Conference
Myths in
south-eastern European
textbooks
22-24 October 2014, Tirana
Myths in south-eastern European textbooks
22-24 October 2014, Tirana
Wednesday, 22 Oct. National History Museum at the Skanderbeg Square
17:00 - 18:00
Official welcome on behalf of the Georg Eckert Institute by Claudia Lichnofsky, GeorgEckert-Institut
Welcome address by German ambassador Hellmut Hoffmann
Introduction by Valentina Duka, University of Tirana
Keynote lecture by Bernd Fischer, Indiana University:
“Myth and Albanian history, the Case of the Second World War”
18:00 - 19:00
20:00
Reception at the National History Museum
Dinner at Hotel Mondial
Thursday 23 Oct. Hotel Mondial
9:00
Introduction and welcome
Claudia Lichnofsky, GEI; Valentina Duka, Uni Tirana
9:30 - 11:00
Panel I: Myths in Albanian-language history textbooks
Chair: Bernd Fischer, Indiana University
The mythization of history in the service of identity construction in textbooks in Kosovo
Abdullahu Durim (Prishtina)
Heroes and myths in curricula, textbooks and other educational materials
Astrit Dautaj/Xhevair Lleshi (Tirana)
Myths and legends in support of the political manipulation of history
Ndricim Mehmeti (Tirana)
11:30 - 13:30
Panel II: Key studies of history textbooks from Albania
Chair: Gentiana Kera, University of Tirana
“The Myth of a Leader”: Enver Hoxha’s role during the Second World War in Albania
Enriketa Pandelejmoni (Tirana)
The myth of the “return to Europe” in public discourses and textbooks in transitional
Albania
Enis Sulstarova (Braunschweig/Tirana)
Myths and events in history textbooks of Albanian-language areas during the
First World War
Dieter Nehring (Berlin)
Collective narratives of the interethnic conflict in Kosovo
Mimoza Telaku (Beersheva)
1
13:30 - 15:00
Lunch at the Hotel Mondial
15:00 - 16:00
Panel III: Myths in comparative perspectives
Chair: Enriketa Pandelejmoni, University of Tirana
Ideology, history and myth: The case of the 1920 Vlora War from a
trans-Adriatic perspective
Fabio Bego (Rom)
Continuity and Change in perceptions of the Greek as an “enemy” in the Albanian
national identity-building process
(Albanian National Movement up to 2010s)
Erika Haxhi/ Klaudjo Kavaja/ Ilir Kalemaj/Konstantinos Giakoumis (Tirana)
18:00
Dinner at Restaurant 'Vila 31'
(Rruga Thoma Kacorr, former rr. Rr. Gjon Muzaka, corner of Rr. Naim Frashëri, in the street
behind the German embassy compound)
Friday 24 Oct. Hotel Mondial
9:30 - 11:00
Panel IV: Myths in Slavic-language history textbooks
Chair: Konstantinos Giakoumis, University of New York Tirana
Between History and Politics: Understanding the Myth of Antiquitas in Macedonian
History Textbooks
Darko Stojanov/Jovan Bliznakovski (Skopje)
Myths of statehood in post-Yugoslav textbooks
Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc (Ljubljana)
The impact of the political context on Croatian heroic mythology
Igor Despot (Zagreb)
11:30-13:00
Panel V: Myths in historical history textbooks
Chair: Eckhardt Fuchs, TU Braunschweig/Georg Eckert Institute
The National Liberation Movement in Albanian history textbooks during the socialist
period
Gentiana Kera (Tirana)
Mythologisation and de-mythologisation of heroes, shield of the communist system
Vojsava Kumbulla/Florenca Stafa/Majlinda Peza (Elbasan/Tirana)
Constructing the myth of the national leader over the centuries
Denis Vuka (Berlin/Athens)
13:00-14:00
final discussion
2
Note
The Mythization of History in the Service of
Identity Constructions in Textbooks in Kosovo
Durim Abdullahu
Abstract: The current historical textbooks which are in wide use in educational system in Kosovo, are
written and structured fairly delicately in a way to reach a level of “political correctness”. Despite
periods, geographical regions, historical events or contents around which are centered, those texts in
most of cases pursue certain narrative and explanatory lines, endeavoring to narrate history in that way
as to incite students to feel proud and comfortable of their own history. In order to reach this goal, the
authors of such texts have often mythologized and modified the history. In a nutshell, in those texts are
selected some events and historical personalities who in turn have received special emphasis while the
rest are being neglected or scrubbed from narrative. This has been done in a deliberate attempt to give
to the students a clear and compact identity. The historical textbooks in Kosovo have a preponderance
of political history, even in those cases when other histories are discussed; the main narrative is
prevailed by politics. This overly politicized narration of history, relies upon some major points: the
territorial autochthony of Albanians; ethnic purity and continuity; a form of albano-centrism as
nationalism; religious tolerance of Albanians; innocence and victimization through history and the
affiliation with West. In those texts, the history is being narrated to sustain the above-mentioned
premises. It happens quite often that historical facts and the truth are mythologized in line with
nationalist demands. This mythization is achieved through the selection of history, linguistic schemes,
one-sided narration, nationalist interpretation, use of images and the repetition of some subjects etc.
Accordingly, through the mythization and reshaping of history, those historical textbooks, conceive
some identity models and set of values which reconcile with the current approaches of Albanians
towards the historical past and their political and social demands.
Keywords: myths, history, textbooks, identity, Kosovo.
The mythization of history is an imagined intervention on the past. Its primary goal is to immerse as
much as possible on the present, and in so doing to fulfill a seemingly determined future. This arbitrary
intervention on the past obfuscates history by muddling the collective memories of people. Mythization,
thus, can be achieved through two ways: in a quite coincidental manner, or deliberately. The more
mythization is a deliberate attempt, the more history became abused in favor of certain subjects.
History and myth went often hand by hand. Thus, in 12th century a Danish soldier named according to
the Latin manner, Saxo Gramaticus, under the patronage of archbishop of Lund, Absalon, wrote a
concise history of Denmark, entitled “Gesta Danorum”. At the very outset, its author states that his book
intended to glorify his homeland. Later on, at the beginning of 13th century, an Iclandese historian called
3
Snorri Sturluson, wrote his book entitled “Heimskringla” (“The Circle of the World”), which consisted of
a history imbued with myths, concerning the deeds of Norway kings. Seven hundred years later, during
19th and 20th centuries, those books became inspiration for Danish and Norway nationalism. This is a
perfect example which confirms once more the role of myths on history.
As soon as myth interfered on history’s domain, it became an active subject. The myth cast its shadow
upon the past and in so doing it became a history-making subject. While the history runs according to its
one-direction-way, namely from the present to the future, the myth moves in both directions at the
same time. The myth is a desperate endeavor to twist history by reshaping the past. Moreover, it is a
competitive history which negates history, empiricism and science alike.1 While the history has a sense
of being accessible, the myth is always not available given that it does not pertain to the present: it
resides on the imagined past, attempting to forge the future. In terms of Heidegger, the historical myth
is “a being without beings”.2 There are myths but they do not exist as long as they are mere
constructions. Most of time, they behave as parasites in the body of history. While the history gets
entailed on myths, everything became more and more vague.
It is not amiss to state that a mythized history is a disguised one, a farce with a powerful potentiality. To
demythize the history, one is compelled to deploy a method of deconstructionism with all its variations:
from the language and theory, to natural and practical.3 The main scope of this insightful take is not the
general deconstruction of myths. The study is confined only at the identification of certain myths. Cases
in point are certain school textbooks in Kosovo, which are peppered at some scale from various myths.
Taking into account the Nitzhean concept on the will for power, Michael Foucault considers the school
as most important institution that shapes the modern man.4 According to him, the school delivers
basically the same knowledge for many generations and it forges a specific type of man for decades. This
kind of education, greatly reduces the creativity of students by curtailing their mental capacities because
its main purpose is to put the knowledge within a box of ''undoubted truths”. Therefore it is of utmost
importance to know what knowledge one gets from school, as Jean-François Lyotard puts it: “Who
transmits learning? What is transmitted? To whom? Through what medium? In what form? With what
effect?”5
In educational system in Republic of Kosovo, history is being taught during eight years of education. For
all levels of educational system, there are in use 17 textbooks: 12 books and 5 work-books. The Ministry
of Education has standardized all historical text-books, thus it leaves little room for alternative
textbooks. Consequently, it emerges a situation when all schools deliver basically the same history. All
students, indiscriminately, are aware of that history which is included in those textbooks. One is
1
C. Levi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning: Cracking the Code of Culture, (New York: Schocken Books, 1979),
pp. 7-12.
2
H. Gordon & R. Gordon, Heidegger on Truth and Myth: A Rejection of Postmodernism, (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 2007), p. 17.
3
Ch. Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 18-24.
4
M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan, (New York: Vintage
Boks, 1995), p. 147.
5
J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington & B. Massumi,
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 48.
4
tempted to repose Lyotard questions: “Who transmits learning? What is transmitted? To whom?
Through what medium? In what form? With what effect?”
In this way, we are attempting to get an answer on one major question: what kind of identity is
conceived by such text-books? First and foremost, in these textbooks history is being narrated along
modernist or pseudo-postmodernist approaches. Although those textbooks include history from
antiquity down to modern times, all 17 textbooks are written by 8 authors: most of them are adept only
for modern history without any specialization for ancient or mediaeval history. It strikes one's eye that
political history predominates more than 90% of contents. The history concerning culture, philosophy,
arts, religion, architecture or science constitutes only 10% of content. It must be noted that all those
aspects are ostensibly influenced by the political history.6 This uniformity on the content unravels a
tendency to inculcate on students an overly political point-of-view about history of their country and
that of world.
What's more, their content entails a socio-political take on history. Most of these textbooks features
with a uniform structure, same language, same illustrations and same approaches, while time to time in
these textbooks appear the same themes borrowed from one another. The authors employ a narrative
where events are selected and they often make use of certain myths, gross exaggerations in a way to
forge a nationalist identity on the students. This is perhaps best exemplified by the first paragraph of
history textbook of 5th grade: “By learning history, we enable ourselves to handle with the present and
future and to be participants of civilized values”.7 These textbooks bolster a kind of identity which relies
upon the hypothesis of an ethno-cultural compactness which stretches back on history. This identity is
centered on six mythical central themes: 1) autochthony; 2) ethnic continuity; 3) religious tolerance; 4)
albano-centrism as nationalism; 5) victimization and innocence; 6) the relations with West.
Autocthony
A solid identity requires deep roots and they in turn need a soil, the space of history and identity. In
terms of history, this necessity is closely associated with the idea of autochthony, which has prompted
the complex of being native. In spite of fact that scholars hold that Albanians are native to the country
they dwell now, historical textbooks in Kosovo have mythized this fact in a crude fashion.
The Myth of Aboriginal People
The myth of being a native people has a clear message, yet untold: “We are the first dwellers here, the
rest came after us”. This idea underlies the interpretations of Albanian ethnogenesis made by textbooks
writers. Those texts lay a special emphasis on the origin of Albanian people, especially on the textbooks
for the 5th, 6th, and 10th grades. The myth of native people is the cornerstone of the identity as displayed
6
B. Dugolli & D. Abdullahu, “Çështje kundërthënëse dhe të ndjeshme në tekstet e historisë për shkollat
fillore dhe të mesme në Kosovë”, in Diskutime, year III, no.9, February-March 2014, (Tetovë: Qendra për
Marrëdhënie Ndërkombëtare dhe Studime Ballkanike - Akademia Diplomatike Shqiptare Tetovë & Instituti për
Studime Evropiane i Universitetit të Tiranës, 2014), pp. 121-144.
7
F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 5, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2012), p. 5.
5
on these texts. This myth is a byproduct of a poor argumentation made by these authors concerning the
vexed problem of Albanian ethnogenesis.
There are certain passages which dwell on the origin of Albanians: “The earliest population on Balkans
was Pelasgians. Scholars opined that they were the predecessors of Illyrians...Illyrians are among the
oldest people in Balkans. They are considered as the offspring of Pelasgians and are the antecedents of
Albanians...They had a distinct language and customs likewise, very similar to those of modern
Albanians. Their dress is similar with that of Albanians.8 Scholars held that Illyrian owes its origin to the
Pelasgian...Albanians are the descendants of Illyrians. The Illyrian language was spoken in Illyria,
although it was written with either Greek or Latin alphabet. Out of this old language survived thousand
words like names of persons, tribes, cities, places, rivers, etc. These words are fairly similar with modern
Albanian equivalents which account to the fact that Albanian is a direct descendant of Illyrian.9
According to many Albanian and foreign scholars, Pelasgians were the forebears of Illyrians....On the
basis of data it follows that they lived on Balkans as far as third millennium B.C...A large array of
historians contended that Illyrians are native and belong to Indo-European peoples. According to many
researchers, both Albanian and foreign, Pelasgians were the ancestors of Illyrians.”10
The above-cited passages make it plain that the origin of Albanians stemming from both Pelasgians and
Illyrians is articulated mainly through simple assertions, without any further ado. In a quite unconvincing
way, the main argument relies upon linguistic connection between Illyrian and Albanian although this
line of reasoning is considered by scholars as indicative but not decisive when it comes the origin of
Albanians.11 Moreover, the Illyrian ethnogensis of Albanians is overly mythized especially when it is
stated that Illyrian dress is similar to the Albanian one.
This thesis is repeated time and time again in order to instill it on students, while in textbooks it is
underlined with bold. The “obsession with origin”12 go as far as to claim that Illyrians lived on Balkans
since third millennium B.C, in spite of fact that the earliest accounts for certain tribes (later assigned as
Illyrian) come out from Homer and Hesiod who lived on 8th and 7th centuries B.C respectively, while the
first account which explicitly mentions Illyrians as a distinct people appears on Herodotus work (5 th
century B.C).13 It is worth pointing out that nowhere is the second theory about the origin of Albanians
mentioned, according to which Albanians descend largely from both Illyrians and Thracians.
The Myth of Original Culture
8
Ibid., p. 8, p. 21.
9
F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 6, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2012), p. 24, p. 89.
10
F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 10: Për gjimnazin e përgjithshëm dhe për gjimnazin e shkencave
shoqërore, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2010), pp. 26-29.
11
J. Matzinger, “Shqiptarët si pasardhës të ilirëve nga këndvështrimi i gjuhësisë historike”, in Historia e
Shqiptarëve: Gjendja dhe perspektivat e studimit, edit., O. J. Schmitt & E. A. Frantz, (Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2012), pp.
13-39.
12
A. Vehbiu, “Obsesioni ynë me origjinën”, in Roli i miteve në historinë e Shqipërisë, Përpjekja, year VI,
no.15-16, edit., F. Lubonja, (Tiranë: Përpjekja, 1999), pp. 67-72.
13
Homeri “Ilias”; & Homeri “Odyssea”, ed., G. Dindrof, Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1921/1925;
Hesiodi “Carmina”, Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1913; in Ilirët dhe Iliria te autorët antikë, edit., Akademia e
Shkencave e Shqipërisë: Instituti i Arkeologjisë, (Tiranë: Toena, 2002), pp. 8-14.
6
As soon as the myth of native people is settled, another myth appears in textbooks which claims a
distinct and authentic culture of Illyrians. To raise the pride on students about their noble ancestors,
authors of textbooks portray them as being highly advanced on terms of culture. This attempt is evident
on the following excerpt: “In the period of king Glaucus, both arts and culture bloomed....In his time
(Pyrrhus of Epirus - D.A), arts and culture flourished...The children of free citizens when they became at
the age of 7 went on private schools...where they received a knowledge on math, history, arts etc...The
Illyrian language was spoken in Illyria, which was distinct from Greek and Latin...It is believed that there
were many books on Illyrian, which have not survived in nowadays...14Greek settlers found a developed
culture in Illyria which they never met before. They took a large amount of knowledge from Illyrians,
especially for agriculture, livestock and craft which were fairly developed...The Illyrian woman enjoyed
respect both in family and society...There were even public schools on several cities...which were funded
by state.15 The earliest attestations of art on Illyrian soil pertain to the Neolithic period....Taken as a
whole, Illyrian art was of highest quality...Illyrians developed their own culture through art, buildings,
language, the way of life, religion etc...In addition with theatres, music and gymnastic, even literature
prospered.”16
The above endeavors assign Illyrians as carriers of a highly advanced culture, and this takes the form of
intuitive narration about history. This narration holds that Illyrian culture harks back to the Neolithic
period by describing it as very developed. By the same token, the Greek culture of coastal colonies on
Illyria is overlooked, whereas Illyrians are displayed as being culturally superior to Greeks.17 The
assertion, according to which Illyrians have written many books,18 is by far the most blatant claim, taking
into account the very fact that the first book was printed on the middle of 15 th century by Guttenberg
because prior to him, there were solely manuscripts or codex’s.
The authors give a special emphasis on the knowledge about Illyrians, which is best attested by the
homework book on history for the 5th and 6th grades. Students are required to know which language is
similar to Pelasgian; how children were educated in Illyria; which language was spoken on Illyria; what
are the similarities between Illyrians and Albanians;19 the cultural level of Illyrians compared to the
Greeks; the boundaries of Illyria; the comparison between Illyrian and Albanian and so forth.20 The
mythization of autochthony reaches its nadir with the myth about ethnic continuity.
Ethnic Continuity
14
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., pp. 11-20.
15
F. Rexhepi, Historia 6, op.cit., p. 32, pp. 84-85.
16
F. Rexhepi, Historia 10, op.cit., pp. 56-58.
17
For helen colonies in Illyria see M. Korkuti, “Themelimi i kolonive helene dhe marrëdhëniet me botën
ilire”, in Historia e Popullit Shqiptar, vol. I, edit., Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë: Instituti i Historisë, (Tiranë:
Toena, 2002), pp. 56-58.
18
For language and culture of Illyrians see A. Stipçeviq, Ilirët: historia, jeta, kultura, simbolet e kultit, trans.
N. Rrahmani, (Tiranë: Toena, 2002), pp. 121-134; pp. 187-192; pp. 216-239; pp. 249-254.
19
F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 5 – Fletore Pune, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2009), p. 6, p. 11, p. 14.
20
F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 6 – Fletore Pune, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2011), p. 23, p. 42, p. 52.
7
The myth about autochthony and the origin of Albanians is further bolstered by the ethnic continuity.
The narrators seem to make the origin as much as possible compact by intertwining with the myth of a
vertical continuity and that of ethnic purity. Such myths belittle the diversity which took place in past;
instead it makes ethnic history of Albanians to look undiluted since the antiquity down to the modern
times.
The Myth About Vertical Continuity
This myth emerges on the very idea that the origin of Albanians has an uninterrupted vertical structure:
Pelasgians-Illyrians-Albanians. Although the history of such lineage spans a period of more than 3000
years, it is explained through an uninterrupted timeline. This narrative is being structured on the text
about 5th grade, 6th grade, 7th grade and 10th as well through such passages: “Since 8th century onwards
Illyrians were called Arbër or Albanians, while their country as Arbëri or Albania according to the name
of Illyrian tribe of Albanoi...Later, this term encompassed all Albanian lands...Albanians are the
descendants of Illyrians...The Albanian state did not include all areas inhabited by Arbërs-Albanians.21
The old Illyrian populace which survived, with the drift of time it was called Arbër or Arbëri. These
primeval names of Albanians stretch their origin back to the Illyrian tribe of Albanoi...The name Arbër
and Arbëri during Middle Age was spread throughout all Albanian lands jutting from Kotorr Bay
(Montenegro D.A.) in north all the way to Arta’s Bay in south. These areas were called Arbëri-Albania.22
During 11th century, Albanians were under the rule of Byzantines...Among the most famous uprising
against Byzantines was that of 1043. At this time appears for the first time the name Arbër.”23
The above cited passage examplifies the very idea to consider Illyrians, Arbërs and modern Albanians as
a single ethnic substance, but with different labels. The transition from Illyrians to Arbër and from Arbër
to modern Albanians, is not explained as a socio-historical and political evolution, but as a mere
spontaneous shift of ethnic terms. These authors seem to lump together different concepts like ArbëriArbëria-Albania, which is a grave mistake on the light of historical sources that draw a sharp distinction
between them.24 This unjustified and erroneous point-of-view is linked with the myth of ethnic
continuity which ignores the historical timeline by drawing a straight line from Illyrians up to the modern
Albanians.25 This mythization reaches its nadir with such passages taken from history textbook for the
10th grade:”...its previous name Illyria and Illyrians with the drift of time was replaced by the new
emerged national names Arbër and Arbëri. These old names hark back their origin to the Illyrian tribe of
Albanoi.”26 This formulation gives the impression that the transition from Illyrians to Albanians was
merely a linguistic replacement and not a deep socio-political evolution within the framework of
Byzantium world which was torn by continuous invasions which altered its demographics. It must be
noted that the terms “Arbër” and “Arbëri'' are shown as “new national names” despite the fact that
21
22
23
24
23.
25
26
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., p. 23, p. 26.
F. Rexhepi, Historia 6, op.cit., p. 109.
I. Bicaj & A. Salihu, Historia 7, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2009), pp. 35-37.
See P. Xhufi, “Vëzhgime mbi emrin Arbëri dhe arbëresh“ in Dilemat e Arbërit, (Tiranë: Pegi, 2006), pp. 3See M. Shuflay, Serbët dhe Shqiptarët, trans. H. Çipuri, (Tiranë: Toena, 2004), pp. 30-36.
F. Rexhepi, Historia 10, op.cit., p. 158.
8
nations in modern sense were not coalesced yet. These names quite paradoxically are considered as
equivalent with the later names Shqiptarë and Shqipëri.27
The Myth of Ethnic Purity
The mythic idea about autochthony and ethnic continuity is accompanied even by the vision of ethnic
purity which seems to be embedded during all periods. This myth constitutes an attempt to prove
biological and cultural purity of Albanian ethnos which lies its basis on the belittlement of contacts
between Albanians and their neighbors. This attempt is best exemplified in the following passage:
“Illyrians throughout centuries preserved their own language, culture and traditions of their forebears,
handling down generations after generations...Arbërs are the descendants of Illyrians. They preserved
their language, customs and culture of their ancestors - Illyrians...In the areas where modern Slovenia,
Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, the ancient Arbëror-Shqiptar populace dwindled away gradually by the new
Slavic dwellers. Whilst in the territory of modern Albania, Kosova, large chunks of Macedonia,
Montenegro and Greece, the ancient Albanians did not extinguish. This population preserved its
language, customs and ancient culture which were carried by Albanians.28 Illyrians were not Romanized
although they were under their rule. They could preserve their language, culture, traditions and their
customs...Illyrians were on the edge of assimilation by the Romans and barbarian invasions...However,
Illyrians, and later Albanians, were capable of preserving their own, although a good deal of their lands
was engulfed by Slavic settlers...the main factors which enabled the survival of Albanian substance were
language, culture, traditions and customs”.29
The complexity of medieval history of Albanians is left on oblivion in a way to push forward the myth
about ethnic purity. The authors of these textbooks ignore all relations with outside world and thus they
explain the transitions from Illyrians to Albanians as natural transformations within that ethnic entity,
without being in touch by any outside circumstance. By emphasizing repeatedly the preservation of
language, traditions and culture, they preclude every possibility of ethnic evolution, which is rather
considered as a solid entity running through centuries and being untainted for most of time.30 These
authors admit only two extremities: the first one comprises the hypothesis according to which
Albanians-Shqiptarët of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia were utterly obliterated by the invading
Slavs; whilst the other one points to the hypothesis according to which Albanians in the territories of
modern Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece as well, escaped from assimilation by
keeping intact their own identity. Then again, these authors abuse with the term ‘Arbër’, which is
projected back in the past in all areas where once used to live Illyrians. Moreover, they preclude every
27
For ethnogenesis of Albanians see K. Frashëri, Etnogjeneza e Shqiptarëve – Vështrim historik, edit., M.
Goleci & B. Karoshi, (Tiranë: M&B, 2013), pp. 225-249.
28
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., p. 23, p. 26.
29
F. Rexhepi, Historia 10, op.cit., pp. 109-110.
30
For complexity of medieval history of Albanians see M. Shuflay, “Gjendja etnike në periudhën e
mesjetës”, in Qytetet dhe kështjellat e Shqipërisë – kryesisht në mesjetë”, L. Malltezi ed., (Tiranë: Onufri, 2009), pp.
74-81.
9
possibility of mingling or ethnic symbiosis in Balkans.31 Another major flaw is using modern political
terms to construe the history of Middle Ages.
Religious Harmony
A common myth is that according to which is envisaged a religious harmony. Behind these myths
emerges the idea that religious diversity among modern Albanians is a given fact. Thus all religions are
depoliticized in a way to create the impression that Albanians never identified themselves on religious
basis, but only on ethnic one. This myth bifurcates on two branches: the myth about religious tolerance
and the one about religious indifference.
The Myth About Religious Tolerance
The myth about religious tolerance constitutes one of the most important myths upon which relies the
identity given on history textbooks. Beneath of this myth is the deliberate attempt to subordinate the
religious diversity under the nation. The following excerpts are cases in point: “Although Albanians have
three religions, they were always unified into a single body, maintaining a religious tolerance with one
another. Albanians are reckoned as the only people who never had any religious war.32 Though divided
in three different religions, the Albanian nation is known for its religious tolerance. The language,
traditions and customs were the main elements which bounded Albanians...With the spread of Islam, at
the end of 17th century, the national names - Shqiptar and Shqipëri came to the fore. These names were
used in all areas where Albanian was spoken in spite of religious differences.”33
All chapters which dwell on this subject, point to the same direction: the religious tolerance. These
textbooks give a great deal of emphasis on the pragmatic behaviors of Albanians regarding the religions,
who always considered their national elements as the most important.34 This myth contains a very
ambiguous term: religious tolerance. This term does not go well along with the peaceful symbiosis
among Albanians. A tolerance perse presupposes a discrepancy, disagreement or conflict which is
neutralized by the tolerance. The multi-religious symbiosis among Albanians was not a consequence of
tolerance, but of a wide inter-religious consensus, best exemplified by the mixed marriages and the socalled kripto-Christians.35
Being so, the students are compelled to choose in their homework books between the following
options: “1) (Albanians) had religious tolerance, 2) (Albanians) had not religious tolerance; or 1) they had
religious wars; 2) there were no religious war; 3) they had only a religious war.”36 Other similar
31
See O.J. Schmitt, “Monada e Ballkanit – shqiptarët në Mesjetë“, in Historia e Shqiptarëve, op.cit., pp. 6769.
32
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., p. 50.
33
I. Bicaj, Historia 7, op.cit., p. 118.
34
See G. de Rapper, “Culture and the Reinvention of Myth in a Border Area”, in Albanian Identities: Myth
and History, S. Schwandner-Sievers & B. J. Fischer edit., (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), pp. 190-200.
35
For religious tolerance see P. Xhufi, “Toleranca fetare ndër shqiptarë”, in Dilemat e Arbërit, op.cit., pp.
541-553.
36
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5 – Fletore Pune, op.cit., p. 30.
10
questions are posed in this way: “b) describe some factors which paved the way to the spread of Islam
among Albanians; c) what is the religion of Albanians.”37
The Myth About Religious Pragmatism
The myth about religious tolerance would be less convincing if it had not been accompanied by myth
about religious indifference. On the heart of such myth lies the idea that no religion made any strong
holding into Albanian beliefs and that religion did not matter at all on the identity of Albanians. This
myth is built upon a poetic verse written by Pashko Vasa in his famous poem “Oh my Albania”. His
attempts to conceive an identity are described in this way: “To achieve the much yearned unification,
they chanted a verse taken by Pashko Vasa ‘The religion of Albanians is Albanism’, which did not
challenge religious beliefs, but religious divisions among Albanians.”38 This poetic verse put forth the
idea that Albanians were strongly bounded by ethnicity, and not the religions.39
The religious diversity is rather seen as a direct result of pragmatism and the struggle for survival.40
Unlike religious tolerance, the religious indifference is never dissected in its entirety. These texts do not
explicitly say that Albanians were indifferent towards religion. But they infer this by pointing too often
the very fact that Albanians made a compromise towards religion to attain political or economical
benefits. Hence these texts contain ample facts which imply the religious fluidity of Albanians.41 Many
chapters are dedicated to the spread of Islam,42 whereas there are only few superficial explanations to
the spread of Orthodoxism and Catholicism among Albanians.43 Its worth of pointing that these writers
do not specify the very fact that in addition to the three above-mentioned religions, Albanians embraced
certain religious heresies as like bogomilism;44 some of them are still practiced. No mention is made for
the community of Protestants45 and that of Bektashis.46
37
I. Bicaj & A. Salihu, Historia 7 – Fletore Pune, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2011), p. 48.
38
F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 8 – Shkolla e mesme e ulët, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2012), p. 70; for
more passages on religious pragmatism see R. Abdyli & E. Bakalli, Historia 11 – Gjimnazi i shkencave shoqërore,
(Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2012), pp. 41-42; see also J. Bajraktari & I. Bicaj, Historia 11 – Gjimnazi i përgjithshëm,
(Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2001), p. 72.
39
For mythization of this poem see A. Puto, “Feja e shqiptarit është shqiptaria: mit apo konstruktim
historik”,in Roli i miteve, op.cit., pp. 32-38.
40
For religious of Albanians during Midle Age and ottoman period see: F. Duka, “Feja dhe shoqëria në
hapësirën shqiptare. Periudha osmane”, in Shekujt osmanë në hapësirën shqiptare. (Tiranë: UET Press, 2009), pp.
41-72; see also P. Xhufi, “Ndjenja fetare në Shqipëri gjatë Mesjetës”, in Dilemat e Arbërit, op.cit, pp. 523-539.
41
For albanian’s myths on religious see N. Clayer, “Feja, krijimi i kombit dhe shoqëria”, in Historia e
Shqiptarëve, op.cit., pp. 121-132.
42
For spread of Islam see P. Bartl, Myslimanët shqiptarë në lëvizjen për pavarësi kombëtare (1878-1912),
trans. P. Xhufi, (Tiranë: Dituria, 2006), pp. 11-138.
43
For spread of Cristianity see G. Schramm, Fillet e krishterimit shqiptar: Konvertimi i hershëm i besëve dhe
pasojat e tij të gjata, trans. S. Gashi, (St. Gallen, Albanisches Institut, 2006); see also P. Xhufi, “Krishtërimi roman
në Shqipëri, shek. VI-XVI”, in Dilemat e Arbërit, op.cit., pp. 473-485.
44
For heresy of bogomilism see Y. Hysa, Shqiptarët dhe të tjerët: nga Madona e Zezë deri te Molla e Kuqe,
(Prishtinë: Instituti Albanologjik, 2010), pp. 11-60; see also E. Jacques & D. Young, Ungjilli ndër Shqiptarët,
(Prishtinë: Tenda, 2000), pp. 15-20.
45
For spread of Protestantism see A. Thomson, Bible Ways in Old Albania, (Gjirokastër: Albanian
Evangelical Trust, 1992); see also J. Clark, 1912 dhe Ungjilli, (Gjirokastër: AEM-Misioni Ungjillor, 2012).
46
For spread and role of Bektashism in albanian society see M. Krasniqi, Shoqëria Biblike Britanike për të
11
Albano-centrism as Nationalism
Most of myths which appear on these textbooks are modernized versions of previous myths which have
been prompted by 19th century nationalism. The pioneers of Albanan nationalism of 19th century, like
Jeronim De Rada, upheld the hypothesis about the Pelasgian origin of Albanians and supported German
scholars who adhered the view according to which Albanians were of Illyrian stock. The Illyrian theory
has been used to the degree of mythization by the communist regime of Enver Hoxha (1944-1985).47
One of the most noteworthy Albanian nationalist, Pashko Vasa through his famous line “The religion of
Albanians is Albanism”, articulated the myth of religious tolerance as an effective tool to tone down
religious divisions that plagued Albanian society at his time. Even the regime of Ahmet Zogu was fond of
exploiting this myth on his sterling attempts to consolidate Albania's statehood. Accordingly, there was a
reuse of such slogan especially after the collapse of Communism because there was some fear that
Albanians might return to their religions considering that Albanian communists put a ban on religions
(1967).48 The history as given on these textbooks does not meddle only with Albanians of Kosovo, but of
Albanians in general.49 Being so, there is no room left to those who claim for a ‘Kosovar nation’. To sum
it up, the idea of Albano-centrism imposes a perspective to see things from an Albanian angle.
The Incoherence of the Nation
While nationalist themes are abundantly popular on these textbooks, there is not a single paragraph to
delve the process how the nation was coalesced. The Albanian nation is considered as a given fact. This
nation is projected not in a certain framework, but it appears during all historical periods. This can be
noticed at the confusing usage of ethnonyms Ilir-Arbër-Shqiptar which are erroneously lumped
together.
When the kingdoms established by the Illlyrian tribes of Encheleans, Taulanti, Molossians, Ardieai or
Dardani are tackled, they are considered as successive entities which followed one another.50 This
warped view is consistent to the idea of Albanian writers who are covetous to see Illyrians as a single
ethnic entity. They ignore the very fact that the term ‘Illyrian’ most likely was never used by Illyrians to
denote themselves; indeed this term was probably an exonym used by either Greek or Romans to lump
together a mixture of tribes who used to live from Danube all the way of the Gulf of Ambracia. A chapter
dedicated to Balsha II has the following: “His intention was to unite all Albanian lands into a single
huajt dhe bektashizmi (1814-1897), (Prishtinë: Instituti Albanologjik, 2013), pp. 97-180.
47
For Enver Hoxha’s role on constructions of myths see M. J. Alex Standish, “Enver Hoxha’s Role in the
Development of Socialist Albanian Myths”, in Albanian Identities, op.cit., pp. 115-124.
48
P. Misha, “Invention of a Nationalism: Myth and Amnesia”, in Albanian Identities, op.cit., pp. 33-48.
49
O. Jazexhi, Rrëfimet e një kombi: Shqiptarët, turqit, muslimanët dhe të krishterët në tekstlibrat shkollorë të
historisë dhe letërsisë në Kosovë – Analizë e teksteve shkollore të ciklit fillor, të mesëm të ulët dhe të mesëm të lartë
në Kosovë, (Tiranë: Free Media Institute, 2013), p. 54.
50
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., pp. 11-13; F. Rexhepi, Historia 6, op.cit., pp. 73-80; F. Rexhepi, Historia
10, op.cit., pp. 37-44.
