1nc(Brazil)
Brazil Economy is on the tipping point but slowly rising-inflation reduction
Malinowski 7/1(Mathew Malinowski, Bloomberg Economist, 7/1/13, “Brazil Economists See
Higher Selic and Slower Economic Growth”, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0701/brazil-economists-see-higher-selic-and-slower-economic-growth.html)
Brazil economists raised their benchmark interest rate forecast and cut economic growth
expectations for this year and next, as inflation persists above the central bank’s target.
Brazil’s central bank will raise the Selic to 9.25 percent this year and hold it at that level
through 2014, up from the previous week’s forecast of 9 percent for this year and next,
according to a June 28 central bank survey of about 100 analysts published today. The economy
will expand 2.4 percent this year and 3 percent next year, compared with the previous
forecast of 2.46 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively.
President Dilma Rousseff’s administration is working to reverse a deteriorating economic
outlook in the world’s second largest emerging market. Brazil’s central bank last week cut its
forecast for gross domestic product expansion this year, as quickening inflation drags down
family and business sentiment. Economic and social discontent has prompted the biggest street
protests in decades, as more than a million demonstrators have taken to the streets in the past
month to oppose inflation, corruption and poor public services.
Swap rates on the contract due in January 2015 were unchanged at 9.87 percent at 9:05 local
time. The real strengthened by 0.2 percent to 2.2271 per U.S. dollar.
Central bankers, in their quarterly inflation report released on June 27, said inflation will reach
6 percent this year should the benchmark rate remain unchanged at 8 percent, up from a
March forecast of 5.7 percent. They also cut the 2013 growth prediction to 2.7 percent, from
3.1 percent.
Lifting the embargo allows for investment and trades off with Caribbean and
Central American economies
Suchlicki 2k(Jaime Suchlicki, Founding Director of the Cuba Transition Project at the Univeristy
of Miami and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 6/2000 “ The U.S.
Embargo of Cuba”, http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)
Trade¶ No foreign trade that is independent from the state is permitted in ¶ Cuba. ¶ Cuba would export to the U.S. most of its
products, cigars, rum, ¶ citrus, vegetables, nickel, seafood, biotechnology, etc. Yet, since ¶ all of these products are produced by
Cuban state enterprises, with ¶ workers being paid below comparable wages, and Cuba has great ¶ need for dollars, the Cuban
government could dump products in the ¶ U.S. market at very low prices, and without regard for cost or ¶ economic rationality. ¶
Many of these products will compete unfairly with U.S. agriculture ¶ and manufactured products, or with products imported from
If the U.S. were to buy sugar from Cuba, it would be to the ¶
detriment of U.S. or Caribbean producers. 1 Cuban products are not strategically important to the U.S., and are ¶ in
the ¶ Caribbean and elsewhere. ¶
great abundance in the U.S. internal market, or from other ¶ traditional U.S. trading partners. ¶ There is little question about Cuba’s
chronic need for U.S. ¶ technology, products and services. Yet, need alone does not ¶ determine the size or viability of a market.
Cuba’s large foreign ¶ debt, owed to both Western and former Socialist countries, the ¶ abysmal performance of its economy, and
the low prices for its ¶ major exports make the “bountiful market” perception a perilous ¶ mirage. ¶ From the U.S. point of view,
therefore, the
reestablishment of ¶ commercial ties with Cuba would be at best problematic. It
would ¶ create severe market distortions for the already precarious regional ¶ economies of
the Caribbean and Central America since the United ¶ States would have to shift some of these
countries’ sugar quota to ¶ Cuba. It would provide the U.S. market with products that are of ¶
little value and in abundant supply. And, while some U.S. firms ¶ could benefit from a resumed
trade relationship, it would not help ¶ in any significant way the overall U.S. economy. Cuba does
not ¶ have the potential to become an important client like China, Russia, ¶ or even Vietnam. ¶ Investments¶ Cuba has promoted
investments in tourism as its highest priority ¶ and only recently has begun to promote investments in other ¶ sectors. Cuba has not
yet attempted to link Foreign Direct ¶ Investments (FDI) with technology transfer. Nor has it permitted 2reater individual freedom in
economic matters. While the Cuban ¶ government is allowing some workers to operate independently, ¶ these activities are highly
regulated. Unlike China, Cuba has not ¶ legalized private agriculture or manufacturing. ¶ Investments will be directed and approved
by the Cuban ¶ government. The Cuban government is unlikely to create a level ¶ plain field for American companies, allowing some
to invest while ¶ discriminating capriciously against others. ¶ U. S. investments in Cuba would be limited, however, given the ¶ lack
of an extensive internal market, the uncertainties surrounding ¶ the long-term risk to foreign investment, an uncertain political ¶
situation; and the opportunities provided by other markets in Latin ¶ America and elsewhere. Modest initial investments would be ¶
directed primarily to exploiting Cuba's’ tourist, mining, and natural ¶ resource industries. ¶ The Cuban constitution still outlaws
foreign ownership of most ¶ properties and forbids any Cubans from participating in joint ¶ ventures with foreigners. ¶ Joint
ventures are only permitted with state enterprises; many of ¶ these are now under military control. ¶ It is illegal for foreign
companies to hire or fire Cuban workers ¶ directly. Hiring is done by the Ministry of Labor. Foreign ¶ companies must pay the wages
owed to their employees directly to ¶ the Cuban government in hard currency. The Cuban government ¶ then pays out to the Cuban
workers in Cuban pesos, which are 2orth 1/20 of a U.S. dollar, pocketing 90 percent of every dollar it ¶ receives. ¶ While Cuba's
foreign investment law provides protection against ¶ government expropriation, all arbitration must take place in the ¶ corrupt and
arbitrary government offices where little protection is ¶ given to the investor. There is no independent judicial system in ¶ the island.
