PACS 2500
Introduction to
Peace and Conflict Studies
Guy Burgess
Co-Director
Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado
UCB 580, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0580, (303) 492-1635
burgess@colorado.edu
Copyright © 2014 Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess
Scientific Change
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/02/10/feds-poised-to-withdraw-longstandingwarnings-about-dietary-cholesterol/
Conflict Insights: Saving Democracy
http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Diamond-26-1.pdf
Info Graphics
http://greatripoffmap.globalwitness.org/#!/
Colorado Oil Production
http://www.denverpost.com/data/ci_27519246/colorado-oil-andgas-wells-by-numbers
Overlay Problems:
Communication
Escalation
Communication
Relationships
Collaboration
Core
Communication Matrix

What do we say
about them?

What do they say
about themselves?

What do we say
about ourselves?

What do they they
about us?
Source: Truman National Security Project
Political Communication


http://www.trumanproject.org/
Trying to play hard ball” politics and
do the right thing (from their
perspective)
Words, Voice, Visuals?
Words
Voice
Visuals
Source: Truman National Security Project
Projecting Strength





Stand up straight
Extend your arms way over your head
Lower them but maintain your head and
shoulder position
Cultivate a military, “at ease” position
(standing at attention is too stiff)
Pretend you’re holding a ball (golf ball to
giant pilates ball)

Palms up (palms forward indicates
submission)
Source: Truman National Security Project
Projecting Strength





Stand up straight
Extend your arms way over your head
Lower them but maintain your head and
shoulder position
Cultivate a military, “at ease” position
(standing at attention is too stiff)
Pretend you’re holding a ball (golf ball to
giant pilates ball)

Palms up (palms forward indicates
submission)
Source: Truman National Security Project
Projecting Warmth

Focus on the smile

Must be genuine




Only good actors / actresses can fake it
Exploits mirror neurons
70% of congressional winners can be
predicted by visuals
Can’t be a submissive smile


Raised eyebrows
Eyes must be “steely”
Source: Truman National Security Project
Wesley Clarke
Tricks: Misdirection Ploy
David Copperfield
Tricks: “Hobbes,” “Who Me?” Ploy




Innuendo – “He’s not a Muslim, as far as I know”
Surrogates
Anonymous accusers – “People say …”
Free lancers
Tricks: “Everybody Does It” Ploy





Devise and implement a Machiavellian plan.
Implement it in a big way.
Find some way to accuse the other side doing
something similar (even though it may be minor)
Invoke the “can’t play hardball” defense
Last minute variation: Act when the opponent has no
time to respond (like just before the election)
Overlay Problems:
Relationships
Escalation
Relationships
Communication
Collaboration
Core
Guiding Principle: Compassion
Karen Armstrong
“That which is hurtful to you, do not do to others.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCG4qryy1Dg
Unrightable Wrongs
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/18/why-fight-against-isis-failing
Meeker / Sand Creek Massacres
The Meeting Place

Justice


Truth


Acknowledge the guilt, build a common
history
Peace


Punish those that committed “unrightable”,
“unspeakable” wrongs
Stop the fighting and killing (even if it
means letting people “get away with it”)
Mercy

Stop the hate with forgiveness
Lederach
Trade-Offs
Visioning

Justice


Truth


Stop the fighting and killing (even if it
means letting people “get away with it”)
Mercy


Acknowledge the guilt, build a common
history
Peace


Punish those that committed “unrightable”,
“unspeakable” wrongs
Stop the hate with forgiveness
Future Vision

Imagining a positive future vision and a fair
relationship
Elise
Boulding
Overlay Problems:
Collaboration
Escalation
Relationships
Communication
Collaboration
Core
Getting to Yes – Fisher and Ury
Interests / Positions

Positions = initial demands
what you want
 “Let me have the orange”
 “Drill baby drill”

Interests = the real reasons behind your
positions (may be unconscious)



Eat the fruit, use the skin for a geometry project
Continue to be able to do the things that need
energy, limit pollution, preserve vitality of energy
companies
Interest-based framing lets you identify and
pursue options for mutual gain


Split orange between skin and fruit
Comprehensive energy plan with conservation,
alternative/conventional energy
The Position Trap
Interests? / Positions?
Leaders? Grassroots citizens?
Positional Political Framing
Interest-based Strategy
Park Service / Climber Negotiation
Interest-based (or Integrative)
Bargaining




Separate people from
the problem
Focus on interests
Generate options
Use objective criteria