12
state....yet he could not fulfil his aspiration. The council of Lezha created the ground to establish an
Albanian state”.51 The writers mention nationalist ideas in a time when no nation has been shaped.52 In
general, they call every political entity as ‘state’ with a nationalist background:”Kara Mahmut Pasha
reckoned himself as a descendant of Scanderbeg and aspired to detach from Ottoman Empire...Ali Pashë
Tepelena struggled...to materialize his idea for an independent Albanian state.”53 While there is no
doubt that these Albanian rulers during Ottoman period were well-aware of French Revolution, it is
redundant to call their attempts as deliberate nationalist acts. This very idea can be found in all
textbooks, implying that Albanians had a proto-nationalist consciousness.54
The Myth About National Renaissance
The period of nation-building is known by Albanian historiography as the period of National
Renaissance. Given that Albanian nation is considered as timeless entity, the writers of history textbooks
do not delve the nature of nation. One is tempted to know which new phenomenon took place during
19th century? As Anthony Smith puts it, the myth about National Renaissance is narrowly linked with
“the golden age of nation”.55 What about the Albanian nation then? According to 19th century
nationalists, the times of Scanderbeg were perceived as the bright period of the nation. History
textbooks in Kosovo give the following definition on the formation of Albanian nation: “Renaissance was
a political movement with nationalist overtones, whose main purpose was to liberate and unite into a
single independent state and the development of both national education and culture56...the liberation
of all Albanian lands from Ottoman yoke and their unification into a single national state.”57
The formation of Albanian nation is described in the same manner as nationalist Albanians of 19 th
century did. The Albanian Renaissance is considered as a unique movement with a clear political
platform: liberation, cultural rise and the establishment of an independent state. There is no explanation
to the ever-growing antagonism between pro-Ottomanist elements and those who advocated either for
autonomy or full independence.58 There is a selection of historical events, where anti-Ottoman revolts
got the main attention, yet there is no passage about the participation of Albanians on Russian-Ottoman
wars on Crimean War, there is a large amount of references on Pashko Vasa, Sami Frasheri, Naim
Frasheri, Hasan Tahsini, Ismail Qemali, but there is not a single explanation that all of them were wellintegrated on Ottoman system.59 Moreover, there is a large amount of information about cultural
51
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., p. 28, p. 40.
52
For myths on nationalism see P. J. Geary, The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe, (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 19-22.
53
R. Abdyli, Historia 11, op.cit., pp. 67-71.
54
For protonationalism and myths on nationalism see E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780:
Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 46-50.
55
A. D. Smith, National Identity, (Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991), p. 34.
56
J. Bajraktari, F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 10: Gjimnazi matematikë dhe informatikë – Gjimnazi i
shkencave natyrore, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2010), p. 51.
57
J. Bajraktari & A. Salihu, Historia 12: Gjimnazi i përgjithshëm, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2006), p. 50.
58
See N. Bozbora, Shqipëria dhe nacionalizmi shqiptar në Perandorinë Osmane, trans. D.Egro, (Tiranë:
Dituria, 2002), pp. 146-207.
59
N. Clayer, Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në Evropë,
13
developments among intellectual circles, yet there is no information which would shed light upon the
cultural level and the identity of other layers of society.60
Victimization and innocence
The history as narrated on history text-books in Kosovo, is a purified version of history. Its authors
carried out a deliberate purification which sought to swept away all eventual ‘sins’, attempting to pass it
off as a mere history of consequences, rather than a history of causes. In order to bolster this kind of
purification, these authors conceived a focal point around which is centered the narration of history:
Albano-centrism. In so doing, they selected either events or historical sources with the primary intention
to conceive an image of innocent people who has been the victim of other peoples.
The Myth of Continuity Resistance
The idea of an innocent people during all of the history, is being harbored on the myth about continuity
and unbroken resistance. This myth had that Albanians were always outraged or assaulted by other
people, while they were always on defensive positions, resisting others onslaughts. This myth is being
narrated as the following passage illustrates: “Illyrians were never subjugated under Roman rule, they
fought all the time for their freedom. Although their uprisings were crushed with much of violence and
cruelty, Illyrians rose up continuously against foreign rulers.61 Albanians waged a continuous war to
liberate themselves from Ottoman yoke...Albanians never ceased their resistance against Ottoman
invaders...She (Elena Gjika – D.A) through folk songs, pointed out the war of Albanians against Ottoman
rule...The establishment of an Independent Albania...was a direct result of the continuous uprisings
against Ottomans...In all cities of Albania....Italian invaders were faced with the resistance of
Albanians.62 They never agreed with Ottoman yoke. The resistance of Albanians got larger proportions
each time...The resistance of Arbërs never ceased.63 The insurgents fought against oppression as well as
economic exploit...The unceasing uprising of Albanians as well as Italian war weakened considerably the
Ottoman Empire.”64
These authors eschew from modern terms like “Pax romana” or “Pax Ottomanica”, and thus they pass in
silence the very fact that Illyrians were well-integrated within Roman political and military framework or
within Ottoman Empire’s structures. They never make a mention to the economic prosperity which took
place during the Ottoman period;65 the intertwining identities of Ottomans and Albanians are ignored
trans. A.Puto, (Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2009), pp. 244-255.
60
A. Buda, “Mendimi politik dhe kultura kombëtare në vitet 50-70 të shek. XIX“, in Historia e Popullit
Shqiptar vol. II, edit. Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë: Instituti i Historisë, (Tiranë, Toena, 2002), pp. 121-131.
61
F. Rexhepi, Historia 6, op.cit., p. 87.
62
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit, pp. 57-58; p. 67; p. 71; p. 84.
63
I. Bicaj, Historia 7, op.cit., p. 54.
64
F. Rexhepi, Historia 8, op.cit., p. 69; p. 111.
65
For history of Albanians during the ottoman period see F. Duka, “Shqipëria gjatë sundimit osman (Një
histori e shkurtër)”, in Shekujt osmanë, op.cit., pp. 373-426.
14
likewise. They lay much stress on the slight resistance of Albanian forces against Fascist invasion on
1939, whom they portray as having larger proportions. To sum it up, the myth of a continuity resistance
of Albanians is a mere byproduct of “historic victimization syndrome”66, which make Albanians feel less
worried of their own history, and especially the lost chances during the past.
The Myth of Innocence
A nation that has been a victim, is an innocent nation! But what does make it innocent? This myth takes
pain to portray Albanians as a victim on the hand of others and that Albanians did no harm to others.
This myth is preceded in a way that many events are simply refrained in order to not provoke students.
When Second World War is tackled, the history textbook dedicated for the 9th grade, has the following
passage: ”Albanians who were ill treated during Monarchy of Yugoslavia, were fairly cautious towards
their Serbian neighbors...After unification of a part of Kosovo with Albania, the Albanian majority was
quite tolerant to Serbian and Montenegrin minorities, there were many instances when Albanians
offered their help to Serbs.”67 Indeed the truth runs much deeper than this statement. According to
impartial observations conducted by foreign scholars, it was a number of Serbs who were driven from
their homes because they felt insecure by any possible revenge of Albanians. Yet most of the expelled
Serbs were largely colons that came to settle in Kosovo fertile plains in the meantime between two
World Wars. The myth which envisages a vision of innocence is a deliberate attempt to justify the deeds
of certain Albanians who provided help to actions which are conceived as wrong by modern standards.68
Thus when authors dwell on the problem of collaboration between some Albanians with Nazi
authorities, they are hell-bent on justifying their motives: “When the German authority was established,
a group of nationalists attempted to preserve national unification which was achieved earlier, by
delivering support to Germans. On these circumstances, in 16-20 September was held on Prizren the
Second League of Prizren...Nazi German gave support to the Second League of Prizren for their goals,
while in other hand, the League members tried to exploit German’s presence to achieve their goals.”69 In
this way, these authors attempt to justify the collaboration with Nazis by portraying the Second League
of Prizren as a kind of pragmatic movement. In a similar manner, there is not a single mention of quisling
government of Tirana70 and SS Skanderbeg Division. Although this armed force’s role was insignificant,
these authors pass over into silence the history when Jews were rescued voluntarily by Albanians during
World War II.
The Relation With West
66
For this syndrome see P. Misha, “Fenomeni nacionalizëm dhe kriza shqiptare”, in Roli i miteve, op.cit., p.
27.
67
F. Rexhepi, Historia 9, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2009), p. 118.
68
See N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, (USA: Harper Perennial, 1999), pp. 293-294.
69
F. Rexhepi & F. Demaj, Historia 11: Gjimnazi i gjuhëve, (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2004), p. 161.
70
See O. J. Schmitt, Kosova: Histori e shkurtër e një teve qendrore ballkanike, trans., E. Robelli, (Prishtinë:
KOHA, 2012), pp. 164-171.
15
Most of textbooks which are in wide use in Kosovo, embarks on the myth about the intristinct
connection of Albanians with West. These authors do not give attention to the relations of Albanians
with Eastern World, instead they surface only the connection with Western civilization. This myth
demonstrates that history is used to attain some modern objectives by altering the historical truth. They
are pursuing the same path as political elites who are eager to belittle eastern elements. This myth is
ostensibly affected by the intense debates among Albanian intellectual milleu on the nature of Albanian
identity.71 Most of these textbooks are fraught with passages which bespeak for the European identity
of Albanians. At the same time, they neglect or ignore eastern elements of Albanian culture in order to
bolster Albanian identity in the line with that of Europe. The dilemma whether Albanians went alongside
West or East72 stems directly from the intense debate relating to the respective influence on Albanian
society.
The Myth About Scanderbeg
The anti-Ottoman resistance led by Scanderbeg, is seen by these authors as the most convincing
argument which evince the affiliation of Albanians with Europe and western world. These authors keep
mythizing Scanderbeg in that level which is required by modern goals. The dire necessity out of which
emerged the figure of Scanderbeg can be placed on 19th century when Albanian nationalists were eager
to find an outstanding historical personality which would amplify their struggle against Ottoman Empire.
Scanderbeg was deemed as the most eligible historical personality to carry out this mission. An Albanian
born into an Orthodox family, later converted on Muslim during his stay on Ottoman court, Scanderbeg
left out Ottoman army on 1443 when he stirred up a successful anti-Ottoman resistance which lasted
untill his death in 1468. The first mythization of Scanderbeg was carried by European Christian writers,
who felt menaced by the Ottoman Empire. They saw on Scanderbeg a noble knight who could inspire
the European Resistance against Muslim Ottomans.73
Scanderbeg, as displayed on history textbooks in Kosovo, is overly mythized. An image showing the
monument of Scanderbeg in Prishtina is stamped on the first page of history textbook dedicated for the
5th grade, while on the introduction about Scanderbeg is asserted: “The noble family of Kastriot was
from Has.”74 It is quite interesting that from a plenty of theories concerning Scanderbeg’s origin, these
authors have a predilection for that theory according to which this hero sprung from a village in nearby
of modern Kosovo. Does this claim represent an attempt to further affiliate students of Kosovo with
Scanderbeg, or a disguised willing to ‘usurp’ him?75 It's hard to find an answer on such question.
71
For those debates see I. Kadare, Identiteti evropian i shqiptarëve - sprovë, (Tiranë: Onufri, 2006); see also
K. Frashëri, Identiteti Kombëtar Shqiptar dhe Çështje të Tjera – (Ndërhyrje në debatin Ismail Kadare – Rexhep
Qosa), (Tiranë: Edisud, 2006).
72
For this dilemma see E. Çabej, Shqiptarët midis Perëndimit dhe Lindjes, (Tiranë: Çabej, 2006).
73
For this mythization see K. Frashëri, “Skënderbeu dhe Evropa“, in Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu 600 vjet
pas, edit., Don Ndue Ballabani, (Zagreb: Misioni Katolik Shqiptar në Kroaci & Këshilli i Pakicës Kombëtare
Shqiptare të Qytetit të Zagrebit, 2005), pp. 19-25; see also O. J. Schmitt, Skënderbeu, trans. A.Klosi, (Tiranë: K &
B, 2009), pp. 423-455.
74
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., p. 37.
75
For origin of Scanderbeg from Kosovo see J. Drançolli, “Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu dhe Kosova”, in
Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu 600 vjet pas, op.cit., pp. 39-47; see also J. Drançolli, Shteti mesjetar i Gjergj
16
Scanderbeg is portrayed on this fashion: “The wars waged by Scanderbeg thwarted Ottoman army to
advance on his campaign to conquer Europe. It can be stated that Scanderbeg defended Europe from
Ottoman onslaughts...Scanderbeg remains a standing national personality and a great personality on
European history...Numerous monuments of the hero...have been erected on several cities of Europe: in
Rome, Brussels, Geneva, etc.”76
On the history textbook for the 10th grade, there is a special chapter entitled “The cooperation of
Scanderbeg with Europe”, where it is explicitly stated: “The war of Albanians led by Scanderbeg had a
powerful echo all over Europe. The western Europeans considered him as the main bulwark against
Ottoman incursions on the eastern fringes of continent...The Popes of Rome had a sympathy for
him...and they called him as a ''defender of Christendom''...they bestowed on him the title “General
Captain of the Holy See”.77 “The fierce resistance of Albanians was a protecting shield for Western
Europe...Scanderbeg maintained good relations with many European countries...The anti-Ottoman
struggle of Albanians was highly praised by the European audiences ...Thus...Scanderbeg might be
regarded as a defender of European civilization.”78
The view according to which Scanderbeg fought on behalf of Europe appears often on the attempts to
construe a pure European identity and socialize new generations with this concept. But this attempt is at
odds with the historical Scanderbeg. The dilemma here is between mythic Scanderbeg and historical
Scanderbeg.79 Such statements pave the way to provide a new set of values in line with modern
politics.80
The Myth of Cultural Homogenity
The authors of these textbooks have been too cautious to not challenge the image of a western identity
of Albanians by unraveling historical elements which indicate a link with eastern world. This can be
noticed on myths concerning religious pragmatism, where the role of Islam on Albanian society is not
properly evaluated.81 “Although, the peoples of Balkans embraced Islam, they preserved their language,
traditions and customs...Dhimitër and the population of Arbëria were converted from Orthodox rite to
the Catholic one...He aimed to affiliate Albanians with western countries.”82 Considering that Islam
Kastriotit – Skënderbeut, (Pejë: Dukagjini, 2000), pp. 183-192.
76
F. Rexhepi, Historia 5, op.cit., p. 42; p. 47.
77
F. Rexhepi, Historia 10, op.cit., pp. 180-181.
78
I. Bicaj, Historia 7, op.cit., pp. 67-69.
79
See A. Puto, “Nga Skënderbeu mitik në atë historik“, in Skënderbeu i kërkimit shkencor, Përpjekja, year
XIX, no.28-29, F. Lubonja edit., (Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2012), pp. 18-23.
80
See N. Nixon, “Ngaherë e tashmë evropianë: figura e Skënderbeut në nacionalizmin bashkëkohor
shqiptar”, in Skënderbeu i kërkimit shkencor, op.cit., pp. 142-164.
81
For influence of Islam in Albanian society see F. Shehu, “The Influence of Islam in Albanian Culture”,
Journal of Islam in Asia, Special Issue, no.1, march 2011, (Malaysia: International Islamic University of Malaysia,
2011), pp. 389-407; see also G. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000).
82
I. Bicaj, Historia 7, op.cit., p. 34; p. 39.
17
comprises all oriental elements on Albanian culture, it is portrayed with an old covering, beneath of
which lie the occidental identity of Albanians. Thus many Albanian writers, painters or architects who
had a bright career, are precluded from Albanian culture. They are seen solely as personalities “who
contributed for Ottoman culture.”83
For the old dilemma whether Albanians pertain to west or east84, these authors have given an arbitrary
answer by openly clinging to the western civilization. This inclination towards West relies upon the
deliberate attempt to envisage a compact identity with a Western veneer. The way of construction
process of this identity, is an “escape from the East”.85 This myth relies on the cultural homogeneity
idea, according to which Albanian society was a monolith entity with no diversity.86 The endeavors to
‘westernize’ as much as possible the history of Albanians is best exemplified by some details on the
illustration for the history book of the 7th grade, where Ali Pashë Tepelena and British poet, Gordon
Byron are painted in a seemingly western interior.87 This illustration does not reconcile with historical
truth, given that Ali Pashë Tepelena had a typical oriental life on his palace built on oriental style.
Moreover, these authors take pain to mention the contribution of Albanians on western culture. They
point to the Illyrian or Albanian origin of Alexander the Great, Constandine the Great88, Saint Jeronime,
Justinian89, Anastas90, or Francesko Krispi.91
Conclusion
Historical textbooks in Kosovo have a missionary character. Their mission consists on envisaging a
complex historical, cultural and political identity which goes well along far-reaching political objectives
of Albanians. The writers of such textbooks have devised a mythologized history out of several clichés or
stereotypes. According to this mythologized history, Albanians are an indigenous people bearing an
original culture; they have a linear history which might be traced back to Pelasgians-Illyrians-ArbërsShqiptarë; they withstood assimilation by retaining their ethnicity; they were pragmatic and tolerant
regarding religions which is why they had an inter-religious tolerance with one another; they had a
proto-national conscience which enabled them to transcend religious differences; they have been
always victims of neighboring peoples and as such they were blameless for the most part of history; they
were defenders and contributors as well of European civilization and culture. This constructed history
eschews every element which would reveal the links with the eastern world. This meta-narration of
83
Ibid., p. 130.
84
For history of this dilemma see O. J. Schmitt, Shqiptarët: Një histori mes Lindjes dhe Perëndimit, trans.
A.Klosi, (Tiranë: K & B, 2012).
85
For escape of Albanians from Orient see E. Sulstarova, Arratisje nga Lindja: Orientalizmi shqiptar nga
Naimi te Kadareja, (Tiranë, Pika pa Sipërfaqe, 2013).
86
See N. Malcolm, “Myth of Albania National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the Works of
Albanian Writers in America in the Early Twentieth Century”, in Albanian Identities, op.cit., pp. 70-87.
87
I. Bicaj, Historia 7, op.cit., p. 124.
88
F. Rexhepi, Historia 6, op.cit., p. 94.
89
Ibid., p. 105.
90
Ibid., p. 108.
91
F. Rexhepi, Historia 8, op.cit., p. 16; see also F. Rexhepi, Historia 8 – Fletore pune, op.cit., p. 10.
18
history offers to Albanians a bright past which enables them a special seat on European history and an
identity which is on the same pair with their inclination towards western civilization.
Bibliography
Abdyli, Ramiz. & Emine Bakalli. Historia 11: Gjimnazi i shkencave shoqërore. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor,
2012.
Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë: Instituti i Arkeologjisë (edit.). Ilirët dhe Ilira te autorët antikë.
Tiranë: Toena, 2002.
Bajraktari, Jusuf. & Isa Bicaj. Historia 11: Gjimnazi i përgjithshëm. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2004.
Bajraktari, Jusuf. & Arbër Salihu. Historia 12: Gjimnazi i përgjithshëm. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2006.
Bajraktari, Jusuf. & Fehmi Rexhepi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 10: Gjimnazi matematikë dhe informatikë;
Gjimnazi i shkencave natyrore. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2010.
Bartl, Peter. Mysllimanët shqiptarë në lëvizjen për pavarësi kombëtare (1878-1912). trans., Nestor
Nepravishta. Tiranë: Dituria, 2006.
Bicaj, Isa. & Isuf Ahmeti. Historia 12: Gjimnazi shoqëror. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2006.
Bicaj, Isa. & Arbër Salihu. Historia 7. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2009.
Bozbora, Nuray. Shqipëria dhe nacionalizmi shqiptar në Perandorinë Osmane. trans., Dritan Egro. Tiranë:
Dituria, 2002.
Buda, Aleks. “Mendimi politik dhe kultura kombëtare në vitet 50-70 të shek. XIX“, in Historia e Popullit
Shqiptar, vol. II, edit., Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë: Instituti i Historisë. Tiranë: Toena, 2002.
Clark, James. 1912 dhe Ungjilli. Gjirokastër: AEM-Misioni Ungjillor, 2012.
Clayer, Nathalie. Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në
Evropë. trans., Artan Puto. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2009.
Clayer, Nathalie. “Feja, krijimi i kombit dhe shoqëria“, in Historia e Shqiptarëve: Gjendja dhe
perspektivat e studimit. Edit., Oliver Jens Schmitt & Eva Anne Frantz. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2012.
Çabej, Eqrem. Shqiptarët midis Perëndimit dhe Lindjes. Tiranë: Çabej, 2006.
Drançolli, Jahja. “Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu dhe Kosova“, in Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu: 600 vjet
pas. Edit., Dom Ndue Ballabani. Zagreb: Misioni Katolik Shqiptar në Kroaci & Këshilli i Pakicës Kombëtare
Shqiptare të Qytetit të Zagrebit, 2005.
Drançolli, Jahja. Shteti mesjetar i Gjerg Kastriotit – Skënderbeut. Pejë: Dukagjini, 2001.
Dugolli, Bujar. & Durim Abdullahu. “Çështje kundërthënëse dhe të ndjeshme në tekstet e historisë për
shkollat fillore dhe të mesme në Kosovë“, in Diskutime, year III, no.9, February-March 2014. Edit., Arsim
Sinani. Tetovë: Qendra për Marrëdhënie Ndërkombëtere dhe Studime Ballkanike – Akademia
Diplomatike Shqiptare Tetovë & Instituti për Studime Evropiane i Universitetit të Tiranës.
Duijzings, Ger. Religion and Politics of Identity in Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
Duka, Ferit. “Feja dhe shoqëria në hapësirën shqiptare – Periudha Osmane”, in Shekujt osmanë në
hapësirën shqiptare (Studime dhe dokumente). Tiranë: UET Press, 2009.
Duka Ferit. “Shqipëria gjatë sundimit osman (Një histori e shkurtër). Tiranë: UET Press, 2009.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punis: The Birth of Prison. trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage
Books, 1995.
19
Frashëri, Kristo. “Skënderbeu dhe Evropa”, in Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu: 600 vjet pas. Edit., Dom
Ndue Ballabani. Zagreb: Misioni Katolik Shqiptar në Kroaci & Këshilli i Pakicës Kombëtare Shqiptare të
Qytetit të Zagrebit, 2005.
Frashëri, Kristo. Identitei Kombëtar Shqiptar dhe Çështje të Tjera – (Ndërhyrje në debatin Ismail Kadare –
Rexhep Qose). Tiranë: Edisud, 2006.
Frashëri, Kristo. Etnogjeneza e Shqiptarëve – Vështrim historik. Edit., Miranda Goleci & Bujar Karoshi.
Tiranë: M & B, 2013.
Geary, Patrick J. The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2003.
Gordon, Haim. & Rivca Gordon. Heidegger on Truth and Myth: A Rejection of Postmodernism. New York:
Peter Lang Publishing, 2007.
Hobsbawn, Erick J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press., 2012.
Hysa, Ylber. Shqiptarët dhe të tjerët: nga Madona e Zezë deri te Molla e Kuqe. Prishtinë: Instituti
Albanologjik, 2009.
Jacques, Edwin. & David Young. Ungjilli ndër Shqiptarët. Prishtinë: Tenda, 2000.
Jazexhi, Olsi. Rrëfimet e një kombi: shqiptarët, turqit, muslimanët dhe të krishterët në tekstlibrat
shkollorë të historisë dhe letërsisë në Kosovë – Analizë e teksteve shkollore të ciklit fillor, të mesëm të
ulët dhe të mesëm të lartë në Kosovë. Tiranë: Free Media Institute, 2013.
Kadare, Ismail. Identiteti Evropian i Shqiptarëve. Tiranë: Onufri, 2006.
Korkuti, Muzafer. “Themelimi i kolonive helene dhe marrëdhëniet me botën ilire”, in Historia e Popullit
Shqiptar, vol. I. edit., Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë: Instituti i Historisë. Tiranë: Toena, 2002.
Krasniqi, Memli. Shoqëria Biblike Britanike për të huajt dhe bektashizmi (1814-1897). Prishtinë: Instituti
Albanologjik, 2013.
Levi-Strauss, Claude. Myth and Meaning: Cracking the Code of Culture. New York: Schoken Books, 1979.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. trans., Geoff Bennington &
Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982.
Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. USA: Harper Perennial, 1999.
Malcolm, Noel. “Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the Works of
Albanian Writers in America in the Early Twentieth Century”, in Albanian Identites: Myth and History.
Edit., Stephanie Schwander-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer. London: Hurst & Company, 2002.
Matzinger, Joachim. “Shqiptarët si pasardhës të ilirëve nga këndvështrimi i gjuhësisë historike”, in
Historia e Shqiptarëve: Gjendja dhe perspektivat e studimit. Edit., Oliver Jens Schmitt & Eva Anne Frantz.
Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2012.
Misha, Piro. “Fenomeni nacionalizëm dhe kriza shqiptare”, in Roli i Miteve në Historinë e Shqipërisë,
Përpjekja, year VI, no. 15-16. Edit., Fatos Lubonja. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 1999.
Misha, Piro. “Invention of a Nationalism: Myth and Amnesia”, in Albanian Identites: Myth and History.
Edit., Stephanie Schwander-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer. London: Hurst & Company, 2002.
Nixon, Nicola. “Ngaherë e tashmë evropianë: figura e Skënderbeut në nacionalizmin bashkëkohor
shqiptar”, in Skëndebeu i kërkimit shkencor, Përpjekja, year XIX, no. 28-29. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2012.
Norris, Christopher. Deconstruction: Theory and Practice. London & New York: Routledge, 2004.
20
Puto, Artan. “Feja e shqiptarit është shqiptaria: mit apo konstruktim historik”, in Roli i Miteve në
Historinë e Shqipërisë, Përpjekja, year VI, no. 15-16. Edit., Fatos Lubonja. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 1999.
Puto, Artan. „Nga Skënderbeu mitik në atë historik“, in Skëndebeu i kërkimit shkencor, Përpjekja, year
XIX, no. 28-29. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2012.
Rapper, Gilles de. ”Culture and the Reinvention of Myth in a Border Area“, in Albanian Identites: Myth
and History. Edit., Stephanie Schwander-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer. London: Hurst & Company, 2002.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 11: Gjimnazi i gjuhëve. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2004.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 9 – Fletore pune. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2007.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 5 – Fletore pune. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2009.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. Historia 9. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2009.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 8 – Fletore pune. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2010.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 10: për gjimnazin e përgjithshëm dhe për gjimnazin e
shkencave shoqërore. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2010.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 6 – Fletore pune. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2011.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 5. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2012.
Rexhepi, Fehmi. & Frashër Demaj. Historia 8. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2012.
Schmitt, Oliver Jens. Skënderbeu. trans., Ardian Klosi. Tiranë: K & B, 2009.
Schmitt, Oliver Jens. Shqiptarët: Një histori midis Lindjes dhe Perëndimit. trans., Ardian Klosi. Tiranë: K &
B, 2012.
Schmitt, Oliver Jens. „Monada e Ballkanit – Shqiptarët në Mesjetë“, in Historia e Shqiptarëve: Gjendja
dhe perspektivat e studimit. Edit., Oliver Jens Schmitt & Eva Anne Frantz. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2012.
Schmitt, Oliver Jens. Kosova: Histori e shkurtër e një treve qendrore ballkanike. trans., Enver Robelli.
Prishtinë: KOHA, 2012.
Schramm, Gottfried. Fillet e krishterimit shqiptar: Konvertimi i hershëm i besëve dhe pasojat e tij të
gjata. trans., Skënder Gashi. St. Gallen: Albanische Institut, 2006.
Smith, Anthony D. National Identity. Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991.
Standish, Alex M. J. ”Enver Hoxha’s Role in the Development of Socialist Albanian Myths“, in Albanian
Identites: Myth and History. Edit., Stephanie Schwander-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer. London: Hurst &
Company, 2002.
Stipçeviq, Aleksandër. Ilirët: Historia, jeta, kultura, simbolet e kultit. trans., Nazmi Rrahmani. Tiranë:
Toena, 2002.
Sulstarova, Enis. Arratisje nga Lindja: Orientalizmi shqiptar nga Naimi te Kadareja. Tiranë: Pika pa
Sipërfaqe, 2013.
Shehu, Fatmir. “The Influence of Islam in Albanian Culture”, in Journal of Islam Asia, Special Issue, no. 1,
march 2011. Malaysia: International Islamic University of Malaysia, 2011.
Shuflay, Milan. Serbët dhe shqiptarët. trans., Hasan Çipuri. Tiranë: Toena, 2004.
Shuflay, Milan. “Gjendja etnike në periudhën e Mesjetës“, in Qytetet dhe kështjellat e Shqipërisë –
kryesisht në Mesjetë. Edit., Luan Malltezi. Tiranë: Onufri, 2009.
Thomson, Alexander. Bible Ways in Old Albania. Gjirokastër: Albanian Evangelical Trust, 1992.
Vehbiu, Ardian. “Obsesioni ynë me origjinën”, in Roli i Miteve në Historinë e Shqipërisë, Përpjekja, year
VI, no. 15-16. Edit., Fatos Lubonja. Tiranë: Përpjekja, 1999.
21
Xhufi, Pëllumb. “Vëzhgime mbi emrin Arbër dhe Arbëresh”, in Dilemat e Arbërit (Një studim mbi
Shqipërinë e shek. XI-XVI). Tiranë: Pegi, 2006.
Xhufi, Pëllumb. “Krishtërimi roman në Shqipëri, shek. VI-XVI”, in Dilemat e Arbërit (Një studim mbi
Shqipërinë e shek. XI-XVI). Tiranë: Pegi, 2006.
Xhufi, Pëllumb. “Ndjenja fetare në Shqipëri gjatë Mesjetës”, in Dilemat e Arbërit (Një studim mbi
Shqipërinë e shek. XI-XVI). Tiranë: Pegi, 2006.
Xhufi, Pëllumb. “Toleranca fetare ndër shqiptarë”, in Dilemat e Arbërit (Një studim mbi Shqipërinë e
shek.
XI-XVI).
Tiranë:
Pegi,
2006.
22
Myths of history textbooks
Xhevair LLESHI
Astrit DAUTAJ
"History is very good teacher, but people are NOT her best students"!
Pitted against this claim, all teachers of history who participated in a workshop about the curriculum
reform for basic education focused themselves in the second half. They complained about the low
interest of students related to the history subject, lack of curiosity and motivation to learn what
happened in the distant past and near. For teachers, the students were the only responsible for such a
situation.
When asked to read more historical books students usually reply: First, tell us why it would serve us. For
us, they keep saying, it is a waste of time to deal with things that we believe are not always true, that
does not affect us, and we think they will never do.
Hence we raise the following issues:
For students to have an interest in the history subject and history itself, they must see the value of it for
their present and future life.
That history deserves to be considered "a good teacher", it must have something to teach students and
people in general.
In order to have them both, an appropriate teaching pedagogy, is needed, which in short means:
A curriculum for history subject which is developed based on a particular policy, under the responsibility
of a state-appointed authority (Institute for Curriculum Development). This curriculum defines what the
students should know and be able to do by the end of their schooling. It sets the framework within
which the historical competence has to be developed, which implies the student as a reader of the
history and the students as a writer of it. .
An good history school textbook which depends on:
curriculum requirements
textbook author - the extent to which the he/she understands and implements these
requirements,
professional ability and integrity of the textbook authors etc..
A good teacher, being able to creatively implement the history curriculum.
There are teachers that literally follow the textbooks,
23
there are teachers that use a variety of strategies and techniques to creatively involve students
in building their historical knowledge and
there are teachers that take even an opposing view regarding the way history is written or an
event is interpreted in the textbook etc. These teachers may ad interesting points to the way
an issue, event, or an historic character is addressed.
All three of these factors, if properly harmonized, create the possibility that, on the one hand, the
history textbooks has something to teach people, therefore, “history can be a good teacher” and, on the
other hand, students, people are motivated to learn from it.
Factors affecting the harmony of the above points are numerous. The focus of this conference are
myths and their impact on understanding and writing history, affecting, in various degrees and forms,
the three factors that we presented above.
For this reason, in this paper we need to point out the existence of myths in the history of our people
and their characteristics, how they are addressed in the pre-university history textbooks, in both, World
and Albanian history textbooks. The way they are considered and addressed has a great impact on the
historical thought and on the teaching and learning process in the classroom and beyond it.
We now about myths, in general, and those that we call Albanian, in particular, through our oral
literature, namely from folklore, history (through its various themes and mainly those related to the
remote past), literature (world and national), cultural heritage etc., that are integrated in our preuniversity education curricula. We certainly will focus on the history textbooks and mostly on our
national history, without neglecting problems being part of the world history. Indeed, it would not be
bad to start from here. Recently, historians have pointed out the idea of revising ancient and, largely,
the Greco-Roman history, for, part of this history is filled, according to them full of myths. It seems that
this idea contradict what Karl Grimberg (author of world history in 12 volumes) says that myths are as
essential to small countries as air, otherwise they would not have a history at all.
We pose the question:
Have myths had only a negative impact on world history? This can be very true if we compare the
coverage of the myths of world history in our textbooks, especially in grade six and ten, because they
cover less than ten percent of the myths addressed by our colleagues in world history. Everybody can
reach this conclusion if he/she had even a quick look at the library of the Institute of International
Textbook Georg Eckert.
Of course it would be nice to know all the myths that came, through different ways, to become part of
our national history, as we know the idea that qualifies our history as highly mythologized.
But, if this is true, could we have avoided it?
24
First, would it be possible to write our history leaving aside Bindi, Lebetitë, Melesoka, Thana, Era etc.?
Yes, this would be the easiest part for us. Because they do not have the status Zeus, Athena, Saturn,
Apollo etc.. use to have respectively in the ancient Greek and Rome history.
There would be problems, for instance, when it comes to Skanderbeg, who became a myth, a legend
(as in fact was), as our Renaissance gave him the status of a national hero, because that was needed in
that specific segment of time and space in our country.
But we ask: Does the Skanderbeg really deserve that status?
In almost all textbooks present in our school environment today, written by 12 different authors,
Scanderbeg is not given a mythical dimensions. He is not Zeus, not even Prometheus, though he kindled
the fire of patriotism, unite associated with survival of the Albanian people.
In this sense, even when myths are created, they have served a very specific purpose.
In this context, the “myth” of Scanderbeg represent the idea of uniting in a single independent state,
the idea of the ability of self-government, which for the Albanians, who have always been under the rule
of foreigners, seemed impossible. Today they say "Albanians cannot build Albania”. At a time, when
the country was under Ottoman rule, inherited from the rule of the Byzantine and Roman centuries,
using the myth of Scanderbeg to convince Albanians that they can govern Albania, was historically
justified. As such this served the survival of this nation. The old and mythical thesis that " Albanians
cannot govern Albania” reappears today and a response is needed to that:
Should history textbooks etc. serve the country’s interests, specifically related to time and
space?
What about the above saying? To what and to whom does it serve?
Scanderbeg was mythologized during the Albanian Renaissance to serve several national purposes of the
time. Albanian Renaissance was mythologized and this served the idea that even labeled, based on
religious affiliation, Muslims ( they were called Turks), orthodox (they were called Greek) Catholics (they
were called Latin), we all are Albanians. In this way, the Renaissance mythologized served the survival
and preservation of the Albanian nation. Indeed there is something more, which began to evoke
Renaissance because even religious heritage was about to turn into a myth, equivalent to nationality.
As seen from these two examples, in our past history, myths have played an important social and
political role. They have served as a model of behavior for the Albanians: unity, love for the homeland,
the resistance against the invaders etc., are some of the typical behaviors required in certain historical
periods (which unfortunately, in our country, lasted for centuries and epochs) for survival and selfpreservation. In this sense, the myths have played a major role for our small country and confirm, in a
way, the famous saying of Carl Grimberg.
