THE CONCEPT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION LAW REGIME
By
Daniel Bwala
Introduction
Extraterritoriality is a concept of enforcement of competition law beyond the
territorial border of the state. Its implementation has created difficulties beyond
states’ borders and the consequent interrelationships amongst states. This paper seeks
to analyse the problems of extraterritoriality as well as the methods adopted as a
model for global competition law so as to mitigate (if not eliminate) the difficulties
created by concept of extraterritoriality. The paper further seeks critically to consider
the pros and cons of each approach and suggest the approach considered as the
preferred universally accepted idea for global competition law. The paper concludes
by suggesting that the multilateral approach that is vigorously pursued by
organisations such as OECD, UNCTAD, ICN, WTO and World Bank be the preferred
idea for international competition law.
Extraterritoriality is related to a States’ limit on its jurisdictional competence in
relation to the application and enforcement of its laws abroad. 1 Jurisdictional
competence relate to states ability to make laws and enforce them. It’s a matter of
international. 2 Generally speaking, extraterritoriality within the purview of
international law is considered as a states’ capacity to protect its national interests
through the five principles, thus; Nationality; Protective Principles; Passive
personality; and Universal jurisdiction. 3 There are three methods that have been
adopted by states, regional blocs and trading partners, all of which are often been
referred to as the model(s) or alternative(s) for achieving global competition law. The
methods are thus categorised as Unilateral; Bi-lateral and Multi-lateral.
Unilateral approach
The unilateral approach has so far been adopted and applied by the United States of
America in the cases of United States V Aluminium Co. of America (Alcoa)4 and
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. V California5 on one hand, and the European Union in
the cases of ICI V Commission6 (Dyestuffs case) and A Ahlstrom Oy V Commission7
(Wood Pulp case) on the other hand. The US approach is premised on section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act 8 which clearly prohibits any deal or deals that restrict
interstate commerce, whether those deals are carried out horizontally by means of two
or more rival companies operating within the same market with a view to gain or
acquire greater market share thereby stifling smaller companies; or vertically by
1
Whish R., Bailey D., Competition Law (Oxford University Press), 7 th Ed, 2012, p.488
Brownlie., Principles of Public International Law (Clarendon Press), 7th Ed, 2008, p.
3
Carter B. E., Trimble P.R., International Law (Boston: Little, Brown) 1995, pp. 725-727
4
148 F 2d 416 (2nd Cir 1945) P.444
5
509 US 764 (1993)
6
(1972) ECR 619, (1972) CMLR 557
7
(1988) ECR 5193, (1988) 4 CMLR 901
8
1890 Ch. 647
2
means of producers colluding at different levels of the market thereby limiting
competition at each of those levels of the market. However, the decision of the US
Courts over time have produced two competing theories regarding extraterritorial
application of US Antitrust Law, thus; vested rights and effects theory. 9 The US court
in American Banana Co. V United Fruit Co10 applied the vested right theory and held
to the effect that the Sherman Act could not, therefore, regulate the monopoly,
because of the fact that the cause of action arose in Costa Rica and the injury suffered
occurred outside the US territorial jurisdiction. It was a case involving American
Banana Corporation located in Alabama and United Fruit Corporation situated in New
Jersey. American Banana Corporation that had a banana plantation in Costa Rica, had
its plantation confiscated and consequently its produce were damaged. It alleged that
United Fruit was behind it and filed an action in the US court and sought for treble
damages. Justice Holmes 11 stated in effect that in determining the legality or
otherwise of the character of an action, the law of the forum of that action must be
considered wholly. However, in United States V Aluminium Co. of America (Alcoa)
as cited above, the US Court adopted and applied the effects or balance of interests
theory and held to the effect that any state may impose liabilities on persons or
companies whether within or outside its allegiance, for conducts outside its territory
that creates an effect within its territory. It was a case involving the United States
government and the Aluminium Corporation of America (Alcoa), a US corporation
that had foreign investment in its stocks. Alcoa had a subsidiary company in Canada.
