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The Manhattan Project:
Motives Shrouded in
Secrecy
A research paper composed by:
Lou Maiuri
Professor Al-Tikriti History 299
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The Manhattan project encapsulates the pinnacle of controversy in the History of the
United States, and perhaps on the world stage. The decision of President Harry S. Truman to
usher in the Atomic age in August of 1945 resonated profoundly across the globe. The instant
eradication of hundreds of thousands of lives was procured by the most brilliant minds over a
half decade in a slow, arduous process known as the Manhattan Project. This codename held
significance only to those selected by the U.S. government to partake in the endeavor of Atomic
engineering; President Truman was even unaware of the progress until the bomb was fully
functional. Simultaneous with the production of the bomb was the growing skepticism towards
the Soviet Union and her intentions of invading China, a major trade partner of the United States.
Truman’s Secretary of State, James Byrnes, was a chief proponent of atomic diplomacy,
and saw Japan as justifiable way to manage the Soviet Union. However, President Truman’s
primary agenda aired on the side of ending the war as opposed to intimidating Russia. Under
heavy pressure from both his cabinet and the American public, Truman signed off on the use of
the bomb, a decision that continues to be questioned today. The American motivation for the
deployment of the Atomic bomb was not solely to end the war, but to deter the Soviet Union
from issuing a declaration of war on the Japanese as well as occupying Manchuria in China. The
Soviet Union’s declaration of war would have ultimately led to Japanese surrender; however, the
United States was focused on bringing an end to the war rather than prolonging it.
The examination of the Manhattan Project’s ideology must begin with those involved in
the endeavor. President Harry Truman, the man responsible for making the decision to use the
bomb, was placed in an extraordinary position through unordinary circumstances. Truman was
sworn into office after serving only three months as the Vice President. On April 12, 1945,
Truman was notified that President Roosevelt had passed away as a result of a cerebral
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hemorrhage. Truman assumed the role of President and was sworn into office on April 13, 1945.
Less than three months after Truman’s swearing in, the news of the first successful atomic test
reached Washington. In, A History of our Time: Readings on Postwar America, a Truman diary
excerpt depicts the personal fears associated with such power. Truman states, “I hope for some
sort of peace- but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when morals
catch up perhaps there’ll be no reason for any of it. I hope not. But we are only termites on a
planet and maybe when we bore too deeply into the planet there’ll be a reckoning who knows?”1
Even as a confident leader of the free world, Truman’s words constitute a sense of hesitation
towards atomic power.
The personal reflections of Truman contrast deeply with his eventual facilitation of the
use of the atomic bomb. This contradiction was heavily influenced not only by the American
public’s outcry for peace, but also by his cabinet members, mainly Secretary of State James
Byrnes. Byrnes had served in the Senate with Truman in prior years, serving as a mentor and a
good friend. Byrnes isolated Truman from other key advisors regarding the Manhattan Project
following his appointment as lead advisor in connection with the bomb. Byrne’s direct
involvement in diplomacy with the Soviet Union shows a striking correlation with his avid
approval for the use of the bomb. Secretary of War Henry Stimson corroborates Byrne’s desire to
flaunt the power of the atomic bomb in his diary entries. Stimson states, “I found that Byrnes
was very much against any attempt to cooperate with Russia. His mind is full of his problems
with the coming meeting of foreign ministries and he looks to having the presence of the bomb
in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing.”2 Byrnes influence is
clearly seen in the actions of President Harry Truman at the Potsdam conference. Truman
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History of our time readings on postwar America. (New York: Oxford UP, 2003.), 19.
History of our time readings on postwar America. (New York), 20.
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postponed the commencement of the meeting until the bomb had been successfully tested, stating
that he wanted to have his “master card” in hand before negotiations with Europe took place.