It must be underlined that myths in our history occupy less space than in the history of other Balkan
countries which we know through history textbooks and books.
25
History repeats itself in different forms and to different extent. The history repeats itself through
repeating situations that threaten the existence of our nation and its inherent features. In these
circumstances, the history called, for assistance, which seems to be a permanent task, myths and their
recreation, which, in this view, have served and serve the preservation of our nation and our own
history.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Maybe we should go through all our history textbooks and identify and give a picture of the status of
myths in them, for instance to quote the lines related to the way Skanderbeg or other characters of our
history are mythologized, or the lines where new modern myths appear and supported for different
interests.
But, ladies and gentlemen, this would be the simplest thing for the sole reason that in this way would
not follow the real logic of history and its determine factors but that of the outside forms.
Therefore, reading the Albanian history, even mythologized, one can understand the consciousness of a
nation, along the stages of its history. One can question the authenticity of the statement of Barletius
that "Albanians have gone through history with a sword in their hand" (forgive us if the statement
sounds as Albanian later myth!). Today we can laugh at the words of the poetry of Ismail Kadare that
"the gun is an extension of the Albanian rib". But, what it teaches us, is that in this country, the ideas
related to them have been part of the social consciousness and that there was a time that necessarily
asked for them, representing in the same time the ideals and institutions of the society, or of its
segments specifically.
But, is it true that the value of myths can go beyond the constraints of time and space? In fact, we
think not, because their value is limited within the framework defined by history.
For this reason, the question of myths, their relation with the truth, and demands that history poses to
a nation, society, social group, etc.., remains always open.
Myths and their excessive use does not help writing the history and history textbooks. They lead
them to wrong direction and far away to their expected outcome.
a. Myths leads students not to the real cause and effect relationship that conditioned the course of
history, but to other non important, casual events that happened to be part of it. Students should be
taught to explore the factors determining the development of society and its history, cause and effect
relationships that are repeated in the course of history, and which therefore are necessary to really
understand history and help us to predict it. In this sense, students should not have to spend time in a
semester, to make, for example, a 2-3 classes tourist trip around the most ancient civilizations, but to
spend it time to study, in depth and in width, 2 to 3 civilizations, for a longer time, in order to
understand, the course of their development and their specific and common features. This will help
students to understands the laws of the economy and its relation to politics and other factors of the
26
society. The students will use this pattern when they will examine later and present civilizations and to
predict a possible future and make sound decisions in time and space where they live.
When studying history, students should learn that, in addition to what is repeatable, there are several
features, ideas, opportunities, etc.. that are closely related to the specificities of the time and space.
The students should be given the opportunity to learn to consider past events, ideas, characters, values,
limitations etc.. against criteria’s belonging to their time and space . Only in this way history teaching
will enable students to put everything in the appropriate space and time and to judge, to accept etc.. in
the context of that time. Only in this way, people will not be slaves of the myths created for various
reasons, and not react when, for example, the mythical figure of Skanderbeg was placed in his
historical environment and would appear before them with the characteristics of any ruler of the time.
So people will be able to demythologizing history and the society will gradually eliminate the conditions
and reasons for the myths to exist and get used.
However, in our history thing are a little bit different. Because giving up myth, mean that you have to
question existing ideas in the existing historical truth, in order to confirm it or, if there are sufficient
resources to suggest its review, it new facts and historical resources are sufficient to suggest such a
thing.
Myths may reduce people self-esteem, as people who believe in them and in their power do not see
themselves or the group they are part of as powerful enough to relay on ... They always feel small and
powerless ...
Governments are interested to make those who they govern believe they need it, because they,
themselves, do have power to govern. When someone opposes or criticizes a government decision or
policy and suggest something else, he does this for, at the beginning, he believes he can do something
in this regard. In Albania, when they say that this or that government decision, actually is the decision
of a international power, then, that decision is accepted as something that is set in "Olympus" and for
which it nothing can be done.
In this way, the modern man feels helpless, like primitive man, to the modern invisible terrific Olympus.
Often the history is the history of such acts of powers, being that individual or state, appearing as the
only or final responsible for the fate of others.
On the other hand, it seems people feel better in a world where heroes act, it seems like they have to
justify their inaction, their social apathy, waiting for superman to come and solve their problems.
Government is interested in such an attitude, just waiting, not opposing, therefore, it feeds in
different forms.
In this way, the myths keep fertile the bed for the creation of new myths, which is in the interest of
policy and its various leaders ...
Mythology speaks of heroes who were punished, because they served humanity!
27
Often, not only in history textbooks, but also in everyday event, such as, for instance, TV debates or in
the printed press, you notice that a great attention is paid to certain individuals, who in many cases are
treated not in their historical, political, social environment, .., giving them the status of a myth, not very
important at the beginning, but very important at the end.
Many historical writings address and judge certain individuals of the past as independent decisionmakers, beyond the realms of time and space in which they lived. In this way, those powerful individuals
became mythical heroes. They are mighty, but, when time comes they are "scapegoated", when a
period, a class, a system should be saved etc. Rise them at the beginning and depose later, in order
for the power to be safe. They are mythologized in order to be sacrificed to the interests of powers that
lie beyond the protected walls.
Students (people) are taught about brave historical figures that took actions, trying to bring about
changes for the benefit of humanity, against the governments (power). Heroes like Prometheus, Martin
Luther King, Gandhi, Mandela, but also figures of our national history, etc.., who were punished because
of their efforts. It seems that through these examples, children are not taught the model they should
follows, but rather, the model that should not be followed if one wants to stay alive by fighting the
power. In fact, this is the way how these martyrs and their deeds are interpreted by a lot of young
people. And that's really pity!
There are hundreds, if not thousands, those who were prosecuted by the communist regime. Should
they be part of our history? Do they serve any historical purpose? If any (and they do serve), what is the
way it should be identified and used? Or what we need is just mythologizing the idea of a bad regime or
them, as individuals? Considering our history textbooks, we can say that regarding these people, they
are moving toward new myths. But we wonder, ladies and gentlemen, can our history textbook carry
this heavy burden? And in the same time being able to safeguard the historical truth? Problems and
challenges facing our history in this regards are numerous. They require solutions and that solution
should be the result of a cooperation all actors.
In conclusion, we want to draw attention to a problem which is at the same time sexy and serious. We
all know that people (has been and will remain) the biggest real author of mythology But today the
people is being challenged by politics, in the creation of the new myths, even though it has to smile
and live with the old ones.
We would kindly ask you to note something simple: The politics very often uses the term “ ordinary
people”, in order to highlight the dreadful fact that, doing this, they are asking to be considered "the
extraordinary ones", the gods. And they have the power to influence the writing of history.
And this is the point where all discussion starts again and the history writing is put under the same
perpetual challenges…
Xhevair Lleshi, INSTITUTE AND UNIVERSITY TEXTBOOKS
Astrit
Dautaj,
EDUCATION
DEVELOPMENT
28
INSTITUTE
(IDE)
(IZHA-Albanian)
Myths and legends in support of political fraud
of the history
Dr. Ndriçim Mehmeti (PhD)
In the history of Albania, like in almost every other country in the Balkans there have been coexisting in
many years myths and legends that have largely replaced the historic truth. More over in our country,
this distortion has happened in the period after the Second World War. Immediately after the
communism was established, new and old myths are used serving the political ideology of that system.
The new regime took care of that all the history, facts, scientific data to be addressed in such a way to
show the new developments undertaken by the country and the success of the new government.
Without putting a second thought to it, many pages of the history were erased. These pages had to do
with inappropriate figures for the new government.
Its ideology reached a high level, especially after 1967. Almost everything was replaced by a new history,
that didn’t have to do with the study of the history in itself, but putting it in the full service of the
dictatorial system intentions that were installed in the country. Very little was taught about the historic
developments and the reasons behind them, instead there was taught more and more about the
principles of Marxism-Leninism. It was gone so far that every book of history, needed to have definitely
a quote of the well-known communist leaders of the world and obviously beside them also the citations
of Hoxha. This was a thorough model that encompassed almost all the Balkans.
Was this a model dictated by that era, in order to review the history by a critical perspective, or it was
just a shield for the new regime? It was absolutely a shield for the new regime and in no line you could
find that it was thought to review the history so that the young generations could better understand
their past and to adjust the mistakes while constructing the future. In a violent way in Albania, the
history suffered major and dramatic changes. Following the principle that “history is written by
winners,” this last category violated everything considered by them old and coming from the past,
throwing it away as something unnecessary. Whole volumes of books, manuscripts and also artworks
were sealed and considered as prohibited, thus there was very little access to them afterwards. From
the ancient and medieval times, there were raised bravery legends fighting against monsters (Bajloz),
enemies that wanted to violate our country but that had the same ending, thus death. The history
resembled more like depicting endless wars than a careful review of the epochs in which Albania and
Albanian people had gone through. It is created an impression sometimes that this subjectivisms, has to
do with deep nationalist tendency, to raise the Albanian nation above others. But this argument is weak
and very unstable. More emphasise was given to some kind of internationalism that to the actual
national history itself. As Castellan says, there is no doubt that, “all the countries (in the Balkans – N.M)
were referred to a sort of Marxism-Leninism implemented in terms of multinational countries and mainly
rural societies: these were two aspects that brought closer these countries with the Bolshevik Russia of
29
the 20s.”92 Inspired by the models of Lenin and Stalin in creation of a new society, Albania made the
utmost to implement this in its own conditions. This intention was served by the continuous
combination of ancient, medieval, renaissance events with the “happy” days that the people were
passing in the communism. History didn’t hesitate to criticise, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Scanderbeg and
even some of the renaissance people. Some of the critics were about the fact that certain leaders in the
ancient and medieval times didn’t hear the voice of the simple villagers; some other said that the
renaissance people believed too much in religion, something that did not abide with the communist
vision and leadership.
Regarding the nationalism and internationalism, they replaced each other as needed. As long as Albania
had good relations with Yugoslavia, the people of Kosovo should feel happy under the new regime of
Tito. When our relations broke up, Tito was the biggest dictator that was supressing our brothers in
Kosovo and Yugoslavia. The same attitude was seen with our other neighbours. The phobic feeling that
the regime had, was transmitted in the history texts as well. None of the Albanian neighbours was
appropriate. The Yugoslavians were revisionists because they had betrayed the ideals of communism,
the Italians were the enemies of Albania because they had conquered Albania twice, whereas the
Greeks were monarch-fascists and which them we had no relations at all. Furthermore the west was
condemned more than our neighbours. The English were devious because they wanted to occupy
Albania; the Americans were the gendarmes of the worlds and so forth. Thus it was clear that in the
inner and outer aspects there were distortions and myths which didn’t abide with the historical truth.
Legends and myths in ancient and medieval times
The writing of the ancient history, and also other periods, was supported in two main lines: Glory of
kings in front, greed of Roma, Byzantine and other conquerors, and the contradiction of them, whom
governed with a conqueror mentality, of the rich oppressing the poor, of the low political involvement
of the peasantry etc. You could rarely find in this period an analysis of a civilization, its features,
comparisons with another world etc. It was clear that this was had no importance what so ever. Also in
the history, the folklore of bravery that came from folk-songs for GjergjElez Alia, Muji and Halili etc. was
not separated properly. Every internal political movement was put either in the context of the peoples
fight or in the context of an internal betray. Nobody spoke about institutions, because those were in the
hand of man. We can say that the Albanians were a combative, fearless population that were frequently
harassed by foreigners. Somewhat this argument was acceptable, but it was inflated so much and was
clothed with so many mystical elements, that it arrived in one point, where it was difficult to separate
between reality and fantasy. History was put in service of how much and in what way it will inspire the
population and not to speak up the truth and to face the reality. This happened because life was so
much politicized at that time that for instance in one case the critics made by the youth organization in
1973 about the contents of the textbooks and politicization of many social aspects of life, Hoxha replied
with the expression that “Albania and Albanian didn’t have what to learn from the Europeans.”93
92
93
Castellan, G, “History of the Balkans”, Tirana 1995, pg. 495.
Duka.V., “Albanian History”, Tirana, 2007, pg. 390.
30
As for the medieval times, it was spoken more about the glorious figure of Scanderbeg. Without any
doubt Scanderbeg was and still is a glorious figure of a people’s hero present in the history of many
populations. Albania had found its symbol for freedom, in the period of time where its identity was
seriously threatened by the Osman Turks. In all his dimensions, Scanderbeg, has a high appraisal not
only by our historiography but also the foreign one. His resistance made that many Italian chroniclewriters actually wrote with a distinct admiration for him. It wasn’t coincidence that he took so many
titles like: “Protector of Christianity,” “The Sword of Christ,” “Shield of Christianity” etc. However here
and there it was not left without mentioning that he relied on “the simple villagers,” something that no
leader had made before and only the Party of Labour and EnverHoxha did many years later. Naturally
this thing does not darken the role and the figure of our national Hero, but deepening in knowing him,
putting his role in the context of that era, would be much more beneficial than general considerations
with political background.
Afterwards all the poorness, underdevelopment and sins were billed to the Osman occupation. In reality
Albania suffered the consequences of a great damage which happened in many areas as fault of Osman
occupation. Even today there is a heated discussion for the consequences of that occupation as some
call it or administering the territory as others call it. Nevertheless, in narrating the events that described
this period there are seen problems as those stated above: Leaving all the responsibilities to the
conqueror, treating them in a discriminative manner and lastly a superficial treatment of some
phenomena of the Albanians, as compared to other European and Balkans countries conquered by the
Ottomans. By this I mean a weakened resistance movement, Islamising factors etc.
Continuation of the myth in the Renaissance
The period of Renaissance or rightly named by the Albanian scholar S. Skendi as “Albanian national weak
up,” is one of the key eras in the history of the Albanian nation. It seems like Albanians meet again eachother, wake up from a deep and long dream, to join forces towards freedom and prosperity. But in what
quantity was this visible by the way the history was written? It was this period that not only mythicized
some historical figures, but helped in disappearing and punishing of some others. There was no place for
historical figures that were not adapt to the communist system. The figure of Ismail Qemali was
mythicized and some other figures were left in shadow. Qemali was used as the only figure to show that
like him, EnverHoxha could do history by themselves by considering the followers as their vassals.
Documents and photos were forged, where the most important one was that of independence and
afterwards people close to Hoxha were introduced as founders of the Albanian state. The myth of
independence was used for as long as the regime wanted it to be used and then was replaced with
29th of November that took more value than the independence of the country. Naturally it wasn’t
forgotten that in different publishing of the text of history that a part of those who were present in
declaring the independence were fascism collaborators, bourgeoisie, and satrap regime of King Zog etc.
Thus in this case different elements or historical figures were displaced from the era that they existed,
bringing them in another era. This phenomenon happened because the truth had to be replaced by
myths and the legends had to replace the historical fact.
31
Distortion between two world wars
As the other periods, also this period placed at the centre of it A. Zogu. Unlike Pyrrhus of Epirus, Teuta,
Ismail Qemali, King Zog was target of an attack, describing him as the worst man that our country’s
history had ever seen. Also in this case the myth of the negative leader was created with the only
objective so he could be compared with the positive myth that was Hoxha. Zog was a heartless, wild
bloodthirsty killer that brought nothing good for Albania but misery. Also in the history textbooks the
comparisons of development in different fields like in education, health, economy, etc., were made
against year 1938. Even today is hard to explain why 1938 in the textbooks of that era was taken as a
reference for all the developments that occurred after World War II. Naturally what was sure is that
history was restrained by such terms as betrayal, fascism of Albania, violence against Albanians etc. Was
this the whole truth, or just a manipulation of that? “The contribution of King Zog is of very high
importance. The ones that replaced him as rulers of Albania, by finalizing the construction of a modern
Albanian state, found out that he left behind him a very easy terrain, as a result of creating the
nationalism feelings, for which the merit goes to Ahmet Zogu.”94 The truth cannot only be composed of
pink colour. The same author states certain flaws of Zog, where he gives much more input like for
instance in economy, education and to a more advanced society.
The myth of Second World War
A propaganda machinery that included history, arts, culture and literature was placed in service of the
most heroic events of Second World War, which happened after 1944. Very carefully treated, the
Second World War, revealed a name and a political force, the Communist Party of Albania and her
glorious leader, EnverHoxha. The events treated by history textbooks indirectly bounced around certain
figures of the communist movement in Albania and widened up more by getting into fake details,
expressing the undisputable role of Hoxha in organizing, directing and processing of all successful plans
for war. In history textbooks there were found photos in which Hoxha was definitely in the centre and
surrounded by others in its sides or around him. He rebuilt, like every other dictator, a bright and
inviolable past which was naturally distinct from the others. The photos were changed based on the
friendships at that moment in time. When we broke up with Tito, he wasn’t part of textbooks anymore
and was announced as being an enemy for our country. Stalin was in the centre of the texts and also in
the life of the country. Almost in all cities you could have found his photo or his bust. Even when his own
patria abandoned him, he was mythicized in the Albanian textbooks of history as a man who discomfited
the Nazism and build up a happy life for his own people. The unbreakable friendships of Albanian
communists were replacing each-other from Beograd in Moscow and from Moscow to the far land of
Beijing by concluding with the love Albania had for Castro’s Cuba.
94
Fisher.B., “KingZogand his endeavour for stability in Albania”.Tirana, 2004, pg. 322.
32
As time went by, Hoxha recreated his own not very popular past turning it in a famous one. In textbooks
he was treated as a Messiah that came wright in the time his people needed him the most, born to save
people from the evilness of fascism and the old society that exploited the ordinary people. He was the
God that was missing to Albania. It was made so much effort to put in centre his figure, that in a
collective madness, his death was perceived as a social drama of one entire nation. The perception was
created that the country had lost its orientation and fear of losing the glory of the happiest nation in the
world was prevailing among the population.This was due to the tragic consequence of that myth by
which many generations were educated upon in the years after the Second World War.
But why this happened. Maybe because of the fact that it was never understood that “consuming
history” means to pass over individual and familiar experience by inserting in a wider ensemble built in
an urologic perspective (before, during and after) and spatial as well (events which had local, national,
continental or global importance), it means to transform memories, serving as raw materials, into a
finished product: in a historical portend”95
In 1990, the fear was weaker and weaker, in relation with the evil that was expected to come leaving
space for hope to prevail. In the years that followed the role of mythicizing the history was seen very
clear in the consequences that were caused. “The dramatic escape of 14 years old Albanians that
wanted to look the lights of Brindisi, showed not only deficiencies in education in families, but also the
overall failure of the ideological formation of the youth of EnverHoxha.”96
Repairing the consequences in our society seems to need more time than we thought. Myths legacy was
not left behind even in democracy. You find fewer than before the 90s, but nevertheless there are seen
certain tendencies for mythicizing historical periods or new and old figures. On the other hand you can
still find cautious people that are careful of not mentioning him or his historical figure, because of fear
that they might get marked as traitors. There are seen clear and unhidden tendencies to rehabilitate
certain period of the history and especially that of Second World War.
Still we haven’t understood what is the role of history and the role of government. Every time that this
two mediums are clearly or stealthily involved, the history is distorted and enters in the vicious circle of
doing history as those that are done in a coffee shop.
That’s why the expression is still valid that “In the Balkans you produce more history than you
consume.”
Dr. Ndriçim Mehmeti (PhD) Professor in European Study Institute Expert in Education Field Tel: + 355 42
34 01 34 Mob: +355 67 44 74 900 E mail: cimmehmeti@yahoo.com
95
96
Lory.B., “Balkan Europe from 1945 until our days”, Tirana, 2007, pg. 272
Castelan. G., stated above, pg. 496
33
“The Myth of a Leader”: Enver Hoxha’s role during
the Second World War in Albania
Dr. Enriketa Pandelejmoni
Department of History
University of Tirana
The aim of this paper would be to shed light on the role of the Albanian Communist Party leader during
the IIWW in Albania and how his figure was reflected into Albanian textbooks before and after 1990.
The analysis will be focus on the school textbooks dealing with the history of Albania and the IIWW.
Enriketa Pandelejmoni is lecturer at the Department of history at the Faculty of History and Philology of
the University of Tirana. Her main research focuses are issues dealing with Albanian modern history.
34
The myth of “return to Europe” in Public Discourses and
Textbooks of Transitional Albania
Dr. Enis Sulstarova
After the end of communism, the idea of the “return to Europe” in Albania took up the features of a
political myth that legitimizes the post-communist transition to capitalism, liberal-democracy and the EU
integration. It is a myth because, firstly it assumes a European unity and identity that never existed until
recently and therefore there is no historical entity to return to. Secondly, the myth of the “return to
Europe” supposes an unchanged European identity of throughout the ages waiting to be rediscovered
and regained by the present generations of Albanians. Such suppositions cannot be sustained by what
we know from how collective identities are made and unmade during history. Thirdly, the Albanian
discourse of the “return to Europe”, like similar versions of other nations in South-East Europe,
establishes the relationship between the past and the present through a teleological reasoning that fits
past events in a single narrative about Albania longing to join Europe. Within this framework the “return
to Europe” is related to the antemurale myth of Skanderbeg that describes the Albanians as a nation
sacrificed for the protection of European civilization from the Ottoman barbarism.
In this paper we follow the theory of Chiara Bottici, for whom political myths are a continuous
work of a basic narrative that provides significance to the political condition and deeds of a group of
people. We argue that the myth of “return to Europe” (together with the related antemurale myth) has
had an emancipatory function in transitional Albania, because it offered an orientation and promoted
social change, but on the other hand it also has had an exclusive function when it was articulated to
police the symbolic boundaries of European and Albanian identities, against supposed “Eastern”
polluters. The data analyzed in this paper consist of (1) texts from public intellectuals and (2) national
history textbooks in use during the transition period.
Enis Sulstarova studied sociology from 1996 to 2000 at the Middle East Technical University, in Ankara,
Turkey. After completing his undergraduate studies he was enrolled in a master program in political
science and public administration in the same university, where he finished a study on the Albanian
nationalism in 19th and 20th centuries. Upon returning to Albania in 2002, he worked for several years at
the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, a local NGO. From 2007 to February 2013, Enis Sulstarova
has worked as a lecturer of sociology and political science in Aleksandër Moisiu University in Durrës and
University of Tirana. In 2011 he completed his doctorate thesis in sociology on the articulation of the
idea of Europe in the public discourses in Albania during both interwar and post-communist periods. His
fields of interest are nationalism, politics of identity, citizenship and orientalism. Enis Sulstarova has
published four books in Albanian language, as well as several book chapters and articles in English
publicationsmainly on the nationalist and orientalist discourses in Albanian modern history, but on other
topics as well. In March 2013 he joined the Georg Eckert Institute as a Marie Curie fellow researcher,
through a scholarship provided by Gerda Henkel Foundation.
35
Current research project
EnisSulstarova’s post-doctorate research at GEI it titled “Shifting National and European Identities: Islam
in Educational Textbooks and Public Discourses in Post-Communist Albania (1990-2012)”. It builds on
and extends his previous research on the political and cultural discourses that have shaped modern
Albanian identities.
36
"Myths and events in history textbooks of Albanian
language areas during the First World War"
PD Dr. Dieter Nehring
The presentation of events during the First World War is in the textbook
history of schools generally subordinate to the description of other
historical facts, but still meaningful. The paper focuses on the main events
of the First World War in Albanian language areas, which are relevant to the
textbook history. It exermines how they contribute to the formation of
myths, binding national history into a regional and international context in
a specific manner. Based on a broader conception of myth-making the paper
attempts to compare different stand and focal points and to highlight
therefore myths types. It is further aimed to strengthen or even to show
approaches to a common denominator in the presentation of textbook history.
PD Dr. Dieter Nehring (Humboldt University Berlin)
Studied Slavic and Albanian languages, literature and history and translation at the Humboldt University
of Berlin, and the universities of Belgrade and Kosovo (1972-78)
Assistant/researcher at the Institute for Slavic Studies at Humboldt University (1976-1999)
PhD in Albanian at the Humboldt University (1984)
Habilitation in Slavic and Albanian studies (1999)
Lecturer at the Charles University in Prague, the Humboldt-University of Berlin and the University of
Prishtina (2002-2010)
Research assistant at Georg Eckert Institute (2010-2013)
37
Collective Narratives of the Interethnic Conflict in
Kosovo
Mimoza Telaku
Individual paper abstract
The aim of this research is examination of the collective narratives of Albanians and Serbs about the
interethnic conflict. The focus of this research is conflictual narratives of these interethnic conflicts. The
armed conflict in 1998-1999, NATO intervention in 1999, Kosovo independence declaration in 2008 and
other preceding historical events/conflicts are perceived and justified differently by these ethnic
communities. The current interethnic tensions are deep-rooted from the experiences, education and
intergenerational transmission of the memories and myths about abovementioned events. As these two
ethnic groups still have incompatible attitudes and different aspirations for the future of Kosovo, the
normalization of the interethnic relations seems far away. The levels of nationalistic attitudes, which are
very high and prevent improvement of interethnic relations, are mostly influenced by the collective
memories and interpretation of the interethnic conflicts. This study is based on qualitative research
methods. The collective narratives are collected from the focus groups from different sites in Kosovo.
The target of this research is Albanian and Serb ethnic communities in Kosovo.
Mimoza TELAKU
PhD candidate
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Conflict Management & Resolution Program
38
The Vlora conflict from a trans-Adriatic
perspective: History, Myth and Ideology
Fabio Bego
Introduction
This article aims to explain why the conflict between Italians and Albanians for Vlora in 1920 is
subject to different interpretations and representations in Italian and Albanian historiographies. My
answer will focus on the analysis of mythologies that have conditioned the development of
historiographies on both sides of the Adriatic. Based on the Vlora conflict the main assumptions made
hereafter are that myths generate collective identity, determinate the establishment of the social order
of nation states we live in and legitimize the political system that governs us. By confronting different
fonts, such as official historiography, monographs, history text books, encyclopedias and the press of
that period is possible to pinpoint the relation between the representation of the conflict and incipient
myths of ideologies that define the social order of states where historiographies are developed. In order
to better comprehend the topic it is necessary to start with a brief enquiry on how history and myth
merge together in our modern historiographies. Roland Barthes has observed that “there are formal
limits to myths, there are no substantial ones”97. This affirmation entails that the study of myths can be
deceiving, and so I believe. I therefore must restrain to a concise and functional epistemological enquiry
of the subject that is only useful for the analysis of social and political phenomena related to the Vlora
conflict. The theoretical perspectives that I here discuss are borrowed from anthropologists, historians
and philosophers who have engaged in understanding what is the relationship between myths and
social order and the impact of mythical thought in the social and political life of different societies. I will
not follow a chronological exploration of the debates since it is not my ambition to trace the evolution
of this multifaceted issue. Instead I will briefly discuss current critique concerning the function of myth
in the dominant social and political forms of organization - the nation states - in order to have a broader
view of the relationship between myths and nation states since the phenomena related to the Vlora
conflict that I here expose belong specifically to this realm.
The mythical imperative: how history becomes myth and how myth becomes reality
What is here intended as a myth? One possible definition consists in the etymological sense of
the word which remotely means “story” or “legend”. But obviously a myth is not common anecdote
conceived for entertainment purposes. Mircea Eliade distinguishes myths from ordinary fiction because
contain a sacred history that informs of something that has happened in primordial time, or as he names
it “the imaginary time of the origins”.98 Many historians do implicitly accept this definition and in general
97
98
Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Noonday, New York, 1991, p. 107
See Mircea Eliade, Mito e Realtà, Borla, Roma, 1985 p. 28
39
terms, when they speak of a myth they refer to a fantastic story that religious or political propaganda
purport as an undisputable truth. Most of modernist critique to nation state and ethnic identity has
been carried by demystifying the mythical conception of the past as a pathology that affects many
national historiographies and have thus tried to dismantle the idea that a nation is a cultural community
integrally coherent.99 Antony D. Smith has improved such theorizations claiming that national identity is
not merely a product invented by the elites of the XIX century as modernists profess.100 Instead “is from
(these) elements of myth, memory, symbol, and tradition that modern national identities are
constituted in each generation, as the nation becomes more inclusive and as its members come with
new challenges”.101 Similar conclusions were reached before by Broinslaw Malinowski whose analysis of
Melanesian cultures comes to consider myth not “merely a story told but a reality lived”:
(…) a living reality believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to
influence the world and human destinies. The myth is to the savage what, to a fully believing Christian, is the
Biblical story of Creation, of the Fall, of the Redemption by Christ’s Sacrifice on the Cross. As our sacred story lives
in our ritual, in our morality, as it governs our faith and controls our conducts, even so does his myth for the
savage”102.
Malinowski and Anthony D. Smith suggestions imply that myths have a strong and long – lasting
pedagogical function for the whole of society. They forge collective identity by providing knowledge on
matters that would be otherwise impossible to fully understand such as the ancient origins of the
people, the purpose of life, cognition on ethics, on the nature of the divine and so on. Myths, by
assuming a narrative form, perpetuate the memory of the moment when a cosmological order was
founded. But the story contains also a moral teaching that establishes an ideal pattern of behavior that
members of a society must follow in any practical situation. Therefore individuals never get rid of the
constraints of the myth because the latter implies not just knowledge of the origin but also their
behavior in the everyday life. For simplifying the issue, this conditioning power that the past embeds on
the present can be here named mythical imperative.
In order to understand how the mythical imperative has structured the perception and the
interpretation of the Vlora Conflict the notion “our sacred history” needs to be questioned. Malinowski
compared the Bible and the myths of native Melanesians affirming that both stories affect the attitude
and the feelings of individuals in their everyday life. But is there any history safe from being potentially
considered as “sacred” which in virtue of this extraordinary quality may produce enough strength to
determine thoughts and actions of individuals who strictly believe it?
Let aside conventional sacred histories that belong specifically to religions, in modern philosophy,
the idea of history as a coherent and natural process that withstands a greater design beyond human
99
I refer especially to the works of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso (revised edition),
London 1991; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: program, myth reality, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1990; Ernest Gellner, Nation and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983
100
See Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of national revival in Europe, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1985, pp. 8 - 10
101
Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memoires of the Nation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, p. 9
102
Broinslav Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays, Beacon Press, Boston 1948, p. 78
40
ability of comprehension is traceable in the work of jurist and philosopher Gianbattista Vico.103 In the
close of the eighteenth century similar assumptions are found in Herder who saw a “God in history” just
as there was one after natural phenomena since man too was part of the creation and thus subdued to
the same natural laws.104 The definitive consecration of history as divine will was eventually professed
by Hegel who affirmed that “God governs the world; the actual working of his government – the
carrying out of his plan – is the history of the world (…).”105
Ernest Cassirer has dedicated a significant work to the philosophical enquiry of how mythical
thought has affected the evolution of the state since antiquity. He found society of his time (1946) being
profoundly under the spell of myths.106 He argues that philosophers who have questioned the legal
claims of authority, from Plato to Hegel and further, have always given transcendent explanations to
power, justice, rights and so on. In Cassirer’s work myths are treated as cognitive processes of
codification of reality which the Greeks already viewed as opposed to logos,107 because mythical
narratives where perceived in contradiction with empirical reality.108 The win of myth over reason seems
to have occurred when romantic thought overtook the influence of enlightenment rationalism in
defining ideas concerning social and political life. Romantics, attracted by the sense of unity that was
considered a characterizing feature of the middle ages, showed a great interest for history and the study
of folklore. They put myth at the root of history of peoples which became not only a source, but the
“very origin of right”109. In Cassirer’s words: “The idealization and spiritualization of the past is one of
the most distinctive characteristics of romantic thought. Everything becomes understandable,
justifiable, and legitimate as soon as we can trace it back to its origin”110
The idealization and spiritualization of the past that Cassirer explicates was not just an
intellectual pastime. Instead, already at the beginning of the nineteen century it became a policy
conceived and deployed for the education of progressively growing masses. In 1807 Fichte considered
the teaching of history the greatest tool for building a national character.111 In his ideal, a national
history book was to accompany the people as a “Bible or as a hymn (…), until the day we in turn
accomplished something worthy of being recorded”112. This message was directed to the German
nation at the time when Napoleonic wars had disrupted social order all over the continent and
threatened traditional forms of collective identification. In Fichte’s mind clearly myth ascended into
reality. Acquaintance with a mythizied history is in fact not just meant for forging a collective identity
through the absolute acceptation of its authenticity, but contains explicitly an imperative character. On
103
See Gianbattista Vico, The First New Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, P.66
104
Free translation from the Italian version; See Johann Gottfried Herder, Idee per la Storia dell’Umanità,
Laterza, Bari 1992, p. 286
105
Georg Willhelm Friederich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Batoche Books, Kitchener 2001, p.62
106
Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 1946, pp. 3 - 4
107
Ibid., p. 54
108
Ibid., p. 46
109
Ibid., p. 182
110
Ibid., p. 181
111
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (with an introduction and notes by Gregory Moore), Addresses to the German
Nation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, p. 19
112
Ibid., p. 83
41
account of the same spirit and ethics that people putatively inherit from the origin, history drags
collective action from the past to the present in uninterrupted continuity. History writing and history
making are then complementary parts of a teleological approach not only to knowledge but to practice.
The ideologies that developed in the course of the nineteen century claimed legitimacy on
account of historical arguments. Pioneers of nationalist, socialist and racist thought gave particular
readings of history that were instrumental to prove scientifically the existence of the collective identity
that they were interested to purport and that each theorist defined on different metaphysical grounds
in respect to another. Such collective identities have developed independently, simultaneously and/or in
opposition to one another. Marx, Engels and their followers were to read history as an endless circle of
class struggles and subjugations. Giuseppe Mazzini, whose thought had profound impact on the
development of national emancipation movement throughout Europe and inspired Adriatic foreign
policy of Italy, saw in history the natural process of emancipation of all people. De Gobineau instead
wanted to prove that race differentiations is determined by physical and cultural factors and that such
differences conditioned the evolution of history. Just as the myths of Melanesians studied by
Malinowski, according to these three perspectives, entities as “class”, “people”, or “race” were living
realities and so had been through unmemorable time. Peculiar social and economic conditions of the
nineteenth century put the premises and called for actual political action from such entities, which - in
virtue of being bearers of the same collective identity - were to move forward the realization of the
prophetic vision entailed by their historical development. This original push toward social fragmentation
structured on the belief that human groups are characterized by different collective identities continued
and reached acme in the twentieth century. The globalizing world of the nineteen century had already
become small for so many emerging mythical imperatives. Members of opposing living realities such as
nationalists of different cultural backgrounds, enthusiasts of imperialistic adventures, and socialists
were to violently clash because their conceptions of an ideal world were simply antithetic. Thenceforth
history became a science useful for galvanizing the engagement in conflict of intellectuals and soldiers
meanwhile the development of physics provided new deadly weapons for the battlefields.
