Prof. AMPARITA STA. MARIA, LL.B., LL.M.
ATENEO SCHOOL OF LAW

CORPUZ v. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
(G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010)
FACTS: Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto. Tomas but subsequently filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
Two years later, Corpuz fell in love with another Filipina. He went to
Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed
Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the
RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
BUT the foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven in court and recognized according to our rules of evidence. Thus, it serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of the alien, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

VDA. DE CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012
Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself.
The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE v. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 168796, April 15, 2010)
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.

Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

RICARDO P. TORING v. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
-Reiterated Santos v. CA and Republic v. CA and Molina
-Grounds for denial of Psychological Incapacity
-First of all, the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely on the testimony of Ricardo, the petitioner and their son, Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to the condition of Teresita to properly conclude that she is indeed inflicted with the Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Conclusions and generalizations about Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
-Second, it was not proven that the condition of Teresita was present from the moment the marriage was celebrated.
-Third, the statement of the root cause is a requirement that cannot be dispensed with but it may be proven either by an express statement or through the description of its physical manifestations.

CAMACHO- REYES v. REYES, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010
Within their acknowledged field of expertise,
(THREE) doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In short, the recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

BACCAY v. BACCAY (G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010)
The phrase “psychological incapacity” is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly non-cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Art. 68, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.

MARABLE v. MARABLE G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the
Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner's marriage to respondent. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extramarital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO GR. No. 184063 January 24, 2011
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

That respondent, according to petitioner, “lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility" does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the children’s upbringing. Still, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood “without any major parenting problems," and such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties’ marriage is a nullity.

OCHOSA V. ALANO G.R. No. 181881, January 26, 2011
In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated and that what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. In the case at bar, the evidence presented were the testimonies of Jose, his military aides and the psychiatrist.
But this is inadequate in proving that her “defects” were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose supported the allegation that Bona’s sexual promiscuity already existed prior to the marriage. The psychiatrist’s testimony on Bona’s histrionic personality disorder did not meet the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity as her findings did not emanate from a personal interview with Bona herself and merely relied on her interview with Jose and his other witnesses.

This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for
Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

AURELIO V. AURELIO G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011
The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity: (1)
Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision; (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

REPUBLIC v. GALANG (G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011)
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, the Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.

KALAW v. HERNANDEZ
(G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011)
The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff (petitioner). Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven.

PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. CA that
“the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”

DIÑO V. DIÑO (G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011)
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code.

In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

YU v. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
Finally, petitioner asserts that the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations would amount to an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment on the main issue. This argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. Petitioner's assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.

JARILLO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
On November 1979, the petitioner, being previously married in 1974, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage. The
RTC found petitioner guilty of bigamy in 2001. In 2003, judgment was promulgated declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage null and void ab initio on the ground of petitioner spouse’s psychological incapacity. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.

Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010
Petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato, alleging that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950. Accordingly, since he is the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue, he is entitled to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the the Civil Code.
This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the
Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.

ANTONE v. BERONILLA G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
This was exhaustively discussed in Mercado (G.R. No. 137110, 1
August 2000), where this Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage, this Court concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy

TEVES v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of;" especially since the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.
It does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the
First marriage AT THE TIME HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND
MARRIAGE.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

REPUBLIC v. GRANADA G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
After nine years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February
2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the CA.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
“as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together,
Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

Munoz v. Ramirez G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the
Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. When the value of the paraphernal property is considerably more than the conjugal improvement, said paraphernal property does not become conjugal property.

Fuentes vs. Roca G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property without the consent of his wife on January
11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code which gives the wife right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter
4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded
Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations
Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)

DELA PENA v. AVILA G.R. No. 187490, February 08, 2012
In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner.
Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. "Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."

AGUETE v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK G.R. No. 170166,
April 6, 2011
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

SPOUSES AGGABAO v. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN
G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code. The sale was made on March
18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. :
“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.

These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
The power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article
1876 to Article 1878).

FLORES v. LINDO G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the
Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31
October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

QUIAO v. QUIAO G.R. No 176556, July 04, 2012
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period. After more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation decision states that the ½ share of Brigido in the net profits shall be awarded to the children,
Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of
conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the
Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the abovelisted properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO
G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.

Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article
105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is
"without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the coheirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.

RAMOS v. PANGILINAN et. Al G.R. No. 185920, July 20, 2010
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege and on both instances, the exemption must be proved.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

DE MESA v. ACERO G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.

DOLINA v. VALLECERA GR No. 182367- December 15, 2010
FACTS: In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for VAWC under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint
Cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth which listed
Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also asked Vallecera‘s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the child’s father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not his. He also added that the petition is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial support.
The RTC dismissed the petition.

Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until
Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.

JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
F ACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC.
Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.

Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
RTC held that the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The CA also ruled in favour of Jesus, noting that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b)
The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of
DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c)
The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”