Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont
Memorandum of Cabinet
Notions for shared peace;
 Want to be seen to have multilateral interests, avoid ‘a suspicion that Great Britain
was inclined to push them forward in the war for our purposes’
 Want ‘monarchies of the peninsula must be independent under their legitimate
sovereigns’, do avoid dominion by France.
 Italy – several ideas of territorial restoration/reimbursement
 The Prince regent affords mediation ‘by the allies in the internal affairs of Germany’
 ‘The Treatment of Alliance not to terminate with the war, but to contain defensive
engagements with mutual obligations to support the powers attach by France with a
certain extent of stipulated succours.’ (Castlereagh, achieves this at the treaty of
Chaumont).
Personal aims and securities;
- Holland – territorially and military
- ‘Great Britain is willing to purchase it by a double sacrifice, by cession both to France and
Holland’, GB will retain possessions if allies do not agree.
- Ties in to maritime securities; ports in low countries Scheldt, and retention of international
colonies. Memorandum of the Maritime Peace
 Britain will sacrifice, as she is ‘desirous of providing for her own security by
common arrangement, rather than by an exclusive accumulation of strength
and resources.’
 Wants independence of Holland and Spain on the seas.
 As nothing is yet arranged it is hard to stipulate what would be conceded, but
if France were to be reduced within her ancient limits then, Britain would
concede territories that don’t affect its own security. They will not retain
colonies ‘for their mere commercial value’
-Peace with US, (this is very specific to Britain, and perhaps not that relevant to Castlereagh
as he leaves for the continent).
‘The signing of the engagements especially as to Holland and the Peninsula as may justify to
the British public and the allies so great an exertion on the part of Great Britain’
Nicholson
P68 aims of the cabinet unrealistic (polish and Saxon issues hadn’t been considered at this
stage) – opinion in London may have remained largely the same in the cabinet, whereas
Castlereagh appreciated the different dynamics when on the continent.
‘Castlereagh had been accorded by the cabinet a remarkably free hand’ Nicholson 65.
Bew - ‘the great resonsability that lay with the government at this critical moment was
devolved to Castlereagh’ (330)
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Vansittart was his biggest critic; ‘a defeatist’, (Bew 330 – Vansittart had an
isolantionist policy towards Europe and feared becoming too heavily involved.)
Bathurst an ally of C (Nich 65, bew 330) .
Thompson – Bathurst, Castlereagh and Liverpool dealt with most foreign military
and colonial affairs between 1812-1822 without much consultation of their
colleagues. (viii)
o 72 – Bath and Liverpool stood in for C, and administered many of his
despatches.
Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont
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Other cabinet members had lack of enthusiasm in reconstruction of Central Europe.
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Opposition etc; Wilberforce and the Saints – had ‘natural impatience’ but this didn’t
really affect Castlereagh. (BEW; Whig MP Sir Robert Heron wished to leave
continental matters to the cabinet and its ministers 331)
Memorandum includes no notion over the slave trade, this is largely viewed as a
separate issue, and one that Liverpool will deal with later (Nicholson 68)
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Riech slave trade ‘differed sharply from other objectives of British foreign policy
during this period’ 129 – this came from public opinion and organised pressures,
treaties between 1810-1814 with signatories like Portugal, Denmark and Sweden.
Hinde British public ‘fanatically determined’ for France to give up slave trade;
France saw it as a crippling of their economy. (216)
Castlereagh to Liverpool
Treaty of Chaumont; signed 9th march.
- Concert allows states on the rhine to have greater security, and are ‘relieved from the
necessity of seeking a compromise with France’
- ‘I am confident this Treaty will have the most decisive and beneficial influence
throughout the confederacy in firmly cementing their union against France.’
Article XVI
‘The present Treat of Defensive Alliance having for its object to maintain the
equilibrium of Europe, to secure the repose and Independence of its Satates, and to
prevent the Invasions which during so many years have desolated the World, the
High Contracting Parties have agreed to extend the duration of it to 20 years, to take
date from the day of its signature; and they reserve to themselves to concert upon its
ulterior prolongation three years before expiration, should circumstances require it.’
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Secret article 3: C believes that Britain should offer subsidies for continued years of
war
o Illustrates power – ‘fund four powers as they engage and supply 600,000
men’ to secure peace.
o Honour and reputation – Britain should take opportunity to assume role ‘as
one of the great military powers’ from her actions and resources.
There is a possibility to reduce efforts if this is possible, and C; ‘I have taken the
precaution however’ when the treaty obligates British support there is an option to
satisfy if ‘either in men or money’.
German issue highlighted in short
Webster; CofV
- Subsidiary proposals depended on the separation of the Netherlands from France,
because Napoleon would resist this, so he had to obtain his allies support on this
issue. (31)
- Secret articles; confederated Germany, independent Switzerland, an Italy of
independent states, a free Spain under the Bourbon house, and enlarged Holland with
Prince of Orange as sovereign. (Castlereagh’s double payment secured this primary
British aim) 31
- Article XVI ‘the balance of power’ but committing to the alliance for twenty years.
32
- ‘perhaps his greatest achievement and title to fame’ 32
Bew – C felt a strong sense of ownership, ‘brought Britain to the table as an equal combatant’
Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont
Schroeder – Chaumont ensured that the allies would not lose the war, even if Castlereagh
wasn’t set on victory. (p504) Castlereagh was willing to make concessions unlike some other
members of parliament and public, and unlike Prussia and Russia wanted to sacrifice peace
for victory. (This is unlike later orders at Chatillon), ‘His central goal was now to preserve the
unity of the alliance during the war and after it’ (501)
- Chaumont ‘was a special achievement and laid the foundations for victory, peace, and postwar security’ (p501)
- Castlereagh ensured Britain’s credibility and indispensability to the coalition (p502)
Nicholson:
Maritime question excluded from negotiations, and C secured these; by February 1814,
without breaking any of the terms that were outlined by his cabinet. (71)
- Castlereagh feared disintegration of the allies unless an alliance was signed (70)
- Chaumont was ‘Castlereagh’s first great diplomatic achievement’ (81) –
- Treaty summarised by Nicholson (80) – Castlereagh’s promise, seen in secret article.
Hinde
- ‘diplomatic coup’ (208)
- Exhilarating for C, but still short of his maximum ambitions (208-9)
o ‘Treaty was a foundation, however fragile, for the edifice of European cooperation in which C. believed Britain’s security depended.’ (209)
o Derry; Castlereagh felt that ‘both in war and peace British interest could be
understood and secured only within the wider context of European stability’
Castlereagh ‘content to safeguard Great Britain’s immediate interests’ 334 Marcham ,
Kauffman 79.
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Tof C honoured;
o P215-6- ‘Account of several payments made in the year ended 5th Jan 1815’ –
to Ireland and other countries.
o Austria and Prussia £972, 222, Russia £1.25 million and 500,00 to the
Russian fleet – all under the Treaty of Chaumont.
Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton
Castlereagh’s happiness is evident;
- ‘What an extraordinary display of power’, effectively providing the equivalent of the
three allied powers united. ‘I was determined not to pay second fiddle’
- Now Britain had suitable claim ‘to an opinion on continental matters.’
- Wants swift ratification to secure what he believes are good terms for Britain and the
allies.
Bathurst to Castlereagh
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Approval of the Treat of Chaumont from HRH, and desire to ratify the treaty swiftly.
General frustration with French negotiations, particularly after securing alliance of
allies;
o Further delays will result in Prince Regent to ‘consider the concession of
British objects, which he has already offered for the common cause, as not
acceded.’ (Backwards step in other words)
o ‘utmost importance’ of recording this complaint against the French ministers.