¶ Foreign investors must also confront political uncertainties that do ¶ not exist in many other countries. They must contend with
the ¶ possibility of the regime’s reversing policy, the legal questions ¶ surrounding previously confiscated properties, and potential ¶
sanctions against foreign investors that cooperated with the Castro ¶ government in the event that an anti-Castro government
comes to ¶ power. ¶ Castro's opposition to market reforms will limit the extent to which ¶ the private sector emerges and functions
effectively, and thereby ¶ will slow, if not prevent, attaining a measurable degree of economic ¶ recovery. While Castro and hardliners recognize the need for ¶ economic recovery, they also see the likely erosion of political ¶ power and control that accompanies
the restructuring of the ¶ economy along free-market rules. Adoption of market reforms may ¶ well represent a solution to the
economic crisis, but a full-blown ¶ reform process carries with it the risk of loss of control over ¶ society, as well as the economy, and
threatens to alienate some of ¶ the regime’s key constituencies. 2HY MAINTAIN THE EMBARGO ¶ The embargo should be held as a
carrot to be lifted when Cuba ¶ changes its current system and develops a democratic society. The embargo ¶ is not an anachronism
but a legitimate instrument of U.S. policy for ¶ achieving the goal of a free Cuba. ¶ While most of the freely elected governments in
Latin America pursue ¶ moderate, neo-liberal economic policies, Castro has deliberately staked out a ¶ position as the last defender
of Marxism-Leninism. In October 1997 he held ¶ a meeting in Havana of Communist leaders from all over the world to ¶ reassert the
supremacy of communist ideology and to plan for a “comeback” ¶ when capitalism fails. ¶ The lifting of the embargo now will be an
important psychological ¶ victory for Castro. It would be interpreted as a defeat for U.S. policy and as ¶ an enforced acceptance of
the Castro regime as a permanent neighbor in the ¶ Caribbean. ¶ The long held belief that through negotiations and incentives we
can ¶ influence Castro’s behavior has been weakened by Castro’s unwillingness to ¶ provide major concessions. Castro prefers to
sacrifice the economic well ¶ being of his people rather than cave in to demands for a different Cuba. ¶ Neither economic incentives
nor punishment have worked with Castro in the ¶ past. They are not likely to work in the future. 2Not all differences and problems in
international affairs can be solved ¶ through negotiations or can be solved at all. There are disputes that are not ¶ negotiable and
can only be solved either through the use of force or through ¶ prolonged patience until the leadership disappears or situations
change. ¶ Ignoring or supporting regimes that violate human rights and abuse ¶ their population is an ill-advised policy. ¶ The Castro
era may be coming to an end if for no other reason than ¶ biological realities. Fidel Castro is seventy-three and deteriorating ¶
physically. U.S. policy should stay the course and wait for Castro’s ¶ disappearance. ¶ The gradual lifting of the embargo now will
condemn the Cuban ¶ people to a longer dictatorship and the perpetuation of a failed MarxistLeninist society. ¶ The gradual lifting of
the embargo entails a real danger that the U.S. ¶ may implement irreversible policies toward Cuba while Castro provides no ¶
concessions to the U.S. or concessions that he can reverse. ¶ A piecemeal lifting of the embargo will guarantee the continuance of ¶
the present totalitarian political structures and prevent a rapid transformation ¶ of Cuba into a free and democratic society. 2 The
lifting of the travel ban without meaningful and irreversible ¶ concessions from the Castro regime could provide the Castro brothers
with ¶ much needed foreign exchange. It would represent one of the first steps in ¶ ending the U.S. embargo and prolong the
suffering of the Cuban people. PECIFIC ISSUES ¶ If the U.S. has relations with China, why not with Cuba? ¶ Relations with China were
propelled by U.S. strategic and economic ¶ interests 1) to counter growing Soviet power; 2) to increase U.S. influence in ¶ Southeast
Asia; and 3) to tap the one billion-dollar China market. ¶ Cuba is small, poor, and strategically and economically unimportant. ¶ In
Latin America, the U.S. has followed a regional policy that fosters ¶ human rights, neo-liberal economic policies, and democratically
elected ¶ civilian governments. U.S.-Cuba policy should be no different. ¶ The U.S. has been willing to intervene militarily in Grenada,
Panama, ¶ and Haiti to restore democracy. In Chile it established a military embargo ¶ against the Pinochet dictatorship. In other
countries it supported free and ¶ transparent elections. Why should U.S. policy toward Cuba be different? ¶ Aren’t the Cubans also
entitled to a free society? ¶ The Cubans are suffering economically because of the U.S. embargo. ¶ The Cubans can buy any products,
including food and medicine from ¶ any country in the world. Dollar stores in Cuba have numerous U.S. ¶ products, including CocaCola, and other symbols of American ¶ consumerism. American dollars can purchase almost anything in Cuba. 2There are shortages
in Cuba of fruits, vegetables, potatoes, bananas, ¶ mangos, boniatos, and other foodstuffs that have been traditionally produced ¶
locally. What do these shortages have to do with the U.S. embargo? ¶ The reason for Cuba’s economic suffering is a Marxist system
that ¶ discourages incentives. As in Eastern Europe under Communism, the failed ¶ Communist system is the cause of the economic
suffering of the Cubans, not ¶ the U.S. embargo. ¶ Tourism, trade and investment will accelerate the downfall of Communism ¶ in
Cuba as it did in the Soviet Union. ¶ There is no evidence that tourism, trade, or investment had anything to ¶ do with the collapse of
communism. Tourism peaked in the Soviet Union in ¶ 1980, almost a decade before the collapse of communism. In the Soviet ¶
Union tourism was tightly controlled with few tourists having any contact ¶ with Russians. ¶ The collapse of Communism was the
result of a decaying system that ¶ did not work, the corruption and inefficiency of the Communist Party, the ¶ economic bankruptcy
of the Soviet Union in part because of military ¶ competition with the West, an unpopular war in Afghanistan, and the ¶ reformist
policies of Mikhail Gorbachev that accelerated the process of ¶ change. ¶ 3he driving force for capitalism in Russia and China is not
trade or ¶ investment but a strong domestic market economy, tolerated by the ¶ government and dominated by millions of small
entrepreneurs. The will to ¶ liberalize the economy does not exist in Cuba. ¶ Cuba is a potential economic bonanza for U.S.
Given Cuba’s scant foreign exchange, its ability to buy U.S. products ¶ remains very
limited. Cuba’s major exports, i.e. sugar, tobacco, nickel, ¶ citrus, are neither economically nor
strategically important to the United ¶ States. ¶ Lifting the embargo would create severe
market distortions in the ¶ already precarious economies of the Caribbean and Central
America since ¶ the U.S. would have to divert some portion of the existing sugar quota away ¶
from these countries to accommodate Cuba. The impact of tourism diversion ¶ toward Cuba would profoundly hurt
companies. ¶
the economies of the Caribbean and ¶ Central American countries. ¶ Cuba, cited as one of the worst political and commercial risks in
the ¶ world by several recently issued country risk guides, lags far behind China ¶ and Vietnam in establishing the necessary
conditions for economic ¶ development and successful corporate involvement. Current foreign ¶ investments are small and limited
to dollar sectors of the economy such as ¶ the tourist industry and mining. American companies are not “losing out.” ¶ In a free
Cuba, U.S. companies will quickly regain the prominent role they ¶ held in pre-Castro Cuba.
Specifically-Sugar is Key to brazil’s economy
Reuters 12(Leading News Source, “US-Brazil
Economyhttp://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/27/us-brazil-economy-agricultureidINBRE87Q0RV20120827
Agriculture has long been known as the green anchor of Brazil's economy, now the world's
sixth-largest. One of the world's breadbaskets, Brazil is a major producer of soybeans, corn,
sugar, coffee, oranges and beef, and has invested heavily in the past decade to keep up with
surging global demand.¶ But the agricultural sector kicked off 2012 on the wrong foot, adding to
the woes of an economy that has been struggling for the past year. Agricultural output
contracted 8.5 percent in the first quarter, hit by a drought in the grains belt, a poor sugar cane
crop and tight credit markets.¶ The slump in Brazil's farm belt, however, was short-lived. The
agricultural sector, which accounts for nearly 30 percent of Brazil's gross domestic product, is
expected to be a bright spot when GDP data for the second quarter is released on Friday.
Brazil economic stability key to regional stability
Cohen 09 [Salu Bernard Cohen. “Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations.”
Rowman & Littlefield. Google Books.158-159. 2009]
However, the independence of South America as a geopolitical region is strengthened by Brazil’s
continued economic growth, political stability, and world influence. It is clearly the dominant
political and economic power within South America and one of the major regional powers of
the world. It dwarfs the rest of the continent in population (190 million out of a total of 360 million), in area (3.3 million square
miles out of a total of 6.4 million square miles), and in GDP ($1.65 trillion, or over 55 percent). Possessing common
borders with every other South American state with the exceptions of Chile and Ecuador, the South
American regional giant is geographically positioned to influence and pressure the other
states, especially as various transcontinental transportation and energy projects are brought to
completion. Factors that favor the economic development prospects of Brazil are the attractiveness of its vast market to
investment capital, and its rich natural resources of bauxite, gold, iron, manganese, nickel, phosphates, uranium, timber, and
hydropower. It has made rapid strides in petroleum development, and in 2006 the country became completely self-sufficient in oil.
Discovery of the vast deepwater Tupi oil field off its southeastern coast followed by discovery of the even larger offshore Carioca
field offers the potential for transforming Brazil into a global energy powerhouse. When this oil eventually comes online, the
country’s reserves will provide brazil with the additional political weight to country Chavez’s petro-supported foreign policy goals.
Now reliant on Bolivia and Argentina for natural gas, Brazil can develop its large offshore gas deposits in the Santos Basin and move
toward national self-sufficiency in gas. This would require major investment to double the country’s gas line distribution system,
making the timetable for bringing in the gas fields uncertain
Latin America instability causes global nuclear war
Rochin ‘94
James Rochin, Professor of Political Science, 1994, Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin
America, pp. 130-131
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more
important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas.
Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly
inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development,
mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and
so on – were
linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the
Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the
region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war,
beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy
Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its
important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for
Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate
increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led
Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
2nc
Links
Embargo allows for investment-lifts reprocutions and increases incentives
Escandon 8(Jennifer Gerz-Escandon, Writer for The Christian Science Monitor, 10/9/8, “End
the US-Cuba embargo: It’s a win-win”,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1009/p09s02-coop.html/(page)/2)
Secondly, direct US engagement could allow two of the nation's largest revenue generators, the
Cuban nickel and sugar industries, to expand into more capital-intensive energy research through
university and private-sector partnerships.¶ Most Cuban exports are currently destined for Canada, China, or the
Netherlands as raw or lightly refined materials. Yet, with funding for technology and without the fear
of embargo-based repercussions from the US, Cuban research opportunities and export
products could have the potential to diversify. ¶ By gaining the freedom and cooperative assistance to make this
transition, Cuba could address its own energy dependence while leap-frogging years ahead on modernization. For starters, Cuba could
explore the sugar-bioenergy market and the energy-related uses of nickel. Given the abundance of welltrained but under-employed Cuban engineers, the ingredients for a perfect storm of
innovation are already present.¶ For its part, by ending the embargo, the US simultaneously gains security through stability in Cuba.
More important, by investing in the future prototype for emerging markets – a 42,803-square-mile green
energy and technology lab called Cuba – America gains a dedicated partner in the search for
energy independence.¶
Embargo is the only restraint on Cuban Sugar
Frank 10(Mark Frank, Writer for Financial Times, 5/18/10, “Cuba Worries as Sugar Industry
Dissolves”, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7ae9965e-6290-11df-991f00144feab49a.html#axzz2adOpt5RL)
Sugar production is expected to weigh in at around 1.1m tonnes this year, compared with 8m
tonnes in 1990 before the Soviet Union collapsed and the poorest result since 1905, according
to a rare recent admission by Granma, the Communist party daily.¶ Negotiations are under way
with several groups to co-administer some of the eight largest mills, built after the revolution,
say foreign business sources and Cubans with knowledge of the industry. It is a big shift in policy
under Raúl Castro, president, whose brother Fidel insisted the island knew as much about
producing sugar as anyone.¶ A big obstacle is the US Helms-Burton law, penalising investment
in properties expropriated from US owners and containing a yet-to-be implemented chapter
allowing Cuban-Americans to sue investors who “traffic” in their expropriated properties.¶ All
but eight of Cuba’s mills were built before the revolution and therefore nationalised, and most
plantations are lands expropriated by the government after Fidel Castro took power in 1959
Lifting the embargo allows for investment-saves the industry
Krisher 5(Ben Krisher, B.A. In political Science from University of Vermont, 12/6/5, “Lifting the
U.S-Cuban Embargo: A Case of Current Events”, http://voices.yahoo.com/lifting-us-cubanembargo-case-current-events-12262.html?cat=37)
A lifting of the embargo would have serious economic consequences for Cuba, allowing
businesses in the US and elsewhere to do business on and with the island. This economic opening would
certainly benefit the country, which, in the past two years, has experienced a blow to its agricultural sector from
a prolonged drought, seriously injuring the sugar industry. Indeed, according to a September 20th, 2005 article in the
Carribean and Central American Report, the sugar industry, which used to provide Cuba's "most important export for more than a century" is now
being dismantled, and only
produced 1.3 million tons of sugar in 2005, a marked decrease from the 8
million tons produced in 1990. Despite agricultural problems, Cuba's Castro has claimed a 9% growth rate for 2005, a figure which, according to a
September 6th, 2005 article in Latin American Economy and Business, is artificially high. In fact, the same article identifies a number of problems with
A lifting of the
embargo would allow US oil companies to do business with Cuba, perhaps relieving some
pressure, and would open American markets up to Cuba's nickle deposits, which, according to the Latin American Economy and Business article, are
Cuba's economy, including an increasing reliance on the cheap oil provided by Venezuela to keep the economy from collapsing.
plentiful.
Lifting restrictions allows for investment
Conason 8(Joe Conason, Journalist-Writer for Salon, 6/18/8, “One more good reason to lift
the Embargo on Cuba”, http://www.salon.com/2008/07/18/cuba_6/)
Now there is at least one more incentive to change course. With its huge potential for producing
clean, renewable, sugar-based ethanol, Cuba represents a significant source of energy that will
remain unavailable to American consumers unless we undo the embargo. Agricultural experts
have estimated that Cuba could eventually provide more than 3 billion gallons of fuel
annually, perhaps even more when new technologies for extracting energy from sugar cane
waste (known as “bagasse”) come online — placing the island third in world ethanol production, behind the
U.S. and Brazil. Given the relatively small demand for auto fuel in Cuba, nearly all of that ethanol would be available for export to its nearest
neighbor.¶ Today the Cuban government manufactures only nominal amounts of ethanol, mainly because of government policies favoring table sugar
and rum instead. Fidel Castro reportedly feels that using cane for fuel instead of food is a capitalist crime against the poor. Having ceded power to his
brother Raúl, however, the aging ruler may no longer control economic policy — and Raúl is widely viewed as the more flexible and pragmatic Castro.
A revitalized ethanol industry in Cuba would have an enormous ready market only 90 miles
away. It is also worth noting that sugar ethanol not only seems to burn cleaner than the kind made from grain but could also reduce pressure on
food prices. (Besides, everyone would be better off eating less sugar.) ¶ Like offshore oil, Cuban ethanol would not be
available overnight. Sugar production has dropped precipitously under Castro and Cuba lacks
substantial biorefinery capacity. Whether that capacity can be constructed faster than Exxon
can find oil and build platforms is an open question. But the difference is that Cuba could
certainly grow far more sugar cane than it does currently. And once the oil is gone, there will be no more, while cane
can grow year after year indefinitely — without contributing to climate change or polluting the oceans.
Cuba Sugar industry is on the brink-Investment key to growth
Grogg 13(Patricia Grogg, Writer for the Inter Press Service-News Agency, 1/9/13, “Cuban Sugar
Sector Aims for Recovery in 2013”, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/01/cuban-sugar-sector-aimsfor-recovery-in-2013/)
The Cuban sugar industry seems to be experiencing a rebirth thanks to an economic
modernisation programme that has allowed for an injection of foreign capital as part of a strategy to
strengthen and diversify this key sector.¶ “There is a recovery, an awakening in the production of sugar
cane, sugar and sugar derivatives,” said specialist Liobel Pérez from the state-owned business group Azcuba, created
just over a year ago to replace the once powerful Ministry of Sugar. Azcuba’s effectiveness will be put to the test in 2013 as it
implements new forms of management in the sector.¶ Foreign
investment in the sugar industry was formerly
limited to a handful of sugar derivative enterprises. Its extension to sugar production was one
of the innovations introduced by Azcuba in 2012. “There are two major investments which complement the
measures that have contributed to sustained growth in production,” Pérez told IPS.¶ The contract between COI and Empresa
Azucarera Cienfuegos, an Azcuba subsidiary, is for joint management over the next 13 years of the 5 de Septiembre sugar mill,
located in the province of Cienfuegos, 232 km southeast of Havana.¶ The Brazilian company will invest in agricultural mechanisation
to raise crop yields and in industrial processing technology.¶ It is hoped that this injection of capital will “optimise human and
industrial resources” and thus help the Cienfuegos mill to raise production to the 90,000 tons per harvest for which it was designed,
from the 25,000 to 30,000 tons it has produced in recent years.¶ As for Havana Energy, it is entering into a joint venture with Azcuba
subsidiary Zerus SA to build a biomass power plant near the Ciro Redondo sugar mill in the province of Ciego de Ávila, in central
Cuba.¶ The
plant will be built with an investment of between 45 million and 55 million dollars,
and is scheduled to begin generating electricity in 2015. During the harvest, it will be powered
with the sugar cane bagasse left over after sugar processing. The rest of the year, it will run on marabu
weed, which has taken over large areas of idle farmland in the country.¶ A number of other foreign investment projects are being
studied, involving joint management, which seems to be Cuba’s preferred strategy for sugar mills.¶ However, other potential joint
venture initiatives are also being considered, “primarily in the energy and sugar derivatives sectors,” said Pérez.¶ Sugar
cane is
a source of a wide array of derivatives used in the food, chemical, pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries. The long list of by-products includes animal feed, resins, preservatives, plastics and raw
materials for paper and furniture production.¶ “Cuba has over 400 years of experience in sugar cane cultivation, as well as trained
human resources, facilities, land, scientific research centres, infrastructure and organisation. What it lacks is technology and, above
all, the money to buy it,” explained Pérez.¶ He believes that what is most important is the “new vision” of how the recovery of the
sector can be achieved, which makes it possible to speak of sustained growth in sugar production, he said. ¶ Pérez preferred not to
hazard an estimate for the 2012-2013 harvest, which began in November of last year with the so-called “small harvest” and will
continue until May, with the participation of 50 sugar mills. He did however indicate that production is expected to be 20 percent
greater than last year’s.¶ Other
sources close to the sugar sector said that the current harvest should
yield enough cane to produce 1.8 million tonnes, although the plan is to produce just over 1.6
million. Sugar continues to be the leading product but not the only one produced by this
industry which was the mainstay of the centralised Cuban economy until the late 20th
century.
