– (May 29, 2013. “Viva la revolucion,” http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/ , lexis nexis)//SDL
THE death of Hugo Chavez, who dominated
Venezuela's political scene during his 14 years as the country's president and reshaped its economy
under the banner of "Bolivarian socialist revolution", heralds a new and uncertain era for the Opec-member's oil industry.
¶ The direction the industry takes will, to a large extent, depend on who emerges as the country's next leader. Chavez's vice president and anointed successor, Nicolos Maduro, has assumed the presidency and will take on leading opposi-tion candidate Henrique Capriles in a special election due on 14 April.
¶
The ruling
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) wasted no time announcing Maduro, a former union leader who was promoted by Chavez up the government's ranks, as its candidate. The party was keen to tamp down growing talk that an internal power struggle was threatening to split the party. Maduro reportedly faced a challenge for leadership of the party from the head of the National
Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, who has broad support within the military. Public-ly, the PSUV has lined up behind Maduro. ¶ Capriles successfully rallied Venezuela's fractured opposition behind his candidacy last year, winning a primary cam-paign that gave the opposition its best chance of returning to power in years. In the end, he was handily defeated at the polls by an ailing Chavez. Many in the opposition were disappointed with the campaign. Some said he was not force-ful enough in pushing back against Chavez's attacks. Those on the right wing of the opposition blamed Capriles for offering the electorate little more than a set of "Chavez-lite" policies. Capriles himself has pointed to the policies put in place by Brazil's centre-left Worker's Party as a model for Venezuela. He has also pointed to state-run Petrobras as a model for state oil company PdV, though he has said he would not part-privatise PdV in the same way shares in Petrobras were sold to be traded on international markets.
¶ With the short election cycle, Capriles is the opposition's best chance. Maduro, though, is widely expected to ride a wave of sympathy over the loss of Chavez to victory. Two polls released in February and March showed him with at least a 10-point advantage.
¶
Venezuela's next leader will inherit an economy sliding towards a crisis. Chavez ramped up social spending
last year to boost his election effort, and put the economy on
an unsustainable footing in the process
.
Inflation
recently hit
22.6% and economists expect it to climb
further still.
The country's fiscal deficit is also growing
.
According to Morgan Stan-ley, in 2011, the fiscal deficit was 7.7% of GDP. As of press time, it had risen to 12%.
Foreign reserves are running low too
. The central bank said reserves stood at $29.9 billion at the end of 2012. At the end of 2008,
Venezuela's foreign reserves totalled $43 billion.
On top of this, the country has experienced shortages of basic goods.
In a recent report, Bank of America Merrill Lynch said the government would need an oil price of nearly $200 a barrel to balance the budget.
¶
This provides ample impetus for any new leader to try to increase oil output as quickly as possible
. Production fell from around 3.2 million barrels a day (b/d) when Chavez took office in 1999 to around 2.5 million b/d now, according to the International Energy Agency. The government disputes that figure, and Opec puts production at 2.75 million b/d. Either way, production has suffered in recent years.
¶ But, as the IEA has pointed out,
Maduro
"" or Capriles, for that matter "" will face a sharp dilemma when it comes to dealing with problems in the country's economy and oil sector.
¶
"Venezuela's next leader faces a Catch-22 situation: current oil policies
, namely, the diversion of oil revenues to fund costly social programmes, cannot continue without putting the oil industry - and the country's entire economy - at considerable risk
," the International Energy Agency (IEA) said in its March oil market report. "But neither can they be reversed without the risk of social unrest and political chaos."
(David R. Mares, Institute of the Americas Chair for InterAmerican Affairs,
University of California, San Diego. “The United States-Venezuela Relationship,” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf)//SDL
Geographic proximity of the US and limited demand in neighboring countries makes the US market the logical destination for Venezuelan crude and refined products
(heating oil, residual fuel oil, specialty lubricants, and gasoline if one distinguishes CITGO’s production).
As Venezuelan reserves of light crude diminished and heavy and extra heavy oil became an important feature of its supplies,
US refineries adjusted to process it, linking Venezuela more tightly to the US market
. As the world moves towards more heavy oil use,

however, the attraction of Venezuelan oil in other markets will broaden, politics aside.
¶
US government has restricted oil imports in the past
(via tariffs 1932-35 and import controls 1959-1970) and Venezuela has suffered along with other exporters to the US.
Today, the oil trade is down.
Venezuelan exports have declined as a result of government policies that dissuade investment in exploration and production
, limit foreign participation and undermine PDVSA’s (the national oil company) ability to be an effective oil company. In addition, Chávez’ intends to diversify the markets for Venezuelan crude, especially to China. Nevertheless, the asymmetry of the relationship continues, with just under half of Venezuelan crude exports going to the US market, but Venezuelan supplies accounting for only 8% of US imports.
(Michael Shifter, Vice President for Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue, “Why
Venezuela Matters,” http://nationalinterest.org/article/why-venezuela-matters-
2388?page=1)//SDL
Such conjecture should in and of itself be enough to warrant the highest level of U.S. attention and concern. In this regard, American indifference has been especially surprising. To be sure, it is not clear what options and instruments the U.S. government has available to become
more constructively and vigorously engaged in shaping the situation in Venezuela. U.S. leverage is limited. The bilateral relationship, mainly centered on oil, has long been mutually
beneficial. Still, the United States could, and should, call on high-level political resources, first
to consult widely and systematically with other Latin American partners, and then to increase pressure on both sides in Venezuela to insure that the referendum is held and all guarantees
are provided. The referendum is the best way to resolve the crisis. It is not, however, selfexecuting, and it is only a first step in a long process. To move towards reconciliation, long-term,
external support, strongly backed by the United States, will be critical. High-level public concern about any violations of press freedom in Venezuela should also be a top U.S. government priority.
¶
It is tempting to step back and let the Venezuelan crisis play out, hoping for a peaceful outcome. Yet, such an approach is myopic, based on wishful thinking, and fails to take into account the fundamental nature of the crisis, the deep wounds that divide the
country. The problems are unlikely to take care of themselves. Already, the United States has
paid a heavy price for such a mindset. The missteps committed in reaction to the April 2002 coup (for which U.S. officials expressed tacit approval) -- and again in response to the general strike in late 2002 (in which the U.S. appeared to explicitly side with opposition forces) -- are a product of inadequate attention from Washington. Having been burned in trying to respond to such critical moments in the Venezuelan drama, the United States has been even less inclined
to take risks, and has been consigned to the sidelines.
¶
How the Venezuelan crisis will turn out is anyone's guess. Though the United States is right to hope for a peaceful, democratic outcome, it is hardly prepared to deal with a plausible, though less desirable result-a
Venezuela that continues to deteriorate, and that poses a serious problem for the region and the United States, for years to come.
(Robert Noriega, Senior US State Department Official. “Latin America is Crucial to US Competitiveness,” http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-uscompetitiveness/)//SDL