Based on fairness
principles
Coalition Building Applications
Works within ZOPA
Party A
Winning
Outcomes
ZOPA Party B
Winning
Outcomes
Zone of Possible Agreement
Initial Situation
Zero-Sum / Draw-Draw
Positive-Sum / Win-Win
Negative-Sum / Lose-Lose (equally)
Zero-Sum / Win-Lose
Negative-Sum / Win-Lose
Positive-Sum / Win-Lose
Positive-Sum Game (e.g. hybrid car wind energy storage)
Win-Win
Win-Lose
Party
Year 1 Bdgt
Year 2 Bdgt
Year 2 Bdgt
A
20
25
15
B
10
15
10
C
20
25
20
D
50
55
75
Total
100
120
120
Zero-Sum Game (e.g. steady state budget)
Draw-Draw
Win-Lose
Party
Year 1 Bdgt
Year 2 Bdgt
Year 2 Bdgt
A
20
20
15
B
10
10
10
C
20
20
15
D
50
50
60
Total
100
100
100
Negative-Sum Game (e.g. Budget Cuts)
Lose-Lose
Win-Lose
Party
Year 1 Bdgt
Year 2 Bdgt
Year 2 Bdgt
A
20
15
10
B
10
5
5
C
20
15
10
D
50
45
55
Total
100
80
100
Hard, Soft, Principled Negotiation I
Problem
Positional Bargaining:
which Game Should You Play?
Solution
Change the GameNegotiate on the Merits
Soft
Hard
Principled
Participants are friends
Participants are
adversaries
Participants are
problem-solvers
The goal is agreement
The goal is victory
The goal is a wise
outcome reached
efficiently and amicably
Make concessions to
cultivate the
relationship
Demand concessions
as a condition of the
relationship
Separate the people
from the problem
Be soft on the people
and the problem
Be hard on the people
and the problem
Be soft on the people,
hard on the problem
Hard, Soft, Principled Negotiation II
Soft
Hard
Principled
Trust others
Distrust others
Proceed independent
of others
Change your position
easily
Dig into your position
Focus on interests, not
positions
Make offers
Make threats
Explore interests
Disclose your bottom
line
Mislead as your bottom
line
Avoid having a bottom
line
Accept one-sided
losses to reach
agreement
Demand one-sided
gains as the price of
agreement
Invest options for
mutual gain
Search for the single
answer: the one they
will accept
Search for the single
answer: the one you
will accept
Develop multiple
options to choose from;
decide later
Insist on agreement
Insist on your position
Insist on using
objective criteria
Hard, Soft, Principled Negotiation III
Soft
Hard
Principled
Try to avoid a contest
of will
Try to win a contest of
will
Try to reach a result
based on standards of
independent will
Yield to pressure
Apply pressure
Reason and be open to
reasons; yield to
principle, not pressure
Source: Getting to Yes
Distributive vs. Integrative Bargaining
Trade-Offs vs. Mutual Gain
Bargaining Chips
Lack of Negotiation Channels
The problem:
 The parties have no
mechanism for exploring
their respective interests
and opportunities for
mutually beneficial
agreement
Options for making things better:
 Convening, facilitation,
and, perhaps, mediation
services
 Institutionalized, standby
negotiation forums
The Double Cross Problem
The problem:
 Unwillingness to accept
mutually beneficial
agreements because of the
fear of being “doublecrossed”
 The “prisoner’s dilemma”
Options for making things better:
 Guarantees, verification,
action-forcing mechanisms
“Trust, but verify”
Illusion of “Winner-Take-All” Victory
The problem:
 People who see governance
as a “winner-take-all” game in
which the goal is to totally
defeat (rather than reach an
accommodation with) an
adversary.
Options for making things better:
 Realistic assessment of
transaction costs and risks of
defeat
 Moral challenge to “winnertake-all” mindset
The #1 “Getting to Yes” Critique
 Interest-based bargainers are vulnerable
to attack and exploitation by hard
bargainers
 Especially, those motivated by ruthless,
Machiavellian ethics.
Getting Past No: Strategies for Negotiating with
Difficult People
 Don’t React (Don’t Contribute to
Escalation)
 Disarm Your Opponent (Start to Deescalate the Conflict)
 Change the Game (To Interests From
Positions)
 Make It Easy to Say Yes (Let
Opponents “Save Face” and Appear to
Win Something Important)
 Make It Hard to Say No (Force
Opponents to Give Up something to
Say No)
Source: William Ury, Getting Past No: Strategies for Negotiating With Difficult
People, Bantam Books, New York, 1991.
Into the Sea
Rule or Die
Core Issues
Distributional
Moral
Status
Identity
Overlays
Three Faces of Power
Forcing Power – You do
something I want her I will do
something that you do not want.
Exchange Power – You do
something that I want and I will do
something that you want.
Persuasive Power – You do
something that I want because it’s
the right thing to do.
Goal:
Most Powerful Power Strategy Mix
Optimal
Power
Distribution
Persuadables
Forcing
Power
Reluctant
Persuadables
Traders Incorrigibles
Trading Power
Column Size Indicates Relative Population Size
Persuasive Power
Backlash
Power Strategy Mix
Excessive force
leads to a
“Backlash
Effect”
which leads to
continuing,
intense conflict
Persuadables
Forcing
Power
Reluctant
Persuadables
Traders Incorrigibles
Trading Power
Column Size Indicates Relative Population Size
Persuasive Power
Backlash Effect / Coefficient
The number of "new enemies" created in the process of
defeating an "old enemy”
"Force Works" Backlash Coefficient
Backlash coefficient = .33
"Force Doesn't Work" Backlash Coef.
Carrots not Sticks
The Case of ISIS
Backlash
Unrightable
Wrongs
Force
Escalation
Identity
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ris
e-of-isis/
Crane Brinton
The Case of ISIS
Iraq Population
 Shia
 Sunni
 Kurd
Saddam Hussein
Nouri al'Maliki
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ris
e-of-isis/
Extra Slides
Power Options / Disputing Arena I