Aside from the political realm of the Manhattan Project, there consisted the military
aspect of the assignment. Lieutenant General Leslie Groves was appointed with the task of
managing the Manhattan Project. Originally confined to engineering and plant production,
Groves watched his duties gradually start to encompass a larger field. In his account of the
Manhattan Project, Now it can be Told, Groves defends the use of the bomb with minimal
remorse or regret. In the epilogue, Groves states, “While it is tragic that the forces for
destruction that we unleashed are stronger than man’s present ability to control them, it is
fortunate indeed for humanity that the initiative in this field was gained and kept by the United
States. That we were successful was due entirely to the hard work and dedication of more than
600,000 Americans who comprised and directly supported the Manhattan Project.”3
The psyche and behavior of General Leslie Groves proved to be a topic of discussion
among his peers and the scientists who he interacted with. His moral code seemed to possess a
naivety that frustrated those around him. Author Stephane Groueff examines the candid
personality of General Groves in his book, Manhattan Project. He asserts, “Others found it
difficult to believe that in the world of the 1940’s any intelligent and well-informed man could
remain so candid and undoubting. They concluded the general, too disciplined and proud …
hiding his feelings.”4 Above all other figures involved in the Manhattan Project, Groves seemed
to have an almost human attachment to the bomb. His unwavering loyalty to the project
represents the primary viewpoint of postwar America, a viewpoint that would begin to shift as
3
Groves, Leslie R. Now it can be told the story of the Manhattan Project. New York, N.Y: Da Capo, 1983. 414
Groueff, Stephane. Manhattan project: The Untold Story of the Making of the Atomic Bomb. Boston, Mass.: Little,
Brown and Company, 1967. 107
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more information surfaced regarding the involvement of the Soviet Union and the notion that
Japan was on the verge of surrender.
In fact, by the summer of 1945 Japan was a broken country in economic turmoil.
The German army had surrendered in early spring of that same year, on May 8, 1945, without
successfully engineering an atomic weapon. The only major obstacle that was blocking complete
allied victory was Stalin and the Red Army. Author Ferenc Morton Szasz examines the
revisionist viewpoint as a plausible theory on why America dropped the bomb. In his literature,
The Day the Sun Rose Twice, Szasz asserts, “There existed little immediate need to drop the
bombs. Instead, argue the proponents of this position, America dropped the atomic weapons
primarily to intimidate the Soviet Union, both in Asia and in Eastern Europe. 5 Szasz goes on
further to uncover important military leaders who opposed the use of the bomb. He states,
General Dwight Eisenhower did not want the United States to use the bomb, and Admiral
Chester Nimitz always maintained there was no need for it. Admiral William D. Leahy argued
that ‘the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance
in our war against Japan’.”6 The revisionist movement concerning the atomic bomb took root in
the 1960’s and was heavily influenced and fueled by the statements of high ranking military
officials denouncing the importance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The revisionist viewpoint gained substantial ground during the 1970’s when America
underwent an anti-government phase following the Vietnam war and the resignation of President
Richard Nixon.7 Perhaps the most striking evidence against the use of the atomic bomb was the
intelligence that had been procured by the United States Military. In the waning months of the
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Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1984), 151
Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. 151
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Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. 155
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war, Japan was in complete disarray having exhausted most of its fuel and food supplies. In fact,
intelligence suggests that further conventional bombings of major Japanese cities would
effectively bring the war to a halt. In, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, Robert Jungk cites the
viewpoint of Military Intelligence Director Alfred MacCormack on the state of Japan. Jungk
states, “We had begun a secret process of mining all their (Japan’s) harbors, which was steadily
isolating them from the rest of the world. Ife we had brought this operation to its logical
conclusion the destruction of Japan’s cities with incendiary and other bombs would have been
quite unnecessary.”8 It is quite evident that the United States had a stronghold on Japan and was
moving in to deliver the crippling blow that would render the allies victorious in the Pacific.
However, the United States government deemed that the isolation of Japan was
considered to be a strategy based on cowardice, and with the new atom bomb added to the
arsenal many officials were eager to demonstrate its power. The anticipation of marveling at the
achievement at Los Alamos became too much to bear for the United States, and the pride of
becoming the first country to unlock and harness atomic energy resulted in a blind decision. The
use of the atomic bomb can be paralleled with an allusion of a child’s excitement on Christmas
morning; overwhelming and clouded due to sheer anticipation.
Now although the revisionist viewpoint is easy to adopt many years after the destruction
caused by fat man and little boy, it is unfair to assume the sole purpose of the detonation
consisted of the intimidation of the Soviet Union. The atomic bomb became available during a
period of extreme duress. The world had suffered the loss of many soldiers while brutal dictators
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Jungk, Robert. Brighter than a Thousand Suns A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists. (New York: Harvest
Books) 1970, 206.