A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security.
However, the US economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with
China’s influence growing.
¶
The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.
¶
The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership.
¶
Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration
¶
An aggressive trade promotion and foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives.
¶
Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall.
Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty.
Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent
, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business.
¶
Already the
Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil, one-third of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies. Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.
¶
The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities.
(Assistant Administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International
Development in the George W. Bush administration, Associate with Vision Americas. November
12, 2012, “U.S. economic recovery could come from Latin America,” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/9/us-economic-recovery-could-come-fromlatin-america/?page=all)//SDL
One hopes President Obama will similarly come to recognize the abounding economic opportunities in our own neighborhood to help jump-start the U.S. economy and create more jobs here at home. Looking beyond the noise and radicalism of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and his populist ilk, a number of important countries have enjoyed a recent history of exemplary political and economic management that has enabled their economies not only to weather the international economic downturn, but to thrive.
¶
Indeed, as the roots of democracy and the rule of law continue to take hold, countries
such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies , liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment and becoming more competitive overall.
¶
The numbers tell the story. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty.
Moreover, between 2003 and 2010, the average Latin
American income increased by more than 30 percent,
meaning that today, nearly one-third of the region
’s population of nearly 570 million is considered middle class
. In just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third.
¶
This is good news for U.S. business . It

means millions of new consumers with an ingrained affinity for U.S. goods and services
.
¶
Mr.
Obama recognized the linkage between exports and more jobs at home when he launched his National Export Initiative in 2010 with the goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2014. After some early enthusiasm, however, interest in the issue has waned.
¶ With the election over, there is no reason why the White House cannot embrace the opportunities to our south and be a better partner to neighbors who share our values and to whom we are bound by close historical, cultural, familial and geographic ties.
¶ A strategic economic pivot to Latin America could involve three immediate actions: ¶ 1. Mr. Obama should initiate negotiations to integrate the 11 existing free-trade agreements the
United States has with countries in our hemisphere. Harmonizing those pacts and bringing about uniformity in standards and treatment of goods — while eliminating barriers between those countries themselves — will increase efficiencies, propel intrahemispheric trade and create more opportunities for U.S. businesses.
¶ 2. The administration should expand Latin American participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an initiative to promote stronger economic ties between the Western Hemisphere and the Asia Pacific region, beyond Peru, Chile and Mexico. Doing so would mean better integration, better efficiencies and better opportunities for trade and investment.
¶ 3. The White House needs to engage Brazil more aggressively. With a population of about
200 million consumers and a $2.5 trillion economy (the world’s sixth-largest), Brazil is an emerging global player. It is in both countries’ interests to deepen the partnership in the areas of trade, security and energy. Granted, past attempts to broaden trade have foundered on our own market barriers to agricultural products, but that is even more reason for more strenuous engagement and negotiation to resolve disputes.
¶ Much as China used the 2008 Beijing Olympics to unveil its economic progress and modernity,
Brazil will be the focus of global attention in 2014 and 2016 as it plays host to the World Cup and Olympics, respectively. It also can herald a new U.S.-Brazil relationship.
¶
Latin America has changed markedly in recent years. The Western
Hemisphere is now home to some of the most dynamic markets in the world. The question is no longer what the United States can do for the region, but what we can do together to benefit all the peoples of the hemisphere and boost our own recovery and competitiveness
.
¶
Greater economic integration also will create momentum to deal with other challenges in the region, from security issues to modernizing immigration policy — not to mention rendering obsolete once and for all the retrograde, populist agendas of some who prefer looking to the past rather than the future.
¶
The incentives are powerful for a fundamental reassessment of relations in our own hemisphere. The Obama administration needs to recognize the potential opportunities and mutual benefits sitting right on our doorstep.
(Julie, AP White House Correspondent, The Washington Times, Obama’s economic agenda:
Boost U.S. competitiveness, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/22/obamas-economicagenda-boost-us-competitiveness/?page=all)
Under pressure to energize the economy, President Barack Obama will put job creation and American competitiveness at the center of his State of the Union address, promoting spending on education and research while pledging to trim the nation’s soaring debt.
¶
Obama hopes this framework will woo Republicans as he searches for success in a divided Congress and will sway a wary private sector to hire and spend money it’s held back.
The economy is on firmer footing than when he took office two years ago, and his emphasis on competitiveness signals a shift from policies geared toward short-term stabilization to ones with steady and long-term growth in mind
.
¶
Obama will speak to a Congress shaken by the attempted assassination of one of their own
. Democratic Rep. Gabrielle
Giffords was shot in the head two weeks ago during an event in her district in Tucson, Ariz.
¶ The president has appealed for more civility in politics, and in a nod to that ideal, some Democrats and Republicans will break with tradition and sit alongside each other in the House chamber Tuesday night during a joint session of Congress.
¶
White House aides have not said much about the specific proposals the president will outline. Obama has offered hints, however.
¶ In a recent speech in North Carolina, Obama said making the U.S. more competitive means being willing to invest in a more educated work force, commit more to research and technology, and improve everything from roads and airports to high-speed Internet.
¶
“
Those are the seeds of economic growth in the 21st century. Where they are planted, the most jobs and businesses will take root
,”
Obama said.
¶ The state of the economy will greatly influence Obama’s re-election prospects in 2012, and White House spokesman
Robert Gibbs said the president will devote most of his nationally televised address to his vision for extending the economic recovery.
ROYAL 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense

[Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and
Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict
.
Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels.
Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next
.
As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power
(see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation
(Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power
(Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline
, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources
, the likelihood for conflict increases
, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources
. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level
. Mom berg and
Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict
, particularly during periods of economic downturn
. They write.
The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing
.
Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour
.
Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other
(Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9>
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism
(Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004
). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions
. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government
. "
Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect
. Wang (1996), DcRoucn
(1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises
, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict
al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

John Griffin, Harvard editorial writer (April 3, 2013. http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//SDL
Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable
. With the world’s largest oil reserves,
countless other valuable resources, and
stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists,
Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically
. Even now,
America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement
with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation
: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company
.

(Jared Metzker, Associated Press Staff Writer for Inter Press Service, News
Agency. “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuelarelations/)//SDL
WASHINGTON, Jun 17 2013 (IPS) -
A shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela may be pending as a bilateral rapprochement suddenly appears more possible
than it has in years.
¶ On the sidelines of talks held earlier this month in Guatemala by the Organisation of American States (OAS),
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua, with Kerry’s subsequent statements indicating that relations could be heading in a friendlier direction.
¶ “
We agreed
today – both of us, Venezuela and the United States – that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that,
” Kerry said following the meeting with Jaua, which was reportedly requested by the Venezuelans.
¶
The meeting happened on the heels of the release of Timothy
Tracy, a U.S. filmmaker whom Venezuela had been holding on accusations of espionage. His release was interpreted by many as an
“olive branch” being offered by the new Venezuelan government of Nicholas Maduro, whose presidency Washington still has not formally recognised.
¶
Only months ago, before the death of Venezuela’s long-time socialist leader Hugo Chavez, any normalisation of relations between Venezuela and the United States seemed highly unlikely.
¶ In 2002, Chavez was briefly removed from power by a military coup d’état that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had known was imminent. Chavez immediately accused the
United States of having played a part in the event. After his suspicions were confirmed partly valid, his rhetoric grew more scathing.
¶
In 2006, he famously told the United Nations General Assembly that then-U.S. President George W. Bush was “the devil himself”.
¶
Following Chavez’s death from cancer in March
, however, his hand-picked successor,
Maduro, the former vice-president, has not been as vitriolic in his posturing vis-à-vis the United States.
¶ According to
Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”.
¶
“Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one,” Shifter told IPS.
¶ ¶ The new president’s waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes.
¶
In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former political base.
¶ Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given to Diosdado
Cabello, currently head of Venezuela’s parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency.
¶
Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to “emulate” his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable.
¶ Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation.
¶ Oil economy ¶
Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports . Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world.
¶
Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States
, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela.
¶
Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues
and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies.
¶
While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company.
¶
The same critics also point to

increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure.
¶
In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from
Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites.
¶ “
The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating,
” explained Shifter. “
They know they need foreign investment to increase production , and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.”
¶
If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United State s, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry’s recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms .
¶ “Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time,”
Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute
, a Washington think tank, told IPS, “and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests.” ¶ Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counternarcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.
(Dr. Ronn Pineo, Senior Research Fellow at COHA, Chair of the
Department of History at Towson University. Laura Powell, COHA Research Associate. “The
Promise Of New Beginning: A Thaw In US-Venezuelan Relations – Analysis,” http://www.eurasiareview.com/13062013-the-promise-of-new-beginning-a-thaw-in-usvenezuelan-relations-analysis/)//SDL
The announcement that Venezuelan Foreign Minister
Elías Jaua met with U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry on June 5 is extraordinarily good news
.
The meeting
, held in the colonial city of Antigua,
Guatemala, came as representatives gathered for the General Meeting of the Organization of American States. Warm smiles and friendly conversation were everywhere. It marks the “start of a good relationship of respect
,” offered Jaua, and a step toward creating “a more constructive and positive relationship
,” echoed Kerry.
¶ What makes this diplomatic initiative so encouraging is that until this development United States relations with
President Hugo
Chávez’s (and now Nicolás Maduro’s)
Venezuela too often seemed only to feature irate political blasts from both sides. As Chávez moved Venezuela to the left he alienated many in the country’s middle class who had originally supported him and deepened the hatred of the nation’s élites, people who had bitterly mistrusted him from the start. These groups had the ear of the George W. Bush administration, which increasingly hardened its opposition to the Chávez regime. Chávez seemed to delight in enflaming the situation, comparing Bush to the devil or a donkey, and demonizing the United States as a “terrorist state.” ¶
Relations deteriorated as debates grew more fierce
and political tensions more unbridgeable. The
United States funneled significant funding to the Venezuelan opposition to Chávez through the National Endowment for Democracy.
When the coup attempt came in April 2002, the United States Ambassador Charles Samuel Shapiro met with the coup’s front man,
Pedro Carmona, providing, in effective, de facto recognition of the coup government. In explaining the U.S. stance on the takeover, one Bush White House briefer challenged the notion that a fair democratic context could ever exist under Chávez, lecturing reporters that democracy means more than “just getting more votes than the other guy,” an odd argument for a Bush administration official to push.
¶
The OAS, meeting in San José, Costa Rica, issued a declaration condemning the coup. The United
States refused to join the collective statement. When the Carmona coup fell apart after 72 hours, the United States was left looking ridiculous and dangerously retrograde: isolated diplomatically and determined to turn back the clock to the bad old days of uncritical
U.S. support for military coups. Diplomatic relations broke down between the nations, with ambassadors and each other’s officials recalled.
¶ With the start of his administration in 2009, President Barack Obama had several chances to make a fresh start and mend relations. He met with Chávez in Port of Spain, Trinidad in April that year at the Summit of the Americas, calling for “a new chapter” in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. But after the meeting Obama seemed to lose any interest in closer ties, and never showed any real enthusiasm for Latin American issues. Obama appeared to be content to allow inertia to guide U.S. policy for the region. And so the
Bush-era policies toward Venezuela rolled on, directionless, unexplored, and unreformed. Even today the two nations have no ambassador-level diplomatic representation.
¶
Given this troubled past, the potential return to diplomatic normalcy is very good news indeed. Despite everything, there remains a good foundation for relations for the two nations to