Moral arguments designed to persuade
people to voluntarily change their
behavior
Appeals to administrative discretion
Efforts to influence "rulemaking"
processes
Legal challenges based on alleged
violations of settled law
Negotiation based on the fact that it is
less costly than power contests and
achieves the same result
Power Options / Disputing Arena II





Litigation as part of an effort to set a new
legal precedent
Lobbying efforts designed to change the
law
Electoral efforts designed to change the
makeup of legislative bodies
Public education programs to lay the
groundwork for a electoral campaign
Economic power and financial
resources to take action in the private
sector
Power Options / Disputing Arena III




Attempt to exert illegal or unethical
influence on political leaders (e.g.
bribes)
Defy political authorities through acts of
civil disobedience or covert lawbreaking
Violent resistance and intimidation
State-sponsored military threats and, if
necessary, action
Political Power Principles


Power contests that are lower on the
power hierarchy tend to be cheaper
People tend to use the power option
with which they have expertise


Hammer’s Law – “to a hammer, all the
world is a nail”
The incentive is to avoid options where
you are weak and pursue options where
you are strong

Your opponent will do the same
Constructive/Legitimate vs.
Destructive/Illegitimate Power Contests
Legitimate Power Options
Illegitimate Power Options
Administrative Appeals
Bribes (Legal/Illegal)
Rights-Based Litigation
Loophole Litigation
“Hot Button” Propaganda”
Principled Campaigns
Democratic Elections
Secret Police
Nonviolent Action
Terrorism
Conquest/Invasion
Military Defense
Invisible Hand
Invisible Fist (Monopoly)
BATNA
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
On what basis do you decide
whether or not to accept a
negotiated agreement?
BATNA
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
Conclusion of a
Negotiation
Process
Administrative appeal
Legal challenge
Political lobbying
Are there any
power contest
alternatives that
are likely to give
me a better
deal?
Electoral campaigns
Public persuasion
Economic action
Civil disobedience
Accept
Agreement
Military action
Etc,
BATNA Limit / Ripeness
Conclusion of a
Negotiation
Process
Administrative appeal
Conclusion of a
Negotiation
Process
Legal challenge
Are there any
power contest
alternatives that
are likely to give
me a better
deal?
Political lobbying
Electoral campaigns
Public persuasion
Are there any
power contest
alternatives that
are likely to give
me a better
deal?
Economic action
Accept
Agreement
Civil disobedience
Military action
Etc,
Accept
Agreement
BATNA Limit / Ripeness
Conclusion of a
Negotiation
Process
Conclusion of a
Negotiation
Process
Are there any
power contest
alternatives that
are likely to give
me a better
deal?
Are there any
power contest
alternatives that
are likely to give
me a better
deal?
WIN Ballot Initiative WIN
Power
Contest
Shortcut
Accept
Agreement
Bitter End Path
Accept
Agreement
BATNA Limit / Ripeness
Conclusion of a
Negotiation
Process
Conclusion of a
Negotiation
Process
Are there any
power contest
alternatives that
are likely to give
me a better
deal?
Are there any
power contest
alternatives that
are likely to give
me a better
deal?
WIN Ballot Initiative LOSE
Power
Contest
Shortcut
Accept
Agreement
Bitter End Path
Accept
Agreement