Cuba Sugar industries need foreign investment-new tech
Garcia 13 (Jose Garcia, Economist, 6/14/13, “Economists Assess Challenges of Cuban Sugar
Sector”, http://www.periodico26.cu/index.php/en/cuba-news/9228-economists-assesschallenges-of-cuban-sugar-sector)
Gathered in working commissions at Havana's International Convention Center, academics, experts and officials addressed the
importance of the sugar industry for the country's economic and social development and the need
to find ways for its recovery.¶ Economist Jose Antonio Garcia said that all sugar mills must undergo a thorough
testing stage before joining the harvest, pointing to the breakdown of a boiler in a sugar plant
in the province of Mayabeque, two days after beginning the harvest.¶ The expert also called
for having sugar cane plantations nearer the industry, bearing in mind the properties of the
soil, selecting the seeds appropriately, guaranteeing the repair of all equipment used in the harvest, and having a larger participation by research
centers.¶ Finance and Price Minister Alfredo Alvarez said that sugar workers must be paid according to the prices of
the product on the world market, and in tune with the diversification of the sector, since
many of the products are exported and others generate electrical power from biomass.¶
Economist Jose Luis Rodríguez said that there is a lot of efficiency to recover in the sector, particularly
in the production of sugar cane derivatives. He also stressed the need for foreign investment
to obtain new technologies.
An end to the embargo would result in cheaper sugar
Knapp 9 (Thomas Knapp, Senior news Analyst at the Center for Stateless Society-Think tank,
2009, “Who Benefits From the US Trade Embargo of Cuba?,” Online,
http://c4ss.org/content/1369)
What would be the result of an end to the embargo — assuming, as it is never safe to do, that both governments
were actually willing to drop it into the wastebasket of history? On the economic side, consumers and non-rent-seeking
producers in both countries would benefit. Sugar in particular would get cheaper in the US
as American producers were forced to compete in an open market instead of being “protected” from
Goods of all types would get cheaper in Cuba as American imports which only have to be shipped across
90 miles of ocean arrive to compete with their European equivalents. Producers in both countries would have new
markets opened to them, and capital from both countries would have new,
competitive places to flow to.
Cuban cane.
US businesspeople want to invest in Cuba—embargo is the only thing stopping
them
Wall Street Journal 12 (2012,“Investing in Cuba: Good Luck With That,”
http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2012/03/26/investing-in-cuba-good-luck-with-that/)
a story about a closed-end mutual-fund manager who has been waiting nearly 20
years for the opportunity to invest directly in Cuba. Indeed, the business opportunity
seems tempting: 90 miles south of Key West, Florida is an island of more than 11 million people with
infrastructure that’s seen little update since the 1960s. That’s led many a businessman
to dream of the day when he or she could get exposure to that market. Of course, there’s a
daunting hurdle: The U.S. has banned most business with Cuba since 1962. As a result, it is near impossible
for ordinary investors to get more than minimal exposure to Cuba, according to lawyers and investment
This weekend, we wrote
advisers. In 1958, as Fidel Castro’s revolutionaries fought the Cuban government, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo. After Mr. Castro took power and his government aligned
The restrictions have remained mostly in place, though
the Obama administration has eased restrictions on travel and money sent to family
members Cuba. U.S. companies in certain industries, such as food, medical supplies, and entertainment can do business in Cuba if they get the proper licenses
with the Soviet Union, the U.S. broadened the trade limits.
from the U.S Treasury Department and the U.S. Commerce Department, said Erich Ferrari, a lawyer based in Washington who specializes in U.S. economic sanctions. Even so,
the penalties for violating the embargo are severe: between $65,000 and $100,000 in
fines and 10 years in prison
The sugar industry in Cuba seeks foreign investment
Peters 3 (Phillip Peters ,degrees from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and
the Georgetown University Graduate School, International Studies, 2003, “Cutting Losses: Cuba
Downsizes its Sugar Industry,”
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/ResearchProducts/cuttin
g-losses.pdf)
The sugar ministry is actively seeking foreign investors to boost production of
derivatives,¶ and officials use Cuban workers’ educational level and the nation’s scientific
infrastructure,¶ low production costs, location, and the markets’ growth potential as
selling¶ points. They say they see substantial interest among potential partners. “There are
more¶ foreign capitalists that come to make offers than those we seek out,” claims one
official.
U.S. investment and bilateral cooperation with Cuba key to Cuba’s sugarcane
ethanol industry
Perales 10 (Jose Raul Perales, senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010, “The United States and Cuba:
Implications of an Economic Relationship,”
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)
it is in the best interest, of both Cuba and the United States to
begin energy collaboration today. What is needed, Piñón continued, is a bilateral policy that
would contribute to Cuba’s energy independence as well as support a broader
national energy policy that embraces modernization of infrastructure, the balancing of hydrocarbons
In spite of these developments, Piñón argued
with renewable materials, and conservation and environmental stewardship. He highlighted the case of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, and what would
happen if such an incident happened in a Cuban oil rig (under current U.S. policy banning equipment and technological sales to the island), as a reminder of the need for an
if U.S. companies were allowed to
contribute to developing Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as renewable energy such as solar, wind, and
sugarcane ethanol, it would reduce the influence of autocratic and corrupt
governments on the island’s road toward self determination . Most importantly, it
would provide the United States and other democratic countries with a better chance
of working with Cuba’s future leaders to carry out reforms that would lead to a more
open and representative society. American oil and oil equipment and service companies have the
capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine in a
safe and responsible manner Cuba’s potential oil and natural gas reserves. In terms of specific U.S.
industries, agribusiness is pushing for a lifting of certain restrictions in the U.S. embargo in
order to increase its participation in the Cuban market, explained Chris Garza, senior director
of congressional relations at the American Farm Bureau. At present the industry has not
been able to see its full potential in Cuba due to existing restrictions. U.S. agribusiness
is not demanding that the embargo against Cuba be lifted; rather, it seeks key
concessions to ensure that U.S. firms can better compete in the Cuban market. Indeed, Garza
energy dialogue between Cuba and the United States. Moreover, Piñón contended that
highlighted how U.S. businesses can sell agricultural products to other U.S.-sanctioned countries and U.S. citizens can travel to such countries. In this sense, agribusiness is not
seeking drastic changes to U.S. foreign policy; it is merely asking for the ability to treat Cuba as it does other countries subject to U.S. economic and other sanctions.
Cuba in need of foreign investment to build ethanol industry
Specht 4/24 (Jonathan Specht, BA from University of California Davis, 4/24/13, “Raising Cane:
Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”,
http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)
because Cuba’s ethanol industry is currently almost nonexistent, ¶ it will need a
great deal of foreign expertise and investment to get¶ started. However, such investments are unlikely to
be made unless Cuba makes ¶ fundamental changes in its business climate. In the words of Gonzalez and ¶ McCarthy, “[C]apital
investment, which Cuba’s economy desperately needs and ¶ which is most likely to be
supplied by foreign investors, will be difficult to¶ attract without enforceable
contracts, access to neutral adjudication of disputes, ¶ and a degree of predictability
that has heretofore been lacking.”54 Any post-¶ Castro government will likely begin to make
such changes to increase the appeal¶ of the island nation to foreign investment. However,
Additionally,
implementing these¶ changes will take time and trial and error, which will slow the creation of a ¶ sugarcane-based ethanol industry.
