Explaining Mao’s Rise to Power
Methods & Strategies
1. Mao’s effective leadership of the CCP
a. During the years of the Yanan Soviet Mao instituted violent measures to punish CCP officials and
party members who dared to question party leaders
b. “Re-education” was widely used to simultaneously punish and brainwash CCP members until they
adhered to the party line
c. Mao exhibited a proven ability to preserve and strengthen the CCP through a series of existential
crises. In each of these episodes Mao advocated strategies contrary to those of other party leaders,
but Mao’s strategies always seemed to preserve and strengthen the CCP. Thus, by 1949 most CCP
members viewed Mao as an almost messianic figure incapable of erring.
i. The GMD’s attacks on the Jiangxi Soviet, 1927-34
ii. The Long March, 1934-35
iii. The GMD’s attacks on the Yanan Soviet, 1935-45
iv. The Japanese invasion of China, 1937-45
v. The “War of Liberation”, 1945-49
2. Mao’s pro-peasant policies
a. The Yanan Soviet became a laboratory for the CCP to implement Mao’s peasant proletariat ideology
and the peasants liked what they saw.
i. Reduced taxes, rents, and interest rates
ii. Redistribution of land from wealthy landlords to peasants
iii. Assistance with irrigation, fertilizer, and seeds to raise agricultural productivity and,
therefore, peasant income
iv. Provided fair, prompt and transparent administration and justice
v. Encouraged peasants to play an active role in local government
b. Through many years of civil war the PLA exhibited superior conduct toward the masses
i. PLA enforced a strict code of conduct that required troops to show respect and consideration
toward peasants and villagers with whom they came in contact.
1. Avoid or pay for damage to peasant property
2. Be courteous, helpful and honest
3. Do not steal or damage property
4. Be sanitary and neat
5. Treat women and elders with respect
6. Show mercy to prisoners of war
ii. Most were deeply impressed by the PLA’s conduct and the contrast with the often ruthless
and unruly GMD.
3. Mao honed a reputation among the Chinese as a genuine nationalist
a. During the Japanese invasion the PLA directed most of the fighting against the Japanese, whereas
the GMD was seen as pre-occupied with fighting the PLA.
b. Xian Incident – the CCP captured Chiang Kai-shek in 1936 only to release him on good faith within
days after he promised to form a United Front against Japan with the CCP. This was seen as an
incredibly trusting and patriotic act.
c. Throughout the Second Sino-Japan War CCP guerilla tactics against Japanese troops proved
effective and held the Japanese at bay.
d. Mao scrupulously avoided subservience to foreigners
i. Soviet advisors were never allowed to exercise a strong influence on CCP ideology or
strategy. The Soviet government became so frustrated by this that they recalled the advisors
and cut ties to the CCP.
ii. It was clear to most Chinese that the PLA received very little direct financial or military aid
from the Soviet Union
iii. The CCP refused to make compromises with Western banking or industrial interests, in
contrast to the pro-West GMD
Circumstances & Factors
1. The Nationalist regime was incompetent and corrupt
a. Nationalist bureaucrats were notoriously corrupt, lazy and incompetent
b. The Nationalist regime seemed unwilling to institute even moderate economic and social reforms to
alleviate poverty and inequality
i. Due in part to the regime’s overwhelming reliance on the financial support on industrialists
in the coastal cities (especially Shanghai)
ii. Due in part to the leadership’s close personal and cultural ties with the industrialists of the
coastal cities
iii. Due in part to the leadership’s poor understanding of China’s problems and solutions
iv. Due in part to the regime’s belief that no meaningful reform could be undertaken until the
Japanese and the CCP had been defeated
v. Spending on the GMD army and debt payments left little money for social spending
c. Economic mismanagement devastated the standard of living for most Chinese
i. Hyperinflation occurred from 1937-49 (as a result of debasing money)
ii. The Nationalists borrowed heavily from the West before and during the war
iii. China experience virtually no trend toward industrialization of modernization under
Nationalist rule (1927-49) resulting in high unemployment, poverty, and recurrent famine
d. The perception was widespread that the Nationalist leaders had “sold out” to the West, financially,
politically, and culturally
2. The Nationalist regime lacked effective control of the country
a. The Nationalist regime was never able to fully consolidate its control over China. From 1927-45 it
relied on shifting alliances with local leaders and warlords. Such political fragmentation rendered it
impossible for the GMD to implement reforms throughout the country
i. Tibet, Manchuria, Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia and Tibet remained entirely outside the control
of the Nationalist government
b. The Japanese invasion greatly undermined the ability of the Nationalists to effectively govern China
and fight the CCP
i. By late 1937 Japan controlled almost the entire coast of China well into the interior of the
country depriving the regime of the country’s main industrial, agricultural, and financial
resources
c. Generals within the GMD often disregarded orders from Chiang Kai-shek and crafted their own
strategy and diplomacy, essentially functioning as warlords
i. They disregarded the rights and dignity of their own troops or of local peasants in war zones
3. Foreign assistance to the Nationalist government was inadequate
a. The US and Soviet Union sold (not gave) weapons to the GMD only during the war with Japan and
for the expressed purpose of fighting the Japanese
b. The US and China experienced strained diplomatic relations throughout this period
i. Advisor Joseph Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek considered one another incompetent and
stubborn
c. American assistance to the Nationalists was inconsistent after 1945
i. US policy-makers were tepid in their support for Chiang
ii. Post-war budget cuts and demobilization entailed a declining level of commitment to China
iii. The amount and predictability of arms shipments was greatly reduced and phased out
entirely by 1947