The mythical imperative, that is the power of the ideal (or mythical) thought to intercede in the
real world, causes two complementary processes that are both equally necessary for (a) the affirmation
of myth into reality and (b) its transformation in historiography. The dynamic of the first process has
been observed by Marshall Sahlins in Polynesian cultures where “myth is used to found actual action
that will be recorded as a historical event”.113 In a further study Sahlins employed the term “mytho –
praxis” for indicating the arbitrary enactment of history as the fulfillment or the reiteration of the
mythical narrative that characterized Maori society.114 As I will argue below, Italians ambitions to
control the Adriatic on behalf of their mythical self – ascribed role as agent of civilization was in flagrant
contradiction with Albanians will for self-determination, who in turn employed myths of national unity
and local love for freedom to fight back. The second process regards the mythization of events that has
113
Marshall Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,
1981, p. 11
114
Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History, The University of Chicago Press, Bristol, 1985 pp. 54 – 72,
42
largely influenced Albanian and Italian historiographies concerning the Vlora conflict. By mythization I
mean the extraction of fact, of a language or of an object from its context in order to give scientific proof
or political legitimacy to the ideological dialectics that is actually, perhaps unconsciously, being
propagandized by the historian. The dynamic of such process occurs by what Roland Barthes defined as
a language robbery that transforms meaning into form. 115 Ideologically driven instigation and
representation of events are made by choosing elements that turn convenient to the adaptation of
myths in practical use. Anthropologist Jonathan Friedman observes that “the discourse of history as well
as of myth is simultaneously a discourse of identity; it consists of attributing meaningful past to a
structured present.”116 The story that historiographies give account of cannot be simple stories for
merely “scientific” purposes. Instead must highlight determinate cultural features or social patterns that
prove the existence of a certain institution or a certain collective identity through time. By proving their
existence, such entities claim authority on the surrounding political environment as they purport
legitimacy on both historical and natural legal grounds. The myth of collective identity is in fact
eternalized by the scientific authority through which modern ideologies defend their affirmations.
Patterns of social/cultural identity are fixed within the framework of the unchanging laws of nature. By
focusing on the mythical causes of the conflict I do not intend to minimize the economical and political
regional causes, instead it is my aim to highlight how myths are deployed from the ideologies that stand
behind organizations or institutions which govern passively or actively the activities of the agents
involved in the conflict, be it by the pen or by the gun.
Mytho – praxis in the Adriatic, or the Vlora conflict
After the armistices of November 1918, Italian troops in Albania awaited for the Paris Peace
Conference to decide the fate of the country. Unfortunately for Albanians and Italians the peace
delegations gathered in Paris could not fulfill the task probably because, as Ivo Lederer noticed, few
delegations possessed the experience and the talent that it was required in that occasion.117 Tensions
among locals and occupants developed gradually into open hostility as Italian diplomacy proved
detrimental to Albanian integrity and independence. Armed conflict broke out the night between 5 and
6 June 1920 after one year and a half of fruitless diplomatic discussions which frustrated public opinion
in Italy and Albania. Irregular Albanians from the south attacked the remnants of the Italian contingent,
which was caught in course of a drastic demobilization process ordered by the Nitti government.118 In
the first days of fighting Albanians overtook on Italian army with unexpected rapidity. The latter was
forced to hold position inside the campo trincerato di Valona (entrenched field of Vlora). Combats
115
Roland Barthes, Mythologies, p. 131
116
Jonathan Friedman, Myth, History and Political Identity, in Kajza Ekholm Friedman and Jonathan
Friedman, Modernities, Class, and the Contradictions of Globalization, Altamira Press, Plymouth, 2008, p.89
117
See Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A study In frontiermaking, Yale University
Press, Yale, 1963, p. 84
118
See Giorgio Rochat, L’Esercito Italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (1919 – 1925), Laterza – Bari
1967; the author reports some figures concerning the Italian presence in Albania between march 1920 and the 3 of
June 1920 which decreased from 33.000 to 15.000. See pp. 170 – 181; According to another font, by mid June
Italian troops in Vlora amounted at around 7000 men. See Vincenzo Gallinari, L’Esercito Italiano nel Primo
dopoguerra 1918 – 1920, Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma 1980, p. 177
43
formally ended the 2 of August when representatives of both governments signed the Tirana
agreements that in its main traits, delivered Vlora to Albanian sovereignty and Sazan to Italy as a military
base for the control of the Adriatic.119
From the disengaged historical perspective that I adopted in the last paragraph the Vlora conflict
seems to have had no mythical roots but only contingent causes that brought two parties to fight
against each other. But if we interrogate the reasons why Italians thought they were in a legitimate
position to claim a piece of Albanian coast, then suddenly we face arguments that defy logical or
contingent explanations. Instead, Albanian reaction to Italian claims unraveled as a strong emotional
response to the fear of being disposed and humiliated in their own ground. Speeches and appeals,
memorandums, and peculiar events that involved or impressed the public were largely conceived and
expressed in symbolical form which recalled the mythical conceptions of collective identity such as
origin, unity, freedom, kin and foe.
Italy as the natural civilizing agent and protector of Albanian independence
Italian expansionist policy in the Mediterranean and specifically in the Adriatic was carried as a
natural continuation of the civilizing mission of ancient Rome and Venice.120 Albania was often
described as one of the most uncivilized parts of the continent which stood only a few miles from
Brindisi. For its geographical position, the former Ottoman region seemed perfectly entitled for the
assistance of an enlightened tutor. Italy entered the war joining the Entente by the (secret) Treaty of
119
For detailed and objective historical account of military operations carried on Italian sources see Mario
Montanari (editor), Le Truppe Italiane in Albania 1914 – 1920, Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma 1978;
Vincenzo Gallinari, L’Esercito Italiano nel Primo dopoguerra 1918 – 1920, Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma
1980. Broader view of history concerning social and political relations of Italy and Albania see Massimo Borgogni,
Trà continuità e incertezza. Italia e Albania 1914 – 1939, Franco Angeli, Milano 2007. Older but still valuable
works on Abanian – Italian relations that treat specifically the Vlora conflict are Paolo Alatri, Nitti, D’Annunzio e La
Questione Adriatica, Feltrinelli, Milano 1976 and Pietro Pastorelli, L’Albania nella Politica Estera Italiana, Editore
Jovine, Napoli 1970. Albanian perspective on Vlora conflitct has been thoroughly developed from different
angulations by Muin Ҫami during his decennial career. For the present elaboration I relied on Muin Ҫami (editor),
Kongresi i Lushnjes dhe Lufta e Vlores, Akademi e Shkencave e RPSH, Tirane 1974; Muin Ҫami, Lufta e popullit
shqiptar per çlirimin kombёtar (permbledhje dokumentash), Instituti i historisё dhe i Gjuhёs, Tiranё 1976; Muin
Ҫami, Shqipёria nё Rrjedhat e Historisё 1912 – 1934, Onufri, Tiranё 2007. Other detailed accounts of the events are
found in Stefanaq Pollo (editor), Historia e Shqipёrisё III, Akademia e Shkencave e RPSH tё Shqipёrisё, Tiranё
1984; Arben Puto, Shqipёria Politike 1912 – 1939, Toena, Tiranё 2009. Outside Italy and Albania, the Vlora
conflict seem to have lost the interest of scholars. Sole exception is an article by Bernd J. Fischer “Perceptions and
Reality in Twentieth – century Albanian Military Prowess” in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer
(editors), Albanian Identities, Myth and History, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2002. Main contribution to
the issue remains a very dated, although precious work of Joseph Swire, Albania rise of a Kingdom, Williams and
Norgate Ltd., London 1929; basic chronology of the events is reported in Owen Pearson, Albania and King Zog, IB
Tauris, London 2004; Recent researches on Albanian history and politics that cover the period 1920 do not take
much in consideration the Vlora conflict (see Robert C. Austin, Founding a Balkan State, Albania’s experiment with
democracy 1920 – 1925, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2012; and Nicola Guy, The Birth of Albania: Ethnic
Nationalism, The Great Powers of World War I and the Emergence of Albanian Independence, Tauris, London
2012; the latter proves limited because the author avoids to confront with Albanian fonts affirming that they would
probably not add much to her research.
120
See Aldo Mola, L’imperialismo Italiano, La Politica Estera dall’Unità al Fascismo, Editori Riuniti, Roma
1980, p. 129
44
London of the 26 April of 1915 which ensured her the posses of Vlora and primacy in the conduct of
Albanian affairs. The clauses of that document left open the possibility for repartition of Albanian
territory in the north and in the south between Serbia and Greece, if this was to turn useful to regional
balances.121
The 3 of June 1917 the commander of Italian troops in Albania general Giacinto Ferrero made e
public declaration in Gjirokastёr promising to Albania, on behalf of Italian Kingdom, full support for
national independence and integrity. The declaration was in manifest contradiction with the Treaty of
London and later Italian historiography has remarked that it was a bluff, only conceived to gain popular
support from Albanians.122 Bluff or not, the words used by the general supposed a past when Italy and
Albania were naturally bound in alliance. Thence was created the myth of Italy as the “protector” of
Albania. The speech deserves partial citation as it shows how political discourse exploited the myth of
“civilization” in order to gain Albanian sympathies by caressing their desire for liberty and self – esteem.
To all the Albanian people. Today, 3 of June 1917, delightful celebration of Italian statutory freedoms, (…)
Albanians, wherever you might be, (…) you who are of an ancient and noble progeny who have old memories and
traditions that rejoin you to the roman and venetian civilizations; you who are aware of the common Italian –
Albanian interests on the sea that separates but at the same time conjoins us; All of you men of good will unite
the destinies of your beloved country (…) for and independent Albania, with the friendship and the protection of
Italy.123
The bluff was never called. Quickly after the end of the first World War Italy demanded the
possession of Vlora and a protectorate on the rest of Albania124. Italian opinions were then radically
different toward Albanians. The latter suddenly appeared as “primitive people, divided in tribes that
often fought each other and were exploited by the local lords: the beys created from Turkey”125. The
efforts for building a modern state would thus definitely beneficiate from Italian assistance and
protection126. Even few months before the attacks on Vlora, there was who in Italy dreamed of moving
Italian peasants from the region of Emilia in Albania with the double purpose to ease the demographic
weight in Italy and
bring civilization among the barbarians by cultivating lands, opening the road to the Orient, refining natives
by the contact with a superior life form, until when the long awaited dawn will rise, in which, once aligned with
121
Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d’Italia e gli Altri Stati, Volume 23, Tipografie del Regio Ministero
degli Affari Esteri, Roma 1930, pp. 287 - 288
122
Military historian Mario Montanari, as others have argued, affirms that Italian Proclama was an emulation
of the constitution of the autonomous republic of Korça in late 1916 by the French and to the institution of
autonomous Albanian protectorate in Shkodёr by Austria – Hungary in the beginning of 1917. Italian declaration
went further since it promised full independence. See Mario Montanari (editor), Le Truppe Italiane in Albania 1914
– 1920, cit., p.110
123
Amedeo Giannini, L’Albania dall’Indipendenza all’Unione con L’Italia (1913 – 1939), Istituto per gli
Studi di Politica Internazionale, Roma 1940, p. 39 – 40; free translation
124
Adriaticus, Da Trieste a Valona, Alfieri Lacroix, Milano 1918 p. 90-91
125
Ibid. P. 76
126
Ibid. p. 78
45
more advanced people and equipped with necessary means, the Albanians, can make an independent and
sovereign state, adequate enough for sitting next to the civilized nations. 127
The myth of Italy as a civilizing agent materialized in Albania. Once settled in Vlora in 1914 Italians
ameliorated the urban infrastructure and connections with the hinterland in order to guarantee
communications along the frontline. These works were then exploited by agonist press in order to prove
the benefits of the Italian occupation of Albania and their right to stay. Benito Mussolini in the pages of
Il Popolo d’Italia recurrently mentioned the “roads, the bridges, the houses, the hospitals” that Italians
built during their “peaceful occupation”, which were then to be bitterly left behind. 128 This sentiment
was transferred in the Italian historiography that developed during the ventennio129 and still survives in
recent treatments of the topic. Massimo Borgogni in a monographic study published in 2007 highlights
Italian’s merit in Vlora, thus subtly blaming Albanians for being silly and ungrateful:
The construction of roads, bridges, harbor infrastructure, modern buildings, few hospitals, as well as support
with clothing, food, medicines, and in some case even cash, and finally all the assistance provided in five years to
an impoverished population seemed to end in oblivion because of the emerging of the national feeling that with
great exemplification, saw Italian troops as the main obstacle to the birth of a state truly independent. 130
The socialist press - which work has been appreciated by Albanian historians as a voice in support
of the Albanian claims on Vlora131 - actually divulgated the same misconception and derogatory view on
Albania as did their rightist foes. Soon after the attack the socialist press Avanti, although demanding
troops to evacuate immediately, affirmed that the rebellion was caused by brigands disguised as
patriots, instigated by feudal lords, manipulated by foreign influences and capitalistic interests.132
Socialist too employed the myth of civilization but in the opposite sense, thus to dissuade any
imperialistic dream. An article appeared on Avanti the 20 of June by the name of Il Paradiso Albanese
described Albania as a barren land
sterile by nature: proved by the fact that never in history had a period of fluorescence. The inhabitants of
the villages built with primitive material do not have beds or sheets or shirts and live by exploiting the shepherds
who, guard the flock of the feudal lords, live on the mountains in little shanties made of land and grass. (…)
Between the different localities there is no commerce, they are connected by mule tracks and the trips on the
donkey back that Albanians make have only the purpose to find food. (…) after having wasted four billions, we
leave it poor and neglected.
Italian historians concord that relations with Albanians swiftly deteriorated after the Tittoni –
Venizelos secret agreement of July 1919 which, among other territorial arrangements, partitioned south
127
Giulio Tozzi, L’Albania e il Suo Incerto Destino. Milano Treves, 1920, p. 29; (discourse pronounced in a
public conference at the Accademia Olimpica of Science, Literature and Art in Vicenza in March 1920)
128
See Benito Mussolini in Via da Valona? No; Restare a Valona; Addio Valona in Il Popolo d’Italia 11
June p. 1, 13 June p. 1 and 5 August p. 1, 1920
129
See Antonio Baldacci, L’Albania, Istituto per L’Europa Orientale, Roma 1929, p. 364; Filippo Tajani,
L’Avvenire Della Albania, Ulrico Hoepli, Milano 1932, p. 33;
130
Massimo Borgogni, Tra continuità e incertezza: Italia e Albania 1914 – 1939, p. 68
131
See Muin Ҫami, Shqipёria nё Rrjedhat e Historisё 1912 – 1934, p. 264
132
Contro L’Impresa Albanese in Avanti, 12 June 1920, p. 2
46
Albania between Italy and Greece. 133 Greece was to acquire the cities of Gjirokastёr and Korça, Italy
Vlora and its outskirts, while Saranda was to be a free harbor.134 Italian nationalist press condemned the
agreement, even before the attack on Vlora, defining it as the “most cynical and shameful diplomatic
document of the third Italy”.135 For the nationalists greatest regret was that Tittoni’s agreement turned
into dusts all the progresses that Italian diplomacy had made by raising trustfulness among Albanians
with the Proclama di Argirocastro. Leading nationalist personalities intervened in the parliament by
stating that Italy was not looking for a colonial adventure in Albania, but only to protect Albania’s
independence and their own coast.136 The term “protection” was thus used to persuade the socialist
party to withdraw the veto from sending fresh troops in Vlora, but also to convince Albanians who
followed closely Italian political debates, that military presence was beneficial to them too. But it was
late for such words to have the desired effect. Leftist propaganda was already successful in mobilizing
strikes and manifestations against the Italian presence in Vlora which actually led to military
insubordination in Trieste and Ancona. This last event had convinced Italian Prime minister Giolitti that
sending new troops would exacerbate even more internal conflict.137 He then adopted the only exist
strategy available for not displeasing too much interventionists and non interventionist. New troops
were not to be sent, but in order to limit damage to Italian prestige, the contingent had to resist the
attacks as longer as possible with the soldiers that were still left.
I believe that Giolitti’s decision was dictated by pragmatic necessity of avoiding major turmoil
that extremists of both sides would have produced if withdraw or reinforcement was ordered to Italian
troops. He was aware that the Vlora question was an object of exploitation by maximalist forces from
the left and from the right which, although demanded different solutions of the problem, used it to
threat the legitimacy of the liberal government. The conflict against Albanians had at the time
transcended its contingency as a limited military phenomenon. On the newspapers it assumed symbolic
value expressed in terms of national honor and social class struggle against imperialistic wars. These two
particular claims deployed respectively by the radical right and left demanded the enactment of history,
otherwise mythopraxis, from those who perceived to belong to the self-professed national or social class
identity.
133
See Gabriele Paresesce, italia e Jugoslavia, Bemporad e figlio editore, Milano, 1935, p. 152; Mario
Montanari, Le truppe italiane in Albania, p.177;Paolo Alatri has expressed another opinion, claiming that main
responsibility for the conflict was due to the inability of Italian military command in Vlora that could not find an
arrangement with the locals in relation to the civilian administration of the city. See. Paolo Alatri, Nitti, D’Annunzio
e La questione adriatica, pp. 475 - 476
134
See Amedeo Giannini, L’Albania dall’Indipendenza all’Unione con L’Italia (1913 – 1939), cit., p. 248 251
135
Francesco Coppola, La Liquidazione Albanese in Idea Nazionale, 1 June, 1920 p. 1 (third Italy is used to
underscore the continuity between the first one, which was ancient Rome and the second that were the Italian cities
of the Renaissance).
136
See Antonino Di Giorgio, Il Problema Militare, La questione Adriatica, L’Albania e la Libia, Discorso
sulle comunicazioni de governo pronunciato alla camera dei deputati nella tornata del 1 luglio, Tipografia della
Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1920, p.51; Luigi Federzoni, Per la Pace Italiana in Adriatico, Discorso pronunciato
alla Camera dei Deputati nella tornata del 7 luglio 1920, Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1920, p. 5
137
See Giovanni Giolitti, Memorie della mia vita, Garzanti, Milano, 1967 pp. 348 - 349
47
“We shall not permit to be treated like cattle”: enacting the myth of collective dignity.
Even after the Proclama di Argirocastro there were Albanians who remained skeptical toward
Italy as it was not clear how Rome would affect state sovereignty.138 By the end of June 1919 Albanians
bore few illusions that Italy could help them restore independence. Epistolary communication of
minister of education Luigj Gurakuqi who was in Paris at the Peace Conference in the fall of 1919 reveals
that Albanian delegates had lost any point of stability because of Italian unpredictability. In a depressed
mood, he advised Sotir Gjika, editor of the Albanian paper based in Rome Kuvendi, not to slander
Mustafa Kruja thus contributing to further fragmentation of the delegation. He then wrote that
decisions were dictated by winners and that ethnic minorities had no voice. “In any case – affirmed
Gurakuqi – Wilson, George and Clemenceau were going to sleep peacefully”. The self determination of
the People - continued Gurakuqi -was the last of their worries.139
This short remark is enough to understand the whole of Albanian question. Albania was a
fragmented reality, both socially and politically and this was plainly visible to the great powers. The
country did not have the international favors of Czechoslovakia and Poland which served strategically as
barriers to the dead, but still kicking, central and eastern empires. Causalities of the Great War did not
count either as they fought for both blocks. In comparison with the Balkan neighbors who had reached
independence and unity by fighting in the Balkan Wars and in the First World War, Albania lacked a true
martyrdom suffered chorally for the sake of the national cause. Recognition of national rights was not
for free, neither obtainable by diplomacy dialectics. It had to be won at the expense of bloodshed in
place of a rite of initiation that would found legitimacy for the independence. At the time, only a war,
that was expressively and internationally presented and received as “patriotic” could give empirical
evidence to the acclaimed existence of a national identity worthy of territorial integrity and self –
determination. Gurakuqi seem to implicitly acknowledge this in another letter that he addressed to
Myfit Libohova, at the time Albanian ministry of foreign affairs, here he states that he was “ready to die
for Gjirokastёr”.140 Indeed someone had to die but it was not Gurakuqi, not this time at least. The war
effort fell on people who lived in nowadays Albanian territories that the Peace Conference had carved
out for repartition.141 Their struggle, although restricted to the sole local population, was soon absorbed
by Albanian political elites and later by historiography that presented the conflict as a national war.
The Tittoni – Venizelos agreement certainly displeased Albanians in the south, but it was not
enough for enhancing a war campaign against Italy. Relationship among them were friendly and
collaborative during the great war and is unlikely that only diplomatic disquisition would send Italians
and Albanians who defended the same trenches against the Austrians in a deadly fight against each
other. The origin of the Vlora conflict springs from a single event when Italians offended local
138
See Paskal Milo, Politika e Jashtme e Shqipёrisё I, Toena, Tiranё 2013, 292 – 293; Kostё Ҫekrezi,
Shqipёria, e Shkuara dhe e Tashmja, Naimi, Tiranё, 2012, p. 197
139
AQSH, Fondi 34 Luigj Gurakuqi, Dosja 8, 1919, (page not readable), letter addressed from Gurakuqi to
Sotir Gjika in Rome the 22 of November
140
Ibid. letter sent to Myfit Libohova in Albania the 4 of December 1920.
141
The memorandum of 9 December which was meant as a diktat by the United States gave full sovereignty
to Italy on Vlora and the right for a mandate on Albania
48
sentiments by disrespecting the symbols of their collective identity. The 28 of November 1919, the day
in which citizen of Vlora celebrated the declaration of independence, an incident occurred that seem to
have produced irremediable fracture among them. Italian historian Pietro Pastorelli speaks of a
celebration organized by Italian authorities that ended in a great failure.142 On Albanian account, reports
on the accident are found in many fonts, especially in memoires.143 The official version delivered to the
Albanian government stated that military authorities had agreed with citizens that a celebration could
take place at the condition that no Albanian flag was lifted on institutional buildings and that no
speeches were to be made in public. Participants disobeyed both rules, and according to the report,
Muslims and Christians went in the mosque of Tabakhane. The muezzin there gave his blessings first in
Arabian and then in Albanian. Afterwards, an intellectual (professor Minga), held a passionate
nationalistic speech. When the crowd headed for the exit in order to continue the celebration in the
street they found the Carabinieri pointing guns straight against the doors of the mosque. The situation
soon degenerated in a street riot. Italian paramilitaries tore Albanian flags into pieces and attached one
to their dog named Caporale. He was then let loose around the city. This was the last offence that
people of Vlora could take. The document asked the government to take firm position, and ended by
declaring that consequences were to be expected: “the people of Vlora, because of the war, perhaps
erring, did not want to cause problems to Italy until the conflict continued, but now cannot endure such
cruelties and has decided to assume any danger for the salvation of the homeland”144. Although this
account contains figures that I find hard to believe, such as Vlora Christians entering into a mosque to
hear the sermon of the muezzin, the fact that the event is reported in many fonts implies that
something grave must have occurred in that day.
In the following months tension among Italians and Albanians grew inexorably. By march 1920 the
illegal organization Mbrojtja Kombёtare based in Vlora started to recruit people that supported an
armed action against Italy. A war committee was formed in Barçalla (near Vlora) the night of 28 may
1920. The 3 o June an ultimatum was sent to Piacentini, the Italian General in Command of the troops in
Vlora. He was intimated to retire his men and deliver the city to the Tirana government. The ultimatum
could have been delivered before, but Albanians decided to wait four days because the 3 of June was
the anniversary of the Proclama di Argirocastro. The choice for a symbolic date shows that actors were
willing to define history not erratically but as the precise enactment of a self-fulfilling prophecy that
would, perhaps, accomplish national freedom and punish Italy for treachery. In the worst case they
would have died but at least with honor and not in anomy in their own land. A participant in the Vlora
conflict, Ago Agaj wonders why the war committee did not decide to seize the strongholds by surprise
and ensure maximum degree of military success.145 He suggests that the noble feeling of those men or
142
Pietro Pastorelli, L’Albania nella Politica Estera Italiana, p. 318
143
See. Eqerem Bej Vlora, Kujtime 1885 – 1925, IDK, Tiranё, 2006, p. 444; Syrja Vlora, Kujtime, Iceberg,
Tiranё, 2013, p. 171 - 172; Tanush Frashёri (editor), Ali Kelcyra, Shkrime pёr Historinё e Shqipёrisё, Onufri, Tiranё
2012, p. 451 - 452 (in notes); Sejfi Vllamasi, Ballafaqime Politike nё Shqipёri (1897 – 1942), Neraida, Tiranё
2000, p. 213
144
Muin Ҫami, Lufta e popullit shqiptar per çlirimin kombёtar (permbledhje dokumentash), p. 480
145
Ago Agaj, Lufta e Vlorёs, Tregim i njё pjesёmarrёsi, Harmony Printing LTD, Toronto, 1971, p. 130
49
the little hope for a peaceful disentanglement may have brought to this solution.146 Most certainly, an
attack by surprise would have provoked a different reaction from the Italian government and public
opinion. Moreover Albanians were not looking for the conquest of the Vlora territory as a geographic
resource, but for the symbolic value of the city where the flag was lifted in 1912, and where it was
shattered few months before by Carabinieri. The attack needed a clear declaration of intents that would
prove to great powers that it was conceived for national and not local purposes. In May 1920 local
Gjirokastёr press “Drita” wrote “Vlora is ours and so it must be. Because Albania maybe exists only
because Vlora made it, but she can also destroy it”147.
The ultimatum was articulated in dramatic tones and blamed Italian administration beyond reason:
“Since five years Vlora, cradle of the Albanian independence, is governed like one of the lowest colonies:
besides the language, the administration and our flag was negated to us (…) Italy infamously determined
the partition of Albania with secret treaties thus dishonoring herself for cancelling a treaty she already
signed in London in 1913”. Who wrote it wanted to give to the reader the impression that fighters, if it
had to be, would face their destiny with stoic dignity but not permit to be “treated like cattle in the
market of Europe”.148 This last statement was certainly an affirmation of identity and scarcely a war
threat as only in the last paragraph the use of force was shyly intimidated. Key words in the paragraph
are “flag”, “dishonor” and “cattle”. Decrypted in the context of the mentality that guided the works of
the Peace Conference these three words meant that Albanians were not disposed to be treated as
humans of an inferior race (the lowest of colonies) that needed to be civilized (that is cattle in the
market), because they had a history (the flag), and would not obey to an undignified patron (Italy
dishonored). The ultimatum was basically conceived to overturn the mythical conceptions of Albanians
as being ruthless, lacking national identity, unable for self government and thus in desperate need for a
civilizing companion. The 6 of June was the first Sunday of the month and therefore the celebration day
of the Statuto, which is the festivity for the first Italian constitutional chart. However, because of the
attack, celebrations in the Italian controlled areas were cancelled; their party, ruined like they ruined the
28 November celebration.
The mythical representations of the conflict: ideology, collective identity and political legitimacy
Hitherto there have been three definitions of the same event: the war, the rebellion, the “war”. A
fourth implies the definition of sheer silence, that is amnesia. Albanian historiography refers to the
Vlora war - Lufta e Vlorёs -, as “one of the most enlightened pages in the history of Independent
Albania”149. Official historiography affirms that “the freedom war of Vlora stands among the greatest
events of our national history of XX century that played a decisive role for the defense of Albanian
territorial integrity and in reestablishing the independence.”150 On the other side of the Adriatic a much
darker spot is reserved to the same facts. Italians label it a rebellion or insurrection which in a way
146
147
148
149
150
ibid p. 131
In Muin Ҫami, Shqipёria nё Rrjedhat e Historisё 1912 – 1934, p. 229
Ago Agaj, Lufta e Vlorёs, Tregim i njё pjesёmarrёsi, p. 133
Arben Puto, Shqipёria Politike 1912- 1939, p. 273
Kristaq Prifti (editor), Historia e Popullit Shqiptar III, Toena, Tirane, 2007, p. 166
50
means to negate or drastically reduce the manifestation of the war as a military phenomenon.
Sporadically, Italian historians speak of a war only in between inverted commas or using italic letters
thus underscoring that events have been overly estimated by their colleagues beyond the sea151.
Besides, Italian historiography treats the Vlora conflict only in specialized books dedicated to the
analysis of the direct relations with Albanians or specifically to the Adriatic question. History manuals
and textbooks written in Italy and designed for high schools and universities bypass the facts as nothing
ever happened. Hardly Italian history and political science students that do not study in depth the
events of those years might know that Italians fought against Albanians in Vlora the 1920. How to
explain such dissimilar representations? The simplest answer is to affirm that the events did not bear
the same weight for the two countries. The burden of the conflict was diametrically different because
Albania was in a more endangered position. Moreover, the battles on the outskirts of Vlora were just
little skirmishes if compared to the massive undertakings of the Great War. But still, a relativist
consideration cannot explain the amnesia of Italian history manuals where the conflict appears as a
phantom whose presence is perceived only by the measurement of its specter. On the other hand
Albanian historiography is far too confident with the idea that the events were part of a coherent
national war for independence.
The Italian perspective
Italian presence in Albania sipped from the state much greater costs then the other occupied
territories.152 Surprisingly, Italian history books conceived for divulging purposes ignore the Italian –
Albanian realities of the time, while more space is dedicated to the Dalmatian or the colonial affairs
overseas. I will limit here to present few examples that demonstrate how Italian historiography proves
reluctant to embrace the topic. A famous work by Federico Chabod (L’Italia Contemporanea) dated in
1961 omits any reference to the conflict even from the chronologies, although it is mentioned that Italy
was to gain Vlora from the Treaty of London.153 Monumental work by Indro Montanelli, Storia d’Italia
dedicates space to the events concerning the Italian involvement in the Dalmatian coasts, but suffers
amnesia for what concerns Albania. Reference to the conflict is avoided even when the author explains
the ministerial crises which followed the attack on Vlora of June 1920 and that brought to the
resignation of Nitti and the formation of the Giolitti government.154 It curious that Montanelli, who
151
Massimo Borgogni, Tra continuità e incertezza, cit., p. 74; Mario Montanari, Le truppe Italiane in Albania
(anni 1914 -1920 e 1939), p. 154
152
See Giorgio Rochat, L’esercito Italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (1919 – 1925), p. 180; according to
the author it is very hard to establish an amount of the expenses, however with good degree of precision he states
that for the month of February 1920 Italy was spending 5 ½ millions (lire) for Dalmatia, 14 ½ for Albania, 4
millions for Asia Minor; in a note he reports that according to the official documents of the time the whole expenses
for Albania including the war years amounted to 1.385 millions, but the author thinks that such sum was much more
inferior then the real one.
153
See Federcio Chabod, L’Italia Contemporanea 1918 – 1948, Einaudi Scuola, Milano 1994, pp. IX – XVI
154
Indro Montanelli e Mario Cervi, Storia d’Italia vol.VII 1919 – 1936, RCS libri, Milano 2006, p.64; I need
here to specify that it is not my opinion that the crises was generated by the Albanian attack on Vlora. It was
certainly due to the social unrest that characterized the Italian nation between 1919 and 1920, the so called biennio
rosso. However the Albanian affair certainly made even more difficult the position of Nitti who was often blamed as
one of the major responsible agents for the Albanian situation.
51
visited Albania and wrote a book on the issue, simply disregards the impact that the Vlora conflict
produced in the evolution of Italian internal politics. Complete amnesia has hit the writers of the
Manuale di Storia, L’età Contemporanea which is a history manual designed for high school and
university use. The book does not refer to Albania even when the Treaty of London is discussed. 155
Throughout the whole of 1000 pages volume the term Vlora appears just once, involuntarily, in the last
chapter on a picture of half –naked Albanians struggling to get in and out of an overcrowded ship
named, ironically, Vlora.156 This feature I think exemplifies how a simple term, the city name Vlora, can
epitomize two different historical idealities. On one hand Vlora is the symbol of Albanian unity, strength
and freedom where Italians were forced to withdraw from Albanian coasts. Simultaneously, following
the events of 1991 that this picture shows, Vlora has become also the symbol of Albanian poverty and
failure that revaluates Italy as its natural, because most proximate, hope for salvation. Italian
historiography has clearly preferred to transpose the latter at the expense of the former. Why it is so?
In the following section I will try to answer this question.
By reading Italian newspaper of 1920 it seems evident that the loss of Vlora implemented the
myth of the “mutilated victory” as much as did the loss of Dalmatian territories that Italy was not able to
obtain in the Peace Conference. The whole issue was one of the main subjects were opinions from the
left and from the right found terrain for crashing. Nationalist and the rising fascist forces were extremely
disappointed when the treaty of Tirana was signed.157 Major themes in Mussolini’s newspaper were that
Italy’s prestige was being profoundly wounded and that attacks on Vlora were stimulated by foreign
powers such as Yugoslavia.158 The 15 of July he wrote that Valona was “another Caporetto, worst than
the first one”159. The 5 of august, in commenting the treaty of Tirana, he affirmed that “Consequences of
our disaster may be incalculable” dreading that Italy had lost authority in the region. 160 The same day,
nationalist paper L’Idea Nazionale opened with the title “the Italian prestige sacrificed to the Balkan
gangs“.161 Few days later on the same paper D’Annunzio released a note claiming that the whole
conflict was an attempt to emasculate the Italian people and that, “because of being expelled from
Vlora, Italy today is a grand soprano choir of castratos in a Sistine chapel without Michelangelo”162. Even
many years after the conflict, Mussolini’s henchman Dino Grandi commented that Vlora was after Adua
“the greatest humiliation Italy had suffered”163. Nevertheless the government worried about saving face
in front of the public opinion. The 7 of August, foreign minister Carlo Sforza, in a clear attempt to
present what nationalist considered a military defeat as a draw, affirmed in front of the parliament that
155
Laterza,
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
See Andrea Giardina, Giovanni Sabbatucci, Vittorio Vidotto, Manuale di Storia, 3. L’età contemporanea,
Roma – Bari 1999, p. 425. Newer versions of the manual do not present significant changes in the section.
Ibid. p. 936
Gabriele Paresce, Italia e Jugoslavia, cit., p. 152
See Nicola Bonservizi Il Ritorno di Giolitti: Albania – Jugoslavia, in Il Popolo d’Italia 1920, p. 4
Benito Mussolini, Popolo d’italia 15 luglio, 1920 p.1
Ibid. Addio Valona, 5 agosto 1920 p. 1
Francesco Coppola, The Italian prestige sacrificed to the Balkan gangs, Idea Nazionale 5 august, p. 1
L’offerta di D’Annunzio per la difesa di Vlora, in Idea nazionale 10 August, 1920, p.2
Dino Grandi, Il Mio Paese, ricordi autobiografici, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985, p. 309
52
“we left Vlora after a brilliant fighting that showed to Albanians that never they would manage to force
us out”164.
Since that time, the Vlora conflict has been described by terms that aimed to prove that the
rebellion was settled by foreign powers which manipulated Albanian peasants and that Italy, beside
adversities, did not lose the city but delivered it voluntarily to Albanians. It is not possible to trace a
genealogy of the Vlora conflict representations on Italian historiography because, as I have already
explained, analysis of subject are only made in few specialized studies whose opinion has been here
already discussed. For this reason my survey focuses on encyclopedic works that have been published
from the ventennio to later on. The Treccani encyclopedia saw the light in the years of the fascist
regime but its last print reports unchanged narration of the conflict:
International intrigues, which manipulated the Albanian soul that exited the war diffident of any
organizational work made also at her advantage, led to the Vlora insurrection against Italian occupation of the city.