The 2012 drought supplies even more incentive to withdraw the embargo and
invest in the Cuban sugar industry
Specht 4/24 (Jonathan Specht, BA from University of California Davis, 4/24/13, “Raising Cane:
Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”,
http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)
The drought of 2012 not only highlighted the drawbacks of the U.S. ethanol status quo, but also the
importance of not abandoning biofuels in general. The¶ 2012 drought substantiated criticisms that the current corn-
based system of ethanol production is flawed. Yet, policy-makers should not automatically
respond by withdrawing federal government support for the creation of bio- based
alternatives to fossil fuels. Given that the RFS would be critical for future¶ development of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry,
the abolition of this standard that some have called for would have long-lasting effects.¶ While it is currently impossible to blame any single
climatological event on climate change, even one as large as a major regional drought, scientists have long predicted that such droughts as the Midwest
experienced in 2012 are the type of events that will result from climate change.192 Adding to the already overwhelming evidence that climate change
is occurring (and should no longer be a matter of debate),193 July 2012 was the hottest month the United States has experienced in 118 years of
meteorological records.194 The key to halting (or at least slowing) climate change will be to keep as large an amount as is possible of the carbon stored
in fossil fuels — coal, oil, and natural gas — in the ground and out of the atmosphere.195 By providing an alternative to petroleum, biofuels can help to
reduce oil consumption and therefore aid in the extremely important challenge of keeping carbon underground. ¶ As
the United States
faces the twin challenges of climate change and peak oil, biofuels must be a part of the
solution. However, it is imperative that policies promoting biofuels are capable of
accomplishing the United States’ environmental and energy goals. Neither a wholesale
abandonment of federal involvement in the development of biofuels nor a continuation of the
corn- centric status quo is an acceptable way forward. The development of a Cuban
sugarcane-based ethanol industry is part of a potential solution. Whether the former incentives for the domestic
ethanol that expired at the end of 2011 will be revived by a future Farm Bill remains to be seen. Even if they are not, as long as the U.S.
trade embargo against Cuba continues there will be little chance of that country making a
substantial investment in the development of an entire new industry. It is understandable, for face-saving
reasons, that United States¶ policy-makers would not consider ending the decades-long trade embargo against Cuba as long as Fidel Castro remains
alive.196 But, as soon as possible after a governmental transition begins in Cuba, United States policy-makers
taking steps to encourage the creation of such an industry.¶
should consider
I/L Sugar Key Brazil
No alt causes to growth-agriculture is the base for future diversity-Dutch
disease
Sapp 12(William Sapp, Writer for Geopolitical Monitor, 2012 “The Fragility of Brazil’s Economic
Strength”,
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-fragility-of-brazils-economic-strength-4657)
When a significant segment of a country’s economy is based around raw material exports,
inflows of foreign capital tend to artificially raise the value of the domestic currency. The
result is inflation and an increased reliance on international savings to finance growth. In
theory, capital flows from developed nations should be welcomed in developing economies like
Brazil. After all, foreign capital can improve social welfare and increase industrial diversification.
But, in practice, the negative effects of a commodity based economy often outweigh the
positive. ¶ Dutch disease is not a new phenomenon in Brazil. Whether sugar, coffee, gold or
rubber, the Brazilian economy has frequently been a prisoner of the boom and bust nature of
commodities. Since its independence in 1825, Brazil has defaulted on (or “restructured”) its
debt a staggering seven times. Indeed, it would be more appropriate to call the economic
phenomenon ‘Brazilian disease’ considering the nation’s long history of economic turmoil. ¶ Of
course, the Brazilian economy of today is significantly different from the Brazil of the past. Its
economy, which for centuries has been based on the exportation of a “small number of
primary products,” now reads like a weekend shopping list. Brazil is the world’s leading
exporter of poultry, beef, orange juice, coffee, and sugar and the world’s second leading
exporter of soybeans and iron ore. In terms of monetary value, its top five exports are iron ore,
oil & fuel, transport equipment (aircraft), soy, sugar, and ethanol. ¶ Despite Brazil’s impressive
portfolio of export commodities, economists remain concerned – largely because of the recent
discovery of the 800 km pre-salt deep water oil reserves off the Brazilian coast. In a recent
Financial Times article, former Petrobras President Sergio Gabrielli, estimated that the oil
industry will grow from around 10% of GDP to an astounding 25% in coming decades. Whether
this unprecedented project – estimated to attract 1 trillion (USD) in capital investment over the
next decade – turns into an economic windfall or an economic oil spill for the Brazilian people
will largely depend on the government’s economic decisions in the next few years.¶ On March
13th the Brazilian government amped up its protective measures, and broadened its tax on
financial operations (IOF) by levying a 6% tax on foreign loans and bonds that exit Brazil within
five years. According to Mantega, the goal is to curb “the inflow of speculative capital” that
enters Brazil seeking to capitalize on the difference between interest rates in developed
countries and Brazil. The IOF may well contain inflation for the 2012 financial year: the real is
currently hovering at approximately (BRL) $R 1.8 to the USD (from a high of (BRL) $R1.53 in July
2011) and is expected to plateau at (BRL) $R2.0 to the dollar by the end of the 3rd quarter. ¶
Regardless of whether Brazil’s manufacturing sector returns to previous levels of production
or continues to decline, the price of commodities should remain stable in the short-term. As
an economic immunization shot, the Brazilian government might heed the advice of legendary
economist Edmar Bacha who recommends creating an oil sovereign fund – in the Chilean model
- that would function as an economic buffer protecting the nation against commodity volatility. ¶
If the Brazilian government fails to implement significant economic safeguards, there is the
unpleasant possibility that the country’s Dutch disease, currently in remission, may indeed
recur.
Even if sugar isn’t key-the ethanol it produces fuels the economy
Neves 13(Marcos Fava Neves, Professor of Business at Unviersity of Sao Paulo, Expert on
Global Ag Business, 4/11/13, “Sugar cane vital to Economy”,
http://www.energyforecastonline.co.za/articles/sugar-cane-can-fuel-economy)
The impacts for agrifood system participants are hard to ignore.¶ Farmers and agribusiness
companies are now expected to reduce their environmental footprint, to increase transparency
and facilitate a better flow of information, to be better governed and promote corporate social
responsibility, to be more inclusive, and to be better stewards of the environment and increase
the usage of renewable energy sources.¶ The legitimacy of agribusiness firms – and entire
agrifood value chains – is not only dependent on economic factors but also on social and
environmental sustainability. Simply put, in the 21st century planet and people matter as much
as profits.¶ The role of biofuels in delivering sustainability¶ Some researchers suggest that
biofuels could play a big part in the solution for poor countries to diversify business and ensure
sustainable development.¶ Several countries that implemented biofuels development
programmes have experienced significant job creation, especially in rural areas but also along
the value chain.¶ The International Labour Organization estimates the number of jobs created in
the renewable energy sector will double by 2020 with about 300 000 new jobs.¶ In the early
phase of the bio-ethanol programme in the US, around 147 000 jobs were created in different
sectors of the economy.¶ This short article outlines some potential benefits of biofuel
development in Africa.¶ The development of the sugarcane industry in Brazil may serve as a
model.¶ The industry output is impressive: 550 million metric tons of sugarcane is used as raw
material to produce 31 MMT of sugar (equivalent to 20% of world production), 27 billion liters
of ethanol (30% of world production) and bio-electricity.¶ Ethanol production alone creates 465
000 direct jobs, which is six times larger than the oil industry in Brazil.