The Canadian company together with other European companies formed a cartel
called an ‘Alliance’ and although Alcoa technically was not a member of the alliance,
however, forty nine percent of the stocks in Alcoa was owned by controlling members
of the Canadian subsidiary company. The US government alleged that Alcoa
monopolized interstate and foreign commerce through conspiracy with the Canadian
subsidiary company. The court reasoned that any form of agreement by parties abroad
that was either intended to, and did have some form of effect on foreign trade or
commerce of the United States, would be caught up by the Sherman Act. In 1976, the
US court applied the balance of interest theory in the case of Timberlane Lumber Co.
V Bank of America12 and further stretched the principle in Alcoa to incorporate the
concept of international comity. The court held in effect that the principle in Alcoa
must be balanced against the interest of international comity. 13 The court further
outlined the tests for determining extraterritoriality to include; some effect (actual or
intended) on American foreign commerce; the effect should be sufficiently large to
present cognizable injury; and the interest and link to the US must be sufficiently
strong against those of other nations. 14 In 1993, the US Supreme Court again in
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. V California15 was called upon to determine whether
the comity principle precludes exercise of US extraterritorial jurisdiction over British
reinsurance companies. The case involved an alleged violation of Section 1 of
Sherman Antitrust Act through insurance coverage by US insurance companies and
British reinsurance companies in the US market. The Court again applied the effect
theory in interpreting the Sherman Act without regard to British foreign sovereignty.
9
Whish and Bailey cited supra pp. 489-492
213 US 347 (1909)
11
supra at p 356
12
549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
13
Jones A., Sufrin B., EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford University Press) 4th
Ed, 2011, pp. 1228-1230
14
ibid
15
supra
10
This extraterritoriality has its difficulties. Firstly, the US courts in Timberlane case
adopted and modified the effects doctrine and in Hartford Fire Insurance’s case
departed from it. It has created a judicial uncertainty as far as antitrust law is concern,
especially in relation to balancing the interest of the comity principle. Secondly,
because of the obvious disparity between the US antitrust law and the antitrust laws of
other nations with less developed principles, application of US extraterritoriality will
simply alienate those countries. Thirdly, even the concept of treble damages available
in US antitrust laws are strange and will adversely prejudice the interest of US trading
partners. In fact, the US extraterritoriality has sparked a series of legislation in other
states, in fierce resistance to US attempt to enforce its competition laws abroad.
Example, the UK, enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 16 as a means
of maintaining a resistance to US antitrust hegemony. Australia enacted the Foreign
Antitrust Judgment (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 197917 and Canada enacted the
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 198518 respectively. In the ICI case cited supra,
the US court even ordered ICI being a UK company from relying on its Patent Rights
under the UK law. A commentator observed that US antitrust extraterritoriality
amounts to judicial imperialism.19The difficulty with the decision of the US court in
Hartford fire insurance’ case is that it is unclear in the decision of the court whether
the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects test of the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) 1982 clearly amends or modifies the effects
theory of the decision in Alcoa and also whether judges have authority to decline
jurisdiction due to comity consideration and or whether the comity balancing test
should be applied only after the jurisdiction has been established.20
The European Union approach is premised on Article 101 and 10221, which empowers
the European court to exercise jurisdiction on grounds other than those grounds that
constitute the effect theory under the US law. The grounds provided under the said
articles are considered as single economic entity or theory doctrine, which connotes
an agreement by undertaking entered outside the European Union, but implemented
within the EU. The case of ICI v Commission (Dyestuffs case)22 paints the graphic
picture of a single economic entity doctrine. It was a case involving Imperial
Chemical Industrial Limited (ICI), a UK firm, but situated outside the EU. ICI was
charged by the European Commission responsible for the imposition of fines for
Dyestuffs cartel activities. The defence of ICI was that the jurisdiction of the
Commission to impose fine on ICI, being a company outside the EU was not
supported both by the EU Treaty as well as the international law principles of
sovereignty. The Commission overruled ICI’s objection, consequently ICI filed an
action against the commission in the European Court for annulment. ICI argued
extraterritoriality as well as the effect doctrine, but the Court held that it was
16
Available at, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/11/contents (Last accessed on 29th March
2014)
17
Available at, http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A02023 (Last accessed on 29th March 2014)
18
Available at, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-29/index.html (Last accessed on 29th March
2014)
19
Rhatican, J.P., Insurance Antitrust Defendants, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California: A Mixed Blessing , 47
Rutgers L. Rev. 905, 955 (1995).