After having lost few external positions, the city of Vlora stayed in Italian hands until when the Tirana protocol, (…)
determined the evacuation of Vlora from Italy that maintained only the small island of Sazan. 165
Italian encyclopaedias written afterwards transpose slighter representations of the Vlora
question and references to the conflict are avoided. Consequently a forgetting process is enhanced that
characterizes most of Italian historiography in relation to the Vlora conflict; a process that had already
begun during the Fascist period. Garzanti encyclopaedia of 1976 gives the following insight:
At the outbreak of the First World War Albania suffered a new occupation by Greeks, Montenegrins,
Bulgarians and French who attempted to split it, until when in June of 1917 became a protectorate of Italy. After
that the independence was gained back it was admitted to the Society of Nations (1920), and it became a republic
under the presidency of Ahmet Zogu (1925), who in 1928, with the support of Italy, proclaimed himself king
imposing a dictatorial regime.166
In this representation not only any reference to armed struggle is omitted, but even Italian
presence in Vlora is considered salutary for Albania in spite of other nations. Instead the Italian allies,
like France, which carried with Italy conjoined war operations during the war, seem to be the one who
actually tried to divide the country. Any reference to London Treaty and Tittoni – Venizelos agreement
is simply bypassed. The Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico UTET reveals great confusion concerning the
events and dates that articulated the conflict: “The Peace conference of 1919 reconfirmed the borders
decided in London in 1913, and in the June of 1920, the last Italian presidium in Vlora was withdrawn.
An Italian – Albanian agreement the 3- VIII – 1920 gave to Italy the occupation of Sazan Island.”167 Here
there are at least two mistakes and one misrepresentation of an international treaty. As it is known in
164
In Mario Montanari, Le truppe Italiane in Albania, p. 230
165
Enciclopedia Italiana di scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Pubblicata sotto l’alto patronato di S.M. Il Re d’Italia,
Istituto Giovanni Treccani, MCMXXIX – VII (1929), (tomo) II, Agro – Ammi, p. 120; this is part of the voice
Albania and is still unchanged.
166
Enciclopedia Europea, vol I Aachen- Bakuni, Milano 1976, p. 220.
167
Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico UTET, Unione Tipografico – Editrice Torinese , Torino, (topo) A – Anti,
1984, p. 414
53
fact the Peace conference did not reconfirm the 1913 borders. The Italian troops were withdrawn from
Albania only in September, thus well after the Tirana agreement as the same agreement prescribed. It
seems also that Italy forced Albania to give away Sazan and not the other way around as Albanians
might argue.
The Piccola Treccani of 1997 shortly reports description of the event in a form that reveals how
Sforza’s speech has been metabolized by educational historiography: “Vlora (…) occupied by Italian
troops from 1914 to 1929, was an important base of military operations in the Balkans. In the august of
1920, the Tirana agreement, returned Vlora to Albania.”168 In this case also reference to armed struggle
is omitted and the delivery of the city to Albanian government seems to have occurred peacefully. It is
interesting to notice that non Italian encyclopedias reserve a much greater function to violent
confrontations that took place among Albanians and Italians.
A fine illustration of how State – centric perception of historical events forge an historiography
biased by ideological myths turns up in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1973 where merit of the
successful Albanian revolt is somehow claimed by soviets:
The Victory of the Great October socialist revolution created the preconditions for the successful struggle
of the Albanian people for independence. The Albanian National congress, which assembled Jan. 21 – 31, 1920, in
Lushnje, proclaimed the independence of Albania and declared Tirana the country’s capital; a result of the ensuing
armed struggle led by the government created in Albania against feudal separatists and foreign occupiers, in the
spring and summer of 1920 southern and southwestern regions of Albania were liberated from Italian troops; 169
The representation that emerges in the French Encyclopaedia Universalis of 1973 is akin to that of
the Albanian historiography. The Vora conflict is presented as part of a greater plan of the Albanian
government to obtain freedom and integrity:
(…) L’Italie prenait Vlora, Sazan et recevait mandat sur l’Albanie; les frontières de 1913 étain maintenues au
nord et à l’est; les frontières sud seraient déterminées plus tard, mai laisseraient sans doute Korça et Gjirokaster a
la Gréce. Ce mémorandum discrédita le gouvernement provisoire, qui dut démissionner a la suite du congrès de
Lushnja (janvier 1920). Le nouveau gouvernement transporta son siège à Tirana, obtint le retrait des troupes
français mata un rébellion d’Esat Toptani bientôt assassiné, profita d’une révolte réussie à Vlora pour obliger les
Italiens à évacuer le pays (sauf Sazan) et put faire admettre l’Albanie à la SDN, le 17 décembre 1920, comme Etat
souverain dans ses frontières de 1913.170
The Italian encyclopaedias mirrors the perception that governments and scholars conjointly
implemented on the conflict after the Tirana agreement. Such perception was conceived for reducing
possible traumatic effects that an unfortunate struggle against a poorly armed neighbour could produce
in the long run thus affecting military confidence as well as relations with Albanians. The Vlora conflict
caused an anomalous precedent Italian and Albanians were in good relations, although the Albanians
168
La piccola Treccani, dizionario enciclopedico, Roma 1997, p. 621
169
Great Soviet Encyclopedia, A translation of the third edition, Macmillan educational corporation, London
1973, p. 201
170
Encyclopaedia Universalis, Volume I, Paris 1973, p. 553
54
were often considered in a subaltern position in respect to Italians. Even during the Vlora conflict,
relations between Italians stationed in Shkodёr and in Durrёs were not affected by the fighting. Fascism,
by means of foreign policies which evidently concerned both ministerial and academic fields, tried to
reduce or even avoid speaking of the conflict. A book printed in 1938 on Italian assault troops Arditi,
who participated also in the Vlora conflict is perhaps emblematic of this censorship toil. The text was
published in two different editions the same year. In the latest edition the entire chapter dedicated to
the Vlora fighting has been completely scissored.171 Sometimes, references to the conflict were made
only to prove the failures of the liberal system that preceded the march on Rome172. Not surprisingly
historiography during fascist regime defined the 1919 – 1922 period as “one of the saddest times of
Italian foreign policy”.173 Italian history books on foreign policy clearly reveal that the new political
system promoted the idea that fascism recovered the international prestige that Italy had lost after the
war.174 The critique toward the preceding liberal government which led to the “loss” of Vlora became
instrumental to the new regime in order to legitimize itself as well as to justify internal authoritarian
turns and external aggressiveness in the region as it happened in September 1923, when Mussolini
ordered the occupation of Corfu in retaliation to the murder of General Tellini inside Greek territory,
during the Albanian – Greek border settlement procedures. Italian historiography that developed after
the Second World War has followed the reductive approach adopted by historians before them. The
prestige of Italian military and foreign diplomacy capabilities is precious to democratic Italy as much as
were to the totalitarian state of the ventennio. Slightly more attention has been dedicated by authors
who are openly inspired by leftist ideas. But also in this case the Vlora conflict is subject to the same
ideologically binding interpretation with the purpose of exalting the merits of the proletarian
movements.175
The Albanian perspective
The Vlora conflict has been recorded into national historiography largely more than in Italy. Apart
from a great number of folk songs and lyrical compositions that celebrate the heroism of the conflict 176,
171
Salvatore Farina, Le Truppe d’Assalto Italiane, Roma 1938, I ed. pp. 332 – 339.
172
See Indro Montanelli, Albania Una e Mille, G. B. Paravia & C., Torino, 1939, pp. 86 – 88
173
Umberto Nani, Italia e Jugoslavia (1918 – 1928), Librerie d’Italia, Milano 1928, p. 11
174
See Pietro Silva, Il Mediterraneo, dall’Unità di Roma all’Impero Italiano, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica
Internazionale, Milano 1937, p. 408
175
See Vittoria Foa, Questo Novecento (edizione ridotta), Einaudi Scuola, Milano 1998 p.100 (in
chronology); also Ruggero Giacomini, La rivolta dei Bersaglieri e le giornate rosse: i moti di Ancona dell’estate
1920 e l’indipendenza dell’Albania, quaderni del consiglio regionale delle Marche, Ancona 2010; the author starts
the book stating that (free translation) in Italy exists a robust tradition of popular pacifism that becomes stronger in
times of conflict, unlike the official one which tends to disappear when e war breaks out. According to him, the
aversion to colonial and imperialistic war and thus solidarity with the freedom wars is in the tradition of the Italian
anarchist, socialist, communist and working class movements. Such tradition is recognizable in the opposition to the
African wars, in the struggle against the war in 1915 and in the movement via da Valona of the summer 1920 that
supported the Albanian independence. Ibid. pp. 13-14. This affirmation is later contradicted by the documents
presented in the book as many soldiers who participated in the military sedition in Ancona the 25 of June, when
interrogated by military police, declared that main reason for them opposing departure for Albania, was not
pacifism but mere fear of being killed in battle or by diseases.
176
See Albert Habazaj, Lokalizimi i Kёngёs Epike Tё Luftёs Sё Vlorёs, in Gazeta Dielli, 13 December 2013.
55
also a film has been released in 1977, Guna Pёrmbi Tela that describes in a highly idealistic fashion the
events of what Albanians call Lufta e Vlorёs (Vlora war). Historian Bernd J. Fischer has dedicated an
article to the mythization of Vlora conflict claiming that the Albanian success over Italy increased
collective mythical perception of military skills that are celebrated in national historiography, but that
ultimately led to the effortless defeat of Albanians in the second Italian occupation of April 1939177. My
aim in the present treatment is not to deepen the analysis of artefacts that prove the mythization of the
events, but to understand how historiography works under the constrains of ideology. Under such
constrains historiography, just as any other institution, becomes a tool for the legitimization of the
political system where it is developed. By operating arbitrarily on the representation of the fact, history
becomes a myth in the form by emphasizing facts that have a strong symbolic appeal able to generate
collective identification; and in the function because its goal is to prove scientifically the benefits and the
legitimacy of the ideology that determines the social order.
Albanian historiography clearly presented the Vlora conflict as a result of the rising force of three
different layers of identity. The first, the dominant one, is the national identity that drove to the
constitution of the state in 1912 and claimed its sovereignty starting from the Lushnje Congress of
January 1920. Secondly, Albanian historiography has underscored the role played by the local southern
or lab identity. Locals, who bore almost all the military effort, appear as naturally gifted by spirit of
freedom, honour, strength and national pride. Lastly historians have often highlighted the war as a class
awareness raising process that ultimately brought to the establishment of socialism. Such traits are
synthetically reported in a history text book for Albanian high schools dated 1965 where the Vlora war is
described as “liberating, popular and anti-imperialist” war: “By winning on the Italian imperialists, the
detested enemies of the Albanian people were kicked out from the Albanian land.”178 How could all
these different identities coexist altogether in the same group of people?
Albanian government formed in Lushnje could not declare war to Italy for two reasons. First it
was not internationally recognized entity and therefore did not possess the interlocutory authority for a
similar act. Secondly, declaring war to Italy would have provoked a more energetic reaction not just
from Italy but from great powers who, in quality of members of the League of Nations, were obliged to
assist a fellow member country under threat. However, Albanian historiography adamantly presents the
conflict as part of a bigger plan that was conceived from the government with the purpose to obtain
sovereignty on the territories that foreign armies still occupied from the First World World.179 The
enactment of this plan is proven by a series of diplomatic moves that paved the way to the armed
showdown. According to Arben Puto the Vlora question was treated in the first session of parliamentary
life in Albania. It was since then decided to undertake underground action through the “national
177
Bernd J. Fischer “Perceptions and Reality in Twentieth – century Albanian Military Prowess” in Stephanie
Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (editors), Albanian Identities, Myth and History, pp. 134 - 142
178
Ministria e Aresimit dhe e Kultures, drejtoria e Studimeve e botimeve Shkollore, Historia e Shqiperise per
Shkollat e Mesme (dispense), Tirane, 1965, p. 200
179
See Kristaq Prifti (editors), Historia e Popullit Shqiptar III 1912 – 1939, p. 150; and Stefanaq Pollo
(editor), Historia e Shqipёrisё III, Akademi e Shkencave, Tiranё 1984, pp. 213 - 235
56
defence” (mbrojtja kombёtare) organization based in Vlora.180 The 3 of April, the government of Albania
that meanwhile moved the capital from Durrёs to Tirana, asked to the command of Italian troops in
Vlora to deliver peacefully the civil administration of the city of Vlora and Gjirokastёr, threatening also
possible retaliation.181 Italian response was negative. Later in April the government sent representative
Sejfi Vllamasi in Belgrade to ask military and diplomatic support from Yugoslavia in order to fight against
Italy.182 He apparently obtained only the kindness of the Southern Slav nation183. However Albanian
government passed into action the 17 may by asking to the Italian contingent in Tepelena to deliver the
town to local administrators. Italians answered by opening fire.184 The last diplomatic effort ensured
neutrality of the Greek troops in the south – eastern frontier by the Kapёshtice agreement of late may.
The role of the government in the conflict was thus of a diplomatic kind, by carrying discussion with
Italian representatives, but also spreading war propaganda elsewhere in Albania.185 Finally, the
assassination of Esat Pasha by Avni Rustemi in Paris and the annihilation of his faction in central Albania
seem to have fulfilled the political action undertaken in support of the Vlora conflict.
The causal relation that historiography has established between the Lushnje Congress, Tirana
government and Vlora conflict constitutes a syllogistic explanation of the event in the high school text
books. During the years of communism more space was dedicated to the description of the military and
diplomatic evolutions in a clear attempt to demonstrate how popular forces would react to an external
threat that jeopardizes the independence of the country and the freedom of its people.186 The authors
ended the chapter by affirming that “the war of Vlora made it clear to the chauvinist circles of the
neighbouring countries that their ambitions on Albania would face with rising opposition from the
Albanian people.”187 During the paranoiac regime of Hoxha such a phrase contained likewise evocative
and imperative power. Recent school books dedicate lesser space to Albanian politics in the period
between the two world wars. However the basic idea that the Lushnje Congress made the Vlora war is
still presented as an axiomatic dogma.188
But historiography cannot deny that combats, with rare exceptions, actually engaged only the
local community. Only people from Vlora and its outskirts attended the Barçalla convention of the 28
may where the decision for war was taken. The attack of the 5 June was ordered by the insurgents’
commander Qazim Koculi without consulting the government of Tirana.189 The symbol of the war is a
180
See Arben Puto, Shqipёria Politike 1912- 1939, p. 267
181
See Paskal Milo, Politika e Jashtme e Shqipёrisё, Toena, Tirane, 2013, p. 478
182
Sejfi Vllamasi, Ballafaqime Politike, p. 196
183
Muin Ҫami, Shqipёria nё Rrjedhat e Historisё 1912 – 1934, p. 229
184
Ibid. pp. 229 -230
185
See Romeo Gurakuqi, Shqipёria dhe Ҫёshtja Shqiptare pas luftёs sё Parё botёrore, Camaj – Pipa, Shkodёr
2007, p. 229 - 230
186
See Kristo Frashёri, Stefanq Pollo, Historia e shqipёrisё pёr shkollat e mesme, Shtёpia Botuese e Librit
Shkollor (I ed.) Tiranё 1973, pp. 136 - 139
187
Ibid., p. 139
188
See Mandu Derguti, Ledia Dushku, Ferit Duga, Sonila Boçi, Historia e Shqiptarёve 12, Albas 2013, pp. 94
– 95; Petrika Thёngjilli, Fatmira Rama, Ajet Shehu, Lorenc Bejko, Liljana Guga, Historia e Shqiptarёve 12, Pegi,
Tiranё, 2011, p. 109
189
Romeo Gurakuqi, Shqipёria dhe Ҫёshtja Shqiptare pas luftёs sё Parё botёrore, p. 153 - 154
57
local dress, the guna, which is a mantel made of sheep fur that insurgents presumably used for crossing
the barbed wire around the Italian presidiums. The most famous war hero became a man who fulfilled
the archetype of an emblematic lab, Selam Musai, who courageously led the attack at the age of 76
years old. His bravery is narrated in lyrical songs as well as in the film Gunat Pёrmbi Tela. What then
linked the local people that made the war to the rest of the Albanians was the “common ideal of
liberating the fatherland from occupants, thus ensuring full independence and integrity of the Albanian
state.190
Muin Ҫami has claimed that the uprising resulted as a consequence of a slow social evolution
process that concerned Albania in the preceding years. The national bourgeoisie had increased the ranks
and was the first class to raise the national question and to spread it among the rest of the population.
Its ideological ascendance on the popular masses of cities and villages was greater than before.191
According to Ҫami the Vlora war was a stepping stone toward a higher class conscience and was not, as
Italians argue, a local insurgence.192 It was a war organized at a local scale and at the same time at a
national scale and so it developed.193 Arben Puto in a recent text affirms that the war was made by the
peasants and the middle classes.194 Puto’s assessment is based on the opinions expressed by Eqerem
bej Vlora who was a member of the aristocratic family that ruled the city in ottoman times. Although he
initially thought that fighting Italians was a “suicide”, when reality proved different, he affirmed that
military success was probably due to the motivational factors that animated the insurgents. But the
remarks of Eqerem Vlora highlight a local feature of the war instead of a greater national commitment.
The interests that they were presumably protecting according to Eqerem bej Vlora appear thoroughly
contingent and personal: “it was their war, it was the battle for their social position, for the properties,
for their women, their children, their honour and surviving”.195
To understand what pushed local population to embrace the risk of fighting Italians is one of the
biggest historiography challenges on the Vlora conflict. There is an interesting book of memories written
by a veteran, Ago Agaj, who wrote it far from communist Albania and was thus out of the reach of its
ideological constraints. The illustration of the conflict is contoured with vivid details which portray the
social life and psychology of the combatants. In the pages of this book Albanians who fought Italians
appear as ethnical labs, who practiced divination rites196 and were strict observant of local customs.197
Fear is certainly an element that national historiography is likely to keep away from the description of a
warring events were national unity is at stake. But indeed Albanians were scared of Italians, and the
decision to fight them matured after fearing to become a colony of Italy. Agaj affirms that it was even
difficult to find volunteers for delivering the ultimatum to Piacentini as they were scared of a possible
190
Muin Ҫami, Lufta e Vlorёs Lufta e gjith popullit Shqiptar, in Muin Ҫami (editor), Kongresi i Lushnjes dhe
Lufta e Vlorёs, p. 139
191
Ibid. p. 140
192
Ibid. p. 141
193
Ibid. p. 150
194
See Arben Puto, Shqipёria Politike 1912- 1939, p. 274
195
Eqerem Bej Vlora, Kujtime 1885 – 1925, p. 447
196
Ago Agaj, Lufta e Vlorёs, Tregim i njё pjesёmarrёsi, p. 143
197
Ibid., pp. 114 – 115
58
immediate retaliation on whoever would hand the letter to the general.198 Albanian historiography has
until now shown scarce interest for the religious feeling that animated Albanians in their struggles, not
just in Vlora. According to the memories of Agaj the religious element played a significant part in
motivating the combatants. In Barçalla they took oath touching the Koran before starting the fight and
saying: may it slay me with all I have got”, and then holding the gun: “may it kill me with a weapon in the
heart”.199 Before an attack, they washed in the river fearing that “there will be no muezzin to wash us
and we have to die clean”200.
Albanian historians have cleansed the Vlora war from elements that would stain the idealized
image of a fair struggle for national independence. Agaj informs us, without regret, of a summary
execution perpetuated on Romani people suspected of being Italian spies.201 Gipsy prostitutes that
stood by Italian contingent were putatively killed in fire exchange during the night and were left
unburied until Albanians ordered Italian prisoners to give them sepulture. This reveals that a strong
taboo hit relations with Italians which prevented Albanians to come into contact with what was
adulterated by them. Agaj’s account adds gross details concerning a “little suicidal pandemic” as he
defines it, which spread in autumn, long after the end of the conflict, among Albanian girls of villages
where Italian troops stationed. The author finishes the paragraph with a chilling comment: “And so it
was finally solved this nasty problem”202.
Although Agaj considers the war a sterling patriotic fight for the sake of the national cause, 203 his
memories reveal that relationships between war committee and Tirana government were not as
splendid as official historiography affirms. When representatives went in Tirana only prime minister
Delvina and minister of Interior Zogu received them with due respect to the guests. The other members
of the government did not even invite them for a coffee, which means that their mission did not fully
succeed in raising consent among Albanian elites. In other terms, even in Tirana only few Albanians
supported an attack against Italy. Nonetheless Zogu and Delvina promised just moral support, by
indirect means, so not to give Italy reasons for declaring war against the whole country.204 For the
message sent to Piacentini the 3 of June “Italy cannot forbid to the small people of Albania to die for
their homeland”, Agaj wonders if by “small people of Albania” they meant the whole of the country or
just for the Albanians living in Vlora. He cannot find an answer for that.205
The memoires of Agaj opens a perspective on the Vlora conflict that it is impossible to see in the
official historiography. Would be perhaps interesting to understand more in depth how were the
relations between Albanians and Italians during the years of the occupation as this would give us major
198
Ibid., p. 132
199
Ago Agaj, Lufta e Vlorёs, Tregim i njё pjesёmarrёsi, p. 114
200
Ibid., p. 150
201
Ibid., p. 200
202
Ibid., pp. 164 - 165
203
It does so in the opening section of his memoires by affirming that the war was the greatest
accomplishment of Albanians since the time of Skanderbeg. Ibid., p. 1
204
Ibid., p. 125
205
Ibid., p. 137
59
insights on the conflict escalation process. The research would need to focus straight on human contacts
between the military and local population instead of the diplomatic field. Changing perspective may tell
us if and how high politics and propaganda affects interpersonal relations in the everyday life. The
reasons that pushed the Southern Albanians to fight the Italians are in my opinion to be searched more
into the local than in the high politics. Italians were in fact in good relations with Albanians until they
abode to a hierarchy which implied the former being guests and the latter landlords. The riot of 28
November 1919 sanctioned the end of this relationship when Albanians had a taste of colonial rule.
Elites emerged from the Lushnje Congress established then links with the local leaders such as Qazim
Koculi and Osman Haxhi who managed to drive the fears and the dissatisfaction of the local population
that finally attacked the Italians.
For the representation of the Vlora conflict it is, I think, obvious that Albanian historians
operated the same way as a gardener would work with a hedge thus scissoring the raw growing of the
plant in order to give it a functional shape for fitting harmonically in an architected environment. The
image of the Vlora war propagandized during the communist regime has not been subject to particular
revision by Albanian historiography nowadays. Perhaps some of the most xenophobic allegations have
been rinsed away, but the mythical attributes of the war still stands untouched in Albanian history texts.
I personally doubt that it will be possible to have Albanian “official” historiography present the Vlora
conflict free of its mythical attributes which is the idea that it was a genuine national fight, involving all
the nation. That in fact would not just mean to reduce some exaggerations concerning number of
belligerents, victims and acts heroism, but to question the whole function of the conflict in relation to
the foundation of the Albanian sovereignty.
Conclusions
It was my aim in the present paper to understand why the Vlora conflict is subject to different
representation from Albanian and Italian historiographies. The root of such differences was searched in
the incipient myths that characterize dominant ideologies of the social orders where historiographies
are developed. By relying on anthropological, historical and philosophical conceptual insights I begun by
establishing an initial conjecture concerning the function of myths in society and history. Myth defines
collective identity that gives sense to social order thus finally legitimizing the political system that
governs the order. From the early nineteen century any national history has become a sacred history
thus assuming the resemblance of a myth, both in the structure and in the function, since historical
speculation defines not only legitimacy but prescribes also action for a determinant political
constituency. The latter concept was borrowed from Marshall Sahlins description mytho – praxis which
implies that events involving human relations, in this case conflict and war, are always structured by the
cultural background which is defined by the myths of origins or by the myths entailed in modern
ideologies such as class, national identity etc. . Therefore, a dominant ideology and the incipient myths
not only determine the course or the happening of an event but shape also its inscription into
historiography. I named this double conditioning effect as mythical imperative that affects events a
priori, by determining collective action and a posteriori, by shaping the narrative. The second part of this
process concerns historiography that transposes representation of the events in order to legitimize the
political system that follows the prescriptions of the dominant ideology which defines also the
60
intellectual environment where historiography develops. Thus Albanian historiography which was
heavily conditioned by a blend of nationalist and Marxist ideology presented the conflict as an ethno –
national struggle for the emancipation of national and class rights. Instead, Italians have exploited the
event in order to legitimize authoritarian turns during the fascist period. Italian socialist historiography
also uses the event to prove the positive incidence of Italy’s proletarian struggles in the fight against
Italian imperialist trends. I also noticed that Italian historiography has sought to delete from its manuals
the Vlora conflict for reasons that can here only be guessed, but that certainly tried to limit damage do
state sovereignty by not harming military prestige. The difference characterizing Albanian and Italian
perceptions and representation of the Vlora conflict are also intelligible in the dissimilar attitude
reserved to the manifestation of violence as a phenomenon related to the conflict. In Albania the event
served as a foundation myth for the independence of the country, and historiography has a posteriori
monopolized the violence on behalf of the Albanian state. It has done so by exalting the role of the
Tirana government as a determinant factor of success. This data is plainly observable on Albanian
monographs and history text books for the high schools. On the opposite side of the Adriatic, Italians
still refuse to accept that violence in Vlora conflict was a product of the practice that the state was
supposed to exercise in monopolistic terms. Instead responsibilities are attributed by historians of
different ideological backgrounds to singular agents such as Piacentini, Tittoni or Nitti, or peculiar
political contingencies such as Italian imperialism or Vlora military occupational regime that do not
represent the genuine orientation of Italian policy toward Albania which, presumably, was of a
collaborative and not of an intrusive kind.
I hope that these reflections, although presenting several limits that the reader is encouraged to
define, could enhance contact between historiographies that were separated by political contingencies
after the Second World War, and that until now have found only little dialogue. I think this to be the
case of Italy and Albania. Revisionist history that has been undertaken lately seem to concern Eastern
European more than western, especially when it comes to national myths. New interpretations are
sometimes astonishingly daring because, in the attempt to demystify myths of national identity that
political regimes forged with the aim to build a national conscience, they underestimate that such myths
are products of the same social and cultural European ideas which affirmed during ninetieth and
twentieth century, and that such myths contradistinguish interdependently all European states.
Therefore myths are functional to the establishment of the state sovereignty both within the premises
of a country as well as in the larger international set of actors: in other words, myths do serve also to
regulate international relations and perhaps even to reinforce some of the realist theories that
dominate the debates of the IR discipline, from both historical and political perspectives. On the other
hand, since myths that found collective identities, at least in Europe, supersede social or spatial domain,
their study can help us develop a historiography that goes beyond the analysis of subjects inside their
national boundaries and mere observation of international relations as if nations and states, in their
different historical configurations, were discrete entities.
Bibliography
Archival sources:
61
Albanian National Archive (AQSH), Fondi 34 Luigj Gurakuqi, Dosja 8, 1919
Published Documents:
Muin Ҫami, Lufta e popullit shqiptar per çlirimin kombёtar (permbledhje dokumentash), Instituti i
historisё dhe i Gjuhёs, Tiranё 1976
Antonino Di Giorgio, Il Problema Militare, La questione Adriatica, L’Albania e la Libia, Discorso sulle
comunicazioni de governo pronunciato alla camera dei deputati nella tornata del 1 luglio, Tipografia
della Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1920
Luigi Federzoni, Per la Pace Italiana in Adriatico, Discorso pronunciato alla Camera dei Deputati nella
tornata del 7 luglio 1920, Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1920
Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d’Italia e gli Altri Stati, Volume 23, Tipografie del Regio Ministero degli
Affari Esteri, Roma 1930
Encyclopaedic works and dictionaries:
Enciclopedia Italiana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Pubblicata sotto l’alto patronato di S.M. Il Re d’Italia,
Istituto Giovanni Treccani, (tomo) II, Agro – Ammi, Torino, MCMXXIX – VII (1929)
Enciclopedia Europea, vol I Aachen- Bakuni, Milano 1976
Encyclopaedia Universalis, Volume I, Paris 1973
Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico UTET, Unione Tipografico – Editrice Torinese , Torino, A – Anti, 1984
Great Soviet Encyclopedia, A translation of the third edition, Macmillan educational corporation, London
1973
La piccola Treccani, dizionario enciclopedico, Roma 1997
Newspapers
Avanti, Roma 1920
Idea Nazionale, Roma 1920
Il Popolo d’Italia, Milano 1920
Monographs:
Adriaticus, Da Trieste a Valona, Alfieri Lacroix, Milano 1918
Paolo Alatri, Nitti, D’Annunzio e La Questione Adriatica, Feltrinelli, Milano 1976
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso (revised edition), London 1991
Antonio Baldacci, L’Albania, Istituto per L’Europa Orientale, Roma 1929
Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Noonday, New York, 1991
Massimo Borgogni, Tra continuità e incertezza. Italia e Albania 1914 – 1939, Franco Angeli, Milano 2007
Muin Ҫami (editor), Kongresi i Lushnjes dhe Lufta e Vlores, Akademi e Shkencave e RPSH, Tirane 1974
Muin Ҫami, Shqipёria nё Rrjedhat e Historisё 1912 – 1934, Onufri, Tiranё 2007
Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 1946
Kostё Ҫekrezi, Shqipёria, e Shkuara dhe e Tashmja, Naimi, Tiranё, 2012
62
Federico Chabod, L’Italia Contemporanea 1918 – 1948, Einaudi Scuola, Milano 1994
Mircea Eliade, Mito e Realtà, Borla, Roma, 1985
Salvatore Farina, Le Truppe d’assalto Italiane, Roma 1938, I ed.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (with an introduction and notes by Gregory Moore), Addresses to the German
Nation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008
Kristo Frashёri (editor), Historia e Popullit Shqiptar III, Toena, Tiranё, 2007
Vittoria Foa, Questo Novecento (edizione ridotta), Einaudi Scuola, Milano 1998
Kajza Ekholm Friedman and Jonathan Friedman, Modernities, Class, and the Contradictions of
Globalization, Altamira Press, Plymouth, 2008
Vincenzo Gallinari, L’Esercito Italiano nel Primo dopoguerra 1918 – 1920, Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito,
Roma 1980
Ernest Gellner, Nation and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983
Ruggero Giacomini, La rivolta dei Bersaglieri e le giornate rosse: i moti di Ancona dell’estate 1920 e
l’indipendenza dell’Albania, Quaderni del consiglio regionale delle Marche, Ancona 2010
Amedeo Giannini, L’Albania dall’Indipendenza all’Unione con L’Italia (1913 – 1939), Istituto per gli Studi
di Politica Internazionale, Roma 1940
Romeo Gurakuqi, Shqipёria dhe Ҫёshtja Shqiptare pas luftёs sё Parё botёrore, Camaj – Pipa, Shkodёr
2007
Georg Willhelm Friederich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Batoche Books, Kitchener 2001
Johann Gottfried Herder, Idee per la Storia dell’Umanità, Laterza, Bari 1992
Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: program, myth reality, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1990
Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of national revival in Europe, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1985
Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A study In frontiermaking, Yale University Press,
Yale, 1963
Broinslav Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays, Beacon Press, Boston 1948
Paskal Milo, Politika e Jashtme e Shqipёrisё I, Toena, Tiranё 2013,
Aldo Mola, L’imperialismo Italiano, La Politica Estera dall’Unità al Fascismo, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1980
Mario Montanari (editor), Le Truppe Italiane in Albania 1914 – 1920, Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma
1978
Indro Montanelli, Albania Una e Mille, G. B. Paravia & C., Torino, 1939
Indro Montanelli e Mario Cervi, Storia d’Italia vol.VII 1919 – 1936, RCS libri, Milano 2006
Umberto Nani, Italia e Jugoslavia (1918 – 1928), Librerie d’Italia, Milano 1928
Gabriele Paresce, Italia e Jugoslavia, Bemporad e figlio editore, Milano, 1935
Pietro Pastorelli, L’Albania nella Politica Estera Italiana, Editore Jovine, Napoli 1970
Stefanaq Pollo (editor), Historia e Shqipёrisё III, Akademia e Shkencave e RPS tё Shqipёrisё, Tiranё 1984
Arben Puto, Shqipёria Politike 1912 – 1939, Toena, Tiranё 2009
Giorgio Rochat, L’Esercito Italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (1919 – 1925), Laterza, Bari 1967
Marshall Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,
1981
Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History, The University of Chicago Press, Bristol, 1985
63
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (editors), Albanian Identities, Myth and History,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2002
Pietro Silva, Il Mediterraneo, dall’Unità di Roma all’Impero Italiano, Istituto per gli studi di Politica
internazionale, Milano 1937
Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memoires of the Nation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999
Filippo Tajani, L’Avvenire Della Albania, Ulrico Hoepli, Milano 1932
Giulio Tozzi, L’Albania e il Suo Incerto Destino. Milano Treves, 1920
Gianbattista Vico, The First New Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002
Memoirs:
Ago Agaj, Lufta e Vlorёs, Tregim i njё pjesёmarrёsi, Harmony Printing LTD, Toronto, 1971
Tanush Frashёri (editor), Ali Kelcyra, Shkrime pёr Historinё e Shqipёrisё, Onufri, Tiranё 2012
Giovanni Giolitti, Memorie della mia vita, Garzanti, Milano, 1967
Dino Grandi, Il Mio Paese, ricordi autobiografici, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985
Eqerem Bej Vlora, Kujtime 1885 – 1925, IDK, Tiranё, 2006
Syrja Vlora, Kujtime, Iceberg, Tiranё, 2013
Sejfi Vllamasi, Ballafaqime Politike nё Shqipёri (1897 – 1942), Neraida, Tiranё 2000
Textbooks in use or previously used in high schools
Ministria e Aresimit dhe e Kultures, drejtoria e Studimeve e botimeve Shkollore, Historia e Shqiperise per
Shkollat e Mesme (dispense), Tirane, 1965
Mandu Derguti, Ledia Dushku, Ferit Duga, Sonila Boçi, Historia e Shqiptarёve 12, Albas, Tiranё 2013
Kristo Frashёri, Stefanq Pollo, Historia e shqipёrisё pёr shkollat e mesme, Shtёpia Botuese e Librit
Shkollor (I ed.)
Andrea Giardina, Giovanni Sabbatucci, Vittorio Vidotto, Manuale di Storia, 3. L’età contemporanea,
Laterza, Roma – Bari 1999
Petrika Thёngjilli, Fatmira Rama, Ajet Shehu, Lorenc Bejko, Liljana Guga, Historia e Shqiptarёve 12, Pegi,
Tiranё, 2011
64
Continuities and Changes in Perceiving the Greek
as an “Enemy”in the Albanian National IdentityBuilding Process (Albanian National Movement to
2010s)
Konstantinos Giakoumis
Ilir Kalemaj
Erika Haxhi
Klaudjo Kavaja
Assoc. Prof. Konstantinos Giakoumis, Ph.D.