build upon. Trade ties remain strong. Nearly half of Venezuela’s export trade and a third of import trade is with the United States. Venezuela is the 14th largest trading partner of the
United States and the fourth largest supplier of imported oil.
¶ President
Obama’s most recent hours could be the finest in his policy for the region. It is time for the United States to return to following its best instincts
, such as the deeply humane vision that at least initially underlay the Alliance for Progress.
President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry have taken an important first step toward the promotion of regional harmony which holds the promise of helping lift Washington back to the high esteem it once had in the region. Venezuela, through the creation of
ALBA and other foreign policy initiatives, has now taken the lead in placing poverty reduction and regional economic development at the forefront of the inter-American agenda.
The United States should move swiftly to restore diplomatic relations with Venezuela, to join the other American states in recognizing the victory of
Nicolás Maduro in the April 14 election
, and then join with Venezuela on advancing the goals of poverty reduction and economic development in the hemisphere.
There is much to do. At long last
, perhaps, there is a beginning.
John Griffin, Harvard editorial writer (April 3, 2013. http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//SDL
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the
entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative
trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations,
all nations involved would benefit from such agreements.
(Patrick Duddy, US ambassador to Venezuela and senior lecturer at
Duke University. Frank O. Mora, director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida
International University, and former deputy assistant secretary of Defense, Western
Hemisphere. “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?” http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html)//SDL
Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region
. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region
. Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with
China and the presence of European companies and investors.
¶ While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.
¶ An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.
¶ From 2006-2011
U.S. non-government organizations
, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four.
Remittances to Latin America
and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion
in 2012.
Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.
¶ Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture,values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify.
Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of

Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists.
¶
Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations
with the hemisphere to
the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not.
We have real and proliferating interests in the region.
As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region.
¶ We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We don’t need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to them would be appropriate.
The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.
John Griffin, Harvard editorial writer (April 3, 2013. http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//SDL
Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building
American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America
.
Chávez
(along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the
United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies.
In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics—by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler.
This weakens the United
States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s
.
If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist
, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin
America.
(Lisa Torres Alvarado, former diplomat in the Mission of Venezuela to the
Organization of American States. May 13, 2013. “The U.S. Must Re-evaluate its Foreign Policy in
Latin America,” http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/latin-america/1457)//SDL
Although there has been a decline in U.S. influence in the region, its presence is still there. In
Venezuela, for example, U.S. oil companies have seen their actions limited, yet they still
operate there. The United States is Venezuela’s top commercial partner, as Venezuela supplies
12 percent of U.S. oil imports.
¶
Relations between the United States and Latin America have
experienced cyclical ups and downs. Geographically, the United States and Latin America are linked and have a natural shared market, so there will always be a relationship of one sort or
another. The United States will continue to seek to exert its influence over the region, whether through future plans for the placement of military bases or the promotion of bilateral trade agreements.
¶
Leftist governments will have to address challenges such as those caused by social divisions and economic inequality. They will likely continue to focus on implementing their leftist discourse, particularly in the wake of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s death.
However, it is important to consider that neoliberal philosophies are also still pervasive in
many countries of Latin America. This is an advantage for the United States, giving it an

opportunity to push for further privatization, but Latin American leftist movements should evaluate themselves and take actions to if they are to avoid a return of neoliberal policies of the
1990s.
¶
All that said, how can the United States improve its foreign policy towards Latin
America? There are many problems in the region that should be faced together. Accepting this reality is the beginning to improving relations.¶ Transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, and immigration problems are worth making joint efforts to resolve. The U.S. should encourage the strengthening of political and economic ties in the Americas as well as promoting compliance of international commitments as a sign of willingness to improve relations. There are many hemispheric conventions that provide the legal framework to
begin to work together against negative outcomes. An example is the Declaration on Security in the Americas signed by the countries of the hemisphere in 2003. This document describes the new concept of multidimensional security, and incorporates as new threats issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, environmental degradation, natural resource and food scarcity, and uncontrolled population growth and migration.
¶
The United States should take active part in establishing institutional networks through which policies can be coordinated, and through these promote the expansion of employment opportunities for the population, stimulate fair trade agreements, and encourage the protection of the hemisphere against drug trafficking and organized crime. These are all proposals that would certainly help
to create better relations between the states of the Western Hemisphere. Relations between the United States and Latin America are complex and changing. If they are based on
cooperation, with respect to the principles of self-determination and non-intervention, they can
become stronger. As such, the U.S. must be willing to re-evaluate its foreign policy and perspectives toward the rest of the Western Hemisphere.
– (Roger F. Noriega, Senior US State Department Official. Jose R.
Cardenas, correspondent for the American Enterprises Institute. December, 5 2012. http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-planfor-us-policy-in-the-americas/)//SDL
But by far the greatest threat to security and stability in the Americas is the narco-state that has taken root in Venezuela
under the unaccountable regime of Hugo Chávez.
This hostile regime is managed by
Cuba
’s security apparatus, funded by China, armed by Russia, and partnered with Iran, Hezbollah, and Colombian and Mexican narco-traffickers
.
¶
US law enforcement
and federal prosecutors have gathered
fresh, compelling evidence implicating senior Venezuelan officials
and Chávez himself in narcotics trafficking in collusion with Colombian terrorist groups.
Chávez has also forged an important strategic alliance with Iran
to allow it to evade international sanctions and carry its asymmetrical threat against the United States to the country’s doorstep. Even as the international community implements new financial sanctions to deny Teheran the means to sustain a uranium enrichment program, the regime has established dozens of shadowy commercial enterprises and banks ¶ in Venezuela to launder as much as $30 billion through its petro-economy.
¶ Certainly the drug kingpins managing Venezuela today have everything to lose when Chávez succumbs to cancer. Several ruthless, anti-United States governments have a stake in trying to engineer a chavista succession, even as the government struggles with an unsustainable fiscal situation, a collapsing economy, social polarization, and a public-security crisis. In short, within the next several years,
Venezuela will become a manmade disaster that will impact regional security and energy supply . America’s current policy of evading responsibility for the implosion in Venezuela is