Ag Key to Brazil Econ
Waring 13(David Waring, Writer at ForexNews, 3/14/13,
http://www.forexnews.com/blog/2013/03/14/brazilian-economy/)
Agriculture represents 5.5% of the brazilian economy and employs 15% of the workforce,
approximately 10 million people. Brazil is often called the food basket of the world and for
good reason, many of the products you take for granted are actually produced in Brazil.¶ Sugar
cane is by far Brazil’s biggest food export, it’s responsible for 6.5% of overall exports. This is
followed by soybeans (5.4%), poultry (2.9%), coffee (2.6%), bovine meat (1.6%) and fruit juice
(1.6%).¶ The agricultural sector in Brazil is one of the fastest growing sectors, growing at a rate
of 9.6% annually. This rapid growth comes at a cost however. There is continued pressure on
Brazil to increase its arable land stocks.
US Wont Increase Quotas
US wont increase sugar quotas
Josephs 13(Leslie Josephs, Writer for Wall Street Journal, 2/19/13, “U.S. Unlikely to Raise
Sugar-Import Quota”,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323495104578314510772923662.html)
The U.S. government is unlikely to raise the quota for no- or low-tariff sugar imports for the
first time in four years, due to increased domestic production, a person who works for the U.S.
Department of Agriculture said Tuesday.¶ Big U.S. sugar production is mirroring the global
market, where output is expected to outpace demand this season. If the U.S. buys less of the
sweetener from the global market, it could put more pressure on sugar prices, which have been
trading near 30-month lows.¶ While U.S. sugar cane and sugar beet growers produce most of the
country's supply of the sweetener, the World Trade Organization requires the U.S. to allow a
minimum of 1.23 million short tons of no- or low-tariff raw-sugar imports each year. Whether
that much sugar is brought into the U.S. depends on demand and market prices. The U.S. usually
chooses to allow more than the minimum, a decision the USDA makes after April 1.¶ "It's highly
unlikely that there would be any quota increases in the current market situation," the person
said.¶ The last time the U.S. didn't raise the tariff-rate quota, or TRQ, for raw sugar was the
2009 fiscal year, according to the USDA.¶ Favorable weather in major sugar cane- and sugarbeetgrowing areas are expected to lift production this season, as well as those in Mexico. Under the
North American Free Trade Agreement, the U.S. can import sugar duty-free from its southern
neighbor.¶ A mild winter, timely rains and dry harvesting weather in late 2012 helped production
reach a record, said Jim Simon, general manager of the American Sugar Cane League, an
industry group that represents 450 farms in Louisiana.¶ The USDA estimates Louisiana will
produce 1.7 million short tons of sugar this season, which Mr. Simon said was "a record."
Louisiana is the second-largest sugarcane-growing state, after Florida.¶ The U.S. consumes 11.5
million short tons of sugar annually.
Cuba Spills Over
A Cuban Sugar Ethanol Industry Would Be World Class if Developed.
Specht 4/24 (Jonathan Specht, BA from University of California Davis, 4/24/13, “Raising Cane:
Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”,
http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)
To speak of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry is, at this point, largely a matter of speculation.46 Because of the anti-ethanol views of Fidel
Castro (who has said that ethanol should be discouraged because it diverts crops from food to fuel),47 Cuba currently has almost no ethanol industry.
In the words of Ronald Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings Institution, “Despite the fact that Cuba
is dependent on oil
imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of Brazil in using ethanol to achieve energy
self-sufficiency, it has not embarked on a policy to develop a larger ethanol industry from
sugarcane.”48 There is, however, no reason why such an industry cannot be developed. As Soligo and Jaffe
wrote, “In addition, Cuba has large land areas that once produced sugar but now lie idle. These could
be revived to provide a basis for a world-class ethanol industry. We estimate that if Cuba
achieves the yield levels attained in Nicaragua and Brazil and the area planted with sugarcane
approaches levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba could produce up to 2 billion gallons of
sugar-based ethanol per year.”49
Cuba is the ideal area in which to grow sugarcane for ethanol, but needs
investment
Specht 4/24 (Jonathan Specht, BA from University of California Davis, 4/24/13, “Raising Cane:
Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”,
http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)
To speak of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry is, at this point, largely a matter of speculation.46 Because of the anti-ethanol views of Fidel
Castro (who has said that ethanol should be discouraged because it diverts crops from food to fuel),47 Cuba
currently has almost no
ethanol industry. In the words of Ronald Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings Institution, “Despite the fact that Cuba is dependent on
oil imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of Brazil in using ethanol to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it has not embarked on a policy to
develop a larger ethanol industry from sugarcane.”48 There
is, however, no reason why such an industry cannot be
developed. As Soligo and Jaffe wrote, “In addition, Cuba has large land areas that once produced sugar but
now lie idle. These could be revived to provide a basis for a world-class ethanol industry. We
estimate that if Cuba achieves the yield levels attained in Nicaragua and Brazil and the area
planted with sugarcane approaches levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba could produce
up to 2 billion gallons of sugar-based ethanol per year.”49¶ The ideal domestic policy scenario
for the creation of a robust Cuban sugarcane ethanol industry would be a situation in which:
the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is ended; U.S. tariff barriers are removed (in the case of
sugar) or not revived (in the case of ethanol); and the RFS requiring that a certain percentage
of U.S. fuel come from ethanol remain in place. Of course, changes in United States policy alone, even those that
ensure a steady source of demand for Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol, would not be enough to create an ethanol
industry from scratch. Cuba will need to foster the industry as a key goal of the post-Castro
era and shape its domestic policies to encourage the growth of the industry.¶ Given that the Cuban sugar
industry lived and died by its ties with the Soviet Union for several decades of the Twentieth Century,50 Cuba will likely be quite wary of investing too
much in the creation of a sugarcane ethanol industry that it perceives as being largely a creature of U.S. energy and agricultural policy. Therefore, the
creation of a significant sugarcane ethanol industry in Cuba will require a large increase in domestic demand for ethanol. One way that Cuba could
encourage domestic demand for ethanol would be to follow the Brazilian model of encouraging the purchase of Flex Fuel vehicles, which can run on
any blend of fuel between 100% gasoline and 100% ethanol.51 Given the relative poverty of Cuba’s population, as indicated by the number of vehicles
in the country that are several decades old,52 expecting new vehicles to provide a source of demand for ethanol may be an extremely unrealistic
prospect. On the other hand, potential pent-up demand for new automobiles, alongside sufficient and well-directed government incentives, could
accelerate demand for Flex Fuel vehicles relative to other countries.¶ Like all new capitalist industries to emerge in the post-Castro era, whatever
ethanol industry arises will have to deal with the painful transition from socialism to capitalism. The
Cuban sugarcane ethanol
industry will face similar challenges to other private sector industries that arise in the post-Fidel era.
One of these challenges will be simply a lack of people with skills necessary for any industry. According to
Edward Gonzalez and Kevin McCarthy of the RAND Corporation, “[A]s a result of 40-plus years of communism, the labor force lacks the kinds of trained
managers, accountants, auditors, bankers, insurers, etc., that a robust market economy requires.”53 While these challenges will not be unique to
Cuba’s ethanol industry, they will put the country at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis existing ethanol exporters such as Brazil. This will be especially
true if there is a significant lag time between the expiration of the ethanol tariff barriers at the end of 2011 and the eventual removal of the United
States trade embargo against Cuba.¶ Additionally, because
Cuba’s ethanol industry is currently almost nonexistent, it will need a great deal of foreign expertise and investment to get started. However, such
investments are unlikely to be made unless Cuba makes fundamental changes in its business climate. In the words of Gonzalez and McCarthy, “[C]apital
investment, which Cuba’s economy desperately needs and which is most likely to be supplied by foreign investors, will be difficult to attract without
enforceable contracts, access to neutral adjudication of disputes, and a degree of predictability that has heretofore been lacking.”54 Any post- Castro
government will likely begin to make such changes to increase the appeal of the island nation to foreign investment. However, implementing these
changes will take time and trial and error, which will slow the creation of a sugarcane-based ethanol industry.