University of New York in Tirana
kgiakoumis@unyt.edu.al
Assistant. Prof. Ilir Kalemaj, Ph.D.
University
of
New
York
ikalemaj@unyt.edu.al
in
Erika Haxhi
erikahaxhial@gmail.com
Klaudjo Kavaja
klaudjokavaja@unyt.edu.al
Tirana
From the early Middle Ages throughout the Ottoman rule the Balkans was a terrain in which diverse
ethno-cultural groups peacefully co-existed identifying themselves primarily in terms of religion (cf. the
Ottoman millet system). During the Ottoman rule such ethnic groups as Albanians, Greeks, Turks, Vlachs
and Jews lived together in territories of modern-day Albania identifying themselves not in terms of
ethnicity but in terms of religion.
The rise of Balkan nationalisms in the 19th century (Albanian nationalism at the last three decades of
the 19th century) applied a powerful, divisive, elites-driven thrust to these groups. In the spirit of the
Romantic exaltation of nationalism, the leaders of the Albanian national awakening movement who
were intellectually nourished in Turkish or Greek schools felt the urge of cutting-off their educational
and intellectual roots and of demonizing Turks and Greeks alike as “enemies”. At the peak of the
Albanian nationalism’s momentum, all those who did not identify themselves in terms of ethnicity were
labeled “Grecoman” (or Serbophiles) or “Turcoman”. Such divisive thrusts were unconsciously fomented
by local religious elites by calling their flocks to entrench Albanian nationalists outside religious enclaves.
The paper investigates the role of historiographies and history schoolbooks in the transformation of the
image of the Greek as an enemy in the frame of national-identity building processes. The paper argues
65
that as far as documentary and narrative sources permit us to sense from the worm’s-eyes-view how
the middle and lower strata of the local society felt, acted, interacted with other ethno-cultural groups
and identified itself, the centuries-old symbiosis of diverse ethno-cultural communities was still deeply
rooted in the region at the beginning of the 20th century, until the centralized nation-state nationalidentity building processes maximized divisive thrusts by further demonizing the Greek “enemies” and
led to a certain degree of estrangement of Albania’s population from neighbouring populations, as also
evidenced by the results of the 2011 survey conducted in Albania on account of the “Strategies of
Symbolic Nation-Building in South Eastern Europe” project. It is noteworthy that for different reasons
certain demonization stereotypes have persisted from the Albanian national awakening movement,
throughout communist times to our days.
66
Between History and Politics:
Understanding Antiquitas Myths in Macedonian
History Textbooks206
Darko Stojanov
Jovan Bliznakovski
Do I believe in ghosts? No, but I'm afraid of them.
- Marie Anne de Vichy-Chamrond, marquise du Deffand
Precisely by rendering banal the extraordinary and vice versa,
political myth may come to operate within the ambit of that which is out of question,
because it is either apparently irrelevant or too important to be questioned.
- Chiara Bottici
It can be somewhat deranging for a scholar in the humanities and social sciences, who doesn't believe
and participate in political and nationalist myth-making, to observe the negative results of that process.
It may feel as a sort of a defeat of one's own academic efforts to bring a deeper understanding of the
complexity of human affairs.207 Political myths seem to be based on no solid ground, and yet have huge
potential for real destruction. Their study poses quite a challenge. Faced with the workings of
political/historical myths, scholars have often approached them guided by one of the following
principles: the enlightenment principle or the functionalist principle. Spears have been broken debating
whether a myth should be deconstructed and “destroyed”, or rather understood in its social context and
left in peace. But, as it was suggested by Kolsto, these two approaches are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.208 We strongly support this opinion and we shall, therefore, use their distinctive
methodologies in our effort to both understand and deconstruct the myths of antiquitas (the myths of
ancient origin, continuity etc.) which are integrated into recent history textbooks in the Republic of
206
A large part of the research that led to this paper was conducted during Darko Stojanov's fellowship at the
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig, in March/April 2014. On this
occasion, he would like to express his appreciation of the Institute's academic and financial support for his work.
207
Cf. the narration in the renown study of P. J. Geary, The Myth of Nations. The Medieval Origins of Europe,
Princeton University Press, 2002, 7. His work is now one of the leading texts on the place of late ancient and early
medieval history in the national imaginary in many modern European countries.
208
P. Kolsto, Assesssing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society, in: P. Kolsto (ed.), Myths and
Boundaries in Southeastern Europe, London, 2005, 31.
67
Macedonia.
Ethnocentric nationalist myths in Macedonian historiography and history textbooks have already
been studied, although not extensively, for at least two decades now. Brunnbauer, Pichler, Vouri and
Proeva among others, have contributed in posing and discussing the question. These researchers have
observed different types of myths, as well as some ideological issues. E.g., Brunnbauer tried to
summarize them, as a part of the “national mission”, as: myth of origin, myth of continuity and myth of
victimization.209 Others, like Hasimbegovic and Gavrilovic, accentuate the myth of Macedonia as the
promised land.210 Proeva analyzed the Macedonian myth of ancient origin in correlation with similar
myths in the neighboring countries (Greece, Albania and Bulgaria).211 In a larger study of education,
ethno-centrism and minority policies in Macedonia, Pichler also tackled the question of ancient origin in
history textbooks.212 It is quite usual, in that context, for researchers to separate or group myths in
different ways, and we have a multitude of classifications today. Yet, it is not our goal to propose new
classifications or to analyze different myths. In this article we shall focus on one particular group of
historical/political myths – the antiquitas myths – following the typology proposed by Kolsto.213
Thus, the aim of this paper is to update the scholarship dealing with the relation between
political/historical myths and history education in contemporary Republic of Macedonia. More precisely,
we will analyse the myths of ancient origin and ethnic continuity which are being addressed to ethnic
Macedonian and ethnic Albanian students in primary and secondary schools. The first target group is
being taught of their ancient Macedonian roots, while at the same time, and by the same textbooks, the
second target group is being taught about their ancient Illyrian origin. It is worth stressing that after the
2001 armed conflict and the Ohrid Framework Agreement (which marked its end) history textbooks in
Macedonia are written by teams of historians and history teachers coming from the two biggest ethnic
209
U. Brunnbauer, Historiography, Myths and the Nation in the Republic of Macedonia, in: U. Brunnbauer
(ed.), (Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism, Munster, 2004, 165-200.
210
E. Hasimbegovic and D. Gavrilovic, Ethnogenesis Myths, in: D. Gavrilovic and V. Perica (eds), Political
Myths in the Former Yugoslavia and Successor States. A Shared Narrative, Dordrecht, 2011, 26. Although
technically it encompasses all of the former Yugoslav republics, essentially their paper focuses on the old tandem
Serbia – Croatia. Therefore, it offers only a few lines on myths in Macedonia.
211
N. Proeva, Savremeni makedonski mit kao odgovor na nacionalne mitove suseda: albanski panilirizam,
bugarski pantrakizam I grcki panhelenizam, Zgodovinski Časopis 64/1-2 (2010), 176-219. For the interdependence
and mutual conditioning between the myths of ancient origin in Macedonia, cf. also M. Lomonosov, National Myths
in Interdependence: The Narratives of Ancient Past among Macedonians and Albanians in the Republic of
Macedonia after 1991, MA Thesis in manuscript at the Central European University in Budapest, 2012 (consulted at
www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/lomonosov_matvey.pdf). He defines “national myths of antiquity” as: “... certain visions of
the beginnings and of the earliest period of the communal past, which are put in form of narratives and claim that the
national history started in Antiquity, i.e. before the Middle Ages or prior to 5 th – 6th centuries AD”, Ibidem, 30.
212
R. Pichler, Historiography and the Politics of Education in the Republic of Macedonia (1991-2008), in:
Dimou, A. (ed.), “Transition” and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe, Eckert. Die Schriftenreihe
Band 124, V& R Press, 2009, 217-249. What is particularly valuable and relevant to our theme, in this article
Pichler uses interviews with members of commissions for history textbooks and historians, which offers an insight
into the process of preparing textbooks and especially the ethnicized and mythologized visions of history which
confronted within.
213
P. Kolsto, Assesssing the Role of Historical Myths, 4 considers the myths to be boundary-defining
mechanisms, and divides them in four principal groups: myths of sui generis, myths of ante murale, myths of
martirium, and myths of antiquitas.
68
communities in the country – Macedonians and Albanians.214 Thus, a textbook prepared by a ethnically
mixed team is used by all the communities, translated into their native language.
In the myth-maker's workshop: enlightenment approach
Bottici argues, following Wittgenstein, that “to define myth, in general, and political myth in particular,
in terms of its claim to 'truth' means to bring it to a terrain that is not its own”.215 Inasmuch we agree
with the general idea of this statement, yet we believe that analyzing and deconstructing the historical
veracity of a myth is relevant and useful for the subsequent effort to understand its role in a particular
socio-political context. Furthermore, we put strong emphasis on Kolsto's view on the function of
demythologization and enlightenment, according to which “... a society that is able to treat its
homespun identity myths with some degree of irony and detachment is less likely to be mobilized by
political and ethnic entrepreneurs for aggressive purposes”.216 Yet, it seems relevant, in this first part of
our endeavor, to try to understand and explain how the myths of antiquitas are being constructed in the
case of Macedonian history textbooks.
In this section we offer an overview of the “veracity” of the antiquitas myths from our case
study. Or, rather, we offer the results from a comparison between the proposed knowledge and the
current established theories and concepts in the field of late ancient/early medieval studies. For almost
a decade Macedonian history textbooks which deal with the late ancient/early medieval period, which
means textbooks for 5th grade of primary and 1st class of secondary school, teach students (11 and 15
years old, respectively) that there is an ethnic and cultural continuity between ancient Macedonians and
Macedonians, as well as between Illyrians and Albanians. The terminology, the argument and the
didactic in the textbooks have been changed in order to meet a new need for autochthony. In an article
published in 2010, Stojanov argued that the myth of continuity follows two lines, or it has two ways of
operating: an indirect one and a direct one.217 Here, in order to better understand the controversy of the
question, this argument will be briefly summarized.
The indirect presentation of mythologized historical knowledge in some history textbooks
focuses on the vague idea of “fatherland”, and through an inadequate, imprecise, ambiguous and
possibly manipulative terminology it suggests a sort of ethno-political continuity with the ancient
Macedonians.218 Dealing with this written material requires, besides common sense, the employment of
discourse and didactic analysis. Authors' propositions are sometimes hidden in the seemingly neutral
tone of the narration, and have a striking resonance with the current political situation in the country.
214
According to the Law on Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Education (Official Gazette no. 98 from
04.08.2008) all textbooks have to be approved from a Review Committee (Рецензиона комисија), which is
consisted of a total of three members from which at least one must be a member of a non-majority community, if the
textbook is intended for students from non-majority background (Article 16).
215
C. Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 9.
216
P. Kolsto, Assessing the Role of Historical Myths, 32-33.
217
D. Stojanov, In Search of Autochthony: A Case Study of the Great Migration Period in History Textbooks
in Macedonia, in: Der Donauraum 50/3-4 (2010) : Cultural Changes in Central and South East Europe after 1989,
225-234.
218
Ibidem, 226.
69
E.g., in a 2005 history textbook for 5th graders (in the opening chapter entitled “Macedonia, our
fatherland”) it is stated that “The name of our fatherland is very old. It is mentioned for the first time in
the 7th century BC”, as well as that “Our fatherland has a long and rich history. In antiquity it was a
strong state”.219 These statements act not only as suggestions for ancient origin, but also as a reversed
mirror of the contemporary political situation. They can have multiple implications. The most important
one is the indirect suggestion that ancient Macedonia (and even politically the Kingdom of Macedon)
was/is equally “our” fatherland. Furthermore, the students can also be reassured that Macedonia is not
something new, “our” name does belong to “us”, and that “our” country has not always been “small” or
“weak”.
As to the direct presentation of the idea of ancient origin and continuity, it focuses on the late
ancient history of the region, and the group identities at that time period. One textbook published in
2006 suggests ancient origins and continuity through a process of ethnic mix between ancient
Macedonians and Slavs in the 7th century. While it is quite logical to assume a cultural assimilation
between the newcomers and the local population in the early medieval Balkans, what is striking in this
particular case is one precise point of departure from the generally accepted theories in the field of late
Roman and early Byzantine studies, which then build the basis for a new national myth. Namely, in order
to make the “Macedonian” continuity possible, the textbook teaches that a clear ancient Macedonian
identity persisted until the time of the Slavic invasions/migrations in the Balkans (late 6 th / early 7th
centuries).220 In this case, it is “ancient Macedonians” who mixed with the Slavs, as opposed to the more
complex and academically more acceptable “local Romanized population”, which we find in earlier
textbooks. The new formula makes the link possible. Not taking into consideration the theories of group
identity in the late empire, as well as those dealing with the group identities among the so-called
“barbarian” tribes at the age of migrations, the textbook gives a “frozen” image of an unchangeable
Macedonian identity, at least until the arrival of the Slavs. As a support from the written sources the
textbook uses selected quotations from three Byzantine writers (Theodoret of Cyrus, the Miracles of
Saint Demetrius, Simeon the Metaphrast) which mention the ethnonym Macedonians. What is omitted
in this case is the classicist tendency among numerous late Roman and Byzantine writers which made
particular efforts to imitate their models from classical times. Besides the style of writing and the use of
some old techniques, one of the major traits of this literary tradition is the use of classical names
(toponyms, ethnonyms etc.) in the post-classical period.221 The generally accepted knowledge in the
field of Late Roman/Byzantine studies holds that in the considered time period the term
Macedonia/Macedonians had a geographical and administrative meaning, and certainly not an ethnic
219
K. Adzievski, D. Petreska, V. Ackoska, N. Dimoski, V. Gjorgiev, Istorija za petto oddelenie, Skopje:
Tabernakul, 2005, 4: “Името на нашата татковина е многу старо. Првпат се споменува во VII век пред н.е.”
and “Нашата татковина има долга и богата историја. Во антиката таа била силна држава”.
220
B. Ristovski, S. Rahimi, S. Mladenovski, T. Chepreganov, M. B. Panov, Istorija za prva godina
gimnazisko obrazovanie, Skopje: Albi, 2006, 98-103.
221
Cf. R. Scott, The Classical Tradition in Byzantine Historiography, in: M. Mullet and R. Scott (eds),
Byzantium and the Classical Tradition, University of Birmingham Thirteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine
Studies 1979, Birmigham, 1981, 61-74. For a rare article on this topic published in Macedonia, cf. O. J. Schmitt,
'Mysians, Macedonians, Dardanians': Some Remarks on Late Medieval Ethnonyms in the Central Balkans, in:
Makedonskiot identitet niz istorijata, Skopje, 2010, 73-78.
70
one. To make sure that the students incorporate this new “knowledge”, in a space of few pages and as a
tautology the authors repeat four times their main argument for the supposed longevity of the ancient
Macedonian identity – basically, the idea that the Roman Empire did not and could not assimilate the
Macedonian people, because of the latter strong collective consciousness based on the traditions
originating in the times of Alexander the Great.222 The suggestion is not only transmitted through the
core textual parts of the particular lesson (unit), but also through its didactic section. The authors pose
the following question: “What was the mutual relationship between the Slavs and the ancient
Macedonians and how did their mutual symbiosis develop?”223 The main argument for the continuity
concept was then taken by other textbooks too, which usually do not discuss it in detail, but rather
repeat its proposition.224 In addition, there are also a few textbooks which touch upon the question of
the relationship between the ancient Macedonians and the Slavs, but their propositions are mixed up in
such a way that they lack not only academic support, but also a basic sense of literacy and historical
knowledge – which makes them even unsuitable for analysis.225
Similar to the previous case, a mythical historical narrative is being proposed to ethnic Albanian
students from Macedonia, too. In a 2009 textbook, a chapter entitled “Illyrian-Albanian continuity”
proposes that contemporary Albanians are direct descendants of the Illyrians. The authors claim that
“The archaeological investigations in several Albanian regions confirm the ethno-cultural continuity of
the Illyrians”. As in its Macedonian counterpart, here too the focus of the historical narrative is set on
late antiquity. The Komani archaeological culture is interpreted as an ethnic Illyrian (i.e. Albanian)
culture. Again, what is omitted is the well known concept in archaeology, at least from the 1960's
onwards, that archaeological culture does not equal ethnic group. According to Bowden, one of the
leading archaeologists working on sites in Albania, the Komani culture is not an expression of ethnic
identity, but rather an indication of a more localized and fluid social structures.226 He claims that the
population of the Komani culture “participated in a European-wide medium of funerary practice, rather
than constructing an identity that consciously expressed their difference from their neighbors”.227 In this
222
B. Ristovski et alii, Istorija za prva godina, 98-102.
223
Ibidem, 146.
224
Cf. M. Boskoski, N. Dervisi, S. Nedziri, D. Madzovski, S. Nikolovski, Istorija za prva godina gimnazisko
obrazovanie, Skopje: Prosvetno Delo, 2009, 164 and then M. Boskoski, J. Ilioski, N. Dervisi, Istorija za sesto
oddelenie, Skopje: Prosvetno Delo, 2010, 32. The latter also emphasizes that the local population in the region had
an ancient Macedonian ethnic identity, but it differs from the other textbooks because it claims that their
contemporary descendants are the Vlachs from Macedonia. While this proposition does not fit in the Macedonian
nationalist discourse, it is still equally without academic support. Interviewed by the Nova Makedonija newspaper
on September 7th 2010 (issue 22085), the author of that claim explained that “Before writing that the Vlachs are
remnants from the ancient Macedonians, I called the president of the Union of the Culture of the Vlachs. He
confirmed to me that it is the truth”(!), while the first reviewer of the textbook justified his signature with the words
“Well, I had to travel to Ohrid, and I had to sign quickly” - online edition available at
http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=91710954511&id=9&setIzdanie=22085.
225
Cf. N. Naneski, B. Memeti, Istorija za VI oddelenie, Zvezda: Skopje, 2006, 32: “The autochthonous
population in Macedonia were the ancient Macedonians, called Paionians. They originated from the Roman
colonists in Macedonia”.
226
W. Bowden, The Construction of Identities in Post-Roman Albania, in : L. Lavan and W. Bowden (eds),
Theory and Practice in Late Antique Archaeology, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003, 57.
227
Ibidem.
71
case too, the didactic section motivates the student to adopt the new “knowledge”: “Was there an
ethnogenetic link between the Illyrians and the Arberians and how did this reflect on culture?”.228
These mythical historical narratives have certain differences and similarities. What is different is
that the Macedonian narrative is based mostly on written sources, while the Albanian one on
archaeological sources. Also, the first one proposes an assimilation of two ethnically and culturally
different populations, while the second one proposes a change and evolution of one autochthonous
population. On the other hand, both myths of antiquitas presented to students as historical
“knowledge” share two common features. They seek the solution for the continuity problem in the late
ancient/early medieval period and they largely ignore basic historical and archaeological concepts and
theories. Group identity in the Later Roman Empire mainly manifested itself in terms of citizenship,
religion and finally region, as well as social status, profession etc. Contemporary research in the history
and archaeology of the region does not speak of a transmission of ethnic identity from classical to late
ancient times. To quote again Geary, who rightly considers nationalist interpretations and (ab)use of
history to be the very antithesis of history: “The flux and complexities of Late Antiquity belong to a
different world from the simplistic visions of ideologies”.229
Actually, contemporary scholarship
challenges and re-examines even the group identities and the related terminology from classical times
(Romans, Greeks, Hebrews, Gauls and genos, ethnos, phylon etc.), which are often taken for granted,
showing their complexity.230 That poses additional problems for any effort to link two different groups of
people over such a long period of time, which myth-makers either ignore or forget.
In order to provide a context which can illustrate the shift of the historical narrative in history
textbooks, i.e. to illustrate the myth at work, we shall briefly turn to the aftermath of the fall of socialism
and communism in the Balkans. The researchers that studied the place of ancient history in Macedonian
history textbooks in the 1990's have reached different results. E.g., Vouri, who examined textbooks from
four Balkan countries (basically Greece's neighbors: Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey) observed
that this historical period has been attested in four particular ways: thematic exploration of ancient
history in the curriculum, incorporation of ancient history in the body of national history, ethnocentric
narrative of ancient history and a revision of the Marxist approach to the ancient past.231 What these
textbooks/countries had in common was that: “they all lay emphasis on the passing need to rehabilitate
the 'downgraded history' of ancient Trace, ancient Macedonia or Illyria”.232 Studying the mainstream
Macedonian historiography from the 1990's, Brunnbauer also emphasized the inclusion of ancient
228
B. Ristovski et alii, Istorija za prva godina, 141.
229
P. Geary, The Myth of Nations, 156.
230
For classical group identity cf. E. Gruen, Did Ancient Identity Depend on Ethnicity? A Preliminary Probe,
Phoenix 67/1-2 (2013), 1-22. For a post-modernist analysis of groups in the context of modern nationalism and
identity theory, cf. R. Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, Archives Européenes de Sociologie 43/2 (2002), 163189, who challenges the tendency to take groups for granted, i.e. the “common sense groupism”.
231
S. Vouri, Antiquity as Source of National Documentation in Balkan History Textbooks (1991-1996), in: P.
D. Hochellis and F. L. Toloudi (eds), The Image of the “Other”/Neighbour in the School Textbooks of the Balkan
Countries (Proceedings of the International Conference, Thessaloniki, 16-18 October 1998), Thessaloniki-Athens,
2001, 77.
232
Ibidem, 78.
72
Macedonians in the national narrative. He, too, points to historians' general suggestions for a mix
between Slavs and Macedonians in the 6th/7th century.233 Yet, this case differs from our more recent
case study, because: 1. The “symbiosis” theory was more vague then today, and actually was not yet
theorized, and 2. It was not included in history textbooks. Our point can be illustrated by Brunnbauer's
conclusion that “academic historians usually do not go so far as to claim a shared ethnic identity
between the ancient and the Slav Macedonians – although they recognize a contribution of the ancient
Macedonians to the ethnogenesis of the Macedonian people – but stress the tradition of statehood that
the ancient Macedonians had established in the region and handed down to the Macedonian nation”.
Apart from the political “pedigree”, the first part of this statement means that Macedonian historians
did not question the Slavic identity of the modern Macedonian people. Ancient history was part of the
national narrative, and it did claim that the ancient Macedonians were not Greeks, but it did not have a
leading role and it did not explicitly suggest an ancient origin of the modern Macedonian identity. At the
same time, the myth of ancient origin of the Albanians was already elaborated in detail,234 but not in
Macedonia. It was elaborated in communist Albania. Off course, we must be aware that these were
processes in two different countries, but it does not mean that they could not influence each other. In
any case, our point here is not the chronological order of myth construction, but the changes in the
historical narrative from the 1990's to the post-conflict period. We argue that the myth of antiquitas in
Macedonia, as seen in history textbooks, is today much more elaborated and explicit, it is based on
limited and hypothetical historical interpretation which provided new (pseudo-)arguments and
conclusions. It can be seen as a manifestation of an ideological use of history, as theorized by K.-G.
Karlsson, because it is related “to attempts to arrange historical elements into a relevant context of
meaning, made mainly by groups of intellectuals and politicians in control of public representations”.235
Yet, proving the “incorrectness” of the myth in textbooks seems, not only to be the “easiest”
thing to do, but also the perhaps the least useful thing to do. Therefore, we shall now move to the
functionalist approach to the myth of ancient origin, and basically try to understand what is its precise
role in the contemporary Macedonian society.
Significance and work on myth: functionalist approach
In the contemporary literature on political myth there are many views on what defines a myth. Although
often there are certain differences between them, still in general they share the opinion that political
myths mainly serve to legitimize a given political order or community. E.g., Ifversen claims that modern
myths are political, that their task is to legitimize foundational political acts, and that they express trans-
233
U. Brunnbauer, Historiography, Myths and the Nation, 180.
234
S. Vouri, Antiquity as Source of National Documentation, 78 and 80.
235
K.-G. Karlsson, Public uses of history in contemporary Europe, in: H. Jones et alii (eds), Contemporary
History on Trial: Europe since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian, Manchester University Press, 2007, 39.
See also his discussion on “the longer back, the more legitimate” idea employed by nationalists.
73
historical values that provide orientation to a given community.236 He proposes to regard a mythical
narrative as a particular discourse whose purpose is to justify order and authority in a community.237 For
Boskovic, Gavrilovic and Perica political myths are in general connected to the state and they classify
them as myths of the polis, founding myths of the state and myths of the nation.238
A much larger view then those mentioned above is offered by Bottici in a study which aimed to
be the first refined theoretical framework for the use of political myths, and which centers around the
universal need for significance. She defined political myth “as the work on a common narrative by which
the members of a social group (or society) make significance of their political experiences and deeds.
Thus, what makes a political myth out of a simple narrative is not its content or claim to truth, but first,
the fact that this narrative coagulates and produces significance, second, that it is shared by a group,
and third, that it can come to address the specifically political conditions in which the group
operates”.239 The core of her theory is the notion of significance or Bedeutsamkeit, an older concept
that she borrowed from the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg.240 It is argued that people need
significance in order to live in a world less indifferent to them.241 The second pillar in her philosophy,
also stemming from Blumenberg, is the concept of “work on myth”, which is actually the main focus of
the inter-relational approach to myth. A myth is not only a story, or a narrative. Bottici argues that a
myth is not “a product that is given once and for all, but is instead a process of the continual reworking
of a basic narrative core or mythologem”.242
An important aspect of the political myth is its use in the politics of identity, especially in ethnonational context. The place of the myth in that process is not fixed, but rather dynamic. As Bottici
argued, political myths “... can be seen as both the symptom of an already existing identity, but also as a
means for creating an identity yet to come”.243 Kolsto's idea of myths as ethnic boundaries equally
stresses the link between historical narratives and traditions as legitimization and celebration of
identity. One of the specific traits of this aspect of myth is the tendency to move to action. Political
myths represent a determination to act, i.e. they have the potential to prompt people to action,
especially when their group identity is based on a myth.244
A political myth can have at the same time a cognitive, practical and an aesthetical dimension,
without it being possible to distinguish clearly between them. Drawing on previous ideas from Flood,
236
J. Ifversen, Myth in the Writing of European History, in: S. Berger and C. Lorenz (eds), Nationalizing the
Past. Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, 454.
237
Ibidem, 454.
238
A. Boskovic, D. Gavrilovic and V. Perica, Myths, Political Mythologies and Nationalism, in: D. Gavrilovic
and V. Perica (eds), Political Myths in the Former Yugoslavia and Successor States. A Shared Narrative, Dordrecht,
2011, 13-14.
239
C. Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth, 14.
240
For this idea of significance, as well as the one on work on myth, cf. H. Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos,
Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1979, especially chapter 3 entitled “Bedeutsamkeit”, 65 ff. For an English
translation cf. H. Blumenberg, Work on Myth, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1985.
241
C. Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth, 131.
242
Ibidem, 7.
243
Ibidem, 230-231.
244
Ibidem, 243.
74
Sorel and Tudor, Bottici has pointed to three particular dimensions of a political myth: cognitive,
practical and aesthetical.245 The cognitive dimension refers to the importance of myths in providing
fundamental cognitive schemata in order to map the social world by reducing the complexity of social
life to the relative simplicity of its narrative plot; the practical dimension implies that people involved in
social action need to represent their planned activity in the form of a narrative that will assure their
success; the aesthetical dimension suggests that a myth is manifested through dramatic or even poetic
forms of narration.246
Finally, in this small discussion on political myth, it is worth stressing that a political myth is not
limited exclusively to a narrative with political content. Actually, the myth can speak of a non-political
message, but when this is inserted into a political context or it receives a political function, then it
becomes a political myth. It is this last point which makes the myth of antiquitas in Macedonia a political
myth. The story of the ancient Macedonia and the story of the longevity of the ancient Macedonian
ethnos and its subsequent mix with Slavic tribes is not necessarily a political story. They are much more
socio-cultural stories. Yet, in the current political context (especially in relation to the 'name dispute'),
this narrative does have a political function, which is to mobilize public emotion, opinion, and action. In
fact, bearing in mind the theoretical explanations mentioned above, the functioning and the purpose of
the ethno-centric myths of ancient origin and continuity in Macedonia become much more
understandable. As we shall see, it is in the context of a number of political situations today that the
narrative of the ancient past becomes “relevant”.
In the following part we will focus on two inter-related characteristics of the supposed function
of the antiquitas myth in contemporary Republic of Macedonia. We will try to connect more novel
sociopolitical developments with the “turn” towards antiquity in primary and secondary school history
textbooks. In the previous section we presented the main narratives found in textbooks which give
information to students in regard to the alleged link between ancient and contemporary Macedonians
and ancient Illyrians with contemporary Albanians. In this section we will focus more on the functions
that these two myths provide for their “followers”. Particularly, we will attempt to show the function of
the antiquitas myth in it's double significance. Primarily, we will discuss the function of the antiquitas
myth in relation to the self-perceived position of the Macedonian nation (understood in purely ethnic
terms) in the overall “order of nations”, and especially in the relations with the neighboring countries
and the “name dispute” with Greece. Secondary, we will discuss the use of the antiquitas myth in the
inter-ethnic dispute between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians over the character of the state
and the political nation, which has marked contemporary history of Macedonia from the independence
of the state to present days. It is important to emphasize that the following characteristics are complexly
interrelated to the point where various theoretically distinguishable functions interplay to provide
understandings of reality valid for a particular point in time and specific sociopolitical context.
245
246
Ibidem, 179-180.
Ibidem.
75
Justification function: making use of the “ancient origin” of the nation in the great “order of nations”
Previously presented citations from the history textbooks that direct towards an ancient origin of the
nation have had the function to show greater worth of the nation in the “order of nations”. It is
important to emphasize that in the Macedonian case the nation is understood in ethnic terms – as first
and foremost (exclusively) a nation of ethnic Macedonians. In a particular socio-political context (post1991) in which the markers of Macedonian identity have been contested from politicians and
intellectuals in the neighboring countries (i.e. the name of the state in the context of the relations with
Greece; the distinctiveness of the Macedonian language and ethnicity in the context of the relations
with Bulgaria; and the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in the context of the relations
with Serbia), the idea of a “glorious“ antique origin of the nation functions as a buffer against these
allegations of non-auchtochtonity. Through this narrative the Macedonian nation is seen as more
morally superior to the neighboring nations which “falsely” attack the markers of Macedonian identity.
In this understanding, the Macedonian nation is older, more glorious and thus, bears complete right
over its present territory. The contemporary experience of a “small” and “weak” state is seen as a direct
consequence of the attempt of the neighboring states to “hijack” the glorious antique historical heritage
of Macedonians.
This argument is especially valid when examining the contemporary relations between
Macedonia and Greece. Ever since 1991 the governments of Greece and Macedonia lead a political and
diplomatic conflict centered around the right for the use of the name “Macedonia”, although it has
much wider implications. Both sides venture back in ancient times to the age of Alexander the Great in
order to show their legitimacy and “rightful” ownership of a name. Or, more likely, in terms of elections
and legitimacy of political power, political parties attempt to obtain votes by presenting themselves as
protectors of the Greek or Macedonian nation, respectively. In this context, if we follow Bottici's ideas
which were presented above, the myth of ancient origin provides the ethnic Macedonians with a
meaning for the conflict, a significance for their situation and values, and a call to action for defending a
name/identity. Kolsto argued that: “No magician's trick can turn the South Slav into the autochthonous
population of the area they now live in, unless they accept that they fused with the older groups. By
seeing their nations as a mixture of old and new population segments they can extend their local roots
by many centuries, if not millenia”.247 Thus, through the myth of antiquitas, which projects modern
Macedonians in classical times through the fusion between ancient Macedonians and Slavs, many ethnic
Macedonians feel confident and morally stronger in their current just fight for identity. The major
economic and diplomatic blockades248 which they live(d) through since the independence of the country
in this way make sense to them.
247
P. Kolsto, Assessing the Role of Historical Myths, 26. He rightly points out that this solution is
contradictory with the nationalist belief that national groups are eternal and unchanging, i.e. the same belief which
searched for autochthony via ethnic mixture in the first place.
248
The economic blockade in 1994 and the blockade to NATO membership in 2008 being the most serious
ones.
76
The myth of the “obvious” linear historical continuity between ancient and contemporary
Macedonians, coupled with the myth of historical right over the territory represent two prime
arguments in the ongoing name dispute with Greece.249 In this narrative, Macedonians have complete
right to use the name “Macedonia”, firstly because they are descendants of ancient Macedonians and
second, because they resided on the given territory for many centuries. Even though none of the two
arguments can be valid in the context of international relations, these justifications in the ongoing name
dispute serve well for Macedonians to explain just what is exactly wrong with Greece's position.
An important part of the Interim Accord signed between Macedonia and Greece in 1995 is Macedonia's
obligation not to use symbols which associate to what is known as ancient Macedonia (primarily the
kingdom of Fillip II and Alexander III the Great).250 From 2006 the Macedonian Government started to
change it's position over the issue and from the previous policy of non-use of ancient Macedonian
symbols it moved towards a policy of sometimes opened and in other times “disguised” use. Firstly, the
Government re-named one of the highways in the country as well as the airport in Skopje with the name
“Alexander the Great”. This raised instant objections in Greece and accusations of non-compliance with
the Interim Accord. Further on, starting from 2010, the Government initiated a large-scale project of rebuilding of Skopje, the capital of the country in which antique symbols and references were even more
openly used. The main feature of the project is a 14.5 meter statue of Alexander the Great in the main
square in Skopje titled cautiously as “The Warrior on Horse” . Statues of Philip II and Alexander's mother
Olympia also feature in the city center area, while new buildings used as administrative facilities and
museums are build to resemble classical architecture, via neo-classical and baroque styles. Statues of
other Macedonian national figures from the antique to contemporary times are also present as a part of
the project titled “Skopje 2014”.
The project itself has been very controversial in the Macedonia's public sphere since it's
revelation to the public. However, it can be argued that the more open use of ancient symbols and
references has fueled national pride of ethnic Macedonians, since it is widely perceived that this was not
allowed in the previous period due to Greek objections. The myth of ancient origin of the nation is
particularly important in this regard, and provides a “rationale” to use those symbols in the first place. It
gives understanding why the use of those symbols is a right of ethnic Macedonians, towards which no
one may object.
Competition over historical precedence? Contemporary yet ancient Macedonians vs. contemporary
249
In a TV debate in June 2009 one of the main supporters and myth-makers, Pasko Kuzman, then a director
of the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, argued that “we” must prove an ancient origin if “we” don't
want to lose our name.
250
Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Interim Accord states that “If either Party believes one or more symbols
constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use
to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does
not consider it necessary to do so.” Available at:
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the%20He
llenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf (last accessed 29.08.2014).