untenable and dangerous .
¶
Every serious government in the Americas has a stake in addressing these issues before they become unmanageable. The crises in Central America and
Venezuela will require US leadership , intelligent diplomacy, and resources to organize an effective
¶
multilateral response.
[Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth
College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William
C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth
College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37,
No. 3, Pages 7-51, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107, GDI File ]
A core premise of deep engagement
is that it prevents
the emergence of a
far more dangerous
global security environment
. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action
. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of
John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive wartemptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?).
Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.
73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without theAmerican pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages— are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a
Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond
(e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s
Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.
What about the other parts of Eurasia where the U nited S tates ha s a substantial military presence
?
Regarding the Middle East
, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington
— notably
Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia
— might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas
. And concerning
East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced .
Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that
J apan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and
increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China
. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on itsparticular—and highly restrictive— assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences
, however, undermines that
core assumption
: states have preferences
not only for security but also for prestige, status, and
other aims, and they engage in trade-offs
among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security
not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals
. It follows that even states that are
relatively secure may
nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior
.
Empirical studies show that this is
indeed sometimes the case
. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity

preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage,
U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in
at least some of the world’s key regions
.
We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either
a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation , and the like
, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local
great powers to contain
(and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional
great power war
).
(July 2008. Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam Stubits, Woodrow
Wilson Center Reports on the Americas, “Iran In LatIn amerIca: threat or ‘axIs of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf)//SDL
Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities , there is concern throughout the region and in the United
States as to what role supportive countries like ¶ Venezuela might play in the advancement
and proliferation of nuclear ¶ technologies . Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has expressed
concern saying, “We are very worried and I can’t refrain from saying so,
¶ that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood . This is very serious, ¶ very worrying,” and with seemingly good
reason. In September 2009,
¶
“ Iran said it test-fired short-range missiles , just days after it
confirmed ¶ it is building a second uranium-enrichment facility.”20 Rodolfo Sanz,
¶
Venezuela’s minister of basic industries and mining has indicated that
¶
Venezuela “could have important
reserves of Uranium, ” and while he
¶ rejects allegations that Venezuela is supplying Iran’s nuclear program,
¶ he did confirm that “Iran is helping us with geophysical aerial probes
¶ and geochemical analyses.”21 In September 2009, Chávez announced an ¶ agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a
“ nuclear village ” with technological assistance from Iran .22
¶
Asked if Washington is worried,
Thomas Shannon, then the top
¶
State Department official for Latin America, responded, “What
worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links ¶ to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires,”
¶ concluding, “Past is prologue.”23 As far back as November 2007, the ¶ United States House of Representatives passed a resolution
“expressing ¶ concern about threats to the U.S. by deepening economic and security ¶ ties
between Iran and like-minded regimes in the Western Hemisphere, ¶ including Venezuela.”
The resolution had its base in “evidence that ¶ Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a designated
terrorist organization, raises millions from counterfeit products produced in the tri-border region of
¶
Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and growing efforts backed by Iran to ¶ foment
anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.”24 It is therefore no surprise that in 2008, the U.S.
Treasury Department accused the Chávez
¶ government of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah
¶ facilitators and fundraisers.” 25 In a hearing before the Senate Armed ¶ Services
Committee, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, then Commander ¶ of the U.S. Southern Command, testified that “We have seen… an i ncrease in a wide level of activity by the Iranian
government in this region .” He continued, “That is a concern principally because of the

connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of ¶ terrorism, and
Hezbollah .”26 It is relevant to note that at the printing of
¶ this publication, there is global controversy over Ahmadinejad’s nomination of Ahmad Vahidi as the minister of defense for
Iran. Vahidi is one
¶ of five Iranian officials wanted by Interpol to face charges in Argentina
¶ for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.27 Without providing any specifics, Stavridis also
¶ testified, “We have been seeing in Colombia a direct
connection between Hezbollah activity and narco-trafficking activity .”28 In October
¶
2008, following a two-year investigation, 36 suspects were arrested in
¶
Colombia on charges related to cocaine smuggling and money laundering. Gladys Sanchez, the lead investigator for the case said, “ The profits ¶ from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah . This is an example ¶ of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the
paramilitaries and terrorists .” 291717
(Steve Jones, US Foreign Policy on About News. “Does Chavez' Death Mean Better
Relations Between U.S. and Venezuela?” http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/Does-Chavez-Death-Mean-Better-
Relations-Between-U-s-And-Venezuela.htm)//SDL
While the U.S. State Department
isn't holding its collective breath, it would like to see better relations between the two
countries in the post-Chavez
era.
That would enable the U nited
S tates to leverage
Venezuela against Iran as it continues attempts to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons
.
¶
Venezuela and Iran became allies during the Chavez' tenure
, and Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela in 2012. The two countries signed various trade and financial agreements.
¶
The U.S. has deployed an array of sanctions against Iran. Venezuela's help could help strangle resources that support Iran's nuclear program
. According the the State Department, the U nited
S tates sanctioned Venezuela in 2011 for "delivering at least three cargoes of reformate, a blending component for gasoline, to Iran
between December 2010 and March 2011."
(10/8/2008, Curt, AP, “US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08-805146709_x.htm
)
¶ MIAMI —
There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks
, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
¶
Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support.
But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S.
¶
"The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the U nited
S tates," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst
.
"
The threats in this hemisphere are real.
We cannot ignore them." ¶ Added U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration operations chief Michael Braun: "It is not in our interest to let that potpourri of scum to come together."