20
Torremans, Paul., Extraterritorial Application of Competition Law; European Law Review, August
1996, Vol. 21(4), pp 280-293
21
Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU): Available at; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12008E101 (Last accessed on 29th March 2014)
22
supra
unnecessary to consider the issue of effect doctrine when grounds other than that
existed under Article 101 and 102. In its judgment, the court reasoned that ICI,
Sandoz and Geigy participated in price-fixing. Moreover that, although they were all
non-European undertakings, located outside the EU, however, were still guilty of
price-fixing through their respective subsidiaries located within the EU. The court
held that both the parent company and its subsidiary formed a single economic entity.
Again in A Ahlstrom Oy V Commission (Wood Pulp case)23 , the question of the
effects doctrine favoured by the US courts was raised and argued in extensio. It was a
case involving non-European undertakings were charged for violating Article 101 by
their price-fixing activities of wood pulp to buyers within the EU. The court held in
effect in its judgment at page 5232 thus "The consequence of the agreements and
practices of the undertakings on prices and/or charges to customers as well as on resale of wood pulp within the EU was therefore, substantial and intended, and was
primary and direct result of the agreements and practices." Interestingly also, the court
analysis its reasoning in considering extraterritoriality and its application. The court
interpreted Article 101 in relation to the case in hand, to include the formation of an
agreement, or conclusion of a decision or concerted practice on one hand and the
implementation of the agreement, decision or concerted practice on the other hand.
The court held that since the implementation of the agreement or concerted practice
was within the common market of which buyers within the EU were affected, it was
irrelevant whether they used subsidiaries, or agents within the EU. It may well seem
that again the EU court avoided making a statement regarding its position in relation
to the US effect doctrine. The tacit avoidance by the EU court to make a
pronouncement regarding its position in relation to the effects doctrine is largely
criticized, because had the court decided on that, it would be clear whether the EU
adopt the US approach and concede to its application in the EU. Secondly, the EU
court in Wood pulp’s case, the court was called upon to interpret the Treaty in relation
to comity principle. The court tacitly avoided making any pronouncement on that as it
held that it was unnecessary to determine the question of international comity as it
would amount to the court determining its jurisdiction in relation to matters not within
its purview. As it stands, while each of the jurisdictions adopted its principle, it is
clear there is no consensus on extraterritoriality by both the US and the EU.
Bilateral approach
The Bilateral approach was adopted as an alternative to the unilateral approach, which
has caused lots of frictions between the US and the EU. The first of such agreement
was the EU/US Cooperation Agreement24 signed in 1991 regarding the application of
their competition laws and exchange of interpretative letters. The idea behind the
agreement was to promote cooperation and coordination of competition between
counterparts and to reduce any differences, problems, e.t.c that has existed or may
arise in the application of competition law of respective parties. Key elements of the
agreement included cooperation, confidentiality of information, information exchange
as well as the concept of comity. The agreement recognized positive and negative
comity on both matters of enforcement and disclosure where disclosure will prejudice
regional laws. The EU/US in 1998 also signed the second cooperation agreement
23
supra
Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:21995A0427(01) (Last
accessed on 30th March 2014)
24
called the EU/US Positive Comity Agreement 199825 which was aimed at promoting
positive comity application of competition laws between the pairs, especially where
the former can show a prima facie anticompetitive practices of undertaking in the
latter’s jurisdiction as adversely affecting the market of the former. This agreement
was developed owing to the friction caused by the respective laws of the counterparts
regarding comity principle and how enforcement of those laws suffered setbacks.
There is other bilateral agreement between the EU and other regional blocs and states,
e.g., Canada, Japan, Korea, China and Russia.26 The cooperation agreement has been
held to be largely successful and preferred than the unilateral approach by US and
EU.27 An example of cooperative efforts in competition law between US and Canada
can be seen in Panasonic/sanyo28 where the respective competition authorities and
parties co-operated in arriving at a positive outcome and Thompson
Corporation/Reuters Group29 where negotiations of and investigations in paralleled
and included joint meetings with the parties by respective competition authorities
from the forum of the companies.