77
yet ancient Illyrians
The “Skopje 2014” project also touched upon another very sensitive issue in the Macedonian public
sphere, important from the very first days of the independence of the state. The two largest ethnic
groups have disputed over the principles in which the state and nation are build. This was best
manifested in demands placed forward by ethnic Albanian politicians and intellectuals in the 1990s for a
revision of the Preamble of the Macedonian Constitution to include ethnic Albanians as a “constitutive
element” of the state. This issue was seemingly resolved after the conflict of 2001 when the Preamble
was changed towards a version of “shared constituency” of all communities residing in the Republic of
Macedonia (Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Romas, Serbs, Bosniaks and Vlachs). Previously, the
Constitution identified the Macedonian ethnic group as a “constitutive element”, while “full equality
and co-existence” was guaranteed for the members of minority groups.251
“Skopje 2014”, as first and foremost a project aimed to promote the ancient origin and continuity of
ethnic Macedonians, fueled ethnic Albanian resentments for at least two reasons. First, the project
obviously lacked presentation of Albanian national figures. This yet again introduced the question of
where is the place of ethnic Albanians in the political Macedonian nation. Secondly (and more important
for our discussion here), the issue of historical right over the city (territory) was also re-fueled. Irritated
by the ethnic marking of a shared territory, some ethnic Albanian groups and organizations from Skopje
have challenged this activity by employing their own belief in ancient, Illyrian, origin and subsequently,
their historical right over the city. This phenomenon has been most clearly seen during and after the
archaeological excavations at the medieval/Ottoman fortress sector (“Kale”) in the city center. Many
local Albanians suspected that the archaeologists, i.e. the state, is doing that in order to hide or destroy
any evidence of Illyrian/Albanian character of the site, and thus their autochtonism in the Skopje area.
Aspects of the activities from the both sides seem absurd: the government's efforts to interpret new
artifacts as Macedonian or as a sign of continuity at any cost (in the context of the “name dispute”), as
well as the Albanian “paranoia” that someone will negate their “historical precedence” in Skopje. But,
this situation only shows the interdependence and interrelation between historical myths in the region.
What is more important is that these events have led to inter-ethnic violence. Consistent with the
program for national “renaissance”, the government decided to build a church at the archaeological site
mentioned above, located in a zone considered as their own by both Macedonians and Albanians. The
result was a massive fight (Februari 2011) at that contested location between groups of young men who
felt “historical truths” should be settled through physical violence.252 Two myths of antiquitas had
confronted. The aftermath of the event saw many minor ethnically motivated acts of violence
throughout the city, which was but a segment of a wider picture of ethnic urban violence that the city
251
For a broader discussion over this issue see: J. Bliznakovski, Symbolic Aspects of Nation-Building: The
Story of Three Versions of the Preamble
of
the Macedonian Constitution, Political Thought 44 (2013):
Ethnic Conflict. New
Perspectives
of the Old Reality, 115-122.
252
F. Stojanovski, Macedonia: Violent Inter-Ethnic Incident on Skopje Fortress, Global Voices, 15.02.2011,
available at: http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/02/15/macedonia-violent-inter-ethnic-incident-on-skopje-fortress/
(last accessed 29.08.2014).
78
has seen in the last several years. Younger generations live the myths fabricated by the generation of
their parents. Through nationalist and pseudo-historical ideas, a space can be created for politics, public
discourse and education to lead to violence.
In this way, it can be argued that some recent manifestations of the myth of Illyrian origin of
ethnic Albanians in the Macedonia has been provoked by the resurgence of the myth of ancient
Macedonian origin of ethnic Macedonians. Or, maybe it is more precise to say that both myths influence
themselves towards a more extensive appearance, i.e. both myths feed from their counterpart with the
effect of gaining much broader ground then before. In the heart of this process stands a quite common
feature of nationalisms – to confront among themselves over the discussion of which group has
historical precedence over a given territory.
Recent European Analogies
The myths of antiquitas seen in Macedonian history textbooks had/has several analogies in
contemporary Europe. In Romania, until recently, in a similar fashion history textbooks emphasized the
ancient origin of the contemporary Romanians, by linking them with the Romans and the Dacians.253
One 1998 textbook teaches that “the Romanian people formed via the living together of the Dacians
with the Roman colonists and the assimilation of the Latin language by the Dacians”, while others from
1999 and 2003 event tried to establish similarities in the national costume between the Dacians and
Romanians. This situation changed in the last years prior to the country's EU accession in 2007, although
similar ideas were suggested in a subtle manner even in 2006.254 In the region of Galicia, in northwestern Spain, a “Galician nation” was legitimized with a theory of Celtic roots as opposed to Spahish
iberism, or of germanic Suebian roots as opposed to the myth of Wisigothic reign. These narratives were
challenged and deconstructed by a new generation of local Galician historians, influenced mainly by the
“Annales school”, at the very end of Franco's dictatorship.255 A peculiar case in this context is Greece,
and the idea of direct descendance from the ancient Greek city-states. It is probably the only myth of
antiquitas in the EU which is left unchallenged, perhaps partly because the western European civilization
itself traces its origins back to the rise of culture and philosophy in ancient Greece.
Whatever the varieties and similarities between these myths, researchers have repeatedly
accentuated their potentially dangerous role for any society. In a brief discussion on the myths in
Kosovo, the historian Geary emphasized the Serbian myth of the Battle for Kosovo (1389), and the
Albanian myth of Illyrian descent. In both myths he recognized the working of a “deadly logic” related to
the idea of a historical right over a territory.256 The same point was also accentuated by Kolsto in his
reflexion on antiquitas myths in general, warning us that they can be “pernicious and politically
253
A. D. Segestan, Myth, Identity and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian and Serbian Textbooks,
PhD Dissertation: University of Maryland, College Park, 2009 (consulted at the library of the Georg Eckert Institute
in Braunschweig), 252-255.
254
Ibidem, 257.
255
R. L. Facal, Teaching history in Galicia, in: P. Carrier (ed.), School and Nation. Identity Politics and
Educational Media in an Age of Diversity, Peter Lang: Frankfurt, 2013, 74-75.
256
P. J. Geary, The Myth of Nations, 7.
79
destabilizing”.257
In that context, mixed teams of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians propose to their
students myths of antiquitas in history textbooks and introduce them into the world view of “we were
here first”, meaning this is ours, and the “Other” is an unwanted visitor. History knowledge often is
forgotten, but values transmitted through history education remain.
Conclusion
1. The myth of antiquitas is explicitly present in Macedonian history textbooks for almost a decade. The
mythical narrative is constructed with the use of hypotheses and presumptions which are not supported
in the academic fields of late ancient and early medieval history and archaeology, as well as identity
theory. It has received relatively small space in textbooks – one unit – but it's message is quite clear. The
narration and the didactic section play an important part in the presentation of the mythical narrative.
How did the mythical narrative first enter the textbooks is another line of inquiry, which is quite
complex because writing textbooks in the region was/is conditioned not only by political context, but
also by personal interests and connections, as well as by different personal interpretations of history.
Which of these, if any, was crucial for the entry of the myth of antiquitas in Macedonian history
textbooks some ten years ago is still a question to be posed.
2. The particular form in which the myth of antiquitas has been presented in the last decade is
considerably more explicit and direct in comparison with the treatment of ancient history in textbooks
from the 1990's. We consider it as a new stage in its functioning, and as an illustration of the “myth at
work” concept. Therefore, it is important to receive new academic attention.
3. Current theories and concepts on the functioning of political/historical myths provide a relevant
framework for general understanding of the myths of antiquitas among the ethnic Macedonians and the
ethnic Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. Following mostly Bottici and Kolsto, we see this myth as
a political/historical myth of antiquitas (ancient origins and continuity).
4. The myth present in the textbooks is in correlation with a large set of ethnocentric policies focused on
antiquity, identity and “historical rights”, visible especially in the Skopje 2014 project, the large scale
archaeological excavations not free (at least in one part) from political (mis)interpretation, the campaign
of renaming places, streets and objects in an “ancient” style – briefly, a variety of forms of nation rebranding and invention of tradition.
5. The main purpose of the antiquitas myth in Macedonia, we believe, is twofold – to provide
significance and to mobilize for action. In the context of the ongoing “name dispute” with neighboring
Greece, the myth makes understandable and bearable the hard and complex problem of having to
defend one's own identity in democratic Europe of the 21st century. It provides significance and even a
feeling of moral superiority to those ethnic Macedonians who feel endangered by that specific political
activity. At the same time, for both ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia it renders
257
P. Kolsto, Assessing the Role of Historical Myth, 10.
80
justifiable their “need” to separate themselves from the relevant other, and to mark (even through
aggression) as an exclusive historical territory, something which in reality is a shared space. Through the
idea of “historical right” over a territory, the belief in the antiquitas myths had played a role in a number
of violent events in Skopje. This does not mean that one or two lessons on ancient origin and continuity
has led directly or indirectly to any particular violent event in the last few years. However, it does mean
that it participates in the same symbolic “mythologized” discourse and mindset manifested in the
ethnocentric “anticomania” and the struggle for 'historical' territory.
Bibliography
Textbooks
Adzievski, K., Petreska, D., Ackoska, V., Dimoski, N., Gjorgiev, V., Istorija za petto oddelenie, Skopje:
Tabernakul, 2005.
Boskoski, M., Dervisi, N., Nedziri, S., Madzovski, D., Nikolovski, S., Istorija za prva godina gimnazisko
obrazovanie, Skopje: Prosvetno Delo, 2009.
Boskoski, M., Ilioski, J., Dervisi, N., Istorija za sesto oddelenie, Skopje: Prosvetno Delo, 2010.
Naneski, N., Memeti, B., Istorija za VI oddelenie, Zvezda: Skopje, 2006.
Ristovski, B., Rahimi, S., Mladenovski, S., Chepreganov, T., Panov, M. B., Istorija za prva godina
gimnazisko obrazovanie, Skopje: Albi, 2006.
Literature
Bliznakovski, J., Symbolic Aspects of Nation-Building: The Story of Three Versions of the Preamble
of
the Macedonian Constitution, Political Thought 44 (2013): Ethnic Conflict. New
Perspectives of the Old Reality, 115-122.
Blumenberg, H., Arbeit am Mythos, Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1979.
Blumenberg, H., Work on Myth, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1985.
Boskovic, A., Gavrilovic, D., Perica, V., Myths, Political Mythologies and Nationalism, in: D.
Gavrilovic and V. Perica (eds), Political Myths in the Former Yugoslavia and Successor States. A
Shared Narrative, Dordrecht, 2011, 13-20.
Bottici, C., A Philosophy of Political Myth, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Bowden, W., The Construction of Identities in Post-Roman Albania, in : L. Lavan and W. Bowden
(eds), Theory and Practice in Late Antique Archaeology, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003, 57-77.
Brubaker, R., Ethnicity without Groups, Archives Européenes de Sociologie 43/2 (2002), 163-189.
Brunnbauer, U., Historiography, Myths and the Nation in the Republic of Macedonia, in: U.
Brunnbauer (ed.), (Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism,
Munster, 2004, 165-200.
Facal, R. L., Teaching history in Galicia, in: P. Carrier (ed.), School and Nation. Identity Politics and
Educational Media in an Age of Diversity, Peter Lang: Frankfurt, 2013, 70-79.
Geary, P. J., The Myth of Nations. The Medieval Origins of Europe, Princeton University Press, 2002.
Gruen, E., Did Ancient Identity Depend on Ethnicity? A Preliminary Probe, Phoenix 67/1-2 (2013),
1-22.
81
Hasimbegovic, E., Gavrilovic, D., Ethnogenesis Myths, in: D. Gavrilovic and V. Perica (eds),
Political
Myths in the Former Yugoslavia and Successor States. A Shared Narrative, Dordrecht, 2011, 21-34.
Ifversen, J., Myth in the Writing of European History, in: S. Berger and C. Lorenz (eds), Nationalizing
the Past. Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, 452479.
Karlsson, K.-G., Public uses of history in contemporary Europe, in: H. Jones et alii (eds), Contemporary
History on Trial: Europe since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian,
Manchester University
Press, 2007, 27-45.
Kolsto, P., Assesssing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society, in: P. Kolsto (ed.), Myths and
Boundaries in Southeastern Europe, London, 2005, 1-34.
Lomonosov, M., National Myths in Interdependence: The Narratives of Ancient Past among
Macedonians and Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia after 1991, MA Thesis in manuscript
at
the
Central
European
University
in
Budapest,
2012
(consulted
at
www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/lomonosov_matvey.pdf).
Pichler, R., Historiography and the Politics of Education in the Republic of Macedonia (1991-2008), in:
Dimou, A. (ed.), “Transition” and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe, Eckert.
Die Schriftenreihe Band 124, V& R Press, 2009, 217-249.
Proeva, N., Savremeni makedonski mit kao odgovor na nacionalne mitove suseda: albanski
panilirizam, bugarski pantrakizam i grcki panhelenizam, Zgodovinski Časopis 64/1-2 (2010),
176-219.
Schmitt, O. J., 'Mysians, Macedonians, Dardanians': Some Remarks on Late Medieval Ethnonyms in
the Central Balkans, in: Makedonskiot identitet niz istorijata, Skopje, 2010, 73-78.
Scott, R., The Classical Tradition in Byzantine Historiography, in: M. Mullet and R. Scott (eds),
Byzantium and the Classical Tradition, University of Birmingham Thirteenth Spring
Symposium of Byzantine Studies 1979, Birmigham, 1981, 61-74.
Segestan, A. D., Myth, Identity and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian and Serbian
Textbooks, PhD Dissertation: University of Maryland, College Park, 2009 (consulted at the
library of the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig).
Stojanov, D., In Search of Autochthony: A Case Study of the Great Migration Period in History
Textbooks in Macedonia, in: Der Donauraum 50/3-4 (2010) : Cultural Changes in Central and
South East Europe after 1989, 225-234.
Vouri, S., Antiquity as a Source of National Documentation in Balkan History Textbooks (1991-1996),
in: Xochellis, P. D. and Toloudi, F. L. (eds.), The Image of the “Other”/Neighbour in the School
Textbooks of the Balkan Countries (Proceedings of the International Conference,
Thessaloniki, 16-18 October 1998), Thessaloniki-Athens, 2001, 75-90.
Internet material
http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=91710954511&id=9&setIzdanie=22085
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the%20
Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/02/15/macedonia-violent-inter-ethnic-incident-on-skopje-fortress/
82
Myths of statehood in post-Yugoslav textbooks
Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc
Tamara Pavasovic Trost
Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, M.A., Ph.D. Candidate
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
jovana.mihajlovic@gmail.com
and
Tamara Pavasovic Trost, Ph.D.
University of Graz, Austria
tpavasov@post.harvard.edu
Paper proposal for the conference “Myths in south-eastern European textbooks”, 22-24 October, Tirana
This paper will present the ways in which foundation of post-Yugoslav states is narrated in the
contemporary history textbooks used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia,
Serbia and Slovenia. Further, the paper will compare the meta-narratives about the dissolution of
Yugoslavia within which these particular narratives are situated. Even in cases where multiple textbooks
are used in a state (or entity within BiH), they follow the main narrative line typical for that state/entity.
Majority of international historiography about Yugoslav dissolution presents emergence of the new
states as a result of various social and international processes, ranging from economic crisis in late SFRY
to the emerging post-Cold War international setting. Quite contrary, the local history-textbooks tend to
present the disintegration of the old common and proclamation of the new independent states in terms
of realisation of (imagined) national interests.
Each of these (mutually conflicting) national narratives strives to legitimise the creation of the own state
as rightful, based on popular will and democratic. For this purpose the history textbooks often avoid
mentioning particular historical facts that would endanger the coherence of the narrative, hence, by the
rule they silence the voice of the political opposition. Their common trait is to present the decisions of
the political leaders (“fathers of the nations”) as the only legitimate solution in given time. In addition,
these national narratives usually invoke continuity of the present state with some previous political
formation that existed at some point during the centuries of convoluted history of the region. In this
way the textbook create exclusivist interpretation of history which disables multi-perspective approach
which is recommended by the contemporary trends in history teaching. Therefore this paper will
demonstrate how the complex and contingent historical events are mythicized in order to serve the
purpose
of
nation-building.
83
The Impact of the Political Context on Croatian
Heroic Mythology
Igor Despot, PhD
Introduction
In Croatian historiography and consequently in school textbooks there are some essential defining
moments in the understanding and interpretation of Croatian past. The first phase, from the second half
of the 19th century to 1945, romanticized the Croatian political people - nobility and regardered as
heroes successful fighters against the Turks (Nikola Šubić Zrinski) or those who have resisted the
Austrian (Zrinski- Frankapan conspiracy) or the Hungarian authorities (Josip Jelačić). Commoners could
not enter into those heroic narratives, although authors begun to write about Peasant Revolt of 1573
since the mid 19th century. Since 1945 and the victory of the socialist revolution, perspectives on the
Croatian history were significantly altered. Social relations were explored in accordance with Marxist
historiography and people that had hitherto been disdained as uninteresting (serfs, peasants) came in
the focus of historians. There were many books that addressed the revolts of peasants against their
feudal lords (heroes from the earlier period of historiography). Matija Gubac, one of the leaders of the
rebellion 1573 against Franjo Tahy, feudal lord of Susedgrad-Stubica seigniory, has become widely
known. Many schools were named after him, his memorial had been visited by generations of
elementary school pupils. Matija Gubec was not the only rebel who became a hero in socialism. Famous
were also Matija Ivanić and Hvar Rebellion and peasant revolts in the Zagreb surroundings. The nobles
led by Gašpar Alapić, who defeated the army of peasants in the Peasant Revolt of 1573, despite the fact
that they had fought against the Turks, became the bad guys. Monument of Ban Josip Jelačić, the former
hero and fighter against Hungarians 1848, was removed from the central square in Zagreb and the
square was 1945 renamed to Republic Square. Since 1989 and restoration of multi-party system, a
partial return to the glorification of Croatian nobility has began. Jelačić monument was returned to
Zagreb's central square, which has since been called the Ban Jelačić Square; Matija Gubec and social
rebellions are presented in textbooks in just a few lines, or are completely thrown out, the number of
visits to the memorial area dedicated to Matija Gubec has declined. Literature is again full of heroic
resistance against Turkish invaders, and many amateur researchers have began seeking for noble origins
of Croatian individuals, earning money for it. The nineties were particularly good period for such a job.
In this paper, I will analyze the historiographical literature before The Second World War, during socialist
period and during the period of Croatian independent state. Through the analysis of selected textbooks
from the end of the 19th century to this day I will show a difference in creation of mythological heroes in
Croatia and bring it in connection with the social context in which that occurs.
84
Heroic epos created in the 19th century
Franjo Rački, one of the leading historians of the late 19th century was also a very active political
worker. In his person the connection between politics and historiography is most evident. At that time,
there were very few educated people in Croatia and they considered political work aimed at improving
peripheral position of Croatia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire as their duty. Disunity and division of
the new Croatian nation in a dual monarchy made a fertile ground for the development of mythological
literature in the service of politics. The most appropriate for highlighting the uniqueness of Croatia were
Croatian noblemen who represented the Croatian political people. There were a few sources for the
study of the independent Croatian principality and later kingdom, not enough to create a full picture and
heroic literature of the time. With entering to personal union with Hungary and later joining the
Habsburg state, Croatia lost its independence and all that was left was emphasizing of Croatian rights
and Sabor (Parliament). The importance of questionable arrangements of twelve Croatian tribes with
new Arpad dynasty was highlighted. That agreement is known as Pacta Conventa or Qualiter but one of
the leading Croatian historians of the twentieth century Nada Klaić claimed that it was the forgery from
14th century. In the constitutional sense, important was also the agreement that Croatian noblemen,
gathered in the Croatian Parliament, made with Ferdinand of Habsburg, who brought Croatia in the
community of many nations, in which Ferdinand pledged to keep Croatian rights. As the main objective
was the unification of Croatian lands and preserving the uniqueness in the complex multinational
association, in historiography and in schools the nobles who represented political people were
emphasized. They were part of the nation that has managed to preserve that uniqueness over the
centuries. Best suited for heroic literature were battles against the Turks, where Croats were portrayed
as defenders of not only the Monarchy but of the whole of Central and Western Europe - Antemurale
Christianitatis. That further obliged the Monarchy and that was another reason, alongside the preexisting reason, agreements with the ruling houses of Hungary and later the Habsburgs, why Croatia
deserved its own uniqueness and better position than it had at that moment. Croatian noblemen Petar
Kružić, Petar Berislavić, Krsto Frankapan, brothers Talovac and many others were labeled heroes of the
whole Europe in the fight against the hated enemy of another faith.
The heroic mythology includes resistance to Habsburg or Hungarian authorities. The most popular were
Zrinski-Frankapan Conspiracy and actions of Ban Josip Jelačić during the revolution 1848/49.
Two events of Early Modern Period, which occurred at an interval of seven years, however, attracted the
most attention in Croatian historiography, but also in culture of nineteenth and twentieth century’s.
These are the heroic defense of Szigetvár in 1566 and the Peasant Revolt of 1573. The amount of plays,
series, great operas, epic poems dedicated to those completely different events shows that they
outweigh any heroic act in Croatia to this day. In the following sections I will handle coverage of these
events in Croatian history textbooks, and in this section the events themselves and their interpretation
in Croatian historiography, culture and their echo in the world.
Defence of Szigetvár and Peasant Revolt of 1573 in History Textbooks until 1945
85
In history textbooks that were printed before the creation of socialist Yugoslavia, Nikola Šubić Zrinski
and the defense of Szigetvár had the important role. The amount of text about Nikola Šubić Zrinski and
the defense of Szigetvár varied from textbook to textbook but conceptually in most textbooks they were
part of greater unites, except in textbook by Vjekoslav Klaić from 1894 and textbooks by Živko Jakić from
1935 and 1937. Vjekoslav Klaić in his textbook written for high schools for girls and lyceums, under the
subheading Nikola Zrinski, wrote about Nikola's youth, battles against the Turks, Nikola as ban and his
heroic death. That textbook is interesting because of several things. It does not mention Peasant Revolt
at all and it's the only one that mentions that Gašpar Alapić was chosen by Nikola Šubić Zrinski to be the
Deputy Commander. The chapter on Zrinski extends from page 89 to page 93. In the part about the
defense of Szigetvár he mentioned the figure of 3000 Croat defenders and 100 000 Turks besieging
Szigetvár. He emphasized that 30 000 Turks were killed under Szigetvár. Živko Jakić in his textbook for
high schools, under the subheading Croatian Struggles with Suleiman, pointed out that Emperor
Maximilian II did not send help to Szigetvár although he had 80,000 soldiers nearby. In addition, he
highlighted the loyalty of Nikola to the Monarchy although he was offered to govern Croatia as a Turkish
vassal. He devoted a special chapter to the Peasant Revolt in which he described the poor living
conditions of the peasants in the 16th century, stressed the fact that there were feudal lords who
treated their serfs well, as the Bishop of Zagreb and Zrinski family did, while Tahy as a stranger (it was
pointed out that he was Hungarian) treated his serfs very badly. He described the tragic death of Gubec.
In the textbook from 1900 by Franjo Valla, Szigetvár and Peasant Revolt had their place in the chapter
Habsburg Austrian House and Turkey in Sixteenth nd Seventeenth Century. One after the other, at nearly
the same extent of twenty rows, the events at Szigetvár and rebellion were described. In the section
devoted to the Siege of Szigetvár it was stressesed that the "Croatian Leonida" stopped Suleiman,
although he promised gold and the Croatian crown. He accused the nobles of Monarchy who did not
want to fight to help Zrinski. When describing a Peasant Revolt, the author emphasized the ruthlessness
of nobility, Tahy and others who participated in the suppression of the revolt. Ivan Hoić in his textbook
for lower grades of secondary school divided chapters by the rulers. In the text subtitled Suleiman II he
described the heroism of defenders of Szigetvár in fifteen rows, and under the subtitle Rudolf II he
mentioned the Peasant Revolt under the peasant's king Matija Gubec, without going into detail about
causes, course and consequences of the revolt. During the existence of Croatian puppet state in World
War II, Stjepan Srkulj wrote several textbooks. In the textbook for 8th grade of high school, under the
subtitle Nikola Šubić Zrinski, he pointed out that in the defense of Szigetvár vast majority were Croats,
and he named Nikola "new Leonidas." In text under subtitle Peasant Revolt of 1573 he described the
litigation of Tahy and Uršula Hening as the cause, described the developments and collaboration with
the Slovenian peasants and finally ended with the sentences: "In the August of the same year the
notorious culprit for the Peasant Revolt Franjo Tahy died. The whole Croatia cursed him as he caused
that misfortune."
Analysing these chapters, we can see that both the defenders of Szigetvár and rebels against the nobility
rule were described in a positive light. The connection that Gašpar Alapić had with both events was not
presented and that is why he was either a positive hero as in Vjekoslav Klaić's book where he was a
defender of Szigetvár or he was described negatively as in the textbook of Franjo Valla where he was a
cruel suppressor of the Peasant Revolt. Common to all the textbooks was disregard towards foreigners -
86
Emperor Maximilian II did not send help to Croats in Szigetvár who were defending the fort and thus
saved Vienna all by themselves or Zrinski family was good to the serfs while the Hungarian Tahy was
cruel to his people. In addition to this common segment that has been well thought out, the rest of the
events were described without deeper analysis in the books, with the exception of textbooks by
Vjekoslav Klaić who did not think that the Peasant Revolt was worth enough to find a place in the
textbook.
Defence of Szigetvár and the Peasant Revolt in Textbooks of Socialist Yugoslavia
In the period of socialist Yugoslavia, a great attention was given to history teaching. The basic tasks of
history lessons were formulated in programs for elementary and high school in 1960. The priority in the
program for elementary school was that "... pupils gain knowledge of the continuous development of
human society, of its gradual, but unstoppable movement from lower to higher forms of socio-economic
life and thus build confidence of a human inherent constant struggle for a better life and the feeling of
belonging to the progressive forces in this fight." The Peasant Revolt of 1573 perfectly fitted - serfs were
progressive force in the struggle against feudalism and pupils were expected to comprehend Franjo
Tahy as opponent to progressive forces, while Matija Gubec was a staunch advocate for the abolition of
feudalism. History textbooks chronologically followed the development of the production relations and
productive forces in the spirit of dialectical materialism, and the development from the original classless
society through slavery, feudalism and capitalism, where the classes were in perpetual antagonism.
Progress had continued towards the classless society that was achieved in Yugoslavia during struggle for
people's liberation in World War II. Accordingly, large space in the textbooks was dedicated to the
Peasant Revolt and in 1973, on the 400th anniversary, in the Oršić castle in Gornja Stubica The Peasant
Revolt Museum was opened and pupils from all over the country went there on excursions. In Vladimir
Babić's textbook for 6th grade in primary school and the second year of high school, along with a
detailed description of the hardship of peasants life, for the first time their program was stressed. In that
program they asked for the creation of a government that would introduce a general tax and military
duty, abolish customs and build roads to the sea and obey the emperor. It was pointed out that the
rebellion undermined the feudal order and strengthened peasant class consciousness, and the
ruthlessness of feudal lords in Stubica battle and execution of Gubec was described. Tahy was portrayed
as a cruel feudal lord.
In the same textbook, battle of Szigetvár deserved only 18 lines in which the emphasize was on
Suleiman's death and his offer to Zrinski to take the ruling position.
In the curriculum for primary schools in 1972, among other tasks, stated was the need to "give pupils a
basic knowledge of major historical events, cultural goods and leading figures from the history of the
Croatian people, other Yugoslav peoples and peoples who had higher impact on historical events in our
country and the world." Prior to that provision, like in the Olga Salzer's textbook from 1963. Nikola Šubić
Zrinski and the Siege of Szigetvár were not even mentioned. The Peasant Revolt was observed similarly
as in Babić's textbook, with the addition of a list of the various uprisings after 1573. Since 1972 texts
87
were standardized: a few lines about the Siege of Szigetvár and a few pages on the Peasant Revolt, with
added maps of important battles. In conclusion, the heroic defense of Szigetvár was not excluded from
history books because it was the struggle against foreign invaders (Turks), but the defenders were
members of the aristocratic class, so it was not opportune to excessively glorify them.
Textbooks after Socialism
Curriculum in history in primary and secondary schools after the collapse of socialism and the creation
of the Croatian state has passed through various stages. At the beginning, the old lessons kept up, "a
thorough cleaning of unnecessary topics" still wasn't conducted. In the last twenty-five years there has
been a lot of changes and reforms. This can, perhaps, be traced on the example of the Peasant Revolt
1573. In the seventh (and the first modified) edition of the textbook by Ivo Makek and Josip Adamček
from 1991 the Peasant Revolt was still described in a separate section and occupied four pages of the
book. Defense of Szigetvár was described in only fourteen lines. In the following year Ivo Makek wrote a
new textbook. Peasant Revolt was incorporated into a larger unit, but the description was still on three
pages. Text about Szigetvár was not significantly changed. From that textbook on, the tendency to
reduce the description of the Peasant Revolt was evident and in recent modifications of the program it
became an optional part of the curriculum.
After the independence, there is a free market of textbooks in Croatia. There are four publishing houses
that publish history textbooks. In textbooks by Neven Budak and Marija Mogorović Crljenko (2007) and
Željko Brdal and Margita Madunić (2009 and 2013) peasant uprisings were not mentioned. Not just the
Peasant Revolt of 1573, there aren't any discussion about the social life and the rural life whatsoever.
Early Modern Period in Croatia is seen only through intellectual movements (Humanism and the
Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation), battles against the Turks, the structure of the
Military Frontier and resistance to the central government through the Zrinski-Frankapan Conspiracy.
Nikola Šubić Zrinski retains the similar amount of text, with the facts previously published, the only
difference beeing that some of the textbooks added historical sources.
The Peasant Revolt Museum is integrated into the Museums of Croatian Zagorje. The new exhibition
includes rooms of family Oršić and Illyrian movement and the number of visitors is drastically reduced. A
good part of Croatian students will not even hear of the existence of any resistance to feudal elites
during the period of Croatian Early Modern Period.
Conclusion
In every country political elites determine education policy. Croatia is not exception. The Peasant Revolt
and Nikola Šubić Zrinski present good examples for monitoring that education policy in history teaching.
One of the proclaimed objectives of teaching is to develop love for the homeland and the most suitable
for that goal are fighters against invaders. That is why Nikola Šubić Zrinski has always been appreciated
88
as a hero. His noble position that was in dialectical materialism perceived as something negative could
not hurt such a perception. On the other hand, the resistance of the peasants against their feudal lords
was part of the social history. The attitude towards that resistance depends largely on society and social
values that it promotes. During the socialist era, Matija Gubec and other insurgents were seen as those
who spinned the wheel of history in the right direction, in the direction of a classless society. With the
collapse of socialism, a classless society ceased to be the ideal. The previous settings of Marxist
historiography have been denied and the Peasant Revolt has become just a phenomenon of the time
without far-reaching consequences. The Peasant Revolt is not mandatory part of the program, and,
depending on the author, it is not mentioned or it's included in larger units.
89
The National Liberation Movement in Albanian
history textbooks during socialist period
Dr. Gentiana Kera
The National Liberation Movement during World War II in Albania has been an important topic of
historiography during socialist regime, a fact also reflected in history textbooks. A resistance myth was
created in which the Albanian people under the leadership of the Albanian Communist Party gloriously
defeated the Italian and German fascist invaders. The explanation of this historical event has been
characterised to a large degree by an emphasis of the contribution of the Albanian Communist Party and
the National Liberation Army to this war neglecting the activities of other resistance groups, especially
during the first years of Italian occupation. The National Liberation Movement became also an
inspiration for writers and artists during socialist period, which created a huge amount of works
representing this event of contemporary Albanian history.
The aim of the proposed paper is twofold: Firstly, to analyse how this historical events of Albanian
history in the 20th century have been presented and explained in the history textbooks during socialist
period. The analysis will focused on several main questions such as how first groups and forms of
resistance were represented in history textbooks, how were partisans represented in textbooks, and
how important meetings during the war, such as the meetings of Peza and Mukje were presented in
history textbooks. Another important issue which will be addressed is how these historical events were
used to legitimise the power seizure of the Communist Party immediately after World War II.
90
MITIZIMI DHE ÇMITIZIMI I HERONJVE MBUROJË E
SISTEMIT KOMUNIST
VOJSAVA KUMBULLA
FLORENCA STAFA
MAJLINDA PEZA
Candidate. VOJSAVA KUMBULLA
Departamenti i Historise
Universiteti i Tiranes “ Histori - Filologji”
Mobile: 0355 69 58 48 516
E-mail . vojsavakumbulla@gmail.com
PhD Candidate. FLORENCA STAFA
Departamenti i Historise
Universiteti i Tiranes “ Histori - Filologji”
Mobile: 00355/ 69 62 98 659
E-mail florencastafa@yahoo.com
Dr. MAJLINDA PEZA
Departamenti i Historise
Universiteti Elbasanit: “ Aleksandër Xhuvani”
E-mail majapeza@yahoo.com
Fjalë kyç: mit, mitizim, hero, sistem komunist,
Në periudha të ndryshme historike roli dhe pesha që ka luajtur një personalitet ose një tjetër në
historinë e atij vendi është vlerësuar, nënvlerësuar ose mbivlerësuar. Kjo është shfrytëzuar për interesa
politike dhe jo vetëm. Sistemi komunist në përgjithësi ashtu si në disa vende të Ballkanit edhe në vendin
tonë solli dyzimin e personalitetit njerëzor, deformimin e ndërgjegjies njerëzore, manipulimin e masës
përmes ideologjisë dhe indoktrinimin me mësimet e marksizmit. Këtij qëllimi I shërbyen edhe
investimet e shumta që u bënë nga pushteti komunist në drejtim të rritjes së interest për kërkime
shkencore të cilat u bazuan në mbivlerësimin e disa prej ngjarjeve e figurave historike dhe zbehjen ,
fshirjen dhe zhdukjen nga kujtesa historike e disa personaliteteve të tjera historike . Mjaft figura
historike kaluan nëpër një filtër ideologjik. Si pasojë kjo u shoqërua natyrisht me efekte afatgjata në
përpunimin dhe përvijëzimin konsenguent, faktik e burimor të historisë.
Së pari: Kjo eleminoi multiperspektivën e këndvështrimeve historike duke e ngushtuar në një rrugicë të
ngushtë pa drithije në mendimin historic.
Së dyti : Përmes mitizimit pushteti komunist i humbi historisë misionin e vërtetë të saj, atë të sjelljes së
fakteve të reja përmes kërkimeve e hulumtimeve shkencore . Ajo jo vetëm që e mitizoi atë por e futi në
vlerë absolute duke humbur mundësinë e zbardhjes përmes dritës historike.
Përcaktimi i një rruge të vetme të interpretimit historik, përdorimi i presionit dhe çdo rruge tjetër për të
imponuar ide e mendim bëri që mendja njerëzore të mbyllej dhe të ishte dritëshkurtër. E keqja nuk
91
mbetet vetëm tek periudha e komunizmit por mbetja në grackën e së kaluarës sot ku faktet duhen
zbuluar dhe historia duhet të jetë sa më afër së vërtetës historike.