(Michael Shifter, Vice President for Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue, “Why
Venezuela Matters,” http://nationalinterest.org/article/why-venezuela-matters-
2388?page=1)//SDL
For the United States,
Venezuela is not just another Latin American country in turmoil. It is
, after all, the fourth largest oil supplier
to the United States, accounting for 15 percent of its oil imports. Senior
US officials point to oil as the overriding interest in Venezuela
. In the wake of US military action in Iraq, and the tremendous uncertainty in the Middle East, one would think that Venezuela would acquire even greater urgency for the United States. Oil works both ways, however. Shrewdly, the Chavez government allows the oil to flow precisely to avoid antagonizing foreign operations and, especially, the United States. ¶ Oil aside, there are other key U.S. interests at play in Venezuela
, though these are less widely recognized.
Regional stability and security top the list.
The five countries that make up the Andean region of South America are particularly convulsed.
Continued chaos and escalating violence in Venezuela would not only inflict damage on the country itself, but could well undermine the ability of neighboring countries to achieve and maintain social peace.
¶ In this regard, Colombia deserves special mention.
The United States has long sought to bolster the Colombian government's efforts to extend state authority and control
. Since 1999,
Colombia has received some $2.5 billion in security aid from the United States
, making it the largest beneficiary outside of the Middle East.
Yet, there has been increasing violence on the Colombia/Venezuela border involving Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces - and even Venezuela's armed forces. Should the Venezuelan crisis become a military conflagration, the resulting instability would be detrimental to longstanding US policy objectives. The conditions are combustible, and the risks are growing
.
¶
More fundamentally,
Venezuela under Chavez potentially poses a challenge to U.S. policy objectives, leadership, and core values in this hemisphere
. Chavez has sought to build a counterweight to the United States on a range of key questions.
For example, he explicitly opposes US efforts to pursue a Free Trade Area of the Americas, an important goal for many of the hemisphere's elected governments. Venezuela, under Chavez, has enhanced its relationship with Cuba, hardly a friend of the United
States. And the Venezuelan government has maneuvered to counter the US position on the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, a critical body of the Organization of American States.
Rochlin ‘94 [James Francis, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan U. College, Discovering the
Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, 130-131, Wake Early
Bird File]
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the
Americas.
Perceptions of declining U.S. influence
in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, underdevelopment, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring
in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worstcase scenario, instability created by a regional war
, beginning in Central America and spreading
elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena
– a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s
Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and
perhaps even a hegemonic war
. This is one of the motivations which led
Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

– (James Pagano, contributing writing to the Truman Doctrine. March 18, 2013.
“Moving Venezuela to the Center,” http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuelato-the-center/)//SDL
After over a decade in power, Hugo Chavez is now dead, providing U.S. policy makers an opening to mend fences and steer Venezuela’s next president towards the center. With smart policy and a light touch, the United States can help Venezuela’s next president lead his country out of the mess that Chavez built.
¶
Chavez won the presidency in 1999 on a promise to
“sow” the oil wealth of Venezuela into its social program. Bolstered by record high oil prices,
Chavez spent billions on such programs. While millions of Venezuelans were able to obtain
healthcare and an education, the poorly designed programs left little money to reinvest in oil exploration; output in Venezuela declined threatening the longevity of all Chavez’s initiatives.
¶
Meanwhile, Chavez became an increasingly authoritarian leader, consolidating power in the executive. He blacklisted opposition figures, altered the constitution and unevenly enforced laws for personal benefit. By creating a steeply slanted playing field, Chavez was able to retain power.
¶
Venezuela’s next president will have to decide whether to reverse these trends, or continue the slide to outright authoritarianism. The United States can and should influence this decision.
¶
The United States must support the democratic process and engage the likely winner of April’s election, Chavez’s chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro. He will have a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a free-market democracy.
¶
The next president will face an extremely politicized Supreme Court and military and reforms are likely more palatable if made by Maduro. Changes to apportionment, food subsidies or tax rates coming from Enrique Capriles (the opposition candidate) could spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or worse, opposition from the military.
¶
What should the U.S. role be? It must work with its Latin American allies in the region, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently pressure Maduro into making the types of institutional and economic changes necessary for
Venezuela to prosper . Failure to do so could lead to the reemergence of authoritarianism in
Latin America, instability in world oil markets and serious regional security repercussions.

– (Charli Coon, JD and Senior Policy Analyst at Heritage, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM, September 25, 2001. http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em777.html)//SDL
Sufficient and reliable supplies of energy are essential for the nation's¶ military in times of peace, but they are especially so when it engages in¶ military action. For example, Greenwire reported on September 17 that the
¶
582,000 soldiers in the Persian Gulf War consumed 450,000 barrels of
¶ petroleum products each day. It takes eight times more oil to meet the¶ needs of each soldier today than it did during World War II. Further, the¶ Department of Defense accounts for about 80 percent of the U.S.¶ government's energy use, of which nearly 75 percent is for jet fuel. It is¶ essential that Washington pursue a diverse supply of oil to meet its¶ security needs.

(Associated Press Staff Writer, Newsmax. “Boehner: Urges Deeper
Engagement in Latin America,” http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/boehner-latin-americagop/2012/05/08/id/438420)//SDL
T he U.S. Congress' top Republican called
on Tuesday for deeper economic engagement with Latin
America as a bulwark against Iran's attempt to gain influence
in the region and the destabilizing effects of international drug cartels.
¶ "
The best defense against an expansion of Iranian influence in Latin
America
- and against the destructive aspirations of international criminals in the region - is for the United States to double down on a policy of direct engagement," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John
Boehner said at the State Department.
¶ "
We must be clear
that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere,"
Boehner said in a speech to the Council of Americas, which represents companies that do business in Latin America.