Aff answers
Imported Cuban biofuel would trade off with corn ethanol production in
the US(US Biofuels impacts)
Specht 4/24 (Jonathan Specht, BA from University of California Davis, 4/24/13, “Raising Cane:
Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”,
http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)
Unless Congress raises the RFS by a sufficient degree to absorb all domestic ethanol production on top of these new imports, the
increase in such imports would likely damage the domestic ethanol industry. “Whatever
the level or type of biofuel,
increased imports (holding other factors constant) would reduce the quantity of domestically
produced biofuels, which would reduce the demand for biofuel feedstocks.”138 Because very little
ethanol is currently imported into the United States, law and policy changes that successfully fostered the development of a
Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry would have a significant economic impact on the
United States. Such a change would have the largest economic effect on two regions: the Midwest, which is currently the
primary source of ethanol production in the United States, and the Southeast, especially Florida. This Part of the Article will discuss
the likely economic effects of such policy changes first on the Midwest, then on Florida, then on the United States generally.
Sugar Ethonal solves fossil fuels(add warming or oil dependence impacts)
Newsweek 7 (“Sugar Rush,” 2007, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/04/15/sugar-rush.html)
He won't be the last. Thanks
to global climate change, sugar now is in big demand. The drum-beat of
alarm over global warming has set businesses clamoring for a piece of the sugar-cane action.
There are plenty of other ways to make ethanol, of course, and scientists the world over are busy tinkering with everything from
switchgrass to sweet potatoes. U.S.
farmers make it from corn, but with the scarcity of arable land there's just so much
combination of limited land
and surging demand have sent corn prices through the roof). So far nothing beats sugarcane—
which grows in the tropics—for an abundant, cheap source of energy. Unlike beets or corn, which are
confined to temperate zones and must be transformed into carbohydrates before they can be
converted into sugar and finally alcohol, sugarcane is already halfway there. That means the
sugar barons like Ometto spend much less energy than the competition, not to mention money.
The moral imperative of finding a substitute for fossil fuels has lent an air of respectability to
new ventures to produce biofuels from sugar—a marked contrast to the sugar barons of old, known for their
they can plant without crowding out other premium crops, like soy beans. (Meantime, the
ruthless ways and their appetite for taxpayers' money. "The distillers who ten years ago were the bandits of agribusiness are
becoming national and world heroes," Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula declared recently. "[E]thanol
and
biodiesel are more than an answer to our dangerous 'addiction' to fossil fuels. This is the
beginning of a reassessment of the global strategy to protect our environment."
Changes in US Policy Are Not Enough To Create a Cuban Ethanol Industry
Specht 4/24 (Jonathan Specht, BA from University of California Davis, 4/24/13, “Raising Cane:
Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”,
http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)
The ideal domestic policy scenario for the creation of a robust Cuban sugarcane ethanol
industry would be a situation in which: the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is ended; U.S. tariff barriers
are removed (in the case of sugar) or not revived (in the case of ethanol); and the RFS requiring
that a certain percentage of U.S. fuel come from ethanol remain in place. Of course, changes
in United States policy alone, even those that ensure a steady source of demand for Cuban
sugarcane-based ethanol, would not be enough to create an ethanol industry from scratch.
Cuba will need to foster the industry as a key goal of the post-Castro era and shape its domestic policies to encourage the growth of
the industry.
Brazil Econ Resilient
Rathbone 12(John Paul Rathbone, Economist at the Financial times, 9/20/12, “Mantega says
Brazil’s economy resilient”, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/91677578-0341-11e2-bad200144feabdc0.html#axzz2ajYEh3nX)
Brazil’s economy is more resilient than other big countries and its economic development model “more
consistent” too, he says.¶ It is a contentious position given that Brazil’s economy, until recently a market darling and many investors’
favourite among the so-called Bric nations of it, Russia, India and China, has lurched from boom to near stagnation. The world’s
sixth-biggest economy is expected to expand by 1.6 per cent this year, after 7.5 per cent in 2010. Still, Mr Mantega says Brazil is now
back on the right track, despite difficult global conditions.¶ “We
are taking measures to ensure that growth is
long-term,” he said, forecasting a return to an annual growth rate of 4 per cent by the year end, “even with Europe
close to recession and the US economy moving sideways.Ӧ Be that as it may, many have
questioned Brazil’s growth model of late and wondered how sustainable it is. For the past
decade, Brazil has surfed the global commodity boom. At home, it has enjoyed an explosion of credit-driven
consumption.¶ Critics say these drivers have now run out of steam and, to compensate, Brazil has increasingly turned to the state
rather than the private sector to provide growth. Furthermore, Brazil is held back by an over-regulated labour market, a highly
complex tax system and crumbling infrastructure.¶ Mr Mantega says that is looking at Brazil “through a rear-view mirror” and,
besides, when the state does act it is to provide a counter-cyclical boost or to step in when the market fails. He cites the example of
Banco do Brasil, a state-controlled bank that enjoys private-sector levels of profitability, but that on recent government orders cut
lending spreads. Competing private banks soon followed suit.¶ The 63-year old also reacts adroitly to charges that Brazil’s
occasionally erratic growth path is a result of ad hoc state intervention and that other Latin American countries, such as Chile or
Mexico, achieve more consistent growth with more market-friendly policies.¶ “I don’t call this chicken flight,” he says, whipping out
a chart, handwritten on a piece of lined notepaper, which
compares Brazilian growth with Mexico’s over the
past six years. It shows that Brazil averaged 4.2 per cent and Mexico 2.1 per cent. At least by
that measure, even though it is backward looking, Brazil is in the lead.¶ What of the future? Mr
Mantega says a series of recent measures – from cuts in payroll taxes to lower electricity tariffs and a $66bn
package of new privately operated infrastructure projects – will reduce the infamous “custo
Brasil”, the high cost of doing business in Brazil.¶ “This is not wishful thinking. This is something that is already
taking place,” he says. “We are going to continue reducing costs and taxes.”¶ The result will be a more competitive
economy, a theme much on his mind as the US, Japan and Europe embark on their latest round of quantitative-easing policies.
These, though, will have little effect on their home economies, he says, but will inevitably led to beggar-thy-neighbour devaluations
and growing trade friction.
Brazil economy down-mulitple warrants
Seibt 13(Sebastian Seibt, Writer for Franch24, 6/20/13, “Behind the Protests, Brazil’s
dysfunctional Economy”, http://www.france24.com/en/20130620-brazil-protests-sao-paulodilma-rousseff-world-cup-economy-inflation)
The increase in bus ticket prices (0.20 real, or 0.06 euros) is symptomatic of the inflation that has
been plaguing Brazil for several months. “Prices are going up at a rate higher than 6% per
month, which is higher than the 4.5% objective established by the government,” explained Christine
Rifflart, an economist specialised in Latin America at the French Economic Observatory (OFCE).¶ The rise in public
transportation costs is part of a larger increase in the cost of living in Brazil. Prices of basic
goods like tomatoes rose by as much as 90% in a year, for example. Rent has also been on the rise over the
past several years, increasing by an average of 120% since 2008. “This inflation is essentially due to the
increase in salaries,” Rifflart pointed out.¶ Consequently, the poorest Brazilians – those whose salaries have not risen – are
getting poorer.¶ “Brazil
remains one of the countries with the highest level of inequality when it
comes to salary and access to social services,” noted Jérémie Gignoux, an economist at the Paris School of
Economics.¶ If the Brazilian government succeeded in significantly lowering the poverty rate in
the country, which went from 34% of the population in 2004 to 22% in 2009, authorities today
are having a difficult time stopping the spiralling inflation.¶ The government is indeed stuck between two,
somewhat conflicting priorities: the need to fight inflation and the need to stimulate the economy so that it is healthy again. Brazil’s
economy, the seventh largest, grew “by only 0.9% in 2012, essentially because of low export levels,” Rifflart said – compared to an
average annual growth rate of 3.6% over the past decade.¶ In
order to revitalise the sale of Brazilian products
abroad, the government could lower its currency rate in order to make exports less expensive,
but that could end up worsening inflation.¶ The World Cup: a bitter pill to swallow¶ But it is not so much Brazil’s
poorest residents who are in the street marching in protest against the cost of living. “Students
and the middle-class Brazilians are also participating in the protests, which makes this a slightly unusual social movement,” Rifflart
observed.¶ For the new middle class, the
spending related to hosting the World Cup in 2014 is a hard pill
to swallow. “They find it indecent to spend between 11 and 15 billion dollars to organise this
sporting event, while public services and infrastructure need money,” the economist explained.¶ he
government is therefore faced with middle-class citizens demanding public services that are up to the level of their new social
status. “It’s the price Brazil is paying for the growth that allowed 30 million Brazilians to lift themselves out of poverty and join the
middle class over the past several years,” said Stéphane Witkowski, chairman of the board at Paris’s Institute of Latin American
Studies, in an interview with French daily Le Figaro.¶ Moreover, the
quality of education available to most
Brazilians remains “very weak”, noted Christine Rifflart, while the best schools are still largely attended by those who
can pay for them: the richest Brazilians.