However successful bilateral agreements have been, it has its own fair share of
criticism and failures. Firstly, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. V California was decided
in 1993, after the EU/US Cooperation Agreement was signed in which parties agreed
to cooperate on the understanding of the principles of comity. The decision also
sparked a reactionary response in the EU when France in France v Commission30
challenged the validity or otherwise of the agreement on the grounds of procedural
irregularity. The EU Treaties, which required that the agreement be reached by the
council in consultation with the EU parliament. The Court ruled that procedure was
not followed and voided the agreement.31Secondly, in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,32
while the USs’ FTC was willing to allow merger arrangement the European
Commission was reluctant to allow the merger. Also in GE/Honeywell33 was the case
of a merger permitted in the US but prohibited by the European Commission.
Multilateral approach
Multilateral approach appears to be the preferred alternative to internationalization of
competition law as a means of avoiding the difficulties of extraterritoriality. The
effort commenced with the post-war Havana Charter for an International Trade 34 ,
where a provision was made for antitrust rules. However when the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was entered into in 1947, the antitrust rules were not
incorporated into the agreement. So by the time the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
was established in 1995, emphasis was laid on trade related activities rather than on
25
Available at, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:21998A0618(01) (Last
accessed on 30th March 2014)
26
Details of EU agreements with regional blocs and states are available at,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/index.html (Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
27
Whish R., Bailey D., Competition Law (Oxford University Press), 7 th Ed, 2012, p.511.
28
Case M 5421, 09, 2009. Also referred to in Whish and Bailey ibid at p.511
29
Case M 4726, 09, 2007. Also referred to in Whish and Bailey ibid at p.511
30
Case C-327/91 (1994) ECR 1-3641
31
Note that the position was rectified by joint decision of the council and commission in Oj (1995) L
95/45 corrected by Oj (1995) L 131/38
32
Case M 877Oj (1997) L 336/16
33
Case COM/M. 2220.
34
The Charter is set out in Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (The Macmillan Company) 1949, pp.
231-327.
competition law policies and principles.35 Because of the inherent defect associated
with the agreement, it has become difficult for the organisation to impose an
obligation on undertakings. It is also challenging to decipher the distinction between
trade and competition policy, consequently, it became even more difficult to
incorporate competition law within its dispute resolution mechanism. Even with its
efforts through the Singapore group36 in 1996 and the Cancun declaration37 in 2003,
there is still no clear outline on competition policy rules and its application amongst
member states. The WTO’s multilateral approach has been considered as the least
successful in a global effort to internationalize competition law. Unlike WTO, the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) takes
competition policy seriously and has been constructively engaged to its progress and
development. It first made a recommendation in 1986 concerning cooperation with
regards to restrictive business practices in relation to international trade and further
developed on that through its revised version in 1995 38 . The key features of the
documents are cooperation, consultation and notification of matters relating the
interests of a foreign government in relation to competition law. In 2012, it published
its Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement 39 amongst
member states. The recommendation further reinforces the earlier released 2009
Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement40. However, the problem
with OECD in relation to internationalising competition law is that it is considered to
be narrow in its scope, because it relates to its member states whose membership is
about forty countries, thirty four of which come from most industrialised economies.
Secondly, because the organisation consists of largely developed states, the model is
considered as too difficult approach to be adopted by developing states. It has also not
provided a clearly defined and unified enforcement mechanism. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on the other hand seeks to
develop competition law policies through The Set of Mutually Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices41. In 1980, the
UN General Assembly adopted a Voluntary, non-binding code. The most recent
document of the organisation is its 2010 model law on competition,42 which sets out
core principles of competition law with a view that member states would adopt or
incorporate them into their national competition law. The model law has been widely
regarded as successful and states have hitherto embraced those principles and have
even incorporated them in their modified form into their respective competition law.