– (Juan Forero, Washington Post Foreign Service. “Venezuela’s Drug-Trafficking Role is Growing Fast, U.S. Report Says,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/18/AR2009071801785.html)//SDL
BOGOTA, Colombia, July 18 --
A report
for the U.S. Congress on drug smuggling through Venezuela concludes that corruption at high levels
of President Hugo Chávez's government and state aid to Colombia's drugtrafficking guerrillas have made Venezuela a major launching pad for cocaine
bound for the United
States and Europe.
¶ Since 1996, successive U.S. administrations have considered Venezuela a key drug-trafficking hub, the
Government Accountability Office report says. But now, it says, the amount of cocaine flowing into Venezuela from Colombia, Venezuela's neighbor and the world's top producer of the drug, has skyrocketed, going from an estimated 60 metric tons
in 2004 to 260 metric tons
in 2007. That amounted to
17 percent of all the cocaine produced
in the Andes in 2007.
¶
The report
, which was first reported by Spain's
El Pais newspaper Thursday and obtained by The Washington Post on Friday, represents U.S. officials' strongest condemnation yet of Venezuela's alleged role in drug trafficking
. It says
Venezuela has extended a "lifeline" to
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or
FARC, which
the United States estim ates has a hand in the trafficking of 60 percent of the cocaine
produced in Colombia.
¶ The report, scheduled to be made public in
Washington on Monday, drew an angry response from Chávez, whose government has repeatedly clashed with the United States.
Speaking to reporters in Bolivia on Friday, the populist leader characterized the report as a political tool used by the United States to besmirch his country. He also said the United States, as the world's top cocaine consumer, has no right to lecture Venezuela.
¶ "The
United States is the first narco-trafficking country," Chávez said, adding that Venezuela's geography -- particularly its rugged 1,300mile border with Colombia -- makes it vulnerable to traffickers. He also asserted that Venezuela had made important gains in the drug war since expelling U.S. counter-drug agents in 2005, a measure the GAO says made Venezuela more attractive to Colombian traffickers.
¶ "Venezuela has begun to hit narco-trafficking hard since the DEA left," Chávez said, referring to the Drug Enforcement
Administration. "The DEA is filled with drug traffickers."
¶
Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) commissioned the GAO study in February
2008, asking the nonpartisan agency to determine whether Venezuela was "in the process of becoming a narco-state, heavily dependent [on] and beholden to the international trade in illegal drugs." ¶
In a
statement about the
GAO report, Lugar
, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the findings "have heightened my concern that Venezuela's failure to cooperate with the United States on drug interdiction
is related to corruption in that country's government." He said the report underscores a need for a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Venezuela.
(Andreas E. Feldmann, Maiju Perala. Wiley online library. “Reassessing the
Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America,” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2004.tb00277.x/abstract)//SDL
Some guerrilla organizations have resorted to terrorism as a delib- ¶ erate strategy to attain
certain goals; principally, demoralizing security
¶ forces and undermining the ruling government’s legitimacy by exposing
¶ their incapacity to protect their citizens. Some guerrilla
groups are more ¶ inclined to use terrorism than others. In Latin America, for example,
¶ while groups such as El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti National Liberation
¶
Front (FMLN) very seldom engaged in terrorism, others, including Peru’s
¶
Sender0 Luminoso (Shining Path) and the

Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
¶ cionarias de Colombia (FARC), have used terrorism quite frequently
as ¶ part of their military strategy.
¶
The principal difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is
¶ the nature of the act itself, irrespective of the individual or organization
¶ that carries out the actions. States, state-sponsored groups, criminal
¶ organizations, guerrillas, and individuals all perpetrate terrorist acts.
¶
Laqueur asserts that while guerrilla operations are directed principally
¶ against the members of the enemy’s security and armed forces, as well
¶ as their infrastructure, particularly strategic installations, terrorist organ- ¶ izations are far less
discriminate in their choice of targets (1976, 404). In
¶ order to challenge their enemy, Laqueur says, terrorist groups generally ¶ conduct sporadic, highly visible attacks, normally directed against non- ¶ combatants. These attacks aim to create commotion among the popula- ¶ tion
and to weaken the power and legitimacy of government (Laqueur
¶
1987, 144-48, 1976, 400-4).
In short, guerrilla actions consist of warfare
¶ tactics used by a weaker side to inflict damage on its enemy. Terrorism,
¶ conversely, consists of deliberate, indiscriminate attacks on noncombat- ¶ ants to instill terror in the population and undermine the power of polit- ¶ ical authorities.
(Maria Osava, Associated Press Staff Writer, Other News. “Dependent on
Venezuela’s Oil Diplomacy,” http://www.other-news.info/2013/03/dependent-on-venezuelasoil-diplomacy/)//SDL
RIO DE JANEIRO, Mar 2013 (IPS) –
Venezuela’s economic challenges
, more than the uncertainty over who will succeed late president Hugo Chávez, could threaten the oil diplomacy he practiced in the region.
¶
Cuba is the most obvious example. Oil imports from Venezuela cover half of the country’s energy needs, and have made Venezuela the Caribbean island nation’s top trading partner.
¶ Cuba’s foreign trade grew fourfold between 2005 and 2011, to 8.3 billion dollars. And Venezuela’s share of the total increased from 23 percent in 2006 to
42 percent in 2011, according to an online article by Cuban economist Carmelo Mesa, who lives in the United States.
¶
Cuba’s growing dependence on Venezuela has raised fears of a repeat of the severe shortage
of essential goods, as well as frequent, lengthy blackouts, that Cuba suffered during the economic crisis of the 1990s triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European socialist bloc.
¶
Cuban economist
Pável Vidal, a professor at the Javeriana Pontifical University in Cali, Colombia,
said “Venezuela today represents around 20 percent of Cuba’s total trade in goods and services
, while the Soviet
Union represented 30 percent, and dependence was even stronger.”
¶ This means the actual risk is lower, although “ a decline, even a gradual one, in the links with Venezuela would spark a recession
,” he told IPS in an email exchange.
¶ He said an econometric projection indicates that a decline in Venezuela’s trade with Cuba could lead to a contraction of up to 10 percent of GDP
and a two to three year recession as a result of a drop in foreign revenue and investment, external financial restrictions, and more costly imports, without payment facilities for oil.
¶ A crisis of this kind would require “a complex and painful adjustment process
,”
Vidal said.
¶ But technological dependence is not as marked as it was with the Soviet Union, Cuba’s foreign trade has diversified, and
Cuba now has a strong tourism industry, which did not previously exist, as well as new instruments of macroeconomic regulation, he added.
¶
However, the country is not in a position to weather a new crisis, he stressed. “Public wage earners and pensioners paid for the adjustments made to survive the crisis of the 1990s, but they could not do so today, because their buying power is just 27 percent of what is was in 1989,” Vidal said.
¶ Furthermore, the state, pressured by “growing foreign debt,” cut social spending, as reflected in a decline in health and education services. Against that backdrop, the economist said, it would be difficult to identify
“who could shoulder the cost of a new crisis.” ¶ But researcher Carlos Alzugaray is confident that bilateral ties will remain strong, because “they have gradually been institutionalised, and they benefit both parties.” He also said “the opposition in Venezuela would not be so irresponsible as to destroy them,” in the unlikely event of an opposition triumph in the Apr. 14 presidential elections.
¶
While Cuba buys oil from Venezuela on preferential terms, it sends over 50,000 doctors, teachers, agronomists and sports coaches to Venezuela. The export of medical services, including some 30,000 physicians, is worth some 1.2 billion dollars a year.
¶
The sudden