Brazil Economy is diverse-Ag not key
Brazil Sourcing 6(BrazilSourcing.com 2006 “Manufacturing Base”,
http://www.brazilsourcing.com/manufbase.php)
Brazil has one of the most diverse industrial sectors in Latin America with industries of
textiles, shoes, chemicals, cement, lumber, iron ore, tin, steel, aircraft, motor vehicles and
parts, other machinery and equipment.¶ It exports transport equipment, iron ore, soybeans,
footwear, coffee, autos and imports machinery, electrical and transport equipment, chemical
products, oil, automotive parts, electronics. The main commercial partners of Brazil are the USA, Colombia,
Germany, Japan, Argentina, China, Canada and United Kingdom.¶ CHIEF EXPORTS: Manufactures, iron ore, soybeans, footwear,
coffee.¶ CHIEF IMPORTS: Machinery and equipment, chemical products, oil, electricity¶ Manufacturing¶ Major products in the
manufacturing sector are televisions, VCRs, telephones, and computer chips. There are a few national companies that are
domestically oriented, such as Consul and Brastemp. There are also companies that are primarily export oriented, such as Nokia,
Intel, and Compaq.¶ State
participation in manufacturing occurs in the production of textiles and
clothing, footwear, food, and beverages. These industries comprise a large proportion of the manufacturing sector,
but there are also new industries that have been developed in the last few decades with
government aid. Machinery and transport equipment, construction materials, sugar cane and wood derivatives, and
chemicals are important manufacturing industries. Direct government participation is noticed in the oil processing industry and
passenger jet aircraft industry through partial ownership of such companies. Indirect government participation is noticed in the
textile industry and machinery industry through export subsidies and low interest loans.¶ Transport Vehicles¶ Automobiles
are the most important manufactured items in Brazil. Brazil's passenger automotive
production was approximately 2.45 million passenger car units in 2005. Brazil has manufacturing plants
for General Motors, Volkswagen, Ford, Fiat, Honda, and Toyota. Workers are highly unionized, receiving the highest salaries among
the manufacturing industries¶ Textiles¶ The
national textile industry is responsible for 3 percent of world
production. Brazil has the largest textile operating facilities in Latin America. The textile
industry is also labor intensive, employing 1.65 million people in 2006. Fibers and leather are used to
produce clothing, shoes, and luggage. Brazilian shoes are exported mainly to Europe, where they are famous for their quality.¶
Paper¶ The
Brazilian paper industry was responsible for the production of 8.8 million metric tons
and the pulp industry produced 11 million metric tons in 2006. The industry consisted of
approximately 200 companies, employing approximately 80,000 people directly in their
processing operations and 60,000 people in forestry operations.¶ Mining¶ The mining sector was protected
by the 1988 constitution against foreign majority participation of direct mining companies. This was a setback for the development
of the mining sector because domestic investors lacked the capital for extensive mineral exploration. Private Brazilian investors and
Brazilian corporations own the majority of the mineral industry. The participation of foreign capital is very limited due to Brazilian
mining laws. However, in 1995 the Congress approved an amendment to the constitution allowing private companies (including
foreigners) to participate in the mining industry through joint ventures, deregulating investments, and the privatization of stateowned mining plants. Shortly afterwards, the state-owned Companhia Vale do Rio Doce was privatized.¶ The
country is the
world's largest producer of bauxite, gemstones, columbium, gold, iron ore, kaolin,
manganese, tantalum, and tin. Major exports are iron ore, tin, and aluminum. The states of Minas
Gerais, Bahia, and Goiás, located in the midwest of Brazil, have deposits of diamonds and other precious and semiprecious stones.¶
Financial Services¶ The
government owns most of the financial sector, the largest component of the
services industry. The 3 largest banks of Brazil are the Bank of Brazil, Federal Economic Register, and National Bank of
Economic and Social Development (BNDES).¶ The Bank of Brazil is the largest bank in Brazil and the largest financial institution in
Latin America. It has 12.9 million customers and agencies in 30 different countries, employing 90,378 people.¶ The Brazilian Discount
Bank (BRADESCO) and Itaú have the largest assets in the private sector.¶ Retail¶ This
sector is responsible for the
highest number of employed people in all sectors of the services industry. The bulk of employed
people in this sector come from companies that employ less than 500 employees. Combined retail and wholesale sectors were made
up of 708,635 retail and wholesale outlets. There are few retail chains in the economy. Most of them are located in the capitals of
each state but are not part of the retail context in the less developed economies in rural areas. Food, grocery, and other retail chains
are located in the coastal areas whereas small family-owned businesses compose the retail sector in smaller cities. The smaller retail
businesses are responsible for employing a large number of people
No timeframe – It would take 17 years to repay its carbon debt
Fargione et al. ’08 (Joseph Fargione, Jason Hill, David Tilman, Stephen Polasky, and Peter Hawthorne, Writers for Science
Mag, 2/7/8, “Clearing and Biofuel Debt”, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/319/5867/1235.full)
Our results show that converting native ecosystems to biofuel production results in large carbon debts (Fig. 1A). We attribute 13, 61,
and 17% of this carbon debt to coproducts for palm, soybeans, and corn, respectively (Fig. 1B) (5). The carbon debts attributed to
biofuels (quantities of Fig. 1A multiplied by the proportions of Fig. 1B) would not be repaid by the annual carbon repayments from
biofuel production (Fig. 1C and table S2) for decades or centuries (Fig. 1D). Converting lowland tropical rainforest in Indonesia and
Malaysia to palm biodiesel would result in a biofuel carbon debt of ∼610 Mg of CO2 ha–1 that would take ∼86 years to repay (Fig.
1D). Until then, producing and using palm biodiesel from this land would cause greater GHG release than would refining and using
an energy-equivalent amount of petroleum diesel. Converting tropical peatland rainforest to palm production incurs a similar biofuel
carbon debt from vegetation, but the required drainage of peatland causes an additional sustained emission of ∼55 Mg of CO2 ha–1
yr–1 from oxidative peat decomposition (5) (87% attributed to biofuel; 13% to palm kernel oil and meal). After 50 years, the
resulting biofuel carbon debt of ∼3000 Mg of CO2 ha–1 would require ∼420 years to repay. However, peatland of average depth (3
m) could release peat-derived CO2 for about 120 years (7, 13). Total net carbon released would be ∼6000 Mg of CO2 ha–1 over this
longer time horizon, which would take over 840 years to repay. Soybean biodiesel produced on converted Amazonian rainforest
with a biofuel carbon debt of >280 Mg of CO2 ha–1 would require ∼320 years to repay as compared with GHG emissions from
petroleum diesel. The biofuel carbon debt from biofuels produced on converted Cerrado is repaid in the least amount of time of the
scenarios that we examined. Sugarcane
ethanol produced on Cerrado sensu stricto (including Cerrado aberto, Cerrado
∼17 years
to repay the biofuel carbon debt. Soybean biodiesel from the drier, less productive grass-dominated end of the
densu, and Cerradão), which is the wetter and more productive end of this woodland-savanna biome, would take
Cerrado biome (Campo limpo and Campo sujo) would take ∼37 years. Ethanol from corn produced on newly converted U.S. central
grasslands results in a biofuel carbon debt repayment time of ∼93 years.