However, one of the challenges of the model law is that it failed to harmonize
competition law because of the simple fact that states have uneven standards of
economic development and mechanism for enforcement. Secondly, in one of their
35
Whish and Bailey supra, p.507
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition, available at,
http://www.wto.org/index.htm (Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
37
South Asian Council for Food Security and Fair Trade Declaration, available at
http://www.seacouncil.org/seacon/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=55&Itemid=69
(Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
38
Available at,
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=192&InstrumentPID=188&
Lang=en&Book=False (Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
39
ibid
40
ibid
41
Resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980. Available at, http://unctad.org/es/Docs/tdrbpconf7d8_en.pdf
(Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
36
42
Available at, http://unctad.org/es/Docs/tdrbpconf7d8_en.pdf (Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
round table meetings, member states from developing countries decried that, since the
global financial crisis, enforcement of competition law has been difficult. 43 Thirdly,
since the global economic meltdown, some member states reverted to protectionist
rules of applying industrial policies instead of competition laws. When it comes to
enforcement, it appears bilateral and international cooperation has been most effective
than observing principles as contained in the model law. Because of the disparity in
trade and development between member states and the fact that the model law has
taking into account more of competition policies of developed states than of the
developing states, it has become difficult for developing states to full appreciate and
apply the principles as encouraged by the model law. On the other hand, the
International Competition Network (ICN) is the most successful of the multilateral
approaches, not only because it has123 agency members from over 108 jurisdiction as
at 201244, but also because it promotes substantive and procedural convergence of
competition laws. The idea for the harmonization of international competition laws by
this network was conceived and articulated through a document titled Final Report of
the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the US Attorney General
for Antitrust (IPAC Report 2000) 45 The Report consist of over 300 pages and
contained recommendation such as multijurisdictional merger review, interface of
trade and competition policy and anti-cartel enforcement. In its reasoning for the
report, the Co- Chair of the Committee, James F. Rill, stated thus "... The Report
draws a blueprint to use in the short and medium term to increase transparency,
deepen cooperation, and encourage compatibility among the proliferating
competition systems that exist in the U.S. and abroad.” 46 The report led to the birth
of International Competition Network, as an international network whose aim is to
advocate the adoption of superior standards and procedures, formulate proposal for
procedures, facilitate effective international cooperation in respect of competition
laws for the benefit of members, consumers, agencies and economies globally.47 The
ICN approach has been particularly successful because it again engaged the US and
provoked transparency amongst member states. The US unilateral extraterritoriality
has been the problems, and to have the US leading and constructively engaged in
promoting multilateral approach of ICN is one of the major achievements of this
approach. The Network also has working groups comprising of highly regarded and
effective resource persons and organizations. For example, the Advocacy Working
Group, whose mission is to develop practical tools and guidance to improve the
effectiveness of the network, has from 2003-2013 through its various programs
created awareness, provoked conversations and influence and improved outreaches.
The Agency Effectiveness Working Group, which was formed in 2009, has as at 2012
achieved most of its objectives from effective project delivery, knowledge
management and ex-post valuation to strategic planning and prioritization. The Cartel
Working Group has been considered to be the most successful of the groups, in that
through its numerous conferences and engagements from 1999-2011 as at 2011
43
Reports on the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy on its Tenth
Session, Geneva, July 2009, pp. 4-6. Available at, http://unctad.org/en/docs/ciclpd6_en.pdf (Last
accessed on 30th March 2014)
44
ICN Statement of Achievements 2001-2012, Available at,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/20112012/2012%20icn%20statement%20of%20achievements.pdf (Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
45
Available at, http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/4272.htm (Last accessed on 30th March 2014)
46
ibid p. 2
47
ICN’s Mission statement, available at, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (Last
accessed on 30th March 2014)
approximately 150 participants from more than 70 jurisdictions have joined the group,
including about 40 non-governmental advisors. The Merger Working Group was