return of so many people to Cuba would be another risk, but at the moment that is in the realm of pure speculation.
¶
According to
Cuban analysts, six years more of a Chavista government would be essential to allow Cuba to seek out new suppliers of oil on terms similar to those provided by Venezuela – possibly Angola or Algeria; make progress in developing its own oil industry; and expand on reforms that have already begun to be implemented.
¶
In Nicaragua, another country that has benefited from Venezuela’s oildiscount programme, drastic changes are not expected as a result of the 58-year-old Chávez’s death from cancer on Mar. 5 ¶
Oil supplies
, which since 2007 have been worth 500 million dollars a year, have enabled the
impoverished Central American country to stabilise its economy and turn around the fiscal deficit
, according to independent economist
Adolfo Acevedo.
¶
The country’s newfound economic fortitude, also achieved thanks to compliance with the recommendations of international financial bodies, would help Nicaragua withstand any change in Caracas, Acevedo told IPS.
¶ Venezuela provided 2.56 billion dollars in oil cooperation to Nicaragua between 2007 and June 2012, according to Nicaragua’s Central Bank.
¶ Both Bayardo
Arce, economic adviser to Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, and Venezuelan ambassador in Managua, José Arrúe, said that cooperation would not be affected because it was based on agreements that were reached before Chávez came to power in 1999.
¶
The San José agreement, under which Mexico and Venezuela jointly supplied oil on preferential terms to 11 Central American and
Caribbean nations, was signed in 1980, the diplomat noted.
¶ But Chávez drastically increased that development cooperation with the creation of Petrocaribe in 2005.
¶ Venezuela also planned to build a 6.6 billion dollar refinery in Nicaragua – plans that will have to be renegotiated with the winner of the Apr. 14 elections, who is expected to be acting President Nicolás Maduro.
¶
In Brazil, which does not depend on Venezuelan oil, economic problems in the neighbouring country would affect exports, which grew sixfold in the last 10 years, as well as the investments of transnational companies.
¶ Trade with Venezuela represents just 1.3 percent of Brazil’s foreign trade. But it is important because it is fast-growing and due to the trade surplus, which stood at 4.06 billion dollars last year and is only smaller than the country’s surplus with China, said Rubens Barbosa, a retired Brazilian ambassador who now presides over the São Paulo Industrial Federation’s Foreign Trade Council.
¶
Venezuela’s economic challenges could affect
Brazil’s interests
because Caracas “will have to adopt some measures” against the high inflation rate and hefty public debt, including unpopular ones like tax hikes and a gasoline price increase, Barbosa told IPS.
¶ But he said no economic collapse would occur in Venezuela as long as oil prices remained high.
¶ Barbosa said Brazilian construction companies were executing projects worth some 20 billion dollars in Venezuela.
¶
In comparison, he said, Caracas provides Cuba with a total of seven billion dollars a year in oil at discounted prices and financial aid.
¶ Economic interests link Brazil and Venezuela, above and beyond political considerations, neighbourly relations, the fact that they share the Amazon jungle, and the focus on regional integration, said another retired ambassador, Marcos Azambuja.
¶
Under Maduro, there would be a “more rational” government, with no disadvantages for Brazil, he said. “The Venezuelan economy is a sub-product of oil” and Caracas will be able to “continue to be reckless” without sinking its economy as long as a barrel of oil costs more than 100 dollars, Azambuja said.
¶ But Brazil has already suffered losses because of that “recklessness,” he said. He was referring to the Abreu e Lima refinery under construction in the northeast Brazilian state of Pernambuco, which is at least three years behind schedule and has cost eight times more than the initial projection.
¶ Part of the problem, he said, was due to the failure to comply with an agreement by Venezuelan state oil company
PDVSA, which was to provide 40 percent of the investment.
¶
The delays in construction of the refinery
, which is to be completed in 2016, has other costs for Brazil as well, which must import large quantities of gasoline and gasoil at high prices, even though it produces crude, which it exports at lower prices.