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such as Stalin and Hitler vied for global supremacy with a ruthless demeanor. Truman was faced
with a monumental decision where time was fleeting and hesitation was not an option. This
pressure coupled with the thousands of hours and billions of dollars spent on the Manhattan
Project had backed Truman into a corner with seemingly no other option but to authorize the
atomic campaign.
General Groves, fearful of not being able to utilize the bombs, turned a blind eye to the
already crippled Japanese army in the effort to hasten the dropping of the second bomb. Author
and academic Barton J. Bernstein explore the determined nature of Groves to deploy the second
bomb before the Japanese had a chance to surrender. In his article he asserts, “Groves alleged
self-aggrandizement, his careerism, and his need to justify the project usually motivated and
dominated his actions.”9 Truman’s vital mistake in authorizing the use of the atomic bomb was
placing an incredible amount of trust and power into the hands of his cabinet officials and
military leaders. Groves had become disillusioned by his tireless project management in Los
Alamos and could not accept that his toils were in vain.
Perhaps the most convincing argument against the use of the bomb stemmed from Economics
professor Gar Alperovitz. A scholarly article composed by Alonzo Hamby illustrates different
courses of action that would have sufficiently ended the war without the use of the atomic bomb.
Hamby relies heavily on the insight provided by Alperovitz in earlier works. In regard to
Japanese surrender Hamby states, “Any remaining Japanese reluctance to quit the war would
have been quickly overcome by the second step, entry of the Soviet Union in August 1945.
American failure to accept and implement this "two-step logic" for an expeditious end to World
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Barton J. Bernstein The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 883-920
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War II was largely a result of the emerging Cold War and especially American concern over
Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia.”10 Once again the issue of the Soviet
Union is introduced as a primary factor in the decision to drop the atomic bomb.
Scholar Jill Kauffman compiled many primary sources in her article Atomic Bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kauffman, like many other scholars investigating the topic of atomic
weaponry, called on credible primary sources including General Eisenhower and scholar Gar
Alperovitz to illustrate her viewpoint. She asserts, “In April we knew they were beginning to try
to surrender. They were already defeated in every sense. We were bombing their cities without
any opposition. The Japanese were making airplane gasoline out of acorns. So we knew that they
were on their last legs," says historian Gar Alperovitz. General Dwight Eisenhower, who
succeeded Truman as president, held a similar view. "The Japanese were ready to surrender and
it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”11 These assertions by high ranking military
officials offer ample evidence to suggest the secondary motivation behind the use of the bomb.
The completion of the atomic bomb gave the United States supreme power in the late
summer months of 1945. Tired with losing American lives and mounting tensions with the
Soviet Union provided a tedious environment for the decision surrounding the bomb. The urging
of cabinet officials and the incredible amount of time and devotion spent on the Manhattan
project made all signs point to the use of the atomic bomb. The United States could not risk
going to war for another decade with the Soviet Union, and instead of bringing about the end of
the war, the atomic bombs proved to be the first move by the United States in the Cold War.
10
Hamby, L. Alonzo, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," Journal of American History, Vol. 84, no. 2 (September
1997)
11
Kauffman, Jill. "Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Issues & Controversies in American History. Facts
On File News Services, 1 Oct. 2005. Web. 9 Nov. 2009. <http://www.2facts.com/article/haa00001010>.
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Bibliography
Barton J. Bernstein The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 2003)
Groueff, Stephane. Manhattan Project The Untold Story of the Making of the Atomic Bomb. New
York: Backinprint.Com, 2000. Print.
Groves, Leslie R. Now it can be told the story of the Manhattan Project. New York, N.Y: Da
Capo, 1983. Print.
Hales, Peter B. Atomic spaces living on the Manhattan Project. Urbana: University of Illinois,
1997. Print.
Hamby, L. Alonzo, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," Journal of American History, Vol. 84, no.
2 (September 1997)
History of our time readings on postwar America. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Print
.
Jungk, Robert. Brighter than a Thousand Suns A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists. New
York: Harvest Books, 1970. Print.
Kauffman, Jill. "Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Issues & Controversies in American History.
Facts On File News Services, 1 Oct. 2005. Web. 9 Nov. 2009.
Lamont, Lansing. Day of Trinity. New York: Atheneum, 1985. Print.
Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1984.
Print.
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