founded in 2001and continue to organize a large body of work product and
conferences. In 2010, the group carried out a survey of the use and impact of its
models amongst members and non-governmental advisors, and 90% of responses
indicated the success of the working group’s body of work product. The Network
adopted the working group’s recommended practices for merger analysis on market
definition, the legal framework for competition merger analysis, the use of market
shares, thresholds and presumptions, competitive effects analysis in horizontal merger
review, coordinated effects, unilateral effects, entry and expansion, and failing firm /
existing assets. According to the 2011 group’s comprehensive assessment report, over
90% of responding agencies were familiar with the Recommended Practices for
Merger Analysis, and 85% of responding agencies reported using the Recommended
Practices.48
Conclusion
No doubt the world is increasingly becoming globalized, so is free trade amongst
businesses, companies and countries of the world. Therefore, while the US through
the decision in Hartford Fire Insurance by the ‘effect doctrine’ seeks to enforce its
antitrust law extraterritorially as a model for the rest of the world, The EU through
Dyestuffs and Wood Pulp’ by the ‘single economic entity doctrine’ seeks to establish
their model, while the rest of the world grapple in the dark as they face global
competition law hegemony. The question becomes then which model is desirable and
adaptable. Enforcement of competition law by unilateral approach has created lots of
problems from resistance to blocking laws. The Bilateral approach has achieved some
degree of successes but leaves much to be desired especially in the light of alienation
of non-members of the agreement in parallel. Efforts to achieve an international
competition law as a means of lessening the controversial nature of extraterritoriality
have been alternatively or simultaneously sought and discussed. Multilateral approach
has become more useful and result oriented model and so far the effort through the
International Competition Network has been the most successful one, even though
with its problems of a non-binding nature of its agreement and the challenges faced
by developing countries in implementing the recommendations of the network. No
doubt the debate will continue especially on the extraterritoriality of competition law
and how it can be solved via a more harmonized approach. At least at the moment, a
multilateral approach has provided so much comfort and possibilities and has reduced
rancor and trading wars amongst the international comity. Whether a better solution
lies ahead remain to be seen.
Daniel H Bwala, Esq, MCIArb (UK)
Legal Practitioner and Arbitrator
Principal, Bwala & Co (Crystal Chambers)
Adjunct Lecturer, Nigerian Law School, Abuja
National Representative, International Negotiation Competition (INC)
Mobile Nos. (Nig) +234-8035231530
(UK) +44-7424732953
www.bwalaandco.com
48
ibid
Bibliography
Primary sources
International Conventions/Agreements/Charters/Statutes/Rules/Model Laws
UK Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980
US Sherman Antitrust Act 1890
Australia Foreign Antitrust Judgment (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979
Canada Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 1985
EU Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU)
EU/US Cooperation Agreement 1991
EU/US Positive Comity Agreement 1998
UN Havana Charter for an International Trade 1947
South Asian Council for Food Security and Fair Trade Declaration 2003
UNCTAD Mutually Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices, Resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980
UN Model Law on Competition 2010
Final Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the US
Attorney General for Antitrust (IPAC Report 2000
Case Law
United States V Aluminium Co. of America (Alcoa) 148 F 2d 416 (2nd Cir 1945)
P.444
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. V California 509 US 764 (1993)
ICI V Commission (1972) ECR 619, (1972) CMLR 557
A Ahlstrom Oy V Commission (1988) ECR 5193, (1988) 4 CMLR 901
American Banana Co. V United Fruit Co 213 US 347 (1909)
Timberlane Lumber Co. V Bank of America 549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
Panasonic/Sanyo. Case M 5421, 09, 2009
Thompson Corporation/Reuters Group. Case M 4726, 09, 2007
France V Commission. Case C-327/91 (1994) ECR 1-3641
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Case M 877Oj (1997) L 336/16
GE/Honeywell
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Textbooks
Whish R., Bailey D., Competition Law (Oxford University Press), 7th Ed, 2012.
Brownlie., Principles of Public International Law (Clarendon Press), 7th Ed, 2008.
Carter B. E., Trimble P.R., International Law (Boston: Little, Brown) 1995.
Jones A., Sufrin B., EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford
University Press) 4th Ed, 2011.
Wilcox., A Charter for World Trade (The Macmillan Company) 1949.
Journals/Articles
Rhatican, J.P., Insurance Antitrust Defendants, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California: A
Mixed Blessing, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 905, 955 (1995).
Torremans, Paul, Extraterritorial Application of Competition Law; European Law
Review, August 1996, Vol. 21(4)