrieved
27. November 2011)
46. http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2009/docs/BFDay2_ConversationRussia.doc (Conversation with Russia: Transcript
from Annual Brussels Forum, 2009, retrieved 12. December 2011)
47. http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/4172 (Kremlin, Пресс-конференция по итогам саммита Россия–Евросоюз, 2009 – in
Russian, retrived 28. November 2011)
- 53 -
48. http://kremlin.ru/news/6078 (Kremlin, Интервью белорусским СМИ, 2009 – in Russian, retrieved 27. November 2011)
49. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8088258.stm (BBC, 7. June 2009, retrieved 27. November 2011)
50. http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17058&Itemid=65 (Georgian Daily, 13. February
2010, retrieved 29. November 2011)
51. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7812368.stm (BBC, 5. January 2009, retrieved 10. December 2011)
52. http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=177:collective-energy-security-a-new-approachfor-europe&catid=92:issuecontent&Itemid=341 (Journal of Energy Security, 19. February 2009, retrieved 3. 10. December 2011)
53. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,796611,00.html (Der Spiegel, 11. August 2011, retrieved 10. December
2011)
54. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/4177668/Russia-sparks-gas-crisis-as-talks-collapse.html (The
Telegraf, 8 January 2009, retrieved 12. December 2011)
55. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11874 (Global Research, 2009, retrieved 8. December 2011)
56. http://www.gdfsuez.com/en/news/press-releases/press-releases/?communique_id=1536 (GDF Suez, 8. November 2011,
retrieved 11. December 2011)
57. http://www.economist.com/node/12926521 (The Economist, 15. January 2009, retrieved 11. December 2011)
58. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf (Delaration of Prague Summit 2009,
7. May 2009, retrieved 10. December 2011)
59. http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/the-czech-presidency-at-mid-term-14981/index.html (Czech
Republic results at mid term 2009, 16. August 2011, retrieved 11. December 2011)
60. http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/events/poland-begins-eu-presidency (Eastern Partnership Community, 1.
June 2011, retrieved 11. December)
61.
http://pl2011.eu/sites/default/files/users/shared/o_prezydencja/programme_of_the_polish_presidency_of_the_council_of_th
e_eu.pdf (Programme for the Polish EU Presidency 2011, retrieved 10. December 2011)
62. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/115592/ (KievPost, 24. October 2011, retrieved 10. December 2011)
63. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15250742 (BBC, 11. October 2011, retrieved 11. December 2011)
64. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-21/world/russia.ukraine_1_ukraine-and-russia-viktor-yushchenko-russian-presidentdmitry-medvedev?_s=PM:WORLD (CNN World, 21. April 2010, retrieved 19. December 2011)
65. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/67511/ (KievPost, 24. May 2010, retrieved 19. December 2011)
66. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/112197/ (KievPost, 5, September 2011, retrieved 10. December 2011)
67. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-10-28-riabchuk-en.html (Eurozine, 28. October, retrieved 11. December 2011)
68. http://www.wider-europe.org/sites/default/files/publications/Wider%20Europe%20Note%202,%202010.pdf (Wider
Europe, 2010, retrieved 20. December 2011)
69. http://euobserver.com/24/114014 (EU Observer, 21. October 2011, retrieved 11. December 2011
70. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33560 (Socor, Vladimir. „Russia moves
toward open annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia”, 2008, The Jamestown Foundation, retrieved 2. December 2011)
71. http://ec.europa.eu/news/external_relations/080902_1_en.htm (European Commission, 2. September 2008, retrieved 10.
December 2011)
72. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/205846 (The Guardian, 6. December 2010, retrieved 11.
December 2011)
73. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/world/europe/16poland.html?hp (Shanker, T., Kulish, N. Russia Lashes Out on
Missile Deal, New York Times, 15. August 2008, retrieved 12. December 2011)
- 54 -
74. http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=50815 (Parliment of Estonia, 10. August 2008, retrieved 12. December 2011)
5. http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/10910.html (President of Ukraine homepage, 12. August 2008, retrieved 12.
December 2011)
6. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3567243,00.html (Deutsche Welle, 15. August 2008, retrieved 13. December 2011)
77. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/392&type=HTML (Website of European Union, 16.
July, 2010, retrieved 13. December 2011)
78. http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/countries/georgia/ (Eastern Partnership: Civil Society Forum, retrieved 13. December 2011)
79. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm (U.S. Department of State, September 2011, retrieved 13. December 2011)
80. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113383.pdf (European Commission, June 2011, retrieved
14. December 2011)
81. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Laender/Georgien.html (Federal Foreign
Office, February 2010, retrieved 14. December 2011)
82. http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/2829.htm (GIZ homepage, retrieved 14. December 2011)
83. http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=348&lang_id=ENG (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, retrieved 15.
December 2011)
84. http://www.polishaid.gov.pl/Georgia,188.html (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, July 2011, retrieved
15. December 2011)
85. http://www.belreview.cz/articles/3233.html (Belreview, Oktober 2008, retrieved 11. December 2011)
86. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/108603.pdf (EU/Belarus Human Rights Dialogue,
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87. http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/europe/news/article_1595940.php/Westerwelle-meets-Lukashenko-urges-freeBelarus-vote-Roundup (Europe News/Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2. November 2011, retrieved 12. December 2011)
88. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12606265 (BBC, 1. March 2011, retrieved 13. December 2011)
89. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/opinion/24iht-edbildt24.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Carl%20Bildt&st=cse (New York
Times, 23. December 2010, retrieved 11. December 2011)
90. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113351.pdf (Eurostat, 8. June, retrieved 12. December)
91. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-10/lukashenko-slams-government-plan-to-stabilize-belarus-s-economy.html
(Bloomberg, 10. November 2011, retrieved 14. December 2011)
92. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/Belarus_node.html (German ministry
of foreign Affairs, 2011, retrieved 11. December 2011)
93. http://rt.com/business/news/belarus-urges-russia-gas-193/ (RT, 25. November 2011, retrieved 12. December 2011)
94. http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/17-03-2011/117228-russia_belarus-0/ (Pravda, 3. March 2011, retrieved 11.
December)
95. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/politics/8926385/Eurasian-Economic-Commission.html (Telegraph, 1.
December 2011, retrieved 14. December 2011)
96. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/24/russia-gazprom-idUSL5E7MO3IR20111124 (Reuters, 24. November 2011,
retrieved 1. December 2011)
97. http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/belarus-quits-eus-eastern-partnership-initiative-news-508050 (EurActiv, 30.
September 2011, retrieved 14 December 2011)
98. http://telegraf.by/en/2011/10/inostrannie-banki-otkazivayutsya-kreditovat-belarus (Telegraf.by, 26. October 2011,
retrieved 11. December 2011)
99.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/847&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguag
e=en (EU press release, 29. November 2011, retrieved 1. December)
- 55 -
100. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126496.pdf (Press release, 1. December
2011, retrieved 1. December 2011)
10.4 Additional sources
1.
2.
3.
Edinburgh Declaration of the OSCE Parlimentary Assembly , 2004:
http://www.oscepa.org/images/stories/documents/declarations/2004_-_edinburgh_declaration_-_english.2314.pdf
(retrieved 10. November 2011]
Council of the European Union: Conclusions of the 2897th external relations council meeting, 13 October 2008, Press:
288m Nr: 14137/08.
Table 1. Gas Coordination Group, Member State General Situation According to Significance of Impact, Memo 09/3,
Brussels, 9 January 2009 (European Commission, 9. January 2009, retrieved 10. December 2011 )
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