SUBJECT : Mythologising and De-Mythologisation of Heroes, Shield Of The Communist System
Keyëord : Myth , Mythifications , Hero , Communist System
In different historical periods and the role it has played a ëeight or another personality in the history of
the place is valued , undervalued or overvalued . It is used for political interests and not only . The
communist system in general as ëell as in several Balkan countries in our country brought the duality of
human personality , the distortion of human consciousness , through mass manipulation and
indoctrination lessons ideology of Marxism . This served the purpose of the investments that ëere made
by the communist government in terms of increasing interest for research ëhich ëere based in
appreciation of some of the historical figures and events of fading , erasure of historical memory and
extinction of several other personalities historical . Enough historical figures passed through an
ideological filter . Consequently, this course ëas associated ëith long-term effects on processing and
delineation konsenguent , the actual source of history .
First : It eliminated the historical perspectives multiperspektivën of narroëing in a narroë alley ëithout
drithije in historical thinking .
Second : Through mythologization history communist government lost its true mission , the behavior of
neë facts through research and scientific research . It not only him but mitizoi caused absolute losing the
possibility of uncovering the ones ëho through historical light .
Determination of a single street of historical interpretation , use of the pressure and any other ëay to
enforce the idea that he thought the human mind ëas closed and shortsighted . Evil remains not only the
Communist period but remaining trapped in the past ëhere the facts to be revealed today and the story
should be closer to the historical truth .
Në qershor të vitit 2014 u mbushën plot 90 vjet nga koha kur opozita e vitit 1924 e mori pushtetin me
dhunë dhe e mbajti atë për 6 muaj. Produkti ishte një qeveri që qeverisi pa parlament dhe nuk arriti të
legjitimojë pushtetin e marrë me forcë, duke i dhënë fund një tradite sado të shkurtër parlamentare që
po përjetonte Shqipëria në vitet 1921-1923. Një ngjarje e tillë nga Historiografia zyrtare moniste është
përcaktuar si Revolucion demokratiko – borgjez. Por a ishte i tillë apo u desh të ishte i tillë? Sigurisht që
sistemit komunist i duhej të kishte një revolucion dhe i ktheu sytë tek grushti i shtetit që organizoi Noli
me shokë. Mendimi se bëhet fjalë për"revolucion" vazhdon dhe sot, sidomos dhe aty ku studiohet dhe
bëhet historia.
Ngritja e një debati shkencor, që më së shumti ka vite që është fokusuar për ta parë në një këndvështrim
të ri lëvizjen noliste në Shqipëri, është poliedrike ku njëra faqe zbardh tjetrën me fakte dhe interpretime
të ndryshme, por njëherazi të gjitha së bashku hijezojnë mbi njëra - tjetrën duke ricikluar kështu të
92
njëjtën enigmë nëpërmjet të njëjtës pyetje; a ishte Fan Noli revolucionar komunist? A kishte lëvizja e
Qershorit e vitit 1924 përmasat e një Revolucioni apo të një “pronunciamenti ushtarak”.258
Fan Noli dhe komunizmi, relacioni i tij me idetë bolshevike të kohës, simpatitë dhe antipatitë individuale,
raporti i politikës së jashme me praktikën aktuale të shtetit shqiptar, janë probleme mjaft të debatuara
në diplomacinë shqiptare, jo vetëm të kësaj periudhe, por edhe në vitet ’30-të te shek.XX. Që këtej
mendimi shkencor i viteve të fundit, ka krijuar gjithashtu një ngërç historiografik mbi paraqitjen e
lëvizjes noliste të 24-ës, si revolucion demokratiko - borgjez apo grusht shteti. Midis idesë së
revolucionit, supozimit të grushtit të shtetit, prokomunizmit dhe antikomunizmit nolian, është ndërtuar
deri tani ngrehina e një debati disa vjeçar ku janë përfshirë shumë autorë e autoritete, institucione dhe
media nga më të larmishmet.
Një nga këndvështrimet e zbardhjes së kësaj enigme është copëzimi i situatave. Është një kontekst i cili
të imponon analizën e fakteve nga origjina fillestare dhe krijimin e një parabole gjykimi me përfundimin
e tyre. Sipas këtij këndvështrimi duhen analizuar tri kohët politike dhe jo politike të Nolit: para, gjatë
dhe pas zotërimit të pushtetit.
-Etapa e parë, e kësaj kohe lidhet me fillesat e karierës së tij, përpos personalitetit të fuqishëm
intelektual. Noli ishte një kapacitet i tillë i kalibrit europian, diplomuar në Harvard, i cili arrinte që edhe
për kulturat e tjera t’i referoheshin të huajtë. Duke qenë ndërkohë peshkop savant, përkthyes, poet,
kompozitor, historian, publiçist, burrë shteti, ai ka arritur të ridimensionojë Bethovenin dhe të sjellë në
shqip Servantesin. Për mëse një dekadë historia shqiptare do ta shohë Nolin si diplomat, burrë shteti,
përfaqësues të popullit të vet në frontin e përbotshëm antifashist. Bashkohësia noliane është kthyer në
sinonim, të mbështetjes dhe përqafimit të çdo gjëje të re, të dukurive novatore dhe prirjeve progresive
në të mirë të shoqërisë shqiptare259.Vetë anglezët e thërrisnin në takime për t’u folur për Shekspirin.
Bashkëkohësit befasoheshin para kulturës së tij të gjithanshme, Uillsoni është ndalur para tij me respekt,
është pritur nga Musolini dhe është komplimentuar nga shtypi anglez, “si njeri që do të bëhej i shquar
në çdo vend”260. Se mundi në Lidhjen e Kombeve kundërshtarët e tij ballkanas me mjeshtëri dhe
gjithmonë me fytyrë të qeshur ”261.
Në kohën e tij, para qeverisjes, shfaqen elemente të bashkëpunimit me shoqërinë revolucionare të
ndikuar nga bolshevizmi. Sipas Bernard Fisherit, “Përfshirja e tij e parë në veprimtarinë revolucionare u
bë gjatë verës së vitit 1923, kur ra në kontakt me komitetin shqiptar të themeluar në Vjenë prej ishregjentit Aqif Pasha”262.
258
Historia e Popullit Shqiptar, Botim I Akademisw sw Shkencave tw Shqipwrisw, vwll. III, Botimet Toena,
Tiranw: 2007, f. 227.
259
Jorgaqi, N. “Fanoliana” (risi dokumentare, kujtime e studime për F.Noli), Tiranë, Toena.1998, fq.9
260
Puto, A. “Demokracia e rrethuar” (Qeveria e Fan Nolit në marrëdhëniet e jashtme, qershor-dhjetor 1924),
Tiranë. 8 Nëntori,1990, fq.73
261
Jacques, E. “Shqiptarët”, Kartë e Pendë, Tiranë.1995, fq. 441
262
Fisher, J. B. “Mbreti Zog dhe përpjekjet e tij për stabilitet në Shqipëri”, Tiranë, ÇABEJ.1996, fq .76
93
Dhënia e dorëheqjes nga qeveria e Vërlacit e pozicionon kundërshtar të hapur të Zogut. Midis Zogut dhe
Nolit sipas diplomatit amerikan GRANT, “nuk qe vetëm ai i dy personaliteteve rivalë, por në të vërtetë qe
një konflikt mbi bazat themelore ideologjike për qeverisjen e vendit”263.
Koha politike e periudhës së qeverisjes së tij, e cila nis me një konflikt të hapur duke shfrytëzuar vrasjen
dhe varrimin e Avni Rustemit, merr nuanca tipike revolucionare. Dihet që Rustemi ishte anëtar aktiv i
shoqërisë “Bashkimi” dhe mik i Nolit. Emri i tij u përdor si simbol i fillimit të lëvizjes.
Ardhja e Nolit në pushtet
Ajo që pranohet pothuajse nga të gjithë studiuesit, është mënyra e ardhjes në pushtet e Nolit, që duhet
thënë se ishte revolucionare Në jo pak raste ai është cilësuar prej kundërshtarëve të tij “peshkop i
kuq”264. Por duke ju referuar mendimeve të kohëve të fundit Revolucioni që ai bëri nuk rezulton as
revolucion, as demokratik, as borgjez, me përjashtim të fillimit të tij për të cilin u përdorën metodat e
dhunës. Madje, vetë Noli, gjatë një interviste dhënë një gazete greke, e ka quajtur “Më shumë një grusht
shteti politik”, ndërsa në proklamatën e tij si kryeministër në dhjetorin e ’24-ës, e ka quajtur para
popullit “revolucion”. Duhet referenca?
Karakteri demokratik i kësaj lëvizjeje argumentohet me përfshirjen në të, të forcave demokratike dhe
me përmbajtjen demokratike që shfaqte programi i qeverisë së Nolit. Porse në të njëtën kohë
historiografia zyrtare moniste pranonte edhe pjesëmarrjen në të të përfaqësuesve nga shtresa e tjera si:
bejlerë liberalë, borgjezë konservatorë, krerë ushtarakë dhe klerikë.265 Tregues i një fakti të tillë
evidentohet edhe në përbërjen laramane që do të kishte qeveria e Nolit, ndërkohë që programi i
qeverisë së Nolit me të vërtetë shfaqte tipare demokratike porse nuk arriti kurrë të realizohej në asnjë
pikë të tij. Rolin vendimtar në një lëvizje të tillë më së shumti do ta ketë përfshirja e ushtrisë sesa e
popullsisë civile, duke i dhënë karakterin e një lëvizje që fillesat e veta nuk i pati nga poshtë por erdhi
nga lart produkt i ambicjeve politike antizogiste të opozitës politike të vitit 19124të mbështetur nga
forcat ushtarake.
Ka të tillë si, Aurel Plasari që e përafrojnë 24 qershorin edhe me fashizmin duke dhënë disa pika të
përbashkëta midis tyre. Aludohet me simotërzimin e diktaturave shprehur në maximën e Musolinit se
“Nën këmishën e zezë unë mbaj këmishën e kuqe”. Ky mendim ka ardhur si rezultat i disa arsyeve, të
cilat të renditura janë këto më poshtë:
Së pari, evidentohet përkimi kohor me 24 prillin e zgjedhjeve fashiste në Itali ku kishin fituar “lista
qeveritare”, të ashtuquajtura “listone”.
263
Diplomatë Amerikanë për mbretin Zog…..fq 61
264
DDI, Serie 1923-1935,III,nr 222 A.Plasari. Shekulli, 18.12.2005
265
Historia e Popullit Shqiptar, Botim Akademisw sw Shkencave tw RPS sw Shqipwrisw, vwll. III, :8
nwntori”, Tiranw: 1984, f. 287.
94
Së dyti, letërkëmbimi i disa organizatorëve të “revolucionit” me funksionarë të lartë të regjimit fashist
Italian të kohës. Ndër këto letërkëmbime përmendet një mesazh dërguar nga Noli, sipas të cilit, ai
shkruante se tashmë ne: “Nuk na mbetet gjë tjetër veçse të rrokim armët dhe të marshojmë mbi Tiranë,
duke ndjekur shembullin klasik të Duçes suaj të ndritur”266.
Së treti, evidentohet sjellja arrogante e anëtarëve të shoqërisë “Bashkimi” e cila përkonte me
këmishzinjtë e sjelljet e tyre në Itali.
Së katërti, mungesa e parlamentarizmit gjatë qeverisjes shprehej si vullnet i Nolit. Më 13 shtator 1924
në një intervistë dhënë gazetës “ VREMJE” të Beogradit, ai mburrej se, “tani për tani, ne qeverisim pa
parlament, dhe ndihemi më mirë…”. Ndërsa në një tjetër intervistë dhënë gazetës greke SKRIP, mburrej
gjithashtu duke thënë se “ ... e shpërndam parlamentin që të bëjmë disa kursime.” Opinioni i tij për
parlamentin shprehet edhe në diskutimet në Lidhjen e Kombeve më 10 shtator, ku e quante, një
“plagë”, “fatkeqësi të madhe” dhe “bestytni të shëmtuar”267.
Së pesti, edhe vizioni i tij qeverisës të linte përshtypjen e një ëndrre socialiste për ta bërë Shqipërinë, siç
thotë Edëvin Jacques “… një Zvicër të Ballkanit”268.
Politika e jashtme
Në raport me politikën e jashme ai ndeshi në një pengesë të ashpër diplomatike të gërshetuar me
opinione dhe interesa sa shoviniste aq dhe imperialiste, politike dhe ekonomike të cilat ndikuan
fuqimisht në mosnjohjen e qeverisë së tij.
Përçapjet për njohjen e Qeverisë filluan menjëherë pas formimit të saj. Më 17 qershor kryeministri i ri,
Noli, njoftonte kryeministrat e vendeve si: Herriot – Francë, Macdonald – Angli, Musolini – Itali, Pashiç –
Jugosllavi dhe Papanastasiu – Greqi, se Këshilli i lartë i Regjencës e kishte ngarkuar të formonte atë që
Noli quante “qeveria e re liberale”, e cila kishte për qëllim t’i jepte Shqipërisë një administratë moderne
e demokratike.269
Përsa i përket qëndrimit Italian në çështjen e njohjes së qeverisë së vitit 1924, duhet parë
në dy drejtime: Së pari, Roma ishte gati ta njihnte në fillim, por nxitimi i Ministrisë së Jashtme shqiptare,
e cila njoftoi telegrafisht më 22 qershor gjithë përfaqësitë diplomatike të Shqipërisë përjashta se “
Qeveria italiane e njohu zyrtarisht Qeverinë e re shqiptare”.270 Vetë Fan Noli, duke folur me
përfaqësuesin e Italisë për përgjigjen e Musolinit, i dha asaj kuptimin e njohjes së Qeverisë së tij nga ana
e qeverisë italiane.271 Së dyti, është për të vënë në dukje edhe arsyetimi që bëhej për t’iu përgjigjur
266
267
268
269
270
271
DDI, Serie 1923-1935,III,nr 222 A.Plasari. Shekulli, 18.12.2005
DDI, Serie 1923-1935,III,nr 222 A.Plasari. Shekulli, 18.12.2005
Jacques, E. “Shqiptarët”…vep. e cituar, fq. 418
A.Q.SH, F. 251 , v.1924, d.136, 140
A.QSH, F. 251, v. 1924, d.140
Puto, A. “Demokracia e rrethuar” (Qeveria e Fan Nolit në marrëdhëniet e jashtme, qershor-dhjetor 1924),
95
vërejtjeve që vinin nga anë të ndryshme se pengesa kryesore për njohjen e Qeverisë ishte se ajo kishte
ardhur në fuqi “me revolucion” dhe si e tillë nuk mund të njihej. Përmendej grushti i shtetit në Bullgari
një vit më parë (qershor, 1923), që shkaktoi mijëra viktima, ndër ta edhe kryeministrin Stamboliski. 272
Mirëpo dokumentet diplomatike italiane, përveç që nuk lënë shteg për asnjë dyshim në këtë çështje, na
tregojnë qartë edhe shkakun e ngurrimit të qeverisë italiane: ajo nuk donte të vepronte vetëm, “pa
qeveritë aleate”273.
Londra e justifikonte mosnjohjen me faktin e degjilimitetit kushtetues për shkak të mosthirrjes së “një
asambleje kushtetuese dhe shpalljes së amnistisë së përgjithshme”274.
Por thelbi i mosnjohjes nga Londra lidhej me koncensionet e vajgurit. Italia gjithashtu me kontributin e
saj ekonomik dhe diplomatik e kufizonte me këto koncensione.
Edhe SHBA-të mund ta përkrahnin Nolin nëse ky do kishte mundur ta vinte në provë revolucionin e tij në
kutitë e votimit. Por Noli e kuptoi tepër vonë këtë lidhje që kishin zgjedhjet me njohjen.
Parisi nuk e njohu se pak a shumë ndiqte qëndrimin e Beogradit në politikën e tij lidhur me Shqipërinë.
Ndërsa vetë Beogradi bënte një politikë tepër agresive ndaj Nolit edhe për faktin se e konsideronin atë
agjent të italianëve dhe ndërkohë ushqenin iluzionin se Zogu do të ishte në dorën e tyre një vegël e tipit
esatist dhe do të shfrytëzohej për qëllimet e veta shoviniste, veçanërisht për Shën Naumin dhe për
kundërvënien italiane.
Athina e konsideronte qeverisjen e Nolit një anarki të pashembullt në Shqipërinë e jugut bashkë me
dhunën e ushtruar kundër kishave dhe shkollave greke dhe mundohej të përfitonte sa të mundte nga
këto rrethana. Në këto raporte të vështira diplomatike për Nolin u shfaqën dy mbështetës, prijësi i
fshatarësisë kroate, Stjepan Radiç dhe Bashkimi Sovjetik. Të dy lidheshin me kurorën e kuqe të
komunizmit dhe të dy ishin në anën e kundërt të fuqive të mëdha europiane. Radiç sipas Robert Austinit,
në tetor të 24-ës, si pjesë e një sulmi mbi politikën serbe, shpërndau një apel emocional në favor të
Nolit, duke deklaruar se pozita e Shqipërisë në Ballkan ishte fatkeqe që kur Italia, Serbia dhe Greqia
duan ta pushtojnë atë. Qeveria shqiptare, thoshte ai, ishte më përparimtare se ajo e Beogradit dhe se
bën një politikë korrekte dhe kryeministri i saj është një burrë i zgjuar. Ai shpallte se populli kroat nuk do
të luftojë me Shqipërinë dhe se asnjë kroat nuk do të kalonte kufirin shqiptar për të shkelur lirinë e
saj.275
Kjo dekleratë u dënua gjerësisht në Beograd dhe u komentua si tradhëti duke u përdorur edhe si
argument për ta paraqitur Jugosllavinë përballë rrezikut të një komploti bolshevik.
Marrëdhëniet me Bashkimin Sovjetik
Tiranë. 8 Nëntori,1990, fq.19
272
Po aty, fq.19
273
Po aty, fq.19
274
Fisher, J. B, “Mbreti Zog dhe përpjekjet e tij për stabilitet në Shqipëri”, vep. e cituar, fq.77
275
Austin, R. “Shtegu I pa shkelur I Nolit”, Tiranë, Albin , 2000 , fq.200
96
Ndërkohë, marrëdhëniet diplomatike me Bashkimin Sovjetik morën një ecejake jo serioze, të cilat
duhen parë të lidhura ngushtë me fjalimin denoncues të Nolit në Lidhjen e Kombeve dhe refuzimin e
kërkesës së tij për ndihma ekonomike. Madje ky sulm e forcoi mendimin e europianëve se ai ishte një
figurë e rrezikshme dhe i vendosur të prishte paqen në Ballkan. Ky mendim u forcua edhe më tepër
akoma kur u vu re se Noli filloi t’u bënte korte sovjetikëve dhe kjo u etiketua si një rrezik për gjithë
stabilitetin e Ballkanit. Ky rrezik u bë më i dukshëm kur Noli rihapi çështjen e marrëdhënieve shqiptarosovjetike, për të cilën Zogu, si politikan më i rafinuar se Noli, u ishte drejtuar fuqive të mëdha për gjykim
dhe kishte marrë prej tyre përgjigje negative.
Më 4 korrik 1924 Ministri i jashtëm Delvina, i shkruante Komisarit sovjetik për punët e jashtme se
Shqipëria ishte e gatshme të vendoste marrdhënie diplomatike. Ndërsa në Romë, vetë Noli në një takim
me Juranevin, bie dakord që së shpejti në Tiranë të emërohej një përfaqësi diplomatike italiane. Kjo u
komentua shumë nga shtypi dhe Jugosllavia u hodh në fushatë sulmesh. Sipas Suajerit,“Jugosllavia e
përgatiti botën për turbullirat e ardhshme, duke njoftuar për veprimtari të agjentëve sovjetikë në
Shqipëri dhe më 26 nëntor tërhoqi vëmendjen e fuqive të mëdha mbi faktin që një përfaqësues rus,
Krakovjecki po dërgohej në Tiranë. Duke vendosur marrëdhënie me Rusinë, imzot Noli thjesht kishte
ndjekur shembullin e Britanisë së Madhe dhe ky hap ishte ndërmarrë, kur qeveria e Makdonaldit ishte
në pushtet…”276 Ai u akuzua për bashkëpunim me udhëheqjen e Komitetit të Kosovës dhe organizatat
revolucionare maqedonase. Shtetet e Evropës Perëndimore e etiketuan qeverinë e tij “një qendër
bolshevike në mes të Ballkanit”277.
Përballë këtij presioni Noli tenton të spostojë në kohë ardhjen e përfaqësisë sovjetike në Tiranë. Më 10
dhjetor ai njofton legatën në Romë se ndërkohë që Shqipëria kishte njohur Rusinë Sovjetike, për shkak
të fushatës elektorale, ishte e domosdoshme të shtyhej shkëmbimi i përfaqësive diplomatike, me qëllim
që të shmangnin vënien e një arme në dorë të reaksionarëve dhe partive kundërshtare. Por, në mënyrë
paradoksale, në kohën kur Ministria e Jashme po bënte çmos ta shtynte çështjen deri mbas zgjedhjeve,
konsulli Nush Bushati në Vjenë jep vizat për legatën sovjetike. Më 16 dhjetor delegacioni sovjetik
mbërriti në Tiranë. Dy ditë më vonë i kërkohet të largohet përsëri nga Tirana për shkak të situatës.
Pikërisht për këtë situatë, Gjergj Dimitrovi do të shkruante në korrik të vitit 1925 se “ardhja e Zogut
privoi lëvizjen revolucionare në Ballkan nga njërën prej bazave të saj”278.
Noli kishte simpati të hapur për Bashkimin Sovjetik, si mbrojtës të kombeve të vegjël, sidomos mbas
denoncimit prej tij të traktateve të kohës së luftës. Por, nga ana tjetër, nevojat ekonomike të vendit e
kryqëzuan atë midis Lidhjes së Kombeve dhe Bashkimit Sovjetik.
“I gjendur përballë armiqësisë që vinte nga çdo anë, thotë Austini, Noli bëri një përpjekje të fundit për
të mbijetuar nëpërmjet Bashkimit Sovjetik”279
276
277
278
fq.557
279
Swire,J. “Shqipëria, Ngritja e një Mbretërie”,Tiranë, Dituria, 2005 fq. 352
Duka, V. “Historia e Shqipërisë” ,(1912-2000) Sh.B.L.U, 2007, fq. 153
Akademia e Shkencave e Republikës së Shqipërisë, “Histori e Popullit Shqiptar”,vëll. III, Tiranë 2002,
Austin, R “Shtegu I pashkelur I Fan Nolit”, Tiranë, Albin , 2000, fq. 216
97
Koha e tretë është jo politike dhe lidhet me pas karierën e tij. Mbas arratisjes së tij nga vendi, KONARE,
iu dha mbështetje mjaft elementëve të emigracionit politik nolian. Një rast i tillë ishte akordimi i
bursave anëtarëve të shoqërisë “Bashkimi” siç ishte Naum Grigor Doko, i cili arriti të të bëhej Rektor i
Universitetit të Tbilisit në Gjeorgji.
Një element tjetër i ngjyrimit të tij revolucionar të shprehur gjatë kësaj kohe, ishte edhe këndvështrimi
studimor mbi figurën e Bethovenit. Në punimin e tij “Bethoveni dhe revolucioni francez”, kapitullin më
të rëndësishëm të tij ai e titullon “Bethoveni rrebel”, ku sipas përcaktimit të një kritiku miqësor, Noli
shfaqej “idhtar i demokracisë dhe revolucionit.”
Të tillë perceptime ka ai edhe në krijimtarinë e tij poetike si; “Krishti me kamzhik”, “Anës lumenjve”, etj.
Duhet thënë se në Shqipëri historia e mësuar deri tani dhe e verteta e ngjarjeve historike nuk kanë
shkuar sinkron me njëra tjetrën. Por, tradita historike e përcaktuar më së shumti nga vullneti politik pas
viteve ’90 ka filluar të zbehet. Janë bërë përpjekje për të krijuar një model të ri të shikimit të historisë, si
një kompleks ngjarjesh të bazuar në dokumente, të dhëna, dëshmi dhe burime të tjera të referueshme.
Me burimet e reja që erdhën nga hapësira e arkivave të huaja, kryesisht të vendeve që kanë pasur rol
qëndror në zhvillimet politike shqiptare të shekullit të kaluar, panorama e studimeve dhe fakteve është
bërë më e larmishme dhe më konkurruese. Por se institucionet akademike zyrtare shtetërore për
problemin e sipërtrajtuar akoma nuk kanë arritur të prodhojnë botime zyrtare të historisë, të cilat, me
gjithë risitë në burime, në trajtimin e pavarur dhe professional të studiuesve vendas dhe të huaj ende
nuk kanë fituar statutin e dokumenteve të gjithëpranuara.
Pikërisht në analizën që I kemi bërë disa botimeve të historisë së Shqipërisë të Akademisë së Shkencave
të Shqipërisë ndër vite, duhet thënë se analiza e lëvizjes noliste të qershorit vijon të jetë në kontrast të
plotë midis vlerësimit si revolucion progresist dhe praktikave jolegale të dhunës për pushtet, duke cuar
në keqpërdorimin edhe të nocioneve demokratike.
Kur bëjmë një pohim të tillë I referohemi dy botimeve ta Akademisë së Shkencave, i pari I vitit 1965 dhe i
dyti i vitit 1985. Në të dy këto botime lëvizja noliste përcaktohet si revolucion demokratiko-borgjez. Për
më tepër botimi I vitit 1985 më së shumti konsiderohet si një ribotim I atij të vitit 1965 pothuajse pa
asnjë ndryshim në parashtrimin dhe interpretimin e kësaj ngjarjeje.280
Por ajo që të bën më shumë përshtypje lidhet me faktin se edhe në botimin më të fundit të vitit 2007 që
konsiderohet si botim zyrtar i Historisë së Shqipërisë, nuk evidentohen elementë të refleksionit historic
rreth kësaj ngjarjeje. Në kreun e VIII të këtij botimi jepet përcaktimi i vjetër I lëvizjes noliste si
“Revolucioni I Qershorit I vitit 19124” duke e krahasuar atë me lëvizjet më përparimtare që kishin
përfshirë vendet e kontinentit evropian në shek. XIX.281 Po në këtë botim, lëvizja noliste përcaktohet si
edhe më parë me karakter demokratik antifeudal,282 duke marrë si kriter në vlerësimin e një ngjarje
280
281
213.
282
Botimi i vitit 1965 (f. 541) dhe botimin e vitit 1985(f. 284)
Akademia e Shkencave e Republikës së Shqipërisë, “Histori e Popullit Shqiptar”,vëll. III, Tiranë 2007, f.
Po aty, f. 227.
98
historike jo produktin që ajo solli por vetëm qëllimin e saj mbështetur më së shumti në idealizmin
nolian. Në të njëtën kohë në këtë botim kundërshtohet kategorikisht debati shkencor për një ngjarje të
tillë, që duhet thënë se parimisht është i paparanueshëm për vetë qëllimin themelor që mbart shkenca
e historisë, duke kufizuar multiperspektivën e vetë historisë. Ja cfare thuhet për këtë problem në
botimin e Akademisë së shkencave: “ Edhe në historiografinë e sotme bëhen herë pas herë përpjekje për
të mohuar karakterin demokratik të revolucionit, për ta paraqitur kryengritjen e qershorit si një “puç
ushtarak”. Pohime të tilla janë subjective dhe bien ndesh me zhvillimin e ngjarjeve politike të asaj
periudhe”283. Duhet thënë se këto konstatime të padëshirueshme sjellin efekte negative në procesin e të
mësuarit të historisë duke e zhveshur atë nga esenca e saj, një histori pa kundërshti nuk ka vend në një
shoqëri demokratike.
Ndërkaq, e një rëndësie fondamentale mbetet sot studimi dhe mësimi I historisë në shkollë që synon
krijimin e një sistemi të qëndrueshëm njohurish, vlerash e aftësish. Tekstet shkollore duhen rishikuar
vazhdimisht, duhen saktësuar dhe duhen “objektivizuar”. E vë në thonjëza “objektivizim” sepse nuk
duhet të përjashtojnë vlerësimet subjektive, por përkundrazi duhen paraqitur të gjitha, ato që janë
realizuar por madje edhe teorikisht të mundshme. Rishikimi i teksteve të historisë, janë kushti i
përvetësimit të një historiografie siç kërkohet, sepse vetë historia është një debat për të shkuarën por
nuk është e shkuara vetë.284
Më konkretisht në studimin dhe analizën bërë disa prej teksteve mësimore historisë së Shqipërisë që
përdoren në sistemin 9-vjeçar dhe që pasqyrojnë lëvizjen noliste të qershorit 1924 konstatohen disa
problematika. Si object studimi kemi marrë dy tekste të historisë së klasës IX, I shtëpive botuese Albas
dhe Filara
Së pari, theksojmë se ndryshe nga përcaktimi I bërë nga Akademia e Shkencave për revolucionin e
qershorit 1924, në
këto tekste evidentohet një evoluim i dukshëm në emërtimin e kësaj ngjarje duke e quajtur jo revolucion
por duke e përcaktuar si një lëvizje e armatosur e organizuar nga opozita e vitit 1924: “lëvizja e qershorit
e vitit 1912”. Ndërkaq, në trajtimin e pasqyrimit të ngjarjeve në çështjet përkatëse, shpërthimi i kësaj
lëvizjeje(kryengritje) paraqitet e motivuar për shkak të pakënaqësive ekonomike të popullsisë dhe
pakënaqësive politike të opozitës së kohës në prag të shpërthimit të saj. 285 Në trajtimin e çështjes së
shpërthimit të kryengritjes në botim evidentohet gjithashtu roli dhe pesha që pati ushtria dhe
regjimentet ushtarake në veri dhe në jug të Shqiperisë në shpërthimin e kryengritjes, duke e konsideruar
një veprim të tilë si produkt i ambicjes politke të opozitës së vitit 1924. Ndërkaq nuk ishte e vështirë në
situatën e krijuar në vititn 1924 të gjeje edhe mbështetjen e një pjese të popullsisë së pakënaqur që më
pas u bashkua me regjimentet ushtarake.
283
Akademia e Shkencave e Republikës së Shqipërisë, “Histori e Popullit Shqiptar”,vëll. III, Tiranë 2007, f.
227.
284
Rreth debatit pwr rishikimin e historisw nw tekstet shkollore, artikull botuar nga Fatmiroshe Xhemalaj,
prill 2013.
285
Historia 9, Albas 2009- 2010-2011, f. 85.
99
Së dyti, duhet thënë se në këto tekste pasi jepet ardhja ilegalisht në pushtet e Nolit, pasqyrohet shpallja
e një programi reformash me karakter domokratik dhe krijimi i qeverisë demokratike por, pa theksuar
përbërjen heterogjene të saj në 6 muajt e qeverisjes, përbërje që do të konsiderohet si faktor kryesor
që çoi në dështimin e zbatimit të reformave qeveritare. Përbërja heterogjene e qeverisë së Nolit nuk
ishte shprehje e pakënaqësive ndaj situatës ekonomike por më së shumti ishte shprehje e karakterit
antizogist të forcave politike që përbënin opozitën e kësaj kohe. Me marrjen e pushtetit divergjencat
midis krerëve të opozitës ishin mëse evidente.
Së treti, në përmbajtjen e materialit historik në këto tekste përsa i përket lëvizjes noliste, nuk
pasqyrohet qoftë dhe përmes parashtrimit të disa koncepteve bazë se në çfarë lloj lëvizjeje mund të
klasifikohet dhe mund të krahasohet lëvizja noliste që përbën dhe thelbin e çështjes. Për më tepër nuk
ka asnjë informacion përsa i përket parashtrimit të versionit të historiografisë para viteve ’90 dhe pas
saj, nuk parashtrohen hipotezat e reja të studiuesve të huaj dhe vendas duke e zhveshur të mësuarit e
kësaj ngjarje nga diskutimet dhe debati konstruktiv. Mendojmë se përmes parashtrimit të mendimeve
dhe tezave bashkëkohore do të synohej të mësuarit kritik të historisë duke hequr dorë nga pranimi dhe
mësimi mekanik. Mendojmë se një detyrë e tillë mbetet në shpatullat e mësuesit të historisë, formimit
të tij shkencor profesional, informimit të vazhdueshëm me materialet dhe burimet e reja historike.
Bibliografi
A.Q.SH, F. 251 , v.1924, d.136, 140
Sëire, Joseph. “Shqipëria:Ngritja e një Mbretërie”, Tiranë, Dituria,2005
Fischer, Jurgen.Bernd. “Mbreti Zog dhe përpjekja për stabilitet në Shqipëri”, Tiranë,Çabej 1996
Histori e Popullit Shqiptar, Akademia e Shkencave e Republikës së Shqipërisë, Toena 2002
Jacques, Edëin, “Shqiptarët”,Tiranë, Kartë e Pendë, 1995
Austin, Robert. “Shtegu i pashkelur i Fan Nolit”, Tiranë, Albin,2000
Jorgaqi, Nasho. “Fanoliana” (risi dokumentare, kujtime e studime për F.Noli)”, Tiranë, Toena.1998
DDI, Serie 1923-1935,III,nr 222 A.Plasari. Shekulli, 18.12.2005
Puto, Arben. “Demokracia e rrethuar” (Qeveria e Fan Nolit në marrëdhëniet e jashtme, qershor-dhjetor
1924), Tiranë. 8 Nëntori,1990.
Duka,
Valentina.
“Historia
e
Shqipërisë”
,(1912-2000)
Sh.B.L.U,
2007
100
Constructing the myth of the national leader
over the centuries
Denis Vuka
Following the linear historical narrative established during the communist regime, the Albanian
people, descendants of the “Illyrians”, who during the late Middle Ages were called “Arber” and resisted
the Ottoman Empire, were once again found on the eve of 20th century struggling for independence.
These noteworthy historical periods will culminate in the memorable National Liberation War during the
WWII when the Albanians, guided by the ideal of freedom, fought against the invaders, sacrificed their
lives and as a result succeeded in liberating their “fatherland”.
In such a way, the nation became the driving force of the society that managed to unify the people
around a common aim. That supreme collective goal was to be transformed into the myth of the
permanent national struggle (Malcolm 2002) successively supplemented by another even stronger, that
of the enlightened leadership. The cultivation of the myth of the leader, as the only competent figure to
guide the nation through its own destiny is a common path that reached often exaggeration
proportions. In the aforementioned nation’s “golden ages” the narrative draws recurrently attention to
the close tie between the people and the leader, while emphasizing the cohesive and unification values
that derive from the latter.
This article focuses in the core of the leader’s myth over the centuries by analyzing the way it is
depicted through the images in schoolbooks. It will be primarily used a comparative and visual analysis
in my approach. Considering the collective aspects in the mythmaking procedure (Schopflin 2002) and
the “national/-ist communist ideology” implemented by the Party of Labor of Albania, I will try to
discern its function and purposiveness within such a framework. At the same time, the consistent set of
beliefs that this myth represents is also to be identified, as well its features and usefulness in
consolidating and stabilizing the Albanian society from the very first years of communist domination
until the post-communist era.
101